

Residence - T. A. Hongo, Swaziland

155

C5522


No61 Robinson to Knutsford 18/7/88 p100 and Enclsorues

/On the subject of the Transvaal's neutrality. Transvaal say that they have given orders for it to be preserved and border guards have been placed (16/7/) Bulwer reported on 14/7 that Chief Deda with 500 men belonging to himself and ~~Sitab~~ Sitambi who live in the Tvl between the Pongolo and Swaziland and pay tax to the Tvl have joined D. /

GH 712 Z423

Rathbone to Osborn 2/7/88 Swaziland. /Informs him that Ferera* has just returned from D's camp where he was eyewitness to the clash when the two dragons were killed.. Sotabmis mand and some Deda's are also assisting D They live in the Tvl between the Pongla and Swaziland and can muster about 500 men well armed.

Minutes "It is certain that both the chiefs Deda and ~~Sitab~~ Sitambo with their people are with Dinuzulu at Ceza. Sitabmi's people took part with Dinuzulu at Ceza on the 2nd June. It does not appear when the Transvaal took the steps stated to preserve neutrality. If they were taken before these chiefs came into Zululand then their insufficiency is clear. The Transvaal Government mention no contemplated steps by them in regard to the proceeding of their subjects complained of by T.E viz: that Deda with five hundred men had joined Dinuzulu in Zululand. The issue of the neutrality proclamation will have no effect whatever on the nations, as they are not likely to hear of it, and, even if they did, they would simply disregard it, unless it be enforced by tangible measures." MO Eshewe 25/7



Resistance - military plans

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C5522

No54 Havelock to Knutsford 4/7/88 p93

~~/Lt Genl Smyth arrived at Durban on 26/6 and 26/6 from Zululand reported that another regiment of infantry, a native contingent, and that all future military operation should be in the hands of of the military authorities assisted by the advice of the civil authorities. Smth said that he could not be responsible for present security unless reinforcements were furnished and the Royal Scots have been despatched from Cape Town. This will be~~

reinforce
 He arrive on 5/7 and will bring the regular forces in Zululand to now at 1200 men. /94/ Once I had ascertained that to have all future operations in the hands of the military did not mean the proclamation of martial law ~~in~~ which I feel is unnecessary I concurred and ordered the Res to place the Basuto's and levies under the General's orders. It was agreed that the police and Native Chiefs should be under the military.

the defeat of Z and the withdrawal of the pst from 'vina has as expected led to difficulties, together with the difficulties in collecting levies.

Blubi's Basuto's are worried as their Chief and followers are away and they fear the Zulu will plunder them. "Some allowance must be made for the suspicion of one another to which uncivilized races are especially prone." /I have order 50 stand of arms and ammo to be taken to them and the Ass Comm to organise a small force./

In the Lower Umfolozi district, the Ass Comm Mr Pretorius reports that the natives are under arms and have adopted a threatening attitude.

With the 40 Zululand police and three hundred friendlies he has thrown up a small fort and on 30/6 a large body of natives came within 500 yards of this and tried to take cattle. Shots were exchanged and the marauders

withdrew. Res Mag Mr Saunders at Eshowe over 50 miles away has tried to raise a levy from Dunn's location to go with him to Pretorius' assistance without success. Have asked Genel to send escort and ammo. A troops of regulars have been sent to Eshowe ~~tax~~ because of the state of the Umfolosi district. I feel O's is needed at Ehsoer and have directed him to return Addison and Mansel will represent the civil authority at Nkongeni, and accompany any movement against D _/

Resistance - Louis Mylin

C5522

No37 Havelock to Knutsford Teleg undated received 9/7/88

"In consequence of defeat of Usbiebu, and withdrawal of police magistracy at vuna 23rd June, disturbances have become serious. Natives of coast district to the north of former Native Reserve Territory, through fear of Dinuzulu, have taken part in rebellion. Attack upon magistracy of district threatened. Troops and native contingent gave assistance to-day. Am confident that forces now in Zululand are sufficient for restoration of good order unless any unexpected complications arise. It is believed ~~that~~ that affair at Hlopekulu will have produced good effect. /Govt of N Rep remain friendly altho there are a few freebooters with D local newspaper reports exaggerated./

CO 427/2 13529

Minutes seen Draft reply to Hav 13/7/88 "I have been asked whether military operations in Zululand are under complete control of General Smyth I have answered in the affirmative adding that ^{chapter two} Colonial rules of course complied with and conclude that you are in full communication with General telegraph reply.

14135

Hav to Knutsford Teleg confidential (printed copy) 14/7/88

"military operations are under complete control of General, in accordance with Chapter 2, Colonial Rules and Regulations, which I have carefully considered and strictly complied with. I am in full communication with the

Lieuteneant-General, and in acocrd with him except as to gravity of situation, of which I consider he takes an exaggerated view, and as to means of paying additionla auxiliary force he wishes to raise. He appears to contemplate their payment from Colonial funds, I haveinformed him that it is out of my power to accept responsiblity for their payment from such fundd."

Minutes "Send Copy to WO requesting that it may be laid as sson as possible boefer Mr Stanhope with an exression of Lord Knutsford's opinion that it is desiravle to authrosie Gen Smyth by telegraph to repay /refray?/ from military funds the cost of such ausiliary force as he thinks necessary. Say that Sir A Havelock is correct in stating that it is not in his power to pay or guarantee payment for this service from Natal Funds. Zululand i s not a party of the Colony of Natal, and its revuenes which are very small, are separately adminstered under the sup ervision of the Treasury. The cost of the ausiliary force must therefore equally with that of the regular force, be met from Army vot4s, and Lor Knutsofrd thinks it important that any dealy which may exist in consequence of the inability of the General to pay the auxiliaries he requeires whould be terminated as speedily as possible." /Herver 14/7
Letter to WO on 14/7/88 in this light.

2-7-88

CO 427/2

15382

Hav to ~~Knut~~ ^{Knut} 2/7/88 C5522/51

Minutes "This is merely formal notice by Mr. Osborn to the NR calling on the latter to see to its frontier, & enforce neutrality. The State Secretary made a proper reply" / "Today's times shows / "that the Transvaal officials will have arrived on the spot, and they will no doubt behave properly in such a matter, as far as they can." S W 31/7

3-7-88

10382
Mumbreen

Remane - Hlopekulu

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C5522

No 66 Havelock to Knutsoford 16/7/88 pl03

/Ref to no 53 gives reports on the attack on Tshignana on 3/7. ~~command~~
commends the Zulu Police / "An easy and inexpensive means of increasing
the strength of the government in Zululand is thus indicated"

Encl ~~Zukomex~~ Addiosn to Osborn 5/7/88 pl03

/On 2/7 I accompnied the Zululand Polcie supported by HM troops and levies
to apprehend Thsingana and disperse his following at the Hlopekulu

Mountain Arrived there about 12 noon and could see armed natives wathich
us from the top. Despatched the Eshowe contingent to the east of the
mountain, Umyamana's people to the south, and the Polcie and the Basutos
advanced supported by troops and a position was taken on hight ground
overlookng the gorges in which the suthu had placed their women, children
and cattle / "and from which they were fully prepared to resisit. "

/hen the ~~polcie~~ police and Basuto gained the high gound firish commenced and
the enemy engated. After 10 minutes the enemy's fire was silenced and Osb
and the mounted police ascnded to a high point and they were fired upon
and lost a man and after two attmepts to dislodge the enemy Mansel moved
the foot polcie in their support and carried the position by bayonet
with heavy losses to the enemey who were pused down a deep kloof where the
polcie and levies inflected further losses. he levies were repulised at first
but then rallied and routed the suthus killing many and r outing the rest
out of caves and hoels. Firing lasted till sunset when the force was
withdrawn and they brought 5-700 head with them. Reports loss of Lt Briscoe
Mr Trent three Zululand Polcie, two mounted Basuto and about 55 levies

The 'suthu evacuated the hill on the night of 2/7

Enc2 John L Knight 7/7/88 p104

/ Confused account by Knight who didn't get the right messages, and did make any contact with the attacking force "I would remark that I was at all impressed with the manner in which the native levies worked, and would advise your Honour not to place too much confidence in them.

I have not had occasion to doubt their loyalty; but there appears to be a lack of energy or spirit about their movements quite unusual to natives when banded together for the purposes of war.

Since writing the above I have ascertained from fugitives that the rebels at Hlopekulu were quite unprepared for the reconnaissance from N'Konjeni; that they were on the look-out for an attack from this side, and were lying in wait in the thorns on the south bank of the river, from whence they had to be brought up hurriedly on the approach of the forces from N'Konjeni."

