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
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REBELLION 1906 AND OF DINUZULUS A



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
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A HISTORY OF THE ZULU REBELLION, 1906

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COLONEL SIR HENRY E. McCALLUM, R.E., G.C.M.G.,

(Governor of Natal, 1901-1907).

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A HISTORY  
OF  
THE ZULU REBELLION  
1906

AND OF  
DINUZULU'S ARREST, TRIAL AND EXPATRIATION

BY  
J. STUART

CAPT. NATAL FIELD ARTILLERY; INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 1906-1909  
EX-ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NATIVE AFFAIRS, NATAL

WITH FIVE MAPS, SIX PLANS  
AND TWENTY-FIVE ILLUSTRATIONS

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED  
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1913

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TO

HIS EXCELLENCY,

COLONEL SIR HENRY EDWARD McCALLUM.

R.E., G.C.M.G., AIDE-DE-CAMP TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING, ETC., ETC.

GOVERNOR OF NATAL (1901-1907),

WHOSE FIRM AND CAPABLE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COLONY,  
IN A TIME OF PUBLIC DANGER,  
WILL LONG BE REMEMBERED WITH GRATITUDE  
BY EVERY NATALIAN.





## PREFACE.

ALTHOUGH the object of this book is stated in the opening paragraph, it is, perhaps, proper that the circumstances under which it came to be written should also be set briefly before the reader.

Towards the end of the campaign, probably the first to be conducted by a British Colony without the assistance of the Mother Country,<sup>1</sup> the Government of Natal decided that a history of the military operations should be compiled. On being asked, I consented to undertake the task. But, though promptly entered upon, the greatest difficulty was experienced in carrying it to a conclusion. This arose from my being a civil servant and being obliged to continue discharging certain special as well as ordinary official duties. As, when the Union of South Africa was established, the work had not been completed, the attention of the Minister of Defence was drawn to the matter. General Smuts intimated that the new Government was unable to ratify the original instructions, and that if the book was ever to be published (which he personally hoped would be the case) it would have to be on my own responsibility and at my own expense. In these circumstances, particularly as an opportunity occurred of severing my twenty-four years' connection with the Civil Service, I resolved to go on with it and appeal for support to those who had taken part in the campaign. This appeal was made to a somewhat limited extent in 1912, and it is owing very largely to the

<sup>1</sup> But see p. 63.

guarantee then obtained that the heavy costs of publication have been incurred.

But, although the volume can no longer claim to be an official publication, it is in the unique position of being based as much on official information as, perhaps, any exclusively official history could have been, for I am pleased to say that considerable assistance has been given by the Government, especially by all records, *e.g.* commanding and other officers' reports, statistics, maps, etc., being placed freely at my disposal. The reader will, however, soon perceive that the subject has been treated with a fulness and freedom that could hardly have been expected in a more formal production. Owing, for instance, to having for years specialized in Zulu history, habits, and customs, I have not hesitated to incorporate information, germane to the subject, which I felt the reader might wish to have, especially as some of it is not procurable elsewhere. Moreover, instead of being limited, as at first intended, to the events of 1906, the narrative includes a detailed account of the Dinuzulu Expedition, and other topics incidental to that important sequel of the Rebellion.

Although I had the privilege of serving as intelligence officer throughout the campaign, as well as during the Expedition, and therefore was an eye-witness of many of the operations, it became necessary, as it was desired that the history should be comprehensive, to obtain exact information regarding several actions, operations, etc., at which I was not present. A party, which included a first-class surveyor and professional photographer, was accordingly organized by direction of the Commandant, as early as November, 1906, for the purpose of visiting the battle-fields. The members were selected for their personal knowledge of what had occurred at the places in question. Quantities of accurate information, not previously available, were thereupon collected by me at each spot, the surveyor at the same time preparing the maps and plans included herein.

So abundant is the material accumulated then, as well as on various other occasions, that it would have been



easy to compile a much larger work than the present one. That the book is as full as it is, is due to the fact that no general account exists of an occurrence that must for long loom large in the history of the Native races of South Africa. To some extent, owing to my recent intimate connection with the Native Affairs Department, the book may even claim to be an introduction to and a study of some of the more fundamental aspects of the Native Question—no doubt the greatest problem with which South African statesmen will ever be called on to deal.

The main object throughout has been to ensure accuracy. Working, as I have had to do, practically alone, the task has proved long and difficult. This is the sole reason why the time originally fixed for publication has, I regret to say, been exceeded by a few months.

I cannot conclude without acknowledging my indebtedness and expressing my thanks to the many officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and others not in the military service, who, from time to time, have given valuable information and helpful suggestions or advice. To name but a few of these would be invidious. I can only say that the uniform readiness and unfailing courtesy of all to whom I was obliged to appeal have been greatly appreciated, and have gone a long way towards rendering the undertaking less arduous than it otherwise would have been. To say that the greatest assistance has come from the Government, especially the Militia and Police Departments in Natal and the Volunteer Department in the Transvaal, is but to state what will be patent to everyone.

The despatches from the Governors, Sir Henry McCallum and Sir Matthew Nathan, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in various blue-books have been invaluable. Captain W. Bosman's and Mr. W. J. Powell's well-known books have, of course, also been consulted; the help derived from them, especially the former, is very gratefully acknowledged.

My thanks are also due to J. Windham, Esq., and my

mother for reading several of the chapters and suggesting various improvements.

The index is the work of Miss M. Marsh, of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* staff; no pains have been spared in rendering it as complete and accurate as possible.

J. STUART.

LONDON, *June*, 1913.

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## ABBREVIATIONS.

- B.M.R. - Border Mounted Rifles.  
Cd. - - Command, *i.e.* "Presented by 'Command' of His Majesty to both Houses of Parliament."  
C.M.R. - Cape Mounted Rifles.  
C.N.A. - Commissioner for Native Affairs.  
D.C.M. - Distinguished Conduct Medal.  
D.L.I. - Durban Light Infantry.  
H.F.F. - Helpmakaar Field Force.  
I.L.H. - Imperial Light Horse.  
J.M.R. - Johannesburg Mounted Rifles.  
L. and Y. - Lancaster and York.  
M.C.R. - Militia Composite Regiment.  
N.C. - Natal Carbineers.  
N.D.M.R. - Northern District Mounted Rifles.  
N.F.A. - Natal Field Artillery.  
N.M.C. - Natal Medical Corps.  
N.M.R. - Natal Mounted Rifles.  
N.N.C. - Natal Naval Corps.  
N.N.H. - Natal Native Horse.  
N.P. - Natal Police.  
N.R. - Natal Rangers.  
N.R.R. - Natal Royal Regiment.  
N.S.C. - Natal Service Corps.  
N.T.C. - Natal Telegraph Corps.  
N.V.C. - Natal Veterinary Corps.  
O.C. - Officer Commanding.  
R.H. - Royston's Horse.  
S.A.L.H. - South African Light Horse.  
Se.H. - Scottish Horse.  
S.N.A. - Secretary for Native Affairs.  
T.M.R. - Transvaal Mounted Rifles.  
Transport - Natal Transport Corps.  
U.D.R. - Umvoti District Reserves.  
U.F.F. - Umvoti Field Force.  
U.M.R. - Umvoti Mounted Rifles.  
U.S.N.A. - Under Secretary for Native Affairs.  
V.D. - Volunteer Decoration.  
Z.F.F. - Zululand Field Force.  
Z.M.R. - Zululand Mounted Rifles.  
Z.N.P. - Zululand Native Police (Nongqai).



## GLOSSARY.

- Commando* - - - A Boer military force, usually one recruited from a particular district.
- Division (District)* - The magisterial areas in Natal are usually spoken of as 'divisions,' in Zululand as 'districts.'
- Donga* - - - A channel or hollow worn in the earth by a current of water; a gully; the bank of a river, etc.
- Impi* - - - A force,—military, hostile, etc.
- Indaba* - - - A story, affair, public inquiry, etc.
- Induna* - - - An officer. The word, however, connotes in one context, military, and in another, civil, functions. In the case of Dinuzulu it may also be taken to mean 'political adviser.'
- Isibalo* - - - Corvée or compulsory labour.
- Ka* - - - A preposition, signifying son or daughter of, e.g. Matshana ka Mondise.
- Kloof* - - - A ravine or gorge.
- Kop* - - - A peak.
- Kopje* - - - A small hill or peak.
- Krantz* - - - A precipice or cliff.
- Lagers* - - - Enclosures of various kinds erected to serve as temporary or permanent fortifications.
- Loopers* - - - Large shot, or irregularly-shaped pieces of metal used instead of shot.
- Nkomondala* - - Name of Dinuzulu's body-guard; formed about 1901.
- Nongqai* - - - Policeman. Members of Z.N.P. Corps. The word, which really means 'watching,' is probably derived from *uGqainyanga*, a moon-gazer, i.e. night-watchman.
- Outspan* - - - *v.* To unyoke or unharness; *n.* Place where unyoking or harnessing occurs.
- Spoor* - - - A recently-formed track.
- Supreme Chief* - Title assumed by Governor in his capacity as head of the Native population.
- Thorn country, the thorns* - - - Country, usually low-lying, covered with stunted trees of *Mimosa* (thorn) species.
- Trek* - - - Travelling by waggon, especially when drawn by oxen.
- Tshokobezi, properly umtshokobezi* - Bushy portion of ox or cow-tail, usually white, worn about the head or neck by adherents of the Usutu faction among the Zulus; the wearer of such badge.

- Umkumbi* - - - The close, circular formation in which an *impi* is drawn up to be doctored, to receive instructions, etc.
- Usutu* - - - (1) Name of the tribe or faction recently presided over by Dinuzulu. (2) The war-cry used by members of Dinuzulu's tribe, as well as by those who espoused his or Bambata's cause.
- Veld* - - - Open, unenclosed country.
- Viyo* - - - A company of warriors, usually varying from fifty to eighty or more in number.
- Voorlooper* - - - A person, generally a small Native boy, who leads a span of oxen.
- Voortrekker* - - - A pioneer.



## I.

### INTRODUCTION.

THE main object of this book is to describe the military operations of the Rebellion of 1906-08, a rebellion in which a considerable section of the Zulus of Natal and Zululand took up arms against the Government of Natal. Such conflict was, of course, between a race of savages on the one hand, and a number of Europeans or representatives of Western Civilization on the other. An account of the campaign that ensued might, indeed, succeed in holding the reader's attention and even afford information of practical value. However that may be, whenever great and sudden outbursts of hostility occur in human society, no one is quite satisfied unless he can, at the same time, learn something of the inner or underlying circumstances under which they came to take place. Particularly is this the case when, as in the present instance, the hostilities were planned by people with whom the British race had been in close contact and on terms of amity for upwards of eighty years. This aspect of the matter will, therefore, be kept carefully in view, in the hope that some of that fuller information, which, it is assumed, every reader naturally desires to have, may be afforded. In order that this better understanding may be obtained, it is necessary to begin with the first coming into contact of the colonists with the Zulu people.

It was in May, 1824, that the first group of European settlers arrived in Natal by sea from the Cape

Colony.<sup>1</sup> They found large tracts of country about Port Natal almost uninhabited.<sup>2</sup> Learning that the King of that important section of the Bantu family, the great and terrible Tshaka, then residing in what is now called Zululand, claimed the territory as his, they immediately repaired to the royal headquarters, Bulawayo,<sup>3</sup> obtained from the despot permission to take up their abode at the Port and enter into commercial dealings with his people. Notwithstanding the ease with which a footing was obtained, their position was, for many years, one of very considerable insecurity, which, indeed, was inevitable under the prevailing mode of government.

The circumstances might have been different had the Zulu dynasty been long in power. As it was, for barely a decade had any kingdom existed in those parts, its existence having been brought about by Tshaka himself by means of a newly-created and remarkable military system, to be described in a later chapter, under which practically every man and youth capable of bearing arms was bound to serve. As, through the King's aggressive tactics, the borders of the country were being rapidly expanded, it can be seen his forces were constantly being augmented in proportion.

<sup>1</sup> Natal was discovered by a Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, when engaged in his quest for a sea-route to India, on Christmas Day, 1497. But little more was heard of the country until Farewell and Fynn, having proceeded in 1823 as far as St. Lucia Bay and Delagoa Bay respectively, returned to Cape Town and organized the party referred to in the text.

<sup>2</sup> The notorious Zulu King Tshaka's catastrophic reign began about 1814. Great tribes were, at quick intervals between then and 1820, driven headlong into Natal, only to sweep the peaceful inhabitants of the land away with them into the Cape Colony and elsewhere. Three or four of these appalling exoduses, taking place by no means only on the south-west boundary of Zululand, soon denuded Natal, and other adjacent territories, of the greater portion of their aboriginal population. The country was transformed into a howling wilderness, overrun with lions, hyænas, and wolves; and any stray wight, who had succeeded in evading the Zulu fury and was eking out an existence on wild-roots or shell-fish, was hunted by members of his own species, so far dehumanized, within half-a-dozen years, as to have become converted into expert and voracious cannibals.

<sup>3</sup> It was after this kraal that Mzilikazi, "the lion of the North," named his own principal kraal—a name subsequently adopted by the Chartered Company of Rhodesia for the already well-known town established on the site of the kraal.



Owing, then, to the existence, on the north side of the Tugela, of this large, efficient and highly-organized army of warlike barbarians, an army whose movements were dependent on the caprice of as absolute an autocrat as it is possible to conceive—an army prepared and able, upon emergency, as was proved upon various occasions, to mobilize 40,000 to 50,000 men (inhabiting roadless, mountainous regions) within a week—it became a matter of vital importance for such state of affairs to be borne perpetually in mind; for these early colonists, it must be remembered, were, from 1824 to 1837, but a handful of strangers in a strange land. It became their first duty to maintain a strictly friendly disposition towards the Zulu monarch, and to avoid, by all means in their power, a conflict which must have severely crippled them, if it did not result in the complete annihilation of themselves, their families and dependants.

There were, however, not a few influences at work, feeble though these were, in the direction of placating the Zulu monarch, and securing, as far as possible, his continual friendly co-operation and goodwill. Among these, practical services of various kinds were rendered by the pioneers from time to time, in a collective as well as individual capacity. For instance, they were occasionally called on to assist in military expeditions; when not so engaged, they established and developed a commerce in sundry commodities, notably blankets, cloth, bangles and beads of different colours and sizes, in exchange for ivory, cattle, goats, corn, maize, etc., which proved as beneficial to the aborigines as it was lucrative for the settlers. Then again, men like Henry F. Fynn, the first European to settle permanently in Natal, ministered unceasingly to the numerous sick, indigent and wounded people, including the King and his relations, whom he found about him on every side during his journeys of exploration. In these and other ways, the foundations of a warm friendship (soon extended to every member of the party, and, later on, to all other Europeans that came to Natal) were gradually and successfully built up. Alive to the material

advantages arising out of having the British settlers so close at hand—for were they not the makers of firearms?—not to refer to the intense interest undoubtedly aroused through his coming into contact with a strange, exceedingly capable and amicably-disposed race, apparently so situated at Port Natal as not to be a source of domestic or political annoyance, Tshaka, on being appealed to, readily agreed to cede to them, “their heirs and executors,” a tract of country stretching some thirty-five miles along the coast, north and south of Port Natal, and running “about one hundred miles backward from the sea-shore,”<sup>1</sup> and there, in 1835, at the Port, was laid off the now beautiful town of Durban.

Thus, the earliest provisions consisted in nought else than the establishment and consolidation of a bond of friendship between the little band of adventurers and the rulers of the land, and, so long as that bond was faithfully observed, so long was there peace between the parties, whatever else might have been the position in respect of the adjoining states.

From 1824 to 23rd September, 1828 (the date of Tshaka’s assassination), the British settlers averaged about twenty-five souls in number. Between the latter date and 1834 they fell to a smaller figure. But, from then on to 19th October, 1837,<sup>2</sup> when a party of Boers under Piet Retief arrived at Durban from the Cape Colony, the numbers, through the coming of traders and missionaries, and their families, were considerably increased.

The policy of the pioneers, indeed, could be no other than, for the time being, to place themselves wholly and unreservedly under the protection of the Zulu sovereign, first Tshaka, their declared and, as it proved, real and constant friend, and subsequently, Dingana, perfidious autocrat as he soon revealed himself to be. The kindly feelings entertained by Tshaka towards *his* Europeans (*abelungu*), as he always called them, and the invaluable services and substantial concessions extended to them up

<sup>1</sup> Bird, *Annals of Natal* 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* i. 326.



to the day of his assassination, are not borne in mind in these days as much as they deserve to be. This disposition carried with it, as a matter of course, an unqualified attitude of amity and respect on the part of the entire Zulu nation, only too eager to render immediate obedience to their tyrant.

With his successor and brother Dingana, the position became greatly altered. So far from cherishing a friendly disposition towards the immigrants, he regarded them as sources of peculiar inconvenience, if not as an insidious and growing menace to his very throne and person. He resented their harbouring refugees from his country at Port Natal, notwithstanding that Tshaka had always refrained from troubling himself with such escapades, on the ground that, in quitting Zululand for the *abelungu* at Isibubulungu (as the Zulus called Port Natal), they had but gone to his friends, and were, therefore, within reach whenever required. So uneasy and hostile did Dingana eventually become that, in 1834, he dispatched a strong raiding-party to massacre every soul, white as well as black, settled in the neighbourhood of the Port, and this vindictive order would have been carried out to the letter, had they not fled precipitately either towards the Cape Colony, or concealed themselves in the numerous bushes round about. As it was, a party, headed by Fynn, consisting of a considerable number of his Native adherents, was overtaken by the raiders south of Umzimkulu, and exterminated almost to a man, Fynn himself escaping. Nor was this the only occasion on which this King betrayed his hatred of the British settlers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Much of the earlier history of the Colony will be found in the following works : N. Isaacs, *Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa*, 2 vols. London, 1836 ; Capt. Allen F. Gardiner, *A Journey to the Zoolu Country*, London, 1836 ; H. F. Fynn, *Papers*, printed in part on pp. 60-124, vol. i. Bird's *Annals of Natal*, Pietermaritzburg, 1888.

Up to the day of his death, Fynn, the friend of Isaacs and the source from which the latter drew much of the information in the work above quoted, was the final authority on all matters appertaining to the Natives of South-East Africa. He, fortunately, left a number of valuable manuscripts. These are being prepared for the press by the author. They include a large quantity of matter connected with early Zulu history, customs and habits hitherto unpublished.

With the arrival overland from the Cape Colony of the Boer voortrekkers, however, a great change came over the scene. Momentous events followed one another in quick succession. Here was a well-armed, mounted and efficient force, extremely small in numbers as compared with the Zulus, and very desirous of occupying the land they found vacant in the northern portions of Natal. Although in no way intending to be aggressors, the entirely amicable and co-operative spirit in which they entered upon negotiations with Dingana being evidence of this fact, they were undoubtedly regarded *ab initio* in that light by the Zulus. The Boers, however, had arrived in these practically unexplored regions prepared for all contingencies, war included ; Dingana saw this, and war they were compelled to enter upon forthwith. The treacherous and brutal massacre of Piet Retief, along with some sixty followers and forty Hottentot and Native servants, at the principal royal kraal, Mgungundhlovu, on the 6th February, 1838, followed almost immediately by the cold-blooded murders of 281 Boer men, women and children, together with 250 of their coloured servants, at Bushman's and Blauwkrantz Rivers in Natal, were the initial acts of that wholly unprovoked war. The valiant manner in which 460 voortrekkers subsequently went forth to oppose an army outnumbering them by at least 40 to 1 ; the readiness with which they moved about the roadless country with cumbersome transport, notwithstanding the traps occasionally laid by a crafty foe ; their crushing victory over some 9,500 Zulus at Blood River on 16th December, 1838 ; and their further expedition of January-February, 1840, when, as the result of a battle between Dingana and their ally Mpande, the former's power was finally shattered, will always stand to their credit, and be a lesson as to how operations can be conducted with success against a race of barbarians.

Subsequently to the death of Dingana, probably from poisoning, in January, 1840, his brother, Mpande, who, towards the end of 1839, had crossed over into Natal with a vast concourse of adherents to seek the protection of the



Boers, was later on formally installed by the latter as Paramount Chief of the Zulus.

Between 1840 and 1843, the relations between the English settlers on the coast and the Boers, who had taken up their residence further inland,<sup>1</sup> unhappily became so strained that open hostilities broke out between them in the winter of 1843, the former having been strengthened by a regiment sent overland to Durban in 1842. This regrettable conflict resulted in the formal annexation of Natal by the British Government, the majority of the Boers falling back to establish themselves in territory across the Vaal, then already partly occupied by their own countrymen, and now known as the Transvaal.

After being invested by the Boers, as already stated, Mpande maintained and even elaborated the Zulu military system. This system continued to exist, not only to the end of his reign in 1872, but throughout that of his son Cetshwayo, that is, until the Zulu War of 1879.

During this long period, notwithstanding that numerous immigrants arrived in Natal, nothing in the shape of regular military organization took place among the white settlers, beyond the formation, from time to time, of volunteer corps<sup>2</sup> (this, however, does not apply to the Boers who, between 1837 and 1843, were well organized). Lagers<sup>3</sup> were erected in various parts of the Colony, as well as a few magazines for arms and ammunition. Where magazines existed, rifle associations soon began to be formed.

<sup>1</sup> Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, was laid off by them.

<sup>2</sup> Among these were the *Natal Frontier Guards*, *Weenen Yeomanry*, *Victoria Mounted Rifles*, *Alexandra Mounted Rifles*, *Natal Hussars*, *Royal Durban Rifles*, *Natal Carbineers*, *Natal Mounted Rifles*, *Border Mounted Rifles*, *Natal Field Artillery*, *Durban Light Infantry*, *Natal Royal Rifles*, also the *Natal Mounted Police* and *Natal Native Police*. (The corps in italics have either ceased to exist or been merged in those printed in ordinary type.) The last-named corps, organized in 1848, and about 150 strong, was disbanded by the Government in 1854, without any reasons being given as to why such action had become necessary. To this day, Natives wonder what the reasons could have been. Mr. (later, Sir) Theophilus Shepstone, was its captain-in-chief.

<sup>3</sup> Often wrongly spelt "laagers." See Glossary.



If it was never possible to determine how long it might be before trouble arose, the Government was aware that a general rising could originate only in Zululand. From the time the first colonists arrived in Natal, up to the end of the Zulu War, August, 1879, the principal arbiter of savage warfare in South Africa was the Zulu sovereign. It was to him that the whole of the tribes of Zululand—the real storm-centre of South Africa—looked, including those of Natal, who were without any hereditary King. The latter were, indeed, only too glad to place themselves under the protection of the British Government, and even actively assist against their former King in the campaign of 1879. The majority of the Natives of Natal then, and the same is still the case, consisted of people who, at various times, had fled from Zululand, fearing lest they should be put to death on some bogus charge of practising witchcraft, of infringing the very stringent and remarkable marriage regulations, or of neglecting to conform to a hundred and one instructions or directions. Ever since the days of Dingana, the King became exceedingly incensed on hearing of any of his subjects breaking away to place himself under the notoriously milder European rule south of the Tugela. Any neglect to conform to his pleasure, where, in former days, similar desires would have been carried out with alacrity and without the least demur, appeared to be no less than outrageous defiance, and, as such, punishable with the utmost rigour. The tendency of fleeing to Natal from the despotic laws, which became even more arbitrary as the possibility of infringing any of them with impunity appeared greater, grew to such formidable proportions, that special regulations were introduced in Natal to cope with the situation. Refugees, for instance, were required to indenture themselves as labourers to European householders, farmers, etc., for a period of three years. But, by the time Cetshwayo, long the *de facto* ruler of Zululand, actually began to reign (October, 1872), the prestige of the Imperial Government had become so firmly established in Natal, and to such numbers had the farmers and other

Europeans grown, backed up by an Imperial garrison at Fort Napier, Pietermaritzburg, that the King perceived that any attack was not only destined to fail, but must result in the prompt dispatch of irresistible forces to bring an end to his rule. The fact, however, remained that the relations between Cetshwayo and the representatives of Imperial authority in Natal became more and more strained, and the outbreak of war between the two races sooner or later inevitable.

No one appreciated better the position than did the Natives in Natal. Because, in most cases, their having come to the Colony was tantamount to flagrant defiance of the royal will, so, no one knew better than they, that, in having placed themselves under alien protection, they had thereby burnt their boats behind them and incurred the unappeasable wrath of the Zulu dynasty. It is for this reason that Natal Natives were, formerly, at all times only too eager to co-operate with their protectors in the direct or indirect destruction of the Zulu power.

In these circumstances, as actual warfare between the colonists and the Zulus was never imminent, notwithstanding sharp differences in civilization, manners and customs, till shortly before 1879, it was unnecessary to promote systematic enrolment and organization of the local forces.

There was, however, an important factor in the situation to which reference should be made. Natal became a British Colony in 1843, and remained such, though at first, for a few years, annexed to the Cape Colony, until the grant of responsible government in 1893; thus, during the long critical period preceding and succeeding the Zulu War, it devolved on the Imperial Government to provide continually for the protection of its recently-acquired possession. A regiment was stationed at Fort Napier. With the existence of this organized and well-armed force, capable of quelling any local disorder of limited proportions, there was still less necessity for organizing the Colony's fighting material. For all ordinary purposes, the Volunteers and the Natal Mounted Police, commanded



for many years by Major (now Major-General Sir John) Dartnell—the first to organize the Volunteers into a military body—were sufficient, with the Imperial troops behind them, to preserve order. After responsible government was granted, however, it became imperative for Natal to consider how to defend herself by means of her own resources against an internal or external foe.

Although there was no regular Native war in Natal proper between 1824 and 1906, there were periodical disturbances, limited, however, to particular districts. Among these may be named: the Fodo Revolt (Unkomanzi River), 1846; the Sidoyi Expedition (Ixopo division), April, 1857; the Matshana Expedition (Umsinga division), March, 1858; and the Langalibalele Rebellion (Estcourt division), November, 1873.

The most important occurrences outside, though near, the borders of Natal were: the conquest of Zululand by the Boers, assisted to some extent by British colonists, 1838-9; a raid by a Boer commando from Natal on Neapayi, (Pondoland), 1841; battle between Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi, sons of Mpande and rival claimants to the Zulu throne, near the mouth of the Tugela (Ndongakusuka), December, 1856; the Bushman Expedition, 1866; the Sikukuni Rebellion, 1878-9; the Zulu War, 1879; and the Zululand disturbances, 1883-8.

Other battles or campaigns, in which, however, the Natives were only indirectly concerned, were: Battle of Congella, 1843; the Boer War, 1881; and the Boer War, 1899-1902.

Of the foregoing campaigns, etc., it is proposed to refer specially to two only, the Langalibalele Rebellion and the Zulu War.

The Langalibalele Rebellion, the only internal warfare of any importance prior to that of 1906, and for that reason worthy of notice here, occurred in 1873. It was directly connected with the Kimberley diamond fields, which began to be developed in the year 1870. Contractors recruited labourers in Natal for the mines. Many

of these Natives received guns in lieu of wages and returned with them to Natal. The Government, objecting to unregistered arms being held, proceeded to call them in for registration, or confiscation, where any owner was regarded as unfit to possess a firearm. Langalibalele, Chief of the Hlubi tribe, living near Estcourt, refused, in the name of those of his tribe concerned, to comply with the order, although aware of instructions issued by the Government prohibiting the introduction and holding of guns, except under the usual conditions. It was believed most of the unlawfully-held weapons were in possession of this particular tribe. A force, accompanied by the Lieutenant-Governor and consisting of 200 regular troops, 300 colonial volunteers, and some 6,000 Natives, marched on 30th October to enforce obedience. Langalibalele, with a large following, fled at once into Basutoland. Many of his cattle, etc., as well as those of a Chief, Putili, who was associated with him, were seized. In attempting to hold a difficult pass in the Drakensberg Mountains,<sup>1</sup> by which it was correctly supposed the fugitives would travel, Major A. W. Durnford<sup>2</sup> and his men<sup>3</sup> who had been directed "not to fire the first shot," were attacked by about 200 rebels on the 4th November—three Natal Carbineers and two Natives being killed. It was found necessary to proclaim martial law on the 11th of the same month over the disaffected area, but only, as it happened, for a period of fourteen days. During the operations, some 200 rebels were killed. Langalibalele himself was followed up in December by a force under Capt. A. B. Allison, one of the Magistrates of the Colony. Finding himself opposed by Natal forces, Cape

<sup>1</sup> Known as Bushman's Pass.

<sup>2</sup> It was this officer who, on 22nd January, 1879, was Colonel in command when the Imperial and Colonial troops suffered their reverse at Isandhlwana.

<sup>3</sup> Consisting of one officer, one sergeant and thirty-three rank and file of the Natal Carbineers (with forty rounds of ammunition per man), and twenty-five mounted Basutos; of the latter, seventeen had various kinds of guns (with about three charges apiece); the other eight were armed only with assegais.—*A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa*, edited by Lt. Col. E. Durnford, London, 1882, p. 32.



Colony troops (which had been specially sent to cooperate), as well as by the Basutos, Langalibalele, after offering some resistance, surrendered. Of the 7,000 cattle captured from him in Basutoland (besides 200-300 horses), 2,000 were awarded to the Basutos, Allison conveying the remainder, with the Chief and a number of other prisoners, back over the mountains to Natal. The Chief, with some of his sons and followers, were afterwards tried at Pietermaritzburg. He was deposed and banished to Robben Island, Cape Town, and his tribe broken up. After some years, however, he was permitted to return to Natal, where he subsequently died a natural death.

With regard to the Zulu War, the fundamental causes were disputes with Transvaal Boers over land matters, notably territory lying between the Buffalo River—then part of the eastern border of Natal—to as far down as where the Blood River enters it, and the Pongolo River. Another cause was, violation of Natal territory in July, 1878, by three sons and a brother of Sirayo, a Zulu. One of these sons was Mehlokazulu, of whom more will be heard when the Rebellion itself is being dealt with.

The land matters were investigated by a Commission. Whilst the award to be made was under consideration, various incidents occurred, thereby complicating still further an already strained position. An ultimatum was sent, by direction of the High Commissioner (Sir Bartle Frere), to the Zulu King, Cetshwayo. This, *inter alia*, required that certain promises, alleged to have been made by Cetshwayo at his coronation in respect of governing his people should be observed, *e.g.* that his army should be disbanded; that the military system should be discontinued, except on certain specified lines; that, on arriving at man's estate, Zulus should be free to marry, without waiting to receive special royal sanction; that a British resident, whose duty it would be to see that these and other stipulations were observed, should henceforth reside in Zululand.

The King failed to meet the demands, whereupon his

country was invaded by three columns. During the campaign, which lasted just under eight months, several severe engagements were fought. Among these were Inyezane, Isandhlwana, Rorke's Drift, Hlobane, Kambula, Gingindhlovu and Ulundi.<sup>1</sup>

The last battle, Ulundi, when the Zulu power was broken up, was fought on the 4th July, but it was not until 28th August that the King was captured.

On the conclusion of the War, the country was divided into thirteen districts, over which as many Chiefs, with very extensive powers, were appointed by Sir Garnet (later Viscount) Wolseley. The arrangement soon proved calamitous and unsatisfactory, notwithstanding that a British resident was stationed in the country to supervise internal and external affairs.

After his arrest, Cetshwayo was imprisoned for a time at Cape Town. In 1882, he was allowed to visit England, where he had an audience of Her Majesty, Queen Victoria. He was subsequently repatriated, but, owing to the refusal of two or three of the thirteen appointed Chiefs to recognize him as head of the district assigned him, his position became untenable. He attacked one of these Chiefs, Zibebu, who, retaliating, forced the ex-King to take refuge in reserved territory south of the Mhlatuze River, first

<sup>1</sup> The strength of columns at 11th January was : *European troops*—85 Staff and departments, 263 Royal Artillery (20 guns—7 and 9 pdrs., 2 rocket tubes, 8 rocket troughs), 5,128 infantry and 1,193 cavalry = 6,669 (of these, 292 were from Natal mounted volunteer corps and 80 Natal Mounted Police). *Native troops*—315 mounted, 9,035 infantry = 9,350 ; making a grand total, including 1,910 conductors, drivers and voorloopers, of 17,929 officers and men.

After the Isandhlwana disaster, another 10,000 men from England, Ceylon and other parts were sent as reinforcements, disembarking at Natal at the beginning of April.

The losses in action were : Killed—(Europeans) 76 Officers (including the Prince Imperial of France), 1,007 N.C.O. and men ; (Natives) 604. Wounded—(Europeans) 37 Officers, 206 N.C.O. and men ; (Natives) 57. The returns are incomplete as regards Native casualties. Between 11th January and 15th October, 1879, 17 Officers and 330 men died of diseases consequent on the operations. The total cost of the war was £5,230,323.—*Narrative of the Field Operations connected with the Zulu War of 1879*. War Office publication. London, 1881.

A Natal official return (1880) shows that, in addition to a reserve of 360 Europeans and 2,500 Natives, the Natal forces called out were : Natal Mounted Police, 130 ; Volunteers, 582 ; Levy leaders, etc, 86 ; Natives, 20,037. Total, 20,835.



at Nkandhla, then at Eshowe. Cetshwayo died at the latter place on the 8th February, 1884. His body was conveyed by his people to the vicinity of the Nkandhla forests and there interred. Of this grave and forests a good deal will be heard later.

The disturbances that had broken out between Zibebu and the royal family continued down to the middle of 1888, by which time Dinuzulu, eldest son of Cetshwayo and bearer of his father's tattered mantle, had reached his majority.<sup>1</sup>

As the part played by Dinuzulu both before and during the Rebellion was of the greatest importance, it would be as well to include here, by way of introduction to what has to follow, a somewhat fuller notice of his antecedents. He was born about the year 1868. As Zulus are nothing if not expressive in the selection of names, so, in devising one for his eldest son, Cetshwayo gave evidence of the well-known national characteristic. Dinuzulu means "*one who is a source of worry to the Zulus.*"

Under Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement, Ndabuko, Dinuzulu's uncle, and, next to Cetshwayo, the man of greatest rank and influence in Zululand, was placed under one of the thirteen "kinglets," Zibebu, a blood relation of the King. During Cetshwayo's imprisonment, Ndabuko became Dinuzulu's guardian. As the result of endeavours by this prince to secure the return of Cetshwayo, friction arose between him and Zibebu. It was not long before civil war broke out between the royalist party and that of Zibebu. Ndabuko's cause became the cause of Dinuzulu. The British Government had, in the meantime, definitely refused to take over the government of the country.

In 1883, when, at Ulundi, Cetshwayo was surprised and

<sup>1</sup> Dinuzulu's mother, a daughter of a commoner, Msweli, was a concubine and never became Cetshwayo's chief wife. There was a posthumous son by the chief wife, called Manzolwandhle, now a Chief in Nqutu district, Zululand, who would, under ordinary circumstances, have succeeded his father, but, with the country in an unsettled condition at the ex-King's death, it was decided that Dinuzulu, because the only son then living, should be recognized as head of the Zulu House.



defeated by Zibebu, Dinuzulu was saved by a faithful adherent Sitshitshili, who will be referred to later.

On the death of Cetshwayo, the heads of the nation nominated Dinuzulu as successor.<sup>1</sup> The claim of his younger brother, Manzolwandhle,<sup>2</sup> to the heirship has, however, always been regarded by the majority of Zulus as superior to his own.

Dinuzulu soon found it necessary to seek the assistance of the Boers against Zibebu and Hamu (another of the "kinglets" and an uncle of Dinuzulu). The latter (Dinuzulu) called in the support of Boers of the Transvaal, who, on the 21st May, 1884, went through the farce of "crowning" the prince "King of the Zulus," thereby recalling the occasion on which, forty years before, they had installed his grandfather as Paramount Chief. On the 5th June following, Dinuzulu's adherents, aided by 600 Boers, attacked and completely routed Zibebu and his followers at Tshanini.<sup>3</sup> The Boers, for their moral assistance—hardly more than moral—induced the young "King" to sign a document ceding them a large tract of north-eastern Zululand, extending down to the sea at St. Lucia Bay. This they cut up into farms and created the "New Republic," afterwards the Vryheid district of the Transvaal. In Sir A. Havelock's settlement with the Boers, this Republic was recognized by Britain, its limitations were defined, and a large portion of country alleged to have been ceded was recovered for the Zulus, including all the coast land round St. Lucia Bay.

In May, 1887, the Imperial Government assumed full control of the affairs of Zululand, the Governor's proclamation of formal annexation being read at Eshowe in the presence of some 15,000 Zulus.

Other disturbances arose between Dinuzulu and Zibebu in 1887-8, but as the country had been formally annexed

<sup>1</sup> The Imperial Government did not at any time recognize Dinuzulu as a king.

<sup>2</sup> The name means "*water of the ocean*," in memory of the voyage that was made by his father to England.

<sup>3</sup> Where Mkuze River passes through the Ubombo Range.

by the Imperial Government, and as it appeared Dinuzulu and his two uncles, Ndabuko and Tshingana, had deliberately contravened the law, of whose provisions they were fully aware, they were arrested on a charge of public violence. Their trial took place at Eshowe before a specially-constituted court, when all three were convicted and sentenced to ten, fifteen and twelve years' imprisonment, respectively. Early in 1889, they were deported to St. Helena. There they remained until the end of 1897, when they were taken back to Zululand. Their return followed immediately upon the annexation of Zululand to Natal, when, of course, the Imperial Government ceased to directly control the affairs of the former territory. The terms of Dinuzulu's repatriation will call for particular notice in a later chapter.

In the Act of Annexation<sup>1</sup> it was provided that "until other provisions shall have been made . . . with the approval of Her Majesty, no grants or alienation of Crown Lands . . . shall be made, nor till then shall the Natives be disturbed in the use and occupation of any lands occupied or used by them at the time of the taking effect of this Act." In 1902, a Commission was appointed for the purpose of delimiting tracts of country to be reserved for occupation of the Natives, on the one hand, and those for immediate and future European occupation, on the other. About seven-twelfths of the country (whose total acreage is 6,695,000), or approximately 3,887,000 acres, divided into twenty-one separate locations, were reserved for the exclusive occupation of the Natives, whose numbers, at that time, fell just short of 200,000. Much of this land, however, was and still is unsuitable for human habitation, either because of its being too arid and stony for cultivation, of malarial fever being prevalent therein, or of its being infested with the tsetse fly. The total area set apart for European occupation was 2,808,000 acres. The recommendations of the Commission received the approval of the Imperial Government, whereupon the blocks set apart for Europeans were surveyed into farms

<sup>1</sup> No. 37, 1897 (Natal).





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not exceeding 500 acres apiece, mainly on the coast belt south of the Mhlatuze River, and disposed of to sugar planters. Similarly reserved lands in other parts were not so readily taken up. This opening of the door on a large scale to European settlers undoubtedly went a long way towards unsettling the people.

## II.

### SYSTEM OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN NATAL.

WHEN the first colonists arrived, there were, as has been seen, but few aboriginal inhabitants, so few that nothing in the shape of formal government could exist. Gradually, however, refugees from Zululand and various parts of Natal proper began to attach themselves to the British settlers. And so, by 1835, the population at Port Natal had grown to about 4,000. Capt. Allen F. Gardiner, R.N., who arrived in the year referred to, accordingly found it necessary to enter into a treaty with Dingana (May, 1835) in the name of the settlers at Port Natal, wherein the latter engaged themselves "for the future never to receive or harbour any deserters from the Zulu country . . . and to use every endeavour to secure and return to the King every such individual endeavouring to find an asylum among them."<sup>1</sup> In the following year, the British Government appointed Gardiner, at his own request, a Justice of the Peace, without, however, providing for the execution of the powers so conferred. The result was a protest on the part of the pioneers, and an immediate and complete failure by Gardiner to assert his authority.<sup>2</sup> A petition from the residents to the effect that Natal, to

<sup>1</sup> Bird, *Annals of Natal*, i. 307.

<sup>2</sup> Among the reasons of the protest drawn up about May, 1837, were : That Natal was not part of the British dominions, but belonged to the resident European inhabitants ; that the power given to Gardiner extended only to British subjects, and did not empower him to punish acts of aggression committed by Natives upon British residents ; that Gardiner had been given no civil jurisdiction. The colonists, moreover, expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would take over the country and appoint Magistrates.—Bird, *Ibid.* i. 320.



which they had given the name of "Victoria" in honour of our late revered Queen, then Princess, should be recognized "as a Colony of the British Empire," met with no encouragement from the Imperial Government. And so it happened that practically no regular government existed when the Boers arrived in 1837-39.

The relations between the voortrekkers and the Zulus have been already touched on. Although, with the defeat and death of Dingana, the menace of the Zulu power had been temporarily removed, the installation of his brother Mpande as Paramount Chief meant a continuance of the military and tribal systems, though in a modified degree. The Boers governed on somewhat similar lines such aborigines as they found already in the country, or those who, since the arrival of the Boers, had fled there from across the Tugela.<sup>1</sup> No reservations were at that time set apart for the occupation of the Natives, the Boer custom being to treat them as squatters when living on lands occupied by Europeans, and require them to render service in lieu of paying rent.<sup>2</sup> No equality as between Europeans and Natives was permitted. Had Boer administration continued in Natal, steps would probably have been taken to prohibit further ingress of refugees; such as were unprepared to serve would, probably, have been refused an asylum and compelled to return to Zululand or to the district between Umkomanzi and Umzimkulu Rivers, if not still further south.<sup>3</sup> As it was, in 1843, when that administration came to an end, there were between 40,000 and 50,000 refugees in Natal (exclusive of some 5,000 or 6,000 original inhabitants), notwithstanding the treaty above referred to.<sup>4</sup> The British settlers at the Port,

<sup>1</sup> The military system, however, was not permitted to operate universally as in Zululand, though there was no objection to Chiefs maintaining a certain amount of military organization within their respective tribes.

<sup>2</sup> The policy was to distribute the refugees over the European farms. "Each farmer was allowed 5 families on his farm, but not any more without consent of the authorities."—*Proceedings*, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 20, 25.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Cloete, *Evidence*, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 18. 25.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* i. 25. 27.

however, looked upon themselves as wholly independent both of the Boers and of the Zulu King, and accorded the refugees and all others living under their protection similar concessions in the matter of self-government, if somewhat more liberal.

The same disposition to allow Natives to live in accordance with their ancient laws, habits and customs—so long as these were not repugnant to civilized usages—is seen in the Instructions issued in March, 1848, by the Imperial Government to the first Governor. By that time, the Native population had increased to over 100,000. So significant is the 28th clause and so pivotal in the long government subsequently maintained, that it would be well to notice it in its original, though slightly abbreviated, form : “ And whereas the said District of Natal is inhabited by numerous Tribes, . . . whose ignorance and habits unfit them for the duties of civilized life, and it is necessary to place them under special control, until, having been duly capacitated to understand such duties, they may reasonably be required to render ready obedience to the Laws . . . , We do hereby declare it to be our Will and Pleasure . . . that, in assuming the sovereignty thereof, we have not interfered with or abrogated any Law, Custom or Usage prevailing among the Inhabitants previous to the assertion of sovereignty . . . except so far as the same may be repugnant to the general principles of humanity recognized throughout the civilized world . . . ”

The same Instruction, whilst further declaring that, civil or criminal jurisdiction of the Chiefs had not been abrogated, went on to reserve to the Crown the right of amending Native laws, and providing for better administration of justice among them, “ as may be found practicable.”

It is not intended here, of course, to trace, step by step the development of Native policy from the issue of the Instruction here quoted to the introduction of responsible government in 1893, and on to the establishment of the Union of South Africa. It will suffice, perhaps, to observe that the key-note thereof has, all along, been to



govern these people in accordance with principles inherited from, and followed by, their race from time immemorial. It has been a cardinal feature of this policy "to make haste slowly," on the ground that a change, not spontaneously desired by the majority of the people, is detrimental to their interests. Moreover, it is productive of unrest if forced on by a government pledged to administer the affairs of its own race on lines radically and obviously different. Consequently, in the endeavour to maintain what every humane man will agree is a laudable practice, Natal, by steadily marking time in the interests of the people, and in order to fulfil what, after all, is the greatest function of government, viz. to endeavour to promote the happiness and contentment of all her subjects, has laid herself open to the charge of *doing nothing*. If what she has done for the Natives in the way of prohibiting cherished habits and customs of untold antiquity; abrogating laws of various kinds long familiar to the people; urging them to hasten to educate themselves and their children in accordance with European, that is, foreign standards; persuading them to forsake their own creeds to adopt one or other of the numerous forms of Christianity—if these be the only evidences of action, then it would seem Natal has not a great deal to advance. But, if there be other standards by which a government that presides over the destinies of a lower race may be judged, if any merit attach to a government which, while it does not actively repress legitimate aspirations, reasonably assists the people, whilst penalizing practices such as witchcraft, putting to death without trial and marrying off girls without their consent, and ordains "that there shall not be in the eye of the law any distinction or disqualification whatever, founded on mere distinction of colour, origin, language, or creed, but that the protection of the law, in letter and in substance, shall be extended impartially to all alike," also "that slavery in any shape or under any modification is absolutely unlawful"; if, we say, there be any merit in these things, then the policy of Natal in the past, if it appears to have been somewhat wanting in energy, has

at least been friendly ; if it has not caused the people to ' progress ' with leaps and bounds, it has at least recognized that *natura non facit saltum* is as true to-day as it was in the time of Aristotle, and as it will be ten thousand years hence ; if it has not sought to impress the European character in all its complexity on a race fashioned in moulds vastly different to those of Europeans, it has preferred to rely on nature to produce such a character as she will produce, regardless of any well-intentioned efforts of impassioned promoters of a civilization which, to say the least, would appear to be not altogether without spot or blemish.

The government of the lower races is a problem of stupendous difficulty, not because of any fear lest, being badly ruled, they will combine *à la militaire* to wreak vengeance on those they consider their oppressors, but chiefly because of the ever-changing legal, political and social position that has to be accorded them within the limits of the British system, framed, as that was, for people whose members are admittedly on a footing of equality with one another.

But, although government of the Natives mainly in accordance with their own laws and customs has been the outstanding feature of Natal's policy, changes being introduced with care and deliberation as they appeared to be necessary, there have not been wanting occasions on which, instead of being sympathetic, her administration has been cold and artificial ; instead of being content with advance in harmony with nature's slow processes, she has imposed laws involving sudden and widespread change ; instead of being occasional and simple to understand, the laws have been frequent and to some extent unintelligible, having in view rather the benefit of the higher than of the lower race. Instances of such inconsistency will be given later ; for these, indeed, are the stuff out of which the bonfire of the Rebellion was built up. Had Natal been true to herself, had she but steadily adhered to the general principles above outlined, it is not too much to say, there would have been no Rebellion.

On the initiation of Native " own-laws " policy in Natal,



the Imperial Government took steps to see that it was followed in the letter as well as in the spirit. The officer selected as the principal exponent thereof was Theophilus Shepstone, a young man of but twenty-eight years of age, who, having arrived in the Cape Colony with his father in 1820, with the Albany Settlers, had lived nearly the whole of his life in Native areas north-east of Grahamstown. The proficiency attained by him in the Native dialects was remarkable, so much so, that he was able, on the one hand, materially to assist the Rev. W. B. Boyce in discovering the underlying philological principle of the Bantu languages known as the *euphonic concord*, and, on the other, to be employed by the Imperial Government in the Cape Colony at the age of eighteen as interpreter and negotiator of treaties with important Native Chiefs, during a critical period. No more competent officer could have been found for the post of Diplomatic Agent, as it was at first called, especially as he had recently and for seven years been in personal charge at Peddie of various Zulu tribes—locally known as amaMfengu or Fingos—who had, since 1820, been driven out of Natal and Zululand by Tshaka and Dingana's inhuman tactics.

The story of Shepstone's early connection with the tribes on the then eastern frontiers of the Cape Colony is itself matter of history, and we cannot stay to consider it, it being enough to note the experience brought by this brilliant young officer to the discharge of the peculiarly difficult duties of his new post.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after his arrival, he, along with Dr. William Stanger, Lieutenant Charles J. Gibb, R.E., and Messrs. N. Adams and D. Lindley (American Missionaries), were commissioned to lay off tracts of country known as "locations," suitable for Native occupation, and conveniently situated in respect of areas inhabited, or in the near future to be inhabited, by Europeans.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Shepstone arrived in 1845, but did not begin to hold office till January, 1846.—*Proceedings*, Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, i. 58.

<sup>2</sup> The very able report of this Commission was dated 30th March, 1847, and will be found *in extenso* in i. pp. 62-67 of the publication referred to in the preceding note.



At first, six or seven locations of about 50,000 acres each, were laid off, followed later on by others, until, in 1906, the aggregate area so set apart amounted to 2,262,066 acres. Arrangements were made for the whole of these lands to be vested in trustees appointed under Letters Patent.<sup>1</sup> A singularly wise provision by the Imperial Government was that such trustees should be the officer-administering-the-government for the time being, together with the members of the executive council. By this means, Native interests were effectually protected against any pressure that might be brought on the Government in the future by would-be European or Asiatic purchasers.

Another early work of importance which Shepstone performed with tact, and credit to himself, was the levying of a tax of 7s. on every Native hut. By 1845, the coloured population had risen to nearly 100,000. As control of so great a number, scattered over many parts of the Colony, involved considerable expense, it was only fair that the people should contribute to the revenue, seeing they were securing the very real benefit—of which the younger generations are too often oblivious—of being completely protected against the tyranny of their quondam rulers. The odd amount of 7s. was made up thus: 5s. “in respect of each hut; it being understood that every kraal, having the usual establishment of a Native kraal, that is, cattle and cultivated ground, whether in a location or on private farms, should be subject to this property and protection tax”;<sup>2</sup> and 2s. “as a quit rent for land on all kraals or villages residing either in the locations or on government land without any location.”<sup>3</sup> Some twenty years later, the tax, which in reality was in respect of wives—Zulus, like all Bantu races, being polygamists—was doubled. By that time, however, the people were earning far higher wages, whilst labour was readily procurable among the steadily increasing European immigrants.

<sup>1</sup> Dated 27th April, 1864.

<sup>2</sup> *Memorandum*, T. Shepstone to Legislative Council, 18th June, 1849.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Shepstone, in 1856, when, under "Royal Charter," a representative legislature was first established in Natal, ceased to be styled Diplomatic Agent. He then became Secretary for Native Affairs. This office he only relinquished some twenty years later, on proceeding to the Transvaal in connection with a mission too well known to need explaining here. Throughout this long period (1845-1876), he had controlled the Natives with consummate tact and ability and, on several occasions, undertaken missions of much delicacy and importance to Zululand and elsewhere, invariably with success and credit to the Government. Although his policy, so well known as to be usually referred to as the "Shepstonian policy," has been charged with being one of *laissez faire*, the mere absence of war between 1845 and 1906 is eloquent and abundant testimony of its worth. To this day, thousands of Natives deplore the setting aside of such natural and well-tryed methods for those more in accordance with European civilization.

One of the consequences of upholding Native law was the introduction of a system of labour known as the *isibalo* or modified *corvée*. This system originated about the year 1848, on the occasion of the road between Durban and Pietermaritzburg being in a bad and impassable state. The Lieutenant Governor, in his capacity as Supreme Chief, thereupon called out a party of Natives, who were paid fair wages, to effect the necessary repairs. Owing to certain political excitement, the system was discontinued shortly after 1854, but, on its resumption in 1858, it remained continuously in vogue until 1911, when the Union Government, instead of introducing regulations to correct the prevailing abuses, merely refrained from using the power of requisitioning labourers, which still, however—the people being as uncivilized as they are—rightly exists in the law.

During the Zulu regime, it was customary for the king to call at any time on young men to serve on public works, such as building royal apartments, erecting cattle enclosures, hoeing and weeding crops. Under the new order



of things, the necessary authority being vested in the Supreme Chief, steps were taken, from time to time, to call youths out for service on public works, notably those connected with roads, the difference between the old system and the new being that, whereas in former days Natives received no remuneration whatever for their labour, they were, under European government, paid a fair wage, even though somewhat less, as sometimes happened, than what was obtainable in the open market.

Notwithstanding that excellent and plentiful rations were supplied, and the hours and conditions of labour all that could be desired, the *isibalo* became unpopular, owing largely to the favouritism shown, in later years, by Chiefs,<sup>1</sup> and to the ease with which some of these officers were induced to accept bribes from those anxious to be exempted. Abuses of this kind could, of course, have been effectually put a stop to by modifying the system and controlling it with better-framed regulations.

Special mention of the *isibalo* has been made here because, being unpopular, its systematic enforcement, especially in later days, when many Natives had become educated and capable of earning higher wages than those allowed, may be said to have contributed in some degree to the dissatisfaction with European administration that prevailed prior to the Rebellion. However, it is but fair to remark that, in practice, only one in thirty of those liable and able to work was ever called on in any year, and then for never more than six months at a time. The duty of seeing that individuals were not too frequently enrolled, that they were not physically unfit, and that each of the 238 tribes in Natal proper furnished its right proportion of labourers, devolved on the Native Affairs Department and the Magistrates. These duties were generally discharged in a careful manner, irregularities being checked as soon as they were brought to notice. Owing, however, to changes in conditions of living, the system, originally adapted to a state of pure tribalism, could not be carried

<sup>1</sup> Chiefs were called on by Magistrates to supply labourers according to the size of their tribes.

out in all respects with the desired fairness. It called not so much for abolition or discontinuance as for modification, at any rate at that particular time (1910). The practice of exacting labour, within the restricted limits referred to, proved to be a valuable stimulus, especially in earlier days, when the people knew practically nothing about manual work. Boys living in far-off, secluded locations, who would otherwise have devoted their lives to courting girls, drinking beer, and faction fighting, were compelled to go out and work—not on the public roads unless specially ordered to do so, but wherever they chose—and, in so doing, were soon in the position of being able to benefit themselves as well as their parents and relations in ways they had not dreamt of.

After Magistrates had been appointed in different parts, varying considerably *inter se* in their knowledge of Zulu habits, customs and language, it was not long before the desirability of preparing for their use a Code of Native law (*i.e.* an attempt to codify Native tribal law) made itself felt. As matters stood, uniformity in judicial pronouncements was practically impossible. Such uniformity, essential in every community, is especially so among savages, who should at once be impressed with the idea of justice under British rule. The periodical meetings of Magistrates that were convened, were of much assistance in attaining consistency before promulgation of the Code in 1877. On being brought into practice, it was soon found that this Code, though ably drawn, was not sufficiently comprehensive (as a matter of fact, it was never intended to be comprehensive), but it was not until 1893 that a more elaborate instrument was enacted by Parliament. The Code, as then expanded, with sundry later amendments, is still the law by which the great majority of Native conditions of life are regulated. On the whole, the Code and the manner in which it has been administered have given considerable satisfaction to the Natives. At time of writing, it has not been extended to Zululand; to do so may facilitate administration, but it would probably result in disappointment and discontent among



people happy enough under the proclamations issued from time to time whilst the territory was under immediate control of the Imperial Government.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the Magistrates, over forty of whom had, by 1906, been appointed in Natal and Zululand, civil and criminal business of a more important character was dealt with by a Native High Court. This court, now consisting of four Judges, but originally of only one, was first created in 1875, to relieve the Supreme Court of a class of work it was incompetent, and had insufficient time, to deal with.

From what has been said, it is seen that, in 1906, and since 1893, when responsible government was granted, Native affairs were presided over by a Supreme Chief, appointed by the Imperial Government, though bound to conform to the advice of his ministers, except on certain important, rarely-occurring occasions. The portfolio of Native Affairs was held by one of the cabinet ministers, assisted by a permanent Under-Secretary and staff.

The Under-Secretary selected for the post was Mr. S. O. Samuelson. This painstaking officer, with an unsurpassed knowledge of the Zulu language and customs, did a vast amount of useful and varied work under difficult conditions. During his long tenure of office, which extended from 1893 to 1909, there were several changes of ministry and, with each, came a new Minister of Native Affairs, holding views sometimes, as it happened, widely differing from those of his predecessor. It seemed so strange to the Natives to have movable ministers in charge of their affairs, that they tended to focus their attention rather on Mr. Samuelson than on the minister, with the result that the former stood constantly in a false light, as unfair to himself as to the people. This mutation of ministers and frequent introduction of new policies, were radical defects in the Constitution Act of 1893. They opened the door, not only to modifications arising out of the personal predilections of the minister, but, what is

<sup>1</sup> Zululand was annexed to Natal in December, 1897, when practically the same system of Native administration in vogue at that time was permitted to continue.

far more important, to those dictated by the party in power for the time being in Parliament. As this party depended on the support of their constituents, needless to say, the latter, with brains ever active in devising solutions of the Native problem, and not unnaturally anxious to promote their own interests, brought pressure, through their members, to bear on highly-placed officials, and, through these, on Magistrates and other established officers, not excluding Native Chiefs—all with the cumulative effect of unsteading the entire fabric of Native administration and imperilling the general welfare of the people.

After Zululand was annexed to Natal (December, 1897), the office of Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate of that territory was converted into one of Commissioner for Native Affairs. Under the Under-Secretary and Commissioner came the Magistrates, the thirty<sup>1</sup> of Natal proper, as *ex-officio* Administrators of Native law, coming under the former, and the eleven of Zululand under the latter, officer. After the Magistrates came the Chiefs of tribes, 238 in Natal proper,<sup>2</sup> and 83 in Zululand. Salaries and allowances were paid to 227 of the Natal Chiefs,<sup>3</sup> and stipends to seven of those in Zululand.<sup>4</sup> All Chiefs were required to control their tribes in accordance with the tribal system and keep in close touch with the Magistrates of their respective wards.

Some attempt must now be made to describe the tribal or patriarchal system (analogous in many respects to that of the ancient Jews), the very backbone of Native administration and still the most prominent and radical feature of the South African Native population.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The statistics here given are for the year 1906.

<sup>2</sup> These include those (23) of the so-called Northern Districts—a tract of country annexed to Natal on the conclusion of the last Boer War.

<sup>3</sup> Total, £2,618 for the year.

<sup>4</sup> Total, £1,200, of which £500 was paid to Dinuzulu, £60 to each of three of his uncles, and £300 to Meiteki (formerly Zibebu).

<sup>5</sup> At the last Census (May, 1911), the total number of Natives in South Africa was 4,019,006 (males, 2,012,949; females, 1,996,057).



Confining attention to the Zulus, we shall begin by observing that they are polygamists and occupy circular huts of beehive formation, invariably constructed of wattles, thatched with grass, and supported inside by poles. Each wife has a hut of her own. There are, especially in larger homesteads or kraals,<sup>1</sup> additional huts for the occupation of young men, storing grain, etc. If, then, a man has four wives, we shall expect to find him in possession of five or six huts. Now, it is universal custom to arrange these huts in circular formation, from which method, indeed, the word "kraal" has evidently been derived. For sanitary reasons, the rule is to select for the kraal-site slightly sloping ground, though, when this is done, the floor of each hut is carefully levelled. At the highest point of the site is built the hut of the head or principal wife, not necessarily the one first married, whilst subsequent wives' huts are placed in a sequence determined by the kraal-owner, who, however, is compelled to act in terms of rigid tribal practice. The intervals between the huts are so regulated as to preserve the symmetry of the kraal as a whole. But, in connection with the circular arrangement referred to, must be considered the indispensable cattle-pen or enclosure, locally known as a cattle-kraal. This, too, is invariably round or oval, the gate being at the lowest, with one or two wickets in the top-most, portion. When it is realized that cattle are given for every woman taken to wife, the close association of cattle and their milk with the huts becomes more intelligible, though the fact of the pen being inside rather than outside the huts as arranged, is possibly also accounted for by the numerous lions, leopards and other beasts of prey that existed before the introduction of firearms, not to refer to human foes.

The cattle handed over by the bridegroom to his bride's father are known as *lobolo*. For two or more generations it was customary for five, six or seven cattle to be so delivered (afterwards restricted by the Natal Government

<sup>1</sup> The word "kraal" which will henceforth be used, is derived from the Dutch "coraal."



to a number not exceeding ten). This passing of cattle was not, as is commonly supposed, by way of purchase, but as compensation for loss of the girl's services, and, further, as a living and visible guarantee that she would receive proper treatment at the hands of her husband.

The next essential to consider is this. When a young man marries, he either continues for a time in his father's kraal (his wife, of course, having a hut of her own), or moves, along with his mother (if she can be spared), to some site at a distance, approved by the Chief or his representative, and there proceeds to act on the same principles that governed his father's domestic affairs. In time, other sons leave to establish themselves on similar lines. And so, like the pumpkin plant (a favourite simile among the people), the family expands, throwing out fruitful off-shoots here and there, only, in their turn, to do the same.

In the case of Chiefs, the number of wives is frequently beyond a dozen in number, and, in respect of Kings, without limit. Owing to this and other reasons, such as jealousy among the women and rivalry among the male children, it was and is still found convenient to erect different kraals, though on the same general lines as those already outlined.

So much for the domestic side. Let us now glance at the administrative.

The King was assisted by a privy council of some five or six members and a general assembly of non-elected and more or less elderly men. The latter deliberated in public, anyone being permitted to listen to, and even take part in, the proceedings. In view of the fact that the assembly included men of high rank, those of inferior status usually remained silent. But as, when the Rebellion broke out, there was no Native King, it is necessary to confine attention to the actual machinery in vogue at that time.

The King's place had been taken by the Supreme Chief (Governor), whilst the functions of the privy council were discharged by the executive council, and those of the

assembly by the Legislative Assembly and Council. It is needless to remark that Native opinion, under such arrangement, where not only the Supreme Chief, but the councils consisted entirely of Europeans, and where no Native council existed at all, except occasional and partially representative gatherings called together by the Magistrates—more to assist the Government in communicating its laws or regulations than to discussing their necessity or suitability—did not find more than apologetic, and the feeblest, expression.

In regard to the various tracts of land specially set apart for Natives, the same tenure was in vogue as had existed under tribal rule from time immemorial. The land was held in common. And this rule applied as much to the Chief as to his humblest followers. There was no such thing as alienation of land ; no freehold, no leasehold, no rents. Occupancy depended on good behaviour, together with ready and loyal discharge of all civic and military duties. Considerable care was taken by the Chief, in allotting building and garden sites, not to interfere with the commonage or existing rights. If these arrangements, in the face of an increasing population, were not always judicious, pressure of circumstances had begun to teach lessons, as it does all other nations.

Anything required by the Government to be done was communicated by Magistrates to the Chiefs, whose tribes varied greatly in size. These then passed the order on to responsible headmen—generally conveniently situated in different parts of the ward or wards<sup>1</sup>—who, in their turn, transmitted it to the various individual kraal-owners in their areas. When, on the other hand, anything of importance occurred in a Chief's ward, such as commission of crime or outbreak of disease, it was, under Native law, the duty of the one nearest whose kraal such incident had

<sup>1</sup> For many years past, many Chiefs had portions of their tribes living in two, three or more Magisterial divisions. In such cases, a Chief was called on to nominate a headman, with powers almost equal to his own, to control each section. It was, moreover, the Government's policy, on the death of such Chief, to make an arrangement whereby the outlying sections would be absorbed by Chiefs actually resident in the Magisterial districts in which such sections happened to be.



happened, to report to the headman, who, after taking such immediate action as appeared necessary and within his power, sent the intelligence on to the Chief, and so on to the local Magistrate. And it is wonderful with what rapidity these reports were transmitted, notwithstanding that Natives, as a rule, are unable to read or write, and are not possessors of horses or any other means of locomotion. The obligation resting on all, on pain of heavy penalty, to report crime, transformed members of every tribe into an organized and efficient police force. It is owing to this fact that the expenditure of the Colony on account of police was, in earlier years, as surprisingly small as it was.

Among the most important crimes was cattle-stealing. Every kraal-owner in regard to cattle—the greatest of all forms of Native property—was exceedingly vigilant, never allowing a beast to be driven past his kraal unless he knew where it had come from, where it was going to, etc. This principle of “collective responsibility,” as it is called, had the effect of preserving order in the tribe and even guaranteeing to every member and the Chief that order would be maintained.

Enough has, perhaps, been said to enable the reader to infer that the position of women was a low one. They could not, except in rare cases, inherit or hold property. Generally speaking, they fell much into the background, and it devolved on them, not only to perform all domestic duties, draw water at the spring or stream and collect fire-wood, but to cultivate and keep clean the crops as well.

It can also be readily understood that the tribes of Natal and Zululand (whatever may have been their inter-relation when Tshaka began his iron rule and the process of welding the nation together), had, in the main—albeit within a couple of centuries—sprung from but three or four parent stocks. It is this universal intermingling of types which, as in England, has gradually evolved a people well-nigh homogeneous and possessing a remarkable degree of solidarity. Although, in 1906, many feuds and differences—some of these dating back two or more generations—existed among many of the tribes, when



anything powerful enough to inflame particular sections occurred, it required but little effort and time to bring on a conflagration of the whole. There is nothing puny or dilatory about a Zulu when he begins to sharpen his assegais and cut shields for war. It will be seen in a later chapter how strained the relations between Natives and Europeans became, and how the black race came to feel that the white man's civilization was oppressing it. With such resentment latent in a million warlike savages, living under such system as has been outlined above, the danger of the tribal system, as well as its meaning, become, perhaps, sufficiently clear; at any rate, for the understanding of the story narrated in these pages. And yet, of all people on this earth, the Zulus are the most respectful, the most amenable to discipline, and the most easily managed—chiefly because of the many excellences inherent in the tribal system.

Having regard to the profound differences in social organization between the Zulus and the British people, differences which, chiefly because of their immense scope and variety, have been but briefly indicated herein, it has, ever since Natal became a British Colony, been a problem of extreme difficulty to devise a method whereby, whilst safeguarding Native interests, their affairs could be managed in a completely satisfactory manner. The elimination of the higher machinery of Native government, *e.g.* the King and his councils, has imposed on an alien people, animated by vastly different ideals, the duty of controlling present Native progress, if such, in fact, it be. If evidences of imperfect grafting of the Native system of administration into our own have often been conspicuous during the last seventy years, it will surprise no one; nor will anyone be astonished to hear that strong Commissions have been appointed at different times specially to investigate the condition of the Natives. One of these bodies was at work in 1852-3, another in 1882-3, and yet another, in the interest of South African Natives as a whole, in 1902-4. What is remarkable is the apparent apathy displayed by the public, its representatives and the

Government, whenever the result of such investigations and reports thereon are in their hands. Not that the various recommendations should all be adopted, but one would think a little time could be spared to examine the development of a problem, probably greater than all other problems put together, that South Africa will ever be called on to deal with, and to consider seriously if such development is or is not proceeding on sound lines. A further Commission was appointed in 1906, on the conclusion of the Rebellion; it, indeed, fared better, but into the sincere and liberal administrative reconstruction brought about by the Government, it is unnecessary to go at this stage.

In the Constitution Act of 1893, provision was made whereby a sum of £10,000 a year was set apart "for the promotion of the welfare and education of the Natives." More than half this sum was, latterly, placed annually at the disposal of the Education Department for furthering Native education, whilst the balance was applied to other Native purposes, such as industrial training, cottage hospitals, irrigation, dipping tanks (East Coast Fever), and barrack or shelter accommodation. With the increase of Native population from 500,000 in 1893 to 945,000 in 1906,<sup>1</sup> this sum soon became inadequate, particularly when regard is had to the fact that the beneficiaries have contributed, on the average, about £250,000 per annum in direct taxation since the annexation of Zululand to Natal.

In addition to this contribution, however, the Government, as long ago as 1862, began making extensive grants of land upon trust to missionary societies, "that the same might be used for missionary work amongst the Natives by the ecclesiastical or missionary bodies named in the several deeds of grant."<sup>2</sup> By 1887 (the date of the last), seventeen of these reserves, aggregating 144,192 acres of the best agricultural land, had been so set apart.

<sup>1</sup> Zululand, with a Native population of about 170,000, became, as has been seen, a province of Natal in 1897.

<sup>2</sup> Preamble, Act No. 49, 1903.



Numerous other, for the most part, smaller blocks have since been granted in Zululand. By way of still further assisting these societies, Parliament, in 1903, passed an Act transferring the administration of the trusts to the Natal Native Trust<sup>1</sup> and authorizing this body to charge rent from Natives living on the reserves.<sup>2</sup> One half of these monies was to be handed over to the missionaries for purposes of Native education and industrial training. It was not feasible to adopt such course in respect of the Zululand lots. Thus the education and general welfare of the people was promoted directly as well as indirectly.

Difficulty has always been experienced by the Government in inducing the people to take up industrial pursuits. On more than one occasion, large sums of money were voted and spent in erecting suitable buildings and providing instructors, but all to no purpose. Lack of enterprise on the part of the Natives was also exhibited in the matter of tree-planting, even when necessary for fuel, and this as to areas in regard to which they had every reason for thinking their occupancy would continue undisturbed for many years.

There are other directions in which difficulty has been met with when striving to promote material development. In some instances, disinclination to adopt European ideas is due to almost ineradicable superstitious notions.

Although Native law is in force in Natal, the Government, many years ago, foresaw the necessity of enabling individuals who had shown a disposition to adopt civilized habits, to obtain exemption therefrom. A law affording facilities, but, in practice, not free from difficulty, was accordingly passed in 1865.<sup>3</sup> Many men, women and children have availed themselves of its provisions.<sup>4</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> See p. 24. A separate Trust, though consisting of the same personnel, was created in 1909 for Zululand. In this territory alone, the area reserved for Native occupation amounts to nearly 4,000,000 acres.

<sup>2</sup> £3 a hut was at first levied, subsequently reduced to 30s.

<sup>3</sup> Law No. 28, 1865.

<sup>4</sup> Some 1,800 men, women and children had been exempted by 31st December, 1908.



was also foreseen that these people, according as they conformed to civilized conditions of life, would stand in need of means whereby their voice could be given expression to. Hence, the passing of the law<sup>1</sup> under which a male Native, who has been resident in the Colony for a period of twelve years, who has the necessary property qualification, and has been exempted from the operation of Native law for a period of seven years, is entitled to be registered as a qualified elector in the district in which he possesses property qualification. In practice, but little advantage had been taken of this law. This tends to show that the Native *per se* has no special desire to obtain European franchise.

There are two disabilities all classes of Natives suffer from, viz. the impossibility of possessing firearms, except with the special consent of Government, and of obtaining European liquor, except on the production of a medical certificate.

<sup>1</sup> Law No. 11, 1865.

### III.

#### STATE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION ON THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION.

WHEN it is borne in mind that the campaign which forms the subject of this history is probably the first to be conducted from start to finish by a British Colony, independently of other than merely moral assistance of Imperial troops, the contents of this chapter will probably prove of greater interest to the reader than would otherwise have been the case. No apology is, therefore, needed for attempting to describe the beginnings and development of military organization in Natal, and to show how it became possible for the Colony, aided to some extent by her sister Colonies, to deal as successfully as she did with the Rebellion.<sup>1</sup>

In 1893, when the Imperial Government granted responsible government to Natal, it was arranged that the Colony should assume direct control of her large Native population. It was, at the same time, decided that the garrison of Imperial troops should remain for a period of five years, so as to afford the colonists time within which to organize a defence force.

After the expiry of the five years, the Imperial Government began gradually to withdraw the troops.

A Volunteer Act was passed by Natal in 1895. The post of Commandant of Volunteers was conferred on Colonel (now Major-General Sir John) Dartnell, K.C.B.,

<sup>1</sup> It is, moreover, not unreasonable to suppose that the Union Government found the example of Natal of considerable assistance when passing its already well-known Defence Act of 1911.

C.M.G., who, in addition to having for years controlled the various, though small, volunteer corps, had, for twenty-two years, been in command of the Natal Mounted Police. On his resignation from the former office in 1898, he was succeeded by his staff officer, Major W. Royston, who, promoted to the rank of Colonel, continued in command until his untimely death in 1902. Colonel H. P. Leader, of the Imperial Army, succeeded. He was assisted by the four District Adjutants who were in charge of a like number of military districts into which the Colony was divided.

Much useful work was accomplished between 1893 and 1902 towards increasing the strength and efficiency of the force, as well as placing it on a sound war footing. To Colonel Royston belongs a large measure of credit for the high degree of organization achieved, notably in connection with the Boer War. During this war, of course, all Natal troops took the field to assist in repelling invasion. The alacrity with which they responded to the calls, and the smartness with which the duties assigned them were carried out, were commented on in the most favourable terms by the distinguished general officers in charge of the operations. But, notwithstanding the promptness displayed, it was impossible to disguise the fact that, out of an available manhood of 12,000, only 2,000 were actually *liable* for service.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, not surprising that Parliament should have been ready to provide for a better and more comprehensive system of defence than was possible under the Volunteer Act.

Organization proper, in the sense of exclusively local adjustment and systematization of local forces and *matériel*, could not and did not begin until some years after the bestowal of autonomy on Natal, and the first step in the process was the passing by the legislature of the Militia Act (1903) imposing on every class of the European inhabitants, between certain ages, the liability

<sup>1</sup> Commandant of Militia (Brig. Gen. Leader), *Annual Report*. See note, p. 45, where it is shown that a much larger number *volunteered* for service.



to undergo military training and service. By exacting compulsory service universally, with, of course, certain exceptions, a powerful instrument was placed in the hands of the Commandant of Militia, and one which enabled the Colony to be put in a more thorough-going state of defence than had ever before been attempted.

The word "organization" is used here in a precise and definite sense, and is taken to mean establishment of the requisite regiments or corps, personnel, horses, arms, transport, etc., and a placing of the same by constant training, inspection or otherwise, in a condition of readiness, with the object, on the outbreak of hostilities, of realizing, in the shortest possible time, the general purpose in the minds of those in authority. Connected with such organization is the ascertainment by the responsible officer of the resources of his command in regard to provisions, labourers, horses, the means of transporting troops and stores, and the obtaining of accurate knowledge of all the strategic features of the country, of fortified places, and the means of defence, the erection of lagers, making of roads and means of communication, and of every particular which may increase his power of acting with advantage against an enemy.<sup>1</sup> But it is one thing to enact a law and frame accompanying regulations, quite another to see that the various provisions are complied with by the three arms and administrative services in such way as will conduce to efficiency and the smooth working of every part when the force is called upon to take the field.

General peace organization, of course, in the way of holding annual camps of exercise, rifle meetings, sending of patrols from time to time through Native locations, arranging for the conveyance of camp equipment, saddlery, etc., by railway or by ox and mule waggon, purchase and hire of remounts, registration and insurance of horses, etc., continued just as they had done for years prior to the passing of the Militia Act, except that improvements on the efforts of preceding years were continually being introduced.

<sup>1</sup> Regulations, No. 110.

Having regard to the great importance of the new Act, it is proposed to allude briefly to the genesis thereof, to some of its principal features, and to the way in which it was administered. Unless the fundamental provisions are grasped at the outset, it is not unlikely that indistinct impressions will arise in the mind of the reader, with the result that the achievements of the Colony during an important crisis, full of meaning as they are and of lessons for the future, will be insufficiently appreciated.

In 1902, a motion, introduced into Parliament by Mr. (now Sir) Thomas Watt, K.C.M.G., member for Newcastle, in favour of universal compulsory service, was carried unanimously. A bill was next drafted and formally introduced by the Prime Minister, Sir Albert Hime, K.C.M.G., but was withdrawn. This was followed by the appointment of a Commission in November, 1902, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest L. Acutt, C.M.G., "to consider and report upon the general measures proper to be taken for the defence of the Colony and to advise as to the most suitable mode of constituting a defence force according to the general object of the bill (No. 36), which was introduced into Parliament at its last ordinary session."

This Commission reported in favour of compulsory military service, drafted another bill and recommended the enactment thereof. The recommendations were supported by the then Commandant of Volunteers (Colonel Leader, whose services had been specially lent to Natal by the Imperial Government). This officer was appointed to take command of the troops during the period of their transition from a volunteer to a militia force, or otherwise to institute such other radical changes as might appear imperative.

The bill was passed into law with but little opposition towards the end of 1903.<sup>1</sup> The labour of initiating, drafting and supporting in Parliament this statesmanlike measure was undertaken chiefly by Sir Thomas Watt.

<sup>1</sup> The Act did not, however, come into force until March, 1904.



Among its principal features were the following :

“That the Militia, with the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, and a Commandant of Militia, with the rank of Colonel, as responsible for the administration of all Militia and Defence matters, should consist of all the male inhabitants of European descent in the Colony, from the age of 18 to the age of 50 years inclusively . . . not being aliens.” Certain exemptions were allowed.

The Force was divided into four classes :

“(a) Active Militia, consisting of all men who may volunteer and who may be accepted for service in this class, and all other men who may be balloted for service.

“(b) Militia First Reserve, consisting of all unmarried men from 18 to 30 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.

“(c) Militia Second Reserve, consisting of all married men between 18 and 30 years of age inclusive, and all men from 31 to 40 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.

“(d) Militia Third Reserve, consisting of all men from 41 to 50 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia. . . .”

The strength of the Active Militia was to be determined from time to time, by the Governor-in-Council, but, in time of peace, might not exceed 4,000 men.

Whenever called out for active service, it became competent for the Governor-in-Council to place the Militia “under the orders of the Commander of His Majesty’s Regular Forces in the Colony, provided such officer shall not be below the substantive rank of Major-General in the Army.”<sup>1</sup>

In the event of the Active Militia being mobilized for military service, the Commandant was required to advertise in the Government Gazette and the press for volunteers, and “should enough men have not volunteered and been accepted in any district to complete the quota required for that district,” within the time specified, “the men enrolled in the Militia First Reserve shall be

<sup>1</sup> Act No. 30, 1905, sec. 1 substituted “Colonel” for “Major-General.”



balloted for” and “any man balloted for . . . shall be attached to such corps in his military district as the District Commandant may notify.”

The period of service in time of peace was not less than three years, irrespective of age at time of enrolment.

The Militia Reserves were liable to be called out by the Governor-in-Council for active service in time of “war, invasion or insurrection, or danger of any of them.” Their officers (designated Chief Leaders and Sub-Leaders) were appointed “at the instance of the Commandant of Militia in pursuance of a vote passed by a majority of the members of such Militia Reserves,” in accordance with the regulations.

In so far as the Native, Indian or coloured male population (outnumbering the European by about 10 to 1) was concerned, the Act empowered the Governor to call out any portion thereof, being British subjects, for military training or service in time of peace, or for active service in time of war, and to form the same into contingents for employment as scouts, drivers, labourers, stretcher-bearers, etc., under officers subject to the Commandant of Militia.

An amending Act, passed in 1906, enabled the Commandant to call out the Reserves for training, and so introduce some degree of organization among them, impossible under the main Act.

Although, during 1906, the entire European population was under 100,000, it was found that 5,000 men (all volunteers) were at the disposal of the State as Active Militia, with about 15,000 Reserves, divided into the three classes referred to.

A defect in the principal Act was the concession to Reserves of the privilege of electing their own officers (Chief Leaders and Sub-Leaders), as the selections, in many cases, were not determined by the military knowledge, military service, firmness of character and so forth of the candidate, but simply by the degree of wealth possessed, or popularity enjoyed, by him in the district. When the Reserves of certain parts were called out for

active service, the seriousness of this mistake speedily manifested itself, with the result that the best efforts of which some of the corps were capable were not put forth. Having regard to the numerical strength of the Reserves, it was of the greatest importance that only efficient officers should have been selected.

But, given the power of exacting compulsory service and the availability of *matériel*, there was wanting another and most important factor, namely, something which could so co-ordinate and systematize the heterogeneous elements as to weld them into that for which they were intended, namely, an engine of war, endowed with the power of life, movement and destruction. There was wanted, in short, an organizer. It was one thing for the legislature to provide the law, the money, the men, the horses, the equipment, ordnance and transport, but he that was to transform these masses of incongruous material into the desired entity could only be born, not made.

Without the active sympathy of a Government, an organizer can accomplish but little. To prepare for war is a task which, in order that it may be properly fulfilled, exacts tribute in numberless directions. Its dimensions are of universal scope and variety, and, unless the State is prepared to meet the reasonable demand of its agent, his efforts are foredoomed to failure. As the goal is to transform the material at hand into a living thing, it devolves on a Government to see that means are forthcoming or the efforts of the artificer become lacking both in efficiency and usefulness. This lesson the Government of Natal had learnt far better than did Canning and his Council at the time of the Indian Mutiny. Instead of refusing offers of assistance from local volunteers, every expedient was adopted by Natal to encourage volunteering; instead of an unsympathetic ruler, the Colony found in the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, an ideal helmsman, who, supported by a strong and capable Ministry<sup>1</sup> and a

<sup>1</sup>The members of the Cabinet were: C. J. Smythe, *Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary*; J. G. Maydon, *Railways and Harbours*; T. Hyslop, *Treasurer*; T. Watt, *Justice (including Defence) and Education*; H. D. Winter, *Native Affairs and Public Works*; and W. F. Clayton, *Agriculture*.



far-seeing Commandant, strained every nerve to suppress the Insurrection in a swift and vigorous manner, well knowing that clemency and indecision would help only to aggravate the situation and imperil the State.

On the Militia Act becoming law in 1904, the Government appointed its Commandant of Volunteers, Col. H. P. Leader, as the first Commandant of Militia. He, thereupon, temporarily assumed the rank of Brigadier General. A District Commandant was also appointed to each of the three military districts into which the Colony was then divided.

Assisted by these officers, his staff and the various commanding officers of corps, the Commandant took early steps to establish the system envisaged by the Act.

It will be remembered that May 31st, 1902, saw the conclusion of hostilities between England and the South African Republics. In that great conflict, Natal had thrown all her regular volunteer forces, numbering only about 2000 men, into the field.<sup>1</sup> Such forces, distinctly well-organized, were maintained at a high state of efficiency as long as the war lasted.

There can be no question but that the exacting discipline undergone by the troops during the Boer War prepared them and the rest of the Colony for the compulsory service imposed by the 1903 Act. But for the serious risks and trials of that war, even though commonly said to have "killed volunteering" in Natal, it is highly probable greater objection would have been offered than was done when the Militia bill was debated in Parliament. The War was, indeed, a blessing in disguise for Natal. It taught her manhood what defensive warfare was, as well as the necessity of establishing an adequate and constantly efficient force. In these circumstances, Leader found his task much easier than it would have been under ordinary conditions. His commanding and other officers were all

<sup>1</sup> Up to June, 1900, however, the approximate number of officers and men raised in Natal (inclusive of local Volunteer corps) was 9,500. Of those who did not belong to local corps, many, besides Natalians, were men from England, Transvaal, Orange Free State, etc., temporarily resident within the Colony.



ready and eager to co-operate. If he was crippled for the want of funds, owing to the Colony passing through a time of severe financial depression, an excellent spirit prevailed, men being anxious to enrol in the various corps and help forward the realization of the general purposes of the Act.

Among the District Commandants was Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel), H. T. Bru-de-Wold, D.S.O., C.M.G., V.D., J.P.<sup>1</sup> This officer, whilst discharging the ordinary duties of his post, observed, not long after peace had been concluded with the Boers, what, no doubt, a number of other colonists also did, namely, that there was a certain amount of restlessness and disregard of authority among the younger sections of the Natives of his district which, on its south-western side, bordered on Pondoland. He made a point of visiting European homesteads in various parts, where he found his observations frequently corroborated, whilst his attention was drawn to other suspicious indications. He took steps to gather, from all available sources, information regarding the tribes, including those living along the border in the Cape Colony. Their probable fighting strength was ascertained, as also tribal differences, distinctions being drawn between hereditary blood-feuds and those of a minor character. Those tribes that had established intimate relations by marriage, etc., or were off-shoots of existing older stocks, though commonly designated by different names, were also noted. These particulars were tabulated so as to show which group was likely to take the field against another in the event of hostilities, and so on. By degrees, there grew up in his mind the idea that an open rupture between the white and the black races would occur in the near future, and on such presentiment appearing more reasonable and palpable as time went on, he set himself to consider how

<sup>1</sup> Col. Bru-de-Wold first entered the Natal Volunteer forces as a trooper in 1873. He served throughout the Zulu War of 1879 (medal with clasp) and the Boer War, 1899-1902 (twice mentioned in dispatches, Queen's and King's medals with three clasps). By the end of the latter war he had risen to the rank of Major. He was awarded C.M.G. in 1900, in recognition of special services rendered by him during the Boer War.

far he would be ready should any such contingency arise in his particular district. He prepared mobilization schemes on a small scale, that is to say, assumed a revolt had broken out at a particular point within the Colony, and then devoted himself to utilizing all available resources so as to grapple with the imaginary outbreak in the most effective manner. These schemes, along with others on somewhat similar lines by the other district officers, were submitted to headquarters. Those by Bru-de-Wold evoked a special interest, with the result that he was invited to prepare others. This time, he was not limited to the resources of his own district, but was instructed to lay under tribute those of the entire Colony. This "day-dreaming," as persons devoid of a military sense may choose to style it, soon turned out to be, not only an amusing and engrossing pastime, but the thing of all others that the Colony stood most in need of at that particular juncture. That this view is correct, will become clearer the further we proceed.

On the post of Commandant being vacated by Leader in August, 1905, Bru-de-Wold was appointed thereto with the rank of Colonel.

But, although Col. Bru-de-Wold was so mindful of the necessity of preparing for war, it is only fair to remember that the foundations of Militia organization were laid whilst the first Commandant was still in office, not to refer to the various other and important contributory efforts in earlier days. The organization of the Volunteers during the Boer War, for instance, was everything that could have been desired, though, of course, it differed in character from a scheme which had in view hostilities with savages, who might rise in a number of places at the same moment. Royston had in view and prepared for possible hostilities with civilized forces living *beyond the borders* of the Colony, a very different undertaking to operating against barbarians residing *within* the Colony. "For the latter, one must have each division complete in itself, but, in organizing for a European war, one knows perfectly well that he must collect his men together in



the bulk before there is to be any resort to arms at all. So long as one's brigade is organized as a brigade, that is sound. In Native warfare, however, there should be organization practically of the individuals, for each of these might be called on to deal with a Native enemy in his immediate vicinity. Just before the Rebellion, each little unit was absolutely complete and prepared to take the field as it stood." <sup>1</sup>

Manuals of instruction based on those of the Imperial army, but adapted to local requirements, were prepared and issued. In these, the various duties of each arm, on receipt of an order to mobilize, were fully and clearly set forth.

Had Leader not felt obliged to resign, it is more than probable that with, for instance, so enthusiastic a lieutenant as Bru-de-Wold, the highly creditable system subsequently developed by the latter would have fully matured. But, whatever *may* have happened in his time, cannot be allowed to obscure well-deserved distinction and prevent the bestowal of that meed of praise the Colony owes to the man who, if he did not actually initiate, took infinite pains, in season and out of season, assisted by an efficient and willing staff, to further the scheme, until it actually assumed the solidarity it did and that capacity for simultaneous and harmonious movement which are the leading characteristics of every sound system of defence. Natal, therefore, owes her gratitude to Col. Bru-de-Wold as to one who, keenly alive to her best interests, in the face of much political and other discouragement, resolutely held to the course he had embarked on, until the long-entertained idea had been fairly realized. Without him, it is conceivable, the Colony might have become so involved during the Rebellion as to have been unable to suppress it without appealing for help to the Mother Country, when the command of the whole of the operations would have passed automatically from her own hands to those of the Imperial Government. That is to say, a Colony which, but a

<sup>1</sup> Major T. H. Blew, Chief Staff Officer, Natal, May, 1912.





*W. B. Sherwood,  
Pietermaritzburg.*

COLONEL H. T. BRU-DE-WOLD,  
C.M.G., D.S.O.,  
Commandant of Militia.



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN G. DARTNELL,  
K.C.B., C.M.G.



*W. Watson  
Robertson,  
Pietermaritzburg.*

COLONEL G. LEUCHARS, C.M.G., D.S.O.



*Lafayette,  
Dublin.*

SIR ABE BAILEY, K.C.M.G.



dozen or so years previously, had deliberately resolved to take on the burden of responsible government and all attendant risks, would have been so far incapable of exercising control and utilizing her own resources as, at the first sign of trouble in connection with purely internal affairs, to seek the aid of external authority to set them in order. Had any such assistance been invoked and rendered, Natal must inevitably have forfeited, especially in the eyes of the Natives, much of the prestige she had so long enjoyed and which she was determined, if possible, to maintain. But let no one suppose these remarks to be made in any ungenerous spirit or unmindfully of that bond of sympathy and warm attachment that will for ever endure between the Motherland and her sons in Natal. It is impossible to gauge the degree to which Natal is indebted to the "old block" of which she is but a chip; her social system, laws, education, and institutions were, for the most part, "made in England," so, too, were many of the better features of the military system of which she is so justly proud. She is not oblivious of the instruction and encouragement her officers have received from innumerable representatives of His Majesty's army, in South Africa and at home, or of the keen interest that has constantly been shown in the general development of her forces.

#### COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE MILITIA.

*Active Militia.*—The strength of the Active Militia was limited to 4,000 in time of peace. This figure, as a matter of fact, was never reached, owing to the severe financial depression the Colony passed through in the years 1902-1906, and later. Although the strength rose from 1,864 officers and men in 1902 to 3,449 in 1904—that it did not increase beyond the latter figure was due to Government fixing 3,500 as the temporary maximum strength—it decreased in 1906 to 2,854. Consequently, there was a shortfall of no less than 1,146 men on a maximum authorized peace establishment at the outbreak of the Rebellion.



In his report, dated January, 1907, Bru-de-Wold says : " Assuming office in October, 1905,<sup>1</sup> during a period of great financial depression, I was confronted with the task of immediately reducing expenditure. . . . At the same time, I was convinced that, at no period since I became connected with the Defence Forces of the Colony, had there been a greater urgency for efficiency and readiness to take the field. I felt sure that the Native trouble, which I had seen for some years past drawing nearer and nearer, was now within a measurable distance, and in my own mind I fixed the latter end of May or June as the most probable time for the disturbance to break out. I was instructed to reduce the Active Militia to 2,500 of all ranks. . . ." <sup>2</sup> Again : " To organize the Force with its reduced numbers, and still to retain its efficiency as an effective fighting force, I arranged a Peace and War establishment for each regiment, the ranks to be filled up when required for war purposes by supernumeraries, or special service men. . . ." <sup>3</sup>

Nothing could show more clearly than the foregoing facts how severe must have been the financial depression through which the Colony passed in 1905 and 1906, and how great the risks run by being compelled to reduce to 2,500 men, the first line of defence of a Colony controlling about a million warlike savages. When, as then situated, Natal determined to deal with the trouble by means of her own resources, she took a bold and even hazardous course. But it was just such decision that appealed to the imagination of the staunchest of her colonists, and it was not long before she had the satisfaction of knowing that her courageous attitude was amply justified by the results.

Having decided, in 1904, to recruit to a figure falling

<sup>1</sup> He assumed in August, but acted until October, the holder of the appointment being technically on leave.

<sup>2</sup> Commandant of Militia (Col. Bru-de-Wold), *Annual Report*, 1906. With an establishment of 2,500, the figures at 31st December, 1905, of the different arms were approximately : Naval corps, 100 ; Mounted Rifles, 1,330 ; Artillery, 350 ; Infantry, 580 ; Departmental corps, 140. Total, 2,500.