Enc3 Mansel to Osborn 6/7/88 p106

Left Nkonjeni at 7 a.m. Details much as given by Addison. Osb when he had gained the height asked if he could remove 'suthu from a koppie 1200 yards away whose fire was worrying him - they were driven back twice so I moved in infantry. They advance through heavy fire safely. / "When we arrived within 40 yards of the kopie* we came into sight again, so I at once gave the order to charge, which order the men obeyed with the greatest alacrity; cheering loudly, they rushed in with the bayonet and carried the kopie in a most gallant manner, the 'suthus rushing out one side as we rushed in on the other. They then took up a position among some rocks further back, but the police rushing on fairly got among them, and drove them out of the rocks with heavy loss,

Mansel's report continued

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From this point we got sight of a great number of cattle in the valley below. My men then fairly go out of hand, and rushed down pell mell into the valley with the sutus who had been driven out of the rocks. /In the valley there was depsearate fighting hand to hadn/ "our men did not seem to use their bayonets much, but picied up the assegais that had been dropped by the sutus and fought with them. Usuthu fought with courage but lost about 200.

Praises his men/ "Nothing could haveexceeded their courage ~~and~~ or dash" and Stabb addressed them in most ~~flattering~~ manner./

" The smallness of the loss of the police /3 killed/ I consider to be most wonderful under the circumstances, and attribute it to the severity of their fire, and to the sutus being only very partially aremd with guns, and thdse mostly being muzzle loaders."

/Genl losses heavy. Ehsowe contingent 45 killed. Zibhebhu 16 killed Basutos 2 Mnyamana ~~xxx~~ lost heavily.

Enc4 Osborn to Havelock Ehsowe 11/7/88 p107

GH 212
/Nothing much new. although it is a much clearer statement. Froce consisted of Polcie under Mansel, Basutos undr Maj Mc^Kean, Eshowe lievies and Mnyamanaa's men under ~~Induan~~ their induans and Europeans appointed by me plus MH troops and Addison the force was stated to have started on the night of 29/6 ~~but the lievies~~ but a report was heard that Thsingana and ~~folloing~~ had left Then fog delayed and the norning of the second the force proceeded to apprehend Thsingana on the Mag's warrant. to dispersed his armed follwoing and to seize the catt~~le~~ most of them stolen byx 100 0 head were captured but $\frac{1}{3}$ of those were lost again. Thsingana excpated on foot to the New Rep from Eshowe Levies were under Chief Yamela and rendered good service losing 40.

Mnyamana's men were satisfactory under their European leaders and they beat off the suthu that advanced on them / "The Chief Somhlolo, who, with a portion of his tribe, had joined Tshingana, happened to be encamped a short distance south-east of from Hlopekulu; this circumstance enabled him to make good his escape / and he is reported at the Hluhulwe River /

CO 427/2 16382 Minutes seen

/ A portion of this despatch was consigned. Taken here. It comes in Enc 2 J Knights report of 7/7/88 p 104 In C5522/66 between

"Us to do anything...and...At 'am at the bottom of the page /

"On receipt of this last letter from Your Honour, Col. Froom intimated to me his intention of at once returning to Camp, giving as his reason for doing so, that he had come to the end of his rations, and suggesting that I should take the Native Levies home for the purpose of rationing them as well. I may here mention that there was no need for this as there were a number of deserted Ustu kraals about, overflowing with grain, on which the Levies had been living since their arrival, and on which they could have subsisted for several days longer. / / I mentioned this to Colonel Froom; but as he insisted upon returning to camp, there was no alternative for me but to do the same, or remain out alone with the Levies, I therefore, decided to return with the Basutos and one Levy (under Mr Alister) and leave the other under Markhan to return next morning, the men being tired. This was carried out, and I reached home at dusk that evening."

Nkoneni 17/6/88

/Tshingana has taken up a strong position from which he is territorising the neighbouring people, and his messengers with D are spreading the story that a decided victory has been gained over the English and when they retire he will come down and murder every loyalist. the messengers add that even if D is not successful they have nothing to fear as the English would permit them to remain in their kraals.

We could not advance on Ceza leaving this danger in our rear and it would also expose the whole district to be raided by Tshignana. Hlopekulu is approachable on the north side only by mounted men, but the south side is so rough and thick with bush that operations are impossible. the whole position will have to be surrounded and the levies employed on the south side while the police and Basuto's advance from the north. both should advance simultaneously and be supported by Imperial troops.

the Ceza would be approached. A laager would be established at the Insubazi kraal at Peter Louw's ~~kr~~ store four miles from Ceza and the Bush in Zululand is only 400 yards broad and two miles long. This should be surrounded, searched by rifle and shell fire and levies ordered to clear it

this however all depends on the attitude of the New Republic and when Tshingana is dispersed and when the levies arrive.

"Dinuzulu and his agents appear to be working on a cleverly concerted plan. by their intrigues the Inkandhla district is kept in such a state of unrest that Sujunguza's tribe, which afforded the most reliable contingent in the disturbance of 1884, cannot be called up, its presence being required in its present position; in Entonjaneni district armed men are in the valley of the Umlatozi and so far render the roads unsafe that waggon-drivers are requiring escorts to bring up supplies to the troops, whilst Tshignana is openly raiding the loyal natives in this neighborhood.

Z is being harried in the Ivuna district
seemingly to ~~ix~~ stop him from helping _/

It may be out of my province in alluding
here to circumstances with which you are far
more intimate than I can be, but I do so as it
seems to me certain, from recent acts, that the
measure of success which has already attended
the endeavours of Cinuzulu and his friends to
hamper the action of the Government will
encourage them to proceed further in the
same action "

each section.

According to the report of the
Director of the Division of the
Department of the Interior,
the following is a list of the
names of the persons who have
been identified as having been
in contact with the persons
mentioned in the report of the
Director of the Division of the
Department of the Interior.

3-7-88

Hlopekulu

15)

C5522

No75 War Office to Colonial Office 28/8/88 pl20

The official report on the attack on Hlopekulu/ XEROX



3-7-88

Readline - Hlopekulu

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C5522

No36 Havelock to Knutsford Teleg 3/7/88 p57

"Tshingana having collected insurgent bands at Hlopekulu, near White Umvolosi river, has been raiding and plundering loyal natives, it became necessary to dislodge him before advance to Ceza. 2nd July, police with native and Basuto levies, with support of troops, advanced to Hlopekulu, found usutus in strong position, from which they at once opened fire, Usutus dispersed, with heavy loss, after six hours fighting. About 1,000 cattle captured. [Two regulars three police and Basutos killed. 8 Basutos wounded. Losses among levies not ascertained. Tshingana escaped.]

3-7-88

CO 427/2

16001

"This graphic account ought to go the W.O." /and might be printed for Parliament - but higher officials veto this

Hav to Knut private .2/7/88

"Lord Knutsford wishes this registered. He recieved it in a private letter from Sir A. Havelock

"A count of Attack on Tshingaana's * Stronghold. Hlopekulu. July wnd 1888.

We left Nkongeni on a lovely morning at 7 a.m. with a force of about 200 mounted regulars, 180 mounted Basutos, 100 Zululand Police and a native levy numbering about 2000, the whole under the personal command of Colonel Stabb - Mr Addison accompanied as Magistrate and Usibepu to give information from his knowledge of the country. There was delay in getting off owing to the usual difficulty in turning out the native levies. We marched across the plain of Ulundi; past the old battle field, to the Hlopekulu hill, keeping the force well together and arriving a little before 12 o'clock - our route had been about 12 miles across an open, but a hilly, broken country, along paths intercepted with swamps and many dongas or deep gulleys....

On arrival at the hill we saw some Usutu scouts on the ridge, and a few running away from a kraal, also a body of about 60 watching us from the top of the range, the questions asked were will they fight, surrender, or run away? On asking Usibepu he told me that he thought they would get into their strongholds and fight - Colonel Stabb at once made his dispositions for an attack, sending the Eshowe levy to surround the East of the hill and Myamana's men to the west. It was intended to keep 1/3 of the Eshowe levy to assist in our frontal attack, but all with the exception of about 50 rushed

away with their won men and could not be recalled in spite of the endeavours of their European leader Mr. Gillink. At this time a messenger arrived with heliograph from Colonel Errom, saying that he would be able to cooperate with his Entonjenannei force, comprising Knights levies, at 3 pm, but that he could not bring the artillery. The levies having got a good start, Capt Mansel and Mr. John Osbron with the plicie and Major McKean with the Basutos were ordered to take the ridge A some mounted infantry under Lietu Marwood being placed B about 800 yeads and Basutos simultaneously rushed up the sttep slopes, and took the ridge without opposition, some Usutus however fored on them from the bush below, and they immediately replied with a very heavy fire. Riding up we found little return fire from the enemy, who were evidently scattered in th thick bush and only occasionally visible singly. At this moment we preceived Lt Briscoe ride up to the ednge of the bush, which was lined by Basutos lying down, and peer in. He was immediately shot through the head not 20 ywards from us. I held McKean and Brooke's horses whilst they dragged him a short way down the hill but found him quite dead - when shot we did not know who he was, or why there, buy believe* that he was coming with a messate to Colonel Stabb, or meant taking the ragne, and fancying no dagner looked into the bush. He must have been shot by an Usutu lying close to him, and with some large bore weapon for it was a terrible wound.