<sup>3</sup> Commandant of Militia (Col. Bru-de-Wold), *Annual Report*, 1906.

short by 500 of the maximum peace strength authorized by law, and again, in 1905, directed a further reduction by 1,000 men, it would be thought the Government, on the first acts of rebellion occurring in February and April, would have been only too glad to avail themselves of the power to ballot for recruits,<sup>1</sup> to raise the depleted ranks to at least the maximum peace establishment. By rights, the final word as to when the ballot should be brought into force, should rest with the officer responsible for the defence of the country. Experience has shown that an elective ministry will not so act if it can possibly be avoided.<sup>2</sup> If not imperative, so as to restore the authorized establishment, such necessity certainly appeared to arise when the character of the *terrain* selected by the rebels came to be closely considered. For operations in connection with Nkandhla forest alone—an area covering 100 square miles, *i.e.* equivalent to that of Greater London, some 10,000 European troops were declared by competent military advisers to be required. If others advised lesser numbers, it was because they were confident (though having no military reasons for saying so) that their extremely elusive foes could be hoodwinked at their own game, and in a country, too, as well-known to them as a cornfield is to the mice that run up and down and between the growing stalks.

The Government, of which The Hon. C. J. Smythe was Prime Minister and Sir Thomas Watt Minister of Defence, declined to use the ballot. The reasons for such paradoxical attitude were briefly these: Owing to the reports of unrest and threatened attack received almost daily from widely-separated parts, in some cases panic-stricken men, women and children taking refuge in lagers and clamouring for help, it was desirable to allay the panic; this alarm must have been greatly heightened had there been sudden recourse to the ballot, which the unexpected initial success of the April rising appeared to demand.

<sup>1</sup> Sec. 32, Militia Act, 1903.

<sup>2</sup> The same weakness appears to exist in the present South African Defence scheme.



Owing to there being no general organization among the rebels, it was highly probable outbreaks would occur here and there, until, having acquired sufficient momentum, a large force had been successfully massed on ground favourable to their tactics. Thus, to denude any particular district of men, was practically to offer it to the enemy as a convenient point of attack. It should be borne in mind that the scanty European population was so distributed as to be almost in every direction in the immediate vicinity of what are known as Native locations. These, laid off for the exclusive use of the Natives as far back as 1845, were made numerous and kept separate for the very reason that, through one large group of Natives gradually losing touch with the others, their power for mischief, in the event of hostilities, would be reduced, whilst Europeans, taking up their abode, either as farmers or as townsmen, on the intervening territory, would serve to leaven the aborigines with civilized habits, and promote their spiritual and material advancement.

On the other hand, it is no less true of savage than of civilized warfare, that the best defence consists in attacking the enemy wherever he may be found, and not leaving the initiative to be taken by him. The latter method, it is true, leaves exposed numerous vulnerable points, at each of which, owing to greater numbers, he ought in theory to succeed.

The Government decided to call for volunteers among the colonists and to attract the many soldiers of fortune and adventurous spirits in South Africa by offering them inducements to join specially-raised corps. It was in this way that the required number of men was obtained. Those Militia Reserves in the various districts who had not taken the field were thereupon able to assemble, elect officers, select lagers and take other measures for the defence of their respective districts.

*The Reserves.*—In view of the necessity of hastening on the organization of the Active Militia, and of the difficulties in preparing rolls, as required by law, complete lists of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reserves could not be made until



the Rebellion was over and, indeed, not until after the conclusion of the Dinuzulu expedition (December, 1907 to March, 1908).

At the beginning of 1906, the numbers of the Reserves were approximately : First, 5,050, Second, 6,875, Third, 3,175 ; Total, 15,100.

In January and February, 1906, beginning at Dundee, meetings were convened for the purpose of electing Chief Leaders in terms of the Act. After the various classes of Reserves had been organized, Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel) A. T. G. Wales was placed in command.

Among these men were to be found many ex-soldiers and volunteers, who had fought in nearly all the campaigns of the preceding thirty years. There were also many Dutchmen who had fought against England during the Boer War, but who had since become valuable acquisitions to South Africa's fighting material.

Notwithstanding the presence of "old campaigners," it was soon patent that the majority of the men had not received any military training worthy the name. To remedy this serious defect, only one way seems to be open—do as Australia did later, in 1908, viz. compel every man and boy within the State to undergo a systematic course annually.

As in the case of the Militia, the Government was obliged to keep down expenses in regard to the Reserves. Such action was felt more by the latter forces than by established corps, and yet nothing was more reasonable than that the Active Militia should, whenever necessary, be in a position to draw without delay on the younger branches of the Reserves.

*Cadets.*—See p. 65.

*Intelligence and Maps.*—In this connection again, nothing but the want of funds rendered it impossible to employ officers and other agents to collect necessary and readily-accessible information before the Rebellion began. Practically all the Magistrates, however, Police, farmers, planters, etc., were emissaries of the Government, though not placed directly or indirectly in touch with the Militia

department as they might have been. Many of these employed Native servants, who, in their turn, were in intimate and constant touch with their own countrymen.

"Immediately previous to the outbreak of the Rebellion," says the Commandant, "I received a great deal of information from people in outlying districts, but, as there was no intelligence department to classify, sift and deal with this, it was very difficult to place much reliance on the information thus obtained. Ultimately, the acting Chief Commissioner of Police (Lieut.-Col. W. J. Clarke) gave orders to the police in the rural districts to collect information from farmers and others and to send everything direct to him."<sup>1</sup> This Police officer, owing to his excellent knowledge of the country, and the various informants, was able to condense and appreciate all that came to hand and thereafter place classified summaries at the Commandant's disposal, and very valuable these proved to be. "Subsequently all this was stopped as, for some reason unknown to me, the Commissioner, *i.e.* the permanent officer, was either unwilling or unable to continue the system."<sup>2</sup>

As regards maps, not the Commandant, but the state of the treasury was to blame. "The want of maps (on military lines, normal scale) has been greatly felt in Natal and has rendered combined action practically impossible. The failure of the Langalibalele expedition was due to the want of reliable maps."<sup>3</sup> Surveying was habitually confined to areas set apart for European occupation, that is, the most accessible portions, whilst the great Native locations, situate for the most part in broken, bushy and untraversable regions, remained unsurveyed. Thus, when, on hostilities occurring, the rebels selected as their *terrain* the great Tugela valley (to a distance of 10 or 12 miles on either side and some 60-80 miles along the river), the Nkandhla-Qudeni district, and the Umvoti

<sup>1</sup> Commandant of Militia (Col. Bru-de-Wold), *Annual Report*, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> The Langalibalele Rebellion occurred between Estcourt and the Drakensberg Mountains. The words quoted are from the Commandant's *Annual Report*, 1906.



valley, their choice was, in each instance, ground the Staff and the Surveyor General's department knew either very little, or nothing at all, about. There were, indeed, the map by Altern—of the Zululand side—and that by Middleton—of Nkandhla district, but, insufficient as these excellent maps were, they did not become available for the troops until long after the Rebellion had started, and when most of the information therein had already been ascertained by commanding officers by personal observation, inquiry of local residents, or direct reconnoissance.<sup>1</sup>

In so far, however, as the various columns in the field were concerned, they were singularly well-equipped with intelligence of every kind. This arose from rapidly adapting themselves to circumstances—a characteristic usually displayed by colonial volunteers of long standing. They, fortunately, experienced but little difficulty in securing capable European and Native agents in every direction.

*Transport.*—The authority given by law to the Commandant to “prepare a register of all animals and vehicles suitable for transport or military purposes throughout the Colony or any part thereof” was taken advantage of in good time, with the result that, when the Rebellion broke out, full particulars as to where vehicles, drivers and animals could be obtained, had been collected.

The same law empowered the Governor, in the event of war, invasion or insurrection, to “authorise the issue of requisitions, requiring all persons to furnish such animals, vehicles and other necessary things as may be demanded from them for military use.” On failure to supply, the property could be taken possession of by, or on behalf of, the Commandant. There was, however, a proviso to the effect that “not more than fifty per cent. of the animals and vehicles suitable for transport or military purposes belonging to any person” might be requisitioned.

<sup>1</sup> Several sections of maps (Major Jackson's series), Field Intelligence Department, Pretoria, were issued at the outset and proved very useful.



Payment, fixed by the regulations, was, of course, made to persons from whom animals, etc., were taken.

When the first mobilization at Pietermaritzburg and other centres took place early in February, there was but one officer in the department, Captain (now Major) C. Victor Hosken, with one sergeant. No plant of any description belonged to that or any other Militia department. But, so thoroughly had the preliminary preparations been made, that Hosken was able to supply the force then called out with all necessary vehicles, draught animals, drivers, leaders, etc., on the day appointed for it to take the field. The mobilizations of 5th and 19th April, 3rd May, etc., were all dealt with with similar promptitude and equally satisfactory results. On none of these occasions was there any recourse to commandeering (impressing) for the Transport department. Such action was not resorted to until the troops moved from Zululand to Mapumulo division (June 19), when, owing to the impossibility of obtaining transport in any other way, seven or eight waggons were commandeered. The otherwise invariable rule was to hire in the ordinary way. To be able, however, to do this with rapidity and success, it was necessary to ascertain beforehand exactly where, what kind and how many vehicles, animals, etc., could be obtained.

On June 11th, when the largest number of troops was in the field, the Transport staff had increased to 5 officers, 12 n.c.o.'s and 30 men. The largest number of waggons in the field at one time—11th July—(including those for supply and regimental purposes), was 440, together with 14 mule waggons, 18 ambulances and 10 water-carts, with approximately 12,000 oxen and 364 mules. In addition to the foregoing, the mounted contingent from the Transvaal (T.M.R.) had its own mule transport, though the department supplied it with ox-waggons for carrying supplies, ammunition, etc.

It fell, moreover, to the department to arrange for the movement of men, horses, equipment, etc., from point to point by rail, such arrangements, both on mobilization

and demobilization—thanks to the ever prompt and unfailing co-operation of all Natal Government Railways officials, whose loyal endeavours contributed very materially to the success of the campaign—were uniformly satisfactory, although they had, as a rule, to be carried out on the shortest notice.

The Commandant, in his report for 1906, drew attention to pack transport being indispensable when mobilizing mounted forces. The mounted corps were possessed of such transport. "When, however, the regiments have taken the field, the true first line of transport must be provided, and this must consist of mule transport." The system of transport, as a whole, was deficient in so far as what is here referred to as the "true first line" was concerned.

*Medical.*—The Natal Medical Corps was in a position to provide officers and men to all the forces, including detachments, as soon as they took the field. The ordinary medical equipment, similar to that in use in the Imperial service, was adequate and up-to-date. Lieut.-Col. J. Hyslop, D.S.O., Principal Medical Officer, points out that "there was, however, a shortage of ambulance waggons, which had to be made up by the most suitable vehicles we could find. These latter . . . were not nearly so useful as the 'Natal ambulance,' which is specially constructed to meet the conditions of the country. Arrangements had been made some time prior to the Rebellion whereby, in case of necessity, civilian hospitals were to be available as base hospitals, and several were so used." Among these was the Victoria Hospital at Eshowe. Authority was given for the Principal Medical Officer to call on District Surgeons "to attend troops stationed in their respective districts, by way of relieving the Militia Medical staff," thereby enabling them to devote more attention to field duties. With the enrolment of irregular troops, it became necessary to increase the personnel of the corps; later in the campaign, the stretcher-bearers, supplied by the Natal Indian community, were a further welcome addition.



General medical assistance was rendered, not only to Europeans, but to various Native contingents and levies, and to a number of the rebels as well.

*Veterinary and Remounts.*—The Veterinary Corps was insufficiently organized, with the result that, generally speaking, officers were called on to treat more animals than they were able to cope with.

The supply of remounts became a serious matter. “It is much easier,” says the Commandant, “to get men than to get horses on which to mount them. During the late operations, the horse supply of the Colony was exhausted practically within the first month, and, within a few months, it was a very difficult matter to purchase a fairly good horse, either in the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, or Cape Colony, and we had to import a shipment of horses from South America. Fortunately, the campaign ended about the time these horses arrived, so that they were not required for the field. But, had the campaign been prolonged, as it easily might have been, shipment after shipment of horses would have had to be imported, and these would necessarily have been unbroken horses, as the contractor was unable to complete his contract to supply the requisite number of broken horses for the first shipment.”<sup>1</sup>

*Ordnance and Equipment.*—The withdrawal of the Imperial troops carried with it the closing down of the Imperial Ordnance stores in Pietermaritzburg. This necessitated stocking by the local Ordnance department of material considerably in excess of what it had been the rule to keep. Instead of limiting the stock to peace requirements, it had to be expanded to those of war.

When mobilization took place, the whole of the Militia forces were duly equipped, whilst demands from the field were promptly and satisfactorily met.

“In dealing with the equipping of irregular corps and Militia Reserves,” says the Ordnance Officer, Major F. Choles,<sup>2</sup> “for which no provision was made, the

<sup>1</sup> Commandant of Militia (Col. Bru-de-Wold), *Annual Report*, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> *Departmental Report* for 1905 and 1906.

success . . . attained . . . was due to the foresight of this department in having placed to 'reserve stocks,' from time to time, such stores as were necessary for contingencies, such as the late Rebellion. These stores were a portion of stocks obtained under the ordinary annual votes during the last few years." Owing to recommendations in respect of reserve clothing not having been given effect to, uniforms had to be obtained from such local sources as were available, with the result that inferior materials at high prices were the only goods to be had.

At various troop headquarters, armouries had been provided. These proved most useful and time-saving, especially as the system mobilization of the mounted forces was always "forward" to the scene of disturbance.

In so far as arms, ammunition and equipment were concerned, the Colony, on the outbreak of hostilities, was fully prepared to meet all reasonable demands likely to be made. The rifles and ammunition were, moreover, of the best and latest types. This satisfactory state of affairs was owing chiefly to continued representation by the Commandant to his Minister to the effect that, although the country was evidently on the eve of a rising, there was an insufficiency of both arms and ammunition, particularly the latter. There was, for instance, little or no Mark V ammunition in stock. During November, 1905, authority was given to indent for 1,000 stand of arms and 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition. The first lot arrived in Durban late in January, and the first outbreak of rebellion occurred on the 8th of the following month.

*Service Corps (Supplies).*—This department, when the first mobilization occurred, had a staff of 2 officers and 24 men. This strength was increased as necessity arose, until it stood at 2 officers, 38 clerks, 9 bakers, 7 butchers, 55 grocers and issuers; total, 135. Some 30 Natives were also employed.

The officer in charge, Captain Ambrose Prior, found it necessary to establish no less than twenty depôts in different parts of Natal and Zululand, whilst, in addition, a supply detachment accompanied each of five operating columns.



The want of properly-trained men at the outset was severely felt, involving, as it did, considerable risk in handling large quantities of supplies. It was fortunate that intelligent out-of-work men were readily procurable. These were trained and distributed among the depôts as soon as they became efficient.

Field bakeries were formed at Nkandhla, Thring's Post, and Mapumulo, and proved very successful. At one time, those at Nkandhla and Thring's Post turned out as much as 4,000–5,000 lbs. of bread daily. Owing to lack of system in the management of loot stock, field butcheries proved a failure, the Government, in consequence, being put to needless expense in procuring meat.

Co-operation between this and the Transport department was everything that could have been desired.

*Telegraph Corps.*—This corps, under Captain F. Fraser, was most efficient and well-equipped. It was, however, handicapped owing to its small establishment, so much so that it was necessary to apply to the Cape Colony for signallers. Some of the corps members had gone through an army class of instruction at Pretoria. The good effects of that training were very noticeable.

*Engineer Corps.*—Owing to the peace establishment of the Active Militia having been reduced to 2,500, the formation of an Engineer Corps was impossible. As, however, searchlights are very desirable accessories in Native warfare for defensive purposes, arrangements were made, with the assistance of Captain Mills, of the Natal Government Railways, to secure a couple of instruments and appurtenances, together with the necessary trained men for working them. Another of these instruments (under Major W. H. Pickburn) was lent by the Transvaal Government and proved especially useful at Nkandhla.

#### THE NATAL POLICE.

Although forming no part of the Militia, the Natal Police, a smart, well-equipped and efficient force, under the command of Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G., took a

prominent part throughout the operations. Its personnel consisted of Europeans and Natives ; the latter, however, were not called out for service. The European section numbered 40 officers and 1,126 of other ranks. Over two-thirds were mounted, but it was found impracticable, owing to there being 143 police stations to look after, to put more than 210 into the field.

#### RIFLE ASSOCIATIONS.

There were no fewer than 117 of these Associations in 1906 in various parts of the Colony, with an aggregate membership of about 7,000.

On the passing of the Militia Act, the Associations, which were invaluable agencies for training men to shoot, ceased to form part of the defence of the Colony, as practically all members were liable to serve in the different classes of the Reserves.

#### TROOPS TEMPORARILY RECRUITED BY THE NATAL GOVERNMENT.

These corps and their strengths were : Royston's Horse, 550 ; Natal Rangers, 800 ; Zululand Police, 90 ; Natal Native Horse, 300 ; the first two were European, the others Native (with European officers). There were, in addition, various Native infantry contingents or levies, whose aggregate strength amounted to about 6,000. The assistance given by the Cape and Transvaal Colonies and Sir Abe Bailey is referred to further on under " Offers of Assistance."

*Royston's Horse.*—When, in the middle of April, matters became serious and it appeared necessary to dispatch a large force to Nkandhla, the Government decided to deal with the position as far as possible from Natal resources. The required force might, indeed, have been obtained from such Active Militia corps as had not up till then taken the field, but, owing to the Militia Reserves not being sufficiently organized, it was found necessary to retain



portions of the Active Militia in Natal to deal with any rising that might occur during the absence of the troops in Zululand, hence the decision to recruit this special contingent of mounted men. Recruiting took place in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and Johannesburg. The corps was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O., and formed part of the "Zululand Field Force" that left for Nkandhla at the beginning of May. Towards the end of the campaign the corps was enlarged, notably by men recruited in the Cape Colony.

*Natal Rangers.*—This infantry regiment was raised because Ministers considered it against the interests of the Colony to keep the Militia Reserves in the field for any length of time. A considerable saving was effected through raising the corps, owing to the pay of the men being at lower rates. Recruiting took place chiefly in Johannesburg and Durban. As regards that done in Johannesburg, the Colony was most fortunate in securing the assistance of the Transvaal Commandant of Volunteers.

*Zululand Police (Natives).*—This particularly useful and efficient infantry corps, originally formed in 1883 by Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G., was disbanded on Zululand being annexed to Natal (December, 1897). Its strength then was about 200. When temporarily re-established, on the outbreak of rebellion, under Inspector Fairlie of the Natal Police, its numbers were between 80 and 90. For further information see Appendix XI.

The *Natal Native Horse*, commanded by Major G. Moe, were enrolled at Edendale, Nyanyadu, and other parts of the Colony in February, 1906. Some difficulty was at first met with in providing horses, owing to many having been sold by the Natives as remounts to agents of the German Government in connection with the South-West Africa campaign. Further particulars regarding this corps will be found in Appendix XI.

*Native levies.*—These were called out as necessity arose, but only in such areas as fell within the theatre of operations, and, except about 120 Basutos (Nqutu district), were unmounted; for the most part, they were armed only

with their large ox-hide shields and assegais.<sup>1</sup> As the great majority were under "tribal" rule, the several contingents were commanded by their own Chiefs, without regard either to age or military fitness. Among the most capable Chiefs were Sibindi, Sitshitshili, Mfungelwa, and Mveli.<sup>2</sup>

#### OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE.

(a) *The Imperial Government.*—When, consequent upon the assumption by Natal of responsible government, the Imperial Government proceeded gradually to withdraw the regular troops, it so happened that, on the outbreak of rebellion, a mere handful of men remained at Pietermaritzburg. The withdrawal, however unobtrusively it had occurred, did not escape the notice of sundry nervous Europeans, or the Natives. The latter, when their resentment had been aroused by the poll tax (to be referred to later), were not slow in making one another believe that the withdrawal had its origin in dissension that had arisen between Natal and Great Britain. Disgusted with the manner in which Natal was governing her Native population, England, it was said, had turned her back on, and would no longer help, her Colony. This absurd rumour succeeded in obtaining considerable credence, and threatened to undermine the public sense of security, especially of loyally disposed Natives. It was, therefore, with something of avidity that the offer of the Imperial Government of 10th February (the day following the proclamation of martial law), that a regiment should proceed to Pietermaritzburg, was accepted by Natal. In accepting, however, the Government said it did not anticipate that the troops would be required for active service. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa had wired that he held in readiness a battalion at Pretoria, as well

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* spears. Some of these are used for throwing—the average distance thrown being 50-60 yards—whilst hold is retained of the larger-bladed ones for stabbing on coming to close quarters.

<sup>2</sup> On the cessation of hostilities all the foregoing irregular corps were gradually disbanded, the services of Royston's Horse and the Natal Rangers being the last to be dispensed with.



as the Standerton Mobile Column. It was arranged that the former should proceed to Natal. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders accordingly received orders without delay, and reached Pietermaritzburg three days later (13th). The General, at the same time, offered to increase the number to 4,300 if required. The occasion to apply for the increase fortunately did not arise. The presence of the troops (they were present until the conclusion of hostilities) had a most reassuring and salutary effect, and gave exactly that touch of moral support the situation required. It was as successful in giving the lie to the false rumour referred to as if a whole army corps had been mobilized for the purpose.

The hand of the Imperial Government was seen in yet another direction. When, prior to the first outbreak (February 8th), the Governor ascertained that H.M.S. *Terpsichore* would arrive at Durban on the 21st February, in connection with the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, he requested Admiral Durnford to expedite the ship's movements, as the presence of a man-of-war at Durban at that time would tend to allay the prevailing excitement. The request was promptly acceded to, and the *Terpsichore* steamed into Durban a week sooner than had been previously arranged. Later, whilst proposing the vessel should accompany the Duke on his departure from Durban, on the 27th February, the Admiral offered to cancel his orders in the event of the political situation being such that her continued presence would be desirable. There being, by that time, no immediate cause for anxiety, the arrangements which had already been made for departure were not interfered with.

(b) *Other Offers*.—A few days after the second and more serious stage of the Rebellion had begun, the *Cape* and *Transvaal Governments* wired intimating a readiness to assist in any way. This was followed, a few days later, by an offer from the latter Government of 500 Volunteers, armed, equipped, and maintained whilst in the field at its own expense, whilst the Cape Government offered six maxims, armed by Cape Mounted Riflemen, as well

as a Signalling Corps. These and two further generous offers—one by Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey of Johannesburg, to raise, equip, and maintain at his own expense a contingent of 150 men (25 being mounted) of the Lancaster and York Association, and the other by the *Natal Indian Congress*, of a corps of 25 stretcher-bearers,—were gratefully accepted.

The first three offers will be more fully dealt with in subsequent chapters.

A large number of other opportune and generous offers were received from various sources in England, South Africa, etc., but as the Government had decided that, unless a serious development of hostilities took place, no efforts would be made to recruit outside South Africa, and in South Africa only in case of absolute necessity, they were not accepted. They were, however, gratefully acknowledged and borne in mind.

Among the Colony's staunchest supporters was a small knot of Natalians living in London, headed by Major Gen. Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B., the Right Hon. Sir Albert Hime, P.C., K.C.M.G., and Sir Walter Peace, K.C.M.G. These lost no time in convening a meeting, cabling an assurance of unqualified support of the Ministry, and thereafter dispatching, at the earliest opportunity, 27 Rexer guns, a most valuable arm, especially in Native warfare, that had only just come into the market.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE CADETS.

The Cadet system, one of the principal institutions of the Colony, and one that at once attracts the attention of a visitor, be he soldier or civilian, has been in existence for many years. The first corps was formed at a private school in Hermannsburg in the year 1869. Hilton College and other schools were not long in following the example. The principles governing the system in its later developments and in vogue in 1906 will be found in the Militia

<sup>1</sup> The guns were taken to Natal by Sir John Dartnell, and arrived in time to be of the greatest assistance.



Act, 1903. The Cadets were under the general supervision of the Commandant of Militia and the special control of an officer of the permanent Militia staff, under the style of "Commandant of Cadets." For many years, the latter officer was Lieut.-Col. W. H. A. Molyneux, V.D., owing to whose energy and devotion, assisted to the utmost by the Superintendent of Education (C. J. Mudie, Esq.), the efficiency of the various corps rose to a standard previously unapproached. No opportunity was lost of promoting the interests of his charges and rendering their course of training so popular and successful as to become the envy of other states, not excluding the Mother Country.

The Cadets began their training at the age of ten; they were not enrolled for military service, although steps were taken to induce lads of eighteen, in the senior corps, to join the Active Militia. They were taught to march, go through the physical, manual, and firing exercises, as well as simple parade and field movements, as laid down in the manual of drill for the mounted forces.

Boys between ten and fourteen were drilled without arms and instructed in musketry, for both of which an efficiency standard was laid down.

In 1896 the total number of Cadets on the muster roll was 1,931 (25 corps). In 1906 they had increased to about 3,500, with nearly 50 separate corps, 3 being those of senior Cadets. The senior corps, on account of lads being required by their parents to enter business at early ages, were much more difficult to control, and therefore did not prove nearly as successful as the junior ones.

With the system so long in vogue, it followed that the majority of the Natal troops (including Reserves) which took part in the Rebellion had, at one time or another, been trained as Cadets in the rudiments of soldiery. It was largely due to having had such experience that the men were as generally efficient as they were.

#### IV.

### ZULU MILITARY SYSTEM AND CONNECTED CUSTOMS.<sup>1</sup>

*(With a Note on the Rebel Organization, 1906.)*

As a result of the precarious conditions of living anterior to Tshaka's accession (about 1814), each of the then more or less independent Chiefs of Zululand was obliged to establish a kind of militia force for employment in defensive or aggressive operations as circumstances demanded. Owing to this prevalence of all-round isolation, it was impossible for any Chief to do otherwise than send into the field heterogeneously formed groups of warriors—old and young fighting side by side. The character of warfare of those days was, in consequence, of a very mild description. When, however, Tshaka became

<sup>1</sup>The main reason for outlining here a system suppressed in 1879 is that it was at a partial revival thereof that the rebels perpetually aimed. The character of their organization and warfare was generally in accordance therewith. Nor, seeing many of them had been obliged to conform thereto in earlier days, is this any cause for surprise. A description of the old and famous order becomes, therefore, the best and most illuminating introduction to their methods in 1906.

It will be remembered that when Tshaka set about conquering the various tribes of Zululand and Natal, some of the more important broke away and fled to far-off parts, *e.g.* Rhodesia, Lake Nyasa, Gasaland, etc. Having regard to the enormous prestige acquired by the Zulus, a prestige which outshone that of any other tribe in South Africa south of the Equator, not only did tribes adjoining those which had arrived find it in their interest to copy the habits and customs of the dominant race and learn their tongue, but more particularly to adopt the system by which the prestige had been won. Thus a description of the system has the added interest of perhaps throwing light on what, in point of fact, has become practically the basic idea or exemplar of all Native military organizations in South Africa.

Had a tolerably comprehensive sketch of the system and its connected customs been available, the present attempt would not have been made.



Chief of the Zulu tribe, and, by a policy of vigorous aggression, succeeded in obtaining the allegiance of other tribes, it became possible for him greatly to extend and perfect the system, learnt from his friend and protector Dingiswayo, of recruiting regiments on an age basis.<sup>1</sup> And, once he had acquired a force more efficient and powerful than that of other tribes, only time was wanted to enable him to extend his operations and add still further to the strength and efficiency of his army.

With the various tribes knit together into one nation, the establishment and development of what is known as the Zulu Military System, *i.e.* Tshaka's system, became for the first time possible. Thus, this engine of war, as we now know it, was simply the outcome of a successful application of principles superior in themselves to those of surrounding tribes, and its pre-eminence and dominion were won by intrinsic merit and genius rather than by accident or sheer force of numbers. We proceed, then, to describe what came into being about one hundred years ago and continued to exist until 1879.

The whole manhood of the country was liable for service. In practice, however, a few exceptions were allowed—among them diviners and those physically or mentally unfit. The total strength averaged from 40,000 to 50,000, though, on special occasions, it rose to 60,000 or even higher.

Each man was armed with a stabbing assegai and one or more throwing ones, also an ox or cow-hide shield. About fifteen to twenty royal kraals were established in various well-inhabited parts of the country. Some of these were used as military barracks, and were known as *amakanda* (heads). Large numbers of warriors were, moreover, usually stationed at the principal royal kraal.

<sup>1</sup> Dingiswayo, Chief of the Mtetwa tribe (near St. Lucia Bay, Zululand), is, curiously enough, believed to have had one or more fundamental features of the system suggested to him, either from observing the organization of British soldiers, as might have been done in the Cape Colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or, at least, by obtaining a detailed account thereof from some person familiar therewith.

All these kraals, being composed of wood and wattles, and the huts covered with grass, were occasionally moved to fresh sites in their respective localities whilst retaining their names.

Regiments were constantly being formed, more by automatic than independent process. This is seen from the fact that every boy of about sixteen was required to serve as a cadet at the *kanda* within whose jurisdiction his father's kraal happened to fall. Every two years or so, when the lads were old enough to be formed into a regiment, they were "collected" from the various *amakanda*, and marched off to the King for inspection, when the latter gave them their new or regimental title. The destination of the new regiment depended on circumstances. It might, if numerous, be directed to go to some district and build and live in a *kanda* of its own, or it might be ordered, wholly or in part, to serve at one or more of the already existing *amakanda*, where, of course, they would profit by the older men's experience. Thus, at these barracks one frequently found men of various ages, notwithstanding that recruitment had invariably taken place on the basis of age. It was from the fact of cadets being "collected" that the word *ibuto* (regiment) was probably derived.

The *amakanda* were designed and built in accordance with a plan common to all. For instance, the barracks of a regiment, according as they were on the right or left side as one entered the principal gate below, were technically described, so with various other sections of such right or left side, down to the gate referred to or up to the King's harem at the top. Thus, it was possible for any soldier to define exactly where he belonged, even though the rows of huts were three or more deep. In the case of the largest regiments, *e.g.* Tulwana, the men, according to the portions occupied, would be given distinguishing names. Thus, in Tulwana, one found the Zisongo, Mkingoma, etc., divisions on the right, whilst Amabunsumana, Ingoye, etc., were on the left—each of them, by the way, nearly as large as an ordinary regiment.



The principal motive for keeping up this huge organization, once the safety of the State was assured, was for attacking neighbouring tribes, generally on the slightest pretext, and making them subject to the State by looting as many of their cattle as possible. This, in fact, was but another expression of the mercenary ideal which even civilized nations of to-day seem to keep before them.

Until an age between thirty-five and forty had been reached, the warriors were not permitted to marry or even to associate with girls. Nor might girls marry men of any age until special authority had been given. Girls, too, were "collected" into classes, though not required to serve at any *kanda*.

It was on some such occasion as the great Feast of the First Fruits, held annually about the first week in January, that the King himself gave permission to a regiment or a class of girls to marry. This was granted, not to individuals, but to a particular regiment or class *en bloc*. Special directions were also given as to what regiment or regiments any particular class of girls should marry into.

Before, however, receiving permission to marry, a regiment required royal approval to conform to the ancient practice of assuming the *isicoco* or headring. As this ring, made of wax and strips of sedge bound round with cord, was sewn into the hair by means of ox-sinew, it sometimes happened that an aggressive military expedition was arranged to take place beyond the borders of the State "for the purpose of fetching the necessary sinew"—a metonymic expression, where "sinew" stands for "cattle." The head was shaved on the crown and sides when the ring was put on.

Owing to this wearing of the headring—once on never removed<sup>1</sup>—the warriors became roughly divided into two great sections, (*a*) the head-ringed, (*b*) those without the ring. The former were known as the "white" Zulus, the latter as the "black"—the colour of the first being

<sup>1</sup> At intervals, as the hair grew long, it would be removed, but only to enable it to be sewn closer to the head.

probably derived from the glittering of the highly polished ebony-like rings or the preponderatingly white colour of the shields they carried, whilst that of the latter was from their heads all being jet black from the uniform colour of their hair, or from the amount of black in their shields.

In charge of each *kanda* was an officer as well as others of subordinate rank. Upon these devolved the responsibility of seeing that all within the military district rendered a reasonable amount of service in each year. Owing to a wonderfully efficient system of control, evasions rarely occurred.

With the lapse of time, and on account of the perpetually recurring warfare, it followed members of any given regiment became greatly diminished. Thus, although the names of perhaps forty to forty-five regiments could be furnished as having been enrolled since Tshaka became King, all but eighteen to twenty would, at any given period, have been of little real use. This is best appreciated by recalling the fact that "collection" began at eighteen or nineteen, that a regiment was, as a rule, formed after every two years, and that, after a man reaches the age of fifty-five or sixty, he is unfit to undertake the exertion of long and rapid marches on foot. The power to mobilize for war lay with the King, though for some years it became customary for him to seek permission of Mnkabayi (grand-aunt of Cetshwayo), who lived in the north-west of Zululand. For all occurrences of a sudden and local kind, *e.g.* raid, insurrection, or breach of the peace, the resident officer or induna had authority to call out men under his command. Indeed, it was his duty to do so, and one which he dared not neglect.

At the head of each regiment was an induna or commanding officer, generally a good deal older than the men of his corps. There was also a second in command, together with junior officers. The strength of regiments varied greatly; the maximum of one might be 700, of another 4,000. There was also subdivision into companies, known as *amaviyo*, with 50 to 60 or more men apiece. Each *viyo* had two junior officers. These



companies originated at the *amakanda* during the days of cadetship. Members associated early with one another, grew up and kept together. If, however, any such group was too small, batches of others, from other *amakanda*, were "thrown into" them on arrival at headquarters to make up a *viyo*. As cadets, there was no appointed induna to a company. *Amaviyo* diminished in size as time went on,—from death, desertion (to Natal), or by being put to death by the King. For instance, shortly before the Zulu War, Cetshwayo sent a force on purpose to put so-called invalids (but really malingerers) to death. Many, again, to evade military service, became diviners, who, as has been remarked, obtained exemption as a matter of course. These were, with notable and necessary exceptions, collected by Mpande into a regiment of their own, and ordered to live in a single kraal. This device had the effect of checking the prevailing craze.

When reduced, *amaviyo* were often combined with others of their own age, though younger men were often added. The reason for so keeping up the strength of regiments was to cause the enemy to respect them and not treat them with contempt. Certain corps, again, were made abnormally large so that notwithstanding wastage through sickness, etc., when on the march, their size, on reaching the enemy, would still appear formidable.

From what has been said, it can be seen there was no such thing as retirement from service. When Tshaka dispatched his army to Sotshangana, a Chief living on the coast beyond Delagoa Bay, he insisted on every available person going, even old men who no longer left their homes.

During the period of cadetship, known as *uku-xeza*, from commonly milking the royal cows they herded into their mouths, boys learnt the use of the national weapon, the assegai or *umkonto*. The proficiency then attained remained with them through life, hence there was practically no special training necessary in after years. There were no special exercises in throwing or stabbing, in guarding with their 5-ft. oval shields, or in marching,

running, manœuvring, etc. The fact that the people were a pastoral race and spent the greater portion of their lives in the open under exacting conditions stood them in good stead.

There was nothing in the shape of remuneration for service, either in time of war or of peace. Nor was compensation given for any injuries received in war. Offences were punished by the indunas, but punishment never took the form of imprisonment for obvious reasons. In regard to the younger warriors, it was invariably severe beating about the body administered by the indunas.

Although no oath of allegiance was prescribed, not a soul ever dared question the right of the King to call him out, or failed to render instant and loyal service of the most arduous description.

The Zulu army took on the character more of a permanent militia than of a standing army. Although required to serve at the various *amakanda*, service was not obligatory for more than a reasonable period, say two or three months per annum. And, as with Europeans, men of a given regiment were under the orders of only their own officers.

Just as the whole nation was compelled to render military service, so, in time of need, all aliens who owed or pretended to owe allegiance to the King were called upon to assist. Tshaka, on more than one occasion, insisted on Fynn, Isaacs and others taking part in his operations.

Zulus erected defences, but only to the extent of what is known as the outer fence of the kraal. The cattle enclosure was frequently made much higher and stronger than was necessary to keep the cattle from getting out on their own accord. But the latter provision was a protection more against wild beasts than human foes. Where it was necessary to obtain protection against a too powerful enemy, the people fled, with their property, to caves, precipices, forests or other places in their immediate neighbourhood.

The uniforms, a most striking characteristic of the army, varied with the different regiments. They were



lavishly ornamental, and composed almost entirely of feathers, cow-tails and hides. The birds chiefly favoured were the ostrich, lorie, crane and sakabuli (jet-black finch, with especially long and beautiful tail feathers); the animals were: blue monkey, civet cat or genet, otter, leopard and the ordinary cow. All wore the bushy portion of cow-tails (generally white) tied round at the elbows, wrists, below the knees, and the neck (falling over the chest). Some had kilts; the majority, loose coverings of various hides. Many, again, wore ear-flaps of different hides and designs, also bands tied round the head across the forehead, of otter or leopard skin. The feathers were worn about the head singly, also in large rounded or otherwise artistically-shaped tufts and plumes. Every man carried one or more assegais and a large war-shield of ox or cow-hide capable of completely covering him. It sometimes happened the principal distinguishing feature of a regiment was the colour of its shield; for instance, all might have black and white, or red and white, red only, black only, white with small black patches, or a single regiment might have two or more types of shields. The shield Tshaka himself carried was a great snow-white one, with a small black patch slightly to the left of the centre, and there stood planted erect in his hair a solitary crane-feather fully two feet long.

No portion of the uniform, arms or equipment belonged to the King or government. All was privately owned. It, however, often happened that iron-smiths,—many of whom flourished in the neighbourhood of Nkandhla forest and on the Imfolozi River—were required by the King to manufacture assegais for the troops. Once presented—but only to men known to be brave and daring—they became the property of the warriors. The cutting of shields was the work of experts.

In all affairs of State, civil and military, the King was assisted by a small privy council as well as a national non-elective assembly. There was a recognized commander-general of the forces properly equipped with an efficient staff.

One of the leading features, especially in Tshaka's day, was the system of espionage. Skilled and intrepid observers were frequently sent out, before the beginning of a campaign, to collect all the intelligence they could of the enemy's strength, property (especially cattle), strongholds, grain, etc. To find their way about, they were obliged to resort to much ingenious cunning and daring.

Orders were transmitted from kraal to kraal, as also in the field, by messengers, *i.e.* verbally. There was, indeed, no other form of communication, except *lête-à-lête*. The messages were almost invariably correctly delivered, due to constant training in childhood when, of course, the same mode was observed.

The officers did not wear any badges of rank, though, as only men of high status were permitted to wear such ornaments as leopard-skin and lorie feathers, there was no difficulty in inferring their rank.<sup>1</sup>

Decorations were of several forms. A man who had killed another in war wore about his shoulders and chest a long rope made of pieces of willow about half an inch long and of equal thickness, the ends being charred and stripped of bark; or a necklace of horns, with charred blocks of willow intervening.

Although there was no remuneration for service, the King was liberal in his rewards for valour in battle. A hero had doled out to him as many as ten fine cattle at a time, but only one who had been the first to rush into and among the enemy would be so treated.

Attached to every army were carriers, known as the *udibi*. These were usually numerous and marched two or three miles off on the right or left flank of the main body. This was the only means of transport, for Zulus had no horses or vehicles. The sleeping-mats and karosses or blankets of indunas and junior officers were borne by the carriers, as also provisions and equipment belonging to different members of the army. Another of their duties

<sup>1</sup> The badge known as *tshokobezi*, worn especially by followers of Dinuzulu, is referred to later (p. 198, note).



was to drive along a herd of cattle for purposes of consumption whilst the troops were on the march.

The interior economy of every regiment was regulated by a few plain unwritten rules, common to the whole army.

During peace-time, such soldiers as were serving either at headquarters or at any of the country barracks, were kept occupied in such ways as constructing or repairing kraals, cattle enclosures, fences or other work of a public character, the necessary poles, wattles, branches, reeds, fibrous plants, etc., being cut and carried by themselves; they also hoed, sowed, weeded and harvested the royal crops. Small groups and individuals were constantly engaged in smaller matters, such as carrying grain to or from a distance, or conveying messages to or from men of high position in all parts of the country, etc. Occasionally great hunts were organized for killing such game as buffalo, gnu, wild pigs, waterbuck, koodoo and other antelopes, or such wild animals as lions, elephants, rhinoceros or leopards.

Among the amusements were: dancing in large numbers, the men being arranged in semi-circular formation,—after one group had danced it was succeeded by another, women and even cattle, also fantastically dressed men, taking part in each pageant; dancing *pas seuls* (*giya*) in the presence of many assembled and applauding comrades; singing national and regimental war-songs; chanting national anthems; and last, but not least, shouting out some portion of the King's interminable praises, including the equally lengthy ones of his ancestors, or listening to one or other of the professional heralds doing so for hours at a time, until he got so hoarse as to be barely audible.

In addition to all this, there were religious observances, as also gatherings at which actual or supposed malefactors of all kinds were "smelt out" by diviners, only to be subsequently either put to death or heavily punished by order of the King. The execution of such orders, like everything else, was left to one or other of the regiments, for the whole nation lived perpetually under a state of martial law. And such state (can it be surprised at?)

bore fruits of physical soundness, alertness and morality in the people, every man noble and energetic, every woman modest and comely. Those were the days when, as the lowing herds came home to be milked, one heard these fine fellows proudly shouting in reply : *Kala, 'nkomo ya kwa Zulu, wen'o nga soze waya ndawo, i.e.* Low on, oh cow of Zululand ! whose hoof shall tread no alien soil.

Mobilization took place in this way : The King sent an order to the officers in charge at the various *amakanda* requiring all men to collect at their respective barracks. The order was instantly re-transmitted by the officers to those in their respective commands, the utmost pains being taken to mobilize with rapidity, for fear the King might direct seizure of stock for dilatoriness. Those within fifteen miles of the royal kraal assembled there within twenty-four hours. There might be thirty to forty *amaviyo* of them, a number of different regiments being represented. The King then reviewed the force and directed those present to separate themselves into regiments and companies, in order that he could see what proportion of each corps was present. He would then discuss with them his war affairs, and afterwards issue instructions as to where they were to bivouac.<sup>1</sup> Those whose barracks were near by might put up there, others had to camp in neighbouring specified valleys. Cattle were given for slaughter. Thus, the troops began at once to establish their camps, so that warriors from more distant parts were able, as they came up, to ascertain where the regiments they belonged to were, and fall in without loss of time. In the meantime, further messengers had reached each outlying post to enquire urgently when the men of that part would be ready. A report of the position was sent back, and redoubled efforts put forth to ensure the earliest possible attendance. In two to five days, according to the circumstances, the whole of the regiments were called to headquarters. They then, of course, went forward in regimental order divided into companies. If

<sup>1</sup> Separate bivouacs were appointed for fear of regiments fighting one another.



the King found an insufficiently strong force assembled, further messengers were dispatched post-haste by the several officers, who had already been threatened by the King with heavy punishment in the event of further delay. And so, in half-a-dozen days, anything between 30,000-50,000 men mobilized and were actually at headquarters in regimental order, every man in his proper place and ready to march. The manner in which the army could come up under the Kings in time of emergency was nothing short of a revelation.

After the troops had massed in sufficient numbers, various ceremonies were held, notably the famous eating of *umbengo*. As this involved certain preliminaries, one of which was the catching and killing of a bull, usually a black one, it will be best to consider them in proper sequence. A beginning was made by the King deputing one of the regiments to catch and kill the bull. The selected regiment forthwith devoted a day to collecting fire-wood for roasting the flesh. Cadets were, at the same time, directed to gather green branches of the *umtolo* tree (a species of mimosa) to be used as a charm by being burnt along with the roasting flesh.

The "eating of *umbengo*" ceremony took place the day following. Early that morning, the regiment in question went to the spot appointed for the troops to *hlanza* at (vomit), and there, under the superintendence of war-doctors, proceeded to do so. These war-doctors were specially appointed by the King. A hole some 18 inches in diameter and 6 to 7 feet deep had already been dug, with its soil heaped alongside. It was into this that every warrior, after swallowing a mouthful or two of the decoctions placed ready in three or four great pots or baskets, proceeded to vomit. Knowing what was coming, he had taken care to abstain from food. Two, three or four might go to the hole at one time. There was a desire on the part of everyone to finish quickly, but the doctors, two of whom stood on either side to see that instructions were conformed to, would not allow crowding. Here and there the stick they each carried was used on those who

had merely pretended to drink the medicated water, and were therefore uninfluenced by its emetic properties. This process was gone through so as to "bring together the hearts of the people." The pots referred to stood, not on the ground, but on special articles, not unlike diminutive life-belts, made of straw bound round with plaited fibre—each doctor having one of his own. It was on such things the King stood when he washed himself of a morning.

As soon as the selected regiment had finished, it moved off to deal with the bull. After it had departed, the emetic continued to be used, none of the other regiments being permitted to leave off until the last men had "come into line." After the process was over, say by 3 or 4 p.m., the hole was carefully filled up by the doctors, to prevent possible visitors from hostile tribes obtaining any part of the substances that had been used. It was for this reason that the hole was dug deep.

Upon getting back to the royal kraal, the deputed regiment found a black bull had already been selected from among those of the King's cattle kept at a distance from the principal kraal. The beast chosen was large, full-grown and fierce. After being driven into the cattle enclosure, say, about 600 yards in diameter, it was tackled by the single, unassisted regiment, all the men being without shields or assegais. It was well chased about, prevented from going this way or that, and eventually, after being kept running about for two or three hours to tire it, it was rushed at about mid-day, caught and brought to earth by many taking hold of it simultaneously. The men then fastened on to it by its legs, tail, head, horns, ears, etc., whilst others proceeded as best they could to twist and eventually break its neck. As soon as it was dead, the war-doctors came up and drove all the warriors away for fear lest any disloyally inclined should cut off portions and carry them off to the King's enemies, whereby ascendancy might in some way be obtained over their own sovereign. The beast was now skinned and its flesh cut into long strips. These strips (known as *umbengo*, hence



the name of the custom) were then roasted on a huge fire that had already been made of the wood gathered on the preceding day. After being roasted, the flesh was smeared with black powders, and pungent, bitter drugs. The names and identity of some of these drugs were kept carefully concealed from the troops. The very reputation of the doctor depended on his being secretive. By this time, 3 or 4 p.m., the regiments had all come up and were waiting "to eat the *umbengo*." They moved to near where the doctors were, and there built a great *umkumbi*, that is, formed themselves into a huge half-moon, the men at every part being many deep. The doctors came forward with the charred, half-cooked and medicated flesh. They and their assistants simultaneously started flinging the strips one after another into the air towards but above the heads of different sections of the troops, and in all directions. To do this satisfactorily, they passed through the *umkumbi* at conveniently-situated and specially-prepared openings. The warriors all standing, each carrying weapons and shield in the left hand, were ready to catch with the other the flesh as it descended. There was a scramble to snatch every piece as it got within reach. The man catching, immediately bit off a lump and pitched the remainder back into the air to be again violently contended for, caught and similarly dealt with, one after another. In the meantime, the pieces bitten or torn off were chewed and spat on to the ground, the juice, however, being swallowed. Owing to many being hungry, and even ravenous, the flesh itself was often gulped down, although quite contrary to custom to do so. If any of the strips fell to the ground when being tossed about, it was not picked up, as supposed then to have lost its virtue. It not unfrequently happened for these discarded portions to be consumed by the half-famished during the excitement. Here and there one saw a weak man fall forward in a faint, and his shield and assegais go clattering to the ground as he did so. But for his friends, who rushed forward to help, he must have been trampled to death for all the others cared. The process of distribution continued

until each had had his bite ; no one was allowed to retire until the last had conformed to the custom.

One bull was sufficient for an entire army. Two were never killed. The entrails were secretly buried in what was known as the King's cattle enclosure (cut off from the main one), the grave being guarded all night by watchmen.

Boy mat-bearers and cooks who had not reached the age of puberty were then sought in all parts of the barracks and ordered to eat up such remains as were consumable, but all who were commandeered were obliged to sleep where the bull had been cut up and roasted, until the following morning. A further special requirement was that all so set apart had to refrain from passing water from the moment of coming up until permission was given to depart. For this reason, it was with considerable difficulty that boys could be found when wanted.

Every atom of the bull that remained over was afterwards burnt to cinders, including bones, hide, etc., etc. The doctors thereupon gathered together all the ashes and conveyed them to some large and deep pool into which they were thrown. This was done to guard, as before, against any portion being taken by strangers and used to obtain ascendancy over the King and nation.

After this observance, everyone who had taken part therein had to refrain from all intercourse with womenfolk. For this reason, as often as girls or women arrived at headquarters with bundles of food for fathers, brothers or husbands, they set them down and left for their homes forthwith without escort of any kind. The word having gone forth that all must arm was an absolute guarantee against interference of every kind. All who armed, including the ones detailed to remain as the King's body-guard, were obliged to eat the *umbengo*, the general object of which was, not only to knit the people together, but to hearten and strengthen them.

Following upon these formalities was another, equally indispensable, viz. the eating of beasts offered as a sacrifice to the spirits of the King's departed ancestors. Such cattle were apportioned to the various regiments. They



were killed and eaten at night, famous national chants being sung at the same time. The departed spirits were invoked by the various highly-placed officers and aristocrats, of whom there were at least a score, men of sufficient status to remonstrate with the King on great and critical occasions. The ancient, undisturbed graves of former Kings were also visited, the spirit being invoked at each.

By way of stimulating the troops to put forth their best efforts in war, the King would call a couple of regiments into the great cattle enclosure and there urge individuals of the one to challenge those of the other, one at a time. "I have," he would say, "summoned you all to hear how you mean to behave on coming in sight of the enemy." It is of melancholy interest to know that this practice was observed by the regiments Kandempemvu and Ngobamakosi, which proved so terribly destructive at Isandhlwana. After the King had spoken, the challenging proceeded in this way: Some man belonging to, say, the Ngobamakosi jumped up and shouted: "I can do better than you, son of . . . (giving name); you won't stab a white man, before one has already fallen by my hand. If you do, you can carry off the whole of our kraal and the property attached (giving name of the kraal), or, you shall take my sister . . . (giving her name, and implying marriage)." Having said this, he started to dance a *pas seul*, with a small shield and stick (on such occasions assegais and war-shields were not carried). The other man, stung by the words uttered in public, jumped up as smartly and, dancing towards and after his challenger as the latter retired, called out defiantly: "Well, if you can do better than I, you may take our kraal . . . and my sister too . . . (giving names)." As each danced, they were loudly applauded by their respective comrades. When a man, known by the King to be a brave fellow, sprang up and danced, the King might point and shake his hand at him approvingly. Others followed the same process, though by no means in monotonous or regular fashion; and so it went on until sunset. Occasionally the one addressed or "selected," as it was called, refrained from

taking up the challenge. Such a fellow was called a coward, and, when the regiments had left the King, his failure was freely commented on. He was then made to suffer the usual indignities of cowards, viz. having his meat dipped in cold water, etc.

A day or two afterwards, two other regiments were pitted against one another. Again the process of "selection" and challenging went on excitedly until sunset.

After the fighting had taken place, the same challenging pairs of regiments were called before the King to "discuss" the campaign. (Such rule was, however, not followed during the Zulu War, for obvious reasons). Some young man then jumped up and accosting the one "selected" by him before hostilities occurred, shouted exultingly: "What did you do, son of . . .? I did this and did that (reciting various deeds of valour or supposed valour). What have you to your credit?" The other replied. The man generally allowed by those assembled to have distinguished himself the more, was declared to have won the wager. The property, as a matter of fact, did not change hands, though, at first, it seemed as if it would do so. The stakes were merely figuratively referred to for heightening public interest in the achievements.

Cattle rewards to acknowledged heroes were made by the King when "war discussions" took place on the above lines.

When the circumstances were such that the troops had to march forthwith against the enemy, the ceremony known as *ukucelwa* (to be sprinkled) was held. As with eating the *umbengo*, there were phases of the custom. The essential features were: Cleansing internally by using specially-prepared emetics and external cleansing by washing in the stream; dipping one's fingers into an open dish placed on the fire, containing hot liquid and drugs poured in by the war-doctor, and thereafter sucking them and suddenly spitting out what has been so sucked; uttering imprecations on the enemy when spirting the medicated liquid from one's mouth; being smoked with drugs whilst standing in a circle round the doctor; being



sprinkled front and rear by the doctor with yet other drugs of a caustic character.

There were various ways in which these essentials were observed. Such variety was due to the fact that each medico to a certain extent kept his own drugs, and observed a procedure peculiar to himself.

As an illustration, let us take what occurred in 1883, after Cetshwayo had been attacked at Undi (Ulundi) by Zibebu. A couple of men who had escaped, returned to their tribe near St. Lucia Bay with an assegai that had been flung after them by Zibebu's men, but had failed to strike. This was handed to a well-known war-doctor, who, being called on to practise his arts on some forty *amaviyo* then present, bent the blade, and at the bend tied a small round vessel containing charms. The assegai was stuck into the ground from 200 to 300 yards off by means of its wooden end, sharpened for the purpose. He then required the troops to approach, a *viyo* at a time, when, whilst escorting the company, he shouted out (in Zulu), "Here's a marvel! Here is the one who shuts out! Here's the keeper of the door!" Each of these phrases, on being uttered alternately, had to be repeated by the *viyo* in chorus. The doctor next directed each man, on filing past, to take hold of the vessel with his fingers, slightly shake it and, at the same instant, exclaim: "I have closed!" or "I shut!" The object of the performance was to cause all Zibebu's assegais to miss their mark or become blunt, and all his efforts against Dinuzulu and his allies to prove unavailing.

The same man, having later on caused the troops to form up in a circle round him, by way of finally preparing them for battle, strode hurriedly up and down and among the men holding something concealed in his right hand. "What is this?" he swiftly asked one, only to pass on similarly to another to put the same question. At the moment of asking, he opened his hand for the fraction of a second, when a glittering stone-like substance appeared, about two inches long, and as thick as one's thumb. "It is earth!" exclaimed those able to catch

a glimpse. Upon which he said: "Did you see it?" "Yes, we did," was the reply. And so, ever moving, he went about, clothed in weird garb, asking the same questions in all directions, and always receiving the same answers: "What is this?" "Earth." "Did you see it?" "Yes, we did." The scene quickly became animated and exciting, due no doubt to the celerity of movement and abrupt questioning of the great doctor, with evident inability on the part of the warriors to know what the glittering substance, of which they kept on obtaining but the briefest glimpses, really was.

This was the man who was employed by Dinuzulu in 1888, shortly before scoring a signal victory over Zibebu within 1,000 yards of Nongoma magistracy in Zululand.

On leaving headquarters, after a stirring address by the King, the army marched in one great column, in order of companies. Upon reaching hostile territory it was split into two divisions of close formation, when competent men were selected for reconnaissance and advanced guard duty. This latter body, forming about ten companies, moved ahead of the column to which it was attached, at a distance of ten to twelve miles. The same was done in regard to the other division. The guard was made considerable, to give the enemy the impression, especially when in extended order, that it was the main body. It was held to be a serious breach in tactics for the column to fail to divide as stated, for, on being taken at a disadvantage, it was considered necessary for another force to be on the flank for creating a diversion and so relieve the situation.

The advanced guard purposely refrained from concealing itself. In addition to the guard, spies were sent out in twos and threes to locate the enemy, with a view to planning surprise or ambush. As soon as the guard found it had been perceived and was being moved against by the enemy, runners were at once dispatched to warn the main body.

The leading principle in attack was to endeavour to surround the enemy. To effect this, the men, on an



engagement becoming imminent, were rapidly drawn up in semi-circular formation and instructed by the officer in supreme command. These instructions resolved themselves into specifying what regiments were to form the right "horn," as it was called, what the left, and what were to compose the "chest" or centre, as also the routes to be taken. The warriors, having been once more sprinkled with drugs to ward off injury, exhorted through lively recitation of praises of departed kings, and reminded of the challenges and promises made by them in the presence of the sovereign, dashed forward to realize the general plan or die in the attempt.

It was the rule to hold back a large force in reserve, for use in case of necessity. The commanding officer and his staff took up a position on high ground to watch the course of the battle, and issue any further necessary directions.

Pass-words and countersigns were frequently made use of, especially as much travelling about was necessary at night.

As it was only shortly before the Zulu War that firearms were acquired, the use of these was not sufficiently general to interfere with the national modes of warfare followed for over half a century.

The powers of endurance of the army when on the march were remarkable. Although living on scanty supplies of food, the men could, on emergency, travel forty miles in the course of a night and forthwith engage in battle. The provision-bearers and herds could not, of course, keep up with the column after the first day, with the result that each warrior was obliged to carry his own food and equipment. Men frequently rolled up their shields when marching, as they then became easier to carry. Those whose feet became sore and swollen were laughed at, including men who resorted to using sandals of ox-hide.

Let us conclude with a few customs formerly and still observed by individuals in war-time.

No warrior ever goes off to war without visiting his

home, in order to "take the spirit" along with him, as it is called. The home is the shrine at which he worships, and where the friendly aid and protection of departed spirits are sought. When about to leave, two or three enter the cattle enclosure and, at the upper end thereof, invoke their ancestral spirits. In the meantime, an old woman has taken her stand at, though outside, the gate awaiting the men's departure. She holds in her hand an ordinary hand-broom of grass. With this she flicks the calf of each warrior as he goes forth, thereby metaphorically warding off the dangers towards which he is moving, but says nothing. The custom is general, though not invariably practised.

After the men leave, various customs are observed by the women. The huts just vacated by the men are carefully swept. A fire is forthwith kindled in each, so as to make everything there bright and cheery. This is done to encourage the return of the soldier and avert his remaining eternally away. With the same object, his mat is carefully shaken and rolled up, an ear of millet being put inside it. It is then stood upright at the end of the hut (the usual position in normal times is horizontal). And in such position it remains until the owner's return. If he is injured, it is taken down.

Quarrelling of all kinds is studiously refrained from, as such is supposed to draw the absent ones into danger. Not only women and girls, but the whole establishment, including little children, observe the most orderly and quiet behaviour, crying infants being hushed as speedily as possible.

Wives and mothers mark their faces by rubbing with a specially-prepared black paste of ashes, earth, etc. The marks are of various designs, the most general being a semi-circle over each eye, the two meeting at the top of the nose, or a  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch diameter circle on each cheek. The tops of their leather skirts, too, are reversed, *i.e.* the nap thereon is turned outwards.

Occasionally bitter-apple (*solanum*) berries are rolled slowly along that side of the hut on which the warrior was



in the habit of sleeping, the berry being aimed to go out by the doorway and so carry all possibilities of harm along with it.

The same berries, two or three of them, may be threaded on to a cord, as also a rabbit tail, the whole being tied as a necklace round the throat to ward off evil.

Other customs, not less quaint, are observed by mothers-in-law.

A sprig of wild asparagus is often stuck in the thatch over the doorway of a hut to safeguard the home.

The black markings on the face and the wearing of the berries represent formal suppression of ordinary personal feeling or the deliberate assumption of an ugly, callous, and unsympathetic disposition.

When husbands or sons are killed, various other customs are conformed to by women.

Turning to the soldiers themselves, we find that when any of the enemy are killed in battle, those responsible for the deaths proceed to rip open the deceased's stomach. This is done as it is feared the deceased's unreleased spirit will invest the one who slew him and turn him into a raving lunatic. He must also strip or, at least, partly strip the corpse of its clothing and wear it himself until, having cleansed himself in accordance with various formalities, he can resume his own.

Those who have killed others, eat and live entirely apart from the main body. This seclusion continues for many days. During this time, they observe other formalities before being finally washed with drugs and allowed to associate with their comrades. They are treated with great respect, the best and fattest portions of meat are served out to them, and they are entitled to wear the decorations previously referred to.

A coward, on the other hand, is subjected to the greatest indignities. His meat is handed to him after having been dipped in cold water. This causes girls to laugh at him. Not infrequently his fiancée will break off the engagement, on the ground that he has so far unmanned himself as to have become a woman. Being a woman, he naturally must

not look to another woman to become his wife ! To such extent is this carried, that one hears of cases where girls actually uncover themselves in his presence by way of shaming him.

And so one could go on describing the inner life of this remarkable race, but sufficient has been said to enable the reader to understand those with whom the Natal Government was, in 1906, called on to deal. The character of their tactics and military habits and customs has been roughly outlined in the foregoing sketch, which, as everyone who lives in the country knows, is descriptive not of a system of life gone by, but of one that was largely revived and practised by those who took part in the fighting, rebels as well as loyalists. The present is understood by studying the past, or, as a Zulu would say : *Inyati i buzwa kwa ba pambili* (news of the buffalo is sought of those who are ahead). Thus the chapter which, at first, seemed to deal only with old bones is found, on examination, to be a picture of the people as they were at the beginning of the campaign.

#### NOTE.

##### THE REBEL ORGANIZATION IN 1906.

*State of affairs among the tribes.*—On assuming the government of Natal, England found many disconnected tribes. This state of affairs has continued to exist to the present day, with the result that any attempts of Natives to organize among themselves have been confined chiefly to the limits of individual tribes. When Zululand was conquered, the principle of dis severing politically-connected tribes was followed, first by Sir Garnet Wolseley, later, and to greater extent, when the magistracies were established.

Although the policy of *divide et impera* has failed to destroy much of the natural affinity between tribes, there is no doubt it has also helped to drive others still further apart. The animosities between many of them are proverbial. The efforts of any Chief at organization have, moreover, been checked by a provision in the Code which prescribes penalties for "summoning an armed assembly of his tribe" or "classing or causing to be classed, the



men of his tribe into companies or regiments," without the permission of the Supreme Chief. Notwithstanding this, various Chiefs have, for many years, divided their men into regiments and companies. In some cases, this has been done innocently by loyal men, in others by men not so loyal. No harm, however, arose out of the practice until the Insurrection took place, and even then the Government gained more, perhaps, from loyal Chiefs who happened to be semi-organized, *e.g.* Sibindi, Mveli, Sitshitshili and Mfungelwa, than it suffered from those who were openly disloyal, *e.g.* Bambata and Sigananda.

The Poll Tax Act was, of course, a powerful agent in breaking down the long-standing differences referred to, whilst the order to kill off pigs and white fowls further influenced large numbers to unite and rebel. It was never possible to determine in any satisfactory way how many were prepared to join those actually in the field, even though approximate estimates of the latter could always be arrived at. It is enough, at this stage, to say that about 150 men struck the first decisive blow and that, although probably 1,000 adherents were gained at Nkandhla within the next two or three weeks, further accessions were determined rather by the successes met with than by a feeling that the methods adopted were the best available for securing the end in view. As these successes were insignificant, the rebels that joined did so in small lots at a time. Had the troops met with two or three reverses, especially at the beginning, it is probable thousands would have gone over, only to be followed by thousands of others if the efforts of these again had proved successful.

*Leaders.*—Suitable and experienced leaders were wanting; not that capable men could not be found, but the most capable were the ones who best realized the difficulties of the undertaking and the poor chances of success. There is no doubt that many Chiefs espoused the cause whilst pretending to be personally loyal, and this when many members of their tribes had deserted to join the rebels.

*Arms and ammunition.*—As there was no law forbidding the keeping of assegais and shields, it may be assumed nearly every Native in the Colony was fully armed, though many would not have been in possession of war shields.

The law was strict in regard to firearms. Natives in general on the south-west side of the Tugela possessed no more than 200 registered guns, if so many. In Zululand, there were as many as 5,105 in 1897; <sup>1</sup> by 1904, they had not increased beyond 5,126—all of them registered. Of the latter, about 90 per cent. were of the old Tower musket, smooth-bore, and other obsolete types.

<sup>1</sup>Nearly all these were obtained prior to the Imperial Government's assumption of control in Zululand (May, 1887).

Apart from legally held guns, Dinuzulu was in possession of a number which he had failed to register, some of them obtained at the time of the Boer War. He also had large quantities of ammunition of various kinds, obtained at the same time and in other ways. How many other guns were owned by his late tribe or other tribes associated therewith, as well as other Zululand and Natal tribes, it is quite impossible to say.

These facts are given to show what would have been available had the Insurrection become universal. How far the foregoing arms were used against the troops it is difficult to judge. The majority of those that were used were of the Martini-Henry, Snider, Lee-Metford and Mauser types.

*Food supplies.*—But for the premature outbreak at “Trewirgie,” the Rebellion would probably not have begun until after all the crops had been reaped, *i.e.* about May. To have waited until all the grain was in would have been but to act in accordance with custom. The rebels, therefore, were somewhat at a disadvantage in regard to grain supplies. Although the cattle disease, known as East Coast Fever, had already invaded Zululand in the north, it had not up to that time made its way across the Umhlatuze, consequently, abundant meat supplies (cattle as well as goats) were always obtainable in the vicinity of Nkandhla. The ways in which supplies were procured whilst fighting was going on at Nkandhla, will be set forth later.



## V.

### EVENTS AND CONDITIONS ANTECEDENT TO OUT- BREAK OF HOSTILITIES.—MURDER OF HUNT AND ARMSTRONG.

ABOUT the year 1895 South Africa was invaded from the north by a plague of locusts. A succession of several abnormally dry seasons, peculiarly favourable for hatching the young, resulted in the swarms increasing to alarming proportions. Immense clouds of them swept over the land in all directions, sometimes so vast as to render dimmer the light of the sun. Natal, euphemistically though not untruly styled the Garden Colony, suffered, if anything, more than other parts, and this owing to the very abundance of her crops and almost tropical vegetation. Recurrent devastations of crops lasted until 1903 or 1904 when, through determined and systematic co-operation among Europeans in the several colonies, involving heavy outlays of public monies, the pest was successfully counteracted and stamped out. The Natives of Natal and Zululand, accustomed as they are to cultivating but small patches of maize and corn, barely sufficient for their wants even in plenteous seasons, suffered most. In connection with this "invasion" came a year of scarcity among them (1896), necessitating distribution by the Government, for their relief, of large supplies of grain at cost price and under,—in some cases, free of charge.

In 1897 a new cattle disease, known as rinderpest, began to make its appearance, and this, whilst the older and well-nigh endemic one, called lungsickness, was still afflicting the

cattle of white and black alike. It, too, had gradually come down from the north. More virulent in form than lung-sickness, it soon spread to all parts of Natal and Zululand, destroying large percentages of the herds wherever permitted to enter. Again did the scourge press more heavily on Natives than on Europeans, especially in Zululand, for the reason that, being a pastoral people, they were peculiarly dependent in many ways on cattle. It will, for instance, be recollected that cattle are used as an essential constituent in every marriage contract. Milk, moreover, is extensively used for feeding infants and children. The price of stock advanced 500% and more; even where sufficient money was earned by hard labour, the necessary *lobola* cattle could not be purchased. It, therefore, became difficult for the young men to obtain wives. That a certain spirit of restlessness and discontent gradually grew up in them cannot be wondered at. Indeed, it is generally admitted these misfortunes, coming one on top of the other and closely affecting the life of the people, were, on the whole, met by them with singular fortitude and forbearance.

But more was to follow. About the end of the late War, through importation at Beira, it has been supposed, of fresh blood in the shape of cattle from Australia to re-stock Rhodesia, a fresh disease—even more disastrous than rinderpest—also previously unknown in South Africa, made its appearance among such stock as remained in that part, and thereafter slowly but surely spread in different directions. Rinderpest had, like a hurricane, swept through South Africa (leaving patches here and there unaffected), and eventually spent itself at the sea at Cape Town. The new disease, known as East Coast Fever, or Tick Fever, by reason of infection being carried by a species of tick, common almost to the whole of South Africa, was much more searching and destructive in its effects. It crept steadily southward, affecting European and Native cattle alike. After causing vast and widespread losses, it is still unconquered at time of writing, though, especially since the Union Government assumed control, the possibilities of its spreading have been greatly reduced.



Entering the Colony on the eastern section of its northern boundary, it moved from place to place, striking down herds wherever it appeared with a suddenness that hardly seemed possible from the slowness of its march. The Natives of Zululand were the first to feel the blow, but the still more numerous black and white population of Natal, though having greater time to organize resistance, did not suffer less. A fundamental characteristic of human nature showed itself in the complacency with which the disease was viewed whilst at a distance, and alarm and even panic when it actually invaded the Colony. Every precaution which science or quackery could suggest was adopted. Thousands of pounds were spent on a device, only a few weeks later to be displaced by another, even more expensive. Parliament passed one law after another, whose aggregate effect scarcely abated the evil, whilst the inconvenience to Natives through enforcement of regulations amounted, in some instances, to actual provocation. That they were unable to see eye-to-eye with the Veterinary Department or other controlling authority in the restrictions imposed within infected or supposed infected areas was due not to fictitious, but to genuine, belief. However, it was clear from the outset that European cattle were no more immune than their own. If their race suffered, so also did that of the white man. Irritating though the precautions were, the fact remained that Natives' cattle were being swept off wholesale, leaving the people in a greatly impoverished condition.

But there was another matter, and one of long standing, regarded by them as a still greater affliction. To this we must now turn.

Ever since farms were laid off in Natal for European occupation, rents had been collected from the Native tenants. There were many reasons, sentimental as well as arising out of actual necessity, to account for the presence of Natives on such farms. First, there was the kraal, and its family (with numerous old local associations) already *in situ* when the farm was laid off; secondly, the farmer, who had no tenants, had, by the offer of inducements, obtained them; thirdly, Natives ejected for some reason from

adjoining or other lands, who had come to apply for permission "to squat." There was variety, again, when the character of the tenancy is examined. One landlord had, as the basis of his contract, service in lieu of rent; another required certain service with a small rent; another, service for which he paid the market wage, leaving the tenant free for six months of the year, but charged rent; another wanted nothing but the rent. Without going too deeply into this exceedingly complex question, it is sufficient to remark that "service in lieu of rent" was generally demanded by the Dutch farmers, in many ways fairer and more sympathetic to their tenants than other landlords, whilst cash was generally required by British farmers. Where rents were charged, they were felt by many Natives to be burdensome. With a number of tenants on his farm, a landlord, of course, felt that where one man could raise the rent, all must be required to do so, otherwise chaos would result. Rents naturally varied in different parts, some places being more productive than others. The lowest amount was about £1 per hut, whilst the highest was as much as £12. The average, however, stood between £2 and £3. As the sizes of Native establishments varied, or facilities for cultivation or grazing and disposing of produce or stock were unequal, so the difficulties of a tenant obtaining the amount of his rent varied. None of the farmers, Boer or British, intended to be oppressive. Many of them were remarkably patient and considerate. The fact, however, remains, that for some time before the Rebellion, some were oppressive, although unintentionally so. This mercenary spirit, however, was exhibited not only by the farmers of Natal. Anyone who takes the trouble to read the official publications will find it prevailing in other parts of South Africa. It is, indeed, a characteristic of Western Civilization. Even where Natives themselves are in possession of farms, they, aping their masters, follow a policy not less exacting in regard to men of their own colour.

For several years prior to the Rebellion, the high rate of rents was generally felt as a burden. It was talked about, and talked about loudly. Every report on Native Affairs



showed that such was the case. On the other hand, one heard not a word in regard to the hut tax imposed by the Government.<sup>1</sup> The justice of it was approved and its amount considered reasonable. As a matter of fact, the complaint that made itself heard, was not against the European farmers, but against the system which had initiated freehold, leasehold, or any other tenure, as distinct from the purely communal. Because the Natal Government did not abolish landlordism, or at least prohibit landlords from charging tenants more than, say £1 per hut, and ejectment on failure to pay, Natives considered they had just ground for complaint against the Government. In their ignorance of the history of freehold, they looked on the colonists as having initiated, and as being responsible for, a system that flourished in Europe long before Vasco da Gama sailed up the coast of South Africa to set eyes on and name the country occupied by their artless ancestors.

Associated with this question were those of usury and cruelly extortionate charges by certain members of the legal profession, notably such as practised in the "country districts." In consequence of many tenants being unable to meet their obligations, largely through loss of cattle from disease, they were driven to borrowing money. For many years past, it had been the practice for them to draw on their cattle to overcome temporary embarrassment. In the absence of a law regulating the interest chargeable on loans, a few of the lenders demanded and received fabulous rates. It would, however, be unfair to hold the administration responsible for not providing a law, practically unknown in civilized communities, until necessity therefor had actually revealed itself. However that may be, the position must be looked at as it was. Here was a people compelled in the main to meet their financial obligations, public and private, with no better means than the earnings of their sons. These sons, aware that their fathers were depending largely on them, instead of *vice versa*, began to assume an unusually

<sup>1</sup> This tax of 14s. per hut had, of course, to be paid in respect of huts on private lands, regardless of the rent charged by the farmer or landlord.

independent attitude in respect, not only of their parents, but of everyone else. The parents complained to the Government and pressed for the application of correctives. What one of the correctives was will presently appear.<sup>1</sup>

This independence, indeed, was but a symptom characteristic of the age. Its growth had, for many years, been observable, though, in former days, not nearly so aggravated as it became in later ones. To such an extent did it develop by 1906, that contempt for authority, particularly Native authority, began to manifest itself in numerous ways, quickened and accentuated by the evil influences of European towns.

The principal means available to a kraal-head for obtaining money had, for years, been the sending of his sons to work in European towns and elsewhere. With the discovery of the Barberton and Johannesburg gold-fields, considerable inducements were offered in the higher wages there obtainable. It, therefore, followed that many accustomed up till then to find employment in Natal, went off to the new centres of industry. The more these centres developed, the greater became their attractions. The result was that, before long, many thousands repaired thither year after year. So large did the number of Natal and Zululand labourers become, that it became necessary to establish a Government Agent at Johannesburg, whose principal duty was to receive and remit to their respective homes the earnings of the workers. Had there been no such considerate provision, much of the money, urgently required as it was by the parents, must have been squandered, stolen or lost.<sup>2</sup>

At these gold-mining centres, however, especially Johannesburg, youths of Natal came into contact with thousands of Natives from all parts of South Africa. They there became acquainted with that insidious American Negro propaganda

<sup>1</sup> An important Act, regulating claims against Natives for interest, was passed by the Natal Legislature in 1908. It has proved very beneficial to the Natives.

<sup>2</sup> As the contracts were never for less than six months, and labourers had not acquired the habit of banking their earnings, it can be seen that losses from theft or otherwise at a mining centre must have been considerable.



called Ethiopianism, as well as with unscrupulous, low-class Europeans of various nationalities. In such environment, it is not surprising that the already growing spirit of independence was developed, as well as vice of the worst possible types. These retrograde tendencies were not long in reacting on Natives in the locations and farms of Natal. Indeed, in conjunction with the local influences referred to above, they speedily became the most potent agents for setting at naught that wonderful tribalism of some of whose features an account has already been given. A deeply-rooted antagonism towards the white man on the part of some began to manifest itself, accompanied by a spirit of defiance that found expression in many ways. Hardly less subversive and disintegrating were the effects of coming into contact with thousands of British soldiers, and the ludicrously familiar attitude of the latter towards Natives during the Boer War.

Alive to the necessity of assisting parents in a matter of this kind, the Government—the Prime Minister then being the Hon. C. J. Smythe—had its own predicament to consider. The wave of great financial depression, brought on by the protracted War, had told severely on the Colony. The Treasury was empty. The credit of the Colony was falling. As much as 6% was being paid on temporary loans, instead of the average rate of 3½% for years paid on public loans. A necessity for instituting new taxing measures was urgent. Already, whilst the preceding Sutton Ministry was in power, had the need for taxation made itself felt. Among the bills of that ministry was one that proposed the imposition of a poll tax, but beyond publication in the *Gazette*, no further steps had been taken in regard thereto.

When the Smythe Ministry came to look into the financial position, it decided to adopt some of its predecessor's taxing measures and to discard others. Among those discarded, was a Poll Tax Bill. Certain other bills, among them one dealing with unoccupied lands, were passed by the Legislative Assembly, only to be rejected by the Legislative Council. With the end of the session in view and no provision made for equalising revenue and expenditure, it

became imperative to impose some other form of taxation. There was, however, no time to prepare a fresh bill. The most obvious forms of taxation had been attempted but had failed. In these circumstances, it was resolved to fall back on the Poll Tax Bill on account of its having already been gazetted as required by law. The Treasurer (Mr., now Sir, Thomas Hyslop, K.C.M.G.), having failed, owing to the adverse action of a nominated upper chamber, to pass measures that appeared to him suitable, it was decided the Prime Minister should take charge of the bill. It succeeded in passing through both Houses with comparatively little discussion. In August, 1905, it became law. It would not have become law but for the rejection of the other taxing measures that had been passed by the representatives of the people.

There are, it has been held, but two forms of direct taxation applicable to all sections of the community without discriminating between classes, namely a poll tax and a house tax. A house tax had been attempted, but, owing to loud and universal protest by the European community, it was not introduced.

Though difficult to justify a poll tax as an equitable mode of taxation among civilized people, it is not inappropriate when applied to Native races. If imposed on all sections of the community, it would, if standing alone, be an unfair tax; accompanied, however, by an income tax, which the Government proposed to bring forward during the following session, the unfairness would have ceased to exist.

There was strong feeling among many in the Colony that Natives were not bearing a fair share of taxation. The choice lay between increasing the hut tax payable by kraal-owners, or leaving the tax on them as before and imposing a fresh one on the younger men. It is a matter of opinion which was the better course to pursue, but, in any case, the poll tax of £1 per head on the unmarried man, and the hut tax of 14s. on the married man, cannot be regarded as unduly burdensome, especially when compared with the taxes imposed in the adjoining Colonies, Transvaal and Orange Free State. In the former, £2 was payable yearly



by every adult male Native, and a further £2 by those having more than one wife for each additional wife ;<sup>1</sup> in the latter, a poll tax of £1 was payable by all Natives. In neither of these cases, however, was there a hut tax as in Natal.

The poll tax was imposed on all sections, Europeans, Asiatics and Natives, but, in respect of the last, those already liable for hut tax were specially excepted. It accordingly fell on the young men, so many of whom, as we have seen, went to work at Johannesburg and were becoming more and more independent of their parents. Thus a class was taxed which had, to a large extent, escaped taxation, though generally speaking, assisting their fathers in finding money for hut tax and other purposes. Had the tax been imposed on the Natives alone, the bill would have had to be reserved for the King's approval. That would have meant delay ; but the country could not afford to delay. Through adopting the course above indicated, the royal assent was unnecessary.

Before considering the manner in which the new law was received by the Natives, reference should be made to an incident, normal in civilized communities, but quite abnormal in those of barbarians. The Government resolved to take the census. Up to that time, no actual enumeration of the Natives had ever been attempted. Estimates only had been prepared from time to time, without any intimation of such fact being given to the Natives. These had been based primarily on the hut tax returns. The reason for not requiring coloured races to conform to the same law as Europeans in this respect was because of their suspicious temperament. There is nothing a Zulu will take umbrage at more quickly than when he, his family and belongings, are being counted. It appears to him tantamount to placing himself entirely in the hands of another, and of being "surrounded." This instinctive dread is deeply rooted, and its *raison d'être* is seen in the mode of attack practised by him in actual warfare, whereby a force moves forward, theoretically in half-moon formation, with the object of *encircling* the enemy.

<sup>1</sup> Ordinance 20, 1902, sec. 2 (Transvaal).

It is, of course, absurd to think that the Natal Government, under which the Natives had lived peacefully for half a century, could have had any inimical motive in taking a census, but that the Natives felt some such motive was latent, is borne out by what happened when the regulations were explained by a Magistrate at a gathering of Chiefs and their followers near Greytown. A Native present put the question: "What guarantee have we that, in being enumerated in the fashion proposed, it is not in the mind of the Government, making use of the information gained, to do us an injury in the future?" The reply was: "The Government has no evil intentions whatever, the sun will sooner fall from the heavens than any evil come upon you, as a result of this census-taking. Europeans, including myself, will be counted along with you." This assurance which, from a European point of view, the official was fully justified in giving, was, however, soon made to bear an interpretation extremely difficult to reply to, and this in the very district where the Insurrection proper afterwards began. The census was taken in due course in 1904, meeting with murmuring here and there among the Natives in parts of the Colony. In the year following, the Poll Tax Act was passed and proclaimed. What was more natural than that they should associate that time-honoured practice of Western Civilization with the introduction of a form of taxation which, in their view, did them injury by imposing an additional financial burden, and, what was worse, accentuating and even legalizing the independence of children towards their fathers, an independence the sons themselves (free from control as many of them had become), veering round in their resentment, also condemned as subversive of their whole system of life. From the parents' point of view, it appeared as if their sons, already too independent, were being rendered still more so. And yet, in passing the Act, the Government was of the belief that one of the correctives above referred to was being provided, and would operate in favour of the parents. Had liability been laid on the father rather than on the son, the protests raised would probably not have been as loud as they were.



Early in the summer of the same year a curious phenomenon was observed in connection with the Kaffir corn or *mabele* crops, particularly in those portions of the Colony that abutted on Zululand. The ears of corn were attacked by the aphid insect in such way as to give an impression of having been oiled. Whole fields glittered in the sun. Although the phenomenon was capable of complete explanation by scientists, it appeared mysterious to European laymen and still more so to Natives, who could recall nothing of the kind in previous years. As a result of inability to explain, the idea got about that Dinuzulu was the cause. The phenomenon was, therefore, taken as a sign that that Chief had something in mind which called for co-operation on their part. This impression became current also among a number of Natal tribes, notwithstanding that two generations had elapsed since the severance of their connection with the Zulu royal house. The crops in question are universally regarded by Natives as the most important, for it is of this grain that the national beverage and food *tshwala* is made. As the corn-fields were attacked over wide areas in a manner at once mysterious and harmless, the characteristics accorded well with the supposition that Dinuzulu was the cause, for it was believed he had potent drugs of which he alone, assisted by various witch-doctors from afar, understood the use. The disease, for such it was, was widely talked of, and Dinuzulu was said to have brought it on for some inscrutable purpose to be revealed or not in the near future as he might choose.

Here again, we have an incident of no significance whatever among Europeans and yet regarded by numberless Natives as a sign of something important to come. The disease existed until after the Rebellion, when, strange to say, it vanished as suddenly as it had appeared.

There was yet another phenomenon which attracted widespread attention, and became invested by the Natives with special significance, namely, a hailstorm of unusual severity on the 31st May, 1905. It swept violently through the whole Colony, including large areas adjacent thereto. Not for more than a generation had there been anything so

furious and destructive. At first the incident seemed to pass without any special comment, but towards the end of the year, about September or October, and just before the provisions of the Poll Tax Act were explained by the Magistrates, certain strange rumours, directly connected with the storm, began to make themselves heard. So curious were these, that one could not help pricking up his ears to listen, only, however, to laugh at their utter absurdity.

Owing to the fact that, ridiculous as they appeared to Europeans to be, the rumours were believed, and what is more, began to be acted on, by Natives in many parts, it is necessary to consider them seriously, and in so doing, it is possible that some light may be thrown on the inner workings of the black man's mind, and that some of the mystery which still enshrouds the underlying causes of the Rebellion may be removed.

The rumours were in the form of a fiat or command, and associated with a personality whose name was never revealed. Neither place nor time was given. All that was known was that the command existed, purported to have come from some one in supreme authority, and peremptorily demanded obedience. The following is the message, given as nearly as possible in the form in which it circulated among the Natives :  
*“ All pigs must be destroyed, as also all white fowls. Every European utensil hitherto used for holding food or eating out of must be discarded and thrown away. Anyone failing to comply will have his kraal struck by a thunderbolt when, at some date in the near future, he sends a storm more terrible than the last, which was brought on by the Basuto king in his wrath against the white race for having carried a railway to the immediate vicinity of his ancestral stronghold.”*

In some places, it was believed white goats and white cattle were also to be destroyed. Pigs, although kept by many Natives to sell or barter to Europeans, were not eaten by them. They had been introduced by the white race, and were regarded by Natives as creatures whose flesh “ smells.” The same prejudice did not exist in regard to fowls, for whose presence in the country Europeans, for all the Natives knew, were not responsible. To discriminate, therefore,



between white ones and others, as well as between utensils of European manufacture and those of their own, could carry but one meaning to any intelligent mind, and that was that drastic aggressive measures of some kind against the white race were intended. What these were to be every Native knew quite well. He knew it was proposed to rise simultaneously and massacre the whites, although the time the butchery was to take place had still to be fixed. The word "thunderbolt," too, bore metonymic interpretation. The acts or characteristics of a Zulu monarch were frequently, in ordinary parlance, compared with the fury of the elements. On the other hand, in accordance with naïve and deeply-rooted belief, the King, to whom the sky was said to *belong*, was supposed to be able to cause the heavens to pour down or withhold rain at his pleasure, though, to do this, he might be obliged to invoke the assistance of Native kings of other countries. It was, for instance, believed that gentle, copious rains could be induced by the Swazi kings, whilst the kings of Basutoland possessed drugs for bringing on violent thunderstorms, accompanied by lightning, wind and hail. Whenever any of these natural phenomena was specially required in Zululand,—ordinary rains, of course, were greatly in demand in times of drought,—it devolved on the King to furnish the oxen, as a rule about ten, necessary for presentation at the foreign court, before the "lord of the elements" would consent to exercise his skill. Hence, "thunderbolt," in such context as the above, means either the King's own army (which never went through a country but its devastations resembled those of a hurricane), or a storm brought about through the King interceding with such other king as *could* bring it on.

It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that, on hearing the command noised abroad, Natal Chiefs should have at once concluded it emanated from Dinuzulu who, though not a King, was the recognised representative of the Zulu royal house. Chiefs like Mveli near Pietermaritzburg, Mtambo and Ndunge near Durban, Tilonko and Sikukuku near Mid Illovo, and Mtele and Nondubela of Umsinga, and others,

accordingly thought it right to dispatch messengers direct to Dinuzulu to ascertain if such order had or had not originated from him. Tilonko went further and asked Dinuzulu if he was to pay the poll tax or not. Dinuzulu promptly denied having issued any such "word." He added that if the people wished to conform to the supposed order it was no affair of his; they could please themselves. This denial, however, did not amount to much, for admission, assuming him to have been the originator, would have been tantamount to saying he was guilty of sedition. No assertion is here made that it did emanate from him. The reader must be left to draw his own inference. It is not a little remarkable that the Chiefs named should have associated Dinuzulu with the order and gone to the trouble of communicating with him at a distance of 200 miles without reference to the Government. That they should have done so is, perhaps, accounted for by Dinuzulu's having posed as agent-in-chief of the Zulu people. In connection with the locust invasion, for instance, partly civilized though he was, he is alleged to have sent ten oxen all the way to the notorious witch Mabelemade in the Transvaal to implore her to remove the plague. The plague afterwards vanished. If Dinuzulu did act in this way, to whom are ignorant Natives likely to have ascribed the relief they then got? And to whom would they look for deliverance on subsequent occasions of general misfortune?

Under the Zulu regime, no king would have dreamt of issuing so vague and mysterious an order. Had he wished anything to be done, he would have communicated his instructions to his *indunas*, who would have transmitted them by recognized messengers to the Chiefs, these to the headmen who, in their turn, would have advised the heads of families immediately under their respective supervision. Everything would have taken place openly, speedily, definitely. The precise meaning of the royal intentions would have become known from the outset to every soul. In 1905, however, something had to be done against, and under the very eyes and nose of, a power to whom Dinuzulu and all his former followers were, and had for long been,



subject. Hence the necessity for issue of an anonymous type of order, and, as no Native of Natal or Zululand had ever had experience of such message, it followed that communication with Dinuzulu was necessary to ascertain if he had issued it, and, if so, what his plans were.

In the district of Weenen, inhabited by two of the largest tribes in Natal or Zululand, viz. those of Silwana and Ngqambuzana,<sup>1</sup> the Magistrate was successful in tracing the rumours to a definite source. They had been disseminated there by three Natives, who, under the rôle of messengers from Dinuzulu, had also traversed Newcastle, Dundee and Klip River divisions. They visited the kraals of Chiefs and others along their route. "They led the Natives," says the Magistrate, "to believe that war would shortly be declared by Dinuzulu, and those who failed to carry out his instructions as to the killing of pigs and destruction of utensils of European manufacture, and a reversion in general to their primitive mode of living, would be swept away by him. Reference was also made to a Basuto woman who had risen from the dead and was in communication with Dinuzulu. They alleged that 500 emissaries of Dinuzulu were canvassing South Africa." One of the 'messengers' "alleged that he and nine others had been dispatched by the Paramount Chief of [Basutoland] to Dinuzulu, from whom they now bore instructions which were similar in effect to those circulated by the other two men."<sup>2</sup> The Magistrate was unable to find that any of the three 'messengers' had been in communication with Dinuzulu. After trial and conviction, they were severely punished for spreading the false rumours.

These rumours were circulated in Weenen division before the Natives were officially notified of their obligation to pay the poll tax. In view of the mystery that still attaches to this extraordinary incident, it may be of interest, as showing the working of a Native's mind, to compare it with a somewhat similar one in Kaffraria, Cape Colony, which reached its

<sup>1</sup> Silwana's tribe consisted of about 30,000, that of Ngqambuzana of about 28,000, souls.

<sup>2</sup> Cd. 2905, p. 11.

climax in February, 1857. It will be remembered that many thousands of cattle of those parts had recently been swept away by disease; that a Native fanatic, Mhlakaza, thereafter came forward and urged the people to destroy their cattle, desist from cultivation, etc.; and that, after complying with the insane order, some 25,000 Natives are estimated to have perished from starvation, whilst 100,000 went out of the Colony in search of food. An official statement was made in April, 1858, by a prophetess, niece of this man Mhlakaza (then deceased). This is so cleverly descriptive of the stuff in which Native superstition has its roots, and has such obvious affinity with the Zulu propaganda of 1905, that it is inserted hereunder in some detail.<sup>1</sup> An article dealing, *inter alia*, with superstitions connected with the Matabele Rebellion, 1896, will be found in Appendix X.

<sup>1</sup> The niece, Nongqause by name, stated: "This talking of the new people commenced after my having reported to Mhlakaza that I had seen about ten strange Kafirs in the gardens. [The first meeting is said to have occurred about 2½ years before the date of giving the information.] . . . I told him I was afraid to go there. The people I saw were Kafirs—young men. I was afraid of them, because I did not know them. Mhlakaza told me not to be afraid of them, as they would do me no harm. He told me to speak to them, and ask them what they were doing there. I did so. They replied: 'We are people who have come to order you to kill your cattle, to consume your corn, and not to cultivate any more.' Mhlakaza asked them through me 'What are we to eat when we kill our cattle, etc.' They answered: 'We will find you something to eat.' The people then said that was enough for that day—they would return some other day. We asked who sent them; they answered: 'We have come of our own accord, as we wish everything in the country to be made new.' They said they had come from a *place of refuge*. I asked them where this place of refuge was. They said: 'You will not know if we even told you.' I always pressed them to tell me where this place of refuge was, but they gave me the same answer. The next day Mhlakaza killed one head of cattle. He then called a meeting of the people and told them that strangers had come to tell them to kill their cattle—to destroy their corn, and that great plenty would be provided for them hereafter. The people dispersed, and from that day they commenced killing their cattle, etc.; and Mhlakaza continued killing his cattle, one a day. The people killed more cattle than they could use. . . ."