Captain Breton with a Troops of Dragons wnow took the commanding height on East (C) without opposition, and thepolice andBasutos continued to pur into the bush a feavy fire from (A) As there was scarcely any return fire, and the Basutos were firing wildly wasting ammunitionx Col. Stabb ordered a cessation of all firing. Upon this anative with some said a voice like Tshingaaa's shoured from the bush close below us, that they

Froom with dragons and Knights levy had belopgarhed about 3 pm ~~that~~ from 6 miles the other side of the Umfolosi saying the groun was rough should they push on, they were told to do so but arrived too late. Force then moved to place where attack was commenced and suqre was made with the ead and wounded in the centre. The night was most umcoforable. Our losses were Briscoe, two plice, one Basuto and it is said about 60 of the lvevy. J Osborn had a slight graze and one of the police as severl wounded. Tshignana was estimated to have lost nearly 300/ "Most of yye fighting was done in the thick bush by the native levies, when we had cleared the sutus from the gop and driven them down. Tshignana's men were evdiency scattered all over the bush, and all around for se veral miles so that it was impossible to xtimate their numbers; their caves and kraals were looted but on the adivce of Mr. Addison their kraals were not burnt as hiterto in their rading parties they have respected the kraals of our friendly natives. "

/General praise all around expecially to the Nonqgai - the natives levies were useful and although they wavered were giving confidence by the troops Encmey had few guns mostly odl muzzle loaders. Absurd to think that there were whites with them. Started march~~ing~~ back on 2/7 Kevin~~xxxx~~ M Next day passed the levies driving cattle sheep and goats and many prisoners including some of Tshigana's own wives and much of his his own personal propeerty and nearly all with huge peices of veef. MrTreant, camp buther and volunteer native lvy leader died of heart attack during the night. About 800 head of cattle driven into Nkonjnei/

、 J Watkins Yardley Capt ADC

Force

Stabb, Maj Gordon Capt Yardley Lt Brooker, Surgeon Robinson.

130 Inniskilling Dragoons

Capt Pennefather, Capts Grey and Breton, Lts Bramley Cos & Herbert.

60 mounted infantry

64th and 27th Regts

Capt Prudon

Lt Briscoe and "arwood

200 mounted Basutos

Major McKean

100 Zulu police

"ansel and Osborn


30 mounted.

2000 "native levy

Eshowe levy

Mnyamanas levy

"Usibepu?"



had had enough of it, Col. Stabb immediately replied by an interpreter, that if he would come out his life would be spared, but he said that he was frightened; upon this one of the native levy said that he knew them, and volunteering to go down, started. At the same time some other Usutus well away in the bush on our right, opened fire on us, and wounded two of the Basutos, who immediately returned the fire, and of course all further parleying was impossible. The Eshowe levy had now crossed the Umvolosi, and marching up the opposite bank, were recrossing and entering the bush below us, ~~where~~ where we could see that they were soon engaged. Mnymanana's levy having gone a long way round to the west of the hill, were not yet visible. We had now been engaged in desultory firing for about 2½ hours, and apparently succeeded in scattering and frightening the enemy from the bush below. Mr J Osborn ~~had~~ with an advanced party of the mounted police had pushed along the ridge, pressing natives along the the ~~top~~ edge of the bush to the stony koppie at point E they were here relieved with ~~arm~~ fired both from the bush F on their flank, and the stony koppie E where the Usutus were evidently in good force; one of their men was shot through the thigh and held to death at once, and they retired rapidly, for the moment, unable to carry him with them. Col. Stabb immediately galloped up, checked the retirement, and remained with them ordering Capt Pennefather to bring up a squadron of the Inniskillings in support - on arrival one Troop under Capt Grey relieved the police at A and another Troop took position at D. Captain Mansel then took the whole of his police forward, and rushed the koppie E in fine form and in a splendid line. The Usutus were concealed in the rocks here in good force,

but qui te unable to withstand the vigorous charge of the plice, who fixed bayonets, drove them out, and pursu3d down the preciipous hill below , killing many /I went with message from Stabb as Mansel had asked for more men and I went to find howx what was requiried. Corssing the koppie I found the hill precipous and rocky but clear of bush. In the vaaley much firing was going on / "and the plice crawling along he edges of the rocks, doing good execution. Hearing from some tff them that Capt Mansel was on a ridge higher up, and taking in the situation, wich was that the Usutus were arruounded on all sides, and the native levy all mised up with the cattle, which to the number of about 2000 were scattered all about the bush, I mounted & tried to ride our of my exposed position / but it was too steep and I walked the hosre to the koppie and found mansel who men to take cattle and and the Basutos were ordered to send men over the coppie and the polcie pusehd through the bush joining Mnymanana's men who had now got round and the Eshowe levy belowx surruounding the cattle and hinting the Usutu / "who still shewed fight, into thex kloofs all xround "

/We then went to a ridge with Addison and Manwel and had a pnormaic view with dea Usutus lying w th their shileds at our feet. Polcie and lives were pursiung through the valley, the cattle wereall taken but in herds for miles through the bush but the sun was now low and it was difficult t coledt them att all. On hieghts AB to our left Burton and Grey were firing and rolling boulders dwon on the sutu were trying to prevent their cattle coming out. / "Jack Osborn lying by us occasionally taking pot shots at Usutus scuttling through the bush "

/It was decided to recall all the men and drive off the cattle /

C5522

No67 Havelock to Knutsford 18/7/88 p108

/Enclosoes report from Osb on the ~~istax~~ situation. Since Osb wrote this there has been a general improvement. Unease in Nqutu district mention in No54 is over and the defeat of Tshigana and the display of power in the Lower Umfolosi district has improved the situation. At the time O feels that D must be put down as D keeps sending warnings that he will attack in conjunction with the Boers. Havelock feels that 'forward movements' of troops will do much. As far as the estimates of the numbers at Ceza ~~thexx~~ they have been estimated at various times between 3-6000. It probably does vary vary from time to time as it is impossible to keep large numbers together for any long period. Numbers tend to be exaggerated as is shown that the number of armed natives in the Lower Umfolosi district was alleged to be 6000 or more but O now feels that it ought to be 2000, and Major McKean who was sent to the district did not encounter any position of this force.

Enc Osb to Havelock. 6/7/88 p109 /A concise report of the disturbances worth taking in full. / /Refers to corrsedone on the relation of military to civil power in Zululand particularly H's of 29/5 and mine of 3/7/

RE "When D and N, at the beginning of April last, commended the assumption of open resistance to the Government, they had already done all they could, secretly, to draw to them all the men they could induce to join them at Usutu Kraal. /para/ The Usutu party, of which they are the prominent heads, did not, at that time, comprise many men, and I should say its actual strength then did not exceed eight companies, or about 400 men,

if so many. /para/ this number was, however, gradually increased by individual natives and small parties of native arriving from different parts of the New Republic. /para/ Many of these were called by Ndaduko to Utsu Kraal on various pretexts, and, when once there, were not allowed to leave. By these means the force was increased to 16 companies (800 men). In the meantime Dinuzulu, who had proceeded in person, via Umkusi River, to the eastern portion of the New Republic and the Transvaal, returned to Zululand, bringing with him a force of ten companies (300 men), which he had collected in those territories.

In addition to the Utsu brought up their number to 26 companies (1,300 men), with which D and N at once occupied Ceza, where they are still, but with the force greatly increased since they went there. Its strength is now variously /110/ estimated at from 3,000 to 6,000 men. I believe the former to be the more correct number.

This increase of strength has been derived entirely from the New Republic and Transvaal, certainly not from ~~tribe~~ tribes within Zululand.

The success of the Utsu in their attack and defeat of Umsiebu has caused a material change in the attitude of the tribes in Zululand, who are now threatened by D with his vengeance should they any longer hesitate to join his party. His uncle, who, by means of threats of extermination, he induced a considerable number of people to join him. In doing this the people were also largely influenced by the circumstances of D collecting and maintaining a considerable armed force, and his daring to attack Umsiebu, and to kill many loyal subjects of the Government.