The same, as well as other, strange men—commonly believed by the Natives to be spirits of the departed—came on other occasions and conversed with Nongqause and Mhlakaza on the foregoing lines. Their object was "to change the country" by "driving the English out" and "making them run into the sea." Such intention was to be communicated to the Paramount Chief Kreli (Sarili) and other Chiefs. On Mhlakaza reporting to Xito (Kreli's uncle), the latter directed him to spread the news throughout the country. This was done. Kreli and others had confidential meetings with Mhlakaza, the latter eventually leaving his kraal to live on roots and shell-fish. Mhlakaza often blamed



It may be argued that the command to kill off pigs and fowls arose in a way similar to that made public by Mhlakaza. But in that case the origin was traced to strangers who communicated their messages to a particular girl, who, in her turn, referred to Mhlakaza, a well-known man. In the pig-and-white-fowl-killing affair, the order seems to have originated with emissaries, careful not to sow the seed in places from which its origin could be traced by the white race. Only by employing secret agents, and making a thorough investigation extending over six weeks, could those who toured Weenen division be traced and apprehended. It is the easiest thing in the world for a stranger, especially if a Native, to utter an alarming rumour to other Natives,—who are an extremely credulous people,—and give out at, say, each of half-a-dozen places that he had heard it in some manner which, in fact, is entirely fictitious. For instance, in the year 1900, a rumour was started in the Lower Tugela division that all pigs were to be killed. An official meeting of Chiefs was promptly called to investigate, but whilst the originator's whereabouts could not be traced, the fact that attention had been publicly directed to the rumour at once put a stop to its further circulation.

There is no doubt but that the underlying intention of the order to kill pigs and white fowls and discard European utensils was that the Natives of Natal and Zululand should rise against the white man. Its purpose was to warn, as well as to unite, by the use of a threat. In the absence of positive evidence, which may yet be forthcoming, it would be wrong to draw any precise inference as to its origination. On the whole, it seems to us more likely to have sprung from the imagination of some Native obsessed with the idea that the conditions of life under European rule were intolerable, than from that of Dinuzulu.

the Paramount Chief as the sole cause of the wide-spread cattle-killing that then went on. Nongqause, too, declared that Kreli had said "the English were in his way," and that he looked to the strangers to assist him in fighting and driving them out of the country. "I have been at a loss," he added, "to know what to do with the English, as they have been stronger than the Kafirs."

By this time, the temper of the people had undergone a considerable change. A sullen demeanour was assumed by them as soon as the poll tax was proclaimed. To use a Zulu metaphor (without equivalent in English), and one that exactly expresses the position, the new tax had caused them to *qunga*.<sup>1</sup> This sullenness is, indeed, characteristic of the people under abnormal conditions. Until satisfied that any action in regard to them is oppressive or betrays neglect of their interests, they are, however, slow to take offence. They prefer to wait and observe the effect on others. If these, too, become morose, the tide of sullenness rises to resentment, and then to anger and open defiance. That the whole community was more or less charged with this ugly spirit, will presently be seen from the contemptuous manner in which Magistrates and other officials were treated in various parts of the country.

It is curious to note in this connection an almost total absence of belief among the Europeans (including those with expert knowledge of the Natives), that actual rebellion was imminent.

But although sullenness is characteristic of the people, it would be a libel to describe them as otherwise than exceedingly patient and long-suffering, equable and philosophic. Once conquered, they become loyal and devoted subjects, even of a race radically different from their own. They are profoundly conservative—the conservatism of ages—content with a simple life, simple pursuits and pastimes. But once such ideal has been destroyed or abandoned, they become restless, unstable and unhappy.

From what has been said, it can be seen that the direct and indirect association of Dinuzulu with the incidents immediately preceding the Insurrection was of the deepest and most subtle character. The part actually played by him during the rising, in some respects that of a kind of Zulu Hamlet, will be gradually unfolded as the narrative proceeds. A brief account of his antecedents has already

<sup>1</sup> That is, to become filled with an angry, vengeful spirit. The countenance of a person or animal that has *qunga'd* is abnormally dark and forbidding. Clouds are said to have *qunga'd* when,—charged with thunder, lightning and rain,—a violent storm is imminent.



been given. It is proposed now to consider the kind of life led by him in Zululand after returning from St. Helena, because an understanding thereof will enable the reader to appreciate the position better than he might otherwise do.

Attention should, in the first place, be drawn to the fact that during his stay at St. Helena (1889-1897), Dinuzulu was subjected to influences that contributed in no small degree to his subsequent undoing. The Governor of the island, with no sense of the fitness of things, treated him just as he might have done Napoleon. The result was that when he returned to the land of his fathers, he was neither savage nor civilized. He had been "spoilt."

With a "spoilt" young Zulu the Government of Natal had to get on as well as it could. Without going into the terms of his repatriation, which will be dealt with later, it may be pointed out that, after spending a few weeks at Eshowe, he was allowed to return to his tribe near Nongoma, where he erected his Usutu and other kraals.

As soon as he got away from the restraining influences of civilization, he relapsed more or less into a state of barbarism. He became a "freethinker." He married more wives than one, and kept more concubines than a dozen. He cast aside the European clothes he had so long worn, not, however, to don once more the picturesque garb of his youth, but something which was neither one thing nor the other. His morals became lax. He grew indolent. His life, being of an unsettled, invertebrate and isolated type, caused many of his actions to appear ambiguous and mysterious. This, in a man naturally cunning, was ascribed to duplicity. He wallowed in such luxury as the £500 a year allowed by the Government and what remained of his patrimony could command at his semi-barbarous, semi-civilized kraal, and sated himself with inordinate quantities of European spirits. He presently became so extraordinarily obese, that it was with difficulty he could move about unassisted. The affliction of "expansion," to which members of the Zulu royal house are notoriously liable, came upon him at an age earlier than usual.

The sorry picture that has been drawn of a man, not

without estimable qualities, could not, we venture to think, have existed had better judgment been exercised by the authorities and his friends in St. Helena, and, to some extent, those in Zululand as well. And yet, in St. Helena, counter influences had not been wanting. Ndabuko, for instance, strenuously resisted all endeavours for his own so-called "improvement"; if Tshingana was less obdurate, he had sufficient judgment and sagacity to prevent his benevolent preceptors from carrying him too far.

This aspect of Dinuzulu's private life, well known to many Europeans and thousands of Natives in Natal and Zululand, has not been repeated for the sake of blackening his character, but—by showing that his European friends were primarily responsible for the *débâcle*—to serve as a warning, for it was out of conditions such as these that the crime, of which he was later on convicted, came to be hatched.

It was in these ways, as well as in attending to the affairs of his tribe, and meddling in other matters that did not concern him, that Dinuzulu passed his time at Usutu between 1898 and 1906.

In 1903-4 there were persistent rumours as to the possibility of Manzolwandhle taking the field against him on the ground of his being an usurper.<sup>1</sup> A remark commonly made by Zulus is: "The Zulu crown is won by force." Instances of this are: Tshaka, who, though not the heir, wrested it from Sigujana; Dingana—by assassinating Tshaka; Mpande—by defeating Dingana in a pitched battle; and Cetshwayo—by defeating Mpande's heir, Mbuyazi, in 1856. Had the crown been worth fighting for in earlier days, it is not unlikely Manzolwandhle would have taken up arms against his brother.

Actions of political significance in Dinuzulu's life, and more or less connected with the Insurrection, will now be considered.

Towards the end of the Boer War, a most regrettable and at the same time highly significant incident occurred near

<sup>1</sup> And this rumour arose notwithstanding that both were subjects of the British Government.



the town of Vryheid. During the early stages of the War, there had been a tacit understanding between the contestants that the Zululand-South African Republic border should not be violated, seeing the Natives on both sides, who formed the great bulk of the population in those regions, were taking no part in the hostilities, the War being, as was explained to them, a "white man's war." This spirit prevailed for a considerable period, good order being maintained as in times of peace. Later, when guerilla tactics were resorted to by the republican forces, orders were issued (without reference, however, to the civil authorities of Natal and Zululand), for the destruction or seizure of the enemy's property by way of depriving him of all sources of supply. These instructions drew to that part such commandoes as had been recruited there, including General Botha himself, the men individually desiring to protect their families as well as their homesteads and stock from possible aggressive action by the Zulus. In these circumstances, British troops not being sufficiently near to afford assistance, authority was given Dinuzulu and the Natives of Zululand generally to protect themselves and their stock by force of arms should they, at any time, be attacked by the Boers.

Some twenty miles from Vryheid, but much further from Dinuzulu's kraal, there lived a Zulu tribe, known as the Baqulusi, under the Chief Sikobobo. The antecedents of the tribe are not without interest. It was established many years previously by a woman, a notable member of the royal house. It became the rule for no war to be waged by the nation, except with this Chieftainess's approval.

So keenly did the Boers resent the manner in which, as they averred, the Baqulusi were assisting the British, that they began to harass them by burning their kraals. Sikobobo, having taken refuge with his tribe at Vryheid, resolved to retaliate. He ascertained that a party of some 70 Boers, known as Potgieter's commando, were bivouacking on ground at the base of a mountain called Holkrantz (Mtatshana), some 12 miles from the town. He marched out one night with some 300 followers, surrounded the

party at dawn, and massacred all but about 16. The Boers, it must be remarked, did not expect attack by Natives, who were regarded as neutral in a war between white races. The Boer rifles were, of course, taken. Some at any rate are said to have been carried off to Dinuzulu.

This affair naturally created a profound impression on the Native mind (to say nothing of that of the Boers), particularly as, only in 1838 and 1879, had Zulus succeeded in defeating a considerable number of Europeans. It remains to add that, although the Baqulusi were formerly a Zulu tribe, they were no longer a tribe of Zululand at the time of this affair (they were Boer subjects and living in Boer territory), hence, Dinuzulu's alleged acceptance of the guns went to show he was dealing in matters lying beyond the position and jurisdiction assigned him.

In the year 1904, Zibebu demanded of Dinuzulu the return of certain cattle owed him by the latter's father. After Cetshwayo's defeat in 1879, that King's enormous estate, consisting of marriageable girls and cattle, was not dealt with and disposed of. To a large portion of this Zibebu, second cousin of Cetshwayo, claimed to be owner. Dinuzulu opposed. The animosity formerly existing between them was revived, accompanied by rumours of possible further bloodshed. About the same time, Dinuzulu built a fort on top of a high hill a mile or so from his kraal Usutu. The fact of his having done this was freely talked about, as also his keeping regiments of young men at Usutu, notably one known as his bodyguard and called "Nkomondala." These he required to undergo military exercises. But what right had a Chief to erect fortifications and train warriors without the authority of Government ?

There were, moreover, rumours among the Natives that Dinuzulu had dispatched messengers to the Swazi Queen to solicit help against Zibebu. Others were that he contemplated fighting his brother Manzolwandhle, and that messages had accordingly been sent by him to Chiefs in the Northern Districts,<sup>1</sup> also to others in the Transvaal. Further, he was

<sup>1</sup>This is the name given to five or six magisterial districts taken from the Transvaal and annexed to Natal subsequently to the Boer War.



reputed to be in communication with the Basutos of Basutoland and the Natives of Rhodesia.

Some of these rumours and many others, circulating at that time and up to the outbreak of rebellion, were either untrue or exaggerated; their mere existence, however, shows the great importance that attached to Dinuzulu in the estimation of Natives far and wide. Here is another sample, taken from a despatch by the Governor to the Secretary of State: <sup>1</sup> "For some little time past, rumours have been current of unrest and disaffection amongst the Natives. . . . The name of Dinuzulu has been freely mentioned as promoting the unrest, and as putting himself at the head of a Native army to invade Natal proper from Zululand."

To show the strangeness and absurdity of some of the rumours, the following, which (except the last) can be vouched for as widely current in 1906, may be cited: that Dinuzulu was in the habit of visiting Natal *incognito*, notwithstanding that his physical condition incapacitated him from travelling; that he once visited Pietermaritzburg and went to the top of the Town Hall tower, when he was observed at one moment to turn into a cow, at another into a dog; that, when in Pietermaritzburg, he was presented with a beast by the Government. This was taken to the market square, where some white man fired at it twice without effect, owing to Dinuzulu having charmed it. On Dinuzulu firing, however, it fell dead. Here we have one of the origins of the rumour, subsequently to be referred to, that bullets fired at Natives by Europeans would not 'enter'; that, on the conclusion of the Boer War, the Europeans intended to compel Native girls to marry the soldiers then still in the country, whilst unmarried Native youths would be compelled to serve in the British Army. In consequence of the foregoing, many girls, though still quite young, had their hair done up and were married off before attaining the customary age.

The content of mere rumour is, of course, of no value as history, but, in the history of a Native rising, that rumours of a disturbing or unsettling character were constantly afloat,

<sup>1</sup> 5th January, 1906. Cd. 2905, p. 1.

and nearly always associated with a particular person, is a fact of considerable significance, and, therefore, worthy of record. When any rumour arose likely to agitate Europeans or Natives, it became the duty of the Government to trace and contradict it in the best way it could. This, indeed, was done as effectively as possible on several occasions.

Those who are not familiar with Native character cannot well appreciate the difficulty of dealing with these rumours, especially such as betoken hostility. There is almost always some foundation in fact, but the fact is generally insignificant as compared with the inferences drawn therefrom by the people at large. In many cases, Dinuzulu was nothing more than the victim of circumstances, the mere fact of being the eldest son of the king of a once famous Native state serving to attach to the least of his acts an importance that did not and possibly was not intended to belong to them. Much that was laid to his charge was the outcome of perfervid imagination on the part of tribes in various parts of South Africa ready to espouse his cause. It has also to be borne in mind that the great majority of Natives are unable to read or write; they, therefore, do not, like Europeans, depend on newspapers for their news. It has, from time immemorial, been customary for them to live in a state of chronic alertness, when even the most absurd rumour of a warlike or disturbing character was spread within twenty-four hours over an enormous area. The media whereby this news, or rather *warning* is spread, are the incessant travelling to and fro of men and women, who again, living as they do under a system of polygamy, have wide circles of relations and acquaintances. Thus a warning brought, say, twenty miles and communicated at a kraal, is swiftly transmitted by the receiver to those within his immediate neighbourhood, only to be borne still further and further by others, leaving the original messenger to pursue his journey, repeating the intelligence as before wherever he goes. It can, therefore, be seen that facts, before long, become greatly exaggerated, leading to extravagant inferences being drawn therefrom.



Natives, as a rule, when employed as messengers, are careful in conveying messages. Dinuzulu probably never employed anyone on an important occasion who was not discreet and thoroughly trained in such duty. Rumours, therefore, are not always a true version of what was originally said, but of what those at a kraal, men or women, believed was said.

It is, we say, right to set but small value on mere rumours, but having regard to their exceedingly widespread circulation, they are apt to be believed and acted upon, as was, for instance, the pig-and-white-fowl-killing one. This characteristic of the great majority of the people should be clearly grasped, and especially the anomalous position in which, at such a time and in such circumstances, a man like Dinuzulu would have found himself. Having regard, however, to his remarkably subtle and far-reaching influence, it can easily be seen how any actually seditious tendency on his part could have been exerted with the minimum risk of detection. Indeed, it is within the power of one like him to pull the strings so as to compass rebellion without the Attorney-General being able at a later date to obtain any tangible evidence which, in a court of law, would be regarded as admissible or, if admissible, as satisfactorily establishing guilt. Thus, though, on the one hand, Dinuzulu might have been the victim of circumstances, on the other, assuming him to have been really at fault, he could have so urged the circumstances in which he stood that the court could not have done otherwise than presume his innocence, although actually believing him to be guilty.

That he was responsible for some of the unrest associated with his name before the Rebellion, will be gathered from the translations hereunder of two somewhat remarkable songs sung at Usutu.<sup>1</sup>

1

I.

Who is going to die among the Whites ?  
 Stand firm, O King !  
 Heed not their mutterings,  
 They are but finding fault.

[*Note.*—The meaning probably is that Dinuzulu is the last person

When the "order" about killing off pigs, white fowls, white goats, etc., became widely current and was being complied with by the Natives in various parts, the Government found it necessary to issue the following instructions to Magistrates: "It has come to the knowledge of the Government that numerous disturbing reports concerning the loyalty of the Natives of the Colony are being spread abroad by irresponsible persons, both Europeans and Natives. These reports are most mischievous, causing unnecessary alarm among all classes of the community, and careful investigation has proved that no real ground for them exists. You are, therefore, requested to reassure the people of your district and to urge them to discountenance the spreading of all such reports."<sup>1</sup> In the same month, the Commissioner in Zululand assured the Government of Dinuzulu's unwavering loyalty, adding that the Chief had declared an intention

that will die among Europeans, as his own people are determined to prevent his being taken.]

## II.

Great must be this people,  
 Who carry loads of goods around,  
 To barter salem-pore for cattle here and there.  
 About It a song, methinks, I'll sing.  
 It will o'erspread th' entire land.  
 A long thin frame It has, bending to and fro.  
 Starting from earth, It makes towards the sky,  
 Like that huge snake which ate the white men's sheep;  
 They set a trap for it and caught it,  
 Pulled at it two, and three, days long;  
 Cut it through with knives, when lo! a flame  
 Leapt from out its pool and scorched them.  
 Clouds of dust straightway broke forth,  
 And streamed throughout the land,  
 Which thereupon was set ablaze!  
 And here at Mbilane, too,  
 From whence (as every pool, 'twas said, was full thereof)  
 They thought it must spring forth.

[*Note.*—Like the foregoing, this song is in the form of an enigma. The word "It" evidently refers to an *impi*, which, when on the march, very much resembles a snake. The object of the song was, no doubt, to promote a spirit of defiance against Europeans. It is possible the word "snake" in line 8 is used metaphorically. Mbilane refers to a pool near Nodwengu, Mpande's principal kraal on the White Umfolozi. Mpande was Dinuzulu's grandfather. That such a song should have been sung at Usutu is clear evidence of the atmosphere of disloyalty that prevailed there.]

The Zulu version of the above translations appears in Appendix IX.

<sup>1</sup> Principal Under-Secretary to Magistrates, 28th Dec. 1905. Cd. 2905, p. 2.



of doing all he could to ensure payment of the poll tax.<sup>1</sup> Dinuzulu, indeed, was one of the first to pay the tax, he paid before being actually obliged to do so.

In August the Minister for Native Affairs issued instructions to Magistrates to convene meetings of Chiefs and the principal men of their tribes, and to explain thereat such provisions of the Poll Tax Act as applied to Natives. These meetings were nearly all held in September and October. Whilst, at some, no more took place than expressions of regret at its having been found necessary to impose additional taxation, of which Natives had not been advised beforehand,<sup>2</sup> at others there was loud remonstrance, accompanied with disrespect to the Magistrates. The meetings at Durban and Pietermaritzburg, owing to not having been authorized till late in October, for the reason that there were practically no Chiefs there, were not held until the 4th and 28th November respectively. By that time, however, dissatisfaction in regard to the Act had been freely expressed in different parts of the Colony.<sup>3</sup> The convening of these further meetings, however, appeared necessary although no Chiefs could be present, seeing the law provided that payment could be made at *any* labour centre.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 2905, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> On the occasion of the hut tax being raised from 7s. to 14s., Sir Theophilus Shepstone officially informed the people of the Government's intentions, and discussed with them the necessity for taking the step.

<sup>3</sup> The following is a case that occurred at Durban in September, 1905, though unknown to the Chief Magistrate when convening his meeting of 4th November: "Mditshwa and other Natives held meetings" at which the poll tax and other matters were discussed, and inflammatory and seditious speeches were uttered. . . . The result of the deliberations was a resolution to write to their Chiefs on the subject. A letter was produced in Court [Native High Court], written by Mditshwa to his Chief. . . . The following are extracts therefrom. "They refuse to submit to this money on any account, and they say that you should advise one another throughout the whole country. To-day you are given manliness, and it will be proved which man is persevering. . . . Day after day we find fault with your fathers, and say that they submit to every law. To-day the matter is upon yourselves. We, in Durban, say let the white people do what they will. I have two ideas: an irresistible army or hooligans, it is they who trod on a white man on the day we were gathered together to be told this law," (referring evidently to one of the other already held magisterial meetings). *Decisions, Native High Court, Natal, March, 1906-January, 1907, p. 34.*

<sup>4</sup> The hut tax, on the other hand, was payable only to the Magistrate of the district in which it became due.

It is easy to be wise after the event. Probably the better course would have been to hold no meetings at all at Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and to have taken other steps to inform Natives working in those towns of the law's requirements.

On the 22nd November the Magistrates were instructed to inform the Natives that the *collection* of the poll tax would take place on the 20th January, 1906, or as soon thereafter as possible. The date and order in which the tribes were to attend were, however, left to the Magistrates' discretion. A further circular (26th January), in calling attention to a proviso in the law that "no Native shall be deemed to have been guilty of a contravention of the Act until after the 31st day of May in any year," went on to direct that there was "no need for Natives who are not now prepared to pay the tax to visit the magistracy, branch courts or centres; only those desirous of paying the tax . . . should be allowed to do so," also that where notices had already been issued calling on Chiefs to bring up their men, such were not to be countermanded, but "the Chiefs or representative headmen alone should be interviewed by the Magistrate and the result of the interview conveyed to the men by the Chiefs or such headmen."

Thus every precaution was taken by the Government to conform to the requirements and spirit of the Act. But, in conveying to uneducated savages the information that, although the tax became *due* on 1st January, and would begin to be collected after the 20th of that month, there was no *compulsion* to pay before 31st May, the greatest difficulty was experienced by the Magistrates. So used are Natives, under tribal rule, to regarding instructions from competent authority as peremptory that anything in the shape of a concessive order is extremely liable to be construed as requiring compliance on the day first notified by the Magistrate as that on which he would be prepared to receive the tax. This is evidently what happened in the case of a Chief shortly to be dealt with, otherwise he would not have called on his people to pay in the way he did.



On so important an occasion it would, perhaps, have been wiser to have adopted a different procedure, such, for instance, as was followed by Sir Theophilus Shepstone when the first tax of 7s. was imposed, and when, many years later, it was raised. That officer, as head of the Native Affairs Department, was, of course, familiar with the whole position. The same could not be said of any of the Magistrates. As the communication to be made was obviously one of delicacy and called for thorough explanation, he resolved to make it himself, and considerably in advance of any attempt at collection. In so acting he secured both accuracy and uniformity, besides keeping a firm hold on the situation. It is true that the Minister for Native Affairs, whose position was very different to that of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, having arrived at somewhat similar conclusions, toured most parts of Natal and Zululand to hold meetings with the Native Chiefs, etc. These were effective and pacifying; but, when the action was taken, most of the Magistrates had already explained the law to the best of their ability, with the results already indicated.

Anxious that those in his employ should conform to the new law, Henry Smith, a farmer of Umlaas Road, personally conducted his Natives to the magistracy, Camperdown, on the 17th January. This was but three days before that on which Magistrates had been instructed to begin their collections. The tax was paid. One of the boys thereafter obtained permission to go to his kraal on the pretext that his child was ill. The same evening, about 8 p.m., Smith was standing on his verandah when he heard a shuffling noise by the wall. He thought it was a dog, but saw a Native, who, putting his head round the corner, exclaimed: "Nkosi!" (ordinary form of salute), and handed him an envelope. Turning to read the address by the light of the window, Smith was at once stabbed by the Native with an assegai and mortally wounded. Circumstantial evidence led at the trial proved that the boy who got permission to go home was the one who had committed the murder. He was convicted.

Apart from having been induced to pay the poll tax, no other motive for the murder could be discovered. That Smith was a good master was abundantly proved by the testimony of his other servants.

The following significant incident occurred at Mapumulo on the 22nd January. The Magistrate (Mr. R. E. Dunn) proceeded to Allan's store, some 9 miles from the magistracy, to collect the poll tax as previously arranged. Shortly after his arrival, a Chief, Ngobizembe, came up with about 100 men, each armed with several sticks and some carrying shields. These sticks and shields they placed beside them as they sat in the presence of the Magistrate.<sup>1</sup> On the latter saying that he had come to collect the tax, all exclaimed: "We won't pay!" Some 200 other members of the same tribe, the largest in the district, now approached Dunn from behind, chanting a song as they advanced. They were dressed in their war dress, and fully armed with shields, knobsticks and ordinary sticks. As they failed to accord the customary salute, their Chief remarked, "Why don't you salute?" "Why should we? We shan't!" they roared in reply. They then sat down, practically encircling the Magistrate and the three European and six Native police who were with him. Many of the Natives who wore hats did not remove them. The Magistrate again stated why he had come, and was about to make other remarks when all present, as with one voice, shouted him down with "Shut up! we refuse to pay!" In spite of further efforts to bring them to reason, the men became more and more uproarious and unruly. Their shouting became 'terrific.' They got up, danced about and gesticulated with their sticks in that defiant manner which only Natives are capable of doing, a form of effrontery indicative of trouble. They eventually came close up to the Magistrate and his staff from the rear, as if contemplating assault. Only by the Chief and some of the older men vigorously using their sticks, could they be made to fall back. In these and other ways the Magistrate,

<sup>1</sup> A gross breach of etiquette and a matter that would at once excite suspicion.



notwithstanding his being a perfect Zulu linguist, was treated with the grossest insolence, contempt and defiance. Only by exercising the greatest care was an outburst of violence averted.

Other similar instances of defiance were exhibited in the same district, viz. at Butler's Store, Insuze, on the 29th and 30th January, and, on the 1st February, at Gaillard's Store, Umvoti, by the members of three other tribes.

Behaviour of this kind called, of course, for immediate action. Ngobizembe was ordered to appear before the Minister for Native Affairs at Pietermaritzburg on the 1st February, and a strong body of police (under Inspector O. Dimmick) was dispatched on the 3rd to keep order at Mapumulo.

The position in Zululand on the 26th January was that out of 83 Chiefs, 62 had been called on to pay; of these, 46 (including Dinuzulu) had responded, with the result that over £1,400 had been collected, and other payments were being made daily. The other 16 Chiefs appeared to be offering a passive resistance. At Empandhleni (Nkandhla), however, the people of one of these Chiefs behaved in a violent and insolent manner to the Magistrate when called on to pay the tax. The Minister for Native Affairs, who was at Nongoma on the date referred to, expressed the view that such success as had been achieved was "in a measure due to the good example set by Dinuzulu."

On the 7th February, the date fixed for collecting the poll tax from the Chief Mveli and his tribe at Henley—a small railway station on the Pietermaritzburg-Umzimkulu line—and about 11 miles from Pietermaritzburg—the Magistrate of Umgeni division (Mr. T. R. Bennett) went out to keep his appointment. Whilst at that place, the Chief called attention to the fact that a section of his tribe had taken up a position on a hill about two miles off and were armed with assegais.<sup>1</sup> The Magistrate sent a European trooper (W. A. Mather) and two of the Chief's relatives to ascertain what truth there was in the state-

<sup>1</sup> The Native Code prohibits, on pain of severe penalty, the carrying of lethal weapons by persons other than constables on duty.

ment. A party of twenty-seven armed Natives was come upon. When an attempt was made to record their names they assumed a threatening attitude, and presently rushed at the messengers with their assegais. The latter, to avoid being killed, retired at a gallop. Depositions were taken and warrants for arrest issued on the charge of "taking part in an assembly of armed men without the authority of the Supreme Chief." It transpired, on a later date, the party had intended, on being called up to pay, to murder the Magistrate and his staff.<sup>1</sup>

Early on the day following the acting District Police Officer, Sub-Inspector Sidney H. K. Hunt, armed with the warrants, left Pietermaritzburg with eleven mounted police for Richmond, where he was joined by four others, including two Native constables. Another small patrol, under a non-commissioned officer, proceeded towards Thornville Junction. Hunt's party, owing to delay on the railway, could not move on before noon, when they proceeded viâ Byrnetown to the farm "Trewirgie." Owing to the guides not knowing the way, their difficulties being increased by a thick mist which came on early in the afternoon, slow progress was made. The nearer the men got to their destination, the more it was noticed that only women and old men were in evidence at kraals along the route traversed.

It was not until 5.30 p.m. that the house of Mr. Henry Hosking, owner of "Trewirgie," near where the accused were reported to be, was reached. The Natives required lived but half a mile from, though out of sight of, the homestead. Hunt resolved, contrary to the advice given him by Hosking, to try and effect the arrests and afterwards put up for the night at the farm house. At 6 p.m. he, with twelve Europeans and two Natives, went to the kraal indicated as that at which the accused would be found, that is to say, one within sight of which the police had passed a few minutes before. A man

<sup>1</sup> When going about a district collecting taxes, a Magistrate's staff hardly ever exceeded three or four Europeans and half-a-dozen Native police and messengers.



and two women were found to be the only occupants. Inquiries as to where the young men who were wanted had got to met with no success. Hunt now directed the man to shout for them. This he did. Two Natives were presently caught in the vicinity and, happening to be among those wanted, were handcuffed. A third and older man was found near by. This turned out to be Mjongo, one of the ringleaders. He, too, was handcuffed. At this moment, Trooper George Armstrong was sent to investigate a suspicious object some way up a steep incline in the immediate rear of the kraal, and about 80 to 100 yards off. No sooner had he gone up than he shouted to his comrades: "Come on, there's an armed party here." Leaving a couple of troopers with the prisoners, Hunt proceeded up the hill with the rest of the men, where he found some 40 or 50 fully armed Natives.

The ground there was very steep and covered with rocks. Hunt went in amongst the Natives and asked what they meant by being armed. They were most excited and kept rushing up to the troopers, flourishing assegais, knobsticks and small shields, exclaiming, "You have come for our money; you can shoot us; we refuse to pay." Hunt's interpreter was at first unable to make himself heard, because of the hubbub. After it had subsided, Hunt again tried to persuade them to lay down their arms and move to the kraal, where he would speak to them. Several then shouted: "If we put down our assegais, you'll make us prisoners, and we'll have to work in gaol," "You put away your revolvers and we'll put down our assegais," and so forth. All this time they kept backing up the slope towards a dense bush, yelling, "Come on, you're afraid." It must then have been past 7 o'clock. Hunt was advised to desist. He, however, released Mjongo, but, as soon as the latter attempted to address the infuriated savages, they rushed at, caught, and dragged him in amongst themselves. The police now retired towards the kraal. The Natives followed, jeering at and taunting the former in the most insolent manner. On reaching the kraal, Hunt ordered his two remaining prisoners to be brought along.



*W. B. Sherwood,  
Pietermaritz-  
burg.*

H. M. STAINBANK,  
Magistrate, Mahlabatini.



*Bauer Studio  
Durban.*

OLIVER E. VEAL,  
of the Public Works Department.



SUB-INSPECTOR S. H. K. HUNT,  
Natal Police.



TROOPER G. ARMSTRONG,  
Natal Police.

CIVIL SERVANTS MURDERED DURING THE REBELLION.





These were put between two mounted men at the head of the party, which had not gone ten yards before a sudden rush was heard in the rear. The two prisoners were thereupon dragged away by the Natives. Hunt and two or three others, rushing at their assailants, attempted recapture. The others resisted. A disturbance arose, but, owing to mist and darkness, it was impossible to see exactly what took place. One of the rebels was seen holding on to Hunt's bridle. Hunt hesitated a few seconds, then, raising his revolver, fired. The conflict became at once sharper and fiercer, use being made of revolvers on the one side and assegais on the other. Hunt and Armstrong were stabbed to death on the spot. Sergeant F. W. Stephens was wounded. Of the remainder, most galloped off on their horses being startled. To engage the rebels further at that time of night was out of the question. All that remained was to report what had occurred. This Stephens did in the speediest manner.

This unfortunate incident would possibly not have occurred had the police, instead of going to Trewirgie via Richmond and Byrne, proceeded direct from Thornville Junction, thereby saving at least 20 miles. Instead of arriving at Byrne at 11 a.m., unknown to the accused, as they might have done, they did not do so until late in the afternoon.

Had Hunt been better acquainted with the Native character and language, he would not have done what he did. This lack of knowledge may be excused; the same, however, cannot be said of his attempting to arrest people at the time he did.

Hearing from one of the troopers of what had taken place, the Hoskings left their house forthwith for Pietermaritzburg, though, as it turned out, there was no intention on the part of the rebels (who included one of Hosking's own servants) to interfere with him, his family or property in any way.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to the late Mjongo, a curious phenomenon occurred almost simultaneously with the commission of this murder. "The matter I am now going to tell you (the writer) about," he said, "is of



As soon as the news of the murder was received by the Government, a force of about 50 police, under Inspector W. F. Lyttle, was sent to Trewirgie to recover the bodies of Hunt and Armstrong. These were found on the 9th at the scene of outbreak, each with 12 to 15 wounds, but not otherwise mutilated. In the meantime, the rebels left the small bush where the police had been murdered and took refuge near by in the Enon forest.

The police remained at Trewirgie, patrolling and searching for the fugitives.

a strange or miraculous description. I am a *Kolwa* (Christian), and would not tell anyone, but in the most confidential manner. . . . The instant the firing started, I saw a ball of fire fall from the sky to earth, near where the fighting was going on. It was so brilliant that a darkness arose after it, continuing some little while. . . . In size, this ball was about 9 or 10 in. in diameter. I was not deceived in any way. It was in no way connected with revolver or rifle fire. Moreover, I was not the only one who observed it. Those present, including the Europeans, must have noticed it. Whilst in gaol in Richmond, I heard Native warders referring to the matter. . . . The ball fell to earth and disappeared immediately. . . . When this occurred, it was misty, but still quite light."

We believe Mjongo regarded this as a supernatural intervention, ordained to mark a most unusual incident. It is probable that the other Natives who are said to have seen it hold similar views.

## VI.

### MOBILIZATION AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN FORCE : (a) IN THE SOUTH-WEST ; (b) AT MAPUMULO.— EXECUTIONS AT RICHMOND.

THE news that the Police had been attacked and two of them murdered, came to everyone in the Colony as a bolt from the blue. Nothing of the kind had been experienced since the affair in Polela district in 1892.<sup>1</sup> But, strange though occurrences among Natives sometimes appear to be, they are almost invariably capable of explanation. In this particular instance (1906), so far as we have been able to ascertain, the explanation seems to be briefly as follows :

In 1895 a dispute arose between Chief Mveli's father, Hemuhemu, and several of the tribe, of both sexes (connected with the group that attacked the police at Trewirgie). They had recently become converts to Christianity. The Chief, having taken exception to disrespect shown by one of them, as well as to immoral behaviour by women and girls through remaining out after dark on the pretext of attending Christian services, imposed a penalty

<sup>1</sup> What happened at Polela was briefly this : In consequence of the local police being unable to arrest two Natives at one Luplankwe's kraal, on a charge of contempt of court, a stronger body, including half-a-dozen European farmers and members of the accused's tribe, proceeded, on the following morning, to execute the warrant. In spite of many attempts to induce the accused to surrender, they refused to do so. They, and eight others, armed themselves with shields and assegais. An altercation arose and assegais were thrown, one of the police party being killed and another wounded. Orders were then given to fire. The accused and four others were killed, and three wounded. The affair was apparently confined to the one kraal. It created a considerable sensation, and formed the subject of special inquiry by direction of the Governor.



under his ordinary tribal authority. Against this decision they appealed; first to the Native High Court, then the Supreme Court. The latter decided, *inter alia*, that, as the appellants were Christians, the Chief had no right to treat them as he did the rest of the tribe. He was reminded that, as a deputy of the Supreme Chief (Governor), he was bound to conform to the instruction the Governor had received from the Queen to the effect that religion was to be fostered to the utmost of his power amongst the Natives, and that such steps were to be taken by the Governor as appeared to him necessary for converting the people to the Christian faith. The appellants were, therefore, declared to be independent of the Chief's control, in certain important respects, though allowed to continue to live within his ward.<sup>1</sup>

This case, and the highly unsatisfactory influence it began forthwith to exert on those concerned as well as on others, had, by 1906, passed almost out of the recollection of Europeans; not so with the Natives. The Christians referred to and their children, having been accorded certain liberties by the highest legal authority, were not slow in assuming a more complete independence than the said authority had supposed they would do. In short, they became what are commonly known as Ethiopians, that is, a class whose church organization, like their social life, is wholly free from European control.<sup>2</sup> Their de-

<sup>1</sup> *Natal Law Reports*, 1895, vol. xvi. 239.

<sup>2</sup> The Ethiopian or Separatist movement is a movement among the Natives of South Africa towards ecclesiastical independence, apparently with the object of obtaining greater political power. Although attempts have, since 1886, been made by Native congregations to break away from European control, the movement did not assume importance until 1892, when one M. M. Makone, subsequently joined by J. M. Dwane, seceded with large followings from the Wesleyan Methodist Church, and set up "The Ethiopian Church" at Pretoria. In consequence of action taken by these Ethiopians, they became affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal Church of America in 1897, and such connection has since then been strengthened in various ways.

Apart from the foregoing, there have been a number of other secessions. Such churches—also wholly independent of European control—as: Church of the Tembus; Presbyterian Church of Africa; Ethiopian Catholic Church of Zion, have been set up in various parts, whilst, in Natal, there are: Uhlanga Church; African Congregational Church; Zulu Congregational Church; Ibandhla li ka Mosi, etc. It may be

nomination was the African Congregational Church. They then became a set of "free-lances," socially, politically and religiously. Is it surprising, then, that a group of barbarians with the merest veneer of Christianity, cut off from all effective controlling influences, should, in course of time, have developed rebellious tendencies? The rigid application of the principles of European civilization to ordinary heathen life, without regard to after-effects, is one of the most subtle dangers to which Natal, in common with all other countries in which there are lower races subject to Christian government, has constantly been exposed.

Among the Ethiopians referred to, but especially in connection with the Trewirgie outbreak,<sup>1</sup> two names—Makanda and Mjongo—stand out prominently. These men were the ringleaders of the attack in question. The former, otherwise known as David, had, years before, been turned out of the tribe by the Chief on account of seditious practice, but, during the last Boer War, he associated with Mjongo, a member of the same tribe, and returned to his old haunts near Byrnetown, under the guise of a sawyer. As such, he worked in the Enon forest along with Mjongo, but, in addition, claimed to be a 'teacher of religion.' So zealous was he in this respect that he was soon recognized as the local leader of the Ethiopians,—a position he held, in conjunction with another Native, until 1906. As sawyer, he resorted to dishonest practices; as preacher, his influence was subversive of law and order.

Mjongo, at this time, was a man of about 58 years of age. For more than thirty years he had been employed, off and on, as a sawyer. "By skill and assiduity," says Mr. Frank Gordon of Enon, one of his oldest masters, "he was early taken note of by bush-owners, and must, during all these years, have broken in some hundreds of sawyers. Many of these set up on their own account no doubt;

added, however, that, in 1900, the South African Episcopal Synod established the "Order of Ethiopia" which, whilst under the jurisdiction of the Bishop, is independent of that of the parochial clergy.

<sup>1</sup> Sometimes referred to as having occurred at Byrnetown. This, however, was not the case.



many formed a sort of gang who followed Mjongo, and who, in a measure, relied on him to support them with suitable work. . . . This gave him a certain ascendancy over this class of industry throughout the district." Although an intelligent and competent workman, and in receipt of high wages, he was never free from debt.

The gravity of the assault on the police at once impressed itself on the Government, already alive to the necessity of detecting and dealing promptly with any tendencies towards actual hostility.

Ministers communicated with the Governor, who, at the time, was temporarily residing in Durban. Sir Henry McCallum returned to headquarters and discussed the situation with the ministry, when it was decided immediately to call out a portion of the Active Militia to deal with the outbreak, and to proclaim martial law over the whole Colony. The Militia were accordingly mobilized on the 9th February, and martial law proclaimed on the 10th.

This calling out of troops and application of martial law have been frequently discussed, different opinions being expressed. Some good people, especially those living beyond the borders of the Colony, although knowing very little of the facts, came to the conclusion that there was no spontaneous rising at all, but that such hostility as had occurred was due to the Government having goaded the Natives by a reckless display of force into arming, more in self-defence than for any other purpose. As this point is of importance, amounting almost to an accusation of tyrannous practice or, at least, of being panic-stricken, an attempt will be made to set forth some of the principal reasons that induced Ministers to advise a resorting to such measures.

The Natives at several of the magistracies, *e.g.* Mapumulo, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Empandhleni (Nkandhla), had already behaved with insolence and defiance, particularly at Mapumulo, where the Government had been openly defied by Natives in large numbers when

attempting to collect the poll tax. And yet, not only had the tax been imposed on all Europeans and Asiatics, but a very liberal concession had been made exclusively to Natives, viz. that those already liable for the hut tax would be exempt altogether from paying poll tax. This, in itself, was evidence of a desire to be fair and reasonable. Notwithstanding this the Natives, as shown by numerous records, generally assumed an attitude of disrespect and defiance. In so doing, they acted hastily and recklessly, owing largely, no doubt, to the difficulty of understanding the exact effect of the law. It was enough that it was extra taxation, and appeared to put a premium on the already increasing independence of youths. No allowance whatever was made for the *bona-fide* straits the Government was in for the want of revenue, nor yet for the fact that the additional burden would not, after all, exceed one shilling per head per annum on the total Native population.<sup>1</sup> Chiefs, aided and abetted by their adherents, made attempts to combine against the Government. At Mid-Illovo, European farmers felt obliged to go into lager, whilst others prepared to do the same at such places as Highflats, Ixopo and Richmond. It will, no doubt, be conceded that defiance in any community calls for firm and prompt action by those in authority; not less necessary is it when savages, known to be warlike and impulsive, have to be dealt with.

Then the anonymous order, purporting to have come from some Native of high position, requiring the killing of pigs, white fowls, etc., and the discarding of utensils of European manufacture, could have had no other significance than that the Natives in general should unite against

<sup>1</sup> The poll tax actually collected from Natives in the years 1906-1909 was as follows:

	1906	1907	1908	1909
Natal -	£68,500 1	£49,637 10	£45,150	£41,498
Zululand -	7,990 6	4,267 0	3,940	3,520
Total -	£76,490 7	£53,904 10	£49,090	£45,018

That it was greater in 1906 than in later years, was due to failure by Natives to apply for exemption or to their assuming liability in different ways for the hut tax.



the white man's government. Such interpretation is patent to anyone. There was, moreover, abundant evidence that this propaganda had been widely spread. Messengers are known to have proceeded to different parts of the Transvaal and even to the neighbourhood of Salisbury, Rhodesia, preaching sedition wherever they went. In Natal the order had already been complied with by many people. Numerous instances occurred in the thickly populated belt of country between Krantzkop, Mapumulo and Stanger, especially on the Tugela side of that line. Others were not wanting in other parts of the Colony, such as Ixopo, Mid-Illovo, Weenen, etc. Not only had animals been either killed or sold at absurdly low figures,<sup>1</sup> but European utensils, *e.g.* pots, had been destroyed or thrown away. If some Natives had already manifested disaffection, only time and want of effective control by the Government were needed for others to do the same.

Thus the atmosphere, by the time of the outbreak, had become so charged with an unmistakably rebellious spirit, and with reports that the tribes generally were out of the control of their Chiefs, that it required but a successful outbreak or two, in places not readily accessible to European troops, to set the whole affair ablaze. And, in any such event, not only the peace of Natal, but of other portions of South Africa, would have been endangered. There is no getting away from this conclusion, because it follows directly from the widely prevalent facts above referred to. Clearly, the position was abnormal, and, being abnormal, it called for extraordinary action.

It was whilst these evidences of unrest and loudly and disrespectfully expressed dissatisfaction existed that the Magistrate of Umgeni division proceeded to carry out the new law. For any Magistrate to have refrained, from fear of outbreak, from collecting the poll tax, after giving proper notice, would have been the height of weakness, of which Natives, in such mood as they then were in, would not have been slow to take advantage. And yet when the

<sup>1</sup> Pigs were disposed of in Weenen division at 1s. to 4s. apiece.

Magistrate<sup>1</sup> proceeded in a normal manner to collect the tax, another section of the same tribe, on its own initiative, marched under arms and in open defiance of the law to await at a convenient spot an opportunity of throwing themselves on to and murdering the Magistrate. Being discovered, they returned to their kraals, well-knowing that, as they had broken the law, warrants would be issued for their arrest. Although unprovoked in any way, they continued to carry their weapons in defiance of law and order. Instead of surrendering or running away, as other offenders would have done, they banded themselves together<sup>2</sup> when the police appeared on the scene, and went into hiding. And when the police proceeded to make arrests, they resisted and murdered them. Why? Not because of any grievance against the Government peculiar to themselves, but one which they supposed had, by then, become common to the whole Black House.<sup>3</sup>

There were, however, other considerations. The Natal Police Field Force, about 100 strong, had some weeks before been divided into two. One detachment was sent on important duty to Zululand and the other to Mapumulo—an isolated district carrying a particularly large Native population, where, it will be remembered, the Magistrate had been openly defied. Owing to this fact, no ordinary police were available to deal with the Trewirgie affair. To have engaged for this duty special constables, many of whom would probably have been unable either to ride or to shoot, would have been almost as great folly as to have sent them out on foot armed with batons. But legal machinery to enrol even such auxiliaries was wanting. If, then, firearms were necessary, it was surely better to

<sup>1</sup> The Magistrate, Umgeni division, was one of the first to attempt collection. On 25th January, however, the Magistrate, Upper Umkomanzi division (Mr. J. Y. Gibson), had made an unsuccessful attempt at Mid-Illovo. The same officer tried again, before the outbreak, to collect, this time at Richmond, but the Chief requested him to defer collecting until some more powerful tribe had paid.

<sup>2</sup> One of them belonged to a different and adjoining tribe.

<sup>3</sup> Natives, in speaking of themselves collectively, frequently use this phrase.



employ a disciplined force than put them into the hands of men who did not know how to use them.

The necessity for immediate concentration of a force at Trewirgie was obvious. To have delayed, say for 36 hours, would have been to court appalling disaster. Zulus are known to be precipitate in action when once the war-cry has been sounded from the hill-tops and the beacon-fires lit. Every battle of the Zulu War testified to their energy, rapidity and true martial instincts. The fact that the first blow had been struck in a cause common to a million others, already impatient to emulate the heroic deeds of their fellows, still further lessened any chances of delay on their part. Here is the language of one of them, uttered on the 13th February to friends within a couple of miles of Richmond: "You are cowards, sitting still when there's fighting on. I have a following of my own. Let us combine and kill the whites round about here."<sup>1</sup> Had the rebels got away with the renown of having attacked and defeated the police with loss, without overwhelming action being swiftly taken, the Rebellion must have spread in an alarming manner. That, at any rate, is the opinion of all persons on the spot best entitled to express it, men with life-long experience of those parts, including the Natives themselves.

The alternative, that of calling out the Militia in support of the police, assuming these to have been available, would certainly have been proper in the case of any ordinary riot, disturbance of the peace, or other emergency, but this was no ordinary outbreak, nor was it at all likely to confine itself to the locality in which it had occurred. Outbreaks of a more serious character, such as the one in question, were intended by the legislature to be dealt with by a Permanent Militia Force, provision for establishing which was included in the law. Such force, it was enacted, might be ordered out to any part of the Colony, "to act therein, either in aid of, or as the police force . . . and

<sup>1</sup> This man belonged not to Mveli's, but another, tribe. He was subsequently tried and convicted by the Magistrate on the evidence of three witnesses.

when so acting every member of the Permanent Militia Force shall have the same authority as constables and otherwise."<sup>1</sup> This force, owing to the want of the necessary financial provision, had never been created. If, however, regular police had been employed, there would have been no one available to relieve them at their various posts. In this connection, it must be stated that, as the disaffection was general, it was obviously impossible to withdraw the police from the various out-stations.

Under all these circumstances, the Governor had no difficulty in deciding (a) "that men were in armed resistance to the authority of the Crown"; (b) "that such armed resistance could not be dealt with by the Military, acting merely in aid of the civil power in the ordinary manner"; (c) "that such armed resistance could not be promptly and effectively suppressed otherwise than by subjecting the inhabitants of the disturbed district to direct military control, and by inflicting summary punishment upon offenders against the peace."<sup>2</sup>

But, although of opinion that martial law was necessary, care was at the same time taken by the Government to provide for all criminal and civil cases pending in the various courts being proceeded with and determined in the ordinary way; where failure or inability to exercise jurisdiction occurred, the proceedings were to be suspended until withdrawal or amendment of the proclamation.<sup>3</sup>

The extension of martial law over the whole Colony instead of only the district in which the revolt had occurred,—to which, indeed, the Governor had at first wished to limit it,—arose solely out of the unrest and disaffection being so wide-spread. Alarming rumours were constantly being received from all quarters, showing that

<sup>1</sup> Act No. 36, 1903, secs. 69, 71. It will be observed the force was to be distinct from the Active Militia or Reserves, but only by reason of being a standing body.

<sup>2</sup> "Rules on the subject of Martial Law." Colonial Regulations, *vide* Colonial Office Circular, 26th May, 1867.

<sup>3</sup> The latter contingency did not arise. The presence of troops, however, had the effect of interrupting public business during April and May at Nkandhla, May, at Umsinga, and July, at Mapumulo, magistracies.



the entire Native population was more or less disaffected and that outbreaks of rebellion were possible anywhere and at any moment. As for the Ministers being panic-stricken, there was not only no sign of this at any time, but they, throughout the whole course of the Rebellion, enjoyed the fullest confidence of the public as well as of the Governor. The latter, on more than one occasion, called the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the cool and collected way in which they were grappling with the situation.

The truth is that, with such a personnel at the head of affairs, together with Sir Henry McCallum, the Colony was extremely fortunate. There is no question that it was owing largely to their able and firm administration that an insurrection, which, at one time, threatened to become universal, was suppressed as speedily and effectually as it was.

As soon as the employment of the Militia had become legally possible, orders to mobilize were issued to the Right Wing of the Natal Carbineers and to one Battery of the Natal Field Artillery; the Commandant of Militia was, at the same time, authorized to issue requisitions on all persons "to furnish such animals, vehicles and other necessary things as may be demanded from them for military use." When, however, reports of threatened risings, with demands for military assistance, were, about the same time, constantly received from Magistrates and others in various parts of the Colony, the Government resolved to mobilize a stronger force than at first intended, and this notwithstanding that later intelligence went to show that the rest of the tribe to which the Trewirgie rebels belonged was loyal. The force, therefore, that mobilized and proceeded from different points on the 10th to concentrate at Thornville Junction, Elandskop and Richmond, consisted of Right and Left Wings, Natal Carbineers (under Major A. C. Townsend and Lieut.-Col. D. W. Mackay, respectively) 675; two sections, C Battery, Natal Field Artillery (Capt. W. S. Bigby); one company, Natal Royal Regiment (Lieut.-Col. A. W. Matterson); two

squadrons, Border Mounted Rifles (Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott);<sup>1</sup> one squadron, Natal Police Field Force (Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G.); and detachments, Natal Medical, Natal Telegraph, and Natal Service, Corps.

Colonel, now Brigadier-General, Sir Duncan McKenzie, C.B., K.C.M.G., J.P., V.D., of the Natal Carbineers, was placed in command.<sup>2</sup> General authority to administer martial law was, moreover, delegated to him by the Commandant.<sup>3</sup>

The rapidity with which mobilization and concentration were carried out could not have been surpassed. That fact alone testifies to the excellence and splendid efficiency of the Militia organization. In the case of the B.M.R., orders to mobilize were received at 11 a.m. on the 10th. By 8 p.m. on Sunday the 11th, although having had to march over thirty miles in heavy rain, the regiment, "mobilizing forward," had reached Elandskop, the destination assigned.

The disposition of the forces on the 11th was :

*Thornville Junction.* Staff; Right Wing, Natal Carbineers; Natal Police. *Elandskop.* Left Wing, Natal Carbineers; Border Mounted Rifles (Troops D—H). *Richmond.* One squadron (D), Natal Carbineers; C Battery, Natal Field Artillery; Natal Royal Regiment.

The object of this disposition was to enable a converging

<sup>1</sup> A, B and C troops were left to guard the Pondo border.

<sup>2</sup> This officer's services were :—Mashonaland, 1897 (medal and clasp). South African War, 1899-1902. Engaged in—Relief of Ladysmith, including action at Colenso; operations of 17th to 24th January, 1900, and action at Spion Kop; operations of 5th to 7th February, 1900, and action at Vaal Krantz; operations on Tugela Heights, and action at Pieters Hill; operations in Natal, March to June, 1900, including action at Laing's Nek; operations in the Transvaal, east of Pretoria, July to October, 1900.

In command 2nd Imperial Light Horse, November, 1900, to May, 1902. Engaged in—Operations in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 30th November, 1900, to 31st May, 1902; operations on the Zululand Frontier of Natal, September and October, 1901.

Despatches, *London Gazette*, 8th February and 16th April, 1901, and 29th July, 1902. Queen's medal with five clasps. King's medal with two clasps. Awarded C.B.; C.M.G.

The *Official Army List*, 1911. War Office. Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Fetter Lane, London E.C.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide*, p. 149 note.



movement to take place, from the three points named, on the farm Trewirgie. A simultaneous advance, with exception of the Artillery and Infantry (which remained at Richmond), was accordingly made on the 12th, the intervening country being searched as much as possible *en route*. On the afternoon of the same day, the troops having completed the drive, combined on the farm Trewirgie, in the immediate vicinity of the scene of outbreak. The brigade then formed was nearly 1,000 strong.

Chief Mveli had, in the meantime, been instructed to co-operate. McKenzie placed on his shoulders the responsibility of finding the rebels, then evidently hiding in the neighbouring forests. The result was that, on the 13th and succeeding days, Mveli, with some 300 of his men, rendered very valuable assistance. The Enon forest, some 1,200 acres in extent, was driven, whilst the kraal and crops belonging to Mjongo were destroyed.

Owing especially to the prompt and energetic assistance of a local farmer (Mr. Gibson), the hiding-places of two of the rebels were ascertained, when both were captured. They were tried on the 13th by a drumhead court-martial and, on its being clearly proved they had participated in the murder of the police, were sentenced to be shot. The sentence was carried out forthwith on a peak overlooking Enon forest, and in the presence of Mveli and his men.

The shooting of these men created a deep impression. News of the incident, which was regarded as just and proper by every loyal Native, spread at once far and wide. Rebelliously disposed Natives realized that the troops had come into the field to adopt stern measures, and put a check on their behaviour accordingly.

As, by this time, everything appeared to be quiet in the district, the column moved on to Richmond on the 14th.

The troops would not have withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Byrnetown had it not been clear that the best method to adopt with the remaining rebels was to continue to hold Mveli responsible for their capture. As

a matter of fact, Mveli and the majority of his tribe were loyal. Apart from this, they had a motive of their own and, therefore, needed no urging. This motive was, of course, to avenge themselves in some way on the Ethiopians, with whom they had the deep-seated, ten-years' difference dealt with at the beginning of the chapter. A further reason for imposing the onus was that the rebels were concealed in a part of the country with which the whole of Mveli's tribe were intimately acquainted. That McKenzie was right in the action he took will be seen further on.

An Inspector of Native Locations (Thomas Fayle) was, about this time, killed at his house, some three miles from Henley, probably by lightning. The death was regarded by some as a murder, connected in some way with the outbreak, seeing it occurred but a few days after the attack on the police, and only a short distance from Trewirgie.

Other intelligence that was received went to show that people living in Richmond division, under a headman, Mamba, but belonging to Chief Miskofeli, under the belief that an attempt was to be made to arrest their Chief, responded to some extent to a call to arms circulated on the night of the 12th. On the following day, certain headmen passed Thedden, the residence of Mr. W. Nicholson, but, finding him absent, used some expressions regarding him which were interpreted at the trial later on to signify an intention to have killed him had he been at home.

Owing to the disrespect that had recently been shown by Natives to the Magistrate of Richmond when explaining the poll tax at Mid-Illovo, the Minister for Native Affairs (The Hon. H. D. Winter) caused another meeting to be convened at the same place to afford himself an opportunity of addressing the Chiefs on the same subject. It was fixed for the 13th. On the day previous, it transpired that some of Tilonko's people had taken up arms either to offer resistance or act in some more daring and even aggressive manner. The probabilities are that they felt their Chief was about to be arrested and intended resisting, if any such attempt were made. Needless to



say, the idea had never entered the mind of the Government. Notwithstanding this intelligence, having made the appointment, Mr. Winter proceeded to keep it, and this in spite of warning as to the risks he was apparently running. On arrival at Mid-Illovo, accompanied by Mr. S. O. Samuelson, Under Secretary for Native Affairs, he found that three Chiefs and a large gathering of Natives had already assembled. The European inhabitants of that part were in a lager, which consisted of wire entanglements erected round a church. The Chiefs, with six men each, were directed to enter a larger wire-fence enclosure, within which the church and lager stood, leaving the rest of their followers seated along the road a short distance off. After Mr. Winter had taken them to account, one by one, for unruly behaviour to the Magistrate, and one of them for having resorted to certain practices of a treasonable character, and had further fully explained the poll tax, they asked for a day to be named on which the tax could be paid by those liable therefor. The matter was thereupon referred to the Magistrate, who met with no further difficulty. It was in respect of this and other occurrences incidental to the tours made by Mr. Winter to different parts of Natal and Zululand at this critical time that the Governor referred to him as having "behaved with conspicuous calmness and courage," an opinion shared by others as well.

In view of the fact that, as daily arriving information showed, disaffection was not confined to Trewirgie or Mid-Illovo, it became necessary for McKenzie's force to demonstrate in other directions, especially on the south of the Umkomanzi and towards Ixopo. At the same time, the Government was most anxious that the troops should be kept well in hand, and not to put the people to more inconvenience than was absolutely necessary. To this end, on the 17th, the Commandant of Militia instructed McKenzie in the following terms: "On Monday next, the 19th instant, you will march with all your mounted men and one or two sections of artillery from Richmond to Springvale, crossing Umkomanzi by the Josephine bridge,

thence to Highflats, and thence to Ixopo. From Ixopo you will proceed to Mabedhlana, thence to Bulwer and Elandskop. . . . You will send two men with a message to Miskofeli and other Chiefs on your route before your forces approach their neighbourhood, assuring them that they need fear nothing from the column. . . . You will take care that nothing is done by your force to provoke an outbreak on the part of the Natives. If Miskofeli does not come and pay his respects to you . . . you will take this as a sign of fear, or as indicating that he is not as loyal to the Government as he professes to be ; you will, however, take no action until you have gone on and given some of the smaller Chiefs an opportunity of coming to see you. . . .”

These instructions were carried out to the letter, except that, instead of proceeding from Ixopo to Bulwer and Elandskop, it became necessary for the column to demonstrate in the direction of the south coast.

Leaving the Natal Royal Regiment to garrison Richmond,<sup>1</sup> with Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton as officer in command of the post, McKenzie moved off at 9 a.m. on the 19th with the rest of the force. He crossed the Umkomanzi river and camped in the neighbourhood of the farm Waterfall. The next day the march was continued through the heart of Miskofeli's ward to Springvale. Owing to the country being hilly, and the roads difficult, the guns and waggons stuck fast several times.

At Springvale, Miskofeli, who was a man of about 25 years of age and head of a powerful tribe, came with a small following to pay his respects.<sup>2</sup> This satisfactory result was brought about through the efforts of a well-known local resident, Mr. Garland, whose services the Officer Commanding was fortunately able to secure.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The N.R.R. were withdrawn from Richmond in the middle of March and demobilized.

<sup>2</sup> Miskofeli's mother is a daughter of the late Chief Langelibalele of whom mention was made in Chapter I. This woman's influence during 1906 was directed to inducing her son's tribe to pay the poll tax.

<sup>3</sup> It should, however, be pointed out that the Magistrate, Richmond, had previously been directed to proceed to the Ixopo division to inquire



From Springvale, the column went to Highflats, where intelligence was received that Miskofeli and three other Chiefs of that part had originally arranged, and to some extent prepared, to break out in rebellion on the 18th, but, on hearing that troops had arrived in Richmond and were ready to advance, their plans were upset.

On the 22nd, the force pushed on to Stuartstown.<sup>1</sup> At this village it remained until the 13th March. The route traversed between the 19th and 22nd had, on purpose, been through, or close to, areas largely occupied by Natives.<sup>2</sup>

During such time as the troops were at Stuartstown, a number of courts-martial were held (beginning on the 3rd and ending on the 12th). As many as three sat at one time. These included the trial of the induna Mamba, whose people had recently taken up arms. On Miskofeli, a fine of 100 head of cattle was imposed by McKenzie, on account of the offence committed by himself and his tribe. Armed parties of the tribe had been reported as roaming about the country, whilst Miskofeli himself had prepared for trouble by causing his wives and property to be concealed in precipices and other inaccessible country.

In view of the fact that this man's tribe was intimately

of Miskofeli if it was true his tribe had armed and, if so, for what reason. Mr. Gibson had an interview with the Chief near Waterfall on the 14th February, when Miskofeli denied having armed or that he intended attacking anyone; he added that he had duly proclaimed the Act about the poll tax. The visit, carried out with much tact and discretion, probably contributed in no small degree to the result referred to in the text.

<sup>1</sup> Also called Ixopo.

<sup>2</sup> A remarkable stampede of about 1,100 horses took place one night whilst the troops were at the village. Owing to its being cold and rainy, the animals were driven, with some mules, into a paddock near camp. The mules later on caused the horses to stampede, when the whole started galloping wildly, *en masse*, round and round in a great circle, part of whose circumference lay within a few yards of the camp. The thunder of the rush as each time they swept madly by was positively deafening, much to the dismay of the reclining warriors. Once or twice they dashed through the picket lines, compelling the sentries to take refuge helter-skelter in camp for fear of being trampled to death. Not until dawn did the galloping cease, probably owing to sheer exhaustion. It was found that many of the animals had severely, and some even permanently, injured themselves by running into barbed-wire fences in the dark.

connected with another in East Griqualand, the Governor requested the Government of the Cape Colony, in the event of force having to be used, to prevent Natives of the Cape Colony from entering Natal viâ Union Bridge (Umzimkulu) to assist their relatives. The Cape Ministers took steps at once in the direction indicated.

The Government, as already seen in Colonel Bru-de-Wold's instructions, had intended that a demonstration should also be made in the direction of Bulwer, but as order had been quickly restored there, as well as at Elandskop, the Commandant decided to keep McKenzie at Stuartstown, with a view to the column being employed along the coast between Isipingo and Port Shepstone, particularly at Dumisa and Umtwalume. The Natives there had recently got out of control of their respective Chiefs, or else the Chiefs themselves were pretending to comply with orders, whilst inciting their men to act with defiance.

In Alexandra division, on the coast, Charlie Fynn, a half-caste and Chief of a large tribe, had, on the 20th February, come with 1,000 men ostensibly with the intention of paying the poll tax to the Magistrate at Nelson's Hotel, Umtwalume. The men were, however, armed with long sharpened sticks (the ends charred so as to harden them) and small shields. They came up, "shouting, gesticulating and prancing," and "striking blows at an imaginary enemy." Many, as afterwards transpired, had hidden assegais at a stream close by. The Magistrate (Mr. J. L. Knight) refused to speak until they had laid down their arms. They moved back to do this, but only to adopt a most unusual procedure. Instead of being laid down, the sticks were stuck into the ground, not simultaneously, but one by one. Then they sat down. After being addressed and having the law explained, they shouted defiantly in one decided voice: "We shall not pay!" Nor did they do so, at any rate, not on that occasion. Violent behaviour was exhibited by several as apart from the mass. One of the leading indunas, Batimane, amidst a general din, "pushed forward" and "raved like a madman." He



spat and "foamed at the mouth" as he ranted, "picked up rubbish from the ground, threw it down in front of, and swore at, the Magistrate"—signs of the grossest contempt and insubordination. In the course of his harangue, he threatened to stab European women and mutilate them in an especially revolting manner. The fact that none of those present reproved him, showed they were either afraid or generally concurred in his conduct. The whole body then rose, marched off triumphantly, and presently breaking into a war-song, moved on to their homes. But for the cool and tactful behaviour of the Magistrate, a serious disturbance must have arisen.<sup>1</sup>

In the other division (Lower Umzimkulu), other Chiefs had neglected to comply with orders to attend at the magistracy.

Leaving Stuartstown at 10 a.m. on the 13th March, McKenzie moved towards Umtwalume, the scene of the threatening behaviour of Fynn's tribe. Marching viâ Highflats and Dumisa, the village of Umzinto and seat of magistracy was reached at 3 p.m. on the 15th. Here, acting upon the advice of the Magistrate, a Chief Jeke came to the officer commanding to pay his respects. On the day following, the force moved to Ifafa; on the 17th, it camped in the neighbourhood of Chief Charlie Fynn's kraal. The Natal Police Field Force had been detached from the column at Stuartstown and sent back to headquarters. On the column reaching Alexandra County, it was reinforced by the Umzinto and Port Shepstone troops, B.M.R.

In obedience to the directions of Government, Fynn, on the 20th March, went to report himself to McKenzie, accompanied by about a thousand of his adherents. His indunas and sub-indunas were then placed under arrest, on account of the seditious and threatening attitude they had assumed towards the Magistrate, whilst on the tribe itself, a fine of 1,500 head of cattle was imposed. The men were, moreover, ordered to bring in all their lethal weapons.

<sup>1</sup> The foregoing took place although all the efforts of the Chief himself were on the side of law and order.

“The above *indaba*,”<sup>1</sup> says McKenzie, “was carried out with as much ceremony as possible [in order to impress the Natives]. . . . Two sides of a triangle were formed, with guns at either flank, and maxims distributed along the lines. I was received with a salute, trumpets sounding and the Union Jack being broken from a flag-staff.”

On the 21st, 300 cattle were brought in by Fynn’s tribe, also some old assegais and guns. The Natives were warned that severe measures would be taken if the required cattle were not handed over.

Not wishing to subject Natives more than necessary to the inconvenience of troops being in their midst, the Government now instructed the Commandant to arrange for demobilization as speedily as possible. Colonel Bru-de-Wold visited Umtwalume on the 26th, when demobilization was ordered to take place on the 30th.

After infliction of the cattle-fine, it transpired that, with the object of evading payment thereof, numbers of Natives were secretly removing their cattle into country on the south of the Umzimkulu river, and there placing them in the custody of various Chiefs and people. Four squadrons of mounted troops were accordingly sent to scour the country and collect and bring in all such cattle as could be found. Of this force, one squadron N.C. was sent across the Umzumbe river, whilst another (B.M.R.) proceeded to the top of Mgayi hill. Some 200 cattle and a number of goats were seized. The full amount of the fine was subsequently handed over by the tribe.

The troops demobilized on the day arranged, and returned by train to their respective homes.

The demonstrations, extending as they had done from 10th February to 30th March, had not, of course, been arranged on the supposition that all Natives whose locations were visited were disloyal or disaffected, but seeing that the people in general had, for some time, been showing symptoms of unrest, notably the tribes of Miskofeli, Faku, Munyu and Mnyamana in Ixopo division, with Charlie Fynn, Jeke and others on the coast, it was

<sup>1</sup> A Zulu word, meaning here ‘affair.’



necessary, after the outbreak at Trewirgie had been dealt with, to restore public confidence and to prove that the Government was determined and able to enforce its requirements. For declining to hand over members of his tribe (charged with sedition), as well as their assegais, in addition to gross impertinence to the Officer Commanding at Richmond, Mnyamana was deprived of a section of his tribe. This was thereupon placed under the independent control of his head induna.

That the action taken by McKenzie's column during February and March was necessary, was shown by the altered demeanour of the tribes concerned, and the absence of all disorder among them during the later and more critical stages of the Rebellion. The existence of martial law and the military demonstrations and operations that took place may, indeed, have caused hardship in some cases. Although it was necessary to punish disaffected tribes as a body, every precaution was taken to prevent punishment falling on individuals, unless their conduct had made it desirable to deal with them apart from the rest of the tribe.

In a report from Stuartstown, dated 25th February, McKenzie says: "Great unrest has existed . . . caused by what the Natives consider to be excessive taxation. There is no doubt that Chiefs have been communicating with each other with a view to combination. . . . The mobilization of this column, consequent on the attack by Mjongo's party on the police (which appears to have been premature, from the general plan of operations by the disaffected Natives), has undoubtedly upset the scheme which was hatching."

After McKenzie left Trewirgie for Richmond, Mveli continued, as directed, to search the Enon and other forests for the murderers of Hunt and Armstrong. Some of the rebels were traced to a thick bush some five miles from Nel's Rust. Here, strange to say, they, though greatly outnumbered, made a sortie on Mveli's force, when one of their number, Mjongo, used a rifle with expanding bullets. Five of Mveli's force were wounded. The rebels

were driven back into the bush, where three were subsequently killed and eight taken prisoners. Among the latter was Mjongo himself. He had been severely wounded. Before the sortie was made, Mveli applied to be reinforced by European troops. Thirty-five European police were accordingly dispatched from Pietermaritzburg, with a company of N.R.R. from Richmond. The troops, however, arrived too late for the fight, though they helped to surround the bush. Another party of rebels, located at New Leeds, close to Thornville Junction, was also captured.

In recognition of the good services performed by Mveli, he and twenty of his principal followers were presented to the Duke of Connaught, His Royal Highness having arrived at Durban in H.M.S. "Terpsichore" on a visit to South Africa, on the 21st of the same month.

By the 2nd March the result was that, with the exception of three men (one of whom was wounded), the whole of the original party that attacked the police had been accounted for.

Reference has already been made to the defiance of the Magistrate, Mapumulo (Mr. R. E. Dunn), by Ngobizembe and three other Chiefs and their followers. These incidents occurred before that of Trewirgie, though they were not of so pressing a character. But, being nevertheless serious, the Government was determined they should not be overlooked, particularly as these Chiefs and their tribes were evidently on the verge of rebellion. When McKenzie, therefore, had operated at Trewirgie, and subsequently marched without untoward incident as far as Ixopo, it was decided to mobilize a second column to deal with the Chiefs and people referred to. The additional forces, which were mobilized on the 24th February, consisted of U.M.R., 250 (Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G.); N.M.R., 280 (Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks); N.N.C., 100 (Commander F. Hoare); A Battery, N.F.A. (Major C. Wilson); and two companies, D.L.I. (Lieut.-Col. J. Dick). The column was placed under the command of Colonel



Leuchars.<sup>1</sup> The immediate object in view was to support the Magistrate whilst dealing, under the ordinary law, with those who had threatened him. In the event of the offenders not being speedily brought in by their Chief, they were to be arrested and brought to the Magistrate for trial.

It was further arranged that Mr. (now Sir) C. R. Saunders, K.C.M.G., Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, should organize and send across the Tugela to Mapumulo a strong contingent of Zulus under the command of European officers. Such assistance appeared necessary, because of the difficult country in which the Natives in question were living. This action was determined on in consequence of Mr. Saunders' contention that the unrest was practically confined to the Natal Natives. "So certain are Ministers," observes Sir Henry McCallum, "that Zulus are to be trusted at this juncture, that they have made arrangements with Mr. Saunders for him to raise at once an *impi* of 2,000 Zulus under European command to assist, if necessary, the field force (Mapumulo). . . ." <sup>2</sup>

Another portion of Leuchars' column was to consist of about 300 Christian Native Scouts, recruited from Edendale and other parts of the Colony.

The *impi* referred to above was to be raised from Eshowe district, which is largely adjacent to that of Mapumulo. The Commissioner issued the order for those concerned to get ready, but, on the Commandant requesting and subsequently urging that the *impi* be sent, he was informed that, as the men objected to taking part against Natal tribes, they would have to be forced to comply, if

<sup>1</sup> This officer's services were as follows :

South African War, 1899-1902—In command Umvoti Mounted Rifles. Operations in Natal, 1899; Relief of Ladysmith, including operations on Tugela Heights; operations in Natal, March to June, 1900, including action at Laing's Nek; operations in the Transvaal, east of Pretoria, July to October, 1900; operations on the Zululand Frontier of Natal, September and October, 1901.

Despatches, *London Gazette*, 16th April, 1901. Queen's medal with four clasps. King's medal with two clasps. C.M.G.

The *Official Army List*, 1911. War Office. Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Fetter Lane, London, E.C.

<sup>2</sup> Cd. 2905, p. 20.

particularly required. As resort to compulsion at such a time might easily have complicated an already difficult situation, the Commandant decided to do without the men, and advised Leuchars accordingly.

Leuchars' column converged simultaneously on Mapumulo magistracy from Greytown and Stanger. Ngobizembe was ordered by Leuchars, acting on behalf of the Supreme Chief, to appear before him, accompanied by those members of his tribe who had treated the Magistrate with defiance. Delay ensued. On the 2nd March, an ultimatum was sent intimating that, if the offenders were not delivered by 10 a.m. on the 5th, summary punishment would be inflicted on the tribe. The warning was practically ignored. Instead of 300, only 20 of the offenders were delivered. Leuchars thereupon moved out, shortly before 11 a.m., with a portion of his force, leaving Dick within the grounds of the Residency. To begin with, he caused the Chief's kraal to be destroyed, which was done by shell-fire at a range of about two thousand yards,—after the women and children had been removed to a place of safety. The mere sound of the guns in a part of the country never visited by artillery before, as well as the act of setting the straw huts ablaze at such a distance, greatly impressed the aborigines, as, indeed, it did the Europeans. Ngobizembe shortly afterwards surrendered, together with a large number of the tribe. After being tried, he was deposed and sent to live in Zululand, over 100 miles from his former ward. A fine of 1,200 head of cattle and 3,500 sheep and goats was, moreover, imposed on him and his tribe for the offence committed, as well as for failing to hand over the offenders.<sup>1</sup> It became necessary for the troops to levy the amount of the fine. As a result of the firm action taken by Leuchars, a number of other offenders required of the Chiefs Meseni and Swaimana were brought in.

<sup>1</sup> General authority to administer martial law had, as in the case of McKenzie, been specially delegated to Leuchars by the Commandant. The latter had, in his turn, been deputed by the Governor to administer it. At a later date, the Governor decided to reserve to himself exercise of the authority granted to the Commandant.



On the 16th, the column was demobilized, except a few men required for guarding the magistracy, until the 100 Zululand Native Police, then being re-enlisted, could relieve them.

Prisoners that had been arrested by McKenzie's and Leuchars' columns were tried by courts-martial appointed by the respective commanding officers. It was not in every case that the Commandant, with whom the necessary authority lay, felt able to confirm the sentences. At such a time, perhaps, it was not unnatural that the military officers, swayed by local and not unbiassed feeling, should have been led away by evidence which, though incriminating, would in any ordinary court of law have been regarded as insufficient to secure conviction and, even if sufficient, it still remained to weigh carefully the degree of punishment to be awarded. A case of this kind arose at Ixopo, the sentences in which, on review, the Commandant found himself unable to confirm as they stood. His decision, as a matter of fact justifiable from every point of view, excited surprise and even resentment in the troops who, for a moment, had overlooked the fact that they were in the field to carry out orders, not to question the adequacy or otherwise of action taken by their superiors. Responsibility for the peace of the country rested, not on their shoulders, but on those of the Government.

Subsequent to the arrest of the Christian Natives who had murdered Hunt and Armstrong, and to whom belongs the unenviable distinction of having started the Rebellion, and started it prematurely, a general court-martial was appointed to try them. The officers selected were: Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton, N.C., President; Lieut.-Col. A. Hair, N.C.; Major W. Knott, Militia Reserves; Captain H. A. Capstick, N.R.R.; and Captain H. L. Pybus, N.F.A. The venue was Richmond. The trial began on the 12th, and ended on the 19th, March. Twenty-four rebels<sup>1</sup> were

<sup>1</sup>One of these was Mjongo, but he was unable to attend, not having sufficiently recovered from his wounds. He was, however, subsequently tried by the Supreme Court, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging; the sentence was carried out in September.

arraigned by the prosecutor, Captain J. Fraser, N.R.R., on three charges, viz. : (i) public violence ; (ii) murder and assault with intent to murder ; and (iii) being in arms against the Government and actively resisting constituted authority, and aiding and abetting rebels against the Government. As the accused were undefended, a local attorney and efficient Zulu linguist, Mr. J. F. Jackson, was appointed by the Government to protect their interests. After a long and patient hearing, in which the strongest evidence was adduced, 17 of the 23 were found guilty of the first charge, 12 of the second, and 16 of the last. The 12 found guilty of the second charge were found guilty of the other two as well. In respect of the murder, sentence of death was passed ; as to the others, the sentences were of imprisonment, lashes, and confiscation of property.

It is somewhat surprising that none of the four daily newspapers in the Colony arranged for publication of digests of the evidence in this important trial. No doubt it was partly owing to this omission that misunderstanding arose as to the justice of the sentence.

The proceedings were submitted for approval. By this time, however, the Governor had withdrawn the delegation to the Commandant of Militia of authority to confirm or revise sentences imposed by courts-martial. This withdrawal had occurred, not because of any dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Commandant had discharged the duty, but because there then appeared to be no pressing necessity for the duty to be exercised otherwise than in the ordinary way.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence and proceedings were carefully reviewed by the Governor-in-Council. As they appeared to be in order, and as there was no indication of injustice having been committed, the Governor accepted the advice of his Ministers that the sentences should be carried into effect. A cable on these lines was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the 27th. Lord Elgin replied in the

<sup>1</sup> Revocation took place on the 16th March.



following terms : "Continued executions <sup>1</sup> under martial law certain to excite strong criticism here, and as His Majesty's Government are retaining troops in Colony and will be asked to assent to Act of Indemnity, necessary to regularize the action taken, trial of these murder cases by civil courts greatly to be preferred. I must impress upon you necessity of utmost caution in this matter, and you should suspend executions until I have had opportunity of considering your further observations." In a lengthy cable to the Secretary of State explaining the position, Sir Henry McCallum said, *inter alia* : "On receipt of your telegram . . . I requested Prime Minister . . . to order suspension of executions which had been fixed for tomorrow pending further instructions from your Lordship. He replied that he regretted that he could not authorise suspension of executions which had been confirmed after full and deliberate consideration. I . . . explained that this decision would oblige me . . . to exercise prerogative of the Crown . . . and to cancel death warrant which I had signed. He quite recognised this, but said that, as a most important constitutional question was involved, he would feel obliged if I would give him written instructions. This I did, upon which he wrote me following minute : 'As your Excellency has thought it necessary to give instructions to suspend executions which were confirmed by the Executive Council and appointed to be carried out on Friday next, I feel that it is impossible for me to continue in office as Prime Minister, and I beg to tender my resignation. My colleagues are unanimous in supporting me in what, under the present circumstances, appears to be most important constitutional question.' " As, however, Lord Elgin's direction was that suspension should operate only until he had had an opportunity of considering Sir Henry McCallum's further observations, the latter requested the Ministry to retain office during his further communication with the Secretary of State. This Mr. Smythe and his colleagues agreed to do.

<sup>1</sup> There had been only two, viz. the two rebels captured by McKenzie's column on the 13th February.

The action of the Imperial Minister instantly caused a commotion throughout the length and breadth of Natal. The press was loud in its denunciation of what was looked on as unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of a self-governing Colony, and as seriously undermining local authority in the eyes of the Natives. Nor was surprise confined only to the people in the Colony. The Governor-General of Australia cabled, in the name of his Ministers, to Lord Elgin on the 31st: "Since an intervention of His Majesty's Ministers . . . with the administration of the self-governing Colony Natal would tend to establish, even in regard to prerogative of pardon, a dangerous precedent affecting all states within the Empire, Your Excellency's advisers desire most respectfully to appeal to His Majesty's Ministers for reconsideration of the resolution at which they are reported to have arrived on this subject." The Governor of New Zealand, too, was requested to "ascertain precise position in respect to action . . . in instructing Governor of Natal to postpone the execution. . . ." <sup>1</sup> Lord Elgin had, however, already cabled (on 30th) to Sir Henry McCallum that "His Majesty's Government have at no time had the intention to interfere with action of the responsible government of Natal, or to control Governor in exercise of prerogative. But your Ministers will, I feel sure, recognize that, in all the circumstances now existing, and, in view of the presence of British troops in the Colony, His Majesty's Government are entitled, and were in duty bound to obtain full and precise information in reference to these martial law cases, in regard to which an Act of Indemnity has ultimately to be assented to by the Crown. In the light of the information now furnished, His Majesty's Government recognize that the decision of this grave matter rests in the hands of your Ministers and yourself." The Secretary of State went on to express regret that Sir Henry McCallum did not keep him informed by telegraph of the steps he was taking, pointing out that it was the lack of such information that had necessitated the telegram directing suspension. The Governor took

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 2905, pp. 32, 34.



the rebuke in a dignified manner, although it was generally believed in the Colony that he had been assiduous in the discharge of his duties and had kept Lord Elgin fully informed.

The murderers of Hunt and Armstrong, twelve in number, after a trial that was in every way fair and impartial, were shot at Richmond in the presence of a large number of Natives, including Chiefs, at mid-day on the 2nd April, the firing-party consisting of comrades of the deceased. There is no doubt that the public execution of these men, who met their death with fortitude, created a profound impression on the Native population, and had no small share in checking the spread of the Rebellion, not only in that district, but in other parts of the Colony. Nor is it too much to say that the resolute action of the Government on that occasion will serve as a lesson for many years to rebelliously inclined Ethiopians throughout South Africa.

Swayed by certain Members in the House of Commons, Lord Elgin cabled on the 6th April to the Governor to know if the warrant held by the police on the 8th February, as well as other documents connected with the executions, could be produced. The cabled reply of Ministers, whilst intimating ability and readiness to furnish any information that might properly be called for, and appreciating the position in which the Secretary of State was placed, contained a request that they might be protected "from harassing interference on the part of Members of the House of Commons in regard to matters for which Ministers are themselves solely responsible."

And no further application seems to have been made.

## VII.

### OUTBREAK AT MPANZA.

WHILST McKenzie was demonstrating in the south-west, and Leuchars was similarly occupied at Mapumulo, a state of affairs was rapidly developing in the Mpanza valley,<sup>1</sup> not more than sixteen miles from Greytown, destined soon to alter the whole character of the situation.

Owing to the fact that neither McKenzie nor Leuchars had met with any opposition whatever when dealing, as has been seen, promptly and effectively with all cases of disaffection that came to their notice, it was, by the end of March, generally supposed that all further trouble was at an end, at any rate, for the time being. This conviction was strengthened by the execution of the murderers of Hunt and Armstrong. This execution, however, proved to be not the end, but only the end of the first phase of the Insurrection.

How far the Trewirgie affair can be associated with what was taking place in Mpanza valley is for the reader to judge, after consideration of the facts that will be laid before him. To understand it, it is necessary to examine the character and antecedents of the man who, on the 4th of April, became the initiator of the second and far more vigorous phase of the Rebellion. This is all the more necessary, not only because the Natives generally refer to it as *his* Rebellion,<sup>2</sup> but because he was the Chief of a

<sup>1</sup> This name, in full, is uMpanza, not iMpanza or Impanza, as sometimes written.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Wat Tyler's, Jack Cade's, and Monmouth's Rebellions in England.



comparatively small, low-class tribe and almost unknown, either by Europeans or Natives, beyond the division in which he lived. The rôle he took on was one which a far more imposing man like Mehlokazulu (of Zulu War fame), or even Zibebu (had he been living),<sup>1</sup> might have been proud to assume, had opportunity favourable for so hazardous an enterprise presented itself. Indeed, the general belief of the Natives of Natal and Zululand in regard to the poll tax was that, if there was to be any overt action at all, Dinuzulu himself would take it as head of the Zulu House. But for his imprisonment and banishment to St. Helena, it is quite possible he would have taken it. As he failed, or at any rate preferred to remain in the background, it fell, of all Chiefs in this portion of South Africa, on one Bambata to step forward as protagonist on this unique and dramatic occasion.

As a section of the Native public appeared desirous of a change in the way in which they were being governed, it devolved, of course, on some one to take the lead. Who should this be? A Chief? Of course, for, in a matter such as this, it would be altogether foreign to Native sentiment for a mere commoner to do so. Look how Makanda and Mjongo had failed. What Chief, then, so far forgetful of his own interests, as well as of those of his tribe, would dare to translate into action the spirit of resistance innate in the people? Who, in short, would have the temerity to start an insurrection against a Government which, however much it might be regarded as oppressive, had yet, as Bambata well knew, delivered his ancestors, and those of a million other Natives, from the wrongs, cruelties and inhumanity of Tshaka and Dingana, and enabled every man, woman and child to sleep peacefully in their homes for upwards of two generations, undisturbed by death-dealing, predatory raids?

The question, therefore, arises as to how it came about that one so petty and obscure as Bambata should stand

<sup>1</sup> Zibebu's loyalty was never doubted for a moment. His name is mentioned here only because of his exceptionally fine qualities as a military commander.

forth, practically alone, as the redresser of the nation's alleged wrongs. Who and what was he ?

Bambata was born about the year 1865 in the neighbourhood of Mpanza valley. His father was Mancinza, *alias* Sobuza, member of the Zondi tribe,<sup>1</sup> and his mother the daughter of Pakade, a well-known Chief of the Cunu tribe, now for the most part living in Weenen division. This woman was Mancinza's principal wife. In regard to the principal wife, a tribe is, by custom, called on to contribute towards her *lobolo* ; an attempt was made to do this in the present instance. The tribe, however, objected to the Chief taking a girl of the Cunu tribe, and refused to assist in *lobola*-ing her.<sup>2</sup> Determined to marry the girl, Mancinza delivered the necessary forty or more cattle out of his own herd. A few months after the wedding, the bride became so averse to living with her husband's three other wives that, after accusing them of wishing to kill her, she deserted and took up her abode at the kraal of another man of the same tribe. It was at this establishment that Bambata was born. His mother then insisted on a kraal being specially erected for her. This was done, the result of the unusual action being that the former place was well-nigh wrecked, for the other wives complained of their husband devoting too much attention to Bambata's mother.

As a boy, Bambata was headstrong and fond of fighting. He frequently neglected the cattle he had to herd. When chastised, he took the beating well, never crying out or shouting as boys sometimes do. He became expert in the use of the assegai, and was an exceptionally fine runner. Owing to the latter qualification, he earned the sobriquet

<sup>1</sup> One often hears Bambata's people spoken of a *ba seNgome* = the Ngome people. The reason is this. At the base of Ngome, a prominent little hill, three miles east of Mpanza valley, Mancinza and previous Chiefs of this section of the tribe lived for two or more generations.

<sup>2</sup> To *lobola* is to deliver to a girl's father the cattle or other property required by custom to be so handed over as part of the marriage settlement, viz. *lobolo*. These cattle are not purchase price or barter, but merely consideration or compensation for loss of the girl's services, as well as a visible guarantee of intention on the part of the bridegroom to treat his wife at all times fairly and justly under the Zulu system of life.



of "Magadu" (short for *Magaduzela, o wa bonel 'empunzini*),<sup>1</sup> which stuck to him all his life. His father had a double-barrelled, muzzle-loading shot gun. This the youth soon accustomed himself to, and became a good shot. When he was about 25 years of age, his father died. His uncle, Magwababa, to whom there will be further reference later, was appointed to act as Chief. After a few years, he was formally superseded by Bambata himself. A year or two after becoming Chief, Bambata committed a daring theft of three head of cattle belonging to a Boer. He was tried and severely punished, though not imprisoned. On the amount of the fine being raised by members of the tribe, he was released.

As Chief, he was harsh, extravagant and reckless, selfish and domineering. On one occasion he fined a man, but, as the latter would not pay, he attacked him with an armed body of men and forced him to comply. He rapidly squandered the property his father had left and, like his father, ran counter to the wishes of the tribe in selecting his principal wife. The elders were in favour of his promoting a particular woman, and opposed to his own choice, on the ground that the woman was a twin. He ignored their wishes and, after one of his wives (there were four in all), had committed adultery and been expelled, whilst another had deserted, he erected a solitary hut for the principal one—calling it *Emkontweni* (*the place of the assegai*)—thereby following once more the irregular example set by his father.

In the meantime, the relations he stood in towards his European neighbours were even less satisfactory. The total strength of his tribe at the end of 1905 was 910 huts in Umvoti, 120 in New Hanover, 21 in Umgeni, and 91 in Lion's River, divisions, or 1,142 in all; representing a total approximate population of 5,000 men, women, and children, or about 500 capable of bearing arms. The system of recruiting regiments was followed in this as in some other tribes of Natal and Zululand. Owing, however, to

<sup>1</sup> "The runner that took the duiker for his model." The duiker is a small antelope.

limited numbers, there were incorporated into each regiment men of widely differing ages. During the twenty-four years Bambata was nominally Chief, he recruited only two regiments.

Most of the kraals of the tribe, as well as his own, especially in the Umvoti division, were distributed over a number of private farms. The landlord of the farm on which he personally lived, viz. Aangelegen,<sup>1</sup> demanded a rental of £3 per hut, this, of course being apart from Government taxation. Such rent was undoubtedly high, although on other farms in the same district a similar, and even heavier, charge was not uncommon. Notwithstanding these obligations, he continued in his career of extravagance. He illicitly purchased European liquor and drank freely thereof, as well as of Native beer, though not so as to become a confirmed drunkard. In order to make good what he had squandered in drink and in other ways, he borrowed from lawyers who, not being less importunate or exacting than other people, usually got back their own with interest through the local Magistrate's court. Bambata was constantly being sued, either on account of loans or for outstanding rent, and to such indebtedness there seemed to be no end. Instead of bracing himself up and endeavouring to meet his obligations, he persisted in his reckless conduct, until he became a nuisance to Europeans, on the one hand, and the members of his tribe, on the other. A more perturbed spirit than he was at the close of 1905 it is scarcely possible to conceive. He, hereditary Chief of a tribe, which, though of humble origin as compared with many of the adjoining ones in Zululand and Natal, was of no mean size, seemed to be daily losing his grip over the people and coming within measurable distance of utter ruin. This prospect he was smart enough to realize, and it was because he knew such end to be sooner or later inevitable that his despondency grew to despair.

<sup>1</sup> This farm, in 1881, belonged to the Swiss Mission Society. It was bonded to the Standard Bank, when a rent of £1 per hut was charged by the trustees. Later on, it was sold to Messrs. Theunis Nel and Gabriel Botha.



In common with all other Chiefs throughout the Colony, including Zululand, he was required, in April, 1904, on coming with his people to pay the hut and dog taxes, to give information in connection with the census. He was the man who, as has been stated, protested to the Magistrate against furnishing a few matter-of-fact details, concluding with the remark: "If there be anything behind all this, we shall be angry." The threat was uttered at Marshall's hotel, exactly two years and a day before his starting the Insurrection not a mile from the same hotel. Mr. J. W. Cross, the Magistrate, by way of pacifying and convincing him that the Government had no sinister motive, said: "You may as well expect the sun to fall from the heavens as imagine that harm will come to you." "That was just what we wanted to hear," he exclaimed in reply.

In August, 1905, a faction fight occurred in the ward. Owing to having taken part in it himself, Bambata was charged before the Magistrate, but the case was not disposed of till early in 1906, as one of those assaulted was too unwell to appear. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of £20, with an alternative of three months' imprisonment. The Government was advised to depose him, as being unfit for the position of Chief, and because he was always being sued. About this time he visited his lawyer in Pietermaritzburg, from whom, it seems, he learned that his deposition was in contemplation.

When, in September, 1905, the Poll Tax Act was proclaimed in Umvoti division, no opposition was raised by the Zondi or other local tribes; the headmen, however, complained that the law would result in complete loss of the small control kraal-owners still retained over their sons. Bambata took the opportunity of reminding the Magistrate of the statement the latter had made when the census was being taken, asking that official to reconcile the assurance then given with the demand for the poll tax that was being made. The Magistrate was unable to do this to Bambata's satisfaction.