The open and armed resistance offered by Dinuzulu to the police and their supports at Ceza on the 2nd June, and the constant threats against the

C552No67 H to K Enc 0 to H in N 067 continued
 people by the "sutu" chiefs, have led to a belief that the "sutu are stronger than the Government, and that it is to the direct interests of all to join the stronger party, and thus escape the threatened ultimate vengeance of its Chiefs, it being commonly said by the people that, even if they do err in this, the Government would not take vengeance on them as the Chiefs would, should the latter prevail.

the feeling describes has within the last week, been clearly ~~demonstrated~~ demonstrated by the coast Chiefs, including Sonkeli, openly joining the "sutu party under "inuzulu.

their attack upon Sokwetyate's people at Mr. Pretorious' station, and upon the station itself, on the 30th Ultimo, leaves the question of their disaffection beyond all doubt,. This attitude assumed by these Chiefs was not known to me on the 3rd instant, when I replied to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th ultimo /110/ In Nkandhla and Nqutu districts much uneasiness prevails amongst the natives. /para/ the Resident Magistrate of Nknadhla, in order to put a stop to intrigues with D by Sigananda, who, with his tribe, occupied the Nkandhla pastures, and to prevent the rising of that tribe, as was the case in 1884, apprehended and imprisoned the chief with a couple of his indunas, and also two or three others who took a leading part in disloyal proceedings. This action has tended greatly to reasssure the other tribes who are loyal to the government.

In the Entonjanenei district the Chief Qetuka, who was the principal promoter of the Nkandhla disturbances in 1884, assumed an attitude of hostile defiance of the law and the Resident Magistrate. He, too, has been apprehended and committed to prison to await his trial.

The Chief Somhlolo, with part of the section of the Beijela* tiribe over which eh acts as Chief, joined Tshignana at Hlopekulu about three weeks ago.

The uneasiness in Nqutut district is caused by a prevailing fear of hostile attack or raiding by U^usutu.

I do not think, however, that this fear is founded upon good grounds. I believe it to be caused by wild rumours which are apt to be rife in times when distrubances are taking palce in the neighb oruing districts.

/As far as the civil/military relations go up to the moment police and levies have been supported by HMtropps I On.1/7 was told by you to place Basutos and a levies under orders of the General although the 'determination of the objects ...to which the troops are to be employed still rest with me..."

but U^u fecoomends that a change of the situation in the last eight days and the spread of disaffection I considerthe situation necessiates the authorization that the Genl be authorised to take the steps necessary to subjdue the suthu under D/ "who are now carrying on hostile porocceedings with the object of subverting the authority of the oernment within Zululand."

9-7-88

Usinm Statement: Official defence

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C5892


No34 Havelock to Knutsford and enclsoures 10/9/88 p50 -64

The message from D and taken on 9/7/88 with the official defence. /

XEROX 

GH 712 2 ⁴¹³ ~~513~~ 88 Contains

C5892/34/i + ii, iii, iv, v. | Also message in C5522/64.



9-7-88

Residence - Union Station

160

C5522

No64 Havelock to Knutsford 15/7/88 pl02

/Has recieved message from D and N ~~who left~~ Messengers left Ceza about 17/6
their message professes/ "to narrate the circumstances which have led to
the present outbreak of disturbances, and it brings charges of a serious
nature against Mr. Osborn, the Resident Commissioner, and against other
officials in Zululand. the messengers came direct from Ceza to Natal
without communicating their message to Mr. Osborn.

I have cause the following message to be given to the messengers: - "The
Governor has read the words delivered by the messengers, Sifo and Soni, sent
by Dinuzulu and Undabuko. The Governor is unable to give any reply, as the
message has not been brought through the proper channel, which is the Resident
Commissioner in Zululand, who consequently does not know what the words of
the message are.

The message brought contains charges against the Resident Commissioner,
and other Government officers, which could, in no case be inquired into so
long as D and N remain in rebellion against the Government. The Governor
can only send word back to D and N that they have broken the Queen's laws;
that they have taken up arms and stirred up the whole country against the
Queen's Government, and that they have killed some of the Queen's troops
and people. They will have to answer for these offences and to take the
consequences of them. the longer their resistance to the Government continues
the more serious will the consequences of that resistance become."

/Have asked for O's report on the message./



11-7-88

Re Name - relief of ACT

163

C5522

No65 Havelock to Knutsford 15/7/88 pl02 (Extract)

this must be wrong
/ON learning that the station at Lower Umfolosi was threatened it was ultimately found possible to induce Dunn to furnish a native levy to accompany regular troops to assist the magistrate Pretorius. the force under Major McKean arrived at the seat of the magistracy at Umsundusi on 11/7. I had instructed Osb that the station should not be withdrawn unless in absolute danger. A military post has been established and has met with no opposition. It has also ~~taken~~ / "taken measures to discourage rebels in that part of the country,..." and McKean's force has met with no opposition /

His despatch as printed is consorted and the following passages not printed and are here taken from CP427/2 16383

"The urgent necessity of re-establishing, at the earliest possible moment, the authority of the Government in the Ndwanwe District, which was lost by the defeat of Usibebu, and by the withdrawal of the Magistrate's post from Ivuna, has been constantly before my mind. When I found that the Lieutenant-General was not prepared for an early advance upon Ceza with the object of dispersing Dinuzulu's following assembled there, I suggested as a useful though a less effective movement, that he should from a fresh position in advance of Nkonjeni, in the direction of Ceza. It is obvious that a movement would, 1 extend the area of our protecting influence, 2 give confidence to the loyal Natives of the neighbourhood and also to those of doubtful mind, 3 offer a refuge and rallying point to those whose fears or inclinations might induce them to forsake Dinuzulu's cause, and 4 secure

of the country and of preventing Dinuzulu, should he leave Ceza, from joining Chief Somkeoi in the Coast District, he proposed to detach a strong flying column from Ensove to sweep round the country, and to co-operate, later on, with an attack upon Ceza."

a more convenient base than Nkonjeni, (which is over thirty miles from Ceza), for any movement against Ceza which might eventually be found necessary. Feeling, as I have done all along, the great value of prompt action in the present divvudlty, and fearing the consequences of continued inaction, I have unceasingly urged on the Lieutenant-General the advisability of making a forward movement. / General Smyth has informed me, in telegrams dated the 7th and 8th Instant, that it was necessary to consider the expedition for the assistance of Mr Pretorius, before attempting any other, but that when the matter of Mr. Pretorius' relief was settled, we would be in a position to operate in the Ndwanwe District in accordance with my proposals. Now, however, that the movement for the assistance of Mr Pretorius has been carried into effect, I have renewed my pressing request for forward action in the direction of the Balck Umfolosi and Ceza, and have urged consideration of the bad effects of delay. I yesterday addressed the following telegram to General Smyth:- 14th July. / ref to telegrams of 7 and 8/inst yours ~~Prax~~ ALP matter now settled hope you can operate in manner suggested in my private letters of 27/6 and 9/7 and telegrams of 3/7 and 6/7 and 23/7 and 8/8. / "Prompt re-establishment of constituted authority in Ndwanwe District seem to me of supreme importance. Movement such as I have suggested will further this end. I deprecate further delay in this matter, and beg you to consider the bad effects of such delay." / Smyth replied saying he also deprecated further delay in a forward movement and I learned with relief that he considered the cooperation of a Native Levy not absolutely necessary in establishing a post in advance of Nkonjeni and he was making preparation to do so and to my satisfaction he telegraphed me today that / "for the purpose of breaking up hostile bands of Natives in the Coast District beyond and to the north and north-west, of the Magistrates Station Umsunduxi, ...and for the purpose of clearing that part of the

Chief Admin - report

181

~~CC-25522x~~

C5892

No1 War Office to Colonial Office 3/9/88 pl

/Draws attention to the good services rendered by Dunn in organising a large auxiliary force and wonders whether HMG will agree in thinking that their thanks should be conveyed to him

Encl ~~Report~~ Lt Genl H A Smyth to Sec of State for War 17/7/88 pl

/When it ~~xxxx~~ came to my knowledge on 2/7 that Mag Pretorius in his station at Umsunduzi 55 miles east of here (Ehsoer) by 2000 insurgent natives and an expected 3000 roving bands I organised a flying column for the relief of the magistate and the restoration of authority.