As a matter of fact, there was considerable and general

objection to the tax, though not given expression to in the presence of officials as at other magistracies. Among those who objected in the Zondi tribe was the headman, Nhlonhlo. He assumed a determined and defiant attitude. But for the part he took, Bambata might not have broken into rebellion. Nhlonhlo called together the people about him, proceeded with them to Bambata and declared they would not pay. Bambata apparently did what he could to persuade, but without success. The only reason why Nhlonhlo made the stand he did was because he had five taxable sons, and did not see why all of these should be liable. Like Bambata, he had got into difficulties with his own landlord, and when, some years previously, the latter had sought to eject him, he borrowed money of Bambata, more than half of which is said to be still owing.

Towards the end of 1905, confidential information was received by the Magistrate to the effect that Bambata was in league with the Zulus, and that he had agreed to bell the cat by putting to death the Magistrate and his staff on their visiting Mpanza to collect poll tax. As a result of this, the collections were begun in another part of the division instead of, as was usual, in Bambata's ward. So far, then, from being the first, Bambata was the last Chief to be called on to pay. More than this, he and his people were ordered to attend for the purpose at the Magistrate's office in Greytown. The date fixed was the 22nd February. After receiving the instructions, he requested the Magistrate to come as usual to collect in Mpanza valley. Mr. Cross, however, said he was unable to countermand the order.

On the day appointed, the people appeared at the Magistrate's office. They arrived about 11 instead of 9 a.m. The Chief was not with them, as he should have been. An induna appeared in his stead, apologizing for the Chief's absence on the ground of ill-health. (He was said to be suffering from a stomach-ache.) The Magistrate naturally concluded Bambata was at his kraal some thirteen or fourteen miles away, whereas, as was afterwards reported, he



and a number of young men had concealed themselves in a wattle-tree plantation, overlooking, and about two and a half miles from, Greytown. Those who came up to pay were chiefly elderly men. They at first appeared very surly. In reply to a question as to where the young men, *i.e.* those liable for the tax, were, the old men said they had gone out courting.

About 8.30 p.m. the same day, information was received from Native sources that Greytown was to be attacked during the night "after the white people had gone to bed," for Bambata had gathered together an *impi* and was with it in the trees overlooking Greytown, meaning Mr. Layman's and Dr. Wright's plantations. It was explained that payment of the tax that day was simply a ruse 'to hoodwink the Europeans,' and that Bambata intended to recover the money paid in. A similar rumour came from another quarter. Steps were thereupon taken to warn and protect the inhabitants. There happened that night to be a dance on in the town hall. The electric light was purposely kept burning all night in the building as well as in the streets. The hall, in the meantime, was quickly transformed into a lager. Arms were issued and pickets posted in various directions.

This 'scare,' for such it was, was based on incorrect or insufficient information. Careful inquiry of those actually with Bambata on the day in question has resulted in the following explanation:—As directed, the Chief called on his people to proceed to Greytown to pay the tax. He instructed them all to assemble on the ridge just before coming within sight of the town. Such procedure was not irregular, as Chiefs, when calling on their people to pay hut tax, often direct them to assemble at a given spot to afford an opportunity for preliminary inspection. Quite contrary to Bambata's orders, it would seem, a number of young men came up from Mpanza valley led by Nhlonhlo, all being armed with shields and assegais. They proceeded to the vicinity of a kraal beside the road, a couple of miles further away from Greytown than where Bambata had directed them to assemble. On learning this, Bambata,

then some little way off, sent a messenger to order the young men to put down their arms and go to Greytown with the others and pay. They refused point-blank. "If," they said, "we are to throw away our assegais and go empty-handed, we certainly shall not comply." Bambata now borrowed a horse and moved to inspect the other section of his people who were in front. As he went off, Nhlonhlo's party were heard to shout to the lender of the horse, "If, after your supplying him with a horse, Bambata should be arrested by the white people, we shall stab you." When the Chief reached the rendezvous, he found his uncle, Magwababa, had already been driven into Greytown by Mr. Botha, whilst a number of others had followed him. Of those present, some were not properly dressed<sup>1</sup> and, moreover, had not the necessary money. He ordered them home, telling them to sell their goats and so find the amount of the tax. Others were sent into Greytown with a message to the man in charge to say that Bambata was absent owing to a headache.

Already apprehensive as to what might happen, especially as he had, contrary to custom, been summoned to Greytown without knowing why such course had been adopted, and, again, finding that a few hot-bloods, who had by then heard all about the Trewirgie affair, had taken up arms for the purpose of protecting him, and, if need be, resisting by force any attempt to arrest him, can anyone be surprised that Bambata showed some hesitation about going forward? He was in a dilemma. The course he took was, questionable as it seems, on the side of law and order, at any rate for the time being. His people were obviously inclined to get out of hand, and it required his personal presence to check any rash or hostile demonstration. Had he gone into Greytown and been apprehended, it is quite possible an effort at rescue would have been made. As it was, nothing occurred. Nor would anything have occurred, because his arrest was not contemplated. It was, of course, bad enough that a body of

<sup>1</sup> There is a standing rule that no Native may appear in a European town unless clothed from neck to knee.



young men should have assembled where they did, armed with assegais, in much the same way that those of Mveli's had done when Mr. Bennett went to collect at Henley, but, at that time Bambata had apparently no intention of attacking Greytown. Where he made a fatal mistake was in not reporting the incident at once, as Mveli had done, thus placing on the Government the onus of preserving peace. Rather than sacrifice the lawlessly inclined he, by inaction at a critical moment, caused himself to be identified with them in every respect. "If we fail to denounce the crime, we become participators in it."<sup>1</sup> From the moment he excused himself from appearing on the lying pretext that he had a headache, it became more and more difficult for him to do otherwise than rebel. At that moment he unfitted himself for the position of Chief. This the Government, some days later, recognized, whereupon Magwababa was appointed to act as Chief as *from that date*.

On the day after the scare, a message was received from the Secretary for Native Affairs summoning Bambata to attend at his office in Pietermaritzburg. Two Native police were sent to say he was to take an early train to Pietermaritzburg on the following morning (Saturday). The messengers returned to say he had promised to comply on the Monday. After the police had gone, Nhlonhlo intervened and would not allow the Chief to keep the promise, for the reason that, having by that time slept in the veld for three days with men under arms, he would be looked on as already in revolt, and, therefore, as a criminal to be put under arrest. Nhlonhlo and his *impi* thereupon carried him off to another kraal. On Tuesday, a further message was sent. After some trouble, the messengers found him and delivered their message. He told them to inform the Magistrate he was afraid of going to Pietermaritzburg, as he had heard the European people had taken up arms against him.

At this stage, Mr. C. Tatham, an attorney of Greytown, who had one of Bambata's relations working for him,

<sup>1</sup> Dilke.

Bambata himself, moreover, being his client, sent to the Chief to say that, if afraid of obeying the summons, he was to send a particular man to him, when Tatham himself would go and see Bambata and, after explaining the position, conduct him to the authorities. Bambata was besought by his wiser followers to seize the opportunity, which he said he would do. The man referred to arrived, but found Tatham unwell. The latter then sent word to say Bambata was to come by himself, and, if afraid, he was to proceed direct to Tatham's residence, when he would be conducted to the Magistrate's office. On hearing this, Nhlonhlo exclaimed: "He won't go." In reply to a remark about the probability of Bambata being released on payment of a fine, Nhlonhlo remarked: "I prefer he should die in our own hands, rather than be shot by Europeans out of our sight." Others tried to persuade the Chief, but, influenced by Nhlonhlo, Bambata remarked: "I won't go. Some of you want me to be killed by myself. When they kill me, it will not be until some of you have been laid out." References to the action of the British Government in regard to Cetshwayo and Langalibalele were unavailing, for Bambata replied: "When each of these was captured, it was not until after some of their people had been killed, therefore I too mean to resist." "If you are tired of him" (*i.e.* Bambata), said Nhlonhlo to the peace-makers, "give him over to us." After the wiser men had queried whether Nhlonhlo had a fortress where Bambata could be hidden with any good prospect of success, the people dispersed. Bambata was then conducted to the forest-clad hill above the principal induna Mgombana's kraal, and there concealed.

On the 3rd March, a final message was dispatched to the effect that, if Bambata continued any longer to disobey the Supreme Chief's order, he would have to take the consequences, whatever they might be. The bearers, however, failed to see him, as the people refused to disclose his whereabouts. The message was delivered to the Chief's brother Funizwe.

Major W. J. Clarke, with a force of 170 Natal Police and



a troop, U.M.R. (Helpmakaar), made a surprise visit to Mpanza on the 9th, with the object of arresting Bambata, but failed, as the man hid himself in the dense bush about those parts as soon as he saw the force advancing. Clarke, thereupon, returned to Pietermaritzburg.<sup>1</sup> In the meantime, Bambata, feeling that Natal could not afford him protection, crossed into Zululand on Sunday, the 11th March, boasting to his followers as he left, that when they next set eyes on him he would be at the head of an army. Nothing more was heard of him officially from the 11th until the morning of the 3rd April.

During his absence, Magwababa and Funizwe (Bambata's full brother), together with the more important men of the tribe, including the fire-brand, Nhlonhlo, were summoned to Pietermaritzburg, the object being to appoint a successor to Bambata, who had been deposed as from the 23rd February. It was decided Funizwe should succeed, but that, for a year, Magwababa was to act as Chief.

But where was Bambata at this time? Subsequent inquiries show that, when he left for Zululand, travelling on foot, he was accompanied by his chief wife, three children, and a mat-bearer, also a young man, Ngqengqengqe by name. Among other places, he slept at a relative's in Nkandhla district; he then proceeded on to Dinuzulu's Usutu kraal by easy stages, leaving his wife and children at a place some seven miles away from there. He reached Usutu on Sunday, the 25th March.

Only long after the Insurrection was any account procurable of these doings, particularly from the woman and children in question. According to their evidence, this young man, Ngqengqengqe, had been sent from Usutu kraal by Dinuzulu's minor induna to summon Bambata, as Dinuzulu desired to see him. Bambata had several interviews

<sup>1</sup> A week before, Clarke had been sent with a strong force to make the arrest. On his reaching Greytown, arrangements were made for a night raid on Bambata's kraal, but, owing to Chief Sibindi informing the Secretary for Native Affairs that Bambata would probably cause trouble if raided, Clarke was directed to refrain from executing the warrant, although he had gone to the trouble of ascertaining that the Chief was at his kraal and could have been secured with comparative ease.

with Dinuzulu, being treated by the latter in a markedly hospitable manner. Accommodation in a special establishment a few yards from the kraal and Dinuzulu's own apartments, was provided. His wife and children were brought the next day to Usutu and there concealed. Dinuzulu, says Bambata's wife, through his principal induna, Mankulumana, gave Bambata instructions to go back to Natal, commit an act of rebellion and then flee to Nkandhla forests, where Dinuzulu's men would join him. Bambata was, at the same time, given a Mauser rifle and some ammunition. After spending four days at Usutu, he started on his return journey, leaving his wife and children at Dinuzulu's kraal. And there they continued to be concealed for fourteen months.<sup>1</sup> Two young men were sent back with Bambata to Natal, one being Cakijana (son of Gezindaka), who soon began to play an important part. Bambata, accompanied by these two, called at a kraal of Chief Matshana (son of Mondise) on Friday, the 30th March, but was refused admission. He left the same afternoon for Ngubevu drift (on the Tugela), having first assured himself that it was not being watched by police.

About 7 a.m. on Tuesday, 3rd April, it was reported to the Magistrate that Bambata was back in Mpanza valley (as a matter of fact he had got back on the 31st March), and that he and an *impi* he had raised had captured the acting Chief Magwababa on the preceding evening; that they had surprised Magwababa in his hut, treated him with violence, and, tying him with a reim,<sup>2</sup> had marched him off towards that portion of the tribe that lies furthest from Greytown, and in the vicinity of Marshall's hotel. The foregoing tale had been brought to a farmer (Mr. Botha) at 3 a.m. by Magwababa's own wife who, from what she saw, supposed her husband must by then be dead.

<sup>1</sup> The sending of Ngqengqengqe to summon Bambata and the inciting of Bambata to rebel were emphatically denied by Dinuzulu. Dinuzulu's connection with the Rebellion will be dealt with later.

One of Bambata's children died at Usutu during their stay there.

<sup>2</sup> Thong of cow or ox-hide.



Afterwards it was discovered that the assailants had, on seizing Magwababa, jeered at him in these terms: "Where are your white friends now? We acknowledge, not a Natal king, but a black one."

In addition to arresting Magwababa, attempting to secure Funizwe (who escaped through having slept in the field because afraid of his brother), Bambata, assisted by his principal induna, Mgombana, and other men, went about commandeering the young men, threatening immediate death on failure to comply. The commandeering was carried on throughout the whole of Monday night (2nd). That such "club law" had to be adopted, shows that Bambata felt it difficult to get members of the tribe to join, although some were only too eager to do so. His tribe, for the most part, was against rebelling, and could be forced into doing so only by the adoption of violent methods. But for the presence of Cakijana, the reputed emissary from Dinuzulu, and who in the name of Dinuzulu urged all to rise,<sup>1</sup> Bambata must have failed to dragoon as many as he did.

The result of the report was that the Magistrate deemed it necessary to proceed to Mpanza to investigate. He was accompanied by a clerk, a civilian, Inspector J. E. Rose and two troopers of the Natal Police, and a Native guide. They went along the main road as far as Mpanza (Marshall's) hotel when, unaware that their movements were being watched, they proceeded up Mpanza valley in the direction of Varty's house in search of Magwababa's captors. Whilst looking for a drift to cross the Mpanza, which passes the hotel about three-quarters of a mile lower down, they were suddenly surprised by a body of men, under the command of Bambata himself, fully armed with assegais and some guns. Bambata's party immediately opened fire at short range at the Inspector, who, with a couple of men, was leading. A few shots were returned, when one of the enemy was wounded. The *impi* had behaved in a deliberate and cold-blooded manner,

<sup>1</sup> It was generally known Cakijana was one of Dinuzulu's personal attendants.

well-knowing the party was composed of Government officials. One would have thought the smallness of the party was enough to have guaranteed its safety. It would probably have made a considerable difference had it been even smaller and unarmed. Evidently the temper of the people had greatly changed. When the men were sent with Clarke to arrest Bambata, he fled to Zululand. Now, when another, though smaller party, appears on the scene, he, without warning, opens fire upon them. Clearly something had occurred during the visit to Zululand to embolden him to break out into open rebellion. The Magistrate's party, on going into Mpanza valley, did so in no aggressive spirit, not even to attempt arrest, but solely to find out what had become of the acting Chief, as it was their duty to do. They could not, under the circumstances, do otherwise than make their way back to the hotel (on the main road) as best they could, through the thick thorn bush that lay between. The three ladies in the hotel, Mesdames Hunter, Marshall and Borham (and son), warned of their danger, proceeded to effect an escape as speedily as they could. This was done with the assistance of the police.

As a matter of fact, though unknown to the party at the time, the rebels did not pursue, otherwise one or more must have been overtaken. They made their way as rapidly as possible to the Police Station, Keate's drift (on the Mooi River), reaching the post the same afternoon.

Some time after the party had gone off, a number of the insurgents proceeded to the hotel and, breaking into the canteen and cellar, helped themselves freely to the large supply of liquor they found there.

After representing the state of affairs to the Commandant, Colonel Leuchars, whose Mapumulo command had, of course, by this time demobilized, proceeded on his own responsibility, in the absence of the Magistrate, to arrange for the defence of Greytown. The necessary organization was effected the same evening with the assistance of the Town Commandant (Major Menne). All available men of the U.M.R. were mobilized; patrols were sent out in



different directions, and the local First Reserves put on to guard the approaches to the town. The action taken was at once confirmed by the Commandant.

Such Natal Police as were available, including the four officers, 100 non-commissioned officers and men who had the day previous been to Richmond to carry out the executions referred to, were immediately ordered to Greytown, not, however, receiving instructions until late in the afternoon. On arrival at Greytown by train at about 8 a.m., the force was joined by a detachment, raising the strength to six officers, 166 non-commissioned officers and men, under the command of Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel, C.M.G., Chief Commissioner. The force marched from Greytown about 10.30 a.m. and camped on Botha's farm (adjoining Burrup's), six or seven miles from and above Mpanza valley. The idea was there to await developments. Leuchars was, the same day, appointed to command all troops in the district; this, of course, brought Mansel's force under his orders.

Intelligence was received by Mansel the same afternoon by wire from Keate's drift, to the effect that the European men and women, who had taken refuge there, were unable to proceed through Mpanza valley to Greytown, owing to insufficiency of escort. On account of the hostile attitude assumed by Bambata, whose fastnesses were not more than seven or eight miles from Keate's drift, the position of the ladies was considered to be unsafe. Mansel accordingly decided, without, however, submitting the matter for instructions, to bring in the fugitives. Shortly before 3 p.m. a column, consisting of five officers and 146 non-commissioned officers and men, left for the purpose. A few men, together with some Nongqai (Zululand Native Police), were left in charge of the camp.

The force, with Mansel in command, not having seen anything of the enemy, although it had passed through Mpanza valley, arrived at the drift at 4.30 p.m. It left again at 6.15, escorting the ladies and child. The latter travelled in an open carriage drawn by two horses. The police detachment at Keate's drift continued to hold the

post under Sub-Inspector Ottley. Mpanza hotel was reached just after sunset. A short halt was made, when the column continued its march along the road. There was an advanced guard of twenty-six men. The carriage occupied a position in the centre of the main body. Every precaution was taken. Connecting files were posted between the guard and main body (about 150 yards apart), but, in Mpanza valley and for some miles further on, the nature of the country was such that flankers could not be thrown out, not even five yards on either side of the road. The density of the bush about that part is remarkable. The trees, though not more than twenty feet high, are so closely intermingled, some of thorn, others of cactus variety, as to make it difficult for a man to make his way through, even on foot. Add to this, a three-strand wire fence running five yards from the road on either side—the road itself not being more than thirty feet wide—and the predicament the column would be in, in the event of attack at night, can better be imagined than described. The worst is what actually did happen. After the force had marched barely a mile from the hotel, and just as the advanced guard, under Major O. Dimmick, 100 to 150 yards ahead of the main body, was passing through the worst section of the forest along the route, and one of the nastiest spots to be found either in Natal or Zululand—the time being about 8 p.m.—a sudden and determined rush was made by the savages at the right rear of the guard. As they rushed, they simultaneously shouted, at the top of their voices, their newly-adopted war-cry “Usutu!”<sup>1</sup> Almost instantly the rest of the right flank of the guard was attacked. Every horse took fright, and, although each man was marching with his rifle drawn, it was impossible to use it. The attack had come from the higher side of the road, where the whole of the enemy, about 150 in number, were in hiding, the spot

<sup>1</sup> It is the custom for Zulus to shout their war-cry on charging. “Usutu” was the one belonging to Dinuzulu’s followers, he having inherited it from his father Cetshwayo. Dinuzulu’s principal kraal, it will be remembered, bore the same name. Bambata’s men had not used this cry before the occasion in question.



being beside a huge solitary rock at the foot of a steep, bush-covered hill, known by the Natives as Hlenyane. The enemy's object was evidently to cut the advanced guard off the main body.


Owing to the narrowness of the road, the way it was hemmed in by the bush on either side, and the darkness—there being but half-moon, with clouds about—the guard succeeded, only with great difficulty and after considerable delay, in making their way back to the main body. As it was, the leading section was completely cut off, and, with three horses wounded, made its way on to the camp as best it could.

The tactics of the enemy were evidently to deal first with the horse, then with the man, after bringing the latter on to a level with himself. Sergt. E. T. N. Brown, Lce.-Sergt. J. C. G. Harrison, and Tprs. A. H. Aston and J. P. Greenwood were killed outright, whilst four were wounded (one of them dangerously). Three horses were killed, and nine wounded. All these had been stabbed, except two—shot through the neck. When the attack started, the main body moved up, dismounted, and volleyed into the bush on either side. Except for those who came on to the road, it was quite impossible to see the enemy, although at the outset they could not have been more than five to ten yards off the road. They were in possession of several fire-arms, but, owing to the heavy fire of the police, were obliged to retire in different directions. It was afterwards ascertained they withdrew by dragging themselves along their stomachs through the undergrowth, done to avoid being hit.

During the action there were several acts of bravery. Among those who behaved with conspicuous gallantry were Dimmick and Trooper O. Folker. Trumpeter C. Milton, who was severely wounded, must have been killed but for their carrying him out of danger, with much difficulty and at great risk to themselves.

The following account by Dimmick will be read with interest :

“When the rebels started their attack, they volleyed







into us ; as they did so, the majority, with assegais, sprang on to the road to stab, or throw where that was impossible. The attack was directed more at the rear of the guard than at its front and, for a moment or two, more at the horse than the man. The practically simultaneous wounding of many horses caused them, as well as the others, to plunge about. During the resulting confusion, the guard, as the attack was being delivered, was pressed forward. I suddenly heard Trumpeter Milton on my left cry out. He had been struck in the back by, I believe, a flung assegai. He bumped up against me and lay across his wallet. I held on to him in the best way I could with my left hand, calling out to the men to steady down. I went forward with him a distance of about 100 yards, shouting to my men as I did so, when, by the faint light of the moon, I saw Hodge and Emanuel on foot in the road, the latter having been knocked off his horse by a knobstick striking him on the forehead. A few yards further on I saw Folker, Guest and others coming back mounted. Folker made for me at once and took Milton up on to the front of his saddle, whilst Guest considerably assisted Emanuel. I told the men, about eight or ten of them, to bunch together, when we began to work our way back. The enemy at this time was in the bush on both sides of the road, being briskly fired at by the main body."

After the rebels, who were commanded by Bambata in person, assisted by his chief induna and Cakijana, had been beaten off, the action having lasted five to ten minutes, the wounded were placed in the carriage (promptly given up by the ladies), and the column moved on.

An advanced guard was dispensed with. The men were all dismounted and made to march in single file with fixed bayonets on each side of the road, horses and vehicle inside. Three of the dead were, at short intervals, picked up in the road and put into the carriage.

For a mile or two there was occasional firing into the bush to keep off the enemy, who, it was supposed, might be following. They shouted obscene epithets at the



police from a distance. The camp was not reached till about midnight. As a matter of fact, the rebels, afraid of being hit, did not follow, notwithstanding that one man was heard to shout out from a hill "*Bapakati!*" (They are hemmed in!)

As far as could be seen, in addition to assegais, shields and knobsticks, the enemy had about a dozen guns.

The ladies, after giving up the carriage, walked most of the way back to camp, a distance of about six miles.

Reviewing the two foregoing incidents, it is, in the first place, difficult to understand why the first expedition took place in the way it did. In view of Bambata's attitude, firstly, on the 22nd February, in connection with the poll tax; secondly, his refusal to attend at headquarters when summoned, and quitting Natal for Zululand; and, thirdly, his arresting Magwababa, who had just been formally appointed as his acting successor, it seems as if the occasion was one which required far stronger action than that which was taken. In arresting Magwababa, Bambata did not do so out of personal spite, although the relations between the two had for long been strained, but because, supported by Dinuzulu, he was determined, if possible, to bring about a general rebellion.

When the Chief Commissioner arrived on the scene, he knew Bambata and his men were under arms; he knew that, after the attack on the Magistrate's party, Bambata did not pursue, otherwise one or more of the fugitives must have been killed. Moreover, there was no good ground for suspecting an attack on the Keate's drift station. As it was, the European residents referred to in the wire on which Mansel acted were perfectly safe where they were, especially as Bambata had, at the most, no more than 150 to 200 men, while the station was protected by about twenty rifles.<sup>1</sup>

There thus being no immediate necessity for removing the "European residents," it would seem the column

<sup>1</sup> It is, however, fair to add that Mansel had had no time to ascertain the enemy's strength, which, seeing the size of the tribe, might have been anything between 150 and 600.

should not have been marched off merely to relieve an unthreatened post at the imminent risk of being attacked on a road it was impossible to defend in the dark. The situation certainly called for immediate action, not, it would seem, in the direction of relieving Keate's drift, but of getting within striking distance of the enemy and, after ascertaining his probable strength and position, attacking him. It is, however, easy to be wise after the event.

In going to Keate's drift, the mistakes were made of returning the same day after an apparently unavoidably late start, and of returning by the way that was used on the forward journey. It is a maxim in Native warfare not to come back by the way one goes out. In this case, just because it was impossible to do otherwise than return to camp by the road (except by making a long *détour*), it would, no doubt, have been wiser to have adopted the precaution of doing so in the day-time. As there was an advanced guard when the column proceeded to the drift, the enemy, of course, knew the kind of formation to look out for.

The body of Sergeant Brown was not recovered until some days later,<sup>1</sup> when it was seen lying on its back at right angles across, and in the middle of, the road where the fight had been. It had been purposely put there by the rebels, and had about it no fewer than twenty-seven assegai wounds. The whole of the moustache and upper lip had been cut off and carried away, as also the left forearm. A deep incision, in the form of a cross, had also been made for some purpose at the side of the left biceps. Deceased's helmet, too, had been taken, as also his boots, tunic and breeches, whilst the way in which the stomach and intestines had been ripped open, showed those present that they were at war with savages indeed.

The horrible mutilation of this poor fellow's body was, however, not done from sheer wantonness, but for a particular object, viz. to obtain pieces of the flesh for medicinal purposes. This practice, so revolting from a

<sup>1</sup> It was not known until after the column got to camp that this man was missing.



civilized person's point of view, is one usually followed by Zulus and other South African races. Indeed, according to their superstitions, to act thus is an indispensable accompaniment of warfare.

On an inspection being made at the scene of the ambuscade, it was noticed the bottom strands of the wire fence had been lifted to the top one, and there tied. This had been done in several places, evidently to enable the enemy to pass through quickly, whilst, at the same time, sufficient to check horses.

An incident of the attack was that not only Aston but his dog was killed, both almost on the same spot. Another feature was that not one of the enemy was killed, though, as was afterwards ascertained, ten or twelve were wounded. Such a result, as it happened, carried with it mysterious significance in so far as the Natives were concerned. To this attention must now be drawn.

Attached to Bambata's force, were three persons of importance, viz. : Cakijana, Moses, and Malaza. The first was commonly understood to be an emissary from Dinuzulu. He it was who had come specially to foment the Rebellion ;<sup>1</sup> the second had, for some years, carried on Christian mission work within the tribe—during the Rebellion he acted as a kind of " chaplain to the forces " ; Malaza was the war-doctor, quite indispensable, according to Native ideas, on such occasions.

By one or other of these, the belief was started that Bambata had secured drugs from Dinuzulu, whose effect would be to prevent European bullets from entering the body. This curious belief was destined to play a remarkable part during the rising. It seems to have originated from the Basutos.

The belief that the bodies of the " rightly disposed " would be impervious to bullets, would appear to have existed, not only before the attack on the police at

<sup>1</sup> He was known also by the names Sukabekuluma (*he who goes off whilst they are still talking*) ; Dakwaukwesuta (*he who becomes drunk on getting a full meal*) ; and Gwazakanjani (*how do you stab ?*). One of his praises was : *uSigilamikuba, ku vel'izindaba* = The one whose pranks give rise to matters for consideration.

Mpanza, but also before the one at the kraal of Mjongo.

If there was anything that went to confirm the belief in "bullets not entering," it must have been the comparative absence of casualties among the rebels: (*a*) at Mjongo's kraal; (*b*) when the Magistrate's party was attacked; and (*c*) when the police were ambuscaded at Mpanza. It may, however, be mentioned that Malaza was wounded at Mpanza, though not to such an extent as to oblige him to retire.

Immediately after their attack, the rebels cut the telegraph line between Greytown and Keate's drift.



## VIII.

### FLIGHT OF BAMBATA TO NKANDHLA FORESTS.— FIRST STEPS TAKEN TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION.—ZULU CUSTOMS.

ON the day following the ambushade in the valley, Mansel moved his camp from Botha's to Warwick's farm (Burrup's), *i.e.* on to high, open ground, slightly nearer Greytown, and awaited reinforcements. Bambata remained in Mpanza valley. He dispatched messengers forthwith to each of the Chiefs Silwana, Sibindi and Gayede, calling on them to render assistance; at the same time, he informed them he had been to Dinuzulu, who had promised to co-operate as soon as the ball had been set rolling. He warned them that, in case of refusal, they would incur "the Prince's" displeasure, and draw on attack by the army the latter was about to bring into the field. The two that went to Silwana were promptly arrested by that Chief and conveyed to the Magistrate at Weenen; Sibindi did likewise with the man sent to him.

Although Bambata was, through his mother, nearly related to Silwana, it was the height of absurdity to think that the latter, the most powerful Chief of Natal, whose grandfather had, in years gone by, formed a not unworthy opponent of Tshaka himself, would risk his position and the well-being of his tribe, by responding, at a moment's notice, to a summons from a Chief like Bambata, even though accompanied by a threat from the representative of the House that slew his father Gabangaye at Isandhlwana in 1879.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Gabangaye, with a large following, formed a portion of the Native contingents that assisted the Imperial troops.

Finding he was not likely to obtain support locally, although general sympathy in his cause was not wanting, Bambata decided, most probably in accordance with a preconcerted plan, to move across the Tugela to the famous Nkandhla forests, commonly known by the Natives as falling within Chief Siganda's ward. He declared he had been directed to do this by Dinuzulu.

The rebel ringleader lost no time, owing to the following developments: No sooner was the news of the Mpanza affair flashed to Pietermaritzburg, than the Commandant re-mobilized the U.M.R., N.F.A. (B Battery, four 15 pdrs.), a company of the D.L.I., with signallers, and Greytown Reserves (120)—brigading these arms with the Natal Police Field Force. Colonel Leuchars was placed in command and ordered to deal with the situation. The artillery and D.L.I. referred to left Durban at 7.30 a.m. on the 5th, and arrived at Greytown by 6.30 p.m. the same day. The other corps mobilized with similar alacrity.

Leuchars moved out the following morning at 9 and, after joining the N.P. and Nongqai at mid-day, remained in camp the rest of the day. Bambata would naturally have received early information of the arrival of these reinforcements.

After considering the position by the light of the intelligence available, Leuchars decided to surround Mpanza valley at dawn on the 7th. His dispositions were as follows: N.P. and Z.N.P. to occupy a long hill to the south-east and overlooking Marshall's hotel, the remainder of the force to proceed to high ground to the west of Bambata's position in Mpanza valley.

At 8 p.m., Leuchars moved out with the latter portion of the column. It was, however, not until 2.30 a.m., after a nine-mile march, that the position overlooking the valley on the west could be reached. Early the same morning, Mansel proceeded with the police along the main road towards Marshall's hotel, whilst Clarke, with a detachment, advanced to a position on hills (on the south) overlooking Mpanza valley, and midway between Leuchars and Mansel.



At 9 a.m. two guns opened fire on kraals in the valley at a range of 3,000 yards, the other two did likewise at 10.30 a.m. from a high position on the north side of the valley. Clarke, in the meantime, opened with a Maxim at other kraals about 1,200 to 1,500 yards off. Not a Native, however, was to be seen.

The Reserves, under Chief Leader John Nel, who did not join Leuchars till 9 a.m. that morning,<sup>1</sup> held ground on a spur to the north-west of the valley, where a Native, evidently a spy, was shot as he tried to escape over the wooded hills towards Mooi River.

The loyal Chief Sibindi, who had been ordered on the 4th to guard the border as well as the Tugela drifts, co-operated generally on the east with his levy of about 1,000 men. His orders were to advance as far as the Biggarsberg main road, about a mile from Bambata's hiding-place, as soon as the guns opened fire.

A report came in about noon that Bambata had vacated his ward, proceeded south-east on to the high veld, and then turned into Gayede's ward. There being no confirmation of this, Leuchars continued the operations. He subsequently withdrew to bivouack for the night at Warwick's farm.<sup>2</sup>

On the following day (Sunday), Sibindi was sent back into the thorns, supported by a squadron U.M.R. (100), under Major S. Carter, with instructions to complete the bush driving. The Reserves occupied a ridge north-west of Mpanza valley. Owing to Sibindi's men being too tired, on reaching Marshall's hotel at 4 p.m., to go further that day, Carter camped with him on an old mealie garden immediately behind Marshall's. By 9 a.m. on the 9th, all the troops being in position, Bambata's stronghold, about three miles north-west of Marshall's, was surrounded. It was found vacated, with evidences about it of quite recent occupation by a considerable force. The rough and

<sup>1</sup> These men had received orders to mobilize only the morning before.

<sup>2</sup> The Reserves, with part of the U.M.R., one Maxim detachment, and one field gun, passed the night at Wintershoek; the Police, with one troop U.M.R. and Maxim detachment, camped at Botha's quarries.

very thickly-wooded country in the neighbourhood of Mpanza was thoroughly scoured in different directions on the 9th, 10th and other days ; the kraals of rebels were burnt and their stock seized. Many, who had, in various ways, managed to hold aloof from the insurgents, were met with. In consequence of being at their kraals within the area of operations, notwithstanding warning to be outside, several narrowly escaped being shot. The crops, not having quite matured, had not been reaped. Those belonging to, and abandoned by, the rebels, were given to the loyalists. The Reserves were demobilized on the 10th, whilst the artillery and infantry withdrew to Greytown on the same day, followed by the U.M.R. on the 11th.

The intelligence that Bambata had fled to Zululand had been fully confirmed by the 10th. The advisability of pursuing the fugitives was thereupon considered by Leuchars. Quick pursuit is undoubtedly in accordance with Native tactics on such occasions, but Leuchars believed it was part of the rebels' plans to decoy his force to Nkandhla and thereby afford the remainder and larger portion of Bambata's tribe, say, in combination with Silwana's people, an opportunity of attacking Greytown and the many outlying European homesteads. Proof of the possibility of such attack lay in the fact of Bambata's force having concealed itself a few weeks previously in Layman's trees, on the day other members of the tribe went to pay the poll tax in Greytown.

Leuchars, however, had other and broader grounds for advising against troops being sent from Natal at this critical moment. To have withdrawn a large portion of the Active Militia would have been to place all civilized portions of the Colony in jeopardy, especially as no Imperial troops were available. The Matabeles, it will be remembered, rose in rebellion in 1896 when the greater portion of the Chartered Company's forces were absent in connection with the Jameson Raid (December, 1895).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See "The Causes, Superstitions and other Characteristics of the Matabele Rebellion, 1896." Appendix X.



The ways and means of dealing with the situation at Nkandhla were fully considered by the Commandant and the Government, when it was decided to employ irregular troops in Zululand, and so obviate as much as possible the necessity of withdrawing the local Militia. Hence the Commandant's instructions to Leuchars were to remain where he was.

Journeying due east, concealed by the dense bush and rugged hills everywhere to be met with, Bambata, after emerging from the valleys, passed through a farm gate, and, travelling a short distance along a road, branched off to the left, making down through Chief Gayede's location and along the lower part of the Dimane stream, a tributary of the Tugela. He had about 150 men with him, including Magwababa (then a prisoner), Mgombana, Cakijana and Moses. It was when he had well-nigh reached the Tugela river that the guns above referred to were heard by the party booming in the distance. Magwababa, on account of having a bad knee, had, by that time, fallen into the rear. In addition to tying him, the rebels had, with a stone, struck and bruised the inner side of his knee, to prevent his running away. About noon on Saturday, he succeeded in eluding his guards; he made his way direct to the Krantzkop magistracy, and was shortly afterwards conveyed from there to Greytown by post-cart. Although a list of the rebels with Bambata had already been partially obtained, Magwababa helped to complete it, besides giving other useful information.

Near the Tugela Rand, and about ten miles from Krantzkop, the fugitives, about noon, came to a store in charge of one John Jenner. Their behaviour was orderly. After the main body had passed the store, which it did forthwith, one who appeared to be an induna, purchased a pair of long stockings, a white handkerchief, also two bottles of lemonade. A few, who were in rear, stayed about fifteen minutes, when they moved on after the others in the direction of the Tugela. It was noticed that the men, who were not known by the storekeeper to be from Mpanza, had eight or ten guns of various kinds,

whilst others carried shields and assegais. Two only were mounted. A number had white ostrich feathers stuck in their hair. They had pushed on quickly, because afraid of being overtaken.

Proceeding down the Dimane by foot-paths, they crossed the Tugela into Chief Mpumela's ward by the Mtambo drift, probably less frequented by Europeans than any between the junction of the Tugela with the Buffalo and Middle Drift. It is about equidistant from the only two drifts possible for wheeled transport in that section of the river, being not less than fifteen miles from each, and in a mountainous, rocky, unsurveyed and unknown region. The party crossed whilst Leuchars' artillery was still engaged firing at various targets in Mpanza valley. Thus Leuchars did not get the report of Bambata's alleged escape until after the latter had entered Zululand!

Bambata went at once to Ntshelala's kraal,<sup>1</sup> where he demanded a beast, threatening to drive the whole herd home and help himself unless the owner complied. The latter selected a young animal; but Bambata, dissatisfied with what he considered the man's niggardly disposition, immediately chose one of the largest; this he then shot on the spot. The flesh was partaken of by the fugitives who, late the same afternoon (7th), passed on to the kraal of Mangati, another son of Godide. Mangati gave them a goat.

After passing the night at Mangati's, the party pushed on, early on Sunday morning, viâ certain kraals, to that of Simoyi in the mouth of Mome gorge, on the edge of the Nkandhla forests, and within a mile of the ancient and redoubtable stronghold.<sup>2</sup> The journey from Mpanza to the Mome, forty to fifty miles, for the most part over extremely rugged country, had been performed within about thirty-six hours, including rests. And so the torch

<sup>1</sup> Ntshelala is one of the many younger sons of Godide, son of Ndhlela, one of Dingana's two principal indunas. Ndhlela was one of the two indunas in power when Piet Retief and his party were massacred at Mgungundhlovu in 1838.

<sup>2</sup> By this time, Cakijana had temporarily detached himself from the force.



that had been lit in Natal, with surprisingly small loss to the insurgents, was swiftly carried with audacity and success into a district whose people had no cause whatever of grievance against the Government peculiar to themselves.

Sigananda's people had, indeed, as recently as the preceding January, expostulated with the Magistrate in a violent and disrespectful manner because required to pay the poll tax. They were brought to trial, but discharged with a caution.<sup>1</sup> Difficulty had also been experienced in procuring (as had previously been done from time to time) a few labourers for the Public Works department. The Magistrate had been obliged to inflict a small fine on the Chief's principal son, Ndabaningi, for neglecting to obey a summons. As regards Siganda himself, it was found that, on account of his great age, he was no longer capable of satisfactorily managing the tribe. The Commissioner for Native Affairs (Mr., now Sir, Charles Saunders, K.C.M.G.), accordingly visited Empandhleni on the 2nd April and discussed the position with Ndabaningi, who represented the Chief, and the indunas, when the meeting concurred with the Commissioner in thinking that Ndabaningi should be authorized to act on behalf of his father. "I told the indunas," says Mr. Saunders, "that there was no objection on my part to recommending Ndabaningi's appointment, but before submitting such a recommendation for the consideration of Government, it was necessary that the question be

<sup>1</sup> The Magistrate specially appointed to try the case, took a surprisingly lenient view of the matter. What had occurred was this: The Chiefs of the district were directed to bring their people to pay the poll tax. All, to begin with, were nervous and averse to paying until Sitshitshili came forward in the presence of the others and made his tribe pay, remarking, as he did so, that, having always obeyed the Government, he was not going to be afraid of doing so on that occasion. Other Chiefs then followed the example. Siganda's people, of whom about 200 were present, declared they had no money and could not pay. When told that, as such was the case, they might go home, they "rushed up to the court-house fence brandishing their sticks, shouted out their tribal war-cry *Yayize!*" and began to dance in a defiant manner (*giya*) within the precincts of the court-house, action which at once terrified all the Native police, as bloodshed appeared to them to be imminent. No physical violence, however, occurred.

considered by Siganda and the heads of the tribe who, if they were of the same opinion, should make a formal representation in this respect to me at Eshowe on my return from the Usutu kraal, whence I was then proceeding." <sup>1</sup>

When F. E. van Rooyen, Chief Leader of the Krantz-kop Reserves, heard on the 6th that Leuchars proposed operating at Mpanza on the following day, he arranged with about twenty of his men, not then mobilized and but few of them armed, to go and watch the operations. They left an hour before dawn. Just after sunrise, they ascertained that a body of Natives had been seen the same morning making towards the Dimane stream. On further investigation, it transpired that the party consisted of Bambata's people. The Magistrate, on being advised, wired the information to headquarters. Van Rooyen volunteered, if reinforced, to follow up and contain the rebels. The offer was accepted, and support promised. He was accordingly instructed to mobilize. At 9.30 a.m. on the 8th, the fifty-four men that had come in, left and, crossing the Tugela at Watton's drift, were not long in finding unmistakable traces of the fugitives. It seemed at first as if they had made for the Qudeni forests.<sup>2</sup> Van Rooyen went on to Ntingwe store, actually crossing, without knowing it, the route that had been taken the day before by Bambata. He at once communicated his intelligence to the Magistrate, Empandhleni, and, leaving Ntingwe at 2 a.m. on the 9th, reached Empandhleni with his men at 6 a.m. Shortly after his arrival, word came that Bambata was encamped at the Mome gorge. By this time, about thirty of the Z.M.R. had mobilized and were at Empandhleni. Van Rooyen proposed that the rebels should be at once attacked. To this course, the commanding officer (Major W. A. Vanderplank), who arrived in the evening, would not agree, on the ground that the local Chiefs had not been ordered to arm. Van Rooyen

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3027, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> These forests are very extensive and difficult of access when approached from Natal. They are mainly on the eastern slopes of Qudeni mountain, and about twenty miles from those of Nkandhla. Bambata, however, does not appear at any time to have had them in view.



made other efforts in the direction of aggressive action by European troops, but, meeting with no success, left with his men on the morning of the 10th to protect the European families at Krantzkop against a possible rising in that part of the country.

After serving under Leuchars from the 5th to 7th, Mansel decided to detach himself and to follow Bambata. His strength then was 175 N.P. and 77 Nongqai. He advised Leuchars of what he was doing, but asked approval of action which, as a matter of fact, had already been taken before the commanding officer had sanctioned it. But, although getting away from Leuchars as quickly as Van Rooyen did from Krantzkop, Mansel did not reach Empandhleni until at least three and a half days after the former, although the distances travelled were about the same. One of the reasons for this delay was that he had waggons with him. These, on getting near Fort Yolland, branched off and made for Empandhleni viâ Eshowe and Melmoth, leaving Mansel, with the main portion of the force, to go on direct to Empandhleni. As, at this time, there was no reason whatever for anticipating attack along the route selected for the waggons, it is difficult to understand why the entire column should have been kept back as escort to the waggons, instead of pushing forward to contain the enemy.

By midnight on the 7th, instructions had been sent from Eshowe to the Magistrates concerned to warn all Chiefs of Nkandhla, Eshowe and Nqutu districts to arrest the fugitives should they enter any of their wards.

Immediately the Nkandhla Magistrate (Mr. B. Colenbrander) heard, as he did on Sunday, the 8th, that the rebels had entered his district—at first he supposed they were making for Qudeni forests—he sent word by Native runners to the Chiefs likely to be concerned, notably Mpumela, Ndube and Mbuzo, directing them to arm and arrest the law-breakers, then correctly said to be at or near a mountain called Kotongweni. Each complied the same day, but, before they had learnt what Bambata's real destination was, the latter had left Kotongweni,

passed from kraal to kraal in the manner described, entered the ward of another Chief, Siganda, and taken refuge in his notorious stronghold. The Magistrate was instructed by the Commissioner the same afternoon "to arm all the Natives in his district to assist in capturing Bambata," and to direct the tribes nearest the magistracy to protect that place during the night. The latter order was complied with.

It may be of interest to indicate what was spontaneously done by Natives through whose kraals or lands the strange body of men passed on their way to the Mome.

Ntshelala at once reported the fact to the Magistrate. Mangati, and two other kraal-owners, although all men of rank, took no such action, but, associating themselves with others, merely sent a report to the Chief (Siganda). They, moreover, at once adopted a friendly attitude towards the rebels, notwithstanding that the latter bore indications of their recent conflict with the police—they carried a number of guns, two or three of which had manifestly belonged to Europeans, and even wore the helmet of a European trooper. They had also the moustache of the unfortunate man whose body had not at once been recovered, cut off and carried to induce others to take up arms against the white man.

Whilst Bambata was halting at a kraal near Mome, a few Natives came up, among them one named Muntumuni. On glancing about, Muntumuni espied Bambata. He immediately exclaimed in a loud tone: "Who is it dares to allow a reprobate to set foot here? Bambata is very well known to me. When serving as a policeman at Greytown, I found him constantly being arrested for thieving European cattle!" This was said in the rebel's hearing. Bambata turned and looked at the speaker, but said nothing. Those of Zululand who were present silenced the ex-constable and, after an interval, sent him and another to advise Siganda, then at his Enhlweni kraal,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Enhlweni, from *inhlwa*, a *poor or indigent person*, may be rendered the *pauper's retreat*, no doubt in allusion to the 'destitute' condition Cetshwayo found himself in on his return from exile,—'destitute,' that is, as compared with his former affluence and popularity.



near the Mome waterfall, of Bambata's arrival, and of the circumstances under which he had come. Muntumuni went and, after delivering the message, said to the Chief that it would be criminal if he failed to notify Bambata's arrival to the Magistrate. Siganda asked how it was that, after being sent to report the arrival, Bambata being a protégé of Dinuzulu, the messenger should advise conflicting action to be taken? "Go and report to the Magistrate yourself," said the Chief. The messenger went. At the magistracy he was presented with a coat and assegais. He returned with instructions that Siganda was to arrest and bring Bambata to the court-house. Siganda now blamed himself for having sent the report. He said to Muntumuni, "I personally know nothing whatever of Bambata, I have never set eyes on him. It was you who suggested reporting. It is all your affair. It, therefore, devolves on you to produce and hand the man over to the European authorities, for *you* declared you had seen him." The messenger found himself in a dilemma. The majority of the tribe condemned him. They kept on asking what business it was of his to make the communication. Although declaring the Chief had sent him, the latter repudiated having done so. On being asked, later on, by the Magistrate to indicate where Bambata was, Muntumuni said Siganda did not know. "But you came here to say he had been seen, didn't you?" "Yes." "Did you not see him?" "Yes, I did." "When Siganda sent you, was not Bambata with Siganda?" "No." "Where was he then?" "I saw him when he arrived, he was then on his way to the Mome. It was at that stage I was sent to report to my Chief." When the messenger returned to his kraal, he was ostracized. Unable to submit to the treatment, he presently threw in his lot with the very man he had declared was a criminal and an outlaw.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This man Muntumuni was later on shot in the Mome valley whilst climbing one of the steepest parts of the gorge. He was fired at many times, being in an exposed position. On being hit, he rolled to the foot of the mountain from a height of over 1,200 feet.




*D. P. Hunter,  
Keate's Drift.*

**BAMBATA** (on the right)  
with Attendant.



**CAKIJANA,**  
One of Dinuzulu's Attendants.



**SIGANANDA,**  
Chief; age 96 years.



**MANGATI.**

**REBEL RINGLEADERS.**





The position at Nkandhla, between the 9th and the 16th, developed, from the Government's point of view, with extraordinary rapidity. Owing to its great importance and complexity, it will be well to consider it somewhat closely.

The Commissioner arrived at Empandhleni from Usutu at mid-day on the 9th, finding about thirty Z.M.R. and fifty-four Krantzkop Reserves already there. The same morning, reliable information came in from Sigananda that Bambata was in the Mome gorge. There was then no particular reason for supposing Sigananda was in collusion with Bambata. The Commissioner accordingly directed the former to try and induce Bambata to come out of the forests and then to effect his capture; failing that, to attempt to starve him. At the time, there was a general impression that when Bambata saw himself being surrounded, he would fly to other parts. The various Chiefs of Nkandhla district were, therefore, informed they would be held responsible should he escape through any of their wards. Under these circumstances, Mr. Saunders did not think it advisable for more Militia to be sent to Empandhleni. Having heard that Mansel was coming via Middle Drift, he advised that the force should remain in the neighbourhood of that drift in case Bambata should attempt escaping that way. It, moreover, appeared to him necessary for the Reserves and Z.M.R. to remain at the magistracy, as it was just possible Bambata might make a dash at that post, if undefended, to obtain arms and food. The strength of the Z.M.R. rose to 105 by the arrival, on the same day, of the headquarters squadron from Eshowe.

At mid-day on the 10th, reports as to Bambata's whereabouts were contradictory. Mr. Saunders was then not at all satisfied with Sigananda's behaviour, feeling that Bambata could by then have been captured had the tribe acted in a *bona-fide* manner. He had strong suspicions the Chief and the tribe were playing a double game.

On the Krantzkop Reserves leaving the same morning,



the Commissioner recommended that the police at Middle Drift should move to Empandhleni as soon as possible.

Later reports on the 10th went to show that Sigananda and his people were professing to do their best to capture the rebel ringleader, but the Commissioner considered a day or two necessary to prove whether the people were really in earnest. By this time, all the other tribes in the district were under arms and watching their respective wards as directed.

The same evening Leuchars, having decided to abandon operations at Mpanza, suggested to the Commandant the mobilization of another force for the purpose of following Bambata. On being consulted, the Commissioner expressed the view, on the 11th, that "nothing can be gained at present by bringing a large white force here," nor would mounted men or artillery be "of much use," owing to the nature of the country. "With the Z.M.R. and Police Force in the district, I do not think further white troops are required at the present time." In consequence of this advice, Leuchars was instructed by the Commandant to remain in Greytown until the operations, then being carried on by him in the thorns in the neighbourhood of Mpanza, had been completed, after which he was to demobilize, viz. on the 13th or 14th.

On the afternoon of the 12th, the Commissioner reported that the forest was being driven by Sigananda's people. He was of the opinion that, although a strong force might be necessary, the sending thereof should be resorted to only after diplomatic measures had failed. It was on this day that Mansel and his men arrived at Empandhleni.

On the 15th, Mr. Saunders pointed out that, unless Sigananda accounted satisfactorily for Bambata and his followers by the following night, there would be no doubt that the tribe was in collusion with Bambata, and that it would be necessary to take strong measures forthwith to punish it. He agreed with Mansel and Vanderplank that, if operations were to be conducted against Bambata, a very much larger force than the one already there would be required. He added that he was in constant touch with

Dinuzulu and had no reason for suspecting that Chief's loyalty, or that he was assisting or encouraging Bambata.

The Commissioner reported on the 16th that he had had no message from Siganda for some days. The messengers he had sent on the preceding day had returned to say the Chief had nothing to report. It was at this moment Mr. Saunders arrived at the conviction that Siganda was acting in concert with Bambata, and had been deliberately harbouring him all along. He, thereupon, dropped all further communication with the Chief, and recommended strong measures being taken as soon as possible to severely punish him and his tribe. This, however, it was added, could only be done by considerably strengthening the European force and obtaining the assistance of loyal Natives. He reiterated his belief that Dinuzulu was not implicated in any way. At 6.15 p.m., information came in from different sources that Bambata, with the assistance of Siganda, intended to attack the magistracy the same night. Siganda had, by then, been joined by portions of Ndube's, Mpumela's and Gayede's tribes, the last-named a Natal Chief. At 7.30 p.m. the situation was reported as still more serious, especially as members of different tribes, including that of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) had joined Siganda. It was felt a large force should be sent up as speedily as possible to reinforce the loyal levies and restore public confidence. The rebel force estimated then to be at Nkandhla was 500 to 1,000.

As the supplies at Empandhleni appeared to be running short,<sup>1</sup> arrangements were promptly made by the Commandant for the dispatch of a convoy of forty waggons of provisions from Dundee, accompanied by an escort of 400 Natal Carbineers,<sup>2</sup> and one section B Battery, Natal

<sup>1</sup>Besides 182 N.P., 92 Z.N.P., 106 Z.M.R. and 20 civilians, there were 30 women and children at Empandhleni.

<sup>2</sup>This regiment got orders to mobilize on the 17th April. The orders applied to the Left Wing and 150 men of the headquarters squadrons (Right Wing). The latter section (under Captain E. W. Barter), joined the Left Wing at Dundee, the whole force being taken command of by Lt.-Col. D. W. Mackay. The remainder of the Right Wing, with the exception of D squadron, mobilized on the 1st May and proceeded to Helpmakaar



Field Artillery (Lieut. F. H. Acutt), under Lieut.-Col. D. W. Mackay. Such force could not, however, leave before the 20th.

The policy of calling on Sigamanda, unaided by European troops, to arrest a well-armed body of desperadoes,<sup>1</sup> who had succeeded in taking possession of the great local stronghold, is not an easy one to defend, especially when it is borne in mind that Natives in all parts of Natal and Zululand had, for three or four months past, loudly complained of the poll tax, many in Zululand having still to pay. Only a fraction of what was due by Sigamanda's people had been collected. It was known the majority considered it a tax that could not be borne in addition to other obligations. Moreover, the news of the Byrnetown outbreak in February; of the hostile demonstrations at such places as Mapumulo, Umzinto, Mid-Illovo, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and at their own magistracy; of the movements of the Militia in the western and eastern portions of Natal; as well as of the successful assaults on the Magistrate's party on the 3rd, and on the large body of Police on the 4th, was all calculated to greatly unsettle the Native mind.

It was well known that, according to Zulu law, anyone harbouring a criminal was liable to the severest punishment, especially if the offender were a rebel. The principle of communal responsibility was applied, as a matter of course, by which the arrival of a stranger, reputed to be a criminal, had to be reported to the next senior officer. In this case, Bambata had gone, not to live at any particular kraal, but taken possession of the stronghold universally acknowledged to be that of Sigamanda and his ancestors, and which fell well within the district assigned

under Lt.-Col. J. Weighton, who then took command of the regiment. D squadron was mobilized in June, and, as will be seen later, accompanied B.M.R. first to Dundee, then to Mapumulo where, until the arrival of Mackay's column early in July, they formed part of that of Leuchars. The total strength of the regiment was 918 (all ranks), including special service men, *i.e.* the largest volunteer corps Natal had ever placed in the field.

<sup>1</sup> Well armed, especially from Sigamanda's point of view.

by Government for the occupation of that tribe. It, therefore, devolved on that Chief to inform his Magistrate. How he did this has already been seen. The attitude assumed by the Magistrate, and soon affirmed and adopted by the Commissioner, was that, as Bambata had taken refuge in the forests, Siganda himself became personally responsible for his apprehension, notwithstanding that the outlaw had arrived with about 150 men, who, on the whole, were probably better armed, and known from the outset to be better armed, than any local levies could have been.

The order issued to Ndube, Mpumela and other Chiefs to "assist" in arresting the ringleader would also appear to have been wrong in principle, in the absence of arrangements for a European officer or force to be present to take charge of and support the levies.<sup>1</sup> After all, Bambata had struck his blow, not at the black man, but at the white. It was, therefore, the duty of the white man to at least assist the levies, and especially Siganda.

There was, indeed, no evidence of previous collusion between Bambata and Siganda. "At that time," wrote the Commissioner, "there was no ground for suspecting that Siganda and his people would not loyally co-operate in effecting Bambata's capture."<sup>2</sup> Later on, allegations were made of Siganda being in league with Dinuzulu, and of Bambata having been directed by Dinuzulu to start the Rebellion, but it must be remembered no one

<sup>1</sup> The position, at the time, seems to have been this: As soon as Bambata, fleeing from Mpanza, was known to have entered Zululand, the local authorities applied the principle of communal responsibility, under which every Chief and his adherents became bound to co-operate with Government officials (if any) and one another in apprehending the fugitive. No Government officials being available on the spot at the outset, Chiefs were expected to assist one another. When, however, instead of running from district to district, Bambata made for the Nkandhla forests and there concealed and established himself, it devolved, under Native law, on Siganda to make the arrest if he could. Mr. Saunders regarded this Chief as able to at least drive the rebels out of the forests by a process of starvation. Hence, qualification of the first order, by Chiefs in general being no longer required to assist Siganda, but being held responsible merely for arresting Bambata should he escape to or through their respective wards.

<sup>2</sup> Commissioner for Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 28th April, 1906. Cd. 3027, p. 32.



believed more implicitly in, and more staunchly and consistently defended, Dinuzulu's loyalty than did Mr. Saunders. When, on the 6th April, at Usutu kraal, he informed Dinuzulu and his indunas of the attack on the Police in Mpanza valley, he says "their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine, and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."<sup>1</sup> Even under these circumstances, assuming Dinuzulu to have been loyal, it is somewhat surprising to those who know anything of Native character and the facts, to find Siganda and other Chiefs repeatedly pressed between the 9th and 16th to arrest a man who, from a purely Native point of view, had done no more than offer a vigorous protest to paying a tax which every Native, throughout the length and breadth of the country, also strongly resented.

By 6.45 p.m. on the 9th, practically the whole of the Zululand Mounted Rifles (105) had arrived at Empandhleni—mobilized under the authority given by law in such emergencies. This force was, on the 12th, increased to about 350 by the arrival of the Natal Police and Nongqai under Mansel.<sup>2</sup> The latter assumed command on arrival, and decided to remain in lager. All these men had assembled for a purpose. What was that purpose if not to arrest Bambata? If Mansel's object was to 'contain' the enemy, can it be said that there was any 'containing' between the 12th and 28th April (the day he moved to Fort Yolland) with the enemy comfortably ensconced in a forest and the Police as comfortably behind entanglements eleven miles off at Empandhleni?

Had Mansel, Vanderplank and van Rooyen been made to converge simultaneously on Cetshwayo's grave from Middle Drift, Fort Yolland and Empandhleni respectively, which could have been effected before mid-day on the

<sup>1</sup> Commissioner for Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 28th April, 1906. Col. 3027, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Had van Rooyen's Reserves been retained, the aggregate would have been over 400.

10th,<sup>1</sup> supplies being at the same time pushed forward from Eshowe, and Sigananda's men ordered to assemble smartly at the same spot, together with those of adjoining Chiefs—McKenzie acted on these lines in Mveli's ward—or had aggressive action been taken in some other form, as advised at the time by van Rooyen, control would have been taken of the situation *ab initio*, instead of, by merely marking time, practically encouraged members of surrounding tribes to rebel for fear of losing their stock through not conforming to Dinuzulu's alleged plan. Had a force established itself then at the grave, Bambata's men would have had no chance against it in the open country of that part. It was, subsequently, at the grave that a not much larger body than the one referred to for over a month defied a force at least three or four times its own strength, and concluded by, almost single-handed, entrapping and crushing it. Precautions could, at the same time, have been taken to prevent Bambata gaining any small advantage, which, exaggerated by the rebels, would have added considerably to his prestige.

Assuming it to have been desirable for van Rooyen, Vanderplank and Mansel to converge at the grave on the 10th or 11th, the order for such movement could not have been issued by the Commandant without fuller information than he then possessed, especially as the Commissioner was of the view that no European troops other than those already in Zululand were necessary at Nkandhla.

Had the troops converged as suggested, they might conceivably have succeeded in suppressing the Rebellion and saved the Colony over half a million of money, but to have done this would have meant practically ignoring a spirit of rebelliousness latent in many of the people, which might only have broken out in some other form in the near future.

Among the rebels, the position developed as follows : After Muntumuni had gone to report Bambata's arrival,

<sup>1</sup> Van Rooyen and Vanderplank reached Empandhleni at 6 a.m. and 6.45 p.m. respectively on the 9th, whilst Mansel got to Middle Drift at 4.30 p.m. on the same day.



the latter, as has been stated, marched to the mouth of Mome gorge and halted at the very kraal on and about whose site, but two months later, he found his Thermopylæ. The force, having regaled itself, passed up the gorge to the right side of the Mome stream near the waterfall, where, entering a dense forest, it concealed itself and proceeded to erect temporary shelters, known as *amadhlangala*.

It so happened that a European scout passed the same day along the top of Nomangci and Dhlabe, with a view to locating Bambata. He fell in with a resident Native, who said that, when rounding up his stock in the vicinity of the waterfall, he had come upon Bambata's party. Later on, it became known that this man had communicated information treated by Sigananda as secret; ten head of his cattle and one horse were thereupon seized by the Chief. Two were slaughtered and the horse appropriated; the rest of the stock was restored on his joining the rebels. One of Sigananda's own sons, too, who had reported to the Commissioner Bambata's being in the gorge, was fined and for some time detained as a prisoner.

Sigananda, at this time, was still at Enhlweni kraal, not a mile and a half from Bambata's camp. On the 9th, fully aware that Bambata had taken refuge in the stronghold, he sent messengers to summon the more important men of the tribe. About sixty assembled; none of them were armed. Sigananda called aside eight or nine of the leading ones and informed them of Bambata's being in the stronghold, adding that a messenger from Mangati (present at time of speaking), had reported that Mangati had just been visited by Dinuzulu's messenger Cakijana, who declared he had been directed to accompany Bambata from Usutu and start a rebellion in Mpanza valley. Cakijana had afterwards passed on to a neighbouring Chief to try and persuade him to support Bambata. Sigananda's sons asked what right anyone had to authorize an outlaw they had received no official communication about to take refuge among them. They asked why, if

Dinuzulu had ordered Bambata to rebel, the latter did not go to the man who had instigated him to do so. It appeared to them, moreover, that secret messages had passed between their father and Dinuzulu of which he had advised no one, otherwise Bambata and party would not have made direct for their district as they had done. One of those present, however, observed, "Are you going to take it on yourselves to refuse to have anything to do with a 'girl' who has come to engage herself to your father?" It soon became clear that Sigananda, notwithstanding his report to the Magistrate, was siding with Bambata, and was supported in that course by his confidant and adviser Lunyana, the keeper of Cetshwayo's grave. On someone declaring that the outlaw would bring ruin upon their district, Sigananda observed, "Yes, then some of you will have to die and leave your wives behind you."

No time was now lost by Sigananda in dispatching messengers to all parts of his ward, calling on the people to arm and bring their blankets with them. Notwithstanding further remonstrance on the following day (10th), Sigananda persisted in the course he had entered upon. He reproached those of his tribe, who, in 1888, when called on by the Government to attack Dinuzulu, had complied, whilst the majority remained loyal to the Zulu House.

On Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, Bambata lay concealed in the forest, but on Tuesday night, he emerged and openly joined those of Sigananda's tribe who had armed and assembled at Enhlweni in obedience to their Chief's orders, including a few from Mpumela's and Ndube's tribes. At this moment, however, a number of Sigananda's and Ndube's men broke away with their families and stock, disapproving of what was being done. It thus became noised abroad, far and wide, before dawn that Sigananda had openly thrown in his lot with the rebels.

Identification of his fortunes with those of Bambata had, however, still to be announced in a public manner. Bambata moved during the night, with his own two companies and such other rebels as remained, to the top of the



ridge behind Enhlweni. Many others arrived at this spot on the following morning from various parts until, about noon, the force was about 500 to 600. Nothing of special note seems to have occurred before noon, except that Sigananda sat openly alongside of, and conversed with, Bambata and the other ringleader Mangati. Bambata, a man of about 40 years of age, of dark complexion, with a rather tall athletic frame, wore a dark coat and trousers, boots, and a Natal Police (European) helmet, no doubt belonging to one of the men killed on the preceding Wednesday. A large ammunition belt was buckled round his waist, with a bandolier containing cartridges over the right shoulder. He also carried a modern rifle.

His men, of comparatively small build, dark and thick-set, had for the most part, white ostrich feathers in their hair, plucked from a European-owned bird wilfully done to death by them in their ward just before their flight. They wore the ordinary Native attire, including *tshokobezi* badges,<sup>1</sup> and each carried assegais, together with a large ox-hide shield. In their possession were eight guns, viz. : three magazine rifles, one Martini-Henry rifle, one double-barrelled gun, and three old muskets.

A black and white cow was soon observed being driven forward. This was presented to Bambata. The significance of the gift was that the Chief, acting on behalf of the tribe, regarded Bambata as a friend and desired to extend hospitality to him in the manner most approved by Native custom. It was now arranged that one of Bambata's men should shoot it. Two shots were fired, but the animal remained unharmed. Indeed, it had been intimated beforehand to those near by that, although fired at, the beast, because of having been charmed by Bambata, would not fall until Bambata himself had fired. True

<sup>1</sup> These were simply the bushy part of ox- or cow-tails of white hair or white and red mixed, with the skin cut so as to enable them to be bound round the head. They were arranged so as to stand erect, lie on the head (front to back), or fall from the back part of the head on to the neck. They were also tied round the neck so as to hang down the back. No one was required to wear more than one. As the wearers ran, the 'tails' continually bobbed up and down,—done possibly with the object of inspiring the enemy with fear.

enough, on his taking the rifle and firing, it dropped dead, and rolled down the incline on which it had been standing. "A marvel! a mystery!" remarked the surprised on-lookers. "Clearly Bambata must be in possession of some wonderful charm!"<sup>1</sup> The animal was now skinned and consumed by the men from Mpanza.

Two messengers, who had been sent by Siganda to the Commissioner, now arrived on the scene. They were taken aside by the Chief with a few others, when one of them reported that Mr. Saunders, on hearing of Siganda's inability to find Bambata, had said he would not keep on sending messages, as it was absurd to suppose the outlaw's whereabouts could not be ascertained; he was known to have come into the midst of kraals, whose occupants, having feet, could detect with ease a track made by a couple of men, how much more that by a hundred, as well as a couple of horses!<sup>2</sup> The Commissioner had also alluded to an upstart, Sitimela; to this man reference will be made further on.

All were now directed to move towards where Siganda and his party were sitting, and there "to march together through one gate." This, however, was merely a metaphorical expression, there being no actual gate at the place. The expression had reference, as everyone at once guessed, to certain two Basuto doctors engaged, not many yards off, in preparing decoctions of various drugs called *izintelezi*.<sup>3</sup> The meaning was that the men were all to walk past the doctors for the purpose of being treated in accordance with custom, in anticipation of coming warfare. There was a small fire close by, from which a large amount of smoke was ascending. The smoke was caused by green branches and leaves being burnt with a fatty substance thrown in by the medicos. The order was that Bambata's men should move off first in twos, followed by

<sup>1</sup> The explanation is that blank cartridges were used for the first two shots.

<sup>2</sup> Bambata and at least one of his men rode horses.

<sup>3</sup> Charms for warding off evil. Different ones are used according to the character of the evil to be averted.



Ndube's and Sigananda's men in like formation. When the first two came to the fire, they trod lightly in it, the man on the left with his right foot, and the one on the right with his left. In so doing, they passed through the smoke. Without halting, they passed slowly by the doctors, when they were simultaneously sprinkled by one of these by means of two black small brushes, apparently gnu-tails (one in each hand), previously dipped in a huge earthenware pot containing some caustic decoction. The men were told that they should not, after the sprinkling, rub their bodies with fat, as usual with Zulus, nor should they wash. Moving on, the leading couple came to the second doctor, who lifted to the mouth of each a ladle containing a different liquid, drawn from a pot on the ground at his side. Each warrior was instructed to take a mouthful, not to swallow, but to keep in his mouth until further directed. Similar procedure was followed in regard to every couple, until the whole *impi* had been dealt with.

After marching past, the men formed up in one large irregularly-shaped body, some hundred or so yards further on. What is known as an *umkumbi* or circle was now ordered to be formed,<sup>1</sup> when Sigananda, accompanied by Mangati and one or two of his leading councillors, entered the ring. Bambata stood apart in front of, but close to, his own men, who also formed part of the enclosure. Everyone remained standing, including the ninety-six-year-old Chief. The last-mentioned addressed the gathering in these terms: "The drugs which have just been used on and about you all have the power of preventing bullets fired by Europeans from entering your bodies or doing injury of any kind. But there will be immunity only on certain conditions, which are that you abstain from womenfolk, and that you lie down to sleep, not on mats, but on the bare ground. Anyone who ignores these directions will render himself liable to injury or to be killed. From to-day, I have resolved to take up arms against the white man! The pass-word and countersign to be used when you happen to meet and interrogate

<sup>1</sup> That is, the men drew up in this formation.

others, especially at night, is 'Wen' u tini?' (= You, what do you say?); the one addressed must then reply, 'Insumansumane!' (= It's all tomfoolery!) After Sigananda had spoken, a Christian teacher named Paula endorsed what the Chief had said, laying stress on the efficacy of the drugs. "I have left my wife behind," he added, "also a waggon and oxen in Mpanza valley. Why did I come away? Because I had made up my mind to fight. The Government is casting aside its right of sovereignty and giving the same over to us. Here (pointing at them) are my tribesmen! These men will never turn back now, but will go resolutely forward. Once angered, they are implacable and continue long in their wrath."

A man, Mmangwana, one of those who had just come from the Commissioner, next mumbled, with the liquid he had sipped still in his mouth: "I cannot accept the assertion that anyone, on being struck by a bullet, will not be hurt or that a bullet will not enter. I never heard of such a thing. Is, then, a man's flesh made of iron? Did not a certain outlaw<sup>1</sup> not long ago find his way into the Umtetwa tribe and there bring about the ruin of a whole countryside? Did he not declare that, if the Europeans came to attack him, they would be stung by bees and wasps, and be bitten by snakes? And when they (Europeans) did come, were not many innocent people destroyed by the white people, whilst this fellow escaped scot free?"

The keeper of Cetshwayo's grave here remarked, also speaking with great difficulty, his mouth half-full of the talismanic draught, "How comes it, in these days, that when the King<sup>2</sup> sees fit to direct anything to be done, a lot of people come forward with all sorts of observations and criticisms? Who ever heard of presumption of this sort in former times?"

On the ring now breaking up, the whole party was led by Mangati to the top of the nearest mountain-top

<sup>1</sup> The speaker referred to Sitimela, a notorious upstart, whose example had been quoted by Mr. Saunders, and of which fact Mmangwana had just told Sigananda privately as above related.

<sup>2</sup> A hyperbole. The reference is to Dinuzulu.



(Ndundumeni). Here they were told to *cinsa*, i.e. vigorously and defiantly spirt the charmed water from their mouths towards the objects of their wrath, shouting as they did so, *Iwa Kingi! Iwa Mgunghlovu! Iwa Mashigela!* (May the King fall!<sup>1</sup> Fall, Pietermaritzburg! Fall, Saunders!) Everyone having uttered these imprecations, came down the hill and, the mist coming on, the gathering dispersed, with orders to meet on the following morning in the neighbourhood of the grave.<sup>2</sup>

When the rebels met as arranged, accompanied by Bambata, they erected other *amadhlangala* or temporary shelters of wattles and branches. Later the same day, probably the 16th, a body now between 700 and 1,000 strong, with Bambata and Mangati in command, marched up the ridge at the rear of Enhlweni towards Nomangci, with the intention of attacking the magistracy, or any of the small patrols that were then being sent out daily. Sigananda, hearing of this, ordered Bambata to desist until the messengers sent by him to Dinuzulu a couple of days before (to obtain confirmation of Cakijana's communication to Mangati regarding Dinuzulu's alleged wishes) had been received. Bambata returned to the grave, where he continued to camp undisturbed for at least a fortnight.

The decision of Sigananda to rebel is surprising when one considers that his district is one of the healthiest and most fertile in Zululand. In many respects it is an ideal place to live in, especially for Natives. Far from the larger European centres, it has an abundance of firewood, wattles, etc., and is, moreover, peculiarly favourable for raising stock. All these advantages became of no account as soon as the blighting word arrived from the royal house that Bambata was to be befriended. Dinuzulu's pleasure first, everything else nowhere. That was the sole cause of this remarkable defection. It can be explained in no other way. Where is the witchery that can be compared with this?

<sup>1</sup> That is, the King of Great Britain and Ireland.

<sup>2</sup> Cetshwayo's grave.

Between the 15th and 23rd, Sigananda sent messages to many neighbouring loyally-disposed Chiefs, urging them to rebel. Although a number of malcontents threw in their lot with the rebels, including members of the tribe of Siteku (Dinuzulu's uncle) and Chief Gayede (of Natal), the majority of the people remained loyal or neutral. Several, as far off as Mahlabatini, went further and offered their services to the Government against Bambata and Sigananda.

Two or three stores, close to the forests, were looted during this period (that at Sibudeni, as early as the 16th), besides cattle belonging to loyalists.

The two messengers that had been sent to Dinuzulu got back on the evening of the 23rd. Unfortunately, there was a difference between them as to the purport of 'the Prince's' message. One man, the senior, said Dinuzulu had denied all knowledge of Bambata's doings, and had remarked: "they have already begun fighting; let them do just what they want, it is no affair of mine. I do not want to be mixed up in the business." The other man, agreeing whilst in Sigananda's presence, afterwards went among the rebels and encouraged them by declaring that Dinuzulu's *real* wish was that they should fight the white man. The construction put on the communication by the latter messenger was that which, readily finding favour, was accepted. These men, moreover, had heard of the Government having arranged with Dinuzulu on the 17th to allow Mankulumana to go and act as "peace-maker," a matter that will be noticed later. The second messenger interpreted Mankulumana's mission into his having been "bought by the Europeans"; his coming, therefore, was simply to try and hoodwink Bambata.

Mankulumana arrived at Empandhleni on the 23rd, and after interviewing the Commissioner for Native Affairs, proceeded, on the following morning, to see Sigananda.



## IX.

### THE NKANDHLA FORESTS.—SIGANANDA AND HIS TRIBE.—DINUZULU'S ATTITUDE.—EARLY OPER- ATIONS AT NKANDHLA.—MURDER OF H. M. STAINBANK.

SOME account is now necessary of the locality within which the rebel bands took refuge, shortly to become the focus of more than a month's operations by some 2,000 European troops and a like number of Native levies.

The name Nkandhla is probably derived from the verb *kandhla*, meaning "to tire, exhaust, or prostrate," and is applied collectively to the various great and more or less connected forests that clothe the mountains, spurs and valleys of that part. The area in question, as will be seen from the map, is about eleven miles long by five broad. Separate names are given to about ten of the forests, among them: Dukuza, (*wander about*), Elendhlovu (*the elephant one*), Elibomvana (*the little red one*), and Kwa Vuza (*the dripping one*). The slopes of the mountains are remarkable for their steepness, especially when approached from the low ground in the vicinity of Cetshwayo's grave. The altitude of the slopes, of course, varies, but the steepness is practically uniform, whether the height be 2,000, 3,000, or 3,500 feet. The bed of the Insuze River, from the Tate to the Halambu, would average about 1,100 feet—where the Mome enters the Insuze, it is 1,122. In many parts, the peaks and ridges rise to a height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet from the nearest stream bed, and within a distance of less than a mile, measured from the foot of the perpendicular.

Three streams flow through the forests into the Insuze, viz. : Mome, Nkunzana, and Halambu, and, of these, the Nkunzana traverses the heart or densest part of the forests.

The principal forest, as well as the deepest and darkest, is Dukuza, no doubt deriving its name from the fact that one is liable to lose his way therein and go wandering about unless acquainted with the secret that, to find his way, he must climb the nearest ridge to see in what direction to make.<sup>1</sup> The trees are not, as a rule, higher than sixty feet, though, near the bottom of some of the gorges, they rise to seventy and eighty. Generally speaking, there is but little undergrowth, and the trees stand rather wide apart. Here and there a precipice or *dongu* is met with.

Notwithstanding the sharp ascent so characteristic of Nkandhla ridges and spurs, comparatively few stones or boulders are to be found. The ground is covered with damp, decaying substances, such as leaves and branches ; here and there, especially along the beds of streams, are to be seen moss-covered, slippery rocks, ferns and monkey-ropes, all tending to give an impression of the immense antiquity and majesty of the forest. Beautiful glades, varying in size and shape, are suddenly come upon in parts, with all the freshness and evenness of some lowland meadow. A look-out must be kept for snakes, such as rocky cobras, *mambas* and puff-adders. Leopards are also to be found. Of birds, lories, red-necked partridges and eagles will frequently be seen. And superstitious people will be interested to know that ghosts have, for generations, haunted and are said still to haunt the dense, precipitous forest Eziwojeni, immediately below Siganda's kraal "Enhlweni."

Above and at the rear of the Mome waterfall (which has a drop of fifty feet) is a natural stronghold, the one used by Cetshwayo in 1883. Owing, however, to a feeling of insecurity, especially on account of the presence of artillery, the rebels did not use it in 1906, they preferred

<sup>1</sup> It was probably after this forest that Tshaka named his great kraal Dukuza, whose site was exactly where the town of Stanger now stands.



to take refuge in the Mome gorge and the adjoining forest-covered valleys. A favourite, though unhealthy hiding-place, is in the vicinity of Manzipambana (a tributary of the Nkunzana), which never issues into open daylight. The peculiar vagaries of its course, which, in parts, seems to proceed one way and then in exactly opposite direction, are ascribed to perverse and occult powers emanating from the still and sombre forest depths.

The Mome gorge, to be often referred to later, takes its name from a stream that flows through it. It is about one and a half miles long, with great mountain walls on either side. At the head of the valley is the waterfall already referred to. Near the fall, the ground rises on either side to an altitude of over 3,000 feet, but at the mouth of the valley drops away with remarkable suddenness. Within a radius of 200 to 300 yards of the fall, the earth is covered with a dense forest which, extending outwards on either side, connects with the various other forests referred to above, especially on the east. A couple of isolated forests are to be seen within the valley, particularly the Dobo or 'pear-shaped' one on the west near the mouth. So steep are the sides of the gorge, like the letter V, that the sun in the morning and afternoon is shut out to such an extent that the day appears to be considerably shorter than it is.

Altogether the Nkandhla, with the Mome gorge as practically the key of the position, could hardly be surpassed as a place of refuge. Nor could the beauty and attractiveness of the district as a whole be easily excelled. There is a cleanness and definition as well as natural grandeur about Nature's handiwork hereabout that immediately appeal to the imagination. The purity and coolness of the air are exhilarating, so much so that one becomes oblivious to the cares of life as he wanders about the woodlands, toils up the sharp ascents, or bends over one of the many brooks to regale himself with some of the clearest crystal water to be found on the face of the globe. The Nkandhla should never become a field of war, and anyone who visits it will realize the pettiness of man's

strife which, for a moment, disturbs its awe-inspiring stillness, and gentle, peaceful slumber.

The history of the tribe that lived about these forests, and especially its relationship to the royal house of Zululand, are naturally matters of greater interest. Called by some *amaCube*, by others *amaNcube*, the tribe is a *Lala* one,<sup>1</sup> closely related to that of *Butelezi*, to which *Mnyamana*, son of *Ngqengelele*, belonged. *Mnyamana* was *Cetshwayo*'s prime minister, whilst *Ngqengelele* was the great *Tshaka*'s guardian, adviser and friend. *Mnyamana*, subsequently to the Zulu War, became unequivocally loyal to the British Government, and, on more than one occasion, publicly dissociated himself from the acts of *Cetshwayo*, as well as of his successor *Dinuzulu*. This detachment was maintained during the Rebellion by his son *Tshanibezwe*, a fact which had no small influence in restraining and even checkmating *Dinuzulu*. The history of these sister tribes during the last thirty years is remarkable in that, whilst the *Butelezi* was unquestionably loyal to the Imperial Government, the *amaCube* was persistently sullen and disloyal. In other words, *Butelezi* threw in its lot once and for all with its acknowledged conquerors, in opposition to the rebellious tactics followed by *Cetshwayo* and *Dinuzulu*, whilst the *amaCube* declared as resolutely in favour of the royal house, though embarked on a mad career after palpably impossible goals.

The year in which *Sigananda*'s ancestors first came to settle in the neighbourhood of the forests is wrapped in obscurity. Natives have no good means of fixing time, especially in regard to events more than a century old. One of the best methods, indeed about the only one, is to ascertain the Chief's genealogical tree, the whereabouts of former Chief's graves, etc., and, from these and related

<sup>1</sup> The Natives of Zululand and Natal may be divided into three great ethnic groups: *amaLala*, *abeNguni* and *amaNtungwa*. Of these, the *amaLala* or *Lalas* were probably the earliest settlers, followed by the *abeNguni*, and then the *amaNtungwa*. The last two have been in the country for at least 350 years. The *amaLala* are now to be found chiefly in Natal proper.



facts, draw such inferences as appear reasonable. In the case of Siganda, the known positions at Nkandhla of the graves of six of his ancestors, enable us to conclude with tolerable certainty that the first Chief died about 250 years ago.

Tradition seems to carry the arrival of the people still further back. It is safe to say it is one of the oldest tribes in Zululand and was already long *in situ* when the migration of the great Xosa family to Cape Colony took place in the seventeenth century.

Although Tshaka attacked and defeated many tribes, he was unable to conquer that over which Mvakela, grandfather of Siganda, presided. Later, however, he succeeded in putting Mvakela to death. This man took refuge in the Manzipambana section of the forests. It proved so detrimental to his health that he was obliged to leave and expose himself, thus affording the enemy an opportunity of which advantage was swiftly taken.

It so happened that Mvakela had married a sister of Nandi, Tshaka's mother. Mvakela's son, Zokufa (father of Siganda), was thus Tshaka's first cousin. This connection with the royal house of Zululand plays a most important part in regard to the Rebellion. It shows the character of the blood relationship between Dinuzulu and Siganda.

Zokufa was allowed to become Chief. The tribe continued, as in former ages, to practise the art of iron-smelting, and the manufacture of hoes, axes, knives and assegais of every shape and size. Owing to special aptitude in these respects, the people were largely patronized by the King who, from time to time, called for supplies of the articles manufactured. The national army depended to no small extent on the assegais made by the tribe, which came to fill much the same kind of place in the body politic that Woolwich arsenal does in England. Large quantities of the domestic articles referred to were, moreover, bartered to the general public far and near. When the white man arrived in 1824, and, in the years that followed, introduced hoes, axes and knives, the demand

for more serviceable wares soon caused this once famous handicraft to die out. But, although the Zulus were content to use European hoes (which were lighter and cheaper), and axes and knives (which were harder and sharper), they never lost faith in their own smiths for the making of assegais and other implements of war. To this day the assegai forged in Birmingham has been unable to supersede that of the ordinary Native blacksmith who, in these days, is not above using European pig-iron, instead of smelting his own with those quaint old bellows of his from the ironstone so frequently to be met with. Sigananda himself was an excellent smith, his reputation for barbed, large stabbing, as well as throwing, assegais being by no means confined to members of his own tribe.

In Cetshwayo's day, we find Zokufa holding the position of induna at that Prince's Mlambongwenya kraal. It was there that the famous Usutu party was first created by Cetshwayo. The Usutu became his personal adherents in opposition to the Izigqoza of the rival claimant to the throne, Mbuyazi. The party was made up of men from many tribes, and not recruited merely from the Zulu one, of which its leader was a member. Zokufa, and after him Sigananda, together with the amaCube tribe, belonged to the Usutu faction. Sigananda accordingly fought on the Usutu side during the great Ndongakusuka (Tugela) battle on the 2nd December, 1856.

Shortly after, owing to disturbances in the tribe, Sigananda fled to Natal. He took refuge in the tribe of Mancinza, father of Bambata. He became a policeman at the Magistrate's office, Greytown, but, about 1871, was invited by Cetshwayo to live in Zululand, when, after fourteen or fifteen years' absence, he became Chief over the tribe.

During the Zulu War, Sigananda naturally fought for his King. Cetshwayo's restoration to Zululand occurred in January, 1883, and, as has been seen, was the signal for violent conflict between his and Zibebu's forces. Cetshwayo was obliged to find a place of refuge. He fled to the Nkandhla forests, where he was harboured in one of the



amaCube kraals immediately overlooking the Mome waterfall. A small kraal, known by the name of Enhlweni, was constructed for the ex-King's use on the eastern side of the waterfall, and only three hundred yards from it, whilst a covered path was specially made through the forest that stood between the two kraals. The Government succeeded, through the influence of Mr. Henry F. Fynn (son of the earliest pioneer of Natal), in inducing Cetshwayo to leave his place of hiding and reside at Eshowe, and there he died in 1884.

Owing to the unsettled state of the country, it was decided by the heads of the nation that Cetshwayo should not be buried on the banks of the White Umfolozi, where it had for generations been the practice to inter the kings. The district in the occupation of the amaCube was the one selected, whereupon he was conveyed there in an ox-waggon and 'planted,'<sup>1</sup> near the Nkunzana stream, on a small exposed ridge about three miles to the east of Mome gorge. A relative of Sigananda was appointed keeper of the grave, a post of much responsibility and honour. One of his kraals was erected on a knoll some 500 yards from his charge.<sup>2</sup>

In the battle of Kotongweni in 1884 between the Usutus, on the one side, and the Government forces, Basutos and other Natives loyal to the Government, on the other, Sigananda threw in his lot with the former. Finally, in 1888, when Dinuzulu once more waged war against Zibebu, Sigananda was called on by the Government to furnish a levy. He refused, subsequently reviling

<sup>1</sup> A Zulu idiom signifying burial.

<sup>2</sup> Undisturbed in any way, as required by custom, the grave was found by the troops in 1906, to be overgrown with grass and weeds. There was around it a grove, some 200 yards in length and oval in shape. Immediately round the grove was a rough fence of Kaffir-boom trees. None of the trees in the plantation were more than 25 feet high. Owing to the grass not having been burnt or cut, it was naturally infested with snakes, among which, it was believed, was that (*i.e.* spirit) of the departed monarch. As, year by year, the grass in the vicinity was burnt, it devolved on the care-taker to make a 10-foot fire-break round the grove by digging away the grass. The grave consisted of a mound, 12 feet long by 10 feet broad and 15 inches high. On top of it lay one or two broken *kambas* (clay pots without handles), and parts of the original ox-waggon.

a few more loyally disposed members of his tribe for breaking away and assisting the authorities.

Such, in brief, was the history of the man and tribe with which the Colony had now to deal. In 1905, the tribe was wholly within the Nkandhla magisterial district ; it consisted of 462 kraals, with an approximate total population of 4,300, or about 700 men capable of bearing arms.

Another factor in the situation was the Chief's great age. There has been some uncertainty in regard to the point, some maintaining he was as much as 105, but, when it is borne in mind that he was a member of the Imkulu-tshane regiment, the cadets of which were recruited about 1830, and that these were about seventeen or eighteen years old when recruited, his age could not have been more than ninety-five at the time of the Rebellion, if quite so much.

It has already been shown that the Magistrate and the Commissioner at Empandhleni placed themselves in immediate communication with Sigananda, who, however, hypnotized by the prospect of co-operating with his old King's son, deliberately ignored all the orders received by him.

When the Commissioner became convinced (as he did on 16th April) that Sigananda had thrown in his lot with Bambata and was in open rebellion, in conjunction with sections of adjoining tribes, he represented the situation as very serious, and urged the immediate concentration within Natal of a large Imperial force, partly to compensate for the imminent withdrawal of local troops to cope with the Rebellion in Zululand, and partly to counteract a rumour that was circulating to the effect that the Imperial Government, disapproving of what had taken place, would not assist the colonial forces. Mansel advised the taking of similar action. The Ministry, however, deemed it expedient to deal with the situation as far as possible from Natal resources alone and, if it proved beyond the Colony's capabilities, to appeal for assistance



to other portions of South Africa. "Fears having been expressed," says the Governor, "that if the Active Militia as a whole left for Zululand, the Natal tribes, who were still in a state of unrest, might possibly rise, and that the Reserve Militia were insufficiently organized to deal with them, it was determined to raise immediately a Special Service Contingent of mounted men under the command of Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O.<sup>1</sup> . . . Detachments of Infantry were sent to garrison Gingindhlovu and Eshowe, in order to keep open lines of communication viâ Fort Yolland."<sup>2</sup> At the same time, a reward of £500 was offered for the capture, dead or alive, of Bambata, and £20 in respect of each of his followers. This reward, intended to stimulate Natives whose loyalty was not assured, was, however, withdrawn before the end of April, on account of the considerable number of Europeans then being put in the field.

In raising the Special Service Contingent, known as "Royston's Horse," Royston was debarred from recruiting members of the Active Militia force. After advertizing in the local press, numerous applications were received from all parts of Natal and the rest of South Africa, with the result that the corps reached its full complement (550) within ten days, hundreds of applications having had to be refused. The great majority of the men came from Johannesburg, Durban and parts of the Cape Colony. Much difficulty was experienced in selecting officers, as

<sup>1</sup> This officer (Brev. Lieut.-Col. B.M.R.) had served as follows : South African War, 1878-9—Zulu Campaign. Medal with clasp. South African War, 1899-1902—Operations in Natal, 1899, including actions at Rietfontein and Lombard's Kop. Defence of Ladysmith, including sortie of 7th December, 1899, and action of 6th January, 1900 ; operations in Natal, March to June, 1900, including action at Laing's Nek ; operations in the Transvaal, east of Pretoria, July to October, 1900.

In command, West Australian Mounted Infantry—Operations in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 30th November, 1900, to 31st May, 1902 ; operations on the Zululand Frontier of Natal in September and October, 1901.

Despatches, *London Gazette*, 17th and 25th April, 1902, and 4th December, 1903. Queen's medal with four clasps. C.M.G. ; D.S.O. *The Official Army List*, Wyman & Sons, London, 1911.

<sup>2</sup> Cd. 3027, 1906, p. 12.

also in obtaining clothing, boots, saddles, etc., as the Militia Department had very little in stock, except arms and ammunition. The corps being a mounted one, it became necessary for Royston to use the powers given him under martial law to commandeer horses where the owners refused to sell.

Dinuzulu's attitude, ever since the outbreak at Byrnetown, and, indeed, for months before, had, as has already been related, been regarded by many with suspicion. Such, however, was not the view of Mr., now Sir Charles, Saunders, who emphasized in one despatch after another his implicit belief in the Chief's loyalty and complete detachment from the rebellious proceedings at Nkandhla. The opinion of such an officer naturally carried great weight throughout Natal and Zululand, as it was commonly known he was not only an exceptionally competent Zulu linguist, with a life-long acquaintance with the Natives, their habits and customs, but had held important official positions in Zululand ever since the beginning of 1888, and these, especially during the preceding ten years, had brought him into frequent personal contact with Dinuzulu. Many were swayed by this testimony, fortified as it was by the fact that Mr. Saunders had just been on a visit of a day and two nights to Usutu kraal, having left there on 7th April, after communicating to Dinuzulu and his indunas the news of the disaster at Mpanza.

The Government, on the 17th, decided on the course reflected in the following telegram to the Commissioner: "Absolutely necessary that Dinuzulu should take some action to show his loyalty, of which you say you are assured. All information goes to show that Natives believe he is concerned in movement, and he must be made to show his hand." Dinuzulu was communicated with accordingly. The same afternoon, the Government asked if the Commissioner thought it advisable to order Dinuzulu and Meiteki<sup>1</sup> to come to Pietermaritzburg to assist in advising as to affairs in Zululand, and whether some other powerful Chief might be told to come as well. The

<sup>1</sup> Son of the late loyal Chief Zibebu.



Commissioner replied it would be fatal at that juncture to order Dinuzulu or the others to Pietermaritzburg. "Situation is most delicate and critical at present and requires the presence of any loyal Chiefs we can depend on amongst their own people."