This was achieved admirably ~~although~~ / "although the enemy was never quite bold enough to stand and fight, this result was, in my opinion, entirely won by the fitness of his dispositions and the celerity of his movements."..../2/ "...the good service rendered by Chief John Dunn, whose prompt and loyal co-operation at a critical moment (when all other prospect of auxiliary force, whether white or native, had resulted in absolute disappointment), may, I trust, meet with an early expression of your appreciation." The report is enclosed in No4

No4 Havelock to Knutsford 7/8/88 p6

/Submits the report but with observations. On reading of kraal burning teleg Lt Genl Smyth on 23/7 for his views on an action which would

only be necessary for military reasons and Smyth replied on 23/7/

"I think he (major McKean) acted rightly in burning down kraals of rebels engaged in cutting off communication. Consider better to burn down kraals

than destory lives. "omkeli and other rebel Chiefs on this account ~~probably~~ will submit to second expedition. Osb in enclosed desp finds it injucidious to burn kraals but Mckean burnt deserted kraals and had justifiabile considertaion in mind / "which may be hled to justify the proceeding." / It is also used as a menas of punishing the guilty. I don't agree that British subjects on ^{British}ritish territory should be treated in this way and have forbidden it as a general rule. /

Encl Smyth to Havelock Ehsos e 17/7/88 p7

Report by Major Mckean 14/7/88 p7

7/7 Laagered two miles from Mhlatus Middle drift . When we arrived 50 natives fled from the kraals of the ^{suthu}suthu Chief Lokotwayo. Darkness approaching and did not pursue but seized 25 cattle. 8/7 Joined by Dunn and 2000 men. Received report that rebels had attacked small portion of Dunn's men killing four and 6 ^Usuthu companies had been on our right flank. Could not find them /p8/ Dunn informed me that his men were demoralized by the attack and / "To restore their confidence I sent 500 back to act as border guards" and continued the advance. Received warning of ^Usuthu impi from Pretorius. 9/7 Relief of post effected Only one attack had been made on the magistracy although some of Soketshata's people out foraging had been repulsed by the ^Usuthu. Pret urged me to disperse and ~~pursue~~ punish ^Usuthu who might be in the southern part of his district as his communications would again be blocked and said he thought Somopo was in the south east, ~~Bejehana~~ Bejana, Lokotwayo, Dabayak to be at the Insezi in the south west.

10/7 Dunn's men made reconnaissance but saw only ^Usuthu scouts by several of ~~the~~ Somopo's kraals were destroyed in terms of Pretorius' request. 11/7 Left for Eshowe / "With a view of preventing the

the escape of any rebels, I moved my force in three columns, the Basutos making a wide sweep to the south-west, whilst Chief Joh Dunn's men scoured the country between them and the troops who moved along the main road with transport..../The native lvy killed four Usuthus without casualties. About 80 kraals were destroyed. 12/7 Dunn's men found groups of rebels in the ~~reeds~~ Insezi reeds and had fired on them. About 100 deserted kraals were destroyed and no gathering Usuthus was seen. A few rebels are still in the reed presumably and Dunn has been left to deal with them and I returned to Eshowe living Dunn's impi about five miles from the Mhlatusze 13/7 the column reached Kongella destroying all deserted kraals north of the Mhlatusze except those of loyal natives who / "I had ascertained had taken refuge in the late Zululand Reserve Territory." Ends with general congratulations all round

Enc 2 Havelock to Osb 22/7/88

/Asks for his opinion on the burning of kraals which seems to punish innocent non-combatants. / " It seems to me that if after the return to their homes of persons other than ringleaders and criminals, who have taken part in the disturbances, ~~it~~ it is deemed necessary to punish such persons, recourse should be had to the ordinary process of the magistrates courts.

Enc3 Osb to Havelock 3/8/88

/Agrees that kraal burning as a general rule is inudicious but in a case like this when there is a serious rising in different parts of the country in which the natives of the Lower Umfolosi took a prominent part and cut off communication with the Magistrate, and when a native force closed in behind the relief column cutting it off from its base that's another thing.

GH713
2526

the inhabitants had removed to Somkekle's stornghold near St Lucia, and the men kept out of reach being content to cut communciations and kill messengers, and loyals. /10/ "I do not doubt that Major McKean had these serious considerations in mind when he casued the burning of the kraals.

Enc4 Hav to Osb 7/8/88 plo

"Irequeust you to forbid, as a general rule, the practice of burning x kraals, I do not consider it a jucicious menas of inflicint punishment for offences committed by British subjects living within British territory.

I think recourse to ti should be limtied to cases inwhich i appears necessary for the safaty of the troops or of the police, and for the success of any militar operaion which the troops may be calledupon to perform."

11-7-88

CO 427/2

17868

CO 879/30 No 370 No 2 Hav to Knut 5/5/88 p2

Enc 1 Osb to Hav Ehsowe 31/7/88 p2 Res Comm to Ass Comm Ndwandwe 30/7/88

✓ p3: Enc 2 Genl Off Cding S A to Hav Eshowe 25/7/88: A Instructions for
Major McKean 6th Dragoons Confidential pp4-5 Route for Coast Colu,m
B Memo Curtis F Col Chief of staff pp.5-6

/Before noting chekc thzat none of these have been taken in Natal_/

Minutes "See also Gov/17871 ...It is lucky that this affair has all ended quietly - if there had been a disaster, the military officers would have 'gone far' poor Sir A E Havelock who has shon great moral courage in pursuing his own policy EF 5/9/88

I think the impression derived from a persual of this correspondence shews that the misunderstanding arose from the that messages that were sent between the Gov. & the Genl. & that in reailyt Sir A Havelock was not asking more than what the General had himself proposed. If we have not already dealt with the subject it might be well perhpas to say as much in acknowledgin this RM 7/9

Upon the whole I think it better semply to send these to the W Office without any observations. K 8/9"

12-7-88

ZA 6

Z 194

Hav-Osb 12/7/88 FMB

/Acks Osb's No84 of 6/7 stating views on civil/military relations. Encloses letter to Smyth and think my views conform with yours._/

Have Smyth 12/7/88 /Hav recieved Stabb's and Osb's report on Civil/military relations and also your telg of 30/6 saying that you had no intention of suggesting martial law but ~~did~~/ "as actual armed resistance had got beyond the power of Colonial or Civil Forces to cope with, you ought to be given the direction of the whole of the forces available for suppressing it. I telegraphed to you in reply that I concurred with you in thinking that all the forces available should be placed, as far as possible, under the same command, and with this view I at once directed the Res Comm to place under your orders, the Basuto and Native Levies. I reserved to the Res Comm as representing the Civil authority, the control of the Zululand Police, and of the Native Chiefs and their followers, but I directed him to use these forces in close co-operation with you. I added that it was understood that the determination of the objects with which, and the extent to which, the troops are to be employed, still rest with the Resident Comm, acting under my instructions. In your telegram of the 1st July, you informed me that you fully understood that the supreme determination of the direction and extent of the movements of the Troops rest with me, and that for that purpose, you desired to keep in direct communication with me, but that you considered it would not be satisfactory that the troops should necessarily follow the initiative of the Res Comm, who was frequently out of communication both with yourself and with me. Since then, the Res Com

has returned to Eshowe, and is now consequently in close communication with you, and like yourself, in communication with me by telegraph and a daily

post. I informed you by telegraph ~~x~~ on the 2nd July that I had desired the Res Comm, on leaving Nkonjeni, to entrust to Mr. Addison,....to accompany the movements of the Troops in that District, and, supported by Commandant Mansel with Zululand Police, to represent the civil authority. I hope I am right in assuming that you concur in these arrangements, and in the relation established between the Military and Civil authorities."

(12-7-88)

CO 327/3

14507

Minutes " I think the postponed reply may do. The Colonial Regulations 11 and 13 very expressly give the direction to the Governor but it seems to me doubtful whether the intention was precisely in accordance with the words of these Regulations i.e. whether when there is a state of war in a colony although not caused by a Foreign Enemy the Military Officer was ~~intended~~ not intended to have more control. RLWH Jul 20

Seeing this in passing, I annex Sir H Taylor's memo; and other papers showing that the difficulty of the ~~relative~~ relative positions of the civil & military authorities - during civil war is an old one. I think that the history of the case shows that the Governor's supremacy was intended to be preserved. /?/ E F 20/7/88

WO to CA 20/7/88

20/7/88
Smyth to S of S for war Newspaper report S of S for the Colonies states that I have complete Military control, Zululand. If so ~~intended~~ intended, further authority wanted. control now rests in Governor Natal.

Proposed reply / Consult with Hav and when agreed to what action to take complete ~~military~~ control ~~rests~~ of military operations rests with you. /

14390

WO to CO 24/7/88 / Cannot meet Hav personally as no delay possible.

Hav considers us in general accord / "but considers my view gravity of situation exaggerated. Still I maintain it."

15787

WO to CO 6/8/88

Minutes. "The Governor only asks that he may be consulted before an important measure is actually taken - this is what the WO expressly told the General to do. But there is evidently much friction between them.

WO to CO 6/8/88 / Does CO think Hav is hampering Smyth's operations / Minutes show that CO does not know as it has no info /

Smyth to WO 4/8/88 / Received message from Hav that we will not attack Ceza until He (Hav) concurs.... / "satisfactory operations impossible if so hampered."