Almost simultaneously with the announcement of Siganda having joined Bambata, the following message was sent to Mr. Saunders by Dinuzulu on the 18th, in reply to that from the Government of the preceding day: "I am not surprised that the Natal Government should have doubt as to my loyalty in face of repeated and constant accusations to the contrary effect which have been levelled against me throughout South Africa. I can only say I am perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this in any way the Government may wish. I have assured you of my loyalty by words and actions repeatedly, but apparently this is doubted, and I now ask that Government suggest means by which my loyalty can be proved absolutely, and finally dispel the slurs which have been cast upon me, and which I keenly resent. I am perfectly ready to turn out the whole of my people, and send them to Nkandhla at once to operate in any manner you may think fit, either in entering the forest and capturing this dog Bambata, who has been allowed to enter Zululand and disturb the peace which we enjoyed long after Natal Natives had openly shown disloyalty. As you know, I am physically incapable of leading my people in person, being unable to move with freedom from my bed, but the *impi* would go down in charge of my chief induna, Mankulu-mana, and I myself am prepared to be conveyed to Non-goma and remain there alone with the Magistrate, whilst my people are operating in any way they may be required as a proof of my good faith in this matter. If Government say they wish me to go to Nkandhla, I will find means to reach there, notwithstanding the state of my health. If this assurance is not sufficient, I am sure that Government will indicate what is necessary for further proof of loyalty to our King."

When this message was received it was communicated

to the press and, being naturally given great prominence, had a reassuring effect far and wide ; so much so, that the end of the Rebellion appeared to many to be in sight. Little did anyone suppose at the time that this communication, to all appearance brimming over with the deepest loyalty and affection, had issued from one who was actually committing high treason at the moment he sent it.

The Government, most fortunately dissuaded by Mr. Saunders, decided not to accept the offer of a levy. Such, by the way, could not have exceeded 500 or 600 men. To have accepted, however, as was pointed out at the time, would not only have attracted to it thousands of Zulus from every part of the country, as well as from beyond its borders, but the very movements of such concourse as would have assembled would have caused a recrudescence of the alarming rumours and unrest of which the Colony had already had a surfeit, the net result of which would have been to greatly augment Bambata's forces, if Dinuzulu and 'his army' did not themselves join *en bloc*. The Commissioner was opposed to Dinuzulu being so called on, not because he doubted the Chief's loyalty, but, as he wired on the 19th, because "the country is in such a nervous state that if his people once commence to arm, people would flock to join him from all parts. This would not only cause a general panic, but would be made the greatest capital of by Bambata as absolute proof that Dinuzulu was arming to join him." At this time, moreover, Dinuzulu was in a somewhat poor state of health, "being enormously stout and suffering apparently from some dropsical and cutaneous disorder, which completely incapacitated him for any physical exertion."

That the Government was not satisfied with Dinuzulu's passive and neutral attitude is seen from the fact that, on the 16th prox., the Commissioner was asked if he was still of opinion it was inadvisable to employ that Chief's men. In reply, Mr. Saunders adhered to the view already expressed.

Instead of requiring Dinuzulu to go to the magistracy as suggested by himself, it was arranged Mankulumana



should proceed to Siganda to ascertain what was his attitude towards the Government, as well as to inquire pointedly by whose authority the rebels were being massed at Nkandhla. He was, moreover, to deny that Dinuzulu was in any way an instigator of what had occurred at Mpanza. Mankulumana, as has been seen, reached Empandhleni on the 23rd, and, after ascertaining from Mr. Saunders what message he was to deliver, moved on to see Siganda at Nkandhla forests. He returned on the 26th to report he had been received by the rebels in a hostile spirit, being precluded by their leaders from meeting the Chief, and that he had made it as generally known as possible that Dinuzulu was not associated with Bambata.

The Magistrate of Eshowe proceeded on the 20th to the neighbourhood of Fort Yolland, where he met three important Chiefs of that part with their followers. These begged the Government to send a force to protect them against raids that were being made by Bambata and Siganda's *impis*. The Chiefs were told a force was coming and directed, in the meantime, to arm and defend themselves.

On the night of the 23rd, intelligence was received that Bambata was in the vicinity of Ntingwe; Mansel thereupon made a night march with the Police and Z.M.R. over the worst imaginable country, so steep as to be dangerous for man and beast. The sortie, however, proved unsuccessful.

The convoy of waggons, escorted by the Natal Carbineers, under Mackay, consisting of the Left Wing, three squadrons of the Right Wing, and a section of B Battery, N.F.A.—400 all told, arrived at Empandhleni at mid-day on the 25th, having left Dundee on the 20th. They had travelled *viâ* Vant's Drift, Nqutu, Nondweni and Babanango.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The convoy found the Buffalo River full and experienced trouble in fording the waggons. Every precaution was taken when travelling in Zululand. A lager was formed each night with the waggons, and a light barbed-wire fence erected 50 yards therefrom. The force stood to arms at 4 a.m. every day.

By this time, the Government had resolved to adopt measures for driving the Nkandhla district from various directions, hence Mackay, on temporarily occupying Em-pandhleni, received instructions to desist from doing any more than seize stock and burn kraals belonging to rebels within the immediate vicinity of the magistracy ; he was warned not to attempt to draw the enemy prior to the general converging movement shortly to take place. Attention was accordingly confined by him to the district lying within a radius of six or seven miles of the magistracy. This ground was completely cleared of rebels, stock, etc.

Mansel, on being relieved by Mackay, was to have left with the Police and Zululand Native Police for Fort Yolland on the 26th, but owing to dense mists, was unable to do so until 10 a.m. on the 28th ; he reached his destination by a somewhat circuitous route at 11 a.m. on the following morning. He had passed along the northern and north eastern edges of the forest, where numbers of rebels were seen ; these, however, refrained from coming to close quarters.

Vanderplank, too, left for Ntingwe—an important strategical position, six miles north of Macala—at 11 a.m. on the 28th, reaching camping ground near there on the following day.

On the 28th, Mackay moved out in the direction of Nomangci, with a couple of squadrons. He came in touch with about twenty-eight of the enemy, when a few shots were exchanged.

On the morning of the 1st May, a small patrol, including Native scouts, from Ntingwe, was fired on near Mfongozi. The fire was returned, when the enemy decamped, leaving four horses and two foals, which were captured. During the night, E. Titlestad's store at Ntingwe was looted by the rebels.

Four squadrons of Mackay's force demonstrated again, on the 2nd May, in the direction of Nomangci, when about a dozen kraals were burnt, including one of Siganda's, known as oPindweni. About 100 cattle, also goats, sheep



and a few horses, were seized. The burning of the kraals was necessary, as it was ascertained the rebels slept and obtained food at them of a night. Shortly after noon the same day, a squadron under Capt. Park Gray went to reconnoitre on Ndindindi ridge, overlooking Insuze valley. No sooner did he reach the summit than he, and the few men with him at the moment, were suddenly charged by a company of rebels, up till then concealed behind rocks. Knobsticks and assegais were flung amidst wild war-cries. The Carbineers met the charge and killed two or three before being obliged to fall back on the rest of the squadron. As they fell back, the two 15-pounders N.F.A. opened fire at about 1,500 yards and succeeded in dropping a shell in the enemy's midst. Sigananda afterwards had the insolence to say his men were out looking for Bambata in obedience to the Commissioner's orders, and to contend that the Government was the first to begin hostilities in so far as he and his tribe were concerned. As a matter of fact, Gray had seen nothing whatever of the Natives before going on to the ridge, nor, when he got there, did they afford him an opportunity of explaining how they came to be under arms four or five miles from where it was commonly known Bambata then was.<sup>1</sup>

On the 3rd, four squadrons made a reconnaissance in the direction of a deep gorge near the Insuze. Some fifty cattle were being driven into it as the troops approached, but it was decided not to attempt seizure. Kraals in the neighbourhood, reputed to belong to rebels, were destroyed and some sixty cattle, with goats and sheep, captured.

On the same day, strips of white calico, two and a half inches wide, and similar pieces of Turkey red, were issued to Native loyalists, who had come in to assist as directed, to enable them to be immediately distinguished in the field from rebels. These bandages were bound round the left arm above the elbow, each colour showing plainly. The

<sup>1</sup> The rebels occupied a position from which every movement by Mackay's force, ever since it left the magistracy, could be plainly seen. They, moreover, had two other outlooks which were visible from the magistracy.

device was later on copied by every force employing Native levies. Subsequently this useful badge was worn also round the head, it being feared that, especially when driving a bush or forest, it could not be readily enough seen when bound round the arm.

The Northern District Mounted Rifles (Major J. Abraham) joined the Z.M.R. near Ntingwe during the day.

Further reconnaissances in force were made by Mackay on the 4th and 5th May, with the object of ascertaining the enemy's strength, without, however, engaging him. On the latter date, as the column was returning to Empandhleni from Nomangei, a few rebels fired on the rear-guard from a distance of about 900 yards. As it was getting late, they were not engaged, particularly as it was impossible to see them as they were behind stones. On one exposing himself full-length, however, and challenging the troops to "come on," he was fired at, when he promptly decamped. It was ascertained during the reconnaissance that a stone wall, about three feet high, had been erected that day across the main road to the forest, with the object, as afterwards transpired, of impeding any advance to, or retreat from, Mansel at Fort Yolland.

Intelligence was received on the 3rd of the death of Mr. Herbert Munro Stainbank, Magistrate of Mahlabatini district,<sup>1</sup> who had been foully murdered the same evening in Chief Ngobozana's ward, on the right bank of the White Umfolozi river, and beside the public road. He had left the magistracy on the 2nd with his wife and child (in arms), a lady companion and two European police, in a mule trolley to collect taxes from Ngobozana's tribe. His party also included nine Native men and two Native servant girls. "The camp was pitched on the south bank of the White Umfolozi, about 200 yards from the drift to the east of the main road leading to Melmoth."<sup>2</sup> Mr. Stainbank had selected the site so as to be near the

<sup>1</sup> This is the district whose Chiefs had, but a few days before, offered their services against Bambata and Siganda.

<sup>2</sup> Cd. 3027, p. 67.



telephone, and so in touch with the Commissioner at Empandhleni. "On the 3rd instant, Ngobozana's tribe assembled and paid hut and dog tax, but it does not appear to have been a successful collection from a financial point of view, as only £184 18s. was collected in hut tax, whereas the tribe are responsible for about £270. The collection ended at about 2 p.m. and the Natives dispersed. Ngobozana is said to have presented Mr. Stainbank with two sheep for slaughter, but he declined to accept them, saying that Ngobozana could afford more than that. . . . Ngobozana took back the sheep and said he would bring a beast next day. . . . About 7 p.m. that evening, Mr. Stainbank spoke on the telephone, then returned to his evening meal, and, at about 7.50 p.m., he went to the telephone, accompanied by Tprs. Sells and Martin. . . . He had a lantern and, after connecting his telephone instrument, he got into a squatting position, Tpr. Sells seating himself about two yards away leaning against the telephone pole, and Tpr. Martin squatting close by Mr. Stainbank's left side; about 7.55 p.m. Mr. Stainbank rang the telephone bell, and was waiting for a reply, with the receiver to his ear, when suddenly a shot was fired, and Mr. Stainbank exclaimed, 'My God, I am shot!' and fell over on his left side, then a second shot was fired, striking Tpr. Sells, and shortly after a third shot was fired, also striking Sells." <sup>1</sup> Sells and Martin, as well as the rest of the party, escaped, but Stainbank died on the journey back from hæmorrhage and shock. The camp was left standing, including the safe, also two guns and ammunition. On returning the following day, the money and camp were found intact.

Chief Nqodi, living in the vicinity, was directed to turn his men out and protect the magistracy.

Mr. J. Y. Gibson, one of the senior Magistrates of the Colony, with a considerable experience of Zululand affairs, was now appointed at Mahlabatini. He assumed duty on the 13th. Much trouble was taken by him to discover the murderers.

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3027, p. 67.

After being informed by the Commissioner of what had happened, Dinuzulu expressed the greatest indignation and grief. He begged to be allowed to assist in bringing the criminals to justice, and asked permission to send Mankulumana at once to Mahlabatini with twenty or thirty picked men to do all he could. The offer was accepted. Several arrests were subsequently made, and the prisoners, after lengthy examination, were brought to trial, but acquitted. The occurrence was for long enveloped in mystery. We shall return to the subject when dealing with similar murders that occurred chiefly after the conclusion of the Rebellion.

Barely a week after the foregoing murder, a Native Mngandi, of the tribe of Matshana ka Mondise, when on a visit to Usutu kraal, was found with his throat cut, though still alive, near the boundary of Dinuzulu's ward. He is generally believed to have been assaulted in this murderous manner whilst within the said ward.



## X.

### MOBILIZATION OF ZULULAND FIELD FORCE.— MANSEL ENGAGES THE ENEMY AT BOBE.

THE news that Sigananda had, with practically the whole of his tribe, together with sections of two other adjoining tribes, espoused Bambata's cause, commonly said at the time to have Dinuzulu's full support, had hardly been made public before offers of substantial assistance were received from the Cape Colony and the Transvaal. The Prime Minister of the former telegraphed on the 17th April: "Extremely sorry to hear of your further Native trouble; can we be of assistance, you may depend on our ready help in anything that it is possible for us to undertake." The reply was: "Many thanks for your telegram. Should assistance be necessary, we shall not hesitate to ask your help."

On the 23rd April, the following message was received from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal (Sir Richard Solomon, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.)<sup>1</sup>: "Please inform your Ministers that, with the High Commissioner's warmest approval, Transvaal Government offers to send to assistance of Government of Natal, whenever required, 500 Transvaal Volunteers fully armed and equipped, and offers to maintain them while in the field." To this the following reply was sent: "Ministers beg to express their very grateful thanks for the most generous offer made by the Transvaal Government, which they gladly accept. They beg me to assure your Government that they highly appreciate the spirit which has prompted this offer." On

<sup>1</sup> Now High Commissioner for South Africa in London.

the 25th it was added : " The regiment we have offered will be a mounted one, and will be kept up to its full strength."

The Prime Minister, Cape Colony, wired again : " I have thought that possibly a battery of six Maxim guns, fully equipped and manned by Cape Mounted Riflemen, might be of service to you in the present campaign. Government, Cape Colony, willing therefore to place these at your disposal, fully manned, equipped and with pack saddles and mules, of course free of all cost to your Government. Should you be short of signallers, we can also supply them fully equipped. I merely make these special suggestions as a part of my original offer of general assistance." To this it was replied : " We are deeply grateful for the repetition of your generous offer of assistance, but are advised that at present we have sufficient forces in the field to deal with the Rebellion in Zululand. We shall certainly avail ourselves of your offer should the insurrection spread to other parts of the Colony."

On the 8th June, the Government, referring to the foregoing, asked the Cape Government for a battery of six Maxim guns. Within a week, the guns, fully manned and equipped, under the command of Captain M. Humphery, C.M.R., together with twenty signallers, under Lieutenant R. Stopford, C.M.R., were in Natal and proceeded at once to take the field.

The offer of the Transvaal having been accepted, it became necessary for that Colony to issue a proclamation, in which, *inter alia*, it was made known that, as it was " desirable in the interests of this Colony, that a Volunteer Corps, formed under the Volunteer Corps Ordinance, 1904, should be called out for service in this Colony, and in the said Colony of Natal," and as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal had " accepted the service of certain persons desiring to be formed into a Volunteer Corps," and such Corps had been lawfully formed and designated the First Transvaal Mounted Rifles, therefore the said Corps " shall be and is hereby required to serve within this Colony or in the said Colony of Natal."



The formation of the corps, 500 strong, took effect as from 26th April. It was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. William Frank Barker,<sup>1</sup> with Captain Walter Jardine as Adjutant.

Great care was taken in the selection of the other officers, non-commissioned officers and men. It was decided to accept volunteers from several existing mounted volunteer corps, in order that each such unit should participate in the campaign. The corps was accordingly constituted as follows :

	Officers.	W.O.'s, N.C.O.'s and Men
A Squadron, Imperial Light Horse - -	7	99
B ,, South African Light Horse -	5	87
C ,, Johannesburg Mounted Rifles and Scottish Horse - -	8	122
D ,, Northern, Eastern, and Western, Mounted Rifles - -	5	82
Maxim gun, Searchlight, Transport and Medical Detachments - - - -	4	15
Regimental Staff - - - - -	4	5
	<hr/> 33	<hr/> 410

Hon. Capt. J. Peet, J.M.R., was appointed Quartermaster, and Lieut. W. Bruce, Western Mounted Rifles, Signalling Officer.

The unit was mobilized on the 25th April, 1906. Notwithstanding the fact that many difficulties had to be contended with,<sup>2</sup> the T.M.R. left Johannesburg for Dundee, complete in every detail, on the 26th. The mobilization had been carried out in a most effective manner and

<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-Col. Barker, then in command of the South African Light Horse, had previously served in the 1st Battalion 60th Regiment (King's Royal Rifles) and 2nd Battalion Royal Sussex. At the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War, he enlisted in the South African Light Horse and took part in the Relief of Ladysmith. He was afterwards engaged in operations in the northern districts of Natal and east of Pretoria. He rose from the rank of Trooper to that of Major in the one campaign, and was mentioned by his commanding officer no less than thirteen times for conspicuous gallantry and capable handling of troops. He was awarded the D.S.O., also Queen's medal with six clasps, and the King's with two.

<sup>2</sup> *E.g.* as service was voluntary, many who wished to enlist were unable to obtain leave from their employers; others, again, who had volunteered were obliged to withdraw on their anticipated leave being refused.

with such speed by Colonel C. J. Briggs, Commandant of the Transvaal Volunteers, Major M. C. Rowland, Controller and Paymaster, also officers, n.c.o.'s and men connected with the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, transport, pay, etc., as well as Major J. W. F. Lamont, R.F.A., Chief Staff Officer, Transvaal Volunteers, that the corps was obliged for several days to await orders at Dundee.

In addition to all the expenses being defrayed by the Transvaal Government, the corps drew all supplies, except rations in the field, from the Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters, Johannesburg.

The Natal Ministers received throughout the Rebellion the fullest support, as well as sound practical advice, from the Governor (who happened to be a Colonel in the Imperial army). Finding that the situation at Nkandhla had assumed a much graver aspect by reason of Siganda's unexpected defection, they resolved to grapple with the problem on lines commensurate with its scope and magnitude. The plan of at once driving through the districts contiguous or adjacent to that of Nkandhla was adopted. In carrying it out, the Northern District Mounted Rifles were to advance from *Babanango*; Royston's Horse and the Transvaal Mounted Rifles from *Empandhleni Magistracy*; and the Natal Police Field Force, with a strong detachment of the Durban Light Infantry, from *Fort Yolland*. The drifts over the Tugela were to be guarded by the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, whilst a strong force of the Natal Carbineers was to be stationed at Helpmakaar to keep a powerful Chief Kula in check on the drive taking place.

The Active Militia were, at the same time, mobilized throughout Natal; many of the units, however, remained at their respective headquarters to keep the Natives in check during the proposed movements. The First Reserves in various towns and districts were also mobilized, as it was not impossible that the Natives, seeing so large a body of troops had crossed into Zululand, might rise and



attempt to massacre women and children. Much of the intelligence received at this time was believed to indicate that a *coup* of that kind was being contemplated.

The moment had arrived when the possibility of a universal rising in Zululand, as well as in Natal, had to be faced and provided against. If one Chief, without specific grievance of his own, was ready to associate himself with those who had taken up arms against the Government, it was probable others would do the same on a fitting opportunity arising. As for the rest of the Native population, it seemed certain that an isolated Chief here and there would remain loyal with his people, though the great bulk would watch events and go with the tide whichever way it happened to flow. The Chief's personality, however, was not the material factor, for, owing to various reasons which need not be set forth here, his influence, in many cases, had been so undermined, that members of his tribe remained loyal or not to him as it happened to suit their individual fancy. The result was, that although the majority, or even the whole tribe, decided to rebel, the Chief would personally attach himself to the Government. Thus, the mere fact of his professing to be loyal was no guarantee whatever that the tribe would follow his example. Generally speaking, his influence proved too weak to prevent a few and sometimes many of his best fighting men from joining the rebels. This was the state of affairs in many directions, especially in Zululand and the eastern parts of Natal, and defections would have gone on to a greater extent than they did, until every tribal unit had been 'hollowed out,' had not the Government at this critical moment acted as vigorously and comprehensively as it did.

Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sir Duncan) McKenzie, who had been in command of the column that operated in the south-western portions of Natal, was placed in command of the combined forces, including the Transvaal Mounted Volunteers and the section of the Natal Police called out for active service in Zululand. His appointment took effect on the 28th.



*F. Atkinson, Ladysmith.*

COLONEL (NOW BRIGADIER-GENERAL) SIR DUNCAN MCKENZIE,  
K.C.M.G., C.B., V.D.





The composition and strength of the command, designated the "Zululand Field Force," will be found in Appendices III. and IV. The troops under Leuchars, who remained in Natal, appear in the same Appendices.

The position of Chief Staff Officer was conferred on Colonel Sir A. Woolls-Sampson, K.C.B., of the Transvaal.<sup>1</sup> The other Staff appointments were made by McKenzie from the force under his command.

The Commissioner for Native Affairs was appointed Political Agent, with authority to represent and act for the Governor and Supreme Chief under martial law in all political matters that might have to be dealt with summarily in Zululand. He was empowered to enquire into the conduct of Chiefs, tribes or Natives who had received and harboured Bambata, or otherwise assisted him, or committed crimes requiring to be summarily disposed of, with the object of suppressing the Rebellion, and to award such punishment as was fitting, provided that all cases, in which sentence in excess of two years' imprisonment was passed, were referred to the Governor for confirmation.

McKenzie proceeded to Dundee on the 30th, and assumed command of his force on the following morning.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson (Honorary Colonel in the Army) served throughout the South African War, 1899-1902; was engaged in operations in Natal, 1899, including action at Elandsлагте, where he was severely wounded. Mentioned in despatches, *London Gazette*, 8th February and 15th November, 1901, and 17th January and 25th March, 1902. Granted honorary rank of Colonel in the Army. Queen's medal with four clasps. King's medal with two clasps. Knighted (K.C.B.).

The *Official Army List*, 1911, Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Fetter Lane, London, E.C.

<sup>2</sup> It was, at the date in question, disposed as follows:—At Dundee—Transvaal Mounted Rifles, 500 (Lieut.-Col. W. F. Barker); Royston's Horse, 550 (Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston); section, Natal Field Artillery (two pompoms), 25; half a company of Durban Light Infantry, 55; detachments of Medical, Veterinary, Signalling and Service Corps. At *Ntingwe*—Zululand Mounted Rifles, 90 (Major W. A. Vanderplank); Northern District Mounted Rifles, 150 (Major J. Abraham). At *Komo Hill* (Fort Yolland)—Natal Naval Corps, 106 (Commander F. Hoare); section, Natal Field Artillery, 35 (two 15-pounders); Natal Police, 200 (Lieut.-Col. G. Mansel); Zululand Native Police, 90 (Major C. Fairlie). At *Eshowe*—Two companies, Durban Light Infantry, 210 (25 mounted) (Major J. Nicol). At *Gingindhlovu*—Half a company, Durban Light Infantry, 55.



The column at Dundee left that place on the morning of the 3rd May, with a convoy of 150 ox-waggons loaded with provisions. The route followed was Laffnie's Drift, Nqutu, Fort Louis and Itala. As the roads and drifts were poor, progress was slow. Wherever a halt was made for the night a square lager was formed by means of the waggons. The country traversed was found almost deserted. Newly-made assegais were discovered at a few kraals in Zululand. The magistracy at Empandhleni was reached on the 8th.

Whilst this column was on the march, developments of an important nature were occurring on the south-eastern side of the Nkandhla forests, resulting in the first serious encounter with the enemy's forces, then, as has been seen, made up of men of Bambata, Sigananda, Ndube, and Mpumela's tribes. By this time, a number of men of other tribes had also joined.

When Mansel reached Fort Yolland on the 29th April (11 a.m.), he found Capt. W. Alexander, D.L.I., had already come in from Eshowe with a convoy of waggons escorted by a company of D.L.I. and a troop of N.M.R. The convoy had narrowly escaped an ambushade, no doubt devised by the raiders from Nkandhla to be referred to later.

It so happened that Chief Ndube, after having turned his men out to capture Bambata as directed by the Magistrate, and after subsequently receiving an order from Mr. Saunders prohibiting entry of Sigananda's ward until Mansel had arrived to take charge of the operations. Lost many members of his tribe by their becoming rebels, primarily, it would seem, to ensure their stock from being looted by Bambata. Bambata and his allies were, at the time, held in check by nothing whatsoever. They were able to raid and range about over wide expanses of country occupied by people as loyal as could be expected. These raids had already taken place in Ndube's ward, followed by others in those of Makubalo and Mfungelwa. Ndube's men, therefore, were obliged to face the alternative, either

of being killed outright and losing their stock whilst remaining loyal to a Government which had, up till then, been unable to give them support, or to join the rebels and, at any rate for the time being, save everything. It is not surprising the latter alternative was seized by many. Terrorization of this kind is one of the principal, though not sufficiently considered reasons, why Bambata was able so speedily to mass together the formidable force he did. With his men melting away hourly, Ndube perceived he could no longer remain loyal without serious risk to his own life and property. He reported what had happened to Leuchars at Krantzkop, and asked for advice. Leuchars told him to move off with his cattle and the loyal portion of the tribe if he felt in danger. He accordingly fled to Eshowe with a number of followers on the night of the 22nd, whilst some of the women took refuge in Natal, near the Tugela. Many of his people drove their stock into Mfungelwa's ward, which adjoins that of Ndube on the east. These cattle and others belonging to Mfungelwa's people were what Sigananda and Bambata's men raided on the night of the 28th and following morning. A number of the owners, who happened to be dissociated from the Ndube-ites, followed the raiders back to Nkandhla and pleaded for the restoration of their stock. In many cases, the applications were granted, the cattle being returned after a forfeit of one large beast per herd had been levied, "owing to its having set foot on ground in the hallowed vicinity of the grave." The decision to raid at that moment was probably precipitated by knowledge of the fact that Mansel was moving to Fort Yolland.

An amusing incident occurred about this time. Mfungelwa had been directed that, should Bambata be seen attempting a further raid, all it was necessary to do was to raise a white flag on a hill near his kraal, a couple of miles from, and within view of, the camp. This would be taken as an alarm, when assistance would be rendered. On the following Wednesday, the flag was observed hoisted early in the morning. The whole force, numbering 350, stood to arms and moved out at a smart pace to



engage the enemy. Upon coming up to the flag and clamouring for particulars as to the whereabouts of the raiders, Mfungelwa quietly replied that there was no enemy—in setting up the flag, he had done so merely as an experiment, it appearing desirable to rehearse the part *he* had to play in case of actual necessity!

The rebel scouts exposed themselves daily on Komo hill, some five miles to the north-west; from this point, the movements of the troops at Fort Yolland were easily perceivable. A reconnaissance was accordingly made to Mfanefile's store at Maqonga, some three miles south of Komo, when general information as to the rebels and the country they were in was obtained.

By way of checking the enemy's encroachments, Mansel decided to make another reconnaissance, this time in force and towards Komo.

He moved out at 6 a.m. on the 5th, each man taking two days' rations and 150 rounds of ammunition. Komo was reached at 9 a.m. After an hour's halt, Mansel decided to descend, *viâ* Sibudeni peak, into the valley lying to the immediate south of the Nkandhla forests. This valley, or rather series of valleys, was known to be in the occupation of the enemy; such area (including the grave) being, indeed, their headquarters.

As the intention was simply to make a reconnaissance, it was deemed unnecessary for it to be governed by any definite, pre-conceived plan. Hence the commanding officer, when he started from Komo, did not issue instructions as to what his objective was. Thus the men were marched through parts of the forest at Sibudeni and into the valley to a point within three or four miles of the rebel headquarters, without any clear conception as to what was to be done on getting within striking distance. The movement, as will presently be seen, proved an extremely hazardous one.

The strength of the force and its order of march, on leaving Komo, was: 30 Mounted Infantry, D.L.I., with 20 N.M.R. (Major S. G. Campbell); 86 Nongqai (Z.N.P.) (Major C. Fairlie); 200 Natal Police; 80 Natal Naval

Corps (Commander F. Hoare); 80 D.L.I. (Capt. R. L. Goulding), and a levy of about 400 men, armed with shields and assegais (Chief Mfungelwa). Total: 410 Europeans, 86 Zululand Native Police, 400 Native Contingent. Of the Europeans, 250 were mounted, 160 unmounted; the Native forces were almost entirely unmounted.

Passing Sibudeni store (looted, it will be remembered, some days previously by the rebels), the road entered a small portion of the forests. Here fresh meat was discovered, with signs of a fire near by. Three or four assegais, too, with small rags attached containing medicine of some sort, were seen, stuck in the ground by the rebels in accordance with their superstitious ideas.

Progress now became slow, owing to occasional sniping by rebels concealed in the bush. Those who were riding dismounted and proceeded in half-sections, each man leading his horse. The Nongqai extended a few yards into the forest on either side. The infantry, after fixing bayonets, marched in single file on either edge of the track, officers in the centre. By the time the open country that forms the summit of a ridge called Bobe was reached, the infantry, owing to the heat and absence of water, were beginning to show signs of fatigue. After a halt, to give the rear time to close up, the force descended by a footpath into the valley referred to, moving in single file.

The head of the column, keeping the footpath, passed on through neck marked *C* on the plan to knolls *D* and *E*. Another halt of about half an hour was made on the western slope of *E*.

During the interval, thirty mounted men were sent to burn a kraal (Mlibo's) a few yards off on the left. Lieut. A. H. G. Blamey, with a few N.M.R., then advanced to knoll *F* to reconnoitre. The time was about 3 p.m. Moving up the eastern incline, and when about 350 yards from the base of *E*, the scouts came upon about 300 rebels lying perdu among the weeds and grass of an old garden, a hundred yards to the right of the path. They were not seen until they simultaneously rose to charge. As they got up, they shouted "Usutu! Usutu!" at the top of




their voices, and dashed at the scouts who, after quickly dismounting and firing a few shots, fell back to the rest of the guard and Nongqai at *E* as best they could. At the first shot, the Nongqai immediately lined themselves in regular order on the right, along a contour of *E* about half-way down the hill, and, with the N.M.R. and mounted infantry—the latter having galloped up from the kraal they were burning on hearing the fire and ranged themselves on the left—opened a heavy fusillade on the enemy as he came rushing through a hail of bullets, the bullets which up till that moment he believed would not ‘enter.’ Each ran stoopingly with shield before his face, as if trying to ward off the bullets, whilst a *tshokobezi* badge tossed wildly about his head. They came on with great dash, directing their attack mainly at the left front of the position. It was at that point that most of them fell. In one or two instances, the Nongqai, who behaved with conspicuous coolness and pluck, were obliged to resort to their bayonets.

Finding themselves beaten at the first rush, they broke, large numbers making down the steep and slightly wooded watercourses on either side of the kraal marked “Man-yunda.” Another section disappeared down the northern slopes that converge at *F*, where they concealed themselves, in the vicinity of Nkunzana river. A number were shot as they ran, especially on the south-western slopes.

The Natal Police, when the action began, were quickly pushed up to support at *D*, about 300 yards from *E*, from where a heavy and effective fire proceeded for the few moments the enemy was visible. The Navals and the D.L.I. came forward on hearing the fire. The former, at the time, were on the Bobe side of the neck leading to *D*, *i.e.* at *B*, some few yards up the incline. From such position, a Maxim they had with them opened at long range, proving effective. The D.L.I., still further up Bobe at *A*, being rear-guard, did not come into action at this stage.

After the rebels had dispersed, the column moved forward and began to close up about 300 yards west of *F*. Suddenly another body of rebels, about 400 strong, was







seen moving up the Nkunzana, as if making for the rear of the rear-guard, and therefore attempting a belated encircling movement. Possibly Mansel's extraordinarily long column and its abnormally slow progress, was the reason why the enemy's attack on the rear-guard failed as it did. The front *impi* had come into action before the rear one (owing to the very high ground Mansel's rear-guard was still descending) could attempt the usual enveloping tactics. As this body reached a kraal on the north side of Bobe, it was joined by a company that had been scouting for some days on Nomangei and which, hearing the fire, had come unsolicited to help. The *impi* then advanced towards the rear-guard (D.L.I.). Not many minutes before, the officer in charge of the guard had had occasion to send Mfungelwa and his force to capture stock and burn kraals on the left, consequently he was under the impression the Natives he saw were the Native contingent, until, examining with field-glasses, he noticed that none wore the usual Turkey-red and calico badge. The enemy was thereupon fired into by the guard and N.N.C.; without charging, although firing a few shots, he broke and disappeared down the slopes up which he had just come.

The column again moved on, only to turn sharp left to cross the Halambu still further below. The enemy followed. The rear-guard was now supported by mounted men, who, firing on the *impi* in the direction of *F*, were themselves fired on from the Nkunzana by eighteen rebels stationed at that point. After pretending to move on to join the column at Halambu, the mounted men suddenly returned and, finding the rebels in force in the open at short range, shot down a number. Still another section showed themselves near Nkolotshane hill, about two miles off to the south-west. They opened ineffectively at long range.

It was now late in the afternoon. Owing to the exhausted condition of the men, the desirability of camping on the left side of Halambu was considered, but, because of the long, dry tambookie grass thereabout, which could easily have been set alight, and to most of the



ammunition being spent, Mansel decided to make for Fort Yolland.

Needless to say, the return march, with the infantry in so exhausted a condition, was extremely difficult. Nor was this to be wondered at. They had already walked twenty miles over rough country, in heavy order.

The enemy dogged the troops for miles, constantly sniping at them in the moonlight : nor did he desist until the main road near Mfanefile's store had been fairly reached. Some of the infantry did not get to camp until midnight.

The reconnaissance was carried out in an apparently loose and irregular manner. Absence of plan has already been noticed. This omission, with the enemy known to be massed in the vicinity of Cetshwayo's grave, was evidently an error of judgment. Conducted as the reconnaissance presumably was with the object of acquiring information, it actually obtained none that was not already known. Although two days' rations were carried, no decision was come to as to where the column should camp for the night. This involved taking heavily-laden infantry over abnormally long and difficult tracts of country, so much so that it was owing only to their sterling qualities and perseverance that they were able to march as they did. When the first attack had been repulsed, there was an oversight in not pursuing and severely punishing the rebels. Had this been done, it might have had something of the demoralizing effect that the Mome had later on.

All units and ranks behaved with much gallantry, repelling attacks that might easily have proved calamitous.

The principal meed of praise must be awarded to the N.M.R., M. Inf., D.L.I., and last, though not least, the Nongqai, owing to whose coolness and steadiness, the first and principal success was mainly due.

When Blamey and his troop were obliged to fall back, a number of the horses would not let the men mount, consequently with the enemy in hot pursuit 100 yards away, they had to make off on foot. "My horse," says

Blamey, " would not let me put my foot in the stirrup, so I vaulted into the saddle. On turning the horse round, two rebels threw their assegais at me. I shot one and then galloped off." He had not gone far, however, before he came across Corpl. Acutt on foot, whose rifle had jammed. The man managed to fire and then took to his heels, the leading rebel five to ten yards in rear. Whilst on the gallop, Blamey, catching Acutt up, offered him his stirrup-leather to hold on to ; instead of seizing it, the man put up his arm, asking for help. On this, Blamey, dropping his revolver, grabbed the arm and, dragging the man over the saddle with much difficulty, rejoined the troop at *E*.

The casualties were : Among the rebels, sixty to seventy killed, with many wounded ; among the troops, none killed ; one N.M.R. slightly wounded ; one Z.N.P. severely wounded and another wounded. Seven horses were also wounded.

Mfungelwa's men took no part in the fighting, though they captured 300 cattle and many goats, besides destroying several rebel kraals.

The *impi* that first attacked at *F* was made up of Mavalana, Hayelwengwenya, Felapakati, and Mbokodwebomvu regiments, the first-named being the youngest and of an average age of 20 to 23. It was Mavalana that led and threatened most at *E*. The body that advanced up the Nkunuzana and threatened the rear-guard, was under the personal command of Bambata. The eighteen who had guns were commanded by Ndabaningi, Siganda's principal son, who, though considerably wearing a white shirt, escaped being hit. All the enemy's shooting was bad. Those seen near the hill Nkolotshana late in the afternoon, were merely elderly men who had congregated from various kraals. Altogether about 1,000 of the enemy were seen during the day.

Inconclusive and unsatisfactory as the foregoing proceedings were from a military point of view, the engagement proved remarkably decisive from that of the rebels. The reason for this is not hard to guess, viz. the clear demonstration that had been given of the utter inefficacy



of Bambata's and his doctors' drugs! *The bullets had entered*, and entered wherever and whatever they had hit. The main success of the Bobe fight accordingly lay in dispelling, possibly for ever, in so far as Natal and Zululand Natives are concerned, the extraordinary delusion already described.

In consequence of the numerous casualties, many Native women came the following morning to where the rebel forces had collected near Cetshwayo's grave to demand, of those who had declared European bullets would do no injury, restoration of their missing sons, husbands, and sweethearts. If anything ever made Bambata wince, these women's simple and unanswerable application did. At the same meeting, one of the older men asked pointedly why Bambata and his men had not engaged in the fight. Why had he stood by when a section of the forces attacked? The speaker went on, in heated manner, to propose that the notorious leader should be arrested and handed over to the Europeans forthwith; if that were inexpedient, then let him be given over to the rebels themselves to put to death. "He has deceived us by declaring bullets would not hurt us."

Finding himself thus suddenly unpopular, with his prestige gone, and even in danger of losing his life, Bambata rode off, an hour or two later, with Cakijana to Macala, saying not a word to anyone, not even to his own followers.

On the same day, Vanderplank came in touch with the enemy in Manyane valley, a few miles south-west of Ntingwe, when two were killed, thirty cattle seized and a number of kraals destroyed.

Between the 6th and 16th May, Mansel's column remained at Fort Yolland, erecting entanglements or otherwise fortifying the lager.

## XI.

### CONVERGING MOVEMENT ON CETSHWAYO'S GRAVE. —NEGOTIATIONS FOR SIGANANDA'S SURRENDER.—FURTHER OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.— TATE GORGE.

THE force that arrived at Empandhleni with McKenzie on the 8th May rested on the 9th. Intelligence, at this time, went to show that Bambata, with his own adherents and a few others, had gone to Macala.<sup>1</sup> After enquiring into the position, McKenzie realized the impossibility of starving the rebels out "by sitting quietly on the hills and allowing them to collect provisions everywhere at night." He considered it necessary to operate at once, and to begin by destroying all their kraals and supplies.

At 4 a.m. on the 10th, the T.M.R., under Barker, left for Ntingwe, to strengthen that important strategical post. The country to be traversed was exceptionally rough, especially at Mdunduzeli ridge. The result was that the waggons, much too heavily laden, could not reach their destination the same day. With even the lightest loads, a journey of thirty-five to forty miles with ox transport over country such as this was obviously impossible. Two squadrons were detached the same day and pushed forward to reinforce Vanderplank, who anticipated attack at Ntingwe. It required the whole of the 11th for the transport to ascend the ridge referred to, some five

<sup>1</sup> This mountain, which has a forest on its western, steep and rocky face, was soon to become one of the rebels' principal rallying-points.



miles long. At 12.30 a.m., 12th, messengers arrived at Ntingwe from Capt. C. E. Ligertwood, who had bivouacked with the transport on top of Mdunduzeli, to say the enemy was concealed in force in a forest close by, evidently with the intention of attacking at daylight. The two squadrons referred to immediately saddled up and returned, reaching Ligertwood about 3.30 a.m. Everything was quiet and in order. Half-a-dozen waggons had, however, capsized. That day the waggons got on to Kombe forest. Shortly after daybreak on the 13th, Tpr. H. C. Maw, I.L.H. squadron, went in search of his horse. When near the edge of a bush, he was sniped from within it and mortally wounded. The troops immediately lined a ridge running parallel and volleyed three or four times into the forest; nothing, however, could be seen of the enemy. The whole force, including the transport, reached Ntingwe about mid-day on the same day. Maw died the following morning at Ntingwe, where he was buried.

McKenzie, with the remainder of the troops, including Mackay's, made a reconnaissance in force at 4.30 a.m. on the 10th to the top of Nomangci ridge, overlooking Mome gorge. Some thirty mounted Native scouts were sent ahead under a European officer. A few of these, on reaching the summit, were fired at by rebels from a stone shelter at the top of a kopje on the left. After the troops (N.C.) had come up and a couple of volleys had been fired at the shelter, the enemy vacated it and fled into a forest close by. An examination was now made of the country round about Green Hill, whereupon the force moved along Nomangci ridge and the northern edges of the forest to the vicinity of Sisusa peak. Here the scouts, among whom was Chief Sitshitshili, a splendid specimen of a brave and loyal Zulu,<sup>1</sup> proceeded to lower ground on the south where some rebel kraals were burnt and stock captured. On withdrawing in the early afternoon, McKenzie left three squadrons of Carbineers concealed close to the kopje referred to, in the hope of surprising the enemy. The ruse, however, proved unsuccessful.

<sup>1</sup> Foully murdered later, as will be seen, because of his loyalty.

On the following day, Mackay, with about 420 men (chiefly N.C.), left for Helpmakaar with a convoy of 138 empty ox-waggon. The Carbineers were ordered back as it was possible an outbreak might any day occur in the northern portions of Natal. Nevertheless, having already done useful work at Nkandhla, they were very disappointed at having to leave that part, especially as fighting appeared to be imminent.

On the 12th, McKenzie made a reconnaissance to Insuze valley on the south-west of the magistracy.<sup>1</sup> In the course of the day, a large number of women and children were met with, but no information could be obtained from them as to the rebels' movements. After being questioned, they were allowed to return to their relations.

Another reconnaissance was made to Dhlabe on the western side of Mome on the 14th. The rebels indulged in a good deal of ineffective sniping from the forest. A few 15-pounder and pompom shells were fired into the Mome valley. The force camped for the night at the site of the old magistracy.

On the same day, three of Barker's squadrons reconnoitred along the base of Macala, with the object of trying to draw the enemy, who had been observed in force at that mountain. Bambata himself was reported to be there. This intelligence was proved later to have been correct. The rest of the force at Ntingwe co-operated with McKenzie's in destroying rebel kraals in the intervening district and capturing stock.

The destruction of these and other kraals, which, as explained in a previous chapter, are invariably of wattles, grass and poles, and therefore easily constructed, was imperative as, being numerous, they afforded shelter and food to the enemy. But for the adoption of such tactics, and the seizure of stock, especially in the vicinity of the great forests at Nkandhla and Qudeni, and other considerable ones at Kombe, Ensingabantu, Macala, etc., the campaign must have been unduly prolonged and resulted in

<sup>1</sup> His force included a levy of about 450 loyal Natives, called out by the C.N.A.



far greater suffering to Natives at large than actually occurred.

The most humane method in dealing with savages is one which has for its object cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible date. To achieve this end, much must necessarily take place which appears offensive to civilized people at a distance, but which not less civilized persons on the spot know to be imperative. Difference of opinion on these matters is very marked and very regrettable, but it is useless endeavouring to justify tactics to those ignorant, often absurdly ignorant, of the elementary conditions under which any given war with savages has to be fought. That is not war which studiously avoids incommoding the enemy in any way. If there be obloquy, it must, therefore, be suffered to remain on the side of common-sense.

Next morning (15th) Barker, leaving sufficient men to guard the camp, moved to a position near Dhlolwana, about six miles to the south-west of Ntingwe and three from Macala. Whilst engaged burning kraals, he had a brush with about 500 rebels, who followed up on his returning to camp, four of them being killed. It would seem Barker lost an opportunity here of inflicting a heavy blow on the enemy. At the same time, it must be remembered he was playing a waiting game which, had he planned a countermove—as he certainly might have done on this occasion—might have been spoilt.

On the 16th, a few men were sent to decoy the enemy ; he, however, refused to be drawn. McKenzie then heliographed Barker to take part early on the 17th with himself and Mansel in a large converging movement towards the enemy's headquarters at Cetshwayo's grave. Leuchars, then at Middle Drift, was invited to co-operate on the south.

During the night, Sub-Overseer Walters, in charge of a road party, was murdered in a tent at his camp by Natives at Mbiza stream, about eight miles north of Empandhleni. The murderers were arrested within a couple of days.

McKenzie had decided on the general movement referred to because of the main body of the enemy being camped at the grave and having with them large herds of cattle. The route to this spot was more difficult for the troops on Nomangci than for those at Fort Yolland or Ntingwe. The one selected was viâ Gcongco, Gcongco being an abnormally steep spur abutting on the Insuze, barely a mile from the Mome stream.<sup>1</sup> Owing to lack of intelligence as to the precise nature of the spur, there was, at starting, some doubt as to whether the troops, especially mounted men, would be able to descend it with safety. Barker was directed to proceed down the Msukane neck and along the Insuze valley. Mansel, who was to bring transport, was to bivouack at Mfanefile's store at Maqonga hill on the 16th, and move forward on 17th viâ Mkalazi and Insuze valleys. The time fixed for the columns to arrive at the grave was 11 a.m.

The descent of Gcongco was accomplished without accident, whereupon McKenzie,<sup>2</sup> seeing Barker coming down the valley, and noticing that his own force would strike the road before Barker could get up, did not trouble about his rear-guard, beyond sending back a D.L.I. Maxim as support, when the enemy was slightly engaged and Pte. Williams wounded. The main body thereupon made straight for the grave. A large number of cattle and goats were captured by London's levies near Tate gorge.

Barker, who had left Ntingwe at 3 a.m., proceeded through the neck referred to and along a bridle path in

<sup>1</sup> This particular spur is famous in Zulu history as being that down which Tshaka led his army about 1823, when pursued by his most formidable rival Zwide. In going down Gcongco, however, Tshaka was merely *pretending* to flee, and, the spur being abnormally steep, made it appear all the more probable that his retirement was genuine flight, instead of a stroke of genius by a master in tactics. After continuing to fly for some distance, he suddenly rounded on his pursuers, and, taking them at a great disadvantage, practically annihilated them.

<sup>2</sup> His force on this occasion was: Five squadrons, R.H. (Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston); 60 D.L.I. (Major G. J. Molyneux), and some 600 Natives (Lieut. W. H. London). Each man carried three days' rations. The artillery was sent to Empandhleri with regimental transport, escorted by D.L.I. Mr. B. Colenbrander, the local Magistrate, with an excellent knowledge of the affairs of his district, also accompanied the column.



single file. The enemy, as day broke, was seen descending Macala heights, streaming on to high ground on Barker's right flank. Recognizing the disadvantages the column must be under if attacked, an effort was made as speedily as possible to reach more open country. Shortly after the advanced guard and main body had come on to open ground, the rear-guard, consisting of the N.D.M.R., was attacked from Macala. The guard, in command of Abraham, assisted by a squadron sent back from the main body, succeeded in driving off the enemy, who made no further attempt to follow. About six rebels were killed. One of the officers, Lieut. H. Wilkins, N.D.M.R., was wounded in the arm with an assegai whilst crossing a drift. Barker reached the grave about 11.30 a.m.

Had intimation of the intended combined movement reached him earlier, Leuchars might, in conjunction with Barker, have made an effective raid through the Macala hills and got in touch with the other columns. As it was, he crossed at Hot Springs at 10 a.m. and moved in a northerly direction on to a high ridge running eastwards from Macala, where a column near the grave (McKenzie's), and another near Komo (Mansel's), were sighted. Owing to a mishap, Leuchars' signallers had not reached him, so it was impossible to reply to the heliograph flashing from the first-mentioned column. A few rebels were observed making along the ridges towards Macala; these were chased in a dashing manner by the Reserves. From 150 to 200 rebels were then observed congregated on a knoll (Simakade) towards which the Reserves, who had become scattered, were making; the U.M.R. were thereupon pushed forward at a hand gallop, when the enemy fled to the bush at Macala, eight being killed and others wounded.

One of those wounded by the Reserves was no other than the notorious emissary from Dinuzulu, Cakijana, the man who, as alleged, had been sent from Usutu to Mpanza to help Bambata start the Rebellion. Cakijana had formed one of the party that emerged from Macala bush the same morning and attacked Barker's rear-guard all

the way from Umzilingwana stream to that of Lugada, near the Tate gorge. Repulsed by Barker, they made towards Nomtulwa hill with the view of joining those who had remained behind with Mangati; but on getting to the hill they came upon Leuchars' Reserves, who at once made for them, as above described. They succeeded in joining Mangati, who, seeing the Reserves scattered and unsupported, contemplated attack. The plan was, however, frustrated by the main body of the U.M.R. moving smartly up, upon which Mangati and his men disappeared over the slopes to the west. Cakijana, dressed in khaki tunic and breeches, with leather gaiters and helmet, ran in the direction of Masolosolo stream. He was quite tired out, having shortly before given over his rifle to another, when he was fired at and struck in the calf of the left leg—a flesh wound.

Mansel's column was late in coming up, owing to difficulties with the transport. Neither McKenzie nor Barker had brought any transport. Had Mansel deployed at Bobe, it would have considerably assisted the enveloping movement, and prevented a number of the enemy from escaping into the forests. By 4 p.m. all the columns had joined hands. They bivouacked for the night near the grave, not far from the junction of the Nkunzana and Insuze rivers.

The result of the day's operations was somewhat disappointing. The enemy's losses, however, must have been heavier than the twelve actually seen dead, especially in the engagement with Barker's rear-guard.

About 800 head of cattle and 1,500 goats were captured, besides the 150 cattle driven off by Leuchars' column. Many kraals belonging to the insurgents were burnt, including a large number of temporary war-huts near the grave. "A gale of wind," says McKenzie, "was blowing at the time, and the grass on the fringe of Cetshwayo's grave caught alight, but no damage was done to the trees of the plantation surrounding the grave. It was an unavoidable incident. Most stringent orders, which I am pleased to say were strictly carried out, were issued to all



columns to prevent the desecration in any way of the grave. The matter was at once reported to Mr. Saunders, so that the true facts could be conveyed to Dinuzulu."<sup>1</sup> The Commissioner advised Dinuzulu accordingly.

McKenzie's column, with those of Barker and Mansel, formed a combined camp a few hundred yards south of the grave and on the site of what had, for a month, been the enemy's recognized headquarters. The strength of the camp was about 1,700 (mostly mounted men), exclusive of about 2,000 Natives (levies).

Leuchars' force moved back down a steep ridge that led towards the Tugela at Ndundumeni, and immediately below Macala, where it bivouacked (Zululand side). At 7.30 p.m., however, the column crossed and bivouacked in Natal. Leuchars gave strict orders for all camp fires to be left burning, whilst no lights were to be struck when on the march. The crossing of an unknown drift on a pitch dark night was carried out without mishap.

A force made up of N.P. (200), T.M.R. (3 squadrons) and R.H. (2 squadrons) was sent by McKenzie on the 18th to operate on the east side of the grave near Bobe, there being reason for supposing a section of the enemy was concealed in that neighbourhood. The information, however, proved incorrect. The supposed enemy turned out to be women and children who, owing to the difficulties of obtaining food in the forest, were making for the kraals of relatives and others near the Tugela who had not up to that time taken up arms.

Native women were a source of much inconvenience throughout the campaign. They not only urged their menfolk to rebel and kept them supplied with food as well as they could, but, taking advantage of the protection afforded their sex, frequently conveyed intelligence to the enemy as to the movements of the troops.

On the same day twenty-one rebels, members of Siganda's and Tulwana's tribes, surrendered at the magistracy.

<sup>1</sup> Report. Colonel D. McKenzie, September, 1906. The state of the grave in 1906 is described on p. 210.

With the intention of attacking the redoubtable Mome stronghold, the whole force, excepting the men in charge of the camp, marched for the purpose, on the 19th, but had hardly moved out when a spy, previously sent out, brought intelligence to the effect that, whilst desirous of surrendering, the rebels refrained from doing so through a sense of fear. The spy, with a white flag, was thereupon directed to inform the enemy that the O.C. Troops was prepared to meet their emissaries half-way up an indicated hill should they really wish to surrender. Upon the spy returning to the hill in question, McKenzie, accompanied by three of his staff, proceeded to the proposed rendezvous. After waiting there a considerable time, the spy, who had again been sent back, returned with two indunas from Sigananda's heir Ndabaningi, who said the people generally were desirous of surrendering. The men were told that surrender was to be unconditional. They then asked for time to find, and deliver McKenzie's message to, Ndabaningi. The receiving of the surrender was fixed for 9 a.m. on the following morning. After this, the troops returned to camp.

It was not until 11 a.m. on the 20th that the spy came back with information that Ndabaningi was engaged gathering together the various members of the tribe to discuss the situation. Extension of time until sunset of the same day was then granted to enable the discussion to take place, notwithstanding that the *bona fides* of those negotiating was already being regarded by McKenzie with suspicion. The same evening, two indunas from Ndabaningi were escorted to the camp, only, however, to apply for further time within which to make the necessary arrangements. The request was once more acceded to, it being again impressed on the emissaries that surrender was to be unconditional. They were further advised that, whilst all operations would be suspended as regards themselves, the Officer Commanding could not permit the negotiations to stand in the way of contemplated operations in other districts, or against Bambata, who, at that moment, was alleged to be in occupation of Macala.



On Monday, 21st May, taking with him all the mounted troops,<sup>1</sup> McKenzie made a reconnaissance to Macala, it having been reported Bambata was there with 500 followers. Soon after starting, word was brought by scouts to the effect that the enemy had vacated that mountain and made off in the direction of Qudeni, some fifteen miles further west, where there are many large and dense forests, similar, in some respects, to those at Nkandhla. The reconnaissance was carried out nevertheless ; it proved long and unsuccessful. None of the enemy were seen, though fresh traces of their occupation were come upon. A few cattle and goats were captured, and kraals as well as war-huts destroyed. The troops did not reach camp until late at night in irregular, straggling order. The day had been a trying one. Owing to the broken nature of the country, the men had been obliged to march in single file. Although the sortie was unsuccessful from one point of view, from that of acquiring accurate knowledge of the topography of one of the enemy's principal rallying-points, it was valuable, and proved of much service at a later date. The same remarks apply to the Mome valley and surroundings, whose many features and peculiarities could be and were carefully noted during such time as the combined forces were camped near the grave.<sup>2</sup>

On the following day (22nd), six men arrived from Siganda to signify his wish to surrender, but as, being so old, it was more convenient for him to do this at the magistracy, he asked permission to adopt that course. McKenzie agreed, and thereupon decided to move to Nkandhla, not, however, before dividing the troops into two columns so as to better equalize them.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 200 N.D.M.R., 100 Z.M.R., 128 N.P., 540 T.M.R., 300 R.H., 30 M.I., D.L.I. = 1,298, also 100 Nongqai and 1,500 Natives (levies).

<sup>2</sup> On the occasion of the reconnaissance to Macala, the O.C. Troops, noticing a small kopje at the mouth of Mome gorge, on which guns could be placed to shell the gorge, caused a sketch to be prepared and subsequently handed to Barker.

<sup>3</sup> The columns as re-formed were as follows: *Under McKenzie's direct command*—Northern District Mounted Rifles, Zululand Mounted

The camping of so large a force at the grave for several days had the effect of greatly diminishing the supplies on which the rebels were depending. At most, if not all, of the kraals, pits were found, in which, as customary with the people, large quantities of mealies and corn were stored.<sup>1</sup> Much of the grain was taken to be consumed either by the levies or the horses. The large herds of cattle, moreover, which had just been captured soon destroyed such crops in the neighbourhood as had not by that time been reaped.

Mansel remained at the grave with instructions to operate in that locality, to continue to use up the enemy's supplies as much as possible, and to see that he (the enemy) did not emerge at night from the forest to draw on such supplies as might still be available. At this particular juncture, the enemy's scouts were observable on all the prominent heights. Reliable information, moreover, was received that Bambata had gone to the Qudeni forests with some 300 to 400 followers.

McKenzie moved to Nomangci on the 23rd, part of the column marching viâ Gcongco, and part viâ Sangofe and London's Kop. The steepness of the ascent at Gcongco may be roughly estimated from the fact that, during the climb, no less than four horses fell at different times; they rolled down the incline, and were quite dead on reaching the bottom. Fourteen other horses had also to be abandoned. McKenzie himself went the same evening with a small escort to the magistracy, with the object of accepting Siganda's surrender there as agreed.

A troop of Royston's Horse, in command of Lieut. Percy Male, which had been sent from the grave to Fort Yolland

Rifles, Royston's Horse, Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders and two pompoms), Durban Light Infantry (two companies). *Under Mansel's command*—Natal Naval Corps, Transvaal Mounted Rifles, Natal Police (Field Force), Natal Field Artillery (two 15-pounders), Nongqai (Zululand Native Police).

<sup>1</sup> Particularly was this the case at Eziggileni, the principal kraal of the caretaker of Cetshwayo's grave. This small kraal (close to the Nkunzana river), a few hundred yards from the grave, contained no fewer than nineteen large grain pits, that is, about five times as many as the average for a kraal of that size.



on the 22nd to escort an ambulance waggon, returned on the 23rd, several hours after McKenzie's column had left, and just as Mansel's was moving off in the direction of Fort Yolland. After off-saddling close to the grave, the troop proceeded on its journey to overtake McKenzie. "The party had not gone more than a mile," says Male, "when about sixty Natives came out of a small bush and attacked us in the rear without the slightest provocation on our part. The time then was about 12.30 p.m. They did not come any closer than 200 yards. I asked Capt. Sharpe to take our seven spare horses on to Denga spur, about three miles from where we were attacked and about a mile from the mouth of the Mome valley. I remained behind with Sergt. Hepworth and three men to protect the rear. We fought a small rear-guard action, which lasted until we got on to the hill where the horses were waiting for us. When starting to go up the hill, the enemy closed in on our rear, right and left flanks. There were about 100 to 150 of them, but I could not see well. They kept up a desultory fire from the cover of the bush on both sides of the ridge I was going up. This firing continued until we had gained the top, about 4.30 p.m. On reaching the top, the men and horses being very 'blown,' we found the Natives trying to cut us off from the column. I posted two men on a kopje (one of them Tpr. T. Malone, subsequently killed at Tate). These kept up a pretty hot fire until we had mounted and advanced. After this, it was a case of galloping to get free. They hung on to our rear for about three or four miles, *i.e.* until we had sighted the rear-guard of the column (Z.M.R.)."

"A few shots," says McKenzie,<sup>1</sup> "were fired by the Z.M.R. at the enemy when the top of the hill was reached. It has been, I understand, suggested that the fact of the Z.M.R., having fired these few shots, upset the enemy's idea of surrender, but this is manifestly incorrect, having in view the fact that the troop of Royston's Horse was fired at from almost the time when they passed the site of my old camp at Cetshwayo's grave, which was some

<sup>1</sup> Report. September, 1906.

considerable time before the shots were fired by the Z.M.R. Personally, I was satisfied that the incident did not in any way affect the non-surrender.<sup>1</sup> At the time, large bodies of rebels could be seen moving about on the hills singing what was reported to be their war-songs. This view was confirmed later on by Ndabaningi, who, when he eventually surrendered, was asked by me why they had not surrendered on the first occasion. He stated the tribe had agreed that they had not had enough fighting, and did not consider themselves beaten . . . they therefore resolved to continue the Rebellion.”

Although McKenzie had withdrawn to Nomangci, there were no indications of Sigananda surrendering. The negotiations, which had been going on since the 19th, thereupon fell through.

To enable the troops to grapple more satisfactorily with the situation at Nkandhla, the Government decided, on the 10th May, to form an irregular infantry corps, 800 strong, subsequently known as the “Natal Rangers.” On application being made to recruit half the battalion in the Transvaal, with the assistance of the permanent Volunteer staff of that Colony, the Transvaal Government, in acceding to the request, generously offered four companies of volunteers with Maxim, Signalling and Medical detachments under their own officers, fully armed and equipped, provided that Natal took over the arms and equipment, and paid and rationed the men. The offer was gratefully accepted. The Right Half of the battalion was accordingly formed in Johannesburg, and the Left in Durban. Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., was placed in command.<sup>2</sup> The Right and Left Halves, having received orders to proceed at once to Nkandhla, united at Nqutu on the 30th May, and reached Nomangci on the 4th June.

<sup>1</sup> It will presently be seen that Sigananda did not come in, at any rate, not on the day he had said he would do so.

<sup>2</sup> Among the other officers were : Major A. B. Boyd-Wilson, second in command ; Lieut.-Col. J. J. Furze, T.L.I. (temporarily assuming the rank of Major), commanding Right Half ; and Captain O. Schuller, T.L.I., Adjutant.



On the 24th May, Major Murray-Smith arrived at Empandhleni (1.30 p.m.) with his column, escorting a convoy of fifty-one waggons. This column, which had left Dundee on the 19th and travelled *viâ* Vant's drift, Nqutu and Nondweni, was made up as follows: N.M.R., 160; N.C., 100; N.R.R., 100, and details. At Nqutu, it was ascertained that Mehlokazulu had armed and joined Bambata. The intelligence was confirmed at Nondweni. Murray-Smith was ordered to return with all speed with the empty waggons to Dundee, and from thence, *viâ* Tugela Ferry, to join the Umvoti Field Force at Greytown. Squadron A, N.C., under Capt. G. R. Richards, was detached; it became bodyguard to the O.C. Troops.

Murray-Smith left Empandhleni on the 26th, travelling by the route taken on the forward journey. On arrival at 8 p.m. on the 28th at Nqutu magistracy, it was reported that Mehlokazulu intended to attack the village and convoy the same night. It is difficult to understand how such scare arose, for the Chief was known to have proceeded to Qudeni, whilst a strong column under Mackay was by then at Isandhlwana, within striking distance of his ward. The convoy reached Dundee on the 30th.

Leaving the N.R.R. at Dundee, and details at Helpmakaar, the N.M.R., instead of joining Leuchars *viâ* Tugela Ferry, proceeded by rail to Greytown, reaching that place on the 2nd June, and the Umvoti Field Force on the 3rd at Spitzkop.

To return to Nkandhla. When he received intelligence to the effect that a number of rebels were in hiding in a small, though dense, forest at Ensingabantu, near Qudeni, at which place there was a small store, McKenzie planned a night march, on the 24th, with the object of surrounding the forest before daylight the following morning. Guided by Sergt. E. Titlestad, Z.M.R., the force<sup>1</sup> left at dusk. It proceeded by a narrow footpath along the extraordinarily steep sides of the Devil's Gorge, where a false

<sup>1</sup> Consisting of 100 N.C. (this squadron—under Capt. G. R. Richards—is the one that arrived with Murray-Smith on the 24th), 100 Z.M.R., 300 R.H., 120 N.D.M.R., 20 T.M.R., 25 M.L., D.L.I., and 300 Natives.

step might easily have resulted in man or animal being precipitated forthwith into the Insuze, 1,000 feet below. A pack-horse, indeed, carrying ammunition did miss its footing, when it instantly rolled headlong into the vast, yawning gulf below. Merely to cross the drift at the bottom took three hours on that cold, dark and memorable night. Ntingwe was reached at 2 a.m. "Although a misty morning," says McKenzie, "the movement of surrounding the position was most accurately carried out, and when day broke, and the mist had lifted, the bush in which the rebels had been reported to be located was completely surrounded by a cordon of troops. Unfortunately, however, the enemy were not there, and although the bush and adjacent country were thoroughly searched, none of them could be found, although there was every trace of recent occupation of the ground."<sup>1</sup>

The same day, Inspector Dimmick, with 105 N.P., made a reconnaissance in the direction of Komo and Fort Yolland.

Returning to Nomangci on the 27th by the waggon road viâ Calverley's store, McKenzie, as a preliminary to attacking the rebels known to be concealed in the Nkandhla forests, moved the following day a few miles to the high and comparatively flat country at Dhlabe.

Although the campaign was being conducted without the direct assistance of the Imperial Government, the mother-country did not permit the proceedings to go on without taking a special interest therein. Major-General T. E. Stephenson, C.B., Commanding the Transvaal District, was deputed to witness some, at any rate, of the operations. He arrived at Nomangci, with his staff officer and aide-de-camp, on the 27th, when, as Colonel McKenzie's guest, several opportunities occurred, during the three weeks he was in the district, of observing what took place.

Early on the 29th May, there being ground for supposing a body of rebels lay concealed in the Tate valley, McKenzie took his force out to drive such valley. Some idea has already been given of the Nkandhla forests which, it was

<sup>1</sup> Report. September, 1906.



shown, are more or less connected and distributed over extremely rough and precipitous country. Although there are two forests in the Tate valley, they are generally regarded as not covered by the name Nkandhla, even though barely two miles from the nearest ones at the Mome. The gorge is even more remarkable in some respects than the Mome; it is narrower, and its sides, especially the eastern, are steeper; they are, moreover, studded with enormous boulders, and where the forests do not extend, they are covered with dense shrubs and undergrowth. The fastness does not continue beyond one and a quarter miles from where the Tate stream enters the Insuze, but throughout that distance, when artillery is wanting, can be defended with the greatest ease. On the day in question, notwithstanding that the natural difficulties appeared insurmountable, it was found that stockades had been erected, whilst the caves, too, had been blocked and loop-holed by the rebels in a surprisingly cunning and effective manner.

The Z.M.R., under Vanderplank, with Native levies, under London, moved down the western side of the valley; the rest of the column, *i.e.* a portion of R.H., with the squadron N.C., lined and drove down the eastern slopes to the stream at the bottom of the gorge. Two guns and pompoms were placed on Gun Hill to cover transport and the D.L.I., who formed the rear-guard. Mansel had been directed to co-operate by moving to block the mouth of the valley. These orders, however, were misunderstood; for he went to the Mome two miles away and proceeded to drive up that gorge for the rest of the day.

Colonel McKenzie, in order to conduct the operations better, took up a position on a large rock overhanging the eastern side of the gorge. It was from this place that he and Colonel Royston soon shot two rebels who, appearing below, were about to throw their assegais at them.

After the troops had begun to descend, about 600 cattle were seen being driven on the left slopes of the valley as if to escape. London, Hopkins, Walsh and Sergt. Waugh, all of Royston's Horse, who were with the levies, leaving

the Z.M.R. on higher ground, pushed on to do work at the bottom that had been intended for Mansel. Lieut. H. T. James moved with eight Z.M.R. to a spot about three-quarters of the way down.

On London and the others getting to the river, a ringed Native, who had hurled an assegai at one of the levies, was immediately shot. Some fifty temporary war-huts were found in an open glade, also five rebels. The huts were burnt, though later on. After the party had worked about ten yards up the river with some sixty levies, eight rebels sprang from behind a large boulder and ran off. It had evidently been their intention to way-lay the invaders, but, realizing that discretion was the better part of valour, made off up the stream, when three were shot. On the boulder referred to being reached, a number of rebels charged the party, shouting "Usutu! Usutu!" Just at that point the Tate makes a peculiar bend, the right bank being precipitous. Round this the enemy, about seventy, rushed forward, and threw their assegais. These were badly aimed, no doubt owing to the demoralizing effect caused by London's firing "loopers" from a shot-gun at a distance of fifteen to twenty yards. The attack did not last more than a minute, after which the rebels disappeared behind the bend. A few feeble attempts at attack were next made by fifteen to twenty at a time. It was noticed "Usutu! Usutu!" was shouted a few seconds before actually charging, thereby giving the impression that the enemy wanted to stir up courage, forgetting that shouting gave warning of their intention. In the meantime, Lieuts. Shepstone and Richardson, also with levies, were engaged in the rear. Rebels who had evaded the foremost party were prevented by them from escaping towards the Insuze.

Intelligence was at this stage received of the presence of a large *impi* further up the ravine. London, feeling he was not strong enough, sent to Vanderplank for reinforcements and awaited a reply. Word came back at 2 p.m. to the effect that those engaged below were to withdraw and return to camp. An unsuccessful appeal for help was



also made to nine or ten Z.M.R. who happened to be within reach. Efforts to make the main body of R.H. hear were futile, owing to these men being too high up, consequently the party had the mortification of having to withdraw with the enemy in its immediate front.

Tpr. T. Malone, R.H., was shot about 2 p.m. through the neck by a rebel who was below him. The rebel was killed and the Martini-Henry rifle he had was recovered.

During the day, over forty of the enemy were killed, and over 400 cattle, besides many goats, seized. Had Mansel's column combined in the operations, they must have proved much more successful. The moral effect of these operations was, nevertheless, very great, for, as subsequently remarked by the enemy, they realized they had no stronghold or retreat that could be regarded as secure when attacked by McKenzie's men.

The troops camped that night close to and east of London's Kop. During the evening, news was brought that the waggon of a Mr. Davis, who had been authorized to keep a dry canteen, had been looted by rebels in the main Nkandhla forest. It seems the vehicle had been unable to keep up with the transport belonging to the column. It followed as best it could, but being late, and the column out of sight, the owner decided to leave it to its fate. The waggon, in charge of its Native driver, continued along the road through a portion of the forest. It was captured shortly after and driven into the forest, the driver and voorlooper being taken prisoners. The Z.M.R. investigated the matter on the following morning. Responsibility for the loss fell wholly on the owner, who had been duly warned of the risks he was running.

Early on the 30th, accompanied by the guns and pom-poms, McKenzie made a further reconnaissance of the Mome valley from the heights on the immediate west. At noon, the whole of the Tate valley was thoroughly driven. R.H. and D.L.I. (under Lieut.-Col. Royston) took part in the drive, the former being, of course, dismounted. The N.C. proceeded to the west side of the gorge to prevent rebels escaping in that direction towards

Macala. The Native levies (under London) also took part. They drove up the valley from its mouth as far as the other troops, which had entered higher up and worked down the stream. Twenty-one rebels were killed ; the operations, which were of a very arduous nature, much of the climbing having to be done up and down exceedingly steep and rocky places, lasted the whole day. Notwithstanding the difficulties, as great as any that could have been encountered in the Mome valley, every man performed the work required of him in an eminently satisfactory manner.

The bodies of eighteen of those killed the day before were found in one cave, and twelve in another, dragged thither by their relatives. Two instruments of strange workmanship and evidently regarded as ' firearms ' were also found. They were made of wood and cartridge cases, the latter telescoped slightly into one another, with bands of metal ingeniously bound round where the joins occurred. One of these curios—they were nothing more—had two barrels, the other one.

By this time, the Government, having realized the necessity of appointing an officer in supreme command of all the forces in Zululand and Natal, with the object of ensuring effective combination over the large areas occupied and traversed by the enemy, decided to appoint McKenzie to the position. The appointment took effect on the 30th May. Nor was it too soon that the step was taken. Although Leuchars had done his best to co-operate, notably on the day of the general converging movement on the grave (17th), his efforts, through his not having received earlier notice, were not as effective as they might have been. There were instances of lack of combination in other directions. As regards Mackay, the Commandant of Militia had intended he should remain at Helpmakaar, to keep in check the large tribes of that part known to be disaffected. Owing to misunderstanding, however, arising out of communicating through the telephone over a long distance, Mackay had moved to operate down the left



bank of the Buffalo in Zululand,<sup>1</sup> that being the side on which, from his recent experience, he considered his efforts would prove most useful—not so much to engage the enemy, as to force him to concentrate at Nkandhla. Whether this view was right or not, the fact of Mackay's leaving the position assigned him, revealed weakness in the arrangements, which, it was considered, would be best remedied by investing an officer in the field with power to immediately control the actions of every column.

Having already begun to deal with the problem at Nkandhla, McKenzie decided to remain where he was and personally direct the operations at that place. Leuchars, who had hitherto so ably conducted them in Natal, was accordingly requested to continue as he had been doing, until McKenzie, having accomplished what was necessary at Nkandhla, was free to undertake immediate supervision elsewhere.

<sup>1</sup> His column then consisted of the whole of N.C., Right and Left Wings (excepting D squadron); a section, N.F.A.; and the Estcourt, Ladysmith, Dundee, and Newcastle Reserves.

Mackay, of course, knew that Helpmakaar was an important strategical post, but, with the recent removal of Kula, the still more recent smashing up of Mtele's and Nondubela's factions by Murray-Smith, and his own operations round about Mahlaba (see p. 267), he decided to recommend his moving to Nqutu district in order to drive on to McKenzie the local and other rebels known to be there. Believing the recommendation had been approved by the Commandant, which, however, was certainly not the case, he took with him the troops referred to. This meant that Helpmakaar became practically evacuated, for the N.M.R., until recently posted at Helpmakaar, got orders from the Commandant on the 25th, when at Nkandhla, to join the U.F.F. at Greytown as speedily as possible. Had Mackay known that his action involved the almost total evacuation of Helpmakaar, he probably would not have taken with him as many troops as he did.

## XII.

### OPERATIONS BY (a) UMVOTI FIELD FORCE, (b) MACKAY'S COLUMN.—BATTLE OF MPUKUNYONI.

BEFORE proceeding to describe McKenzie's further operations at Nkandhla, it is necessary to turn to the Natal side of the Tugela, and see what account was being given of itself by the Umvoti Field Force. Except for his co-operating with McKenzie, Barker, and Mansel on the 17th May, in the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave, the last we saw of Leuchars was when his force, having failed to get in touch with Bambata at Mpanza, withdrew to Greytown on April the 11th.

Although Bambata had escaped, there was still work to be done in the ex-Chief's ward. A composite squadron (100), under Major S. Carter, accordingly proceeded thither on Thursday the 12th to destroy rebels' kraals and capture stock, as well as escort members of the Natal Telegraph Corps on their way to repair the line recently cut in a couple of places. This force remained in the thorns until Saturday night, when all the stock that had been captured was brought back, including four prisoners. The troops had been accompanied by Funizwe, Bambata's own younger brother. This man pointed out the kraals of rebels and generally assisted the troops in other ways.

A squadron (62) under Capt. W. J. Gallwey, was sent on Sunday the 15th to Krantzkop (Hopetown), where there was much unrest. The Reserves of that part had, in consequence, mobilized and gone with the other European residents into lager.<sup>1</sup> Those of the ordinary

<sup>1</sup> By this time, Van Rooyen and his men had got back from Zululand.



Native Police employed at the magistracy, who were members of more or less disaffected tribes in the immediate vicinity, and therefore suspected of being disloyal, were replaced by others from Estcourt division.

By this time, Magwababa, who, it will be recollected, had been carried off some distance by Bambata, had returned from Pietermaritzburg. He, Funizwe and others were interviewed by Leuchars at Greytown in regard to the future management of the tribe. A few loyalists, whose kraals had been burnt and their stock seized by mistake, were told that compensation, assessed by a Board, would be paid by the Government.

Between the 13th and 19th, the country round about Greytown was thoroughly patrolled. On the latter day, a sale of loot stock, captured in Bambata's ward, was held, realizing nearly £2,000.

Capt. J. Stuart, N.F.A., was, on the 21st, sent with Funizwe and four other Natives to Empandhleni. These Natives were required by the Commissioner in Zululand for identifying rebels of Bambata's tribe whenever necessary. The party, travelling by Ngubevu drift and Qudeni, reached their destination on the 23rd.

Much disquieting information was received about this time at Krantzkop, chiefly from members of tribes adjacent to Nkandhla district. One of the Chiefs, Hlangabeza, assembled his tribe although his application to do so had been refused by the Magistrate. The Intelligence Officer at this important post was Capt. M. Landsberg, U.M.R., whose information from the date of his assumption of duty to the conclusion of the Rebellion was remarkably full and accurate.

Leuchars visited Krantzkop on the 22nd, finding the defences highly satisfactory.

A company of the Natal Royal Rifles was dispatched on the 26th April to Krantzkop to take up the garrison duties being performed by the U.M.R. squadron. Capt. J. Fraser and forty men, N.R.R., came to Greytown to replace those sent to Krantzkop. At this time, it was ascertained that many loyalists were crossing from

Zululand into Natal.<sup>1</sup> The Chiefs were accordingly warned to report all refugees and cattle entering their wards.

Lieut. J. H. C. Nuss, with thirty men, was directed by Leuchars to proceed to Keate's Drift, Mooi River, to relieve the N.P. stationed there; the latter travelled by rail to Gingindhlovu and joined Mansel's column at Fort Yolland on the 2nd May, three days before the action at Bobe.

The attitude of the Chiefs Gayede and Hlangabeza continued for some time to cause much apprehension, especially owing to their being so close to the disaffected areas in Zululand, and from the fact that many inter-marriages were known to have taken place between their tribes and those in the Nkandhla district. As a result of this intimacy, many refugees fled into their wards. On one occasion, Mbuzana, of Mpumela's tribe, crossed into Gayede's ward for protection with the inmates of twenty-eight kraals. Strict orders were given that invasion of their wards by rebels was to be resisted by force. It was discovered that they were not properly guarding the drifts, and, in fact, acting as spies on behalf of the enemy. To so great an extent did they sympathize with the rebels that, had our arms suffered a reverse, they would probably have rebelled. As it was, a portion of Tshutshutshu's tribe was reported to be arming and eleven kraals of Gayede's tribe as having joined Sigananda,<sup>2</sup> whilst small batches of Ngobizembe's (in Mapumulo division) proceeded to Nkandhla, some of them already doctored for war.

News arrived on the 30th that rebels were busy removing grain from their kraals to the forests at Nkandhla. A patrol of fifty men from the U.F.F. visited Middle Drift.

On the 1st May, the U.F.F. marched to a position near the Inadi, where it was joined by the squadron

<sup>1</sup> In consequence of Bambata's and Sigananda's *impis'* raiding tactics. Many cattle were at the same time driven into Natal.

<sup>2</sup> Two of Gayede's sons were killed in the action at Bobe.



that had been posted at Krantzkop, as well as by about eighty of the First Umvoti Reserves, under Chief Leader J. A. Nel.<sup>1</sup>

A patrol by a squadron was made through Sibindi's ward, the tribe much appreciating the action. Owing to this Chief's activity on behalf of the Government, he had become intensely disliked by the many who were in sympathy with the rebels, with the result that his people were in danger of attack at any moment by Gayede's tribe, or other neighbouring ones.

A squadron U.M.R., under Capt. E. Simkins, with forty Reserves from Krantzkop, proceeded on the 5th to Watton's store, in consequence of information to the effect that an *impi* had been seen in that locality, and that the store had been looted and burnt; the intelligence was subsequently found to be correct. The party crossed into Nkandhla district, destroyed several kraals there and seized about sixty cattle.

These cattle were subsequently claimed by loyalists of Mpumela's tribe, who had taken refuge in Natal. The stock had been driven by them to graze across the river in Zululand, *i.e.* in the district from which they had recently fled. After inquiry of the Commissioner in Zululand, the stock was restored to the claimants.

At this time, many women and children belonging to Bambata's tribe were wandering about without sufficient food, and hiding in bushes in the wards of Bambata, Sibindi and Silwana. Sibindi asked permission to collect those in his ward and take them to Greytown. On permission being granted, all who came in were fed and well looked after. A suggestion by Leuchars that a concentration camp should be erected for them at Pietermaritzburg was not acted upon. All the women had, therefore, to be placed temporarily in charge of their

<sup>1</sup> The strength and disposition of Leuchars' forces, at 3rd May, was as follows: At *Mazongwane* (high up Inadi River)—U.M.R., 192; N.F.A., 37; N.M.C., 3; N.V.C., 2; N.T.C., 6. At *Greytown*—N.R.R., 44; N.S.C., 6; U.M.R., 7; Reserves, 81. At *Krantzkop*—N.R.R., 58; Reserves, 81; U.M.R., 5; N.S.C., 1. At *Keate's Drift*—U.M.R., 31. At *Mapumulo*—U.M.R., 20.

relations, *i.e.* members of adjoining tribes that had hitherto remained loyal.

Requiring in the field a larger force of mounted men than was already at his disposal, Leuchars, on the authority of the Commandant, caused the First Greytown Reserves to be re-mobilized and to proceed to Greytown to relieve the Umvoti District Reserves, who thereupon joined him at the farm "Solitude," some six miles from Krantzkop magistracy and nearer the Tugela.

Persistent rumours were afloat to the effect that Gayede and Hlangabeza's tribes would join the rebels should the latter invade Natal. It was also reported on reliable authority that large numbers of Kula's tribe were in arms under that Chief's uncle Mtele in the Umsinga division. It further transpired that Gobeyana, a son of Gayede, had actually asked his father's permission to arm the tribe and aid the enemy, after Bambata, flying from Mpanza, had gone through his ward. Permission was, however, refused.

On the other hand, an offer of help was received from Chief Ngqambuzana of Weenen division in the event of its being required by the Government.

In consequence of the Zululand Field Force being sent to Nkandhla—arriving there, as has been seen, on the 8th May—it now became necessary for Leuchars to co-operate as much as possible in connection therewith, without, however, actually crossing into Zululand, except for a few hours at a time. This policy, which was quite in harmony with the Commandant's general plan of campaign and, indeed, formed an essential part thereof, was adhered to so long as Nkandhla continued to be the principal rallying-ground of the rebels. The U.F.F. accordingly confined its attentions primarily to the rugged regions immediately south of the Tugela and lying between Middle Drift and Ngubevu. Thus, whilst keeping such powerful Chiefs as Silwana, Hlangabeza and Gayede in check, by constantly demonstrating in or near their tribes, the column was, at the same time, in the position of being able to assist materially in Zululand in any



extensive, quickly-executed operations the O.C. at Nkandhla might wish to undertake.

Moving to "Solitude" on the 10th, Leuchars, on the 11th, having heard that the rebels were in strength at Macala, marched at 2 a.m. with 150 U.M.R. and 60 Umvoti Reserves for Watton's Drift. He reached it at sunrise and, crossing at once, occupied ridges facing the drift. None of the enemy were to be seen. He then proceeded for about eight miles down the river, clearing a belt of country on the left bank to a width of five or six miles. Returning to a spot opposite the drift, the column, after a halt, moved up the Manyane valley to a point immediately below and about 1,500 yards from the Macala bush. Numbers of the enemy could be seen scouting on the hill-tops, but they would not allow the troops to come within range. The Tugela drift was reached at 5, and the camp at "Solitude" at 8 p.m. The eighteen hours' march, with but two halts, through exceedingly rough country, was well borne by man and beast.

Owing to difficulties as regards water, the U.F.F. was obliged to move to the farm "Spekfontein" and nearer to Krantzkop magistracy. Further intelligence was there received from different sources betraying a strong disposition on the part of Chiefs Kula in Umsinga, Gayede in Krantzkop, and Meseni, Mtamo, Ndhlovu, Swaimana and Ngobizembe in Mapumulo, divisions, to rebel as soon as others like Mehlokazulu had actually begun to fight in Zululand. Swaimana personally was loyal, though practically the whole of his tribe was the reverse. The various tribes in Mapumulo division were, moreover, observed to be openly carrying arms. Their demeanour was insolent. The people of Ngobizembe's tribe were being doctored for war. The kraals of loyalists, too, near Hot Springs<sup>1</sup> were being burnt by rebels. Chief Mpumela applied for permission to come into Natal, as he was being harassed by the enemy. This Leuchars

<sup>1</sup> These springs are in the bed of the Tugela River, some nine miles from Krantzkop.

refused to grant, instructing him to place himself under the protection of the nearest column in Zululand.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Leuchars resolved to make a dash into Zululand through Middle Drift. After moving to Krantzkop on the 14th, he marched to the drift, reaching it at 5 a.m.<sup>1</sup> Here the N.R.R. were left, also a squadron U.M.R.; the remainder of the force moved to Hot Springs. The 15-pounders, with a troop U.M.R., were placed on a position commanding the opposite country. The rest of the force operated in Zululand in a north-easterly direction. Many kraals were destroyed and 400 cattle captured, also goats. Small parties of the enemy were seen and fired on, ten being killed; as a rule, however, they were careful to keep on the hill-tops and beyond rifle range. "An unfortunate accident," says Leuchars, "occurred during the operations, which resulted in the wounding of a woman and a child. Two men were observed running across a mealie-field and were fired upon at about 1,000 yards. They escaped, but the woman and child, who were hiding in a mealie hut past which the men ran, were wounded. The medical officer attended to them and they were placed in charge of an elderly male prisoner who was released to take care of them."

The column returned to Hot Springs at 3 p.m. Here it was found the goats would not face the water, so had to be left. While crossing the remainder of the stock, a few shots were fired at those engaged in the work. Sibindi's men were left in charge of the goats, whilst Leuchars went on to Middle Drift. Presently, word came that the former had been again sniped at. A troop was immediately sent back, when a couple of rebels were observed crossing from an island to the Zululand side. One of them was captured. The goats were got across with great difficulty on the 16th.

It was at this stage that Leuchars received the invitation

<sup>1</sup> His force was composed as follows: U.M.R., 150; 1st Umvoti Reserves, 40; 2nd Umvoti Reserves, 30; Krantzkop Reserves, 50; N.F.A., two guns; N.R.R., 50; and 25 men of Sibindi's levy.



to co-operate in the general converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. His operations on that occasion have already been described on pp. 242-244.

The troops re-crossed the river at 7 a.m. on the 18th, reached Hot Springs camp at mid-day, and moved up to Krantzkop the following morning. The N.F.A. horses performed the heavy work required of them on this occasion without a hitch, although a section of the road up a steep cutting was greatly out of repair.

The country between Middle and Watton's Drifts having been fairly well cleared, Leuchars resolved to take his force viâ Inadi to Ngubevu, "so as to be in a position to co-operate with any column which might work towards the Mfongozi from the Zululand side." Nuss, at Keate's Drift, relieved by twenty-five N.R.R., and the detachment of the 1st Umvoti District Reserves, at Greytown, joined Leuchars at Ngubevu on the 21st. The 2nd U.D.R. were sent back to Greytown for demobilization. Leuchars' force now consisted of U.M.R. ; 1st U.D.R. ; and twenty Krantzkop Reserves.

Intelligence was received to the effect that a rebel *impi* under Mtele was camped where the Mazabeko stream joins the Buffalo, whilst Kula's brother Manuka, induna over that portion of the tribe which occupied the Mngeni valley, was in league with Mtele.<sup>1</sup>

Leuchars pitched his camp beside the Mfongozi road drift. A strong bush fence was erected round the camp. Here a message was received from Sibindi to say he was mobilizing and would join the U.F.F. forthwith. He was, however, directed to stand fast for the night. He came over on the 22nd, to say that if the column was crossing into Zululand, he would like to accompany it with his levy. Leuchars replied that he had no intention of doing this and instructed him to cross into the Umsinga

<sup>1</sup> Reports had been received as far back as the 19th ult. of messengers having come to Mtele from Mehlokazulu and Faku in Zululand asking him to co-operate. On his agreeing, Mehlokazulu instructed Kula through Mtele "to wait until fighting had commenced in earnest in Zululand, when he was to attack Pomeroy and then proceed against Greytown."

portion of his ward, and, after taking up a suitable position on his boundary, to watch the actions of Manuka's people whose ward was conterminous with his own. "This action of Sibindi in mobilizing his *impi*," says Leuchars, "was entirely voluntary, as I had not sent word to him of my intention to pass through his location."

A troop went into Zululand on the 23rd to reconnoitre. On the 24th, it was reported that Gunderson's store on the Qudeni had been looted, and that an *impi* of about 150 was in Hlatikulu forest (Qudeni). Further intelligence went to show that Manuka's section of Kula's tribe had risen and joined the rebels under Mtele and Mehlokazulu. It also appeared that the Kombe forest and Qudeni mountain generally were now the principal resorts of the enemy.

Being of the view that co-operation between the different columns was essential to success, Leuchars wired in this sense to the Commandant of Militia as well as to McKenzie and Mackay. The latter, on this day, was engaged operating in difficult country about Mahlaba, barely seven miles, as it happened, from Mpukunyoni hill (in Zululand), soon to become the scene of a notable action by Leuchars. Leuchars rode to Tugela Ferry, on the Pomeroy-Greytown road, on the 25th, to confer by telephone with the Commandant. At 9 p.m. he received a wire from McKenzie saying a column was being sent to the bush close to Ensingabantu store, and that it was timed to arrive there at dawn (26th). A messenger was thereupon sent by Leuchars to Major W. J. S. Newmarch, instructing him to proceed with three squadrons to the neck overlooking Mfongozi valley and there keep a sharp look-out for rebels who might fly from McKenzie. Leuchars joined Newmarch at 2.30 p.m. Small parties of the enemy were seen about Hlatikulu, but out of reach. Nothing was seen or heard of McKenzie's column. On Leuchars' retiring, a hundred or so of the enemy came out of Hlatikulu to watch his departure; owing, however, to the lateness of the hour and to difficult intervening country, no attempt was made to engage or trap them.



## OPERATIONS BY MACKAY'S COLUMN

Mackay left Empandhleni for Helpmakaar viâ Nondweni and Nqutu on the 11th May, returning by the same route he had taken on the forward journey. Nothing of importance occurred on the march. Nondweni was reached on the 13th.<sup>1</sup>

When at Empandhleni, he had received unsatisfactory accounts of Mehlokazulu's behaviour towards the Magistrate. Notwithstanding two or three orders to appear at the magistracy (Nqutu) he had failed to do so on the plea of ill-health. On reaching Nqutu, Mackay sent his Intelligence Officer, Capt. J. Stuart, accompanied by Sergt. Roberts, N.P., early on the 16th, to Mehlokazulu's kraal to instruct that Chief to meet him the same afternoon at Rorke's Drift. Stuart visited three kraals, but could not find Mehlokazulu; the latter purposely avoided a meeting. He vacated his third and furthest kraal Pumulefile (*with death comes rest*) at dawn, no doubt because suspicious of being in some way deceived. This kraal was at the foot of a precipice and reached only with difficulty by horsemen. Every effort was made to find him, but, in the absence of his induna, his mother and wives either did not know or would reveal nothing. In consequence of this well-intentioned mission—carried out in the belief that a man, for years notorious as one of the actual starters of the Zulu War of 1879, would probably wish not to be associated a second time with such nefarious practices—Mehlokazulu, realizing he had lost an opportunity of coming to the troops and explaining his conduct, forthwith quitted his kraal and ward and entered upon a mad career of open rebellion. He collected as many malcontents as he could from his own tribe—luckily, however, the majority of the tribe remained loyal to the Government—and combined with those on the

<sup>1</sup> When at Nondweni, a small party visited the spot where the Prince Imperial and others were killed during the Zulu War. The memorial cairn and graveyard, in charge of a Native headman, were found to be in good order.

opposite side of the Buffalo in Natal under Nondubela (Mavukutu) and Mtele, who had just clashed with the N.M.R. at Elands Kraal (12th May).<sup>1</sup> The amalgamated force, constantly threatened by Mackay's strong and active column, decided to move towards the storm-centre at Nkandhla, picking up recruits in Faku's and other Chiefs' wards on the way down. The largest number of accessions was obtained from the ancient Ntombela tribe under Faku (the last of Sir Garnet Wolseley's famous "thirteen kinglets"), whilst a few came from Matshana ka Mondise's and other tribes. The tribes of Mpiyake, Matshana ka Sitshakuza, Gadaleni, Nongamulana (a near relation of Bambata) and the Basutos, under Mayime, remained entirely loyal throughout the Rebellion.

The posting of a column near Helpmakaar, where Mackay arrived on the 14th May,<sup>2</sup> was a wise and far-sighted step on the part of the Commandant, for it had the effect of holding both Kula in Natal and Mehlokazulu in check. As it happened, the rebels fled before Mackay's column wherever it went, no doubt because of its being extra strong and because it traversed ground that did not afford much cover, though often difficult to operate in, especially near and on both sides of the Buffalo.

At 6 a.m. on the 23rd, all available men were promptly sent to defend Helpmakaar on receipt of a report that Mehlokazulu's *impi*, said to have just entered Natal, was about to attack the village. The news, however, turned out to be false.

Mackay operated on the 24th and 25th May in the exceedingly rough country about Mahlaba and Mahlabana (in Natal), barely seven miles as the crow flies from Mpukunyoni. This, together with his further moves in the direction of Rorke's Drift on the 26th, and Isandhlwana

<sup>1</sup> An account of the position and occurrences at Umsinga will be found in Chapter XV.

<sup>2</sup> It will be seen in Chapter XV., that a column (under Murray-Smith) was posted at Fort Murray-Smith, a couple of miles from Helpmakaar, simultaneously with the departure of the Zululand Field Force for Nkandhla from Dundee on the 1st May.



on the 27th, undoubtedly had the effect of driving the rebels from those parts of Natal and Zululand, further into Zululand, and, as it happened, right on to Leuchars, who, as will presently be seen, stepped across at Ngubevu to Mpukunyoni on the 27th and almost immediately came into conflict with a large force of the enemy.

As already explained, it was owing to a misunderstanding that Mackay, on the morning of the 26th, left his camp near Helpmakaar for Zululand.

At 9 p.m. (26th), Leuchars got a wire from Mackay, saying he was marching with a force 600 strong from Rorke's Drift on the 27th to operate about ten miles down the Buffalo river on the Zululand side. He at once decided to move into Zululand with a force and gain touch with Mackay, though he did not inform Mackay he was doing so.<sup>1</sup> Orders were sent to Sibindi (then in Umsinga division) to march his *impi* across the Buffalo to meet Leuchars in the vicinity of Ngqulu and Mpukunyoni hills, six miles west of Qudeni mountain. Owing to the country on both sides of the Buffalo being exceedingly broken, orders were given that only a top-coat or blanket, 3 lbs. of grain, and one day's rations were to be carried. The actual duration of the incursion was to be governed by circumstances, it being felt that, in case of necessity, the troops could easily live on the country for a week.

Getting away at 5.30 a.m. (27th), the force, consisting of 180 U.M.R. and 60 U.D.R., with the Krantzkop Reserves, after much severe climbing over rocky thorn country, reached the ledge about half-way up on the western face of Qudeni mountain.

On the way up, Colonel Leuchars' horse, which had got above him, fell. It knocked him down and rolled over him. But for a thorn bush, it must have gone to the bottom of the mountain. Leuchars, who was badly bruised and shaken, had great difficulty in getting along, either walking or riding. Although he must have been in great pain, he did not delay the column.

<sup>1</sup> Mackay was not advised, as the only means of communication, a telephone, was eighteen miles away.

A number of recently vacated huts belonging to disloyal members of Mbuzo's tribe were destroyed, as also supplies of grain found there. Many rebels could be seen on the mountain top, but as it was important to keep the appointment with Sibindi, the column was not delayed on their account.

As far as could be seen, there were no cattle in Mbuzo's ward, which lay to the right along the Tugela. All had apparently been removed to the top of the mountain. In Matshana ka Mondise's ward, however, there were large numbers, but they were for the most part the property of Matshana himself. They were not interfered with, as all the intelligence went to show that that Chief and the majority of his people were loyal, although five of his sons had rebelled. A number of kraals in the ward, belonging to rebels, were destroyed.

Matshana's kraal on the Qudeni was reached at 11.30 a.m., when an interview took place between Leuchars and the Chief. The latter was delighted to see a European force, as he was afraid lest the rebels, led by his sons—who wished him out of the way—should attack him. He was, therefore, sorry to learn the column would be in that part only a day or so, leaving him to protect himself as best he could in the absence of his loyal young men. These, in response to the Government's call, had gone off to assist at Nkandhla.

Guides were now furnished by the Chief, when the force moved to Mpukunyoni hill, reaching there at 12.30 p.m. After off-saddling for an hour at another of Matshana's kraals, the troops divided into three sections and proceeded to different positions on the long ridge opposite to, and immediately north of, Mpukunyoni. One of these bodies surprised a party of ten armed rebels driving cattle towards Faku's ward, nearly the whole of whose people were already in open rebellion. A troop, under Lieut. H. E. G. Fannin, was dismounted and sent to a small, wooded valley into which these rebels had fled. The valley was driven, with the result that eight Natives were killed and the cattle captured.



The other portions of the force had, in the meantime, gone off to the north-east into Faku's ward, where they burnt a number of kraals.

At 4.30 p.m. Sibindi joined Leuchars with about 1,100 men.

It now became necessary to select a site on which to bivouack for the night. The only water available was a little stream called Burobo, which flows from east to west, and about a mile from Mpukunyoni. Between the stream and Mpukunyoni the country is intersected by *dongas* which run from the base of the hill to open on to different parts of the stream. With the object of being near water, Leuchars selected an old mealie garden between two of the *dongas* referred to, and only 200 yards from the stream. This spot was by no means a good one for defensive purposes, being in the midst of broken and somewhat bush-covered country, with high tambookie grass, and commanded by high ground in several directions, especially on the immediate north. In other respects the ground was favourable for a Zulu army to operate in. The 'chest' could form up and advance unseen up a *donga* in one direction, whilst somewhat similar advantages were available for each of the 'horns.' From a soldier's point of view, therefore, the site was somewhat questionable. There was, indeed, safer ground higher up nearer the hill, but Leuchars was a diplomat as well as a soldier, and, with a lengthy experience in Natal, he thoroughly understood the Native character. He knew that manœuvring in itself would have little or no effect on the rebels. As at Nkandhla, a collision was essential, but to bring it about, it was necessary to give the enemy a fancied advantage.

The bivouac took the form of a square, each side of which was 120 yards long. Two squadrons U.M.R. (Headquarters and City) occupied the eastern face; one squadron U.M.R. (Noodsberg) and one squadron U.D.R. the southern; and Sibindi the other two faces. Sibindi's men were particularly adapted for night work, having magnificent eyesight, and a keen sense of hearing.

The squadron which had been operating on the north-east, returned at 6 p.m. to report having observed an *impi*, about the same size as Sibindi's, moving towards Mpukunyoni from high hills on the north-east. This force, Leuchars concluded, was moving away from Mackay. It was, however, too late then to operate against it.

Soon after the men had settled down for the night, a man arrived from Matshana ka Mondise to warn Leuchars to be particularly careful as the enemy was near by, and to point out that, in his opinion, the column had bivouacked in a dangerous locality.

Every precaution was taken to safeguard the square against surprise. Sentries and pickets were directed to be extra vigilant. During the night, which was a bitterly cold one, two false alarms occurred, one at 10.30 p.m., the other about 2 a.m., both caused by young sentries of Sibindi's levy. The alacrity with which every man sprang to his place, without the least confusion, was highly satisfactory.

At 4.30 a.m. all stood to arms. Half an hour later, a troop under Lieut. J. H. C. Nuss was sent out, with orders to reconnoitre in the direction in which the *impi* had been seen the previous evening. If it was not in sight, he was to go to a suitable hill and try and get into communication with Mackay by heliograph.

About 6 a.m., however, Nuss and his troop, after firing a couple of shots by way of alarm, rode back to report that the enemy was approaching in force and was close at hand. As he spoke, the latter could be heard shouting their war-cry "Usutu" as they advanced. In a few moments, a dark mass could be observed in the half-light of early dawn,<sup>1</sup> streaming rapidly over a small neck some 700 yards north-east of the square. They moved at once into the bed of the stream where, it so happened, the cattle seized by Leuchars on the preceding day had been left for the night. A smaller force (left 'horn') could, about the same time, be seen sweeping along the foot of Mpukunyoni in rear of the bivouac, as if to attack from

<sup>1</sup> The sun rose, on the day in question, at about 6.45 a.m.



the *donga* on the west. Another force, evidently the right 'horn,' detaching itself from the 'chest,' came down the stream to engage the north side of the square.

The attack opened at 6.15 a.m. on the eastern face, by the enemy causing the cattle, which they had driven ahead of them, to rush wildly at the square on emerging from the *donga* referred to. The order was thereupon given to fire, when, at the first volley, fifteen of the cattle fell within 15 or 20 yards of the troops. Two or three of those rebels who were advancing under cover of the cattle were also killed. This had the effect of checking the enemy's rush for a time. The rebels then proceeded to encircle the square, keeping well under the excellent available cover. Repeated attempts were made to rush at the bivouac through the open ground between it and the *dongas*, but, on each occasion, the attack was overwhelmed by steady, well-directed fire.

The fight had by now assumed practically all the characteristics peculiar to South African warfare. There were the Militia Reserves, the majority of them Dutchmen, their horses already saddled, prepared, in accordance with the practice of their forefathers, on being too hardly pressed, to mount and retire to the next ridge and again contend against overwhelming odds. There, too, were the Active Militia, most of them the descendants of Scotchmen or Englishmen, who, true to the custom of *their* ancestors, had, with saddles planted on the ground, taken shelter behind them, having come to stay and fight to the bitter end.

The enemy, again, delivered his attack in true Zulu style. The 'horns' had deployed from the 'chest' to right and left in the ancient orthodox manner with the idea of encircling, closing in on, and eventually massacring, their opponents to a man. Sibindi and his men, too, were there, though only at a later stage did they get a chance of exhibiting the martial instincts of their tribe.

Whilst the various attacks were in progress, the leaders urging the men to close in, it was observed that the enemy had approached to within 80 yards of Sibindi's men,

causing the latter to become a little nervous. It was accordingly considered necessary for all sides of the square to be held by riflemen. To do this, some were withdrawn from other parts, and the sides of the square reduced by about 20 yards. The movement, which took place about 6.45 a.m., was carried out with the utmost coolness, enabling the enemy to be opposed at every point with heavy, effective fire.

During the whole of this time, there had been an incessant fire from two or three men who were armed with modern weapons and concealed on the long high ridge on the north. They were between 700 and 800 yards from the square. This fire caused a considerable number of casualties, including Tpr. H. Steele, U.D.R., killed; Tprs. S. Mackenzie and P. Braithwaite, U.D.R., wounded; sub-Leader T. J. van Rooyen, Krantzkop Reserves, wounded (three places); twenty-one men of Sibindi's levy, wounded—three of them succumbing to their injuries within three hours. There were also many narrow escapes, and casualties among the horses. All but three of the casualties among the men were caused by Mauser bullets.

The whole of the cover on the ridge in question was carefully searched by picked marksmen. Later on a man, reported to be Faku's induna, was found dead there. The principal sniper, however, escaped, a man named Magadise.

Up to 7.30 a.m., Sibindi's men had remained practically inactive. When superseded by the riflemen, they had withdrawn into the square. They did not, however, like quitting the cover afforded by the grass. They then quietly abided the issue, sustaining the many casualties referred to whilst conforming to methods of warfare which must have appeared to them strange. When, however, the enemy's attacks became less vigorous, they realized that their turn to pursue must shortly arrive. The order came. In about five minutes, Sibindi got his men to charge. This they did strictly in accordance with the custom of their forefathers, shouting their tribal war-cry "Undi! Undi" as they bounded forth to deal destruction to their flying foes.



Many rebels escaped viâ the waterfall and down the great valley on the west of the square. Others were pursued up the ridge, and in numerous other directions. The levy alone succeeded in killing thirteen at the waterfall.

A squadron was sent in pursuit of those that had attacked from the *donga* on the west and then retreated round Mpukunyoni. Troops were, moreover, sent in pursuit to the north-east. One of these discovered the enemy's blankets, etc., at a kraal about one and a half miles off. The things had been left there just prior to attacking.

The dead were counted in the scrub and *dongas* immediately round the lager, fifty-seven bodies being found, exclusive of those killed by Sibindi's men. The aggregate was probably not less than a hundred. Among the slain was Babazeleni, Faku's chief induna and principal commander of the *impi*.


The losses sustained by the Reserves were attributed by Leuchars to their having saddled up when the alarm was given, and stood on their line with the bridles over their arms. The saddled horses naturally afforded a good target for the snipers.

The wounded were attended to by Dr. C. H. Crass, N.M.C., who, with three members of the Signalling Corps as assistants, performed his duties during the action and afterwards in an eminently satisfactory manner.

The attacking rebels proved to be only about 800 strong. They were composed of Faku's and Mtele's tribes, with some from Makafula and Mehlokazulu. A number of them were Christians. One of these, as was proved from a pocket-book found on him, was a certificated preacher of the Gordon Memorial Mission, Natal.

Owing to several of the wounded having to be carried on improvised stretchers, to there being no sign of Mackay, and to the enemy having been seen at Qudeni on the 27th, Leuchars resolved to return to Ngubevu, though by a different route, namely viâ Ngqulu, the Buffalo valley and Sibindi's location.

The return journey began at 10.30 a.m., but proved




# MPUKUNYONI

Dispositions are at moment impi appeared on the neck near A

SCALE: 4 inches = 1 mile. Contours Ver. Int. = 30 ft.  
 0 100 200 300 400 500 yards

- REFERENCE**
- A = Position of the cattle
  - B = Where first attack began
  - C = Point of subsequent attack. Enemy advanced to C under cover of donga
  - D = Point of another attack,—from the river bed
  - E and F = Enemy's snipers; most destructive was at E
  - G = Waterfall; many escaped here
  - H = Where enemy stopped before attacking. Clothing left at the two trees near by
  - J = Luchars' square
  - K = Where Nuss was when he caught sight of impi
  - ☾ = Enemy
  - = Lines of enemy's advance





most arduous on account of the wounded having to be carried by relays of U.M.R., the Reserves, and Sibindi's levy. After the column had gone three or four miles, gun fire could be heard, and shells were seen bursting on Hlazakazi Mountain, about eight or nine miles to the north in a direct line.<sup>1</sup>

A halt was called at the Buffalo at 3 p.m., after which the column moved on to the Copper Syndicate Works on Umsinga Mountain, where Steele was buried.

In consequence of having stabbed and killed a number of the enemy, Sibindi's men, on the march back, carried their assegais, as customary on such occasions, with the blades upwards. On getting to the Buffalo, they bound certain green rushes round their heads, and otherwise doctored and cleansed themselves.

The column moved further up the same mountain and, at 7 p.m., bivouacked for the night at the kraal of Sikota, one of Sibindi's indunas.<sup>2</sup>

At 11 a.m. on the same day, Leuchars sent a message to Lieut. M. W. Bennett, N.F.A., who was in charge of the camp at Ngubevu, directing him to send bread for the troops, also medical comforts and stretchers for the

<sup>1</sup> Mackay camped at Isandhlwana on the night of the 27th. He operated at Malakata on the morning of the 28th, and at Hlazakazi at 1.30 p.m. on the same day.

<sup>2</sup> On Sibindi's levy getting within about three miles of the kraal of Nyonyezwe, the minor for whom Sibindi was acting, they started to sing their ancient, tribal war-song. Up to that moment, the women had been in hiding in various places, owing to uncertainty as to whether the *impi* they had, two or three hours before, seen descending to the Buffalo from the direction of Mpukunyoni, was the enemy, or men of their own tribe. The sun had, in the meantime, set, and it had begun to get dark. On recognizing the old familiar song, and realizing that their men were returning triumphant, they forthwith emerged from their respective hiding-places and kraals, and, one and all, wherever, on the bush-covered mountain, they happened to be, accorded their heroes so weird and fantastic a greeting as will not quickly be forgotten by the European troops who had the privilege of hearing and witnessing it. At least sixty to seventy women, faces smeared with light-coloured clay, and carrying little hand-brooms, with leaves bound round their ankles, approached the advancing column, shrieking at the top of their voices as they ran about: "*Ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki, ki,—Kuhle kwetu!*" (Oh! joy in our homes!) The oft-repeated cries were heard in all directions. Not only did this serve as a welcome to the warriors, but as an alarm to all of the tribe who were too far off to hear the famous war-song.



wounded. These reached the column about 3 a.m. on the 29th.

The march was resumed at 7 a.m. on the following morning, the camp at Ngubevu being reached at 1 p.m.

The Krantzkop Reserves were now sent back to Krantzkop, with orders for the Second and Third Krantzkop Reserves to demobilize.

At the moment Leuchars was dealing the enemy a heavy blow at Mpukunyoni (28th), Mackay was operating in difficult country about Malakata and Hlazakazi mountains, some fifteen and eleven miles respectively from Mpukunyoni in a direct line.

Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton, N.C., on Mackay's departure, was sent to take command at Helpmakaar. He directed Mackay to return; the order was, however, countermanded by Leuchars, who, as has already been observed, was put in command of all the forces in Natal. Mackay was thereupon instructed to continue to operate in Nqutu and western portions of Nkandhla divisions as an independent column.

Between the 28th May and 10th June, Mackay operated between Isandhlwana and Madhlozi mountain. On the 28th, a reconnaissance was made in the direction of a well-watered valley of vast extent known as Mangeni, in which some 2,000 head of cattle and many goats were discovered, evidently placed there by Natives for safety. Mehlokazulu and two or three followers were observed on the east side of the valley hurriedly escaping towards Qudeni. It being too late to seize the stock, steps were taken early the following morning to collect and bring it to camp. On other days, special pains were taken in the wards of Makafula, Faku and other Chiefs to ascertain promptly the kraals of rebels, especially such as had joined the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni. The stock belonging to them was thereupon seized and, after returning what was proved to belong to loyalists—done on the advice of a specially-appointed Board—the balance was sent forward to Dundee to be sold by public auction.

Whilst Mackay was encamped at Mangeni, information was received to the effect that Mehlokazulu, Mtele and other rebel leaders, had, two weeks prior to attacking Leuchars, assembled their men at a kraal overlooking Mangeni and there had them formally doctored for war. As, however, the kraal in question was within view of Helpmakaar, although hardly less than twenty-five miles away, it was deemed unsafe for the ceremonies to take place in its immediate vicinity, for fear lest the European troops stationed there, then 800 strong, should, by means of field-glasses and what not, see what was being done! A spot close by, but well out of sight, was accordingly chosen, and there the ceremonies were performed on orthodox lines, two head of cattle being killed for the *impi*. There were two doctors. The principal one was Magadise, afterwards, as has been seen, one of the snipers at Mpukunyoni. It was here, too, that Mehlokazulu declared his policy to be to wait and see what the white people intended doing. He would not, he said, go forward and assume the offensive, but wait to be attacked, when a stubborn resistance would be offered. After being doctored, the bulk of the forces were accordingly told to return to their kraals and await further orders. This advice was publicly approved by Babazeleni, the man of Faku's tribe who commanded and was killed at Mpukunyoni. It was about this time, too, that the small store, a mile from the kraal where the doctoring took place, was burnt to the ground.

Among the Chiefs who attended the above gathering was Makafula. He went because his ward had been chosen by Mehlokazulu as a convenient rallying-point for the insurgents in that part of the country. He was much afraid of the notorious Chief, who might have caused him to be attacked and exterminated forthwith had he held back. Mackay, it will be remembered, did not leave Empandhleni for Helpmakaar, viâ Nondweni, till the 11th May, which was just about the day that the above doctoring took place. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Makafula temporarily identified himself with the rebels solely because of there being no European



troops in the vicinity to which he could have gone for protection. His act would, nevertheless, have been regarded as treasonable had not the Chief immediately dispatched a messenger to the local magistrate, Mr. Hignett, to report exactly what he had done, and by what reasons he had been actuated in so doing. "Acting on my advice," says the Magistrate (who had presided over the district for over six years), "though desirous of retiring from his ward, he (Makafula) remained at his post at great personal risk, and, under the pretence of interesting himself in the rebel designs, acted as an informant." Predicaments of this kind frequently occurred in various parts of the Colony, and, too impatient to personally inquire into the circumstances, commanding officers sometimes concluded that sedition had been committed, when the act had sprung from motives entirely dissociated from a spirit of disloyalty. When rebellion breaks out it is, of course, difficult to weigh and consider evidence that is at all involved, the impulse being to assume from even the most trivial indications that the worst has happened, and, therefore, that the most severe punishment must be meted out at once to fit the supposed crime.

Among the Chiefs who afforded Mackay assistance in the way of scouts was the Basuto Mayime. His people had been settled in the country ever since the Zulu War, having been granted land in consideration of notable services rendered by them during that campaign.

Mackay's operations at this time were confined to those parts of Nqutu district that abutted on the Buffalo river. He operated in, and thoroughly patrolled, such parts as Isandhlwana, Malakata, Hlazakazi and Mangeni. Steps were taken to ascertain all kraals from which Natives had deserted to join the rebels, whereupon their stock was seized and confiscated. Owing to these measures, which included the destruction of Mehlokazulu's most important kraal, Mackay assisted materially in causing the situation at Nkandhla to mature, besides restraining many from rebelling through fear of their stock being looted by the enemy. But for such activity, Mehlokazulu, for instance,

would not have amalgamated his forces with those of Bambata as soon as he did. Mackay, in fact, compelled the foregoing, Mtele, Nondubela and other leaders, with their followers, to act with greater precipitation than it was in their interest to do. Had more time been allowed, it is more than likely that a far greater *impi* would have been raised in Nqutu district than the one that actually went forward to Nkandhla. If, again, Mehlokazulu had been afforded the opportunity, it is not improbable he would have resorted to tactics similar to those adopted by Bambata and Siganda towards seemingly neutral or half-hearted tribes, *i.e.* dragooned them, by seizure of stock, etc., into taking up arms against the Government.

The Reserves attached to Mackay's column were ordered, on the 5th June, to demobilize at Helpmakaar. The excellent services rendered by the men whilst in the field were suitably acknowledged by the Commanding Officer.

When McKenzie was appointed to take supreme command in Natal and Zululand (30th May), Leuchars was instructed to continue to command all troops in Natal as well as those in Nqutu district, though in future under McKenzie.

After placing Newmarch in temporary command of the U.F.F., with Capt. W. N. Angus as staff officer, Leuchars proceeded with Carter via Greytown to Helpmakaar to direct operations from that point.



### XIII.

#### FURTHER OPERATIONS BY ZULULAND FIELD FORCE.—ACTION AT MANZIPAMBANA.—ENEMY DECIDES TO MOVE IN FORCE TO MOME.

HITHERTO McKenzie's efforts to come into conflict with the enemy had met with comparatively little success, and this in spite of the fact that the Zululand Field Force had been over three weeks on the spot. Ever since the force arrived, the men had, indeed, been kept particularly busy. Reconnaissances had been carried out time after time in Insuze valley and at Nkandhla by McKenzie, and in the neighbourhood of Macala and Qudeni by Barker, four columns had made a converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (the enemy's headquarters), then had come Siganda's negotiations for surrender, the reconnoissance to Macala, followed by further activity in the directions of Tate, Mome and Komo. In the course of the operations, many rebels had been come across, but as they were nearly always in small parties, it was impossible for those unacquainted with the peculiar conditions to repress feelings of disappointment with the results that had been achieved by the end of May, especially as intelligence went to show that Bambata and Company were at the head of at least 1,000 men, and that these numbers were constantly increasing. Where was this ever-vanishing *impi*? What was the best way of making it fight? That was the problem McKenzie was called on to solve. He had not merely to be ready to fight when it suited him to do so, but to hunt for the rebels and make them fight, however much in favour of the latter locality and time might

happen to be. His difficulties were, therefore, primarily and, indeed, almost entirely of a strategical character. He, of course, knew of the rebels' perpetually shifting from one place to another on purpose to avoid a conflict, and, at the same time, of always being on the alert to take advantage of detached sections of the troops. That such were their methods had of itself required time to ascertain. The methods were novel. There was nothing of that kind during the Zulu War.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes the enemy would be at Nkandhla, at others at Macala. At each of these places there were dense forests and rocky hiding-places. The intervening country, moreover, was exceedingly rough, but so well known to the rebels that they could travel over it by night with the greatest ease. In these circumstances, in addition to robbing them of all food supplies to be found about Nkandhla, the O.C. came to the conclusion that the only policy was to drive the forests in as thorough and systematic a manner as possible. But to carry this out effectively with the men at his disposal was out of the question. That, at any rate, was the view of General Stephenson and other competent authorities. Hence he was compelled to adopt procedure which he felt might easily fail in actually cornering the enemy. However, in order that the best might be done, he decided to undertake and persevere with the drives. These it was necessary to carry out section by section, as it was quite impracticable, owing to their magnitude and interconnection, to attempt the whole of the forests in one day. If the enemy's strategy was to keep shifting about, the troops could at least help him to shift about a little more, and perhaps rather more than he had intended to do.

Whilst the troops, after operating at Tate gorge, were taking a much-needed rest on the 31st May, Mansel and Barker were summoned to Nomangci. Colonel McKenzie then proceeded with these and other officers to the heights

<sup>1</sup> Small parties of troops were, of course, sometimes swooped down on suddenly in 1879 and overwhelmed, *e.g.* the Prince Imperial's party and the Intombi disaster. Such tactics, however, were merely incidental or subsidiary to those generally practised.



above Mome valley, where the proposed drives were to begin, and explained the plans he had in mind for the following day.

On the 1st June, all the troops moved out at an early hour. When daylight appeared, Gun Hill had already been occupied by two 15-pounders, N.F.A., and two pompoms. The valley was heavily shelled and searched in every direction from above, as well as by Mansel from below, but without much result. The men then proceeded on foot with the Native levies to drive both sides and bottom of the valley in the following order: McKenzie's worked down the western slopes, whilst Mansel's ascended the ridge on the east as far as Esipongweni peak, near Siganda's kraal, Enhlweni, and then down towards the river bed.

McKenzie's men, consisting of 400 R.H., 150 Z.M.R., 140 D.L.I., 100 N.P., and 100 Nongqai, or about 900 in all,<sup>1</sup> with about the same number of Native levies, moved in single file down an open ridge along the north edge of Esigqumeni forest and in the direction of the waterfall. On entering the forest, the Nongqai and levies were distributed along the line of troops. When the head of the column had got within a few yards of the Mome stream, "files right" was given, which brought the troops into line formation facing down the stream and towards the stronghold. The shelling from Gun Hill began when the head of the column was about half-way down, and continued until it had reached the Mome. Mansel's guns shelled the same forests from the mouth of the valley. Many of the shells burst over the troops, whilst others did so at the proper place. The column halted whilst Eziwojeni forest was being shelled. During the shelling, which lasted nearly an hour, one of R.H. was grazed across the forehead by one of the bullets of a shrapnel shell, whilst one of the levies was struck by a shell on the leg and seriously wounded. The troops remained in line formation until the right flank was in position.

Whilst waiting for the order to advance, one of General Stephenson's staff officers (who was with one or two

<sup>1</sup> N.C. remained with the O.C. troops at Gun Hill during the drive.

others), when in the act of taking a photograph, was fired at by a rebel at a distance of about twenty yards. The charge, evidently one of slugs, luckily struck no one. One of the officers immediately fired three times with his revolver in the direction the shot had come from. This caused a little confusion, as some of the men, believing the enemy to be near, also began firing ahead. Just before resuming the advance, three volleys were fired in the direction to be traversed in order to clear the way. The left flank kept as close to the Mome as possible. Progress was slow on account of the abnormally steep and difficult nature of the ground.

Just above the thick forest at the bottom of the waterfall, orders were given to the troops in the higher portions of the forest to wheel gradually to the left and in the direction of the forest below, it being at the time thought that a number of rebels had gathered there to make a stand. In consequence of this, a section on the extreme left flank lost touch, but continued to move downwards. A number of other men in different parts of the line also temporarily lost touch.

In the meantime, on the opposite or eastern side of the valley, the T.M.R. had gradually worked their way up and co-operated generally in accordance with the plan. "A troop (T.M.R.), in the advance, occupied a kopje and sent ten of the men up the ridge to round up cattle, which they succeeded in doing. In retiring, a sniper on their left flank, concealed in the bush, shot Tpr. Steyn, who some days afterwards died from the effects of the wound. Three of his comrades immediately went to his assistance and carried him along, whilst two men went in advance and the remaining four protected the rear. The retirement was conducted with coolness and precision, and both General Stephenson and Colonel McKenzie, who witnessed the movement from Gun Hill, openly expressed their approval of the men's conduct."<sup>1</sup> After the forests in the immediate vicinity of the waterfall had been driven, the troops withdrew.

<sup>1</sup> W. Bosman, *The Natal Rebellion of 1906*, p. 66.



As a result of the operations, a considerable number of women and children emerged from the forest. They carried white flags. They were directed to a place of safety during the operations and subsequently returned to the bush. Much pains was taken, without success, to discover Sigananda's whereabouts. Only three rebels were killed; twenty-four surrendered to the troops. Traces of recent extensive occupation were, however, found. Information received at the time went to show that the enemy had vacated the gorge on the preceding day. About 300 cattle and many goats were captured. Sigananda's Enhlweni kraal was destroyed. Two men (including Steyn) of the T.M.R. were wounded by snipers.

Mpikwa, one of Sigananda's principal indunas, surrendered at the magistracy during the day with seventy-six men of the same tribe. Among these was a brother of Sigananda. All declared they were opposed to their Chief's conduct and, had, therefore, refrained from participating in the Rebellion.

On the 2nd June, McKenzie moved his camp to the east and further up the Mome stream, with the object of making an extensive drive to the east through the heart of the Nkandhla forests (Dukuza), as well as over Bomvana ridge where large numbers of cattle had been repeatedly seen and in which direction Sigananda's *impi* was then said to be. The Z.M.R. and N.C. were left to occupy the camp until dark when, with their fires alight, they were to withdraw, so as to lead the enemy to suppose the locality was still being occupied. A 15-pounder and a pompom, moreover, supported by the Z.M.R., continued to shell the upper portions of Mome gorge until dusk, with the view of keeping the enemy from entering the bush that had been driven that day.

Since McKenzie's departure from Insuze valley on the 23rd May, Mansel's column, when not actually engaged in a combined movement with that of McKenzie, had operated within a radius of five or six miles of the grave and succeeded in capturing considerable quantities of cattle, goats, etc., besides doing other useful work.

Colonel Woolls-Sampson at this stage received orders to proceed to Pietermaritzburg to confer with the Acting Commandant (Major-General Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B.)<sup>1</sup> and the Government. Major C. N. H. Rodwell, N.C., now assumed the duties of Chief Staff Officer, with the local rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

McKenzie left with his forces at 7 a.m. on the 3rd June, with the object of making an extensive drive in an easterly direction. Mansel, with N.P. and T.M.R., proceeded from his camp to the vicinity of Komo Hill. The guns and pompoms took up positions covering the general advance of the former column. Colonel McKenzie, accompanied by General Stephenson and his bodyguard of N.C., moved round open ground on the north to a position some three miles in a direct line from Bomvana ridge. The Z.M.R. occupied a kopje about one mile west of where it was proposed the drive should cease. Here they were subsequently joined by the O.C. Troops and General Stephenson, N.C. being strengthened by a troop temporarily detached from the Z.M.R.

R.H., D.L.I., and N.D.M.R., together with the Native levies, after crossing the head of the Mome valley, lined up along the edge of the bush, where instructions were given to the officers to drive the bush in line, with one European to every three levies, thus 1 \* \* \* 1 \* \* \* 1 \* \* \* 1. The objective pointed out was a knoll, which could be seen over the bush and beside the Nkandhla-Eshowe road. The N.D.M.R. took the left, D.L.I. the centre, and R.H. the right. As regards R.H., A and D squadrons were on the left, C in the centre, E and B on the right. Royston himself was on the right.

The idea was that, on the march through the bush, R.H. were to join forces with Mansel's men, who would move on the right from Cetshwayo's grave, whilst the left of the line was protected by McKenzie and the men posted near him on the open tops of the overlooking ridges.

<sup>1</sup> This appointment had become necessary early in June, owing to Colonel Bru-de-Wold being obliged, through illness, to temporarily relinquish the duties of his office.



After proceeding through the forest for about two miles over extremely broken country, the centre of the R.H. section of the line found that the spruit Royston had directed the right of the line to rest on was joined by another flowing down from the left front.

On C squadron, in command of Capt. E. G. Clerk, reaching the spruit referred to, a number of tracks of Natives were observed, so fresh as to appear to have been caused but a few minutes before. Following these, the men, still in fair line, came in contact with a party of thirty to forty rebels. A number of these were killed as they endeavoured to escape. Shortly after, it was discovered that touch had been completely lost with the two squadrons on the left, and that Royston with B and E had swung away more to the right and were at that time on the far side of a very high and narrow kopje. Four rebels were chased by men of C up this hill and would have escaped altogether had not the attention of men on the hill been attracted. The latter moved along the crest and shot the fugitives. Corporal Alexander, C squadron, killed later in the day, did some very accurate shooting at some Natives who were, as they thought, securely hidden on their side of the same kopje, sniping at members of C squadron in the valley below. These were shot by him at a range of about 500 yards.

After what remained of C had moved on, six *amadhlangu* (war-huts) beside the spruit were destroyed. Here a quantity of goods looted from Davis's waggon on the 29th May was found. About a mile and a half further on, the men emerged, about 1.30 p.m., on to an open ridge, where some forty-five men of the squadrons on C's right, together with some Native levies, were come upon. Here Clerk found instructions had just come from Colonel McKenzie through Colonel W. S. Shepstone to move on, as Royston, with the remainder of the right wing, was said to be in advance on the right. There was, however, ground for doubting the intelligence, as firing could be faintly heard away on the right and slightly to the rear. At this time, it was not known to C where the R.H.

squadrons on the left, much less the D.L.I. and the N.D.M.R., had got to. After a few minutes' halt, Clerk gave the word to move forward. London, supported by Lieuts. Fryer and Midgley and others of R.H. were put on the right, with the main body of levies, whilst Clerk, supported by Lieut. Stewart and Sergt.-Major Webber, took the extreme left. Lieut. Shepstone, who was with a portion of the levies and some of R.H. on the left, soon completely detached himself. Many Native footprints were seen; indeed, there was every sign of a large body of the enemy being close in advance. Six cattle that were come upon was a further indication. "I passed the word down the line," says Clerk,<sup>1</sup> "to keep a sharp look-out, explaining that I knew we were close on the enemy. At this time, a number of the levies had moved from their proper position and were bunched up near me, close on my right. The nearest European was Corpl. Alexander, about ten yards off on my right. Hawkins was next to him, then Holmes, Flynn, Corpl. Woolnough (A squad), Act.-Sergt. Fraser, Harding, Wilkinson, Bouck, Nesbit and others. After passing the word of warning, we moved about 200 yards and had just crossed a small *donga*, when I thought I noticed something move on my left. On searching the bush, we failed to find anybody, though we noticed that the Natives' tracks were very numerous and fresh. We moved forward till the left was about twenty yards across the *donga*, the right not having yet crossed it, when a Native stepped out of a thick bush, between forty to fifty paces away on our left front. He was armed with, I think, a breech-loader. He fired the charge, striking close to the third man's feet (Hawkins). This appeared to be the signal, as immediately on the report, the forest on our left and left front seemed to be alive with the enemy. It looked like an overturned hive more than anything else. They must have been lying down till the shot was fired. They yelled 'Usutu!' and something like 'Zuzu!' and charged at us, one horn swinging round on our left and the other

<sup>1</sup> The following account is now published for the first time.



towards our right and breaking. I turned to call to the men, only to find that the Native levies were running for their lives, not directly back the way we had come, but down the line, straight down to our right. This served to break our line a lot and create a gap between the 7th and 8th men. Seeing that there was no chance of making a stand where we were, I shouted to the men to move back and rally in the *donga* lower down. Knowing that unless the centre were checked in some way, the enemy would cut us up before we could get back to the *donga*, I emptied my carbine (magazine) into the main lot at about twenty yards distance and about seventy from where I was afterwards lying. This served to check them for a minute or two and I took advantage of it to run after the men. While doing so, I slipped another cartridge into the breech of my carbine and had just succeeded in doing so, when I ran into another lot of the enemy who had charged between the *donga* and myself (*i.e.* between where I first fired on the enemy and the position at which we rallied), as if to partly surround the party in the *donga*. I thereupon fired five shots at them with my revolver as I ran towards my men. The enemy broke, and left, as I thought, a clear line to the *donga*, where I could hear Fraser's voice calling out, 'Here we are, Sir!' Just then a Native rose from the low bush in front of me, *i.e.* between me and where I heard Fraser's voice. He had a stabbing-assegai and some sort of weapon—it seemed like an old muzzle-loading gun. He raised the assegai, but as he did so, I snapped at him the last shot in my revolver and he fell. As he fell, another Native appeared suddenly on my left—I think he had been behind a small tree. He was within stabbing distance before I noticed him, my attention having been engaged with the other man. I had no time to aim my carbine, merely being able to swing it up and parry his thrust. I narrowly escaped being wounded, for the assegai just grazed the right eyelid (I thought my eye was out, as the blood flowed over my cheek and almost blinded me). Catching my foot in something I fell, but the slope

of the ground being very steep, I succeeded in throwing myself right over. I turned over purposely and, in so doing, again faced my adversary. Swinging my carbine forward, I pulled the trigger, not, however, with the ordinary finger, for which there was no time, but with my little finger which happened to be in position at that instant. The shot struck the man in the chest and he fell forward past me on my left about seven yards from the east edge of the *donga*. I remarked that this man had bound round his forehead a broad band of Turkey-red, as well as a stiff peak of red over the centre of the forehead.<sup>1</sup> The first of the other two had a narrow strip of red cloth round his forehead. I also noticed that a great number of the remainder of the enemy had Turkey-red round their heads. Recovering my footing, I ran down and leaped into the *donga*, where I found Fraser, Woolnough, Alexander, Holmes, Flynn and Hawkins. The rebels seemed to surround us immediately and I had succeeded in firing only about two shots when Alexander staggered forward crying out, 'Oh, my God, pull this out, pull this out!' referring to an assegai which had been driven into the middle of his back. Someone pulled the assegai out and he sank down and died immediately. This assegai had been thrown from a distance of about ten yards up the *donga* by one of the enemy who was there. Almost immediately afterwards, Hawkins staggered forward and sank against the east bank just on my right, with two assegais in his back. He remained in a crouching position and, from the peculiar sound, I knew his lung had been injured. Once he cried to someone to shoot him and put him out of his misery. Just as he fell, I felt a shock through my left upper arm, which caused my hand to lose its power; owing to this, I dropped my carbine. Stooping quickly to pick it up, I found that my left hand was useless and that I could not grasp anything. The little finger only retained its normal power. I seated myself on a root

<sup>1</sup> This cloth (Turkey-red) had been issued to members of levies as a badge to indicate that they were loyalists. It was worn either round the left arm or round the head (above the forehead).




which was jutting slightly out of the bank and, raising the carbine with my right hand, succeeded in loading it by gripping it between my knees. I then fired it by lifting it with the right hand and pulling the trigger with the little finger of my left. I continued doing this until loss of blood compelled me to abandon the carbine in favour of my revolver, which I had to load in the same way, *i.e.* between my knees.

“Shortly after I was wounded, I heard Holmes say, ‘Ah! I’ve got it!’; he went on to explain that a bullet had gone through his thigh. He, however, continued firing, merely relieving himself by leaning against a tree which grew from the bank of the *donga*. Woolnough had already been wounded in the ankle, and was lying close by the bank on the eastern side of the *donga*. Flynn had blood streaming from wounds on the face, but Fraser, though in a very exposed position (with a white shirt on), suffered no injury whatever. All this time we were crying: ‘Rally here, Royston’s,’ thinking it possible that the men further down the *donga* might succeed in forcing their way to us, or that Colonel Royston might be within hearing and come to our assistance. I also shouted out, ‘Give it to them, boys!’ intending that the enemy should hear, as I supposed a few of them might know English. I knew that the men lower down were busily engaged from the firing I could hear, and occasionally I could hear Sergt.-Major Webber’s voice encouraging our men.

“The Natives had made two charges when, as I was aiming at one up the *donga*, about twenty yards off, a thrown assegai penetrated my right forearm.

“We were by this time getting very weak from loss of blood, and, as our fighting strength was four only, *viz.* Fraser, Holmes, Flynn and myself, things were looking very serious. I personally felt very weak but, after drinking some water from Flynn’s water-bottle, I revived in time to assist in repelling the third charge. We succeeded in driving them back again, but I knew that unless help arrived soon, we would be overcome and, speaking to Fraser and Flynn, said if they succeeded in getting out to







tell the Colonel that we had left our mark on the enemy. A minute or so later, Holmes said, 'Look out, they're preparing to rush again.' I, at that moment, was loading my revolver with the last six cartridges I had. I succeeded in getting five in, but dropped the sixth. I fired two shots at some Natives in the *donga*, twenty to thirty yards up. Holmes fired at them at the same time. They both dropped, I am certain Holmes killed one, but am not sure of the other. At this moment, shouting and shooting attracted our attention, and to our relief we saw other members of the regiment coming to our assistance, amongst the first being Lieuts. Male, Jones, and Oswald, then Colonel Royston a second or two later, he having stopped to bandage levy-leader W. H. E. Hopkins, who had been shot on the side of the head when running by the side of Colonel Royston in advance of the relieving party."

The foregoing account is necessarily confined to what took place in Clerk's immediate vicinity. The following particulars, taken from others who were engaged, are intended to supplement Clerk's graphic narrative.

The action occurred at the bottom of a large valley, which lies wholly within Dukuza forest, and through which flows the Manzipambana stream. There are remarkably few stones about, except in the *donga* or water-course, which runs almost due north and south. The gully in question is but 130 yards long; it slopes steeply on the east, and is 12 to 14 ft. wide and about 6 ft. deep where Clerk lay. The forest is not very dense at this particular spot, one being able to see fifty yards all round. The enemy, about 300 strong—all exceptionally well-built men—was congregated in one spot. Although he must have been within twenty yards, the late Alexander, when sent forward to the left by Clerk to reconnoitre, did not see the *impi*, no doubt because lying flat on the ground in accordance with custom, and behind trees and other cover. Although frequent efforts were made by the rebels to charge one or other of the three groups of R. H. in that vicinity, not one was pressed home, due no doubt to the



accuracy of the shooting, and to the fact that the 'horns' failed to get round at the lower end owing to the length of the line. Each of these groups was engaged, though at longer ranges than Clerk's group had to fire at. More than once the highest and the lowest groups fired at one another when masked by the rebels. Where Clerk was, the fighting was almost hand to hand. Many assegais were thrown and shots fired by the rebels. The engagement did not last more than fifteen to eighteen minutes.

It is difficult to determine how many of the enemy were killed; the number was at first given as fifty-three, but probably some of these were merely wounded and got away. In view of the duration of the action, and of its having taken place at short range, with at least twenty-four rifles, the killed were probably not less than thirty-five. The having of about nine head of cattle with them is noteworthy as evidence of an intention on the part of the rebels to decoy by offering a bait. As soon as the action commenced, the cattle were driven ahead, as if to confuse or afford cover. A device of this sort, it will be remembered, was adopted when the rebels made their first charge at Mpukunyoni. The enemy was in possession of anything from a dozen to three dozen guns of different kinds, but his shooting was distinctly poor; more casualties, however, were attributable to gun-fire, such as it was, in this action than in any other of the campaign.

The conduct of the levies in deserting *en bloc* at so critical a moment is a lesson to be carefully borne in mind in the future. At the same time, it is fair to point out that they were not being led by anyone well-known to them, or familiar with their language; there were not more than fifty, and these were separated from the rest of their party. In this connection, it was unfortunate that the levy-leader attached to that part of the line was not at hand to give such moral support as he could. The fact that one or more of the enemy wore Turkey-red, thereby becoming undistinguishable from the levies, may be due to such or similar material having been among the goods in the waggon looted by the rebels a few days before.

It was most providential that Royston was within reach. Had he not come when he did, the party must have been annihilated. When the relieving party heard their comrades' shouts, they set out as fast as they could down a steep incline nearly a mile away from the scene of the action. Royston was accompanied by Hopkins, Oswald, Male and others. Hopkins, struck by a bullet on the side of the head, fell, rose, plunged forward again down the hill, only to fall again, when he was assisted by Royston. The enemy was found on all sides, especially east of the donga, but, on seeing reinforcements arrive, showed no disposition to fight, especially after Major A. W. Fraser, with his officers, n.c.o.'s and men had deployed on the east. The wounded were attended on the spot by the rescuers and, a few minutes later, by Capt. Austin Robinson, N.M.C., who was most assiduous in the discharge of his duties under difficult conditions.

There were four killed, viz. Corpl. E. Alexander and Tprs. J. L. Bouck, Harding and S. J. Robertson; eleven were wounded: Capt. E. G. Clerk, Lieuts. P. Male and Oswald, Corpl. Woolnough, and Tprs. J. Hawkins, F. Flynn, W. C. Holmes, W. H. E. Hopkins, D. C. Swart, J. Mann and H. D. M. Barnett. Of the latter, Clerk, Hawkins, Holmes, Hopkins and Swart were wounded severely. Hawkins succumbed to his injuries the same evening.

"All the units engaged inflicted severe losses on the enemy during the day's operations, and over 150 were killed, ten of them by Colonel Mansel's force. Over two hundred head of cattle were captured. It was again a very hard day for the troops, who had to work dismounted over exceedingly difficult country."<sup>1</sup>

Colonel McKenzie moved his column through the forest on the following day (4th June) along the road (Nkandhla to Eshowe), to join Mansel's force near Bobe ridge. The combined force thereupon drove through the forest on the eastern side of the road, making towards Sibuda peak. N.N.C., T.M.R. and Natives were on the left of the line;

<sup>1</sup> Report, Col. D. McKenzie, September, 1906.



D.L.I. and Nongqai in the centre ; and N.C., Z.M.R. and R.H. on the right. The N.D.M.R. occupied high ground near the objective towards which the troops were working. Owing to no rebels being found in the vast area traversed, it seemed that the enemy had moved back to the western or Mome side of the forests. With the forces at his disposal, it was quite impossible for McKenzie to prevent such breaking back. His idea, under the circumstances, was to harass the enemy as much as possible, by constantly driving him from one position to another.

It was on this day that the Natal Rangers (seven companies, with Maxims and signallers), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., arrived at Nomangci camp. Their arrival was most opportune. They soon proved to be a valuable addition to the forces.

A detachment of 85 N.N.H. (under Major G. Moe, U.M.R.), also came in on the 4th, with a number of remounts. Many of the corps had seen service during the Zulu War and on other occasions. Their enrolment was, therefore, wise, not only from a political, but also from a military point of view.<sup>1</sup>

On the 5th, the men, including those of Mansel's column, thoroughly exhausted by the heavy climbing and driving, were given a complete rest.

Leaving sufficient troops to take charge of the camp, McKenzie proceeded, on the following day, to drive that portion of the forests which slopes away downwards from the waggon road in the direction of Insuze and Manzipambana rivers. The line of drivers, which included N.R. and N.N.H., swept along both sides of the Manzipambana, and through what is acknowledged by Native residents to be the densest and least frequented portion of the forest. The N.N.C., T.M.R., N.P. and Nongqai, under Barker, co-operated effectively on the south. Only ten rebels were shot, as but few of the enemy were come upon during the operations. These again covered an enormous and par-

<sup>1</sup> Some account of the excellent services performed by N.N.H. will be found in Appendix XI.

ticularly rugged area.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence at this time went to show that the enemy was gradually quitting Nkandhla for Macala and the Qudeni forests, as a result of the frequent and thorough-going driving being done by the troops.

“The force bivouacked for the night at the Nkunzana stream,” says McKenzie. “The next morning (7th June), I moved up the Bobe ridge, and having received information that Sigananda was in the bush facing the south of the road from Bobe ridge to the Isibuda (Esibudeni) hill, I made a drive through that section of the forest and also shelled the bush, the guns having come out of camp to join me. Unfortunately some pompom shells struck very close to the squadron of the Natal Carbineers, but, fortunately, no one was hit. No trace of Sigananda could be found. Twenty rebels were killed. A large number of cattle were taken and stores of grain destroyed.”

After an exceedingly trying day, McKenzie withdrew for the night to Nomangci (the infantry being assisted by ox-waggons sent from camp to meet them), whilst Barker returned to his camp near the grave.

It became necessary to give the troops another rest on the 8th. Many of the men had, by this time, completely worn out their boots and clothing, in consequence of the rough work in the forests.

As the forests now appeared to be clear of rebels, in so far, at any rate, as large parties of them were concerned, McKenzie began to work out plans for a combined move of all the columns, including those of Leuchars and Mackay, to Qudeni, where the enemy was reported to have mustered in considerable strength.

Heliographic communication was established with Mackay at Madhlozi mountain. During the day (9th), small drives of bushes took place in the neighbourhood of the camp, unattended, however, with any success.

At night, however, intelligence of such vital importance

<sup>1</sup> During this drive, a few N.N.H. were directed to look after the horses. One of the men, Hendrick Mkabela, seeing a party of rebels, with twenty-one head of cattle, attacked them and, though single-handed, succeeded in capturing the stock, and subsequently handing it over to the Provost-Marshal.



was received as to enable McKenzie, not only to come face to face with his long-sought-for enemy, but, by taking advantage of the opportunity to the maximum, to deal him a crushing blow, so decisive, indeed, as to bring the Rebellion in Zululand to an abrupt end, much to the relief of the Colony and not least of the troops themselves.

Reference has already been made to the local intelligence staff, Lieut. Hedges and Sergts. Calverley and Titlestad. These officers, all of the Z.M.R., and intimately acquainted with Zululand, had, for some days past, been endeavouring to locate Sigananda. This was done with the assistance of Mandisindaba, a man who had for long been known to Calverley. He had been induced by the latter to surrender with his family a few days previously. This was allowed by McKenzie to take place on condition that he went to the Mome and ascertained Sigananda's whereabouts as precisely as possible. Accompanied by two or three Native scouts and two rebel spies—the latter disguised as messengers from Dinuzulu—Mandisindaba proceeded to the gorge. Whilst walking through a forest, the party accidentally met a member of Sigananda's tribe who, it so happened, was also in search of Sigananda. On being informed that two of the party were messengers from "the Prince" and were carrying a message which they had been directed to deliver to the Chief, the man referred to announced that he had been sent by Bambata and Mehlokazulu, then bivouacked at Kombe forest (fifteen miles west of Mome), to inform Sigananda that they would leave there with the whole of their forces (including many of Sigananda's tribe)—some twenty-three companies in all—that very evening, and, travelling *viâ* Macala, camp near the junction of the Mome and Insuze, with the object of entering the Nkandhla forests.

Whilst endeavouring to locate the Chief, the party separated themselves from Bambata's messenger. The former presently succeeded in obtaining information as to Sigananda's approximate whereabouts, when they immediately withdrew to carry back their extremely impor-

tant intelligence. This was received at an appointed rendezvous, and at once, *i.e.* at 9.30 p.m., conveyed to Colonel McKenzie.

After considering the matter, McKenzie concluded that, although the rebels might reach Mome during the night, they would probably not enter the forests until daylight. He accordingly decided to try and prevent their entry, a decision which, having regard to the lateness of the hour and the great difficulties to be overcome, called for that swiftness and directness of action which are so characteristic of the man.

Whilst plans and arrangements were being made for the move, a message was received from the Magistrate at Empandhleri, confirming in all essentials the intelligence that had already been brought in.

This corroborative information had also been obtained by Native scouts—two very plucky men, one of them called Bayekana, who had themselves seen Bambata and Mehlokazulu's *impi* in the Kombe forest, and further ascertained from people in the vicinity that the intention was to move to the Mome the same night. This intelligence was at once transmitted by special runners over a distance of twenty-five miles to the Magistrate, who, again, was six miles from Nomangci.

Presuming that the rebels would move down the Insuzu valley, that being their easiest route, it became necessary to place the responsibility of preventing the entry primarily on the column already in the vicinity of the grave. This column, in the absence of Mansel on duty in Pietermaritzburg, was then under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. F. Barker, D.S.O.<sup>1</sup>

The instructions issued at 10.30 p.m. by McKenzie to Barker, being important, are given *in extenso* :

“ From O.C. Troops to Colonel Barker.

“ On receipt of this despatch, you will please move at once, with all available men (leaving sufficient for the

<sup>1</sup> Barker had assumed duty on the 8th.



defence of your camp), to the mouth of the Mome valley. I have information that an *impi* is coming down from Qudeni to enter the Mome valley between this and tomorrow morning. Please try and waylay this *impi* and prevent them from entering the Mome, and at daylight block the mouth of the Mome at once. It is anticipated that they will not enter the Mome till daylight.

“I have reliable information as to almost the exact spot Sigananda is in and I am moving from here to surround him. He is supposed to be just below the Mome stronghold, a little lower down than where we burnt his kraal. I will cut off this portion at daylight and drive down towards you, so please do all you can to prevent his escape, and to co-operate with me generally.

“At daylight, please send the Zululand Police and Native levies up to Sigananda’s kraal, which you burnt the day we attacked the stronghold, where they will join my forces. You must take your gun<sup>1</sup> and Maxims in case you meet the *impi*, which is reported to be of strength.

“Look out for my signals.”

<sup>1</sup>Barker had two 15-pounders.

## XIV.

### ACTION AT MOME<sup>1</sup> GORGE.

OF so important a nature were McKenzie's instructions, that three men were employed to carry them to Barker, who was known to be camped three or four miles from the grave.<sup>2</sup> The three selected were Tprs. C. W. Johnson (because of his knowledge of the district), G. O. Oliver (because of his ability to speak Zulu), and W. Deeley (as additional rider in case of accidents)—all of the Z.M.R. In informing the men of the contents of his despatch, McKenzie explained he did so, so that, in case of mishap, one or other of them should ride through and acquaint Barker thereof, even though only verbally.

It was just about 10 p.m. when the men, quitting Nomangci camp, moved towards the road a mile off. Once in it, they pushed forward at a sharp pace, which increased to a gallop on entering, as they presently did, the great black forest. The speed at which they went naturally caused the clatter of the horses' hoofs to reverberate loudly in the still, dark avenue formed by the trees on either side. It was for a double purpose they galloped along as they did, firstly, to convey the intelligence with utmost speed, secondly, to give the impression to any of

<sup>1</sup> This word is dissyllabic, and pronounced 'maw-me' (the 'e' being as in 'met').

<sup>2</sup> Owing to the insanitary state of his camp (the site having recently been used by three columns), Barker got permission from McKenzie to move about three miles to the south-east of the grave, and out of sight of Macala. This had occurred on the afternoon of the 8th. On the same day, all the supply waggons (empty) trekked back to Fort Yolland. Little did Barker suppose that this lucky move would make the enemy believe the column had vanished as well.



the enemy that might be lurking about—for the entire route to be traversed was held by him—that the party was larger than it really was. After proceeding about half a mile in the forest, a large tree was found lying at right angles across the road. It had not fallen by accident, but had been chopped to come down as it had done, so as to obstruct waggons going to and fro. (Only a few days before, it will be remembered, a waggon carrying supplies had been captured in this locality). Leaping the hurdle, the riders were next surprised at seeing a fire burning but a short distance away to the right, one of them declaring he heard persons running from there further into the forest. It was not until they had got to the looted store at Sibudeni peak, where they left the road to proceed along a rough track leading through other dense forests and broken country to Bobe ridge, that the horses were pulled in and compelled, owing to the nature of the ground, to proceed at a walk. At this point, two or three cow-hides were found tightly stretched and pegged out to dry across the said track. To prevent more noise than necessary at this dangerous part (it was one of the enemy's principal outposts—the attack on Mansel of 5th May began near there), the men dismounted, made a detour round the hides, and then went on again as before. They soon emerged altogether from the forest, descended the long steep Bobe ridge, and crossed the Halambu stream at the bottom. Here doubt arose as to the whereabouts of the Transvaalers' camp, but the existence of fresh wheel-marks, fortunately noticed in the nick of time leading off the well-beaten Fort Yolland track, induced the men to follow them, with the result that, after proceeding but a few hundred yards, they found the object of their mission had been successfully achieved. To be passed through the lines of sleeping soldiers and on to the Officer Commanding was the work of but a few moments. The despatch was safely delivered at about 1 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Some fifteen miles of difficult country had been traversed. The feat was a noteworthy one; it had called for courage and daring, and well deserved the Distinguished Conduct Medal afterwards awarded to each of the men.

Barker at once made arrangements to move as directed. He had all the officers and men quietly roused. Calling the former together, he read them the despatch and made known the order of march, anticipating he would be in time to lie in ambush at Tate gorge, that being a part of the country which lent itself well to such tactics.<sup>1</sup> The strictest orders were issued that there was to be neither smoking nor talking. Leaving a force sufficient to defend the camp, the rest of the column moved off at 2 a.m. It was made up as follows: T.M.R. (three squadrons—B, C and D); N.P. (90); N.F.A. (one section—two 15-pounders); one Maxim gun; one Colt gun; Nongqai (100); and a levy of about 800 Natives (Chiefs Mfungelwa and Hatshi).

When near Cetshwayo's grave, Inspector C. E. Fairlie, with Nongqai and levies, branched off to the right and proceeded to a position overlooking a small neck in that large bend of the Mome stream situate some 200 yards below where the "pear-shaped" forest (Dobo), tapering down, abuts on the said stream. He was directed to stop the rebels on their making an appearance at the neck. If nothing happened for an hour after daybreak, he was to proceed up to Sigananda's already burnt Enhlweni kraal and there, as directed, co-operate with McKenzie's forces.

On reaching the entrance of Mome gorge, the advanced guard of the main body, consisting of a troop of C squadron, had already moved across the comparatively level ground opposite the mouth, when Barker and those with him, glancing over their right shoulders, observed a number of fires burning brightly in the gorge, some 1,000 yards away. There were about sixty. It seemed as if the troops had come too late. Word to halt was immediately passed along. The guns at the moment were half a mile in

<sup>1</sup> The mouth of Tate gorge is about a mile west of the mouth of Mome gorge, and is on the route along which, as hinted in McKenzie's despatch, the enemy would probably travel. In Barker's view, it was just possible the enemy, although bound for Mome, would proceed thither through Tate. It will be seen later, McKenzie, notwithstanding his written instructions, entertained similar suspicions.



rear. On looking intently, it seemed as if figures were moving in front of the fires. The time then was about 4 a.m. Barker dismounted, and, taking two or three men with him, advanced on foot along the slope of the small ridge on the west of the mouth of the gorge to obtain a nearer view. Having satisfied himself the enemy was actually bivouacked on an old mealie garden, and in considerable force, exactly where the fires were, he proceeded to make his dispositions for attack, which, it was arranged, should begin as soon as daylight came. B and D squadrons and a Maxim gun were posted on a ridge to the immediate east of the Mome stream, where a good field of fire could be commanded. C squadron and fifty N.P. with a Colt gun, occupied the eastern face of a low ridge on the west, whilst the rest of the Police, except the troop that formed an escort to the guns posted on a prominent and detached hillock (in front of the mouth of the gorge), were kept in reserve out of sight and close to where the road passes between the gun position and the said low ridge on the west. The object of the latter force was to prevent a possible breaking back of the enemy into Insuze valley. The guns, crossing at the drift, purposely made a big detour to the left, skirted the left bank of the Insuze, and came up the southern face of the hillock referred to.<sup>1</sup> As it was, it was feared the noise was enough to alarm the enemy.

When Fairlie arrived at his position, finding the enemy bivouacked immediately below him, he detached about twenty Nongqai and 400 of the Native levy, with two or three Europeans, to hold ground north of him, and opposite and within 100 yards of where the Dobo bush meets the Mome.

The orders were that not a shot was to be fired nor the slightest noise made until daybreak, when a round from the 15-pounders was to be taken as the signal for a general fusillade. Barker made it known that he himself was with the guns.

For about two hours everybody remained in position,

<sup>1</sup> This is the hill referred to on p. 246.

perfectly still. As silent were they as their sleeping foes. The fires died out gradually, one by one. The time was one of the greatest anxiety for the commanding officer, as he did not know but that the whole of his remarkably elusive foe had slipped through the neck immediately in rear of their bivouac, which neck, owing to the nature of the country, it was impossible to completely block in rear without disclosing the presence of a hostile force. Owing to a heavy mist that arose towards dawn, making it difficult to discern objects at a distance of 200 yards, daylight was longer than usual in coming.

After watching for a long time through field-glasses, the mist cleared slightly, when Barker saw something resembling the outline of a burnt kraal where he had hoped to set eyes on the enemy himself. Suddenly remembering no burnt kraal existed on that particular spot a few days previously, he looked again, when he became convinced that what he beheld was nothing else but the enemy himself, drawn up in a circle—the inevitable circle in which orders are given as to engaging an enemy. Barker, moreover, saw enough to convince him that he had himself by then been seen.

The preconcerted signal was fired a few seconds later, not, however, by the 15-pounders, but by the Maxim under Lieut. R. G. Forbes, on the opposite or eastern side. What occurred at that point was this : D squadron under Capt. H. McKay, lay on Forbes's immediate right. Forbes's orders were not to fire without consulting McKay, and fire was on no account to be opened unless found to be absolutely imperative, viz. to prevent actual escape of the enemy up the gorge. If, however, it started in any other quarter, the Maxim was, of course, to do likewise. Just as it began to get light, the time being about 6.50 a.m., Forbes and McKay, using a good pair of field-glasses, 400 yards closer to the enemy than Barker, could see the rebels getting up and forming themselves into companies. It appeared as if they were about to move up the Mome and towards the redoubtable stronghold. McKay declined to give the order to fire until, after closer examination, he



agreed that, by not opening, the first company, then obviously on the move, must be lost. "All right, have a go," he cried, whereupon the Maxim blazed forth at a range which, as it turned out, had been correctly fixed at 600 yards.

As soon as the Maxim started, practically simultaneous volleys broke from all troops east and west, including the two 15-pounders and Colt gun—the whole forming almost a semi-circle of flame in the gloomy, early dawn. The consternation among the rebels was such as, for a few moments, to paralyze action; they rushed wildly to and fro, throwing down coats, tin cans, equipment, etc. and seeking shelter in the greatest disorder, anywhere and everywhere. Large numbers dashed through the neck in the hope of escaping to their original destination, only to be met, first by well-directed fire of the men posted immediately above that part on the east, and, where these failed, by that of men (also on the east), detached from Fairlie and pushed forward still nearer the Dobo forest. Thus those fortunate in escaping the hail of bullets at the mouth had to continue to run the gauntlet for another 200 or 300 yards over rugged country. The day of reckoning had come, and come with a vengeance. Some, by sheer perseverance and good luck, succeeded in reaching the forest immediately below the waterfall, where they were, of course, safe; but, on this retreat being completely cut off by McKenzie, as will presently be seen, the fugitives found themselves forced to enter the then only available shelter, namely the Dobo forest; but to proceed thither was no better than jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. That forest was nothing less than a huge trap, capable of being completely surrounded and driven at leisure. Moreover, in attempting to gain entrance thereto, more than one sharp encounter took place with the Nongqai, levies, and supporting European troops.

At 7.5 a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded, when the troops were directed to leave the ridges and drive down the slopes, as well as over the area and along the stream in the immediate vicinity of the bivouac, also between the

neck and Dobo. Much of the ground was covered with shrubs, long grass or rushes, and, here and there, the banks of the stream were hollowed out through the action of the water. In carrying out the movement, several cases occurred of individual rebels feigning death, when, on being more closely examined, they suddenly jumped up and attacked, either by seizing their assailant's rifle, or lunging at him with an up-till-then carefully concealed assegai.

Having described how Barker (who happened to be nearest the enemy) carried out the instructions he had received from McKenzie, it is necessary now to see what action was being simultaneously taken by the latter. The infantry and artillery were moved from Nomangci at 3 a.m. and the mounted troops at 3.30 a.m. to co-operate with Barker by descending both ridges overlooking Mome gorge, with the principal object of cutting the enemy off from the stronghold on fleeing from Barker below.<sup>1</sup> The western side was occupied by N.C. (C squad), Z.M.R. (about 100), N.D.M.R. (about 100), R.H. (about 450), D.L.I. (about 140), N.F.A. (one 15-pounder), two pompoms, a Maxim detachment, and a Native levy. The eastern side was held by the Natal Rangers (with Maxim guns), under Lieut.-Col. J. Dick.<sup>2</sup>

As part of McKenzie's plan was to effect the capture of Sigananda, he dismounted the Z.M.R. and marched them and the D.L.I. in single file, together with the Native levy, down to the large forest known as Mvalasango (on the west of the waterfall), in which Sigananda was said to be, with the object of driving it. The men were lining the edge of this forest, extremely dense and steep at that part, and awaiting the order to move forward into the bush, under Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston, when the loud and simultaneous fire already referred to burst from Barker's Maxim, artillery and rifles, about 2,500 yards further down.

<sup>1</sup> Orders were given for the searchlight to be kept flashing throughout the night, to give the enemy the impression that the troops were quietly resting on Nomangci—a ruse that exactly served its purpose.

<sup>2</sup> F company (Capt. Forsbrook) was, however, at Mangeni. It joined the regiment on the 14th June.



The first thought that flashed across McKenzie's mind was that Barker had trapped the rebels at the mouth whilst they were marching to enter. If such surmise were true, it became necessary at once to prevent fugitives from retreating towards Tate gorge and Macala. With this object in view, the troops were recalled and the order given to mount, the intention being to move down into the Insuze valley by way of Geongco ridge which, as will be remembered, had been used on the occasion of the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave. These movements, although extremely difficult in the mist and dark, were carried out with great rapidity and dash, but resulted only in the troops being presently wheeled to a position lower down the gorge than the one just vacated. McKenzie came to the decision to right about wheel whilst on the gallop, owing to seeing that the flash from the fire of Barker's 15-pounders, 1,400 feet below, was directed up the Mome instead of westwards as at first anticipated. To return to hold ground half-way between top and bottom of the gorge and 300 yards from the edge of Dobo, was a matter of but a few moments. On this hurried rush back, a solitary armed rebel was come upon and shot whilst attempting to escape in the mist.

Alive to the importance of swift movement, McKenzie dashed down the side of the gorge at a pace that excited at once the surprise and envy of his men. These could but follow to the best of their ability. He grasped the situation in an instant—his eye for country is proverbial. He saw that the main line of retreat, the disposition of forces then being what it was, must necessarily be up the Dobo, to the top of the ridge (down whose eastern slopes that forest grew), and from thence into as precipitous though narrower a ravine on the west. Stringent orders were thereupon given for that particular topmost part to be effectively guarded by Royston's Horse, who were, moreover, ordered to connect with Barker's left. So important did McKenzie deem this, and rightly so, that a staff officer was at once sent to see that the order he had already sent by another staff officer was, as a matter of fact, being properly

executed.<sup>1</sup> His next act, as essential as the other, was to push troops down to check the rebels already making along the river banks towards the waterfall and the large dense forests in that neighbourhood. Detachments of the Z.M.R., N.D.M.R. and R.H., having once more dismounted, accordingly ran down to the Mome and there effectually cut off such fugitives as had not already made good their escape, compelling them to find refuge, though only for a time as it happened, in the pear-shaped or Dobo bush. At the same time, the N.C. Maxim (Sergt. Ross), was smartly got down to a suitable position and greatly assisted in preventing the enemy's escape.

The Rangers had originally been directed to hold the upper eastern ridge of the Mome and get in touch with Fairlie. On leaving Nomangci camp at 3 a.m., they were obliged to traverse a large section of forest along narrow paths, where they were delayed owing to the guides for a time losing their way, so much so, that when the action started, the men had barely emerged from the forest at the left rear of the waterfall. On hearing the fire, however, they pushed forward at a brisk pace to occupy the ground assigned them.

When the action was at its height, they were required to move down and assist men of N.C., Z.M.R., R.H. and other corps in cutting off the retreat. The necessary orders, however, could not be conveyed, as there was insufficient sunshine to use the heliograph. The semaphore was tried, but also proved unsuccessful. It is, however, doubtful, if, had the men come down, they would have been in time to be of material assistance.

After running down to check escapes along the banks of the Mome, the detachments of Z.M.R., N.D.M.R., N.C. and R.H. that had assembled there, when it was evident the fugitives had been cut off, were reinforced and then directed by McKenzie to drive, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Royston, down the Mome through the scrub

<sup>1</sup>It so happened that a squadron of R.H., which, for a few minutes had gone astray during the gallop on top, had already been made by Major A. W. Fraser to occupy a portion of the position in question, and so prevent escapes then already beginning to occur.



and bush towards the lower part of Dobo. In the course of this drive, the notorious ringleader, Mehlokazulu, one of the men who started the Zulu War, was shot. He was wearing a new pair of riding trousers, shirt, socks and overcoat, whilst a pair of new tanned boots was being carried for him by one of his servants.

About 9 a.m. Barker got into communication with McKenzie by semaphore, when he received orders to move his guns to the ridge in immediate rear of the enemy's bivouac (where the neck referred to was), and to search Dobo thoroughly with shrapnel. The forest was accordingly shelled from top to bottom. The enemy, realizing that he had been caught in a trap, could do nothing else than conceal himself as effectually as possible among the numerous boulders, crevices and other hiding-places to be found there. The troops at the bottom, including Nongqai and levies, now began to drive the bush upwards. They had not proceeded many yards before Colonel McKenzie directed them to withdraw, climb the western face of the gorge immediately north of Dobo, and, joined on top by N.D.M.R., R.H., D.L.I. and B and C companies N.R. (which battalion had been ordered to come down from the opposite side of the gorge)<sup>1</sup> to drive downwards towards the Mome. The reason for operating in this way was because, by advancing upwards, the troops were at a disadvantage, as the rebels, most of whom still retained possession of their assegais, would have been able to throw with effect at men climbing under the greatest difficulties up so steep an incline.

It was already 2 p.m. when the drivers, purposely as numerous as possible, were in position. N.R., R.H., and D.L.I. took the left, N.D.M.R. the centre, with Nongqai and levies on the right. The rate of progress, owing to the exceptionally steep and rugged area, and to the enemy having concealed himself in various and most ingenious

<sup>1</sup>The battalion moved in line of companies, searching the bush-covered gullies *en route*; a number of rebels was come upon. A and H companies lined the river, whilst parties of D, E and G lined one of the sides of Dobo bush as it was being driven. The work done by the regiment, especially B and C companies, was very useful.

ways, was very slow. Steps, too, had to be taken to see that the line advanced in as uniform a manner as possible to prevent accidents. Occasionally Nongqai or levies on the right, more used to such movements than Europeans, got ahead, when they had to be halted to allow the rest to move up. With the constant interruptions that occurred, it is surprising the drive was conducted as well as it was.

After reaching a point about three-quarters of the way down, it was seen the Nongqai had again swung round in advance and partly overlapped. If their being in advance had been dangerous when higher up, it was more so now where the bush, narrowing as it approached the Mome, was only 250 yards across instead of 1,200. All this time, independent firing had been going on in various directions and many rebels were killed. Fairlie, who led the Nongqai, fearing accidents, decided to withdraw, leaving the rest of the bush to be completed by such troops as remained. He directed the "assembly" to be sounded. The effect of this unfortunate mistake was that, not only did all the Nongqai begin to leave, but also all the European troops and Native levy (though not so fast), for, hearing the call, the majority naturally supposed it had been ordered by the general officer commanding. Had the "assembly" not been sounded, the rest of the bush—only a small portion remained—must have been as thoroughly driven as that already done, with the result that many rebels, who had continually slipped further and further to the bottom end as they heard the drivers advancing, would not have escaped as they did. For all anyone knew at the time, Bambata and other important rebels were among those who escaped. When the bugle sounded, it was already late (4.30 p.m.), though not so late as those engaged supposed, nor too late for the drive to be completed. Exactly how many rebels escaped at that particular spot it is impossible to say. A hundred would probably be beyond the mark.

After withdrawing from Mvalasango forest, in which it was supposed Sigananda was concealed, McKenzie could



not, of course, take steps to drive it that day. Even supposing Siganda was there, which, as a matter of fact, was not the case—information subsequently obtained proved he was in the small gorge immediately on the west of Mome—the futility of driving increased every moment after withdrawing to cut off the enemy. Siganda, on hearing the fire at the mouth (supposing him to have been in the gorge), would naturally have retreated further into his stronghold, and to one or other of its innumerable recesses where, after the delay of say an hour or two, it would have been utterly impossible, even for the total forces engaged, to have found him, had they been withdrawn from all parts of the field to undertake the search.

Among the slain were Mtele<sup>1</sup> of Umsinga division (uncle of Chief Kula, who will be dealt with at length in Chapter XV.; Nondubela (*alias* Mavukutu), a Chief also of Umsinga division and an associate of Mehlokazulu; Paula and Moses, the Christian teachers who had joined Bambata at Mpanza; and the rebel protagonist Bambata himself.

The death of Bambata occurred as follows: Some time after those who fled into Dobo had passed in, and shortly before the shelling thereof, a solitary unarmed man, with but a shirt on, was seen making his way up the Mome stream, walking in the water. The first to notice him was a Native loyalist, some sixty yards away on the left bank of the Mome. Behind the man in the shirt, however, on the right bank, and only ten yards off, was another loyalist. The man in the water perceived the Native sixty yards off, but not the one in rear. Seeing the more distant man rushing to attack him, he left the water, but no sooner did he mount the right bank, than the one in rear, seizing the opportunity, darted forward and planted his long-bladed assegai in the rebel's body. This happened just as that part, where Dobo abuts on the Mome, had been reached. The loyalist, a powerfully built fellow, endeavoured to withdraw the weapon, the only one he had, with the object of again stabbing his far-from-dead foe. But, having

<sup>1</sup> It is believed by some that this man escaped.

# MOME

Dispositions are at beginning of action; for subsequent ones, see Reference and text

Scale



## REFERENCE

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>A = Colonel McRae's position during action<br/>                 B = Where N. 1., S. D. M. R., and R. H. presumed escape of rebels<br/>                 C, D, E = Positions N. C., D. L. J., S. D. M. R. respectively, at 10 a.m.<br/>                 F = Squads of R. H., 5 a.m.<br/>                 G = Barker's 11-pdr. 5 a.m.<br/>                 H to J = Barker's force was operating at 4 a.m. between these points</p> | <p>K = Rebels killed here<br/>                 L to M = Loss told by S. H., 9 a.m.<br/>                 N = Rebels killed here<br/>                 O = Kansas - 4 fire lines revealed at 4 a.m. in forest near and retail, side to side (parrakajep) forest</p> |
|---|--|







thrust too hard, the assegai had got so bent that it could not be extricated. The unfortunate victim had by this time fallen. Presently, the man who had first observed him, crossed the stream and, raising his assegai, attempted to thrust at the half-prostrate form. Quick as lightning, the latter—never uttering a sound—clutched the assegai with both hands before it had struck him, and violently struggled for its possession. It seemed he must succeed, notwithstanding two were against him. He fought with the valour of despair. By this time, however, a Nongqai, also on the left bank, had noticed what was afoot. Coming up quickly, he raised his rifle and shot the rebel through the head. And there, after further unsuccessful efforts to withdraw the assegai, the corpse was left to lie. None of those present bothered themselves with deceased's identity. As the establishment of such identity did not take place until a couple of days afterwards, and then only under special circumstances, the rest of the story must be reserved for its proper place.

When the last troops (among them the D.L.I. and the Native levy) had emerged from Dobo, orders were given for the columns to march back to their respective camps. Needless to say the infantry that had taken part in the last drive, were thoroughly exhausted by the time they got back. For them, indeed, the day had been particularly long and arduous.

It is only to be expected that the enemy's losses were severe. The total, however, as has been proved by subsequent enquiry, was not so great as believed by some. The estimates were at first fixed at anything between five and six hundred. Taking into consideration the accounts given by rebels, by members of various units that took part, and others likely to know, it would appear the number was about five hundred. The losses amongst McKenzie's troops, including Barker, were small. Capt. S. C. Macfarlane (D.S.O.), T.M.R., was killed (probably by his own side, through his pushing further forward in the early dawn than directed to do). Lieut. C. Marsden, R.H., and Tpr. F. H. Glover (I.L.H.), T.M.R., were mortally



wounded, and eight other Europeans wounded. Sergt. Mahashahasha, Z.N.P. (Nongqai), and members of the levies were also wounded. This great disparity in losses of the opposing forces is, of course, accounted for by the fact that the rebels were taken at a disadvantage. It is only natural that heavy losses would have resulted on well-armed troops waylaying the enemy as was done on the day in question. The rebels knew perfectly well what the result of clashing with European troops would be (this from lessons drawn especially from the Zulu War), even where the ground was not particularly favourable to either side. They had still to experience the effects where, with greatly inferior weapons, they were tactically at serious disadvantage. Such contingency they were, of course, aware *might* occur. No doubt, looking on their opponents as slow and ponderous, they thought it would never arise. It is, however, the unlikely that occurs in war. There is no question that the end they kept constantly in mind was in some way or another to secure tactical advantages over detached sections of European troops similar to that obtained over themselves by the latter on the 10th of June, when, it is needless to add, they would have administered punishment even more severe and relentless than was meted out to them then.

To be shot down or stabbed in battle is regarded by Natives as the natural consequence of war, and, when an advantage has been obtained, they are surprised if it be not used to the greatest effect. It is difficult to describe the contempt with which the warlike Zulu regards what we are pleased to style magnanimity—the magnanimity, for instance, of Gladstone in 1881, with certain victory in view, and the magnanimity of restoring Cetshwayo to Zululand in 1883. They reason thus: Two peoples are at war; one must defeat the other, and the best way is to do so in a thorough-going way. Nothing, they hold, is so effective and lesson-serving as wholesale slaughter. Anything else is to pander to future trouble and misery. When the blow has to be struck, let each strike and strike severely. To spare an enemy during continuance of

hostilities is fatal. As well spare flames doing their best to burn down a kraal.

Curious incidents sometimes occur on the eve of momentous events, but escape narration because irrelevant to the issue. An exception must be made on the present occasion, for the story will at least surprise any Zulu that happens to hear it. "As we were marching at a walk on the night in question," says Barker, "and when about two miles to the south of Cetshwayo's grave, I and my Adjutant (Capt. W. Jardine) leading, I noticed in our path a black cat. I called Jardine's attention to it, jocularly supposing it to be a sign of luck ahead. It was moonlight, and before the mist had come on. The cat, black all over, was evidently tame. It led the way towards the Mome. I afterwards forgot and lost sight of it. On our way back after the fight, coming along last, as I wanted to see all our men out, the same cat entered my path and came along. Again I lost sight of it, but next morning found it lying on or near my pillow. After this, it remained in camp and became a regimental favourite. I subsequently took it to the Transvaal."

The chapter will conclude with a brief survey of what took place among the rebels themselves between the converging movement on Cetshwayo's grave (17th May), and their collapse at Mome.

Not satisfied that the order to rebel had emanated from Dinuzulu, as declared to be the case by Cakijana and Bambata, seeing the promised reinforcements had not arrived, Mangati resolved to visit Usutu and learn the truth from Dinuzulu himself. Bambata decided to accompany him, but Cakijana, owing to the wound he had received, could not go. The two, accompanied by two other mounted men, rode off on the 20th. Interviews took place, probably on 24th (Queen's birthday), and 25th, between them and Dinuzulu. The latter denied having started or authorized the Rebellion, emphasizing he had merely said to Bambata: "If you people want to fight, why do you not all unite and fight the whites?" He said, again, to Mangati: "If you people desire to fight, go and



do so, it is not my doing. Go and join Mehlokazulu. I hear he also has joined the rebels. After joining him, go and join Siganda, and, if necessary, go on fighting till you get to Natal. . . . Siganda's messengers are here now to report that the white people have burnt my father's grave and are unearthing my father's bones. I tell you now, go and join Mehlokazulu and do what he tells you." <sup>1</sup> After spending two days at Usutu, where they were fed and hospitably treated by the man who, but five weeks before, had sent the loyal and reassuring statement printed on p. 214, and beginning: "I am not surprised that the Natal Government should have doubt as to my loyalty. . . . I can only say I am perfectly loyal and am most anxious to give proof of this . . ." the rebel ringleaders departed with a blessing from that 'loyal' and 'much maligned' Chief, to use their best endeavours to overthrow the white man's rule.

By the time Mangati and Bambata had got back to the area of hostilities, Leuchars had fought his action at Mpukunyoni (28th). Mehlokazulu and other leaders from the north-west moved to Nkonyeni forest, near Kombe. After the fight at Manzipambana (3rd June), the greater portion of the Nkandhla rebels collected at Macala. Bambata, leaving Macala with his tribesmen, got into touch with Mehlokazulu, and returned with him and them on the 7th to mass at Macala. Here, the combined forces were informed by Mangati that he had just returned from Dinuzulu whose wish it was that Macala—"a man with a temper"—should take supreme command, and Mganu command the regiment Mavalana. Under this arrangement, Bambata and Mangati assumed the title of 'princes.'

Finding the *impi* had, for the most part, gone to Macala, Siganda sent word to Bambata to return at once, as, having started a rebellion in his (Siganda's) ward, it was unfair to desert, leaving him to cope as best he could with the enraged Europeans. Bambata had deceived them once by declaring the white man's bullets would not 'enter,' was he going to do so again by throwing over the

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3888, p. 185.

original plan of adopting Nkandhla as the principal rallying-ground? The reply was that the forces would return at once.

It was now resolved by the leaders to further increase their numbers if possible. A large force accordingly proceeded on the 7th to the Tugela, near Watton's store, where Mangati alone paid a visit to a son of Chief Gayede to induce him, as diplomatically as he could, to join them. The son explained his father was ill and unable to join, being a mere "dog of the Government." The primary object of the expedition was to put Gayede and another adjoining Chief, Hlangabeza, to death, whereupon their people would probably espouse the cause of the rebels. These irregular and hazardous proceedings were strongly disapproved by Macala and others. These men, therefore, refrained from accompanying the force.

After visiting Watton's store, the *impi* bivouacked in Zululand, close to the river. It was midday before they were again astir. A couple of Native police from Krantz-kop were soon observed on the opposite bank. They began shouting at the rebels. Cakijana dismounted, dropped on his knee, and shot one of them dead, after which the force moved back to Macala.

There being no reason why the *impi*, considerably augmented by the arrival of Mehlokazulu's and other men, should not return to Nkandhla to continue tactics up till then comparatively successful, a start was made for the Mome between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 9th. The men, leaving in batches, marched in the loosest order. When close to Tate, they got reliable intelligence that Barker was still near Insuze river, although his waggons had gone off to Fort Yolland. Ndabaningi believed the news, but Mehlokazulu ridiculed it, retorting that the informants were partial to Europeans and purposely wished to mislead.

Mangati, with four companies, moved at once up the Mome gorge and bivouacked near the waterfall. Owing to sheer obstinacy on Mehlokazulu's part, the main *impi* camped at the mouth of the gorge instead of moving further in with Mangati. It was, moreover, owing to him



that intelligence brought about 3.30 a.m., three hours before the action began, by a little boy to the effect that some waggons were approaching was ignored—these 'waggons,' as it happened, being the two 15-pounders and ammunition waggons. In reply, Mehlokazulu described the intelligence as rubbish, for he had himself seen from Macala every waggon belonging to Barker's column trek off towards Fort Yolland. Thus, this vaunted leader, chiefly on account of personal fatigue, did his side the greatest possible disservice, forfeiting his own life in addition.

After hearing the little boy's story, Ndabaningi detached himself with a section of the rebels and followed Mangati, leaving Mehlokazulu and Bambata with the bulk of the *impi* behind.

The aggregate force that came from Macala would have been anything between 1,200 to 1,500 strong. Of these, probably not more than 1,000 were in action, if so many.

Had the whole body entered the stronghold unperceived, the plan was to rest a day, then begin attacking the surrounding Chiefs and looting their stock. These Chiefs, although members of their tribes had become rebels, had themselves refrained from joining. It was, therefore, supposed that, on conclusion of hostilities, they would visit their displeasure on those who had rebelled. Consequently, the intention was to deal vigorously with and kill off these half-hearted men; such were the tactics of Tshaka, for, after killing the leaders, the ordinary people, it was found, flocked to the 'conqueror.' The policy, furthermore, was to lie in wait for small parties of the Government forces near, but especially *in*, the forests, and massacre them before reinforcements could arrive, as, indeed, had almost happened at Manzipambana.

The reader will naturally wonder what became of the newly-appointed commanders, Macala and Mganu. Macala thought it wiser to push into the gorge. He joined Mangati and Ndabaningi, leaving the headstrong Mehlokazulu and Bambata to look after themselves. Mganu, however, remained.

On Bambata and Mehlokazulu's suspicions being aroused, scouts were sent out to examine the ridge on the west, occupied by part of Barker's force. These returned a few minutes before the Maxim opened to report troops were really there. The *impi* was speedily roused and formed into an *umkumbi*, that is, the 'circle' Barker had seen. Bambata then completely lost his head, so much so that Mganu, in the absence of Macala, was called on to take general command. He immediately gave such orders as appeared necessary to meet the situation. His own regiment, Mavalana, was told to charge at Barker in one direction, and the others to do likewise in another. But before the men (already arranged in companies) could move forward (not *backward* as McKay and Forbes had believed), the Maxim began—not from the ridge suspected by the rebels, but from a different one. What followed at this stage has already been related. It remains to add that, when it became a case of *sauve qui peut*, the majority turned and made over the neck in rear as hard as they could. It flashed across the minds of those familiar with that part of the country that Dobo was a snare; that being the case, there was nothing for it but to run the gauntlet towards the waterfall. This, as has been seen, many accordingly did.

And so, as far as the ordinary rebel could see, the great storm that was to come turned out to be nothing more than a thunder of artillery and hail of bullets, brought on by that very race against whom the mysterious command had been specially directed. Truly, the manner in which Dinuzulu had directed the elements left much to be desired.



STATE OF AFFAIRS AT UMSINGA.—OPERATIONS BY  
MURRAY-SMITH'S COLUMN.—FURTHER OPERA-  
TIONS BY UMVOTI FIELD FORCE AND MACKAY'S  
COLUMN.

ALTHOUGH Nkandhla had been selected by the rebel leaders as their *terrain*, that was not to say outbreaks would not occur in other parts of the Colony as well. Indeed, one of the objects of making Sigandanda's stronghold the principal rallying-point was to encourage overt acts of rebellion in other parts from knowledge of the fact that, so long as the fastness was held, it was available as a general headquarters and place of refuge. As an illustration of this, the disaffected men of Ngobizembe's tribe who, after being punished in the middle of March by Leuchars—being by themselves powerless to resist the troops—made off from Mapumulo and joined Bambata at Nkandhla. Mehlokazulu and other Chiefs, as has already been seen, broke from Nqutu and adjoining districts to do the same. The principle upon which all these men acted seems to have been that, where local confederates were not strong enough to offer resistance on the spot, either from want of numbers or suitable fastnesses, they would move to Nkandhla, but where the prospects were not unfavourable, as at Umsinga and Mapumulo, each with a teeming Native, and sparse European, population, they would resolve to try their chances there and then, in the hope that, by creating additional and widely-separated areas of disturbance, the difficulties of the troops would be

increased, when other tribes would follow one or other of the alternatives referred to, always with the ulterior motive of causing the country to rise *en bloc*.

In view of the importance of Umsinga and Mapumulo, both districts being within forty to forty-five miles of Nkandhla by such routes as Native pedestrians ordinarily travel, it is well to understand the position at those places.

In Umsinga district there were, in 1906, ten tribes, by far the largest being that of Kula. The total huts owned by members of his tribe was upwards of 4,500.<sup>1</sup> The huts (in the same district) of the other nine tribes together did not amount to 4,000. To so great an extent did Kula overshadow the other Chiefs, that it is unnecessary to make more than passing reference to the latter.

Kula was a young man, grandson of Ngoza, once famous throughout Natal and Zululand as Sir Theophilus Shepstone's principal induna. Ngoza, after serving in a position of trust and responsibility for many years, was appointed Chief over a tract of country vacated in 1858 by a Chief Matshana<sup>2</sup> to escape arrest. The ward was 450 square miles in extent, almost the whole falling within one magisterial division.

The Poll Tax Act and regulations were promulgated to the Natives of Umsinga in September, 1905, visits being paid by the Magistrate to four centres for the purpose. The announcement was well received. The only matter commented on by the Natives was that young men and boys (over 18) were held liable for the tax, instead of their fathers, as in the case of the hut tax. It was thought this would promote greater independence than was already being exhibited towards parents, and, at the same time, lead to youths retaining their earnings, instead of handing them over to their fathers or guardians, as up till then customary, on the plea of having to meet obligations of their own towards the State.

<sup>1</sup> Giving, roughly, a population of 18,000 souls, or about 2,500 fighting men.

<sup>2</sup> The man referred to frequently in this history as Matshana ka Mondise.



Kula and the smallest local Chief, Nondubela, soon began to influence their respective people against paying the tax. Their intrigues were extended to other Chiefs near them, both in Natal and Zululand. Early in December (1905), the same two tribes began to prepare for rebellion. Supplies of assegais, shields and *tshokobezi* badges were obtained. The young men of all the Umsinga Chiefs were called on to pay the poll tax subsequently to 20th January, though payment, it was explained, might be made at any time between then and 31st May. Only one of the Chiefs made earnest and successful endeavours to induce his men to pay, viz. Tulwana, a man who had always been conspicuous for his loyalty to the Government. Nondubela instructed his men not to pay, nor did any do so until after the Rebellion had broken out and several reverses had been sustained by the rebels. Kula advised his tribe to pay a few pounds, and so throw dust in the eyes of the Government. £98 out of £1,500 is all that was paid by his people.

In February, two of the same man's tribe, constables at Tugela Ferry, were charged and convicted of conspiring to murder the European police at that place and seize their arms and ammunition. The conspiracy was exposed by one of Chief Sibindi's men—a fellow constable.

Kula, a man of intemperate habits, had for long been a source of annoyance. In 1898, he openly organized his tribe into regiments. He was reprovved for so doing by the Supreme Chief. Between 1898 and May, 1906, he was repeatedly fined, either for refusing or neglecting to supply labourers for the Public Works Department. In January, he was warned by the U.S.N.A. to be more careful. "The Government," this officer said to him, "is lenient, but will not put up with annoyance such as this for ever." In July, 1905, the Governor (Sir Henry McCallum) paid a visit to Pomeroy. The Chiefs were summoned to greet him. Kula arrived with a mounted cavalcade and deliberately galloped past the King's representative without saluting. For this gross disrespect he was cautioned by His Excellency in person.

On the 4th March, 1906, about fifty men of the tribe residing at Elands Kraal, under headman Mabulawo, openly took up arms. This caused all European farmers in the neighbourhood to flee precipitately from their homes. The *impi* continued under arms and defied the local police, with the result that thirty-six of the Police Field Force, under Sub-Inspector C. R. Ottley, were sent to Umsinga to restore order. Ottley, however, deemed it inadvisable to attempt more with so small a force than camp near the court-house. On the 23rd, Kula held a large beer-drink at his kraal within two miles of the magistracy. An armed force was there assembled, it was said, for the purpose of killing the police and court officials. On the night fixed for the massacre, Kula, it seems, got drunk, when some of the more loyal headmen of the tribe bound him up, thereby preventing him from carrying his supposed threat into execution.

After these proceedings had been reported, Kula was summoned to Pietermaritzburg by the Supreme Chief. He at first hesitated about complying, but, on being pressed by his headmen, obeyed. Upon being questioned at headquarters by the Minister for Native Affairs, he denied everything that had occurred, but, in the face of irrefutable evidence, was ordered to arrest Mabulawo and all who had been or were still under arms. Twelve days later, the headman was brought to the Magistrate, unaccompanied, however, by any of those who had armed. On the 23rd April, a large *impi* was organized to release Mabulawo. The latter was now driven off in Dr. Keith Murray's trap to Pietermaritzburg. When the *impi* heard of this, and of the fact that thirty of the Umsinga Reserves had been mobilized and posted at the magistracy, they withdrew to their kraals.

Ever since the 4th March, the affairs of the district had been going from bad to worse. Europeans and loyal Natives were assaulted by disaffected Natives with impunity, so much so that the police were directed to desist from attending beer-drinks in uniform, and not to arrest any Native in the presence of others. By this time, Kula's



tribe had virtually become master of the district, doing whatever appeared right in its own eyes.