(12-7-88)

CO 427/2

17006

Hav to Knut 89 22/7/88

Minutes "Very sensible despatches K 23/8"

"In view of the early prospect of a forward movement and of active operations by the Troops in Zululand" and have written to the Lt Genl, the Res Comm despatches which contain certain considerations which should influence the way in which the employ the Troops. I submit them /

Enc 1 Hav to Smyth 19/7/88

"In view of the early prospect of a forward movement and of active operation by the Troops under your command, with the objects, (1) of dispersing the Usutu forces in arms against the Government at Ceza Bush and elsewhere, and (2) of enabling the Police to execute the Warrants issued by the Magistrates against Dinuzulu and others, it may be of use that I should make known to you certain considerations which should, I think, influence the number and extent of the employment of the Troops, in respect of those objects. / It is greatly to be desired, quite as much on grounds of Policy as on grounds of humanity, to avoid, as far as possible, the infliction of loss of life and of suffering on those of the followers of Dinuzulu and Ndabuko who are not actually ringleaders and perpetrators of acts of lawlessness and crime, but who have blindly, and as they probably believe, loyally, obeyed the commands of their misguided Chiefs.

With this object, I have on several occasions, since the beginning of the disturbances, instructed the Resident Commissioner to make every effort

to detach the people from the offending Chiefs, to re-assure them, and to induce them to return to their homes.

I have given instructions to Mr O in this sense and request your assistance in following this line. "I would suggest that, whenever military consideration do not absolutely forbid such a course, and endeavour should always be made, before commencing an attack on a body of hostile armed Natives, whether at Ceza or ~~else~~ elsewhere, to open communication with them and to give them an opportunity of dispersing, on the conditions, 1 that all arms are surrendered, and 2 that Dinuzulu, Undabuko, Tshigna, or any other person charged with an offence against the Law, be given into custody."

After the operation involving armed force has been used "every possible forbearance consistent with the effectual carrying out of the object in view, may be enjoined on the Officer in command of the Troops employed. If the natives so dispersed show a disposition to submit, and a desire to return to their homes, every reasonable facility to their doing so, should, I think be given. / / The probability of there being women and children congregated at Ceza Bush and possibly in other places where the rebellious Zulus may collect, should, I think, be made known to the officers in charge...in order the necessary precautions may be taken in case of any attack that may be made by the forces under your command".
Enc Hgv to O sb 19/7/88 In the same light and refers O sb to desp of 18/6/88 /

(12-7887)
CO 427/2

17005

Minutes

"This is mainly a question of money. . . he Gernal could, naturally, not realise that the Govr. was unable, without Treasury sanction, to undertake these expnses. even if Zulu funds were in a position ot bear them." / We've explianed this to the WO 14135 and they told the Gernal that / "all expenciture will be primarliy chargeably a ainst Impierail funds"

Hav to Knut 21/7/88 88

/Says that he has told the Gernl that He Hav cannot ~~sacitiamxxxx~~ assume reponsilbity for the caost of ausilia y forces. / " I have avoided any interference with, or opposition to any of the arra nment which General Smyth has thought propoert to mke or to suggest, tand I ahve no desire to ciricize those arra nments. ,ut, as I foresee the possilbiy of represenations being made by the Military authorities , having for their object the chargin to Zululand funds the cost of the arragnments I refer to, I think it my duty to put on record my opinion that the circumstances of the case do not jsuify the payment from Zululand Funds of the cost incurred by the L G in raising a levy of mounted men in Natal, called the Edendeale Levy, in ra inf a body of Eurorpean Mounted Rfilemen, which, I believe, the LG contemplates, or the expsnive re-organization of the Zulu Native Leiveis, b the employment, for the pruoose, of Sir F C rrrington and other officers, which, I understand, he has arragned for."

Enc 1 Hav to Smyth 12/7/88 /You hav asked me if we could improve the exisitn arragnment for Native Lieves and you recommend free rations daily

and 10/- a moth. Osb has reported to me that they have been promised 10/- per month perman, and 15-30/- for Indunas and chiefs. / "He states that they are fed on 'captured cattle', and he recommends that when order is restored, a present of cattle should be given to each tribe employed, in proportion to its deserts."...

"Before leaving the subject of the Native Levies, I should observe that, in the opinion of persons acquainted with the habits and ways of thought of the Natives, it is useless to expect Levies composed of men suddenly called

away from their homes, and not trained or drilled, to keep together for any length of time. However well they may be paid or fed, they will, it is thought, persist in dispersing to their homes after a short while, and this just as much after a victory as after a reverse. There seems to be two remedies for this inconvenience, 1 to call out a special fresh levy for each occasion, and this course would, I believe, go that most in accord with Native usages, or 2 to organize and train the levy and European officers, in the same manner as the Zululand Police are organized and trained. The latter remedy is the one which I understand you wish to apply. It would take considerably time and entail much cost. / I cannot be responsible for the cost of this as I have not the authority. Also on principle I should have been glad to avoid employing native levies. / "The objections to this course are to be found 1 in the difficulty which exists in restraining such levies from the exercise of unnecessary violence and cruelty; and 2 in the trouble which is likely to arise in the future, out of the inter-tribal animosity which is likely to be engendered. It was only the representation of the officer Commanding the Troops, supported by that of the Resident Commissioner, that I consented to the enrolment of a Native

Levy for the express purposes of assisting in movements against the rebellious Natives at Holepkulu and Cesa /and to help AIP /

Enc 2 already taken from Z A 6 No ~~206~~ 198 Hav to Oxxxx Smyth 14/7/88.
about graxing conditions at Knondjeni and extreme emergency.

Enc 3 Smyth to Hav 19/7/88 Ehsowe

/Been talking with MO on inefficiency of Levies wants to orgnaise them slightly under an officer // MO byt ehway was "confident of their efficien cy for immiedtaite action" but Officers at Ceza and Holpekulu weren't not to drill them but to give them a white leader to whom they can look for direction in action.

and on 19/7 also he expressed his regret that Hav caon't five the manoeey

Ecn 4 Hav to Smyth 21/7/88 /Points out that he has not "assented" to S's proposal to rogansie the Levies but that he has "offiered no objection" When I heard today that you had sent for Sir F Carrington for the phceme I reminded you by teleg that I could nto be reposnbile for payment. I have not interfered or opposed to your measures only being careful to poin out that I was not ressible for the cost of these measures and that rests with you. I ~~haven~~ don't want to ciricise but am afraid that claims will be made against the Zululand treasury / "I think it is my duty to put on record the fact that I have wanred you that I can assume no responsiblity for such expenditure, and also my opinioj that the circumstances of the situation are not such as to warrant the payment from Zululand Fundsof the cost incurred by you in raisng a body of Mouneted men in Natal..."

24
I am writing you this letter in order to tell you that I have been thinking of you very much lately and I hope you are well.

I have been thinking of you very much lately and I hope you are well. I have been thinking of you very much lately and I hope you are well.

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I have been thinking of you very much lately and I hope you are well. I have been thinking of you very much lately and I hope you are well.

Not filed

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Zululand & Archives 6
No 206 Hav - Osb 21/7/88

Hav -Smyth Zululand 198 14/7/88 /Received your telg of 12/7 partly in code / "!.I learn ~~xxx~~ unmistakeably from Commanding officers and other officers that no grazing at present exists near Nkonjeni, and that Basuto horses are almost ineffective from want of food. I fear Y E has not realized from previous communications the gravity of the present situation of affairs. In addition to the rebel forces to the north, there are now, according to Pretorius, six thousand men to the eastward, and special messengers sent by Osbron cannot reach flying column for relief. His country everywhere is in a condition of alarm, and the lines of communication with the front ~~dem~~ demand more and more protection. The evil continues to spread, yet Y E continues to raise objections to extra expenses. I have asked for officers competent to organize dis-organized Native Contingent, and for white mounted rifle-men. If Y E cannot give me anything beyond further consultation with Osborn, and promise of further levies of unwilling Natives, I must ask S of S for War."

/In reply I have asked R_es Comm to arrange for supply of forage for the Basuto horses. / " I would venture to suggest that if your representations on this, and on similar matters of detail, were made to the Resident Commissioner, who is at Ehsio and therefore ~~in~~ in close proximity to you, there would probably be a gain in both time and convenience.

With respect to my estimate of the gravity of the present situation of affairs in Zululand, I desire to attach much importance to your views, but I must be allowed to form and hold my own opinion, after consideration of the facts of

of the case as they present themselves to me.

I regret extremely that you should have imputed to me continuance in raising objection to you proposals for better organized lives and for white mounted rifle men. I have looked through all my replies to the proposals made by you, for obtaining increased forces and for improving the condition of those you now have. I cannot find that I have objected to a single one of those proposals. On the contrary, I have done what is in my power to help in carrying them out.it is not in my power to defray, from funds under my control, the cost of the ^Endenal levy which you propose to raise, or the complete organization of a Native Contingent, which you appear to contemplate."