It so happened the Magistrate (Mr. A. E. Harrington) was collecting hut tax at Keate's Drift when Mr. Cross and party were fired on by Bambata and others in Mpanza valley (3rd April). Chiefs Silwana and Sibindi were ordered to arm and prevent the rebel Chief from crossing into their wards. As soon as the message reached Sibindi, he did all he could to assist, in fact most of his tribe in Umsinga division were mobilized within two hours. Silwana's response was half-hearted. About 11 p.m. the same day, Ottley and twenty men arrived at the drift from Pomeroy, six hours after hearing of Bambata's outbreak. The Magistrate, Umsinga, proceeded the next day (4th) to collect taxes at Tugela Ferry, where, however, but few paid.

The unrest among the Umsinga Natives now became more accentuated. Mtele, Kula's uncle and principal induna at Elands Kraal, mobilized the whole of the people under his charge. Nondubela joined him. The indunas of that portion of Ngqambuzana's tribe, which was in Umsinga division, were reported by the Chief as intending to cross into Zululand and join the rebels. All the Europeans of the district went into lager at Helpmakaar, excepting the court officials. The Umsinga Reserves were joined by those of Dundee, Newcastle and Weenen early in May, together with a composite Militia force under Major W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.

Kula reported by messengers on the 4th May that Mtele was in open rebellion. Harrington, in reply, remarked that he had two months previously told Kula a portion of his tribe was in rebellion, but this had been denied; "he sends only now to tell me what I knew two months ago." Before receipt of this message, Kula had openly declared that he would never come to the court again.

In consequence of a large number of Natives being expected at the magistracy to pay taxes, a squadron N.M.R. (Capt. P. M. Rattray, D.S.O.), with a few Reserves under Chief Leader D. C. Uys, was sent there from Help-

makaar at 6.30 a.m. on the 8th, pending arrival the same day of Lieut. G. R. Richards, M.L.A., and a squadron (100) N.C. Kula, probably because he saw troops proceeding to the magistracy, deemed it prudent to visit it too. Accompanied by a dozen of his leading men, he arrived shortly before 11 a.m. Almost simultaneously, Richards rode in with his men. Harrington conferred with the latter, Rattray and Uys. He pointed out the degree to which Kula was implicated in the Rebellion, and suggested the man should be removed from the district. Richards, then in charge of the post, though not senior officer, decided, with the concurrence of the other officers, to transfer the Chief to make the statement he had already made respecting disloyalty in his tribe to the Officer Commanding at Helpmakaar. Kula was informed of the decision. A few minutes later, he was required to proceed with Rattray and his men to Helpmakaar. Six headmen were allowed to accompany the Chief. On arrival at Helpmakaar, Kula was closely examined by Lieut.-Col. A. T. G. Wales, who, in his turn, resolved to keep him in custody pending receipt of orders from the Government.

The Government was naturally placed in an awkward position by these unexpected and unusual proceedings. Richards, of course, had made no actual arrest, and, in referring the question of the advisability of Kula's continued presence in the district to the officer at Helpmakaar, had done so because the point at issue appeared to be one not for him but for some higher authority to decide. The Commandant was surprised at Richards' action, and could he at once have got into communication with the responsible officers, the probabilities are that Kula would not have been either arrested or detained, as everything pointed to his committing himself sooner or later, when he would have been either captured or shot as a rebel.

Under the circumstances, in view of the then greatly disturbed condition of the country, the Government caused the Chief to be conveyed on the 9th from Helpmakaar to Pietermaritzburg, where he was detained, though not in custody.



Those best competent to judge, firmly believe the arrest or enforced removal of this important Chief at that particular moment checked the spread of rebellion in those parts. This, indeed, was subsequently realized by the Government. Thus, though there was irregularity in the way in which Kula was removed, the step was justified by peace being maintained at a time when a rising was imminent in the thickly-populated district over which he had control.<sup>1</sup>

Kula's brother, Manuka, tried to usurp control of the tribe after the former's departure. On such endeavour being detected, he was promptly placed under arrest.

Simultaneously with the dispatch of the Zululand Field Force to Nkandhla (1st May), squadron A (with the Sydenham troop of B), N.M.R. (about 110), under Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., were detailed for Mapumulo, whilst the remainder of the regiment (160) proceeded via Dundee to Helpmakaar, under Major W. Murray-Smith. A force,<sup>2</sup> under the command of Murray-Smith (with Capt. G. T. Hurst as Staff Officer), left Dundee for Helpmakaar on the 5th. It reached its destination on the 6th, but moved on the 7th to a new site two miles off, where a strong lager of wire entanglements was speedily erected.

It was from the foregoing column that the detachments proceeded to garrison Pomeroy, as already noticed in connection with Kula's removal. Patrols, too, were sent out in various directions. These obtained intelligence in confirmation of Mtele and Nondubela being in open rebellion.

When Wales left for Pietermaritzburg on duty (11th), Murray-Smith took over the command. Finding the Natives referred to were actually in rebellion, Murray-

<sup>1</sup> Kula's uncle, Mtele, with the portion of the tribe that rebelled with him, formed part of the force that attacked Leuchars at Mpukunyoni.

<sup>2</sup> It was made up of 200 N.C., Right Wing (Major A. C. Townsend); 160 N.M.R. (Capt. P. M. Rattray); N.F.A. (four guns) (Major C. Wilson); 55 N.R.R. (Lieut. A. McKenzie); and departmental details. When *en route* to Helpmakaar, it was joined by the following Reserves: 80 Newcastle (Chief Leader Adendorff); 200 Estcourt (Chief Leader A. F. Henderson, C.M.G.); 55 Dundee (Chief Leader D.C. Uys).

Smith decided to attack and prevent them from inducing others to take up arms. An armed body of 200 to 300 was discovered at a kraal in a valley some four or five miles from the camp. As, however, the Commandant's instructions were that the column should simply proceed to Helpmakaar and, having fortified itself, await Mackay's arrival, it became necessary for permission to assume the offensive to be obtained. This Colonel Bru-de-Wold, after carefully considering the situation, gave in a few hours by telephone.

On the following day (12th May), Rattray was accordingly detailed to take command of the mounted troops, viz. 60 to 80 N.C. (Lieut. P. W. Stride); 60 to 80 N.M.R.; about 150 Newcastle, Ladysmith, Dundee and Estcourt Reserves; and 8 Umsinga Reserves under Chief Leader A. Müller, the latter being guides and scouts.

Leaving camp before daybreak, the force moved towards Elands Kraal, some ten miles away. About 9 a.m., the scouts got in touch with the enemy and exchanged a few shots. Rattray, close at hand, pushed on at a gallop up a hill and attacked Mtele's *impi*, about 150 to 200 strong, the latter partly concealed in bushes. The *impi*, making neither charge nor stand, was forthwith driven into an adjoining valley, through which they were promptly pursued by N.C. and N.M.R. as far as the Buffalo (about two miles), as well as in other directions. On reaching the river, the Natives scattered more than they had already done, some crossing into Zululand, whilst others concealed themselves in as extraordinarily rough country on the Natal side.

The Reserves, with a Maxim (N.M.R.), took ground where the enemy had first been seen. From such position, a continuous fire was kept up, which proved very effective in breaking down any opposition that might have been offered in such extremely rugged and out-of-the-way country.

The main force with Murray-Smith had, in the meantime, occupied high ground overlooking the Elands Kraal settlement and the Buffalo valley. Here the N.F.A., supporting and covering Rattray, opened and kept up a



shrapnel fire on groups of retreating Natives. Such, however, was ineffective on account of the long range.

The whole action, including pursuit, lasted about two hours. The troops suffered no casualties; of the rebels, twenty-nine were killed, eight prisoners were taken, and thirty cattle captured.

On an examination of the scene being made, two camps of war-huts were found (about a mile apart). Food and clothing belonging to the insurgents were discovered at the back of the hill on which they were first sighted.

Two days later, Murray-Smith took a force (including N.C. at Pomeroy, then having been relieved by N.R.R.) to Nondubela's kraal, at a hill called Nqoro, near Buffel's Hoek, but the rebels, on the alert in consequence of the action at Elands Kraal, escaped to Zululand. It was on the same day that Mackay crossed into Natal at Rorke's Drift.<sup>1</sup> Had it been possible for him to co-operate, Nondubela and his force might not have escaped as cheaply as they did. As it was, Murray-Smith went with a section of his force to Rorke's Drift, then down the right bank of the Buffalo, whilst another section, under Rattray, proceeded by road viâ Elands Kraal valley, and, after crossing Mazabeko stream, converged with the main body on Nqoro hill (below Fugitives' Drift). On this occasion, all kraals that were come across belonging to rebels were destroyed. Over forty miles were covered during the day. The feature of the day's operations, however, was the splendid performance of the guns (N.F.A.) under Wilson, which travelled a distance of not less than forty miles.

In addition to *tshokobezi* badges, it was noticed that strips of white goat-skin, about an inch broad and tied round the neck, were used by Natives of these parts to indicate being in rebellion. The prisoners, as well as the killed, were found wearing them.

As soon as Mackay arrived, he took command and operated as already described in Chapter XII.

Orders were received from the Commandant on 16th

<sup>1</sup> His and Murray-Smith's men met near the Buffalo and moved back together to the latter's camp.

May for 100 N.M.R. and 100 N.R.R.<sup>1</sup> under Murray-Smith, to escort a convoy of fifty-one waggons (supplies, etc.), from Dundee to Nkandhla. Leaving on the 17th, the escort, strengthened at Vant's Drift by 100 N.C. under Richards, arrived at Nkandhla viâ Nqutu, Nondweni and Owen's store, on the 24th. On the following day, the escort, less the N.C.—detached to become bodyguard to Colonel McKenzie—was ordered to return with the empty waggons to Dundee and join the Umvoti Field Force (then under command of Major W. J. S. Newmarch, U.M.R.) at Greytown, and do so viâ Tugela Ferry. Murray-Smith left Nkandhla on the 26th and, returning viâ Nqutu, reached Dundee on the 30th.

The night the escort reached Nqutu (28th May), an absurd scare arose out of a belief that Mehlokazulu intended attacking the village the same night. The Basutos had, in consequence, mobilized and taken refuge at the gaol. As, at this time, Mackay was camped sixteen miles away at Isandhlwana, it is difficult to understand how the scare arose.

On arriving at Dundee, Murray-Smith got orders from Leuchars to proceed *by rail* to Greytown, leaving N.R.R. at Dundee. He accordingly entrained on the 1st June, reached Greytown 6 a.m. on the following day, and joined the U.F.F. at Spitzkop on the 3rd, temporarily taking command.

Shortly after, Mackay moved into Nqutu district, Zululand (27th May), to co-operate with Leuchars. Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton was appointed to command at Helpmakaar.

On being appointed (29th May), to the command of all troops south of Tugela and in Nqutu district, Zululand, *i.e.* the whole of Natal plus Nqutu, Leuchars, as has been seen, visited Helpmakaar to direct operations from there. He arrived at that place on the 2nd June to find that 1,000 of Chief Silwana's men had suddenly, and without reference to the Commandant of Militia, or to himself, been

<sup>1</sup> N.R.R. were relieved at Pomeroy on the 16th by D.L.I. (100) (Capt. W. P. M. Henderson), the latter having arrived at Helpmakaar on the preceding day from Dundee with a convoy of supplies.



called out by the Minister for Native Affairs, with orders to be at Pomeroy on the 3rd. Efforts were at once made to secure a European leader. The men displayed no enthusiasm whatever and were barely civil. Although called out under the authority of the Native Code as an ordinary levy, they asked to be armed with rifles and supplied with blankets. The applications could not be entertained. Warnings were received that the levy was not to be trusted. It was freely stated that Silwana had forbidden the men to cross into Zululand. At Gordon Memorial mission station they looted a European house. On a false alarm occurring one night, a number of the younger men sprang to arms with the war-cry, "Usutu!" Under these circumstances, Leuchars decided to send them back to Weenen. Urgent requests, however, came from Government and the Magistrate of Weenen to give them a trial. Mr. G. A. Jackson, who knew the people, was accordingly appointed to lead them. The order to return to their homes was withdrawn. They were told Jackson would take them next day (7th) to a locality where a number of returned rebels of Manuka's section was in hiding. As there was a tribal feud of long standing between Silwana's and Kula's people, it was thought the levy would have undertaken the duty with alacrity. Jackson went to Helpmakaar to arrange for supplies. On getting back to Pomeroy next morning to lead the levy on, he found no less than 600 had deserted during the night. Although about 100 of those remaining volunteered to go forward, they were carried away by the majority, who, packing up their bundles, made for their homes. After expressing regret at the behaviour of their men, the indunas proceeded to do likewise.<sup>1</sup>

By way of facilitating control of the forces in Umsinga and Nqutu districts, those under Mackay, less the Reserves sent back to Helpmakaar, were separated from the Helpmakaar Field Force and formed into a distinct column, with instructions to confine their operations to the basin of the Buffalo and the north-west portion of Qudeni

<sup>1</sup> Report, Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G., 23rd Nov. 1906.

mountain. Mackay's column then consisted of the N.C., Right and Left Wings; N.R., one company; N.F.A., one battery (six guns); and N.N.H., one squadron.

The Mapumulo garrison was detached from the U.F.F. and became a separate column under Sparks, with authority to turn out 200 from each of two loyal tribes to assist in searching for and arresting returned rebels of Ngobizembe's tribe.

The H.F.F. was now made up of the garrisons of Pomeroy, Fort Murray-Smith,<sup>1</sup> Helpmakaar, Paddafontein and Dundee. Wales was appointed to command *vice* Weighton, who had been ordered to take over court-martial duties.

Further proof was given by the Transvaal at this juncture of an earnest desire to assist Natal in her trouble. That patriotic and well-known organization, the Lancaster and York Association, Johannesburg, conceived the idea of offering Natal the services of 150 men (twenty-five of them mounted). On approaching the President, Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey, K.C.M.G., the latter not only approved the proposal, but undertook to defray all expenses of equipment, clothing, saddlery, etc.—excepting only salaries and food supplies—out of his own pocket. This generous offer was most gratefully accepted by the Natal Government. So enthusiastically did Mr. Joe Bell, Mr. W. Beachy-Head and other members of the Association take the matter up, ably assisted by the Staff of the Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters, that after beginning to enrol on the 1st June, the corps, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Thomas Peakman, C.M.G., with Capt. G. H. Helbert, as Adjutant, actually presented itself for inspection at 3 p.m. on the 3rd,<sup>2</sup> and, moving off by train at 5.15 p.m., reached Dundee at 9.30 a.m. on the following day, prepared for any service that might be required.

The greatest pains had been taken to select only the most efficient out of the 1,500 applications handed in. The

<sup>1</sup> That is, the lager, consisting chiefly of wire entanglements, erected about two miles from Helpmakaar.

<sup>2</sup> By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.



rapidity with which the men were enrolled, clothed, equipped and entrained was as surprising to the people of Johannesburg as it was to the Colony of Natal. The L and Y, or 'Rosebuds,' as the corps was more familiarly styled, were directed to attach themselves to Mackay's column. This they did at Mangeni on the 9th June. Peakman was appointed second in command of the column, and he and his contingent remained with it until the end of the operations in Zululand.

Intelligence was received by McKenzie (at Nomangei) on the 9th June of the presence of a strong rebel force at Kotongweni mountain (*i.e.* close to the Tugela, above Watton's Drift). This was probably the force whose expedition was referred to on p. 315, although the expedition there dealt with was confined to the neighbourhood of Watton's Drift. McKenzie ordered the U.F.F. to make a night march on 12th and, crossing next morning near Ngubevu Drift, to work down Mfongozi valley, where a column from Nkandhla would be ready to co-operate. Leuchars thereupon re-mobilized the 1st and 2nd Krantz-kop Reserves, instructing van Rooyen to march down the Dimane valley to the Tugela and prevent the enemy from breaking into Natal from Kotongweni, on their being pressed on the Zululand side. The O.C. Helpmakaar, moreover, was directed to co-operate on the north-west by moving a force of Reserves, N.R.R. and D.L.I. to look out at the Buffalo for any of the enemy who might be returning to their homes in that direction. It was at this time (10th), it will be remembered, that the Mome action took place.

The U.F.F., joined by Sibindi, who had again voluntarily mobilized his men, crossed at Ngubevu and proceeded to Mfongozi valley, where touch was got with Mackay, but, in spite of constant efforts, communication could not be opened up with the column from Nkandhla until 11 a.m. on the following day. Leuchars operated in Mfongozi valley both on the 13th and 14th, capturing many cattle. After he had conferred with Colonel

McKenzie, a decision was come to for both columns to operate at Kotongweni on the following day. Five hundred of Sibindi's men accordingly went down Mfongozi river to the Tugela, whilst McKenzie operated from the top of the mountain. The operations, however, proved unsuccessful.

The O.C. Troops now directed Leuchars to return to Broeder's Hoek, about twelve miles from Krantzkop magistracy, keeping his own force in the vicinity of Kombe forest. Mackay was instructed to remain on Qudeni mountain during a three days' armistice which was proclaimed at the same time, to afford rebels an opportunity of surrendering. Captive women were utilized to make the proclamation known to those who were in hiding.

The U.F.F. marched viâ Ngubevu to Broeder's Hoek. The Reserves at Helpmakaar were demobilized on 16th and 17th June, with exception of those of Umsinga, who were retained as garrison at Helpmakaar lager, it being still unsafe for the women and children who had taken refuge there to return to their farms.

With the object of relieving some of the men of Mackay's force, two squadrons B.M.R. and one squadron N.C.(D), were mobilized, and sent under Arnott to Dundee on the 18th.<sup>1</sup> Major Moe proceeded, at the same time, with the whole of the N.N.H. to Pomeroy, in order to bring rebels of Kula's tribe to book, also escort to Pomeroy Chief Makafula of Nqutu district whom Mackay had been directed to arrest. The arrest, however, was not made, as Mackay, who had been in close touch with the Chief, had good grounds for believing he was not disloyal, as supposed to be the case by those at a distance. In this view, Mackay was supported by the Magistrate.

Whilst contemplating a demonstration in Silwana's location by Mackay's column from the Umsinga side, and by the U.F.F. from that of Greytown, Leuchars received a wire from O.C. Mapumulo reporting that his convoy had been attacked on the morning of the 19th at Oglesby's store, near Otimati, when one man had been killed and

<sup>1</sup> Only, as will appear later, to proceed at once to Stanger.



another wounded. He thereupon caused his forces to concentrate at Mapumulo as speedily as possible.

Before describing the position at Mapumulo, a thickly-populated district which now became the principal focus of rebellion, it will be necessary to take up the threads once more at Nkandhla and narrate what happened between the action at Mome gorge (10th) and the outbreak at Mapumulo just referred to.

## XVI.

### CONCLUDING OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.—VISIT OF DINUZULU'S INDUNAS TO PIETERMAR- ITZBURG.—POSITION AT MAPUMULO.—ACTIONS AT OTIMATI AND PEYANA (HLONONO).

REFERENCE was made towards the close of the preceding chapter to a combined move by Leuchars, Mackay and a column from Nkandhla in the direction of Kotongweni on the 15th June. The object was to drive the enemy with his stock from Qudeni mountain into the valley of the Mfongozi river. The Nkandhla column, commanded by McKenzie, consisted of the 'divisional troops' shown at the foot of the page.<sup>1</sup>

The transport and N.F.A. (pompoms), with an escort of N.R. (three companies, A, D and E, Major Boyd-Wilson), proceeded on the 12th viâ Nkandhla and Ensingabantu to Ntingwe. On the same day, the remainder of the divisional troops and R.H. (temporarily detached from Royston's Brigade), visited and thoroughly searched Ofeni

<sup>1</sup> Nkandhla column: C squadron N.C.; N.D.M.R.; Z.M.R.; 150 N.P.; pompom section, N.F.A.; and 3 companies N.R. The N.P. at this time had only one officer, Sub-Inspector F.B.E. White. Royston was, at the same time, given command of a column, known as Royston's Brigade, consisting of R.H.; D.L.I.; 4 companies, B, C, G, and H, Natal Rangers; and one section, 15 pounders, B battery, N.F.A.

Before the O.C. Troops left Nomangei, his Intelligence Officer, Capt. E. J. B. Hosking, asked for a squadron in order to search for Bambata's body, said to be lying in the Mome gorge. The application however, could not be granted, as there were no men to spare, and because McKenzie realized that, if Bambata was dead, his body could no doubt be recovered later. Under the circumstances, it was certainly wiser to act on the assumption, weak though it was, that Bambata was still at large, than on the far stronger one that he was already dead, and that, therefore, absolute proof of such fact was necessary.



gorge and ridge *en route*. Ofeni<sup>1</sup> is a remarkable chasm, about five miles to the south of Empandhleni. A small stream that rises there and descends rapidly to the Insuze, has the same name. The sides of the chasm, which are over 300 feet in height, are linked together by means of a tiny, natural bridge but a few feet in width. Makahleka, one of Sigananda's many and more important sons, was declared to be in hiding at this uncanny place. The search, however, resulted in practically no rebels being found. The troops afterwards proceeded to Titlestad's store, at Ntingwe, where they bivouacked for the night.

Although the foregoing movement was carried out expressly with the object of co-operating on the 13th with Leuchars and Mackay, then near Kotongweni and Qudeni respectively, the plan, in so far as McKenzie was concerned, was disturbed through receipt of intelligence to the effect that Bambata, Cakijana and Mangati had taken refuge in the bush at Macala. To surround the mountain by day-break on the 13th then, of course, became the immediate object. Barker was ordered to co-operate. He was to take up positions on the south, whilst McKenzie would do likewise in other directions. When dawn broke and the latter's troops were in the positions assigned, Barker was found exactly where it was desired he should be, *i.e.* at the lower end of Macala bush. The fastness, which lay in a bush at the top of the mountain, consisted of great masses of rock lying one on top of the other in such a way as to form, below the surface of the ground, a network of dark passages, the one communicating with the other. Only with the greatest difficulty could people who had taken refuge there be found and, when this occurred, the searchers, on account of the irregular formation of the labyrinth and its narrow passages, ran serious risks when dealing with a desperate enemy, especially one who had reduced the length of his assegai to enable it to be used with the best effect. A Native levy which had accompanied the column, was instructed to drive the bush,

<sup>1</sup> From *ufa* or *ulufa*, a crack.

whilst being supported by the troops. During this operation, a rebel, who was concealed under the rocks, stabbed one of the levy in the leg. On the drive, which was partially successful, coming to an end, the underground passages were entered and thoroughly searched by the N.C., with the result that a number of other rebels was killed. It afterwards transpired that these Natives, when at first they had found themselves surprised by the troops, ran to the rock 'warren,' never dreaming "people with boots on," as they put it, would venture to explore so dark and perplexing a spot. The principal object of the quest, however, was not attained, though Bambata's witch-doctor, Malaza, was among the slain. Some 450 cattle were captured during the day. McKenzie withdrew to Ntingwe, and Barker to near Cetshwayo's grave.

Whilst the foregoing operations were in progress, the Z.M.R., under Vanderplank, proceeded to the hill Jokwana, west of Macala, to get in touch with Leuchars and Mackay, and to advise the former of what was taking place at Macala. He was, moreover, to co-operate as well as he could in carrying out the original plan. Owing, however, to the haze, communication could not be established.

On the day following, 14th June, McKenzie moved up towards Kombe forest, where he succeeded in getting into communication with Leuchars. A drive of the combined forces through the valley that lay between them was accordingly arranged and took place the same day, but without result. Colonels McKenzie and Leuchars met, when further combined operations were arranged to take place on the 15th at Kotongweni, where Mangati and Cakijana were then alleged to be hiding in caves. On the departure of the O.C. Troops from Nomangei, Lieut.-Col. J. S. Wylie, D.L.I., was placed in charge of the camp. Hedges, Calverley and Titlestad were, at the same time, instructed to try and locate Siganda, with a view to bringing about his capture or surrender. One or other of these alternatives appeared imminent. As a result of the untiring and well-directed efforts of these officers, not only



was the rebel leader's whereabouts discovered, but, on his being persuaded to surrender, he did so forthwith, not, however, to Wylie, but to an officer of lower rank. The latter's action, with Wylie in camp, was inexcusable, and his acceptance of the surrender irregular and invalid, as, of course, the only person competent to announce the terms of surrender was the O.C. Troops. Unfortunately, the last-named did not receive a notification as to what had happened until twenty-four hours later. He decided that the surrender was to be unconditional and be accompanied with those of all the Chief's people, together with their arms. To this Siganda agreed. On the 16th, he was conveyed by the balance of R.H. at Nomangci to Empandhleni.

Boyd-Wilson, by making a creditable forced march with the transport, succeeded in joining McKenzie at Kombe on the 14th.

The combined operations at Kotongweni (15th) proved disappointing. In the neighbourhood of the camp, however, where the bushes were searched by N.R., thirteen rebels were shot, whilst a large quantity of goods, probably looted from European stores in the vicinity, was discovered. Owing to Mackay not having got in touch with McKenzie on the 13th, his column was unable to take part in the operations.

In the meantime, reliable intelligence had reached Nomangci of Bambata having been killed during the action at Mome. Because of a rumour circulated on the day of the action that he had escaped with a wound, it obviously became necessary to take the greatest pains in securing identification. Two of his tribe, who had been brought from Greytown in April in anticipation of difficulty in connection with matters of identification, happened to be still at Empandhleni. These were conducted on the 13th to the spot where the body was lying, namely, at the very bottom of the gorge, within half a dozen yards of the right bank of the Mome, and just where the Dobo or 'pear-shaped' forest abuts on the stream. Although the inspection took place five days after death, the features, by

reason of the extreme cold in the gorge at that time of year—mid-winter—were remarkably well preserved. The two Native informants, who were intimately acquainted with Bambata, had no difficulty in recognizing the body as that of their Chief. Such peculiarities as had been described *beforehand* by these and other relatives and acquaintances as characteristic of Bambata, were found about the body—tallying exactly. Among them were : a gap between the two middle upper teeth ; slight beard, rather under, than on the front of, the chin ; a scar immediately below one eye, and another on the cheek opposite ; a high instep. As, however, the officer in charge wished to put the matter beyond all doubt, and as to carry a corpse already five days old up the sides of a gorge, about whose steepness so much has already been written, was out of the question, he directed the head to be removed and brought instead. As a result of this, decisive corroborative evidence was secured. This must have been wanting had timidity been permitted to usurp the ordinary dictates of common sense. It was, of course, of the utmost importance to prove that the principal ring-leader in a serious rebellion, a man then still believed by many of his followers to possess supernatural powers, was really dead. Care was taken to keep the head in a decent manner until the plain and necessary object, solely on account of which it had been removed, was served. At no time whilst it was in charge of the troops, was there the slightest act of disrespect towards it or the deceased's memory. It was not exposed to public view, but kept by one of the medical officers in a manner the most proper under the circumstances. It was, moreover, impossible for anyone to see it without permission, which, again, was withheld, except for the necessary purpose of identification. In addition to the two Natives referred to, three others, viz. a prisoner who had come from Natal with Bambata, and two men of Sigananda's tribe who knew Bambata well, were sent by the Acting Magistrate to see the head ; this they at once recognized as Bambata's.



As soon as identification had been completed, the head was taken back to the gorge and there buried along with the body.<sup>1</sup>

After the finding of Bambata's body and the surrender of Sigananda, General Stephenson, who had witnessed the operations at Nkandhla for nearly three weeks, left with his staff for the Transvaal, via Pietermaritzburg.

Before proceeding with his chief staff officer and body-guard to Empandhleni on the 16th, McKenzie, convinced that the Rebellion was then practically over, allowed the levies to return to their homes for three days. During this period, he gave out, all operations would be suspended, to afford those in hiding an opportunity of surrendering. The levies were accordingly told to try and induce rebels of their respective tribes to come in. Sigananda was, at the same time, directed to send messengers to members of his and Ndube's tribes who had rebelled, by way of bringing about speedy and general surrenders. Among those who were successful in this connection was Sergt. E. Titlestad, of the Intelligence Department, and for long a storekeeper at Ntingwe. Proceeding to Qudeni forest he, in a couple of days, managed to induce 284 men to return with him to camp. McKenzie's column, then taken command of by Royston, moved to Ndikwe stream, north-east of and below Ensingabantu store.

With the Rebellion in Zululand at an end, nothing remained but to clear the country in the direction of Qudeni, Mfongozi and towards Nqutu, that is, to receive surrenders or make arrests where rebels, generally the most culpable, were unwilling to come in. Woolls-Sampson, having returned from his visit to Pietermaritzburg,<sup>2</sup> was,

<sup>1</sup> Conclusive as is the evidence as to Bambata's death, strong rumours nevertheless got afloat shortly after the Rebellion that he was still alive and in hiding, first in one part of Zululand then in another. To this day, there are Natives and Europeans who believe the rumours, but such beliefs have probably been formed without due consideration of the facts here set forth. For the most part, they rest on the mere fact that Bambata's wife, Siyekiwe, did not go into mourning. Under normal conditions, this would undoubtedly have been an important criterion, but the conditions were clearly very abnormal.

<sup>2</sup> This officer had been to explain more thoroughly than could be done on paper the particular problems that confronted the troops at Nkandhla.

on the 20th, given command of a column.<sup>1</sup> He was instructed to form a depôt at Ensingabantu and to operate in that part of the country.

It was at this stage that news of the outbreak at Mapumulo on the 19th was received. In addition to instructing Leuchars to push forward the U.F.F. to the scene of disturbance, Mansel was ordered by the O.C. Troops to camp at Middle Drift, from which place patrols were to be thrown out in all directions, particularly up and down Tugela valley, so as to intercept movements towards Zululand of rebels then stated to be collecting on the right bank of the Tugela, between Middle Drift and Bond's Drift.

Mackay and Royston proceeded, in the meantime, to clear country in the vicinity of their respective camps. On the 22nd, two squadrons N.C., with the mounted section, L and Y, and a Native levy, left on a patrol in the direction of the Buffalo river. Very difficult country was traversed. A remarkable gorge, known as Emlolamazembe (*where axes are ground*), was come upon in a small and peculiarly-secluded valley, through which the Gubazi stream passes. At the lower end of the valley, the stream runs through a huge cleft, the stone walls of which are about 150 feet high and only about 12 feet apart at the top. The cleft extends some 100 or so yards before the water flows from a large dark pool at this uncanny spot into another valley beyond. No wonder that such place had, until that very day, been occupied by rebels.

A notable arrest was made about this time near Empandhleni, viz. Bekuzulu, brother of the late Mehlokazulu. This man, who was a rebel, was being harboured at a kraal. The head of the kraal was, of course, also arrested.

At Empangeni on the coast, a Chief Bejana had recently failed to comply with the orders of the local Magistrate. Without informing Colonel McKenzie of what was taking place, a small party of N.P. proceeded to Em-

<sup>1</sup> It was composed as follows: N.D.M.R. (with one Maxim), 198; Z.M.R. (with three Rexer guns), 99; N.P., 147; N.R. (three companies, A, D and E), 290; N.F.A. (one 15-pounder and two pompoms), 26; departmental corps, 19; staff, 11. Total, 790. There were also Native levies (Lieut. W. H. London).



pangeni to effect the man's arrest, but, feeling later on they were not strong enough, applied for reinforcements. The idea of sending a small party on such a mission appeared more likely to provoke than suppress rebellious tendencies, consequently Barker was directed to assume command and make the arrest. Owing, however, to instructions received from headquarters, the expedition did not take place, although Barker's orders were not definitely cancelled until he had got as far as Entumeni.

The Government, as stated in Chapter IX., felt it necessary for Dinuzulu "to take some action to show his loyalty." It was thought he and Mciteki should visit Pietermaritzburg and advise as to the state of affairs in Zululand. The proposal, however, was allowed to drop for the time being. On the 29th May, the Governor again strongly urged it. Mr. Saunders then acquiesced. An invitation was conveyed to Dinuzulu, who replied (2nd June) that he was in bad health, and that he wished to discuss the matter with his headmen. The headmen were summoned, but, owing to the alleged death of one of the Chief's children just at that moment, his meeting with them was delayed. The headmen saw the necessity for making the visit, but remarked that "in Dinuzulu's present state of health, they feared he would never reach, but die on the road." Permission was sought to send a large deputation of indunas instead. In acceding to the request, the Governor suggested that the Chief should himself go to the telephone at Nongoma and be there to refer to whilst the interview lasted. About twenty indunas, headed by Mankulumana, accordingly proceeded to Pietermaritzburg, accompanied by the Commissioner and the local Magistrate. They had three interviews with Sir Henry McCallum on the 20th, 21st and 22nd. The latter reported that the men had replied in a straightforward and satisfactory manner to questions put to them, so much so that he and the Minister for Native Affairs were persuaded "that Dinuzulu's name had been used as a 'stalking-horse' by different malcontents to incite their neighbours to rebellion." It was in this way, they believed,

that many of the false rumours of which the Chief complained had arisen. It transpired from the interviews that messengers had reached Dinuzulu from three Natal Chiefs, whose coming he had failed to report in accordance with instructions previously given him by the Governor. The indunas were told to inform Dinuzulu that he had disobeyed orders, and that he was to be more careful in future.

On account of ill-health, Dinuzulu did not proceed to the telephone office at Nongoma, as desired by the Governor.

The situation at Mapumulo now began to grow more serious. It developed with the same remarkable rapidity that had been witnessed at Nkandhla. At such a time, given a few weeks of incubation, a Zulu is nothing if not swift and vigorous in his movements. To organize is, with him, instinctive. To-day the country may be still and deserted, to-morrow it is overrun by great 'swarms,' called *impis*, sprung from nobody knows where.

McKenzie made up his mind to withdraw from Zululand all troops that could be spared and proceed with them towards Mapumulo, so as to confine the Rebellion as much as possible to the vicinity of the fresh outbreak.<sup>1</sup> Royston's brigade remained at Ndikwe, with orders to operate through Mehlokazulu's ward towards Nqutu,

<sup>1</sup> Woolls-Sampson was ordered to Empandhleni. Leaving his infantry at Ensingabantu store, he reached Empandhleni with the rest of the force on the 22nd. The D.L.I., detached from Royston's brigade, joined Woolls-Sampson, whilst three companies of Rangers (A, D and E), under Boyd-Wilson, became attached to Royston, in lieu of B, C, G and H, whose disposition is referred to further on. The N.F.A. (B battery), moreover, detached from Royston's brigade, returned to Empandhleni to join Mackay, whilst N.F.A. (two guns, 15-pounders), detached from Mackay, joined Royston.

Mackay was directed on the 22nd to move to Empandhleni as speedily as possible.

Dick, with N.R. (C, F, G and H companies), left on the 23rd for Fort Yolland. He had with him 40 N.N.H. B company, N.R. remained as garrison at Empandhleni. He moved to Middle Drift on the 26th, to Krantzkop on the 28th, and to Thring's Post on the 2nd July.

The Cape squadron of R.H. (about 100), arrived at Gingindhlovu on the 23rd, where it was directed to remain pending further orders.

Part of the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, after being detained for a few days at Melmoth, came on to Nkandhla and eventually joined Mackay's column.



clearing up generally and receiving as many surrenders as possible. The Commissioner for Native Affairs was at first of opinion the latter action might be misunderstood by loyal Zulus, but, after further consideration, concurred in it.

Woolls-Sampson left Empandhleni on the 23rd June,<sup>1</sup> and, marching viâ Fort Yolland, took up a position on the northern side of the Tugela at or near the precipice known as Isiwasamanqe, with the object of preventing Natal rebels from breaking into Zululand. The loyal tribes of that part, including that of Mtonga,<sup>2</sup> assisted with levies. Strict orders were, at the same time, given to Woolls-Sampson to take every precaution to prevent looting of property, or damage to crops, kraals, etc., of friendly Natives.

As, at this juncture, everything pointed to a peaceful state of affairs in Zululand, the O.C. Troops left Empandhleni on the morning of the 25th. By this date, the majority of rebels in Nkandhla district had surrendered. The garrisons at Empandhleni and Ensingabantu were, nevertheless, allowed to remain, owing to the inadvisability of entirely and suddenly denuding the country of troops. Just before he left, the indunas and Native messengers at the magistracy asked to see Colonel McKenzie, when they expressed their gratitude for the Rebellion having been so rapidly suppressed and peace restored once more. They, at the same time, warned him "just to glance back occasionally, as a grass fire, when put out, often starts again in rear." This McKenzie took to mean that Dinuzulu was still in his rear and might have to be dealt with.

These facts are sufficient to show that, to the action at Mome, must be attributed the complete and almost immediate collapse of the Rebellion in Zululand. After that fight, there was no further opposition in any direction in

<sup>1</sup> He escorted about 230 Native prisoners from the place referred to to Fort Yolland.

<sup>2</sup> A brother of Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo had, years before, attempted to put him to death, when he was obliged to take refuge for some years in Natal.

Zululand. Throughout Nkandhla and Nqutu districts peace and good order were restored almost at a single stroke. A decisive blow, and all was over. That was what McKenzie constantly aimed at, that was what the Government desired him to aim at, because the more summary the punishment, the sooner would peace be restored and destruction of life put an end to. War is not a pastime, as some people seem to think, but a reality, as stern in operation as any law of nature. At any rate, that is how it is viewed by Zulus, and the sooner Europeans look at it in the same way when at war with these tribes, the better for them and the tribes.

Although, for a few days, many rebels remained in hiding, none ventured to take refuge in the stronghold which, having become a place of bad omen, was entirely deserted. It had become the home of the dead. Nor did the few more prominent rebels like Cakijana, Mangati and Magadise, fearing the consequences of their misdeeds, make further use of it during the many weeks they roamed about from one place of hiding to another.

It will be remembered that Mapumulo district was visited by a column (under Leuchars) during March, when a large cattle fine was levied on Ngobizembe and members of his tribe for defiant conduct towards the Magistrate.

As part of the general plan for coping with the Rebellion, the Commandant of Militia decided at the end of April to establish a garrison at Mapumulo. This took place simultaneously with the Z.F.F. leaving Dundee for Nkandhla, and the garrisoning of such other places as Helpmakaar, Krantzkop, and Greytown in Natal, and Empandhleni, Fort Yolland, and Eshowe in Zululand.

It was known that the Natives at Mapumulo were liable to rise at any moment, hence the question as to how the outbreak could be delayed at once occurred to the Commandant, for he had not sufficient troops to operate in that part as well as at Nkandhla and other places. Calling to mind what he had read and studied of Cape and other



Native wars as to how Natives, setting no value on time, had often been prevented from precipitating a conflict through troops being frequently moved about in such a way as not to run risks of being ambushed, he decided to garrison the place with a small force which, strongly entrenched behind wire entanglements, would be adequate in case of a rush, though not strong enough should the O.C., losing his head, feel inclined to act on the aggressive. Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., was the officer selected for the post, firstly, because he was intimately acquainted with the district, and secondly, because of his being a cautious leader. He was instructed to have the district well patrolled, but on no account to come into collision with the enemy unless his lager was attacked. Stores, etc., were to be drawn from Stanger, but, unless a strong escort accompanied the waggons, drivers and voorloopers were to have no escort at all.

The force, consisting of 120 N.M.R. and 50 D.L.I., arrived at Mapumulo on the 2nd May. Sparks found the Natives, barely fifty miles from Nkandhla as the crow flies, with the Tugela between, in a very disturbed state, notably the tribes of Ndhlovu, Meseni, and Ngobizembe. They were all palpably in sympathy with Bambata. A lager of wire entanglements was erected about the gaol and court-house. Patrols were sent out daily to Balcomb's and Allan's stores, *i.e.* north and north-west, as well as to Thring's Post and Umvoti Drift, in Meseni's ward. On the 15th May, a large one went into the latter ward, where armed Natives were observed on the hills. These were said to be awaiting an opportunity of joining Bambata at Nkandhla.

Reports were continually brought in by scouts that Natives of certain tribes were being doctored for war, after which they proceeded to Nkandhla. One of the Chiefs concerned helped to ascertain the kraals of those who had so gone off. Sparks adopted the ingenious expedient of distraining all cattle belonging to these kraals until the rebels who ordinarily lived there had been surrendered, and, in several instances, with every success.

The O.C., moreover, ably assisted by the Magistrate (Colonel T. Maxwell),<sup>1</sup> got into touch with a number of loyal Chiefs and headmen. In these and other ways, these two officers succeeded in maintaining order until after the decisive blow had been struck at Mome.

Of the Chiefs in Mapumulo, Lower Tugela and Ndwedwe<sup>2</sup> divisions, two or three, apart from those already referred to, call for special mention.

Meseni was head of the Qwabe tribe, one of the most ancient and famous tribes in Natal and Zululand.<sup>3</sup> On the death of his father Musi, some years before the Rebellion, a dispute arose as to the heir, when the Governor, after inquiry, decided to divide the tribe. Meseni was appointed Chief over the principal section, whilst his nephew, Siziba (a minor), was awarded another section, as well as the property left by Musi. This decision, however, caused considerable dissatisfaction. The Magistrate of Lower Tugela (Mr. F. P. Shuter), was shortly after made Chief over Siziba's section. This gave great offence to Meseni. A fight took place between the two factions. Although, in Meseni's view, one party was as guilty as the other, his men were more severely punished than those presided over by the Magistrate. This Meseni felt to be unjust. He became disrespectful to Mr. Shuter. Such offence, as well as his assembling men with the alleged intention of attacking another Chief, with whom some difference had arisen, were reported, when nearly 1,000 huts of his tribe (*i.e.* the section in Lower Tugela division), were detached and put under other Chiefs.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Maxwell, a firm ruler, with a varied and life-long experience in Natal in different official capacities, was selected for the position, after the Magistrate, who had been defied by Ngobizembe's men when the poll tax was proclaimed, had left Mapumulo.

<sup>2</sup> A broad, continuous tract of country, which runs through portions of Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions, and extends further south, is reserved entirely for Native occupation. The three districts mentioned had, in 1906, a total population of 80,000 Natives.

<sup>3</sup> Qwabe, the progenitor of the tribe was, like the founder of the Zulu tribe, a son of Malandela, who flourished probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century. As Qwabe was Zulu's elder brother, the tribe, though politically subordinate to the Zulu one, is regarded as senior in a social sense.



When those of Meseni's tribe in Mapumulo division were called together by the Magistrate for the purpose of the poll tax being explained, they behaved in an insolent and defiant manner. This occurred at Gaillard's store, Umvoti, whilst the Chief himself was at Stanger in connection with the faction fight referred to. Such absence did not, of course, prevent his being called on for an explanation by Leuchars in March. He was ordered to arrest and hand over all such as had misbehaved. This Meseni said it was impossible to do within the three days allowed, especially as many weeks had elapsed since the affair. He, however, brought in a number, who were punished. For failing to hand over about 200, he was later on arrested and imprisoned at Mapumulo. After being in gaol for about six weeks, he was released by order of the Government, without, however, having been brought to trial. When, with the fighting going on at Nkandhla, the people at Mapumulo began to assume a rebellious attitude, Meseni was ordered to come in but did not do so. In May and June, when larger numbers of troops came to the district, he called up his people, as he says, to protect himself. Action of that kind, of course, at once gave the impression that he was in rebellion.

Ndhlovu ka Timuni, of the Zulu tribe, was a Chief with considerable influence in Mapumulo division.<sup>1</sup> Owing to a mistake, he was summoned to Stanger in April. On instructions from Mapumulo, he was placed under arrest and subsequently removed to that place, where he was detained for a time and then released.

The people of both these tribes broke into rebellion in June. Associated with them were the Chiefs Matshwili and Mlungwana, also portions of Ntshingumuzi's, Swaimana's and other tribes. Ntshingumuzi himself did not rebel, though a relation of his, a young man Mahlanga, vigorously coerced many to rise and join Matshwili.

But although, as in the cases of Meseni and Ndhlovu, there was apparently some cause for complaint, purely

<sup>1</sup> Being of the Zulu tribe, he was, of course, related to Dinuzulu.

Native influences of a distinctly disloyal character were at work, and this prior to either of the arrests referred to.

As far back as January and February, for instance, a large portion of Ntshingumuzi's tribe had been doctored for war, whilst practically the whole of those of Mlungwana and Matshwili had gone through the same performance.<sup>1</sup> There is no act, passive in its nature, which a Native can commit that betrays hostile intent more plainly than being doctored for war. Once such ceremonies are held, all that remains is to await the signal for a simultaneous rising.

Early in June, two messengers (one a headringed man) arrived from Siteku, an uncle of Dinuzulu, living near Melmoth in Zululand. This man (Siteku) incited the tribes of Ndhlovu, Matshwili and Meseni to rebel and kill all the white people; "Bambata has not been killed," he said, "but is in hiding in the Tugela valley." He threatened

<sup>1</sup> The following is a digest of interesting evidence given for the prosecution at the trial of Ntshingumuzi, Mbombo and another before the Native High Court. Mbombo was a doctor from Zululand, living near Usutu kraal under Dinuzulu, and one of that Chief's domestic physicians. It was alleged that Ntshingumuzi had called the tribe to his own kraal, early in 1906, to be doctored for war. In response to the summons, the people came carrying sticks and dancing-shields. They formed a circle (*umkumbi*) in the cattle-kraal. Mbombo then came out of a hut with his face smeared with black powder, and carrying a smoking firebrand. He went round the men, first on the inside and then on the outside of the circle, flourishing the smoking brand wherever he went. He then threw it away and sprinkled the people with medicine, by means of two Native brooms, one being held in each hand. After this, the company was sent by him to a stream. His boy followed with a basket of medicine, which was put into deep running water, so that the water flowed into the basket and out of it. The basket was retained in position by the doctor's boy, assisted by one of the boys from the kraal. The warriors drank of the water, some from the basket itself, and others just below it. This done, they individually moved down the stream and vomited into the water. After washing their bodies, they moved back to the cattle-kraal, chanting as they went in company formation. Thus clean of body and stomach, they dipped their fingers in the war medicine, prepared on heated potsherds, and brought it to their lips. The Chief was not doctored. When sprinkling the warriors, the doctor asked them if they wanted war, they replied in the affirmative. They were then allowed to return to their kraals, but told to sleep on their weapons.—*Decisions, Native High Court*, 1907, p. 93.

It seems that the warriors were also invited by the doctor and Ntshingumuzi to make money contributions, and that shillings and sixpences were given. The money, it was said, was to be sent to the 'Chief of Zululand' (Dinuzulu) to buy drugs, to render their bodies impervious to bullets.



Ndhlovu with violence if his people did not rise. Calling to mind an occasion on which a relation of that Chief had, some seventy years before, failed to assist the Zulus against the Boers, Ndhlovu was warned that although his relation had escaped punishment at the hands of the Zulus, he (Ndhlovu) was not to be too sure such luck would be his own during the existing crisis. Ndhlovu states that a messenger from the tribe of Mtonga (another uncle of Dinuzulu, living in Eshowe district), also came and incited him to take up arms.

It was in these and other ways, too numerous to be noticed in detail, that the majority of the Native population at Mapumulo decided to rebel. Those who did, began by arming and organizing themselves quietly in their respective wards. And the more they massed and organized, the more confident they were of success. To such a pitch did the excitement grow, that Ndhlovu resolved to step forth and give the required signal.

It so happened that on Monday, the 18th June, a convoy of nine waggons, drawn by oxen, left Stanger for Mapumulo. The waggons outspanned for the night 200 yards from Oglesby's store, near the Otimati stream, and some six miles from Mapumulo. On receipt of news of the locality being in a greatly disturbed state, an early start was made on the following day. The usual Native driver and voorlooper (leader) accompanied each waggon, also a European conductor (Q.-M.-Sergt. L. E. Knox, N.M.R.), Trooper Albert Powell, of the same regiment (who was returning from sick leave), and a Griqua. Just as the waggons had begun to descend a white cutting, some fifty or sixty rebels of Ndhlovu's tribe, wearing *tshokobezi* badges, sprang up on either side and made for the leading waggon. Knox was struck with a knobstick, and stabbed in the right thigh (the assegai penetrating to the stomach). He jumped from the waggons, dashed through his assailants and made off for Mapumulo along the road as hard as he could go. Being a good athlete, he quickly outdistanced the rebels and arrived at the magistracy shortly before 9. In the meantime, Powell, who was on

the last waggon, ran to Oglesby's store. The Oglesbys (father and son), did what they could. The former was in the act of conducting Powell to a cave a few hundred yards off, when the *impi* came in sight and overtook them. Powell, who, like Knox, was in uniform, was immediately stabbed to death, but Oglesby and his son, well known to the Natives of that part, were not touched.

The drivers and voorloopers ran off for a time as soon as the attack began, although the rebels shouted that, being Natives and having been commandeered for service, they would not be molested. The oxen were not interfered with, nor were any contents of the waggons worth referring to looted.

Early the same morning (19th), Corporal J. Koster, N.M.R., rode off from Mapumulo towards Stanger on leave. After going about eight miles, and at 7 a.m., when on a short-cut, he was suddenly attacked from the lower side of the path by eight rebels of Ndhlovu's tribe. The telegraph wire between Mapumulo and Stanger had just been cut. It was possibly in anticipation of a despatch-rider going that way, that the Natives lay there in ambush. Assegais were flung at Koster, who narrowly escaped being killed as he rode past. One of them struck his horse, piercing a kidney. After galloping about 300 yards, he dismounted and fired several shots at the enemy, who at once decamped. These shots were heard by the rebels then engaged with Knox some three miles off, and to this may be due their not having pursued Knox further than they did. Koster then passed on to Thring's Post, where he was informed that a Norwegian storeman, Sangreid, and Mr. W. C. Robbins (Stock Inspector), had been murdered during the night in Mr. Thring's dwelling-house, some 400 yards from the store. After obtaining a trap and pair at Bull's some miles nearer Stanger, Koster returned to Thring's. He found Sangreid dead, but Robbins living, though severely wounded.

The *impi* that attacked Sangreid and Robbins was also from Ndhlovu's tribe, evidently the same men that subsequently attacked Knox. Robbins' life was saved by one




of the rebels, owing to his being well known in the district. Sangreid was brutally murdered in his bedroom, late at night, for no offence whatever.

The stores at Thring's Post and Oglesby's were looted, as also the cattle belonging to the former place. Oglesby's store was not looted until it had been vacated by the owners.

On Knox reaching Mapumulo, it so happened a patrol was about to leave for Balcomb's, six miles north-west of the magistracy. A hurried account of what had occurred was given to Lieut.-Col. J. Ritchie, V.D., who, after directing others to follow in support, left with Capt. W. H. Smith and eleven N.M.R. at a gallop for the spot at which the convoy had been attacked. On getting within a couple of hundred yards of Oglesby's store, a large track, evidently of the *impi*, was come upon. Following this, the men passed through a Mission Station (Norwegian), about a thousand yards from the store. Near this station, which was still being occupied by the missionary, four armed Natives, evidently scouts, were seen on a hill on their left front. These immediately disappeared into a large valley and towards a kraal belonging to Chief Ndhlovu (Ezintandaneni). Ritchie galloped to a high ridge overlooking the valley. A solitary horse was observed some distance below tied to a tree, whilst a number of cattle, which afterwards turned out to be those seized at Thring's Post, were seen grazing within the immediate vicinity of the kraal. The men dismounted and descended the rocky, steep slopes towards the kraal. This, in respect of the position they then occupied, lay between them and the magistracy. After proceeding about 120 yards, and when about the same distance from the kraal, they were suddenly surprised by an *impi* about 200 strong, up to that moment concealed near a bed of reeds in one of the two forks at the head of a kloof or small valley running past, and on the immediate north of, the kraal. As soon as the enemy showed himself, he charged upwards at them, shouting Dinuzulu's war-cry "Usutu!" The troops opened fire at once at fifty yards. This had

the effect of checking the advance for the time being. "They attempted several times," says Ritchie, "to get round our flanks and . . . in fact had almost succeeded, when Knox and Campbell came up with the supports. . . . The rebels had again to take shelter under the cliff and behind the rocks. Shortly after this, they made one more determined rush to get up over the rocks, where eight or ten of us were standing. They came to within five yards,



but, although all had their assegais poised ready for throwing, only one was actually thrown. The fire seemed to paralyse them. The assegai that was thrown just grazed the head of one of the men."

It was but a few minutes after Ritchie had gone off from Mapumulo, that Capt. A. G. Knox, brother of the man already referred to, and Capt. W. A. Campbell left with about fifty men in support of Ritchie as directed. They arrived on the ridge referred to just before the charge. Their appearance was most opportune as, having descended as far as they had done, Ritchie and the others would



probably have been annihilated had the rebels not been checked as they were from the ridge. Finding the supports too strong, the enemy retreated down the valley up which they had come, many being shot as they ran. The locality being 'thorn-country' afforded cover—even though it was winter—of which full advantage was taken by the enemy. The troops now combined and drove the valley from which the attack had come, as well as a similar one 120 yards from the kraal on the south, in which other rebels were found concealed. One or two of the ridges were also driven.

During the drives, which extended over about a mile of country, many armed Natives withdrew from their hiding-places and were shot as they ran down the streams towards the still more rugged country below. Lieut. R. Armstrong and another, who had become detached from the main body, took up a position below Luhoho's kraal and commanded the fugitives' main route at *C* (*vide* plan) with considerable effect.

Towards the conclusion of the drives, intelligence was received that Ngobizembe's men, under Sambela, about 600 strong, were approaching from the direction in which the rebels had just fled. Owing to accounts subsequently received from the fugitives, they decided not to continue the advance.

The total strength of the N.M.R. engaged on this occasion was sixty-six (made up of the Stanger and Greenwood Park troops, exclusive of twelve men sent by Sparks to Nyamazana to expose themselves to the enemy in Meseni's ward, and thereby prevent the latter from joining the *impi* at Otimati). About 150 rebels were killed and four prisoners captured during the operations, which lasted an hour and a half. There were no casualties among the N.M.R. Powell's body was found later the same day in a horribly mutilated and scarcely recognizable condition, having been dragged by the rebels some 300 yards from where he had been killed to a place where it was supposed it would not be found. It was then removed to Oglesby's store.

The number of rebels killed in this action was greater, in proportion to the number of troops engaged, than in any other action of the campaign. From start to finish, the proceedings reflect the greatest credit on Ritchie and his men, not the least remarkable feature being the rapidity with which the men got into action. Only fifty minutes elapsed between their leaving camp and firing the first shot, although the distance travelled was fully seven and a half miles.

It afterwards transpired that the rebels, led by Ndhlovu himself, were expecting Ritchie and the few with him to go to the kraal, when the plan was to cut them off in rear. No doubt the horse and cattle had been purposely left as baits. Before the arrival of the troops, the enemy were in the cattle-kraal. They slipped into the valleys on either side at the last moment.

After the action, Ritchie sent Smith with sixteen men to investigate what had occurred at Thring's Post. As many of the enemy were still lurking about the broken country in the vicinity of Oglesby's, the reconnaissance caused both sections of the troops to run considerable risks.

When Sparks ascertained that the wire between him and Stanger had been cut, he sent telegrams asking for reinforcements to Kearsney, for transmission to headquarters. The men who carried the despatches were Sergts. A. J. Wadman and J. E. Sjöblom. Leaving at 10 a.m., they found the wire had been cut a few yards from the store at Thring's Post. When proceeding along the short-cut on which Koster had, unknown to them, been attacked the same morning, they found some fifty or sixty of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off. On reaching Thring's Post, they found the store upside down, a great many goods having been looted and the rest scattered on the floor. "I noticed," says Wadman, "about ten mice which I had previously seen at the store had been let out of their cage and then stabbed with assegais." After delivering the despatches, the men returned to Mapumulo the same night.

On this same eventful day (19th), Sub-Inspector A. S.



Clifton, of the Natal Police, arrived at Thring's Post with about a dozen men, and removed the deceased Mr. Sangreid, as well as Mr. Robbins, to Stanger.

The troops ordered by Leuchars at this juncture to concentrate at Mapumulo were N.M.R., under Murray-Smith ; U.F.F., under Major W. J. S. Newmarch ; two squadrons B.M.R. (mobilized on the 14th and originally directed to proceed, with D squadron, N.C. (Capt. J. W. V. Montgomery), to Helpmakaar ;<sup>1</sup> and C.M.R. Maxim detachment (Capt. M. Humphery). The first-named regiment, receiving orders at 2 p.m. on the 20th, left at 5 p.m. in light marching order, and, after off-saddling for four hours at Balcomb's, reached Mapumulo before dawn on the following day. A portion of the regiment made a reconnaissance the same morning in the neighbourhood of Oglesby's store. Powell's body was brought back and buried at the magistracy.

Further reconnaissances took place towards Otimati and Isiwasezimbuzi, near the Tugela, on the 22nd and 23rd respectively.

A patrol under Knox proceeded on the 25th to Hlonono Mission Station, when many of the enemy in the low country of Meseni's ward were located.

Arnott's column reached Otimati drift on the 24th. As the camp was to be a standing one, the waggons were formed into a lager, strengthened with barbed-wire entanglements.

Leuchars, who reached Arnott on the morning of the 27th with the greater portion of the Mapumulo force, now decided that a reconnaissance in force should take place in the direction of the hill Peyana, some three miles to the south-west of Thring's Post, and two from Hlonono Mission Station. The troops, including a section of

<sup>1</sup> These squadrons, when preparing to move from Dundee to Helpmakaar, got orders on the 20th to move to Chaka's Kraal, on the north coast. The destination was altered to Stanger and, on 21st, to Otimati, for which latter place the troops marched from Stanger on the 22nd, having by then been joined by C Battery, N.F.A. (Major Currie) ; Durban Reserves (Chief Leader N. Chiazzari) ; and the Indian Stretcher-bearers (Sergt.-Major M. K. Gandhi). The column was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott.

C Battery, N.F.A. (Currie); four C.M.R. Maxims (Humphery), and two Maxims and one Rexer, N.M.R., left camp at 9.30 a.m. under the command of Lieut.-Col. Arnott.<sup>1</sup> The N.M.R., 350 (Murray-Smith), were in advance, N.C., 100 (Montgomery), on the left, and B.M.R., 100, supporting. The Carbineers, besides supporting on the left, covered a convoy of waggons then on the way to Kearsney, escorted by a troop B.M.R.

After branching off due west from the main road at Thring's Post, some difficulty was experienced in getting the two field guns down a rough incline. These guns, with a troop N.M.R. as escort, took up a position and unlimbered at *C* (*vide* plan), which covered some 2,000 yards to right and left front; N.C. took high ground to the left at *D*, from where a deep kloof to their front was commanded; N.M.R. moved in extended order to neck *A*, and halted on the ridges to right and left thereof, with B.M.R. supporting in immediate rear on the right. These dispositions were made owing to the broken nature of the ground, which favoured ambush, and had up till then been held daily by the enemy's outposts. The track along which the column had to advance skirted to the right of, and under, Peyana hill (*B*), by which it was commanded.

When the troops were engaged occupying the ground referred to, the time now being about noon, some half a dozen of the enemy's decoys were observed on hill *E* to the west of Peyana, freely exposing themselves. This was almost a certain indication that the enemy was in ambush somewhere, most probably behind Peyana, and overlooking the route along which the troops were moving.

After the ridges referred to had been properly held, two troops N.M.R. were sent forward to scout before the column proceeded further towards the decoys. One troop advanced to within 100 yards of the crest of Peyana, the other halted in support, about 150 yards in rear. Lieut. P. Addison, in command of the advanced troop, then went

<sup>1</sup> Although giving the command to Arnott, Leuchars accompanied the column, and, with his staff officer (Major Carter), witnessed the operations from the field gun position referred to later on in the text.



forward alone mounted, accompanied by his dog. He rode to a neck near the crest and to within thirty yards of the enemy, who were about 400 strong, lying concealed in a slight depression out of sight of the troops at *A*. In the immediate rear of the enemy, was a bushy krantz. On seeing the rebels, Addison shouted "Here they are," and, turning immediately, rode back to rejoin his troop, and then on to the main position at *A*. The troops supporting had already been ordered to retire. As Addison was turning, the enemy rose *en masse*, then crouched, only to rise again in an instant, crying "Usutu! Usutu!" as they charged down the steep, grassy slopes in open order at the retiring troops. N.M.R. at *A*, with three Maxims (C.M.R. and N.M.R.), and the Rexer,<sup>1</sup> could not open fire because of the enemy being masked by the retiring troops. In the meantime, however, the two 15-pounders on higher ground opened with shrapnel at about 1,800 yards, over the troops at *A*, as well as those retiring. One of the two or three shells fired struck right in the middle of the swiftly-moving mass, but, failing to burst, did no harm. In a few seconds, heavy rifle and machine fire broke from the N.M.R., who were reinforced at the same moment by a squadron of their own regiment, up till then kept in reserve, but which, on seeing the charge, was at once pushed forward to assist on the left.

The combined fire had the effect of checking the rush and breaking the rebels into three bodies. One of these (*i.e.* the larger portion) ran into a valley immediately below the ridge south of the neck referred to, where it hid in scrub and such other cover as could be found; another fled to the left of N.M.R. position and disappeared into a kloof, but, when making down the kloof, was met by a hot fire from N.C. at *D*, when a number of casualties was sustained. The centre portion continued the charge, and came within a few yards of *A* before it was stopped; the rebels then turned and fled to the south-west. At this particular moment, the N.M.R., as well as the ridge on which they were, masked the fire of the field guns

<sup>1</sup> Probably the first time this type of gun was used in action.

at *C*, which had, for a few seconds, been directed at the charging rebels.<sup>1</sup>

After the rush had been broken, N.M.R. galloped in line of squadrons up Peyana, accompanied by the machine guns. It so happened that a large portion of the enemy (about 300), had taken no part whatever in the charge. They preferred to lie in wait, that, no doubt, being part of the plan. They were discovered a few yards from where the first lot had started. For the most part, they turned right about and fled, under rifle and shell fire, down the precipitous and bushy country in rear of *B*.

When the position at the kop had been taken, Arnott ordered the B.M.R. (by this time strengthened by *C* squadron, under Capt. J. L. Gordon),<sup>2</sup> to descend on foot into the small valley of scrub, etc., on the right of, and below, *A*. This was thereupon driven from top to bottom by *C* squadron at the point of the bayonet. Gordon sighted a large *impi* in Mvoti valley that had not been engaged; he continued to watch its movements until recalled to the column.

Arnott now marched in open order, with as broad a front as the country would permit, until Hlonono Mission Station was reached. Here the ridges overlooking low ground on the south-west were lined, with a front of about half a mile. The main body of the rebels, estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 strong, was presently seen about one and a half miles off, and between the station and Meseni's principal kraal, evidently trying to get round the column's right flank. As soon as it came within artillery range, fire was opened from Itshelensimbi hill. This, in a few minutes, succeeded in checking the advance.

The object of the reconnaissance having been achieved, viz. locating the position and strength of the enemy, the column began to withdraw to the camp at Otimati. During the retirement, which was carried out in good

<sup>1</sup> The artillery fired about fifteen rounds, viz. shrapnel, from *C*. To begin with, the shells burst on graze; later on, good bursts were obtained.

<sup>2</sup> This squadron had been sent out in the morning to patrol near Tugela. It arrived at a most opportune moment.



order, the field guns shelled the *impi* whenever it appeared, thereby preventing the rear-guard from being harassed in any way.

Some seventy Natives were killed during the engagement. The casualties among the troops were of a minor description, no one being killed.

Examination of the plan will show that the ambush was of a very ingenious character, the locality selected being exactly suited for the purpose. Troops less wary would probably have been trapped. The plan evidently was to draw them towards *E*, when the two *impis*, barely fifty yards from one another at *B*, would have pounced upon them front and rear.

The rebels, who were under the command of a brother of Meseni, Muziwenkosi, carried ordinary shields and assegais. One of them used a rifle, whilst others had shot-guns. All wore the *tshokobezi* badge.

The decoys, who were seen before the action began, openly signalled to the two *impis* on Peyana, visible to them, but invisible to the advancing column. This was done by sweeping the grass to right and left with their shields. Such action, of course, immediately aroused the suspicions of the troops.

On Addison galloping back to rejoin his men, the dog, a white pointer, missed him and got in amongst the rebels. These he followed, barking at them in the liveliest manner.





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## XVII.

### GENERAL CONCENTRATION AT THRING'S POST.— ACTIONS AT MACRAE'S STORE, INSUZE AND PONJWANA. — CONVERGING MOVEMENT ON MESENTI'S WARD.

McKENZIE reached Krantzkop on the same day that the action at Peyana<sup>1</sup> was fought. He met and discussed the position with the Acting Commandant (Major-General Sir John Dartnell)<sup>2</sup> and Leuchars on the 29th June. Owing to its appearing that disaffection was spreading from Mapumulo towards Tongaat, and not being confined to Mapumulo division, as had been supposed, he gave up the idea he had first entertained of trying to force the rebels towards the Tugela, where they would have found themselves opposed by Mansel and Woolls-Sampson on the Zululand side, for one that involved a far more extensive field of operations. In pursuance of the fresh plan, Barker (then at Middle Drift) was detached from Mansel,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sometimes called Hlonono, after the name of a Native who, until recently, lived some two miles from the scene.

<sup>2</sup> This distinguished officer, who had assumed office on the 2nd June, arrived at Krantzkop on the 29th. His services were, briefly, as follows: Indian Mutiny, 1857-8; Bhootan Expedition, 1865; Zulu War, 1879; Boer War, 1881; and Boer War, 1899-1902, being frequently mentioned in despatches and awarded the King's and Queen's medals with clasps. He was knighted (K.C.B.) and granted the honorary rank of Major-General in the Army on the conclusion of the last Boer War.

<sup>3</sup> When directed to arrest Bejana near Empangeni, Barker moved towards Eshowe with three squadrons, T.M.R. On getting to Entumeni, however, his orders were cancelled, when he proceeded to Middle Drift, reaching there on the 23rd June. By this time, he had become practically detached from Mansel's column, then making towards Ngudwini.



and, on account of being closer than Mackay, and having mule-transport which had been resting a few days, was sent round by Dalton and Great Noodsberg to take up a position at Esidumbini, that is, on the far or south-western side of the disturbed area. Barker reached Krantzkop from Middle Drift on the 29th. He left the same afternoon and got to Dalton on the 30th. On the night of the 29th, two guns, A Battery, N.F.A., were pushed forward to reinforce him, as it was reported the enemy was in force at the junction of Umvoti and Hlimbitwa rivers. The artillery was sent, as it appeared possible to shell the rebels from the slopes of Noodsberg and drive them back to the sphere of intended operations, viz. that part of Umvoti valley occupied chiefly by Meseni's and Swaimana's people. Woolls-Sampson was instructed to move viâ Bond's Drift and Bulwer to Thring's Post, whilst Mansel, supplemented by such police as, up till then, had been attached to Woolls-Sampson's column, proceeded to the position just vacated by the latter column.<sup>1</sup> A detachment of D.L.I. formed a garrison at Bond's Drift. At this point was a large railway bridge connecting Natal with the coastal districts of Zululand. Mackay's column, by this time hastening to concentrate with the other troops at Thring's Post, reached Krantzkop at mid-day on the 30th, only to move later the same day towards its destination.

The necessity for swiftness of movement was in the air. Every man knew that Mapumulo was one of the most densely-populated districts in Natal. It was a purely Native district in which the ancient superstitions, habits and customs of the Zulus were still generally observed. The country was open and picturesque, with water and pasture abundant. The climate, moreover, was as fresh and exhilarating as that at Nkandhla. Such troops, *e.g.* Mackay's, as had not as yet clashed with the enemy, betrayed irrepressible eagerness to do so as soon as possible. Not less keenness was displayed by the Transvaalers under Barker, flushed with their recent and brilliant

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* Ngudwini, near Isiwamanqe, Eshowe district.

successes in Zululand. Thus, although at this critical moment, some 8,000 rebels were reported to have massed in Umvoti valley, barely a dozen miles from Thring's Post, the *moral* of the troops was excellent. And, one and all, the crushing blow at Mome still in their minds, were inspired with the feeling, not only that the concentration taking place was opportune and fitting, but that they were on the winning side and would still further stamp out the Rebellion, be the insurgents 10,000 or 20,000 in number. If ever a man rode a winning horse, knowing he was winning, that man at this moment was McKenzie. Eager co-operation by the Government in every conceivable direction, with a vigilant and sympathetic Governor, and every combatant, white or coloured, animated with a desire to put forth his best, *that* was what all these neo-Usutuities of Natal had to contend with. Thus, although some sharp conflicts with the rebels had still to come, it was a foregone conclusion that the Rebellion in those parts, notwithstanding the formidable numbers that had massed, would be crushed, and crushed in the speediest manner possible.

As soon as Woolls-Sampson reached Bond's Drift on the 1st July, after traversing an exceedingly difficult country for ox-transport, he received orders to push on with all speed to Thring's Post. At Bond's Drift he was joined by a squadron of Royston's Horse that had been recruited in the Cape Colony. He decided to leave his transport at Bond's Drift and to make a night march. Thring's Post was reached at 3 a.m. on the 2nd.

On leaving the drift, Woolls-Sampson instructed Major S. G. Campbell, D.L.I., to establish the garrison referred to with 35 D.L.I. (mounted infantry), 145 D.L.I. and one N.F.A. gun. At 11 a.m. on the 2nd, however, Campbell, then on the Zululand side, received a wire from Woolls-Sampson ordering him to come on at once to Thring's Post with a convoy of twenty-two waggons of supplies, it being imperative for these to reach Thring's Post the same night. By double-spanning (no punt being available, as the water was too low), the waggons were got across, and



at 1 p.m. the convoy, consisting of 70 D.L.I., one N.F.A. gun (Beningfield), 50 Z.M.R. (Flindt), and some 15 N.D.M.R., moved forward. When about a mile from Mr. Hulett's house at Bulwer, a Native was seen on the road. As he appeared suspicious, he was made to accompany the convoy. Questioned as to the whereabouts of the enemy, who, it seemed, from a subsequent telegram from Woolls-Sampson, was lurking in the vicinity, the man denied all knowledge of it, though later on said he had heard it might assemble where the springs of two streams were but a few yards apart. A short halt was made at Bulwer and, just after sunset,<sup>1</sup> the convoy pushed on.

In the ordinary course, the best plan, with an enemy close at hand, would have been to lager at Bulwer. It was owing entirely to the stringency of the orders that an advance was made at that late hour. All were warned to be ready in case of attack. Bayonets were fixed and flankers thrown out. With darkness rapidly coming on, the flankers, for fear of being cut off, were not more than thirty yards off the road. Four mounted men of the advanced guard, consisting of a troop Z.M.R., under Capt. D. J. C. Hulley, marched along the road. A couple on the right and another couple on the left did the flanking, whilst seven were in the road in immediate rear of the front four. Behind, with an interval of about fifty yards, came 70 D.L.I. (with a Maxim gun), N.F.A. gun, an ambulance, and 22 waggons. A number of N.D.M.R. were riding on the vehicles. Z.M.R. (35) formed the rear-guard with two Rexer guns. The Native referred to was now noticed staring frequently to the right.

Owing to the likelihood of attack, the men marched as compactly as possible. The worst spot was undoubtedly the long cutting a mile after leaving Bulwer; nothing, however, was seen or heard of the enemy at that point. The little column next moved slowly across the low ridge between the end of the cutting and a small zinc store, known as Macrae's, on a knoll. The small clump of trees between the road and the store could be seen on the

<sup>1</sup> The sun set at 5.10 p.m.

horizon ahead. The country about this part is rugged, though the three or four valleys in the vicinity, if steep, are, just there, small and not deeper than 100 feet. The road was hard and in good condition. After passing the store (at a distance of thirty yards), it is practically level and easy-going the whole way to Thring's Post.

The convoy moved along well, at an average speed of two and a half miles an hour (the usual pace for oxen on good roads). As, after leaving the cutting, danger of attack did not appear so imminent, Capt. Robert Armstrong, N.M.R., was sent on by himself to select a suitable bivouac. The advanced guard now went up the slight incline to the left of the store. When passing, a black dog that was following Hulley stood, and, ruffling its hair, began to growl and bark in the direction of the plantation on the right. Seeing this, Hulley became suspicious; the same instant, noticing a mass of armed Natives springing up from among the trees<sup>1</sup> (the sound they made being similar to the rising of a flock of guinea-fowl), he shouted a warning. The guard swung their horses round and began to fall back on the main body in rear as the rebels, some 300 strong, dashed forward from both sides of the road,<sup>2</sup> crying "Usutu! Usutu!" and using their knobsticks as well as assegais. Armstrong, by this time some 200 yards ahead, finding himself cut off, galloped back through the enemy, knocking down two or three, and using his revolver freely as he did so; notwithstanding the heavy fusillade then going on towards him, he succeeded in reaching the main body on the right without mishap. Steady and well-directed volleys were poured into the advancing enemy. He did not assume his characteristic formation, probably owing to the nature of the ground, but moved along the road *en masse* and with great dash. The distance from the store to the head of the column was barely eighty yards. The hot and effective fire, however, including case from the 15-pounder, stopped

<sup>1</sup> There was no undergrowth of any kind.

<sup>2</sup> On the left of the road, the enemy had been concealed at the head of a small valley. *Vide* map and inset.



the advance, and caused the rebels to break to rear and right of the store.

Two minutes after the attack had failed, reinforcements having, in the meantime, moved up from the rebels' rear, another attack came, slightly to the left of where the first had taken place. This was well met by rifle fire and case, and resulted in a second and speedy retreat.

There being reason to suppose a third would follow, Campbell drew the men up in half-moon formation across the road, the convex side facing the store. The 15-pounder was placed in the centre of the road, the rear-guard was brought up, and the N.D.M.R. directed to fire right and left as necessity arose.

As anticipated, the third attack came, some twenty minutes after the second. It was from the same quarter, and was delivered after darkness had set in. It met with no better luck than the others. During this attack, one of the three Rexer guns was brought into action.<sup>1</sup>

Two hundred yards beyond the store, a road branched off to the left. At this point, a second *impi*, also about 300 strong, had at first lain in waiting, its object evidently being to allow the convoy to get between both *impis*, when it would have been attacked front and rear. The plan failed on account of the foremost body being prematurely forced to take action.

The rebel forces were composed of men of Matshwili's and Ntshingumuzi's tribes, under the indunas Dabulum-bimbi and Mvukazi respectively. Mahlangu also accompanied Ntshingumuzi's men as second in command. He remained in rear whilst urging others to charge.

During the engagement, forty rebels were killed and others wounded. Tpr. G. Coll, Z.M.R., was seriously wounded with assegais. He received every attention from Major Campbell, M.D., C.M. (Edin.), but afterwards succumbed to his injuries at Thring's Post.

The dog which had been the first to detect the enemy,

<sup>1</sup> A brief report on this gun, which was first used at Peyana, will be found on p. 419.

and practically saved the column, was accidentally shot by its own side when trying to get back.

The column bivouacked for the night where it had been engaged. Apart from the proximity of the enemy and the darkness, it was impossible to move, because waggons and oxen, owing to Native drivers and voorloopers having run away, had either capsized or become considerably disorganized. Thring's Post was reached at mid-day on the 3rd without further incident.

The smart manner in which these attacks were met and repelled reflects the greatest credit on Campbell and his men, who were not only ambushed at dusk by an enemy far outnumbering them, but were considerably encumbered by slow transport, which had already come some nineteen of the twenty-eight miles to be done that day. Even the 15-pounder was being drawn by oxen. Having regard to the enemy's most determined charges, only remarkable promptitude and resourcefulness on the part of the officer in command turned a threatened calamity into a decisive victory.

But other and even more important developments were occurring almost simultaneously not many miles away. To these we must now hasten to draw the reader's attention.

The last we saw of Barker was his departure from Krantzkop to take up a position at Esidumbini. His force then consisted of four squadrons T.M.R. His orders were to reach Esidumbini as soon as possible and be on high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift at Gaillard's store by daybreak, 3rd July, to co-operate with three other columns from Mapumulo, Thring's Post and Glendale in a general converging movement on Meseni's ward, where, it was known, the rebels had assembled in great force.

A delay occurred at Dalton from 9 a.m. (30th) until 2 p.m., owing to Barker having to wait for supplies. These had to come from Pietermaritzburg and Greytown by rail. He resolved to push forward at 2 p.m., with thirteen waggons, though still somewhat short of supplies. During the same afternoon, he was joined by the guns that had been sent after him.



About 8 p.m., a message came from Chief Leader H. Ehlers, in command of the New Hanover Reserves (70), to say he was in lager at Little Noodsberg Hall, and that intelligence had come in to the effect that he was to be attacked at daybreak on the 1st July by an *impi* that had been seen during the afternoon on the Great Noodsberg.<sup>1</sup> Barker immediately decided to march to the Hall with three squadrons (each about 100 strong), leaving the fourth as escort to the guns and transport. The Hall was reached at midnight. Everything there was quiet. When daylight appeared, the expected attack was not made. Barker then left for the Great Noodsberg, where he waited till 11 a.m. for the rest of the column to come up. That night the column bivouacked on the Great Noodsberg. A number of scouts had been noticed during the day, all of whom retired suspiciously to the front of the column as it advanced.

By 7 a.m. on the 2nd (Monday), having been joined by the New Hanover Reserves on the preceding afternoon, the column was again on the move.<sup>2</sup> After travelling about a mile and a half, the advanced guard (B squadron, T.M.R.), came upon an *impi* some 300 strong, concealed on both sides of the road in a wattle plantation (site of the Newspaper Mission Station), which had been thinned out, but had a lot of scrub about it. Steps were now taken to

<sup>1</sup> The New Hanover Reserves assembled at Noodsberg Hall, by direction of the Acting Commandant, on the 27th June. On the 28th, a patrol visited the Swedish mission station (Rev. J. F. Ljungquist), under the Great Noodsberg, when a small body of the enemy was seen on the top of the mountains. Mdungazwe reported that the rebels were doing their best to incite people of his and other tribes to rise. As word had come in that Butler's store had been looted at Insuze, the whole of the Reserves, including Messrs. W. Dickens, M. Jackson, J. H. Culverwell and H. Jacobson, left to visit the place, but, on discovering a party of the enemy driving some thirty cattle near the Newspaper Mission Station, two miles from Butler's, the project was abandoned after capturing the cattle. The rebels now assembled in larger numbers at Newspaper, and rumours of an intended attack on the Hall were freely circulated. It was at this stage that Ehlers got into touch with Barker at Dalton.

<sup>2</sup> On moving from the Hall to rejoin his column, Barker left the Reserves where they were, but when he received warning a few hours later of a possibility of his being attacked by strong bodies of the enemy, he ordered them to attach themselves to his column.

drive the place, with the result that many armed Natives, particularly near their small church, where it had evidently been intended to lie in ambush for the troops, were discovered and shot. Scarcely any other portion of the column, except the advanced guard, came into action. As the enemy retreated, he was pursued by the advanced guard and two troops of A Squadron, T.M.R. The operations lasted about twenty minutes. After the fighting was over, the plantation was again, but more thoroughly, driven. About sixty rebels were killed.

At 9.30 a.m., the column moved along easy slopes towards Insuze river, the advanced guard being increased to two squadrons. The strength of the column now was four squadrons, T.M.R. (400); two Maxims and one Colt gun (25); two guns, 15-pounders, N.F.A. (25); and the Reserves (70). There were no Native levies.<sup>1</sup> Many Natives were observed on high ground to the right and left fronts.

After passing Butler's store, about a thousand yards from Insuze Drift, Barker, seeing the place was a suitable one for watering, decided to halt. The column accordingly began to pull out on to level ground immediately across and to the right of the drift. The guard, under Lieut. H. S. Liddle, went forward to establish itself on a long grassy ridge, parallel with the river at that part. This ridge rises to a height of 60 ft. above the drift and increases gradually to 80, 100 and 150, as it extends further to left and right fronts. On the immediate right of the small neck through which the road passes over the ridge, was a police station, consisting of two or three small buildings. Three or four Native kraals were also to be seen on the ridge to the left of the road. With the object of protecting the column against surprise, the guard occupied ground (C), some thirty yards to the right of the station. A troop was sent to kopje F, whilst a section (four men), under Sergt.-Major S. L. Neville, was sent to B, *i.e.* within fifteen

<sup>1</sup> There was no opportunity for Barker to obtain levies from local tribes until the 7th. He was then joined by men of those of Mdungazwe and Mahlube, who gave much assistance in seizing cattle and locating rebels.



or twenty yards of the kraal—round which grew a thick, bushy fence.<sup>1</sup> Here three of the men dismounted and were just handing over their horses, with the object of searching that and the other kraals, before occupying a kopje near by, when an *impi*, some 500 strong, sprang from behind the nearest kraal and hedge, and charged round both sides of the kraal at the men, shouting the usual war-cry as they did so. The latter, having no time to fire, mounted and retired to the guard, wheeling slightly to the right, to avoid masking the fire. The enemy continued their charge. The troops at the drift, as well as the guard, opened a hot fire as they ran. In the meantime, another *impi*, as strong as the first, began to appear from a bush some forty yards to the guard's right rear. The bush, showing but slightly on top, extended down a steep incline on the far side of the ridge. At this moment, Barker, who was watering his horse when the charge began, galloped to the troops at the police station. Whilst six men were told off to check this latter charge, others were engaged with the *impi* rushing down from the kraal. It was all a matter of seconds. The guard stood their ground and opened smartly with magazine fire. Notwithstanding the cross-fire, flank and front, that was being poured into them by the men near the drift, some of whom had lined the left bank below the drift, whilst others were on higher ground in rear, the *impi* succeeded in getting within a very few yards of the guard. The leader did not fall until within six. On his falling, the remainder broke and ran down the slopes on the far side, looking from the drift. When the action was at its height, Barker, whose horse was wounded with an assegai, instinctively perceived that the critical point was the one to which he had just ridden. He at once sent for reinforcements. Such men as were immediately available dashed up. Neither of the two guns at the drift came into action. Had case been promptly fired at those who came from the kraal,

<sup>1</sup> The owner of this kraal, Kati, was a member of the Natal Police. Kati did not fight at Insuze, but did so at Ponjwana (Sikota's kraal), where he was killed.

it must have proved very destructive at a range of 400 yards. A few seconds later, however, it became impossible to open, owing to the guns being masked by the reinforcements that sprang forward from the drift to the ridge.

A and B squadrons, as well as two troops of D, were sent in pursuit of the now flying enemy. The two 15-pounders were placed at the kraal from which one of the *impis* had been in hiding, whilst the Maxims and Colt gun took up positions on the ridge between the police station and the bush.

The rebels retired in a northerly direction, down Insuze valley. They were hotly pursued by the troops, who rode along the ridges. The field guns fired about twenty rounds with great effect at ranges varying from 600 to 1,800 yards, but were eventually forced to cease fire, on account of the pursuing squadrons too closely approaching the enemy. The machine guns, too, did excellent work.

A third *impi*, also about 500 strong, which up till then had taken no part whatever in the engagement, was accidentally come upon by A squadron (Lieut. R. V. Saner).<sup>1</sup> The attack made by about fifty of this *impi* was promptly and effectively repelled, whereupon the rebels joined the others in a general retreat.

At a distance of three or four miles from the scene of action, about thirty fugitives got into a narrow valley (through which the pursuing A squadron had to pass), evidently to lie in ambush. They were, however, seen, and dispersed with loss. Still another *impi* was observed by the same squadron about a mile to the left, composed apparently of men who had not been engaged at all. They did not, however, come into action.

Two troops of C squadron were ordered to turn out the rebels who were hiding in the long grass and rushes in a valley between the gun position, near the police station, and the pursuing squadrons.

<sup>1</sup> This *impi* was found crouching, their faces towards the drift, in a slight grassy depression at D, about 150 yards in rear of the kraal from which the first attack had come. Although concealed from the troops at the drift or police station, it became easily visible, owing to there being no cover, as soon as men began to move towards its right rear.



By 11 a.m., the squadrons, having by that time pursued the enemy for four or five miles, were recalled, as a number of rebels had shown themselves on both flanks near the police station. The troops reassembled by about 1.30 p.m., when they off-saddled for an hour on different parts of the ridge.

The casualties were Tpr. Robert Knight, D squadron, T.M.R., killed; Tprs. Simcox and Tobin, A squadron, T.M.R., wounded. The enemy's losses amounted to about 400.

A local Native Chief, Mahlube, who was with Barker's column when the foregoing action was fought, although many of his tribe had joined the rebels, expressed the following opinion: "My belief is that the enemy intended disputing the drift with the troops as they were watering their horses. The T.M.R. saved themselves by their courageous stand. Had they betrayed the slightest weakness, they would have fared badly, for I could see the enemy were reckless and did not care what happened."

The march to Esidumbini was resumed at a quarter to three. A camp was formed at that place on its being reached two hours later. The night passed without incident.

The demeanour of the local and apparently neutral Natives was unsatisfactory. They were very reticent and pretended to know nothing whatever of the intentions of the enemy. They professed to be ignorant of the *impis* that had attacked but a few miles away at Insuze. One of the Chiefs, Njubanjuba, living on high ground, must have seen the fight and could have given valuable information had he chosen. He maintained a sullen and insolent attitude all the time the column was in the district. It was in view of these facts that Barker decided not to leave camp until after daybreak, a decision which, as it happened, was one McKenzie had also come to, in consequence of information obtained by him on the night of the 2nd that the rebels proposed to attack Barker at dawn on the 3rd.


When the column started (7 a.m.), one squadron, T.M.R.,



### INSUZO

Dispositions at the beginning of the action

SCALE: 6 inches = 1 mile. Contours Vert. Int. = 20 feet



#### REFERENCE

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| A = First attacking impi                               | J = Butler's store   |
| B = Pickets  | K = Position of 15-pdrs. during enemy's retreat. Maxims and Colt gun were then between G and L |
| C = Two troops, T. M. R.                               | → = Direction of enemy's retreat   |
| D = Impi; out of sight at drift                        | ☺ = Enemy  |
| E = Where part of enemy gathered when about to retreat | ☛ = Wagon  |
| F = Hill to which pickets were sent                    | --- = Swamp, with long grass and rushes  |
| G = Police Station                                     | ☼ = Kraal  |
| H = Six men posted here to check impi in bush          |  |





and the New Hanover Reserves being left to guard the camp, it proceeded along the Mapumulo road towards the high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift.<sup>1</sup>

On the march, a number of Natives was seen on a ridge at Sikota's kraal in the neighbourhood of a prominent detached hill Ponjwana.<sup>2</sup> Word was passed on to the advanced guard, A squadron (78), who, however, had already perceived the rebels' movements. As further attack was imminent, the main body was kept within two to three hundred yards of the advanced guard. About three miles from Esidumbini Mission Station, the Mapumulo road passes over two well-defined hills about a thousand yards apart, and connected by a hog-backed neck. The country on either side of the road is steep and thickly covered with thorn bush. As the road approaches Sikota's kraal from the hog-backed hill, the ground rises immediately on the left to about fifty feet above the road, such elevation extending for about 200 yards, when the road enters and ascends open ground for another 200 yards. It is about a hundred and twenty yards from the road at this point that the kraal referred to was situated. On the immediate right of the road is a dense, precipitous bush, 100 yards broad at the top and extending some 400 yards down into an enormous, steep, and wooded valley. On the left of the road where Sikota's kraal was, and opposite that kraal, is a patch of open, high ground extending some two or three hundred yards, and about a hundred and fifty broad. To the west of this, the country falls away into another great valley, similar to the one already referred to. At the front, again looking from the road where it is nearest the kraal, the ground slopes gently to the front and right front, but more sharply to the left, where the trees grow more closely together.

As the column came along the hog's back, it became a little "crushed up," whereupon the advanced guard

<sup>1</sup> It consisted of three squadrons T.M.R. ; machine guns, T.M.R. ; and two 15-pounders, N.F.A.

<sup>2</sup> This hill was between four and five miles from the camp, and on the far side of, and about 1,000 yards from, Sikota's.




canted forward a little way to the knoll on which Ngembudi's kraal stood.<sup>1</sup> At this point, a section was marching some thirty to sixty yards ahead along the road, whilst half a dozen scouts moved out to their positions on the right and left fronts, owing to the ground there lending itself to better deployment. No sooner, however, was the top of the knoll reached at *A* than the enemy, some three to four hundred strong, was observed 150 yards to the right front, that is, some way down an incline, but not concealed from view of the leading section. The scouts fell back to the troop in rear, which, at the same time, advanced to a point in sight of the enemy and immediately lined across the road.

Fire was opened at the rebels then swiftly charging, with uplifted shields, like a hive of bees upset, over somewhat uneven ground. Some of the guard at first fired from the saddle, aiming rather at the oncoming mass than at particular individuals.

The men, ordered to dismount, handed over their horses to be held, and, dropping quickly on one knee, opened a hot and rapid fire. The charge was direct and determined. Some of the enemy came to within ten feet of the rifles when, their centre by that time blown out by the first-class marksmen that happened to be among the troops, they swerved off to right and left. Those going to the right were in the act of passing between the flank and the kraal, when *C* squadron was moved smartly to the right, only to come to so close quarters with the strong force then at and about the kraal as to be obliged to fall back to hold the line *B* indicated on the plan. Barker had, in the meantime, moved up from the main body, some 200-300 yards in rear at the moment of attack, and addressed himself to the situation on the right, then the most critical. At the same time, the left flank being threatened, support was also pushed forward there. This caused the rebels opposite that flank to retreat to west and down the steep inclines.

After the main fire had been turned towards the *impi*

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* plan.



Del-Aug. Hammar, 1906  
REFERENCE

## PONJWANA (SIKOTA'S KRAAL)

### SKETCH PLAN


Dispositions at the beginning of the action

SCALE: 6 inches approximately = 1 mile

0 100 200 300 400 yards

- A = Where scouts first caught sight of impi at D
- B = Line held by troops when pressed on right flank
- C = Ngembudi's kraal
- D = Impi that attacked first
- - - = T.M.R. scouts
- ☾ = The enemy
- = Lines of enemy's retreat





at the kraal, that *impi* was also repulsed, when it forthwith precipitated itself into the dense bush on the immediate east of the kraal, and from thence down the great, steep valleys and ravines which were near at hand.

Just as the situation in front was becoming critical, that is, about the end of the first charge, another and different body of the enemy, about 200 strong, charged down on the rear-guard from that part of the hog's back which rises fifty feet above the road on the left, whilst yet another, though smaller *impi*, attacked from the right rear.

The scouts that were in rear galloped up to the last two troops which, turning left and right about as the position required, proceeded to pour in a hot fire at the charging enemy, then some 100-150 yards away. The rushes were stopped, whereupon the rebels broke and fled down the valley on the right, to join those who had already fled from the kraal into the valley on that side.

When the attacks had been beaten off, Barker at once sent A and B squadrons in pursuit, but, owing to the extremely broken nature of the ground and to the extensive thorn-bush, the majority of the rebels escaped. It was impossible for the 15-pounders, particularly during the retreat, to be used with effect. During the engagement, Capt. J. T. Mitchell was wounded. About 100 of the enemy were killed.

Whilst Barker's column was thus brilliantly holding its own, each time against an *impi* larger than itself, a large European force was being concentrated with surprising rapidity at Thring's Post, the place selected by McKenzie as his general base of operations.

Arnott, leaving Otimati at 2 p.m. on the 1st, reached Thring's Post the same afternoon.

After explaining the situation to the Acting Commandant and McKenzie, and discussing the future plan of campaign, Leuchars left Elandskop with the U.F.F. on the 29th and reached Thring's Post on the 1st.