12-7-88

Levies - Smyth

165

GH712

Z449 to sofs 88-21/7

Lt Genl Commanding : South Africa H A Smyth to Havelock 19/7/88 Eshowe
/_Strength of levies 1810 and the Resident is confident o their efficiency
for immediate action, but I doubted this on the grounds of statements by
officers present at Ceza on 2/6 and Hlopekulu 2/7. Proposes to attmpt to
organsie and supply them more efficiently/_

Z450 Smyth t Havelock 19/7/88 /He regrets that he cannot meet the
larger expenditure on military matters/?/ and the Endendale levy have to
be his (the Gnels) repsonsibilitiy. The levy is needed to guard roads and
protecti communciations and cattle._/ Minute "HE I have just been infomed
by the C6 troops, that the strength of the Levy is 143 men 6 sergeatns
1 sergent major and 2 officers. These men are not those of the Edendale
Troops but supplied by the Chief Jantje who hasrecieved ~~a~~mission to move
into Zululand. the force marched ~~into~~ out oftown yestereday afternoon.
x T Shepstone SNA " 2/8/88

Z462 Osbto Hav Ehsowe 20/7/88

Hav-Osb

11/7/88 "General complains of inefficiancy of native levies - says they
are underpaid and fed, underofficered. He states that Basutos express
dissatification at want foage for horses and supplies for themselves
and are becoming difficut to manage. Please see him and endeavour o
remedy ..."

Z A 6

No 196

Hav -Osb 12/7/88 PMB /Ref to teleg correspondenece on organization and complaints about Levies from Smyth/

Hav-Smyth 12/7/88 Zulualnd 195

"In the course of recent correspondenece Y E has several times drawn my attention to the inefficient organziation the Native Levies , and in reply to my inquiry whether I could do anything to improve exisiting arragnments, you recommend a daily issue of free rations and a motnhly payment of ten shillings. The Res Comm has repoted to me that t e Native Levies have been promsied ten shillings per month per man, and fifiteen to thirty shill ings for Indun_as and chiefs. He states that they are fed on 'caputred cattle'; and herecommends that when order is ~~restored~~, a present of ca tle should be given to each tribe employed, in proporition to its deserts. I have informed the ResComm t that you still consider the Levies to be underpaid, underfed and undere officered, and I have desired him to confer with you and to endeavour to remedy the defects complaned of. / Befltre lea ing the subject of the Native Levies, I should observe that in the opinion of persons acquaintedwith the habits and ways of tought of the Natives, it is useless to expect Levies composed of men suddenly called away from their homes, and not trained or dirllled, to keep together for any length of time. However well they may be paid of fed, they will, it is thought, persist in dispersing to their homes after a short while, and this, just as much after a victory as after a reverse. There see to betwo remedies for this inconvenicne, (1) to call a special fresh levy for each occasion, and this course would I beleive, be that most in accord with Nativeusage, or (2) to organize and train the Levy under European officers, in the same manner as

levies /2/

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the Zululand Police are organized and trained. the latter remedy is the one which I understand you wish to apply. It would take considerable time and entail much cost. I have informed you that I have no objection to your acting in this manner, but that I am unable to undertake the responsibility of the cost of the proceeding. Y E is not perhaps aware that I have no authority to incur expenditure, in excess of that approved in the Annual Estimates, without the sanction of the S of S for the Colonies, and, of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and that I am bound to keep the expenditure of the Territory within the amount of the Revenue raised from it. I have, in the case of the Basuto Levy and in the case of the Native Levies hitherto called out, taken upon myself the responsibility of incurring expenditure on the scale recommended by the Res Com. I hope Y E clearly understands that the cost of organizing, equipping and maintaining any levy other than the Basuto levy and the Native Levies which have been or may be called out, under my authority, cannot be defrayed from Zululand funds, or from any funds of which I have control or administration. I shall be happy to give every assistance in my power for the organization of any auxiliary force, the employment of which may appear to you, from a military point of view, to be necessary. But the responsibility of defraying the cost of such force must rest with you. I think it right to say that, on principle, I should be glad to avoid the employment of Native Levies in the suppression of disturbances such as those unhappily taking place in Zululand. The objections to this course are to be found, (1) in the difficulty which exists in restraining such levies from the exercise of unnecessary violence and cruelty; and (2) in the trouble which is likely to arise in the future, out of inter-tribal animosity which is likely to be engendered. It was only on the representation

of the Officer Commanding the Troops supported by that of the Resd Comm, that I consented to the enrolment of a Native Levy, for the express purpose of assisting in movements against rebellious Natives gathered at Hlopekulu and Ceza. And again, when the post of Assistant Commissioner Pretorius in the Lower Umfolosi District was reported to be in jeopardy, and Y E was of opinion that you had not sufficient force at your command to effect his relief without the assistance of a Native Levy, I concurred in the arrangement you had entered into with Chief John Dunn, for the co-operation of a force of his men to be engaged on the same conditions as to payment as the Levies employed at Nkonjeni."

(12-788)

Residence : mid July : Deployment of forces. 164

GH 712

Z487

Osib to Hav 24/7/88 Eshowe

Encl R Baden-Powell Asst mil secy to Osborn 14/7/88 Ehsowe

/When will the levies be ready so that the advance can be made on Ceza_/

Enc2 Secy to Res Comm A S Windham to R Baden Powell 14/7/88

/the levies used at Hlopekulu dispersed to their homes in Eshowe district after the fight and I will inform you as soon as possible as to when they will be reformed.

Enc3 Secy to Res Comm to Act Mil Secy Ehsowe 15/7/88

Proposes the following ^{forces} ~~levies~~ to move on Ceza with military support

1 Zululand Police 150

2 Yamela's men (Nkani) 170

3 Zibhebhu's men 250

4 Native ~~x~~ levies from Nkandhla
under McAlister, Markham now with

Mr Knight 550

5 Umymanana's men 500

6 Basutos 190

1810 to be supplemented by as many additional

levies as can be raised in time from the Ehsowe district.

Enc4 Ass Mil Secty to Res Comm Eshowe 20/7/88

"From information he has recieved the Lieut General is unable to form such a favourable view of their ~~immediate value~~ immediate value as that expressed by yourself, and, taking into account the grave importance of avoiding a second repulse in the Ceza and the large force of rebeles reported by Mr

Addison and others to be accumulated there, he considers it inexpedient to push them on to attack until they are further increased and organized."

~~He would mention that Col~~

Z492 Osborn to Havelock 25/7/88 /In reply to Y E 'steleg of 24/7 submits the following figures of native levies.

1. "At Mr Knights Umfulazana men belonging to the tribes of Siteku, Umbuzo Utshinane, Faku and some small headmen 550

Two leaders in charge viz Mr McAlister and Mr Markham

2. At Nkonjeni (Mr Addisons' Yamula's men (22 mounted) 170

Usibebu's men 250 Two leaders Mr Foxon and Mr E Eastwood.

3. Umnyma ana's men 500 Usiwetu's 100 " /TOTAL 1570/" These two men are not encamped with the others at Nkonjini. their chiefs only are.

One or two companies come to their chiefs at the camp daily and the whole are ready to turn out at a moment's notice under the leaders named.

4. Basutos 190

I expect to assemble here on Sunday next from chiefs in Eshowe Dist 800
TOTAL 2560

/Dunn's levy ~~left~~ was to join the troops and Basutos at Umhlautse yesterday and go to Somkele's. Mr Saunders was in charge and its strength is said to be 2000 /

Resistance: Amangweni Hombake surrender 16/

C5522

No45 Havelock to Knutsford Teleg undated received 18/7/88 p68

coar7/2
14323

"Improvement in situation of affairs Zululand. Referring to my telegram of 8th July (no37) Osborn reports movement on Hlopekulu has largely checked spread of disaffection and ~~sir~~ alarm. Magistrate of Lower Umfolosi district given assistance without opposition, and his proper authority strengthened by establishment of advanced post near him." *Liwhetved PTO*

No46 Knutsford to Havelock Teleg ~~/1938~~ 19/7/88/ "Report by telegraph without delay as to your communications with messengers arrived from Dinuzulu. Debate in House to-night."

No47 Havelock to Knutsford Teleg 20/7/88 p69

"Miss Olenso sent message to Dinuzulu 3th May. Her messengers, accompanied by two others from Dinuzulu, were despatched from Ceza about a week before attack upon Usbiebu. Message to me ~~rexx~~ purports to narrate circumstances which have led up to present disturbances, and brings charge against Osborn and other officials. I have said that I cannot send reply, as message not sent through the proper channel; and that I cannot inquire into charge against Osborn as long as Dinuzulu remained in rebellion against Government; that Dinuzulu has broken laws, has taken up arms, stirred up the whole country against Government, killed some of British troops and people, and that longer resistance is maintained more serious will consequences become. Have sent message to Osborn for report. I do not attach much importance to message."

CO 427/2 Teleg Hav to Knut 18/7/88 continues from original
"Important movements contemplated by Lieterat General which will promote
restoration of Government authority in Ndwandwe District."

GH 712

Z462

Osb-Hav 20/7/88 Eshowe covers teleg and heliops

Osb-Hav 13/7/88 Addison has reported that Thsingana is at Ceza and the usuthu impi about 40 compnaies is about to attack Mnymanana and is helped by 20 young Boers. The U'suthu levies have deserted with the exception of Nkani.

Hav-Osb 13/7 /Asks if Osb' accepts ALP's estimate of 6000 as the number of the force in his area/ "Are you of opinion that disaffection and alarm continue to spread and increase."

Osb-Hav 14/7 /Believes the figure to be about 2000/ "Am of opinion that until Dinuzulu is finally put down there will be no end to alarm as he keeps sending about warning and threats of his contemplated proceedings in conjunction with Boers.

Hav-Osb 14/7 answer the question about the spread of alarm more fully, as it is wanted for a speical reason for forward movement and levies don't exist. Also Genl says civil power isn't ready

Osb-Hav 16/7 Considers that the succesffl operation at Hlopekulu on 2/7 and the show of power in the Lower umfolosi will have beneficila effect. Have told Genl that I am propered to make kforward movement with the

1800 levies now exisiting

1. The first part of the report is a general description of the project and its objectives. It includes a brief history of the project and a statement of the problem to be solved.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes a description of the data collection methods and the statistical analysis techniques used.

3. The third part of the report is a description of the results of the study. It includes a summary of the findings and a discussion of their implications.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the study and the references list the sources of information used in the study.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of appendices. These appendices contain supplementary material that is too large to include in the main body of the report.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of figures and tables. These figures and tables provide a visual representation of the data and the results of the study.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of footnotes. These footnotes provide additional information about the study and its findings.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of acknowledgments. These acknowledgments thank the individuals and organizations that provided support and assistance during the study.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of abbreviations. These abbreviations provide a shorthand way of referring to the various terms and concepts used in the study.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of symbols. These symbols provide a shorthand way of representing the various variables and parameters used in the study.

-8-88

Crit of Osborn

CO 327/3

14840

H of C question Sir John Swinburne asks the First Lord of the Treasury whether HMG will use armed Natives of Africa to suppress the unhappy disturbances in Zululand. On 26/7/88

C O to WO 2/8/88 and S of to Gov on 2/8/88 reprinted in C5522

Minutes "I fear that it is inevitable to employ Native levies. It was done in 1884 under the late Government. But there are two ways of employing them - either as allies over whose proceedings no practical check is exercised or as thoroughly controlled levies. As to these points, see Sir A E Havelocks two despatches 14267 and 14269. In the first he instructs Mr Osborn 'that strict orders should be given with the view of restraining the violence and cupidity to which in accordance with tradition and habit the Native and Basuto levies are likely to be tempted to give way. The European Officers in charge of levies should be warned that they will be held responsible for the observance by the Natives under them, of the orders to this effect, that you (Mr Osborn) may give them'

In his despatch No 69, he warns Mr Osborn not to employ Usebebu in his military operations.

Sir A E Havelock's views are admirable, but the conduct of the operation has since passed into the control of the military and I would therefore write to W.O. suggesting that they should refer the General to these two despatches of Sir A E Havelock to Mr Osborn and say that the views expressed in them are approved by HMG and are to hold good in regard to levies employed by their military authorities, and that no levies are to be employed unless under the command of a European officer.

I take this opportunity of suggesting that after ~~what~~ what was said in the House last night, it would be better not to ~~express~~ express any opinion one way or the other on Sir A E Havelock's despatch to Mr Osborn of the 18th of June (14267) There seems a concensus of opinion that Mr. Osborn has, by giving wrong advice, and otherwise, proved a failure and ought to be replaced by a man of fresh mind. Approval of his views and Sir A.E.Havelock's really commits us as regards the whole future of Zululand. One of his proposals is that the Usutu after they have submitted are to be put 'under loyal chiefs according to locality occupied.' This sounds very nice, but it really means that the Usutu part of the Nation are to be handed over bound hand and foot to their enemies. If these latter were strong enough to hold them down, there might be some policy in this - although scant justice - but as a matter of fact we ~~now~~ now know that, apart from our help, the anti-Usutu chiefs such as Usebebu and Umnyamanana are not strong enough to hold their own. ZAZulu chief's power extends to the cattle of his subordinates, and the 'loyal' chiefs will be continually aggravating their unwilling Usutu ~~for~~ subjects by enforcing cattle contributions. These will provoke resistance, and we shall be involved in new hostilities in supporting our precious proteges. Surely we have had enough of following Mr Osborn's ~~lead~~ lead? If Zululand is to be put ~~down~~ under a man of higher stamp with a view to a thorough over-hauling of the system which has broken down, it would be better to leave him a free-hand, that to commit ourselves in advance to the somewhat common, but never successful plan of putting the majority under a weak and unpopular minority, which will want bolstering up by us from time to time by our forces.

EF 24/7/88

ZA 6
Z 204

Hav-Osb 19/7/88 PMB "In view of the early prospect of a forward movement and of active operations by the Troops, I wish to recall your attention to the desire expressed by me in my Despatch, No 163, of the 18th June last, as to the course to be adopted towards those of the followers of Dinuzulu and Undabuko who are not actually ringleaders and perpetrators of acts of lawlessness and crime ~~xxxx~~ / Give ~~Adix~~ Ass Comm instructions on these lines. I have communicated my views to Smyth and suggested / "whenver military consideration do not forbid such a course, an endeavour should always be made, before commencing an attack on a body of hostile armed Natives, wheter at Cezaor elsewhere, to ~~xxxx~~ open communications with them, and to give them an opportunity of dispersing on the conditions, (1), that all arms are surrendered, and (2) that Dinuzulu, Undabuko, Tshingana or any other person charged with an offence against the Law, be given into custody...that after the completion of any operation, involving, unavavoidbley, the use of armed force, for the dispersion of a body of Natives at Ceza or elsewhere, every possible forbearance consistent with the effectual carrying out of the object in view, may be enjoined on the officer in command....if the Natives so dispersed show a disposition to submit, and a desire to return to their homes, every encouragement to their doing so should,...be given. I have reminded the Lt Gl, "of ~~the existence of~~ ~~the~~ of the probability of there being women and children congregated at Ceza Bush, and possibly in other places where the rebellions Zulu may collect." / Remind the Res Mags that they should unceasingly strive to carry out their ordinary judicial and administrative functions/ A steady exercise by them...of ordinary authority of the Government...will have a healthy effect on their own minds as we generally

-8-88

Not indexed

172

Z A 6

Z No 210

Hav-Osb 27/7/88 /Refers to and expands on the desp overleaf

"In the particular case of a contemplated attack upon Dinuzulu at Ceza, Mr Addison should, when the troops are actually established in force at Ndwandwe and Mfolosi, and when preliminaries are completed, for bring the forces within effective range of Ceza, (presumably about the 3rd August) cause the armed force collected to be summoned to disperse, and to surrender their arms. They should be made to understand that if they do this, they will be allowed to return to their homes. Dinuzulu, Undabuko, Thsignana and all others charged with offences against the Law must, however, be exempted from this act of grace. They must surrender unconditionally, or be apprehended.... Give the orders that will enable this to be done / "It is obvious that Mr. Addison should use the greatest care in selecting the messengers whom he employed to convey communication to the hostile Natives, and in instructing them in the message which they are to deliver."

GH 712

Z479

Resistance: Distribution of Troops 167

26/7/88

FCurtis Colonel Chief of the Staff for Lt Genl commanding Hm Troops S Africa-Hav
 Distrubtion of troops in Zululand on 25/7/88

Northern Column (Entonjaneni Nkonjeni commanded by Col Stabb

Officers Men Horses and mules

34 941 378

Eastern Column Commanded by Maj McKean

14 413 228

Eshowe base Colonel Sparkis in command

~~73~~ 25 ~~583~~ 97

73 1937 703 no transport animals included

Z485

Smyth to Havelock 21/7/88 /Answer to H's of 12/7 on the subject of the
 relations between military and civil power in Zululand states that he
 recognises the arrangements therein/ "but I cannot say that they have my
 concurrence, as I believe that this country has so far become the scene of
 active military operations that I ought to have the unrestricted command
 of all the armed force available - nevertheless I shall give all the effect
 in my power to your instructions...."