Mackay moved from Mvuzana stream near Nkandhla at 8 a.m. on the 28th June, and crossed the Tugela at Middle



Drift on the same day. On the 29th, leaving his ox-transport to ascend Krantzkop mountain during the afternoon and following morning, he reached Elandskop at noon. Unable to march before noon on the 30th, because of the transport, the column nevertheless succeeded in arriving at Thring's Post early on the 2nd July, *i.e.* a few hours after Woolls-Sampson had come in from Zululand. He was thereupon joined by C squadron, N.C. (which had, for about five weeks, served as bodyguard to O.C. Troops), as well as by squadron D of the same regiment.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, between 27th June (day of the action at Peyana) and the 2nd July, the situation in Mapumulo division had so far changed that, instead of less than 200 troops being in the district, there were over 2,500 at Thring's Post, and 500 with Barker at Esidumbini.

In addition to the steps taken to cope with the situation in that part of the Colony, and to Mansel being posted in the neighbourhood of Isiwasamanqe in Zululand, Dick was ordered to proceed with the N.R. direct to Mapumulo, leaving half a company to garrison Krantzkop, whilst the detachment of N.R.R., then at Krantzkop, was ordered to Greytown.

The Chief Leader at Krantzkop got orders to mobilize at once the First, Second and Third Reserves.

The detachment of D.L.I. at Pomeroy was sent to Ndwedwe via Verulam. The posts at Fort Wales and Sibindi in Umsinga division were evacuated, the N.R.R., up to then garrisoning those places, moving to Pomeroy to replace the D.L.I.

The detachment of D.L.I. at Melmoth proceeded to Eshowe and from there, with as many others of the D.L.I. as could be spared by O.C. Eshowe, went to join their regiment at Bond's Drift.

<sup>1</sup> The regiment now, for the first time during the Rebellion, operated under its O.C. As to its strength, see note 2, p. 191.

For the past and recent history of this fine regiment, the reader could not do better than consult the following work: *The Natal Carbineers*, 1856 to 1911. Edited by Rev. John Stalker, M.A.—P. Davis & Sons, Pietermaritzburg, Natal. 1912.

Whilst camped at Otimati, Mackay decided to send a Native spy to Meseni's principal kraal with the object of finding out as much as he could about the movements, strength and intentions of the enemy. Nkantolo, the man in question, left at 4 a.m. on the 2nd. He rejoined Mackay's column at Thring's Post at 9 p.m. the same day, to report that, disguised as a rebel, he had been to the principal kraal Mtandeni, where he learnt that a vast *impi* had been mobilized and was camped in the immediate vicinity of the kraal; and that portions of the force were already out guarding parts of the valley where it was supposed the troops might attempt to enter. He heard of the fight that had already taken place that day with Barker at Insuze, and that, with a view of checking the latter's advance—it being already known his column was a small one—an *impi* had been sent towards Esidumbini to lie in ambush on the road to be travelled. The same man also ascertained that, on the preceding Sunday afternoon (1st), a European who was passing through the district on a bicycle from Mapumulo towards the coast, had been captured by the rebels, brought to Mtandeni, and there murdered and mutilated.

On this intelligence being brought to the notice of Colonel McKenzie, he decided at once to inform Barker of his danger. It was accordingly arranged that Nkantolo, notwithstanding that he had already walked some twenty-five miles that day, should take a despatch to Barker warning him not to leave Esidumbini before dawn, which, according to instructions previously issued to that officer by McKenzie, it was necessary for him to do. In view, however, of the fact that the distance from Thring's Post to Esidumbini by the most direct route is not less than twenty miles, the task, in spite of the Native's assurances to the contrary, appeared a greater one than he could possibly perform, especially as, seeing the intervening country was under arms, it was imperative to use a still longer route to avoid contact with the enemy. When Nkantolo, having travelled through the night, was approaching his destination, he heard the fire at Ponjwana



and, afraid of being mistaken by Barker's force for a rebel, decided to make another detour to Esidumbini. After reaching that place and reporting himself, he at once followed the route taken by Barker, passing over the battle-field at Ponjwana, and delivering his message about noon in the neighbourhood of Umvoti Drift. Thus, between 4 a.m. on the 2nd and noon on the 3rd, a distance of not less than sixty miles had been covered by the messenger. This is but an illustration of what many Zulus are capable of doing. Such extraordinary mobility is but one of the factors that has to be taken into account in a war between Europeans and Natives.

Reference has already been made to the general plan of converging on Meseni's valley, and the attempt made by Barker to carry out his share of that plan.

The instructions to Woolls-Sampson<sup>1</sup> were to proceed to Mapumulo and, picking up there the N.M.R. and a detachment of C.M.R. Maxims, to make a night march to a kopje overlooking the drift (Gaillard's), where the Mapumulo-Esidumbini road crosses the Umvoti. He was to arrive at that spot before dawn, and there co-operate with the columns of Mackay on the left and Barker on the right.

Mackay<sup>1</sup> was to proceed viâ Hlonono Mission Station, close to the scene of Arnott's recent action, towards Meseni's principal kraal, and there co-operate with Woolls-Sampson on the right and Leuchars on the left.

Leuchars<sup>1</sup> was to move after dark into Glendale valley, along the main road from Kearsney. He was then to bivouack for the night, and move sufficiently early on the 3rd to co-operate with Mackay and Barker.

<sup>1</sup> Woolls-Sampson's, Mackay's and Leuchars' columns were composed as follows: *Woolls-Sampson*—N.M.R., 300 (Murray-Smith); N.D.M.R., 200 (Abraham); Z.M.R., 100 (James); and one squadron R.H. (Cape), 85 (Simmons).

*Mackay*—N.C. Right Wing (Barter); Left Wing (Brandon), 560; L and Y, 150 (Peakman); N.R., 350 (Dick); N.F.A., two guns, A battery (Wilson), two guns, B battery (Acutt), and two guns (pompons), (Swain).

*Leuchars*—U.M.R., 270 (Newinarch); B.M.R., 160 (Arnott); N.C., D squadron, 89 (Montgomery); N.F.A., two guns, C battery (Currie).

From all reports that had been received, it appeared the main force of the rebels was concentrated at Meseni's Mtandeni kraal, hence the nominal objective of each of the columns was this kraal. They converged thereon, roughly speaking, from the four points of the compass. McKenzie gave the column commanders clearly to understand that the movements of the different columns were to be of an encircling nature, with the object of hemming the enemy in, and it was with that object in view that they were to co-operate with one another as much as possible.

Colonel McKenzie, who was accompanied by the Acting Commandant, attached himself to Mackay's column. This force reached Hlonono Mission Station just as day broke. As the troops were proceeding down a ridge, a party of rebels was surprised in a thorn valley on the right. This valley was swept through by the Natal Carbineers, one squadron being sent to a ridge on the right of the valley. The main body passed down the quickly-descending ridges towards Meseni's kraal, hurriedly searching the country as they went.

On Mackay's column reaching Mtandeni, the kraal was found completely deserted. Two separate camps of temporary war-huts had been erected within 300 yards of the kraal at the rear, capable of accommodating 1,500 men. Many signs of recent occupation were observed, such as bones of cattle that had been slaughtered, pots, etc. The kraal had evidently been hurriedly vacated, as numerous articles, such as dishes, mats, spoons, ornaments, etc., etc., were found lying about in the huts. A search was made for the European said to have been murdered. A bicycle with satchel attached, containing articles of clothing evidently belonging to the deceased, was found. Later on, under a tree, 150 yards from the kraal, the corpse of the murdered man was also come upon. The body had been horribly mutilated. The head had been cut off and removed; and the whole of the intestines, heart, lungs, liver, stomach, etc., extracted. The right hand, cut off at the wrist, was missing, whilst the pad or sole of one of the feet had also been cut away and removed.



The body was shortly after identified as that of Mr. Oliver Edward Veal, of the Public Works Department, who had left Pietermaritzburg in the hope of seeing a friend attached to Colonel McKenzie's staff. Deceased left Pietermaritzburg for Greytown by train on the 30th June, and from thence viâ Krantzkop to Mapumulo on a bicycle. At the latter place, he was warned of the danger of entering Meseni's ward but, having already come further than he had intended, he decided to go on to Tongaat and catch the train back to Pietermaritzburg on the Sunday. He was quite unarmed. He, moreover, not being a combatant, was in mufti. A party of rebels caught him half a mile from Gaillard's Drift and triumphantly conveyed him to Mtandeni. Meseni was informed of what had happened. He ordered Veal to be conveyed back to Mapumulo, but the large force there congregated was in no mood to carry out the order. Macabacaba, the fighting induna, not only ignored his Chief's orders, but identified himself with those who clamoured for Veal's being put to death. The rebels accused the latter of being a spy. Had he been able to speak Zulu, he might have been able to clear himself of the charge. As it was, Meseni concluded he was not a spy; it was on that account he gave the order he did. That the Chief's order should have been ignored shows that he had practically lost control of the tribe. Instead, however, of actively interfering, he allowed the rebels to do what they wished. And so this perfectly innocent young man, actuated by no other motive whatever than that of getting back to duty as speedily as possible, was struck, stabbed, and fearfully mutilated in the manner already described. The principal motive of the murder was, no doubt, to enable the local war-doctor to obtain parts of the body for doctoring the *impi* and rendering it so terrible to its opponents as to ensure victory on a conflict occurring.

There is no truth in the rumour that the sole of deceased's foot was removed whilst he was still alive, and that he was then compelled to walk. Zulus are undoubtedly barbarous in certain respects, but to say that

the above took place is a libel. If proof be wanted, we have it in the fact that the foot was closely examined on the body being found, when no trace whatever of dirt attaching thereto was detected.

The killing of this fine young fellow, loved by all who knew him, only shows what Natives were still capable of during the Rebellion, and how necessary it was to guard against members of any regiment becoming detached and wandering about in the enemy's country.

Another point is that whereas the rebel Chiefs generally protected civilians as far as they could, such protection could not be relied on, especially in the case of Meseni who, though present, was unable or did not care to assert his authority. In spite of all professions by the ringleaders that European non-combatants, including women and children, would not be molested, there was no guarantee whatever that a time would not arise when indiscriminate massacres would take place. Thus, the only way of checking these possible catastrophes was to do as McKenzie did, viz. so punish the rebels as to show them that rebellion, even in incipient forms, would be stamped out with the utmost severity. Had Chiefs been able to exercise effective control, especially when the passions of their people were aroused, a corresponding modification might have been introduced by European officers in dealing with the situation, but with instances as revolting as the one described, no other course was left than to suppress the tendencies in the sternest manner.

Meseni's kraal was burnt and Veal's remains buried close to where they were found.

McKenzie moved to an elevated position about a mile from Mtandeni, from where he generally directed the operations.

Woolls-Sampson, after leaving Mapumulo at 2 a.m. on the 2nd, advanced due south towards Wome kopje, overlooking Gaillard's Drift. Difficulty was experienced, when compelled to leave the road, through his not having a proper guide. A party of rebel scouts was surprised just before dawn—half a dozen of them were shot and two



captured. The night-march was otherwise without incident. As soon as it got light, about forty of the enemy were observed on top of a steep hill, Mpumulwana, about a mile from Wome. There were other signs that the enemy was concentrating there—the beginning of exceedingly broken country, covered with thorn trees. Woolls-Sampson sent B squadron N.M.R., dismounted, under Rattray, to dislodge the rebels. After going half-way up the steep hill in close order with bayonets fixed, Rattray sent Tpr. Le Mesurier on horseback to draw the enemy. The squadron followed close in rear. Le Mesurier rode practically up to the enemy, whom he found to be 300 to 400 strong. He then turned and galloped down the incline. The rebels, armed with shields and assegais, at once began to charge. As they appeared over the brow, they were met by the fire of Rattray's men. Instead of continuing, they drew back to the crest from whence they had come, and there once more concealed themselves as best they could.

Woolls-Sampson now sent the N.D.M.R. (under Abraham) at the gallop, with Z.M.R. and R.H., to a hill on the enemy's right flank, which commanded the rear of the hill occupied by the enemy. N.D.M.R. opened fire from right rear when the rebels, seeing they might be surrounded, retreated down the slopes in their rear towards the Umvoti river. As they made off, they were closely pursued by Rattray. Many were shot in the pursuit, especially by the Maxims. The remainder of the force was brought up, when the bush was driven to the river.

The troops were halted some 300 yards from Mpumulwana. 'A' squadron, N.M.R., was now sent to cover the right flank, as well as endeavour to bring fire to bear on the part of the hill occupied by the enemy. In the meantime, C squadron went forward to support Rattray.

When the N.D.M.R., after operating on a ridge almost parallel to that on which the main body was, reached the base of a conical hill, still nearer Wome, on their left front, a separate and considerable body of Natives

charged on to them from the top. The attack was immediately met and the rebels, having no opportunity to form up, hid themselves, after suffering severe loss, in scrub, dongas, etc. Whilst crossing some mealie-fields which appeared to be clear of rebels, Abraham and Lieut. H. G. James, Z.M.R., who were riding together with a few men, were suddenly attacked by rebels, up till then carefully concealed. Both officers used their revolvers with effect at close quarters.

In the operations about Mpumulwana and Wome, 102 of the enemy were killed.

It so happened that many of the rebels who escaped from Woolls-Sampson came in the direction of Mackay's column, when, later in the morning, very heavy losses were inflicted on them by the Carbineers in the scrub and thorns on both sides of the river—especially on the left bank.

Woolls-Sampson moved the whole of his force to the river, but although at once getting in touch with Mackay, he failed to do so with Barker, whose delay was, of course, accounted for by his having been engaged with other *impis* at Ponjwana, as already related.

Now, as to Leuchars. At daybreak, after entering Glendale valley, the column worked up the river. At a place where the Umvoti flows close to a precipitous and thickly-wooded slope, the road was found well barricaded with trees. The removal of the obstruction delayed the advance for about fifteen minutes. On the edge of some cane-fields, a few Natives were seen running into a densely-wooded valley on the right. Two shells were fired at them. Leuchars ascertained from Indians living there that the rebels were in the habit of secreting themselves in the cane, and that they were there then. It, therefore, became necessary to proceed with caution and to take the column off the road and through a field of young cane. Further delay arose through an ambulance waggon capsizing.

On the mill being reached, it was found that a store had been burnt and a house looted.



Leuchars' principal difficulties, however, arose after the road came to an end beyond the mill, when the guns and ambulance were obliged to proceed along trackless country, for the most part covered with thorn bush.

It was 2.30 p.m. when he sighted Mackay's column on a knoll near Umvoti river.

After his action at Ponjwana, Barker resumed his march at 9 a.m., and arrived at Gaillard's store, Umvoti Drift, shortly before noon. His progress through the intervening thorn country was retarded somewhat owing to being occasionally threatened by the enemy, though without any serious attempt to come to close quarters. After conferring with McKenzie, he moved back to Esidumbini, reaching his camp at 7.30 p.m. after an uneventful march.

In the afternoon, Mackay's, Woolls-Sampson's and Leuchars' columns proceeded to high ground on the road, about 1,000 yards from Gaillard's Drift (left side), and close to the spot where, two days before, Veal had been caught. Here the combined forces bivouacked for the night.

The total number of rebels killed by the columns during the day was 444, and about 400 cattle were captured.

On the following day (4th July), McKenzie decided to remain in Umvoti valley and to continue the sweeping operations generally in a northerly direction. Leuchars operated on the left, Mackay in the centre and Woolls-Sampson on Mackay's right. Each column traversed exceedingly rugged country during the day, but practically none of the enemy were met with in any force. All the rebels had apparently dispersed. Mackay proceeded via Misi hill into Swaimana's ward where, owing to not having vacated their kraals as instructed to do, two brothers of Swaimana—loyalists—were unfortunately shot in the belief that they were rebels.

Nineteen rebels were killed and a large quantity of stock captured during the day.

The columns—searching the country as they went—returned to Thring's Post on the 5th.

Attached to the Natal Carbineers was Lance-Corporal

V. J. W. Christopher. When in the neighbourhood of Hlonono Mission Station, he went to a kraal to make investigations. As he entered the place, a rebel, who had armed and concealed himself behind a fence, immediately pounced upon and stabbed him and his horse to death. The body was removed and buried at Ladysmith.

Although the combined operations in Umvoti valley, on account of Barker having been opposed at Ponjwana and Leuchars having to bring his guns and ambulance along rough and roadless country, did not achieve McKenzie's principal object, viz. establishing a cordon round Meseni's entire force, they were nevertheless successful in stamping out rebellion in that part. As late as the evening of the 2nd, all reports had gone to show that some 6,000 to 7,000 Natives were under arms in Umvoti valley. But, as the result of the vigorous operations of the 3rd, 4th and 5th, the rebel forces, defeated in action at two points, had entirely vanished. And, with their kraals destroyed and stock captured, no opportunity was allowed them to reorganize with any prospect of success.

The *terrain* here, though difficult to operate in, differed greatly from that at Nkandhla in having no strongholds of any importance. Had the valley been dealt with piecemeal, it is more than probable hostilities would have been kept up longer than they were, and been accompanied with far greater loss of life to the rebels than actually took place. Although the punishment was not as severe as it might have been, it was heavy enough to show Natives the futility of taking up arms against organized European troops. The swoop on Meseni's valley from four widely-separated points was a fine conception, and, although not as effective as it might have been, and was intended by McKenzie to be, the rebels saw enough to realize that an octopus had come down upon them from the surrounding heights, against whose powerful and far-reaching tentacles their own efforts were puny and feeble in the extreme. The reader may remember that a Zulu dreads nothing so much as being surrounded or hemmed in. The very effort to do this on the 3rd no doubt caused



many of them to be afflicted with nightmare, for that was the day on which, as they say, "every hill was covered with European troops, which, moving closer and closer, threatened and meted out destruction on every side."

On intelligence being brought in at 2 p.m. on the 6th that Meseni was in hiding a short distance off, three squadrons hurriedly left Thring's Post, only, however, to find, after proceeding a couple of miles, that the place was at least nine miles from camp, and required a much larger force to deal with. The troops accordingly returned to camp. Orders were issued the same night that all mounted troops of Leuchars', Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's columns were to move out at 3.30 a.m. on the 7th in the direction of Glendale. Fortunately there was a bright moon.

Woolls-Sampson's men took the right. After making a long detour, they, approaching on the west, reached the appointed rendezvous, Mzonono gorge, shortly after day-break, and got into touch with Mackay, who had moved to the east side from the north. Leuchars was to have closed the bottom end from the south-east, but he arrived late, owing to having been conducted along the wrong road. McKenzie, who was with Mackay's column, caused the bush in the gorge to be driven, but without result. Woolls-Sampson's and Mackay's men subsequently went to the top of hills overlooking the Kearsney sugar plantations and searched some caves near there. Leuchars, in the meantime, drove a valley on the east. During the day, thirteen prisoners were taken and six rebels killed. Tpr. Reed, N.C., accidentally shot himself through one of his lungs, but the injury luckily did not prove fatal.

The troops returned the same afternoon to Thring's Post, without having been able to ascertain the Chief's whereabouts.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> At 3 a.m. on the 15th, a fire suddenly broke out at the field hospital, Thring's Post, owing to a hurricane blowing about fragments from a burning rubbish heap. The medical officer (Dr. R. Milner Smyth) assisted by others, succeeded with considerable difficulty, in rescuing the patients (one of them, the man referred to in the text) from their burning tents.

With the object of dispersing a body of rebels, said to be between Spitzkop and Riet valley, Barker was instructed to move his column towards the upper portion of Umhlali river. A company N.R., was, at the same time, detached from Royston's column (which had just reached Dundee), and ordered to proceed by rail to join Barker.



## XVIII.

### ACTION AT IZINSIMBA.—CONCLUDING OPERATIONS. —DISBANDMENT.—COURTS-MARTIAL.—COST OF THE REBELLION.

It was clear from the outset that the *impis* that attacked the convoy at Macrae's on the 2nd July had come from Matshwili, Ntshingumuzi and Ngobizembe's tribes. Of these, the leading spirit was undoubtedly Matshwili<sup>1</sup> of the Mtetwa tribe. Intelligence went to show that a force of some eight companies of the rebels, *i.e.* between 400 to 600 men, was concealed in his ward in deep ravines at Izinsimba, a tributary of the Tugela. These rebels, although they had failed to annihilate Campbell, were awaiting favourable developments in other parts to amalgamate, or effectively co-operate, with the *impis* of Meseni, Ndhlovu and others. Only by striking decisively was it possible for McKenzie to break down the widespread disaffection in Mapumulo, Lower Tugela and Ndwedwe divisions, all thickly inhabited by uncivilized Natives.

As soon as the principal rebel force had been disposed of, attention was turned to that of Matshwili. McKenzie decided to surround this *impi* in the same way that had been attempted in Umvoti valley. The situation demanded celerity of action. With such crafty foes, action

<sup>1</sup> Grandson of the famous Dingiswayo, initiator of the modern Zulu military system.

When questioned by Natives as to who had given him orders to start hostilities in a country belonging to the Government, Matshwili is said to have replied: "If you don't keep quiet, I'll shoot you."

within twenty-four hours or so might meet with success, when a couple of days would result in absolute failure. The problem, however, was not of such vast dimensions as that in Umvoti valley, but, in view of the rugged country in which Matshwili's people lived, quickly descending as it does into a far more difficult and thickly-wooded district in the vicinity of the Tugela, it was necessary to cut off retreat thereto before the enemy had conceived the possibility of such movement taking place. Owing to the nature of the country, offering innumerable facilities for escaping, McKenzie was especially careful in the preparation of his plans.

The columns employed were those of Mackay, Woolls-Sampson and Leuchars. They were composed as follows :

*Mackay's*—Right and Left Wings, N.C. ; 2 guns, N.F.A. (Wilson).<sup>1</sup>

*Woolls-Sampson's*—4 squadrons, N.M.R. (Murray-Smith) ; 2 squadrons, N.D.M.R. (Abraham) ; 1 squadron, Z.M.R. (Vanderplank) ; 2 guns, N.F.A. (Acutt) ; detachments of D.L.I. and N.R.

*Leuchars'*—3 squadrons, U.M.R. (Newmarch) ; 2 squadrons, B.M.R. (Arnott) ; 1 squadron, N.C. (Montgomery) ; L. and Y. (Peakman) ; 2 guns, N.F.A. (Currie).

Mansel, as will presently be seen, also co-operated on the north-east.

McKenzie, with Mackay's column, left Thring's Post at 3 a.m. on the 8th, and advanced towards Izinsimba from the west. With a good moon, the first part of the march was comparatively easy. The ground, moreover, was fairly level. Matshwili's principal kraal was approached by two squadrons N.C. (dismounted), led by McKenzie, and then smartly, though quietly, surrounded by men with fixed bayonets before dawn, in the hope of arresting the Chief. The place, however, was found to be deserted. Mackay was directed at once to occupy a small, narrow ridge immediately overlooking Izinsimba (right bank), on which was a small mission station, and, in addition, to throw forward along the same ridge a strong force to hold

<sup>1</sup> Two companies N.R. (F and H) escorted the guns part of the way.



ground on the immediate west of Woolls-Sampson's position.

By this time, Woolls-Sampson had already taken up the position assigned him further down the Izinsimba. He had left Thring's Post at 2.30 a.m. and proceeded by road to Macrae's store, where he turned off sharp to the left and descended a long ridge to take up a position on the Izinsimba, about a mile and a half below Matshwili's principal kraals. The N.M.R. took the advance. Rattray was sent with squadron B to get astride of the stream, about fifty yards below where a tributary (which springs immediately east of Macrae's store) enters it. Ground was accordingly held to the extent of about fifty yards on either side. Murray-Smith, with the rest of N.M.R., remained for the time being at the base of the ridge the troops had come down, covering the entrance to Indaka spruit. The remainder of the troops supported some 200 yards in rear. All these positions were reached before daybreak.

Leuchars, who had marched at 3 a.m. to link up and co-operate with Woolls-Sampson on the opposite or left side of the Izinsimba, got generally into position by daybreak.

The converging on the valley by the three columns from different directions was accomplished in a highly creditable, and, indeed, remarkably simultaneous and accurate manner, owing chiefly to the excellence of the plan and the orders issued for carrying it into execution.

About 120 yards to the right front of Rattray's position, and in the same valley, was a square Native hut, from which nearly a dozen Natives soon rushed up the stream into thick bush. These, however, were not fired at, owing to the advisability of reserving the ammunition for the main body, which, it was supposed, would attempt to force its way through later. Presently some thirty of the enemy, probably alarmed by the noise of the approaching artillery, tried to break through the cordon, but were driven back with loss.

Finding that touch had been satisfactorily established

by Mackay with Woolls-Sampson on the right flank, and Leuchars on the left, McKenzie caused a small forest on Leuchars' side of the stream, and under high ground lined by his men, to be searched by Wilson's guns, using shrapnel.

One squadron, N.C., lined the ridge on the right of Izinsimba, another was posted higher up the stream, whilst, as has been seen, a strong force was holding the ridge on Woolls-Sampson's left flank.

By now, Woolls-Sampson had moved down the greater part of his column (dismounted) to block the Izinsimba valley more effectually, preparatory to driving up the stream, in which direction it was then evident the enemy was concealed and in force. After making such dispositions as were necessary, the drive began.

Leuchars did not take part in the earlier movements that occurred near where the Indaka and Imbuyana streams enter the Izinsimba. What happened with his column was this: Arnott, with B.M.R. (two squadrons), and N.C. (D squadron), had been directed to occupy ground immediately opposite that held by Woolls-Sampson. Arnott's guide mistook the path, which resulted in his pushing too far down the Izinsimba, *i.e.* about 800 yards below Woolls-Sampson. Such position was reached at dawn. The error, however, proved advantageous, as the troops were just in time to prevent the escape of about 150 rebels who were between N.M.R. and B.M.R. They were driven up the Izinsimba and dealt with later.

As, by this time (10.30 a.m.), it was clear that a considerable portion, if not the whole of Matshwili's *impi* had been completely surrounded, McKenzie ordered the principal valley to be driven downwards towards Woolls-Sampson, whose men (N.M.R. and N.D.M.R.), then out of sight in the irregularly-shaped and bushy valley, were already slowly and cautiously driving upwards.<sup>1</sup> The former troops (*i.e.* those driving downwards) consisted of portions of Mackay's and Leuchars' columns acting in combination, notably N.C. and L. and Y.

<sup>1</sup> B.M.R. also took part in driving up the stream.



The drives, which were through rough and rocky country, took about three hours to complete. Two or three of the small, precipitous ravines opening into the main valley, especially on the right side of the stream, were also driven. During the drives, numerous armed rebels were come upon in various parts. These made the best use they could of their assegais and shields. There was plenty of cover, bushes as well as rocks, but before long the enemy realized that he had been completely hemmed in. He continued to fight to the last, though at considerable disadvantage, because of having broken up into small groups. The "Usutu" war-cry was used whenever any lot made up their minds to charge or hurl their assegais.

Mansel left Ngudwini camp at midnight with 146 N.P.; two guns, N.F.A.; and 100 N.N.C. (Commander F. Hoare). His force co-operated generally at Izinsimba. It crossed the Tugela, drove the thorn country near the river, captured 100 cattle belonging to rebels, and returned to Ngudwini during the afternoon.


The operations at Izinsimba proved very successful. The enemy's losses amounted to 547 killed, including Matshwili, his son, his principal induna, Dabulumbimbi,<sup>1</sup> Mahlangu,<sup>2</sup> a Native Christian preacher (who, though carrying a Bible and hymn-book, was fully armed), as well as many of those who had taken part in the attack on Campbell's convoy six days before. The rebels' camp, consisting of many temporary war-huts, evidently hastily vacated, was found in a bend of the stream under a lot of shady trees.

It was already late in the afternoon when the forces withdrew, after a heavy day's work, to the base at Thring's Post.

L. and Y. (Peakman), who, as part of Leuchars' column, took part in the drives, were of much assistance. The L. and Y. infantry deserve a special word of praise. Not


<sup>1</sup> The man who led Matshwili's *impi* when Campbell was attacked.

<sup>2</sup> *cf.* p. 346.



## IZINSIMBA AND MACRAE'S STORE

Dispositions in each case are at beginning of the action  
Scale of yards



- REFERENCE**
- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>MACRAE'S STORE.—2nd July, 1906.</b></p> <p>A = Ennet, artillery and company<br/>         B = Store<br/>         C = Barricade<br/>         D = Did not take part in first attack<br/>         E = Enemy<br/>         F = Just above advanced guard at moment of attack<br/>         G = All attacks were from the west</p> | <p><b>IZINSIMBA.—3th July, 1906.</b></p> <p>H = Near here Woola-Sampson's artillery<br/>         I = N. P. L. was left with H. L. I. and N. K.<br/>         K = Krul surrounded by McKenzie<br/>         L = Where main downward drive began<br/>         M = Ntshoni's billet here<br/>         N = Ntshoni's outlook post<br/>         O = McKenzie's route<br/>         P = Leukhane's route<br/>         Q = Woola-Sampson's route</p> |
|--|--|







only did they march out a distance of ten miles, but, besides driving the valleys through the greater part of the day, walked all the way back to camp the same evening without a single man falling out.

With the decisive blows at Mome, Umvoti valley, Insuze and Izinsimba, the one following the other in quick succession, and each involving the rebels in severe losses, cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace became possible far sooner, and with much less bloodshed, than would otherwise have been the case. But, before this desirable consummation could be reached, a little more work remained to be done.

Ndhlovu's district had not been invaded. This was the tribe that had murdered Sangreid and Powell, had attempted to murder Robbins and Knox, and, apart from looting the stores at Thring's Post and Otimati, as well as a herd of cattle from the former place, had fought the N.M.R. at Otimati. After allowing the troops to rest on the 9th, McKenzie accordingly arranged a combined move on this ward for the morning of the 10th, intelligence going to show that Ndhlovu's *impi* lay concealed in the Mati valley.

In pursuance of the plan, Leuchars, whose column now consisted of U.M.R., N.M.R. and L. and Y., left at dusk on the 9th for Allan's store viâ the magistracy at Mapumulo. Woolls-Sampson, whose column now included B.M.R. (Arnott), in lieu of N.M.R., made for Hlungwini Drift (Tugela). Both columns were to be at the mouth of the Mati by the following dawn. Mansel got orders to move up the Tugela and assist on the Zululand side. Again, accompanying Mackay's column, McKenzie, leaving shortly before 3 a.m., entered the rebels' district by a more direct route than did the other columns. The N.R. accompanied Mackay, though, being infantry, started half an hour earlier.

Woolls-Sampson's column traversed extremely difficult and thorny country. It proceeded to where the Mati joins the Tugela and close to Isiwasezimbuzi mountain. Although a thick mist added to the difficulties of



the march, the force was in position at the appointed time.<sup>1</sup>

Leuchars, after bivouacking at Mapumulo, left that place at 3 a.m. As with the other columns, strict silence was observed during the march and no lights struck. By daylight, the force had occupied positions round Allan's store. Subsequently, Capt. W. J. Gallwey was sent down Masiwele valley with a squadron, whilst another squadron, under Capt. E. Simkins, crossed the Masiwele stream and moved along a high ridge on the north. Leuchars, in the meantime, took the main body down Mati valley, where it had been arranged Gallwey and Simkins should meet him. When about three miles from the Tugela, touch was got with the columns of Woolls-Sampson, Mackay and Mansel. None of the enemy, however, were met with, though a spoor leading in a northerly direction into the next ward was found.

After the columns had got into their respective positions, McKenzie directed them to drive forward simultaneously to the junction of the Mati and Masiwele streams. The country each column operated in was exceedingly rugged. Vast portions of it were covered with thorn and other varieties of trees, growing so closely together in places that it was impossible for horsemen to do otherwise than proceed in single file along narrow, stony footpaths, across which fallen trees and other obstacles were frequently found. Not a single rebel was seen throughout the day. The movement, though within ten days of the general concentration at Thring's Post, had come too late. The wily rebels, no doubt aware of what had happened at Izinsimba, had slipped, under cover of the dense forests, some ten miles or so up the river.

The troops, having bivouacked for the night on the Mati, continued the operations during the following day, but met with no better success. Leuchars and Woolls-Sampson then withdrew to Mapumulo, and Mackay to

<sup>1</sup> The B.M.R. were later on sent a short way into Zululand; they rejoined the column, along with Z.M.R., at Mapumulo on the following day.

Thring's Post. The infantry, including D.L.I., returned to Thring's Post via Isiwasezimbuzi (*the goats' precipice*).

On the day in question, Mansel left Ngudwini with 146 N.P.; 100 N.N.C. (Hoare); 2 guns, N.F.A.; and 100 Nongqai (Fairlie), and, crossing the Tugela, met and co-operated with McKenzie in Mati valley. Recrossing the Tugela, his force bivouacked for the night near the drift.

In regard to the operations of the 10th and 11th, Colonel McKenzie remarked: "Some column commanders used their guns whilst a heavy fog was hanging over the valley. There was apparently no need for this, but, thinking they were in touch with the enemy, it had the effect of hastening the movement, which might have been the means of allowing the enemy to escape, for, naturally, the country traversed was not searched so thoroughly as it otherwise would have been."<sup>1</sup>

In consequence of the operations in Umvoti valley and at Izinsimba, finding their *impis* altogether unable to stand against the troops as had at first seemed possible,<sup>2</sup> Meseni and Ndhlovu decided to quit their wards and take refuge in Zululand with a few headmen. News of the flight was speedily obtained by O.C. Troops and telegraphed to the Commissioner at Eshowe. The refugees were placed under arrest by the loyal Chief Hatshi, near Entumeni forest, and conveyed to Eshowe. McKenzie ordered that they should be sent under escort to Mapumulo. They accordingly reached Thring's Post on the 13th, and Mapumulo magistracy on the following day. To the latter place McKenzie at the same time transferred his headquarters.

With the surrender of these two men, and the death of Matshwili, there was every reason for supposing that the Rebellion was at an end in that part, if not throughout

<sup>1</sup> General Report, September, 1906.

<sup>2</sup> When advised by their elders, men who had fought for Cetshwayo during the Zulu War, not to take up arms against the whites, as they would be as surely defeated as they (the elders) had been in 1879, the semi-civilized youths of 1906 shouted derisively: *Sa si ngeko tina!* i.e. *We were not there!*



the whole Colony. In the absence of disturbing intelligence from any other district, the latter assumption presently proved to be correct.

Immediately Meseni and Ndhlovu arrived at Mapumulo, the advisability of proclaiming a general armistice was considered. Although it was known that small bands of rebels still existed in the Tugela valley, between Krantz-kop and Izinsimba, notably under the leadership of Sambela, a relation of the expatriated Chief Ngobizembe, McKenzie felt the time had arrived when an opportunity of surrendering should be afforded to all who cared to avail themselves thereof. It was with the object of discussing the situation from this and other aspects, that the Minister of Justice and Defence (Mr., now Sir, Thomas Watt) and the Commandant of Militia (Colonel Bru-de-Wold)<sup>1</sup> visited McKenzie at Mapumulo on the 14th. Orders were thereupon issued that all further operations were to be suspended. Column commanders were, at the same time, instructed to use every endeavour to induce outstanding rebels to come in. One of the means adopted with success was to use the services of those who had surrendered, on seeing whom many still at large became satisfied that the opportunity given was *bona-fide*.

The Krantz-kop, Durban, New Hanover and Umvoti Reserves were demobilized, as also the N.N.C. and N.F.A. The Durban Reserves (under Chief Leader N. Chiazzari, D.S.O.) had for some time been doing good work at Thring's Post.

On the 16th, Leuchars' column went to relieve Barker's at Esidumbini, when the latter, after an exceptionally fine record in the field, both at Nkandhla and in Natal, was permitted to return to the Transvaal.

Since the 3rd, when, after successfully invading Umvoti valley, Barker had returned to Esidumbini, his column, still including the New Hanover Reserves, had been far from idle. The country was thoroughly scoured in all directions within a radius of ten to fifteen miles of the camp, notably the wards of Chiefs Njubanjuba, Xegwana

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Bru-de-Wold resumed duty early in July.

and Swaimana. Between the 4th and 14th, seventeen rebels had been killed, 233 prisoners captured (including sixty-three suspects), and over 1,000 head of cattle taken. When the order to return to the Transvaal was received, Barker was still engaged sending out small patrols, seizing stock, and accepting surrenders in different directions.

The infantry corps, D.L.I. and N.R.R., were demobilized on the 16th, and the New Hanover Reserves on the 17th, whilst the Z.M.R. were sent to relieve at Krantzkop. When, on the 14th, McKenzie moved his camp to a spot near Mapumulo, N.R. (two companies) were left to occupy Thring's Post.

By the 22nd July, a very considerable number of rebels had surrendered to the various columns, but, as some were still at large, notwithstanding special pains taken to induce them to come in, Woolls-Sampson got orders to demonstrate in the vicinity of Riet valley on the coast, between Glendale and Chaka's Kraal.<sup>1</sup> Leuchars, at the same time, moved towards Tongaat, and Mackay into Ntshingumuzi's ward, near Bulwer, afterwards to Otimati. In each case, column commanders were instructed to use every effort to induce rebels outstanding in those parts to surrender, and not to resort to aggressive measures. The doctors who were in Mackay's column (Capt. J. E. Briscoe and Lieut. W. Black) dressed the wounds of a number of rebels that were met with in different places. In consequence of these tactics, many more surrendered.

Sambela, the man above referred to, was arrested on the 18th near Umhlatuze river in Zululand, whilst Meseni's 'fighting induna,' Macabacaba, who was primarily responsible for Veal's murder, was secured in Ndwedwe district about the same time.

McKenzie was summoned to Pietermaritzburg on the 24th. He returned to Stanger on the 28th, when a general order was issued for all Militia corps still in the field to demobilize on the 30th.

<sup>1</sup> On the 30th July, Woolls-Sampson's column was taken over by Arnott, the former having been granted leave of absence.



Before concluding the account of the operations, it is necessary to consider briefly what Mansel's and Royston's columns had been doing in Zululand, since the general concentration at Thring's Post.

When, on the 29th June, Woolls-Sampson was ordered to proceed to Bond's Drift and then to Thring's Post, the N.P., 147, who had been attached to his column since 20th, were, it will be remembered, left at Ngudwini to form part of Mansel's force. Mansel had left Fort Yolland on the 3rd July, with N.F.A., 35 (two guns); N.N.C., 140, and Nongqai, 130, and assumed command at Ngudwini on the same day. Patrols were daily sent by him down and up the Tugela to prevent rebels crossing into Zululand. When the three columns at Thring's Post made a combined move in Matshwili's ward on 8th, and in Ndhlovu's and Ngobizembe's on 10th and 11th, he, as has been seen, co-operated from the Zululand side. On the 13th, his column moved to Isiwamanqe, from which position a constant watch was kept along the river. N.N.C. and N.F.A. left Mansel on the 16th to demobilize in Durban. The column moved on the 21st and reached Bond's Drift on the 23rd. On Mansel leaving (24th), Lieut.-Col. W. J. Clarke took over the command. The force demobilized in Pietermaritzburg on the 3rd August.

Royston's column, consisting of R.H., D.L.I. (including Mounted Infantry) and N.F.A. (two guns), moved to Ndikwe stream on the 20th June, and to Ensingabantu on the 21st. On the same day, the D.L.I. (including M.I.) left to join Woolls-Sampson at Nkandhla. The column was, however, joined by four companies N.R. (Boyd-Wilson). N.F.A. (two guns) were detached and returned to Empandhleni on the 23rd. After establishing a garrison at Ensingabantu with one company N.R. (Capt. J. J. Whitehead), to guard the supplies, Royston left that place and, on the 24th, proceeded on a two days' drive to Macala mountain, down to the Tugela, and from thence to Mfongozi valley.

On the 27th, a force of 250 mounted men demonstrated down Mfongozi valley, towards Tugela and Qudeni moun-

tain, returning to Ensingabantu for supplies. The column now went over Qudeni, towards the junction of Tugela and Buffalo rivers. The country between Hlatikulu forest and the Buffalo was driven, after which the force rested at Mangeni. The Mangeni district was next driven towards the Buffalo, about 1,500 head of cattle belonging to Chief Matshana ka Mondise being seized.<sup>1</sup> The column then went on to bivouack at Isandhlwana.

Mehlokazulu's ward was now traversed by the column. All prisoners, cattle, sheep and goats that had been seized were handed over to the Magistrate, Nqutu. The force moved to Vant's Drift, where waggons from Dundee had to be awaited, as no transport from Zululand was allowed

<sup>1</sup> A mistake. Mackay, acting on advice received from the Commissioner, had already imposed a fine of five head of cattle for every rebel, when 312 cattle and 169 goats had been handed over by the Chief, in addition to thirty-three rebels. Matshana was, thereupon, given a complete discharge.

Because it was supposed Mackay had not properly dealt with the position, another column, seven days afterwards, invaded the district and swept up almost every beast it could find; and yet Matshana had kept in close touch with the authorities ever since Bambata's arrival at Nkandhla. Out of his many sons, five joined the rebels, whilst a number of people had gone from the tribe. These incidents were immediately reported to the Commissioner, the Chief urging that a striking example should be made of his rebels, beginning with his sons. As regards these defections, Matshana was no worse than the majority of the Nkandhla Chiefs, and not nearly so bad as some, *e.g.* Sigananda, Ndube and Mbuzo. But there is another and more telling consideration. "On Sunday evening (27th May)," says Leuchars' chief staff officer, Major (now Lieut.-Col.) S. Carter, "soon after we settled down in camp, a man came from Matshana ka Mondise, saying the Chief sent him to warn us to be particularly careful, as we were in a dangerous locality. The man was told to go back and thank Matshana for his warning. Next morning, after the fight was over (*i.e.* the battle of Mpukunyoni), two mounted messengers, . . . arrived and said they had been sent by Matshana to congratulate Col. Leuchars on having defeated the enemy." There are other facts in connection with this matter, other assistance readily afforded by the Chief under difficult circumstances, but the foregoing are, perhaps, sufficient to show the danger of sending one column to generally 'put right' what it is supposed another has failed to do through incompetency or lack of information. The result was that, on the truth coming to light, Matshana's wrongfully seized property was, of course, restored by order of the Commandant of Militia.

If further proof be required of the Chief's loyalty, we have it in the fact that, as declared by the rebel ringleader Mangati, Matshana, because of his loyalty, was to be shot by rebels then being harboured at Usutu by Dinuzulu.—*Vide*, Cd. 3,888, p. 186.

It is right to add that Royston was not acquainted with the foregoing facts when the cattle were taken.



to cross into Natal owing to East Coast Fever restrictions. Dundee was reached on the 7th July. The column ceased to exist on the 19th. Royston entrained with his regiment for Pietermaritzburg on the 29th.

Whilst the column was camped in the vicinity of Rorke's Drift, five Native prisoners were shot when attempting to escape from custody. The case formed the subject of inquiry, first by a Military Court of Inquiry, then by Mr. Justice Beaumont (now Sir William Beaumont, K.C.M.G.) of the Supreme Court, on a complaint by the Bishop of Zululand that the men had been "taken out after their arrival at the camp near Rorke's Drift and deliberately shot." The allegations, after being fully examined, were found to be not proved, although the Commissioner considered the Bishop was amply justified in taking the action he did.

After the disaffection in Mapumulo and adjoining districts had been finally dealt with, there remained but two tribes to consider, viz. those of the brothers Tilonko and Sikukuku, living near Mid-Ilovo. The former and more important Chief was ordered to appear before the Minister for Native Affairs in Pietermaritzburg. This he did on the 23rd July. After denying the charges brought against him, he was served with a summons to stand his trial on the 30th, and then permitted to return to his tribe. The summons was obeyed.

It was subsequent to this incident that the Government came to the decision to demobilize, as already narrated. Owing, however, to the fact that the unrest had not entirely died out, and that certain clearing-up operations might require military assistance, it was resolved that a composite regiment, consisting of about 600 men, made up almost entirely of special service men, should be enrolled and stationed in Mapumulo division or wherever else might be desirable. The actual formation of the regiment was, however, rendered unnecessary owing to work done during August by R.H., by three special service squadrons, 139, 84 and 40 strong,—the first (consisting of N.C.) at Mapumulo, under Capt. J. W. V. Montgomery; the

second, under Capt. E. Simkins, at Tongaat; the third, at Krantzkop and, later, Nkandhla, under Lieut. G. E. Blaker,—and by N.R. and N.N.H. The first-named corps, again commanded by Royston, visited various Chiefs' wards in the neighbourhoods of Krantzkop, Nkandhla and Qudeni, that is, on the Tugela side of those mountains. During such demonstrations, neither Natives nor their property were interfered with in any way. Lists of outstanding rebels were readily obtained from each Chief and special efforts were made to bring about early surrenders. Royston addressed several large gatherings of Natives at different places. The tone of his remarks on each occasion was everything that could have been desired, and helped materially in causing the people to return to their several customary avocations. The speedy manner in which the lately disturbed areas assumed their normal condition, as well as the eagerness displayed by the great majority of Natives to hand over the rebels, must be attributed in no small degree to the exertions of this regiment.

A detachment of 50 R.H. under the command of Lieut.-Col. B. Crompton (N.C.), D.S.O., operated independently of the regiment, by direction of the Commandant, in the Noodsberg district between the 5th July and the 9th September. The country about the Great Noodsberg was driven with the assistance of Native levies, viz. 130 from Chiefs Swaimana and Mdungazwe, and 500 from Sobuza. The detachment rejoined the regiment at Pietermaritzburg on the 9th September.

Montgomery's men reached Mapumulo on the 11th August. In addition to guarding prisoners, gaol and supplies, the Umvoti and Tugela valleys were regularly patrolled, with the assistance of Native levies. Several important captures of rebels were effected. The squadron, understaffed as regards officers, performed its various duties in a very satisfactory manner. It was disbanded on the 12th September.

Simkins carried out patrols in the Tongaat district, took charge of prisoners, and discharged other similar duties.



Blaker's squadron, which contained N.C. men and ex-members of other corps, performed useful work at Krantz-kop, and, along with Z.M.R. under Capt. Flindt, at Nkandhla. At the latter place, it and Z.M.R. co-operated with R.H. in Mfongozi valley. Disbandment took place simultaneously with R.H., Montgomery's squadron, and details of the active Militia.

And so it happened that, by the 12th September, there being no recrudescences of the Rebellion, Royston's Horse, Natal Carbineers, Natal Native Horse, Natal Rangers<sup>1</sup> and details had been disbanded. Such work, *e.g.* arresting criminals, as then remained to be done was within the power of the ordinary police to perform.

It has been observed that, with the surrender of Tilonko, the torch of Rebellion was regarded as finally extinguished. This, in fact, was the case. Curious that on the very day this Chief was on his way to Pietermaritzburg (23rd July), the light of a far more important man was flickering out at Empandhleni. This was none other than the veteran Chief Sigananda, who, forced to rebel,—as he plainly hinted at his trial, by Dinuzulu and Mankuluman's attitude towards Bambata,—had been the cause of so much trouble at Nkandhla. Although treated as a first-class offender, supplied during his thirty-eight days' imprisonment with whatever he required in the way of food, clothing and other comforts, the old man was unable, at the age of 96, to adapt himself to changed conditions of living. He was cheerful and communicative to the last, and in full possession of all his faculties. On more than one occasion, he narrated wonderful experiences gone through by him in earlier days. Among these, was the massacre of Piet Retief and party in 1838 at Mgungundhlovu, when Sigananda had himself actively participated. The glee with which the old man told of his King's triumph, wholly regardless of the fiendishly treacherous manner in

<sup>1</sup> When, on the 10th July, Dick returned to Durban, Furze took command (under Wylie); Furze was relieved on the 13th by Boyd-Wilson. In the concluding stages of the campaign, N.R. were detailed as garrisons at such places as Thring's Post, Kearsney, Stanger, and Nkandhla, whilst E squadron cleared up at Noodsberg.

which it had been accomplished, served to throw a lurid light on the true Zulu character when called on to deal with a supposed enemy.

As soon as the T.M.R. were relieved at Esidumbini, they proceeded to Durban. There they became the guests of the Mayor and Corporation during such time as they were in the town. The whole people rose in their honour and loudly acclaimed their performance. The regiment was entertained by the Government at luncheon on the 21st, when, in the course of an eloquent speech, intended also to apply to the "Rosebuds" (L. and Y.) and Rangers (N.R.), the Governor formally and warmly expressed the heartfelt thanks of the Colony for the splendid services that had been rendered by the Transvaalers, services which included the defeat and expulsion of the enemy from a stronghold supposed for many generations to be insurmountable and impregnable. Help such as that, freely and generously given by a sister Colony in time of need, would, said Sir Henry McCallum, never be forgotten. At Johannesburg, again, the return of these and other Transvaal troops was an occasion of much public rejoicing.

The following general resolution was moved and carried unanimously in the Legislative Council as well as in the Legislative Assembly on the 31st July :

"(1) That the cordial thanks of this Council (Assembly) are hereby accorded to the Militia and other forces now or lately engaged in the field, for the promptitude with which they responded to the call to arms for the purpose of quelling the rebellion of portions of the Native population of this Colony. That this Council (Assembly) in congratulating the Officers Commanding upon the success which has attended their arms, places on record its appreciation of the gallantry and endurance displayed by all ranks, and of the public spirit with which private interests have been sacrificed by all alike for the defence of the Colony. (2) That a copy of this resolution be conveyed to the Commandant of Militia, with an expression of the wish of this Council (Assembly) that its terms may be communicated to the various units engaged."



Two days later, some 2,000 troops, representing the various units recently engaged in the operations, including the Cape Mounted Rifles, headed by the band of the Cameron Highlanders, marched to and paraded on the Market Square, Pietermaritzburg, where they were addressed by the Governor in the presence of a large concourse of spectators, not the least interested being members of many of the Native tribes. Speaking on behalf of the Colony, and as His Majesty's representative, Sir Henry McCallum cordially thanked the troops for "the magnificent services they had rendered to the Colony and to the Empire." "For, perhaps, the first time on record," he went on, "you have been engaged principally upon the offensive, and you have carried out work which was supposed to be insurmountable. This has required the greatest fortitude on your part. Willingly have the mounted men put their horses on one side, scrambled into the bush, and got into the forefront in attacking the enemy. The conduct of the campaign throughout has been one for the greatest congratulation, not only to yourselves, but to the Colony in general." His Excellency added: "I see on parade a detachment of the Cape Mounted Rifles. I am afraid that many volunteers from the Cape Colony were disappointed at not being able to take part in this campaign, but I am extremely glad that arrangements could be made by which our sister Colony was represented. I thank those who have come to our assistance extremely, and I ask them when they go back to inform their fellow-colonists that the young Colony of Natal has equally soldiers who are ready at all times to give to her assistance, if wanted, in the same way that they have come to us."

With martial law in force, it followed that offences arising out of the Rebellion were, for the most part, dealt with under such law. Many of the Magistrates were granted authority by the Commandant to try these offences, but this was revoked by the Governor on the 17th September. Graver crimes were reserved for properly-constituted courts-martial. These courts were

convened at such places as Nkandhla (Empandhleni), Mapumulo, Greytown, Dundee and Pietermaritzburg, and were presided over by the following, among other, officers : Lieutenant-Colonels J. Weighton, V.D., J. S. Wylie, H. H. C. Puntan, H. R. Bousfield, C.M.G. The sittings began at Empandhleni on the 25th June with the trial of Siganda,<sup>1</sup> and lasted till the end of September. To afford the accused every facility in procuring witnesses, to obviate putting European and Native witnesses to more inconvenience than necessary, and to impress those most specially concerned with the enormity of the offences that had been committed, it was arranged to try offenders, as far as possible, in the districts within which the treason or sedition had been committed. Among the most important trials were those of Siganda, Ndabaningi, Meseni, Ndhlovu,<sup>2</sup> Tilonko, Sikukuku, and some forty of those implicated in the attack on the Police at Mpanza (tried in two lots). In some of these, and in other, cases, the death sentence was passed, but, on the advice of Ministers, the Governor, in every instance, commuted it to one of imprisonment. The three Natives, including Mjongo, who were concerned in the murder of Hunt and Armstrong—too unwell to be tried by court-martial at Richmond in March—were tried in September, not by court-martial, but by the Supreme Court. The evidence adduced was similar to that given at the court-martial. The prisoners were defended by counsel other than those who appeared before the latter court. The three were convicted, the jury being unanimous in respect to two, and 7 to 2 as to the third. The sentence of death by hanging was subsequently carried out. This conviction by an ordinary tribunal only goes to confirm the Governor's contention in respect of the first trial, namely, that it was in every way fair and just.

Kula, the Chief who was removed from Umsinga in May,

<sup>1</sup> Major W. A. Vanderplank, Z.M.R., prosecuted in this important case, and Capt. C. F. Clarkson, D.L.I., with Lieut. H. Walton, N.C., defended.

<sup>2</sup> Meseni and Ndhlovu were tried at Mapumulo on the 16th and 17th July, 1906, and convicted of high treason.



was not tried for the reason that no crime of a sufficiently definite nature was found to have been committed by him. As, however, his conduct as a Government officer had, for some time past, as well as during the Rebellion, been unsatisfactory, it was considered undesirable for him to resume control of his tribe. He was accordingly required to reside for a time a few miles from Pietermaritzburg, so as to be under the immediate eye of the Government.<sup>1</sup>

The rank and file of some 4,700 prisoners were tried by their respective Magistrates and by Judges. The great majority of sentences ran from six months to two years, with whipping added. A few were for longer periods, for life, etc. After a number had been flogged, the Government directed suspension of all further whippings during good behaviour. Special arrangements had, of course, to be made in Durban and elsewhere for accommodating the prisoners. About 2,500 were confined in a compound at Jacobs near Durban, formerly used by Chinese labourers; 400 (for the most part with sentences of two years) in a special prison at the Point, Durban; 100 at Fort Napier, Pietermaritzburg; and the rest in various gaols. The Inspector of Prisons (and Assistant Commissioner of Police), G. S. Mardall, was responsible for the carrying out of the foregoing and other connected duties. The labour on which the men were principally employed was in connection with the harbour works, Durban, as well as making and repairing roads in different parts of the Colony. Later, about 1,500 were hired by the Collieries, and others by the Railway Department.

As the Ministry were of opinion that a good effect would be created on the Native mind by such ringleaders as had been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment being sent out of the Colony to serve their sentences, arrangements

<sup>1</sup> Other Chiefs and headmen, whose conduct during the disturbances had been unsatisfactory, were deposed, and, in some cases, ordered to remove to other districts. Among those removed were Tshingana, Dinuzulu's uncle, and, later on, Mabeketshiya, one of Dinuzulu's cousins; the former left Mahlabatini district to live near Amanzimtoti in Natal, the latter went from Vryheid district to Alfred division.

were made for the removal of twenty-five to St. Helena. They were deported on the 1st June, 1907.

A general desire to abrogate martial law at the earliest opportunity was felt as soon as the troops had been demobilized. No one was more anxious to do this than the Government itself. With so many prisoners to be tried for offences of varying gravity, however, it was impossible to do this before the 2nd October.

On the same day, the Governor, on authority granted by the Secretary of State in August, signified his assent to an Act indemnifying the military and civil authorities of the Colony and all such persons as had acted under them in regard to acts during the existence of martial law.

It was with much gratification that the Governor and his Ministers received the following telegram, on the 2nd September, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies :

“ I rejoice to think that the period of strain through which the Colony of Natal has passed may now be considered at an end, and I desire on behalf of His Majesty’s Government to express our sense of the courage and self-reliance with which the emergency has been met. The conduct of the troops in the field and the management of the operations appear from all accounts to have been admirable and to have been well supported by the determination and self-restraint of the Government and the people. I should have been prepared at any moment to move His Majesty’s Government to render assistance, but I am glad that the necessity did not arise.

“ The judgment and moderation shown in the commutation of courts-martial sentences inspires the hope that the peace of the Colony will now be re-established on the broad basis of justice and good feeling for all races.

“ For yourself this has been a time of great stress and anxiety, and I congratulate you on the success which has attended you in your difficult task.”

An estimate of the total number of rebels that took part in the Rebellion is very difficult to arrive at at all approximately. Judging from the reports of Commanding Officers,



the aggregate for Natal and Zululand would be about 10,000 to 12,000, of whom about 2,300 were killed. After the outbreak, the Government obtained particulars from the various Magistrates, when the totals for Natal and Zululand were found to be 3,873 and 2,031 respectively ; of these, 782 and 609 were said to have been killed or missing.<sup>1</sup> There are several reasons why the Magistrates would have been unable to obtain exact information, the chief among them being dread of punishment, either by imprisonment or seizure of stock. At the same time, the military estimates may also have been at fault.

It remains to refer to the cost of the Rebellion. The expenditure for the suppression and prevention thereof was met from loans raised under Acts of the Natal Parliament, whereby authority was granted to borrow up to £1,000,000. A sum of £900,000 was raised, the amount realized being £892,137 16s. Actual expenditure chargeable against loan account amounted to £637,039 15s. 5d. at 31st December, 1906 ; this rose to £778,360 1s. 7d. by 30th June, 1907. Included in the latter total are claims for compensation for losses sustained during the Rebellion, £40,750, and upkeep of rebel prisoners, £49,657, whilst a reduction of £10,992 has been made, on account of monies received by Government for the hire of rebel prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

The issue of a medal, in recognition of services rendered during the Rebellion, was approved by His Majesty the King. It was granted to those (including nursing sisters), who served between the 11th February and the 3rd August, for a continuous period of not less than twenty days, also to certain civilians, Native Chiefs, and others who had rendered valuable service. A clasp, inscribed " 1906," was issued with the medal to such as had served for a continuous period of not less than fifty days.

<sup>1</sup> As, at a number of the places where engagements had occurred, *e.g.* Mome, Insuze and Izinsimba, it appeared that many bodies of rebels had not been removed, it became necessary for the Government to send out a small party to bury them.

<sup>2</sup> Particulars will be found in Appendix VIII. regarding expenditure from the beginning of the Rebellion to 31st May, 1910, *i.e.* including that incurred in connexion with the Dinuzulu Expedition, December, 1907, to March, 1908.

## XIX.

### SOME LESSONS OF THE REBELLION.

FROM a military point of view, the rapidity and thoroughness with which the rising was suppressed cannot but reflect the greatest credit on the Colonists and the Government of Natal. Hostilities began on the 4th April and lasted until the middle of July, barely three and a half months. The achievement was altogether a notable one, and one of which far larger Colonies would have justly been proud, especially when it is borne in mind that it was accomplished without the assistance of the Mother Country.<sup>1</sup> To have conducted with success so formidable a campaign, calling as it did for the employment of nearly 10,000 men and over 6,000 Natives, without Imperial aid, is probably unique in the history of the Empire. And not less creditable was it that the rising was kept from developing to far greater proportions, as might easily have happened through mismanagement.

The character of the work done by the Natal Militia, as well as by the Transvaal and Cape troops, the Natal Police and other forces, shows that a very high standard of efficiency existed at the beginning of the hostilities, indicating that organization in the hands of the Commandant, and of the authorities in the sister Colonies, was everything that could have been desired. Throughout the campaign, all units, under their respective commanding officers, discharged the duties allotted to them in a cheerful, soldier-like and exemplary manner. Many of the operations and actions engaged in from time to time were

<sup>1</sup> Except to the extent indicated on p. 63.



of a particularly severe and difficult nature. Especially was this the case in regard to what is known as the thorn country, which is very extensive and broken, and at Nkandhla, where forest-driving had to be repeatedly undertaken, often under the most disheartening conditions. If the men were not obliged to undergo privations to an abnormal extent, it was only because of the general excellence of the other branches of the service, *e.g.* transport, supplies, medical, ordnance, etc., each of which, again, was strongly supported by all ranks of the Natal Government Railways Departments.

Foremost among individuals who contributed to the success were the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, G.C.M.G., the Natal Ministry (Messrs. Smythe, Maydon, Hyslop, Watt, Winter and Clayton), and Colonels Bru-de-Wold, McKenzie and Leuchars.

Attention has already been called to the eminent services rendered by Sir Henry McCallum. That he should have made a point of discussing the position with his Ministers, as he did, *daily* from the day the trouble started to its close, is proof, if any were wanting, of his extreme solicitude for the welfare of the Colony. Valuable assistance was afforded him throughout the campaign by Sir Charles Saunders, for the time being his deputy in Zululand.

The Ministry are deserving of the greatest praise for the cool, resolute and statesmanlike manner in which they controlled the affairs of the Colony. They met the extraordinary difficulties that confronted them from time to time with courage and success. The stand made when the suspension of the Richmond executions was ordered is alone sufficient to cause their administration to be remembered and respected. A further measure of credit is due to Sir Thomas Watt, who, as Minister of Justice and Defence, was, of course, primarily responsible for the excellent state of military organization at the beginning of the campaign.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate what has already been said about Colonel Bru-de-Wold. The Militia was

exceedingly fortunate in having so enthusiastic and experienced an officer as Commandant. The same applies to that distinguished soldier Major-General Sir John Dartnell who, for a time, relieved Colonel Bru-de-Wold.

That Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sir Duncan) McKenzie did more than come up to the high expectations formed of his capacities as a soldier was generally acknowledged. But few opportunities for distinguishing himself arose during the demonstrations in February and March. When he assumed command at Nkandhla, however, early in May, with Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson as Chief Staff Officer, they became numerous. It was due mainly to his generalship, ably supported by the column and other commanders, that the decisive results at Nkandhla and elsewhere were brought about. Every operation or action taken in hand by him during the campaign was planned with the greatest care and circumspection. He was fortunate in being provided with excellent intelligence. His policy was always to strike hard, and to afford no chance of escape. It was, in the main, owing to this method, and the vigour and resolution with which it was followed, that hostilities were brought to an end as soon as they were.

A fine horseman, with an unerring eye for country, his performances in the field were invariably marked by swiftness of action, and brilliancy and thoroughness of execution.

Colonel Leuchars commanded all troops in Natal proper and Nqutu district, though, after 30th May, he did so under McKenzie. Much useful and solid work was done by this popular officer, with Major (now Lieut.-Col.) S. Carter as Staff Officer. He proved himself to be a judicious, capable and reliable commander. The disturbed area over which he had control included no less than five magisterial districts. As these all abut on the Tugela, it can be seen that the command was one of exceptional difficulty, and this not only in a geographical, but a diplomatic, sense.

The first lesson of the Rebellion may, therefore, be said to have been (a) the happy conjunction of capable



statesmen and soldiers, one and all ready to serve the Colony to the utmost in its time of need ; and (b) the thoroughness of military organization.

*Rebels' strategy, tactics, etc.*—The primary object of the rebels was to score victories, however small, at the outset, it being felt that that was the most effective way of rousing the people from a condition of apathy or inertia brought on through chronic fear of Europeans. The masses considered it was useless fighting against a race far better armed than themselves, and one which, twenty-eight years before, had defeated the Zulu army when in its highest state of efficiency. If the Rebellion was not to fall flat, the most strenuous efforts had, therefore, to be made to secure adherents.

Having regard to their inferior weapons, the only chance of success lay in selecting a *terrain* suitable to their tactics. That, at any rate, would afford breathing-time, for if the theatre of war lay away from railways and in country difficult for horses, the longer would hostilities continue. Thus success was recognized as depending largely on protracting the campaign, by rendering it as difficult as possible for the troops.

To start hostilities, again, at the most favourable time, *i.e.* about May, when all the crops had been reaped, was regarded as essential. It is true that the Trewirgie affair occurred in February, but such must be regarded as an exception which proved the rule.

The feeling that they could, as it were, "float" a general rebellion was, no doubt, largely derived from the success achieved by a Zulu *impi* against Potgieter's commando at Holkrantz. The ambushade at Mpanza, too, was a success, and afforded just the illustration required to support the cry that European bullets would not "enter." As Natives in general greatly dreaded rifle fire, it became necessary to counteract the fear by inventing the "non-entering-bullet" superstition. Had but one or two rebels been killed at Mpanza, not nearly so much would have been made of the superstition as was done.

The fact that, at the beginning of June, the position

was extremely serious, only shows that the enemy's tactics had been effective, differing widely from the free, open methods practised during the Zulu War. But for the remarkable *coup* at Mome, the Rebellion might easily have developed to far greater proportions. As it was, many Chiefs on both sides of the Tugela had begun to assist directly or indirectly. And it is clear that the more protracted the fighting, the more Natives at large would have inferred that the Government had got to the end of its resources, and was, therefore, unable to cope with the situation. Once such a notion had been created and been widely believed, anything up to 100,000 might have risen, and so called for an army corps to deal with the outbreak at a cost of £10,000,000 or so. That is the prospect the Ministry had before them at the latter end of May and beginning of June.

That principles such as the foregoing would be followed in any future Native war appears axiomatic, particularly as Natives know quite well that their tactics in 1906 were, on the whole, successful; Mome, though a catastrophe, was due to accident or carelessness that could easily have been avoided by a competent commander.

That an outbreak should have occurred at Mapumulo subsequent to the *débâcle* in Zululand, is remarkable chiefly as showing lack of territorial organization. Although a certain amount had been introduced at Nkandhla, between the arrival of Bambata and the action at Mome, the army daily becoming more crafty and efficient, it had reference only to such rebels as had actually massed at that place. A supreme organizer was wanting, one who, whilst directing at Nkandhla, could have so far enforced obedience as to control situations such as those at Umsinga, and especially in Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions. That there was this want was undoubtedly felt by every insurgent. They knew too much of Tshaka's successes to do otherwise than realize that they were weak, and see what such weakness was due to. That is why Dinuzulu's personality and presence was so much in demand. That is why, for instance, one heard of such



talk as that they would seize and carry him off to lead them whether he willed it or not. To have a visible leader and to submit to his direction, that was the height of their ambition. Only then did they feel themselves to be a people, possessed to some extent of their former solidarity. To sacrifice their lives for someone is everything, to have to do so for an absent reality, nothing.

Another lesson is the necessity of pursuing the enemy the moment he starts hostilities. Quick pursuit is what every Zulu holds as a primary maxim of warfare. Such action inspires loyalists with confidence, because affording them protection at the time they most require it.

The policy of the rebels having been to avoid conflict whenever the conditions were unfavourable, meant that the campaign resolved itself into one where the troops had *always to assume the offensive*.<sup>1</sup> The enemy deliberately invited being hunted in the forests in which he took refuge. There was no other alternative but to 'hunt' him. His perpetual and masterly evasiveness was resorted to just because felt to be the most telling and safest tactics to adopt. He knew that, man for man, he was infinitely better acquainted with forests, streams, dongas, caves, hills and valleys than the Europeans, most of whom had spent the greater part of their lives in towns at a distance and in sedentary occupations. But, whilst practising these methods, the motive was invariably to draw the troops on after him in the hope of small parties becoming detached when the opportunity was smartly seized, and the severest blow possible struck. This being the game, can it be wondered at that the rebels were severely punished whenever they were come upon? For it must be remembered that, up to the moment of Mome, nothing had been further from their minds than to surrender. Ample opportunities for so doing, notably when the troops first went to Cetshwayo's grave, were afforded, but the negotiations fell through because they felt, and even publicly stated that they had not had enough fighting.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the principal feature of the rebels' tactics was that the troops *should* assume the offensive.

From their point of view, it was in their interest to continue.

This watchful evasiveness, then, was the essence of the situation at Nkandhla. Hence it sometimes happened that the troops drove one or other of the bushes in the belief the enemy was there, whereas, as a matter of fact, he was not there at all, but at Macala ten miles off or elsewhere, having slipped away during the night.

In these circumstances, it was soon realized that, not 2,500, but 10,000 men were required to deal with Nkandhla alone, although the rebels themselves did not exceed 2,000 in number. In no other way was it possible to put a cordon round the forests, and, by confining the enemy, speedily starve him into submission.

Connected with the same tactics was the waylaying of a force when on the march. This generally took place at a carefully-selected position, from which there was an immediate and safe line of retreat. Instances of this occurred at Mpanza, Bobe, Macrae's store, Peyana, Insuze and Ponjwana. At all, except Mpanza and others not here named, the method was to divide the *impi* into two bodies, one to attack the front, and the other the rear, of the advancing column. And the principle was observed, although the ground rendered the application thereof extremely difficult. On no occasion did attack take place in the open, as often happened during the Zulu War.

The only standing camp attacked was that of Leuchars at Mpukunyoni. This took place at dawn, there being no shelter for the troops except their saddles.

At Macrae's store, the attack came just after sunset and later—the only instance of night attack. When the offensive is assumed by Zulus, the proper time to do so is just before dawn, unless the force be a strong one, when battle would be given in broad daylight.

The rebels moved about to get food and seize cattle chiefly at night, sometimes going ten or more miles for the purpose. Those wounded in action, too, were removed after dark.



A close watch was always kept on each column, especially by spies posted on hills, where, if out of rifle range, they did not mind whether they exposed themselves or not.

Occasionally it happened that those who had fought against the troops, but had been obliged to surrender, took up arms against their own people. Several of such men were utilized as spies, and proved invaluable.

*European troops.*—Having regard to the number of troops in the field, the importance of the campaign, and the wide area covered by the operations, it would seem the officer in supreme command should have been given the rank of Brigadier or Major-General. The O.C. Troops was, of course, a full Colonel, but, on being appointed over Natal and Zululand, it would, perhaps, have been more in accord with the general duties he had to perform, to have conferred on him a rank conspicuously higher than that of any one else in his command. The rank, however, seeing the campaign was being conducted by Colonial troops, could have been conferred only by the local authorities.

The want of a trained staff was much felt by each column.

“It is,” says Sir Duncan McKenzie,<sup>1</sup> “of great importance that an intelligence department should be formed on the soundest of bases. . . . It is not sufficient that an intelligence officer should simply be able to speak the language of the country. He should have all the available information at his instant disposal and also be able to guide or conduct his O.C. anywhere. . . . Intelligence officers should not be attached to any regiment in peacetime, but in the event of a force being required in any district, the intelligence officer from that district should be placed at the disposal of the column commander.” All the columns were supplied with excellent intelligence. To the fine work done by Lieut. Hedges and Sergts. Calverley and Titlestad at Nkandhla must be attributed much of the success met with in that district.

The two points on which attention was, perhaps, chiefly

<sup>1</sup>General Report. Sept. 1906 (not published).

concentrated were (a) methods of dealing with the enemy when concealed in forests, and (b) advanced guards. That such matters assumed the importance they did, was due to the enemy habitually leaving the initiative to be taken by the troops. The troops never went out to drive forests, but some catastrophe was possible. The greatest circumspection had invariably to be exercised, not so much because unable to afford the loss of men, as because the loss would have been absurdly magnified by the enemy to obtain further recruits.

The principal authority as to dealing with the enemy in the Nkandhla forests is, of course, Sir Duncan McKenzie. "A General Officer Commanding," he says, "at a place like Nkandhla should have 10,000 men at his disposal. I, however, derived confidence from the fact that not above 2,000 rebels were in the bush, consequently greater risks were taken than would have happened had they been more numerous. The chief aim as to the drives was this: I fitted my force to the bush, not the bush to my force. It was impossible to do the latter, so I did the former. As soon as the intelligence, which was good, showed in what part of the forests the enemy was, it was at once driven.

"The forests could never have been completely driven at one time, *i.e.* in one day. Empandhleni and a number of other places had to be garrisoned, whilst the different camps had to be protected during the actual operations. Such calls naturally greatly reduced the force available for driving.

"I do not see how the driving could have been carried out more effectively than was done with the men at my disposal. My tactics, of course, would have been considerably altered had there been, say, 10,000 troops. I would, in that event, have put the men in a line as skirmishers, with small supports at intervals of every 500 yards, and larger ones at points that appeared more dangerous.

"So long as there was no reverse or tight corner, I felt the levies were all right, hence their being sent in with the troops, as they were to assist in the drive.



“ I always made a point of driving downhill as much as possible, so that when the enemy was come upon, he would be obliged to charge uphill.”

Barker, who was more frequently attacked when actually on the march than any other column commander, says of advanced guards : “ I would never allow the guard to be more than 300 yards from the main body as, if further, I would not have been able to gallop up in time on its being suddenly attacked.

“ I had only one squadron as advanced guard between Noodsberg camp and Dalipa (wattle plantation). It was formed of two troops in front in sections of four (in close touch with each other), with two troops close up on either side in support. The head of the main column was, at the same time, marching in the centre, not more than 200 yards away. This order was adopted as I expected to be attacked. The guard, in this way, were able to at once deliver a counter attack, instead of falling back on the main body. Had they been weaker, they would have been obliged to fall back.

“ It is, moreover, necessary to have the guard so arranged that the main body can be pushed forward to support whichever side the attack comes from. In Native warfare, one can never tell what flank will be threatened.

“ I fully realized that the whole essence of the position lay in the advanced guard. Hence, before the action at Ponjwana, having seen Natives collecting the previous day along the route to be traversed, I warned the officer in command to be on the alert. When the attack came, sudden though it was, his men were ready in a moment to engage the enemy.”

One of the surprises of the campaign, in the opinion of competent judges, was the prominent part played by infantry, *e.g.* D.L.I., N.R.R. and N.R. Because a less showy arm, infantry has been apt to be underrated in connection with Native warfare. It is, however, not too much to say that any such opinions as existed in Natal have had to be considerably modified on account of the consistently fine work that was done at Nkandhla, and in

the actions of Bobe, Mome and Izinsimba. Not only was it found that a well-trained corps could march twenty or even thirty miles a day, but able to take a share in the fighting as effective as that of troops conveyed on horseback to the scene of action. As Native wars of the future will probably be fought on difficult and out-of-the-way ground, similar to that chosen in 1906, it would be well to bear this fact in mind.

In going through thick bush held by the enemy, as the N.P. had to do at Mpanza, it would appear advisable for the advanced guard to dismount and hand horses to Nos. 3, as, in the event of attack, men would then be able to reply at once, as well as stand together to resist the rush. Horses are startled by the shouting inevitable on such occasions, with the result that a man's time is taken up in trying to keep his seat, thereby becoming practically *hors de combat* at a very critical moment.

The following miscellaneous extracts are taken from an unpublished general report by Sir Duncan McKenzie :

*Transport.*—"The majority of the transport was ox-transport; for military operations, mule-transport is absolutely necessary. . . . Expense should not be considered in such an important matter.<sup>1</sup> . . . The necessity of good conductors was apparent." Closer supervision should be exercised by O.C. units than was done to ensure that only the regulation weight per man is put on the waggons. "Pack transport is absolutely necessary in rough country, and the saddles should be carried on the waggons, so that they can be used when the country will not permit of waggons accompanying the troops."

*Remounts.*—"The loss of horses from hard work, exposure and want of suitable food is bound to be heavy. . . . Steps should be taken to enable the remount officer to know exactly where he can put his finger on suitable horses when required. . . . The establishment of a proper remount depôt is strongly recommended."

<sup>1</sup> In his report for 1906, Col. Bru-de-Wold observes: "The recent operations have shown the absolute necessity for mobile transport, as rapidity of movement is the secret of success where Natives are concerned; ox-transport is far too slow to meet the requirements."



*Boots, clothing, etc.*—"These should be issued on repayment at cost price and the articles should be of really good quality. The wear and tear on clothing, and more especially on boots, was very heavy. . . . A man without boots is useless."

*Searchlights.*—"Their usefulness for defensive purposes is of the greatest value. . . . They should be so arranged that with one engine and dynamo, two or more lights could be placed at different positions in the defences."

*Maxim Transport.*—"Having seen practical results with the C.M.R., who carried their Maxims on pack mules led by Cape boys, and the Natal Militia regiment, who carried theirs on pack horses led by a mounted man, I certainly recommend that we should follow the C.M.R. in this respect."

*Stretcher-bearers.*—"These are indispensable when fighting takes place in the bush or rough country. There was no organized supply until too late." Natives had to be employed at exorbitant rates.

*Native levies.*—Their value was largely discounted by the fact that parts of many tribes had joined the rebels. "Their services came in useful in clearing up after an engagement, collecting and driving cattle, etc., and also using up the enemy's supplies. They require to be led by experienced officers who are known to them and who are also well acquainted with Native habits and customs. For operations, they need to be stiffened with a good proportion of European troops."

Colonel Leuchars, who had exceptional opportunities of observing them, is of opinion that "as a fighting force, they were useless, though those under Sibindi (a Chief quite above the average) were, as far as I know, keen to help the Government. The use I expected to make of them was in skirmishing down broken, bushy valleys, but my experience goes to show that for this work they were useless as, although I succeeded, after some trouble, in extending them, they would always, a little further down the valley, collect and march along in groups. As scouts and camp followers, they were useful. In a lager, through

not being armed with rifles, they are only an encumbrance. Their only use would be to skirmish through rough country known to be occupied by the enemy, and this, as pointed out above, they failed to do."

*The Rexer guns.*—"This arm," says McKenzie, "gave most satisfactory results. Handiness and portability in rough country are its chief advantages. It does not afford a large target for the enemy, as is the case with the Maxim. No cases of jamming occurred. The number of spare parts to be carried is few. On more than one occasion, the gun was caught up by the gunner and used from the shoulder when, owing to scrub and long grass, the tripod could not be used. The present equipment for carrying the gun is not satisfactory. . . . Every squadron of mounted men and company of infantry should have three of these guns."

*Branding of loot stock.*—"It is imperative that all captured stock should be at once branded with a distinctive mark. A responsible officer with each column should be detailed for this purpose."

*Miscellaneous.*—No epidemic or cases of serious illness occurred. The organization of the medical department was so carefully planned and carried out that only four died from disease out of over 9,000 men in the field.

"Generally speaking, veterinary surgeons had more animals to look after per man than it was possible to deal with."

"The establishment of a field bakery and consequent supply of fresh bread was an excellent innovation."

Sufficient transport was always available, although at times the demands were very heavy.

The making of roads through all inaccessible parts of the Colony would appear to be necessary. The want of these was felt along both sides of the Tugela. A belt of country, some five miles wide on either side, needs attention, though that is by no means the only region in Natal that is difficult of access. Only narrow and inexpensive roads are required. These, in time of peace, would be of assistance to the inhabitants in facilitating conveyance of



produce to available markets, and generally developing the locations.

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

The lesson to be learned from the poll tax is, of course, that no taxation should be imposed on Natives without previously consulting them in some way or another. It is, however, unnecessary to obtain the views of more than a few of the leading and most influential advisers. These would speedily reveal the attitude likely to be taken up by the majority towards any such proposal.

The advisability of securing uniformity when promulgating measures closely affecting the Natives is so obvious as to call for no special comment.

The likelihood of some of the Native police (Government) taking part in the Rebellion was realized at the outset, consequently, at such places as Krantzkop and Mapumulo, men connected with the divisions were removed to another part of the Colony, their places being taken by others. Native police from such stations as Insuze, Kearsney, Glendale, Umhlali and Stanger rebelled. Sixteen were recognized, by their finger-prints, among the rebel prisoners, whilst at least four were killed. About eighty Durban Borough police are said to have taken up arms.

On the other hand, out of the whole of the Nongqai, whose members and ex-members numbered some thousands, only one man, who left the force some twenty years previously, is known to have joined the enemy. Full and careful inquiry was made in the matter by Chief Commissioner Mansel. This highly creditable state of affairs may be accounted for by the fact that, during the many years Mansel had control of the force, he never allowed any one to serve as 'substitute' for a regular member. An account of the Nongqai will be found in Appendix XI.

The part taken by Christian Natives in the Insurrection was a large and prominent one. The teaching of many Native preachers, generally belonging to Ethiopian de-

nominations, was of a distinctly seditious character. Here, for instance, is a type of an address frequently repeated in 1906 in a location within the vicinity of Greytown: "The end of the age is at hand! On the black race did God originally bestow the right of governing. The race, however, failed to acquire the art. Now is the time drawing to a close. The right to govern is reverting to its original possessors. Authority will be conferred on the black race, and they will now be exalted to a position above the whites. You shall enjoy complete ascendancy over Europeans, for the power has at length been restored to you by the Almighty. Even were actual conflicts to occur between you and the whites, you will surely put them to flight, for God is standing by you." The services were usually held in out-of-the-way places, and always out of hearing of Europeans or their Native agents. It was found exceedingly difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute, even though sedition was known to be constantly preached. When hostilities actually broke out, many of these men determined to practise what they had preached; they accordingly broke away from mission stations, notably in Mapumulo, Ndwedwe and Umsinga divisions, and joined the rebels.

In July, 1907, it was found that of the Native prisoners then in Natal gaols, 418 were Christians. Of this number, 204 were ordinary criminals, whilst 214 had been convicted of rebellion.<sup>1</sup> Of the latter figure, seven were preachers. The foregoing totals, which are below the actual numbers, owing to the difficulty of ascertaining who were converts, were obtained subsequent to the release of about 500 rebels, among whom other so-called Christians would probably have been found.

In addition to the above, several preachers and many members of different denominations were shot during the operations. Hunt and Armstrong, it will be remembered, were murdered by a band of mission Natives.

It is but fair to add that many of the Christian

<sup>1</sup> Those convicted of rebellion were about 5·3 per cent. of the total number of rebel prisoners, less the 500 referred to in the text.



Natives who rebelled were not attached to any recognized missionary body at the time they did so.

A number of other matters, which might have been noticed here, have already been sufficiently dealt with in preceding chapters. The Native Affairs Commission drew attention to various reforms in administration, many of which have already been introduced, such as the appointment of a Council for Native Affairs and Commissioners,<sup>1</sup> limitation of interest on loans, various problems connected with labour, and compulsory service on public works.

The fact that none of the Magistrates of such districts as Mahlabatini (H. M. Stainbank, later J. Y. Gibson), Nongoma (G. W. Armstrong), and Nkandhla (B. Colenbrander), in Zululand, and Umsinga (A. E. Harrington) and Mapumulo (T. Maxwell), in Natal, were withdrawn, but continued to discharge the duties of their office throughout the Rebellion, tended to influence and reassure many European farmers, storekeepers and others, preventing them from getting into a panic, and, by flying off to other parts for protection, making matters considerably worse than they were. With the troops often operating at a distance, there is no doubt considerable danger was run of any of these magistracies being attacked and the officials murdered. As very little protection was immediately available, sometimes even with the Native police disaffected, it would have been comparatively easy for any band of determined rebels to have brought about one or more of such results before assistance could have been rendered.

Much credit is due to Magistrates generally for the admirable manner in which they retained a hold on the Natives of their districts throughout the period of unrest. Occasionally, however, scares among Europeans could not be prevented. Those at Greytown and Nqutu have already been noticed; another occurred at Pietermaritzburg.

<sup>1</sup>The Union Government has abolished both the Council and the Commissioners, so that Natal is now practically in the same position in which she was before the Rebellion.

It will already have been gathered that many loyalists, especially those of tribes within the area of disturbance, stood in an extremely invidious and dangerous position. Too little consideration is given to the fact that, unless promptly supported by Government forces, loyalists are liable to be murdered or their property looted. When an outbreak occurs, it is almost as important to support the well-affected as it is to operate against the insurgents themselves. The reason is clear. If you do not back up those on your side when in danger, do not be surprised if, in your absence, they are coerced into taking up arms against you, and so add greatly to your difficulties.



## XX.

### NATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION.—VISIT OF DINUZULU TO PIETERMARITZBURG.—MURDERS OF LOYALISTS.—ESCAPE OF BAMBATA'S WIFE AND CHILDREN FROM USUTU.—REMOBILIZATION OF MILITIA TO ARREST DINUZULU.

As far back as June, 1906, the Prime Minister had informed the Legislative Assembly that certain bills, prepared by the Native Affairs Department, and of the greatest importance in connection with Native administration, would be laid on the table of the House. At the same time, the Government was of opinion that the scope of these should be extended. It had, accordingly, been deemed advisable to appoint a Commission to inquire into the whole subject of Native administration and legislation. In this proposal the Governor concurred; indeed, in his capacity as Supreme Chief, he had already urged the taking of some such step.

The appointment of the Commission, however, could not take effect until September, primarily on account of hostilities in the eastern districts of Natal, as well as of the dissolution of Parliament and following general election.

The terms of reference were of the widest range, practically every aspect of Native legislation and administration being set down for inquiry. There was, however, one matter which did not fall within the scope of the inquiry, viz. the actual causes of the Rebellion.

The seven Commissioners appointed included a repre-

sentative of the Imperial Government. No time was lost in getting to work.

The labours and area covered by this important body are succinctly set forth in the following extracts from its own report :

“The design of the inquiry being both general and particular, the powers conferred have been used in the manner intended and to the fullest extent by collecting information from all sources, European, official and unofficial—Native and others ; all being invited who could further the investigation, by advice or suggestion, or the results of their observation or experience. . . . The Commission held its first meeting on the 16th October, 1906, . . . evidence was received from time to time up to the 18th June, 1907. To facilitate this object, thirty-four places were visited, at which statements by 301 Europeans were received, together with those of 906 Natives and others, who addressed the Commission personally or by delegation. So highly did the Natives appreciate the opportunities afforded them of expressing their views that at least 5,500, including Chiefs and headmen, exempted and Christian Natives, attended, and, on the whole, spoke, as they were invited to do, with remarkable freedom.”<sup>1</sup>

The recommendations of the Commission will be referred to later.

Colonel Bru-de-Wold was unfortunately obliged to retire from the position of Commandant of Militia, as well as from the public service, at the beginning of 1907. He had served in several capacities, chiefly as a soldier—always with benefit to the Colony and credit to himself—for upwards of thirty years. In recognition of the splendid work done by him before and during the Rebellion, the honour of D.S.O. was conferred on him by the King. The Natal Militia, moreover, presented him with a sword of honour, formally handed to him by the Governor. Colonel Sir Duncan McKenzie, K.C.M.G., succeeded as Commandant.

<sup>1</sup> Report. Native Affairs Commission, 25th July, 1907.



A general election took place towards the end of 1906, when Mr. Smythe's Ministry, finding itself without a sufficient working majority, resigned in November. The Right Hon. Sir Frederick R. Moor, P.C., K.C.M.G., was then called on to form a ministry. This he did, the portfolio of Premier and Minister for Native Affairs being taken by himself.

In connection with many of the courts-martial referred to in the preceding chapter, a considerable amount of evidence was led more or less implicating Dinuzulu in the Rebellion. Moreover, a Native who had visited Usutu kraal on private business in January, 1907, reported having seen being harboured there twenty-eight rebels he knew by name and some hundred or more others. The men, it was averred, had been formed into three companies and called the Mbambangwe (leopard-catcher) regiment, because, for the most part, they consisted of those who had almost annihilated a small portion of Royston's Horse at Manzipambana.<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances, the Government arrived at a decision in August to hold an inquiry into Dinuzulu's conduct. Although action followed, it was soon suspended in favour of the Chief himself paying the Governor a visit. The making of such visit arose out of a conversation Sir Charles Saunders had with Dinuzulu (then at Nongoma) over the telephone. The latter had wished to 'unburden his heart.' After doing this as well as he could through the telephone, he asked that what he had said might be transmitted to the Government. This, the Commissioner replied, it was obviously impossible to do, although he promised to forward a summary, and suggested Dinuzulu's paying the Governor a visit and setting forth at a tête-a-tête all he wished to say. As, by this time, the Imperial Government wanted Sir Henry McCallum to assume the Governorship of Ceylon at an early date, suggestions were made to Dinuzulu that he should proceed to Pietermaritzburg for the purpose of unburdening himself, and, at the same time, bidding His Excellency good-bye. After some delay in arranging

<sup>1</sup> Deposition by Mgunguluzo, 1st Feb. 1907.

preliminaries, he proceeded to the railhead at Somkele. At various stopping-places on the way to Pietermaritzburg, he was visited by Natives, who not only accorded him the highest royal salutes, but laid at his feet other tokens of devotion and humble allegiance. This triumphal progress continued until he had reached Pietermaritzburg. At this place, too, the Natives treated him in a manner that could not have been outdone by the most servile subjects of an eastern potentate.

On the 20th and 21st May, he was summoned to Government House, where he, with his indunas, Mankulumana and Mgwaqo, and others, had lengthy interviews with Sir Henry McCallum in the presence of the Minister for Native Affairs and other officials. After saying all that was on his mind, Dinuzulu was spoken to straightly in respect of his misbehaviour and offences, real and imaginary, so far as these were then known. He parried too searching inquiries with his usual dexterity, not unmingled with *suppressio veri*, but there were certain accusations which he was unable, even with the assistance of his counsellors, Mankulumana and Mgwaqo, to quite brush aside. For instance, his having received messengers from Chiefs in all parts of the country in connection with the poll tax and not reporting them to the local Magistrate, as required to do by standing instructions.

The Governor's object, however, was not to punish him for such misdeeds as had come to light, or to probe too deeply into others that rested merely on suspicion, but to show him that the Government was in possession of information which clearly proved misbehaviour on his part, and to afford friendly counsel as to his conduct in the future. Little did the Governor or the Government know that the man then being addressed and urged to make a clean breast of his grievances, as he had himself requested to do, had already committed several serious and unpardonable acts of high treason.

After another interview, this time with the Acting Prime Minister and other Ministers, the Chief returned to his kraal.



By this time, the Native Affairs Commission was touring in Zululand, holding meetings at most of the magistracies with Chiefs and followers, under conditions the most pleasing to the Natives. Zulus rejoiced at having that opportunity of laying their grievances before the official delegates. Not so Dinuzulu. And yet the Governor's words to him, through the interpreter, were that he would "have an opportunity of laying his views before the Commission. I ask him to do so, because I can assure him that any recommendations which that Commission may send in will receive the earnest consideration of the Government."<sup>1</sup>

When Dinuzulu got to Somkele by rail, the Commission happened to be there too. This Dinuzulu knew, and yet although compelled for some hours to be at the station, he was unable to leave his railway carriage and walk a hundred yards to tender evidence, general in character, which it was well within his power to give, and which, in the interests of the people one would think he would rejoice to have tendered.

By reason of the fact that interviews had taken place with Dinuzulu, the Governor decided to arrange others with the most influential of those Natal and Zululand Chiefs who had behaved loyally during the Insurrection. Some of these men controlled tribes as large or larger than that of Dinuzulu. It was, indeed, for that particular reason that no differentiation was shewn between him and them. The interviews, held on the 3rd and 4th June, helped materially to allay much of the nervousness then still prevalent among the people at large, and to restore the former amicable relations between them and the authorities.

This proved to be the last of many useful services Sir Henry McCallum was called on to perform as Governor of Natal. With the greatest regret did Natalians of every class take leave of this public officer, for he was one who had very closely identified himself with their interests, in times of peace and of war. The energy and ability with

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3,888, p. 83.

which he had grappled with the numerous issues of the Rebellion were at all times conspicuous and conspicuously successful. Difficulties of the most serious nature arose, sometimes with surprising force and suddenness, only to be met with coolness and courage, and invariably surmounted. The Colony prided herself in having him as her Governor. In his hands she felt safe. So satisfied was she with him in command, as to accord him every privilege in connection with internal affairs as it was possible to do. In parting with him, after more than the normal term of years, she rejoiced to know that his services and experience, which had been of such intrinsic value to her in times of stress and of peril, would not be lost to the great Empire of which she formed a part.

Until the new Governor's arrival at the beginning of September, Mr. (now Sir William H.) Beaumont, one of the judges of the Supreme Court, acted as Administrator.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Matthew Nathan, K.C.M.G., who had served with distinction as Governor on the Gold Coast and Hong Kong, arrived at a critical time to preside over the affairs of the Colony. He at once addressed himself to the situation which, as will be seen, had been rapidly developing during Mr. Beaumont's tenure of office.

During Dinuzulu's visit to Pietermaritzburg to see Sir Henry McCallum, reference had been made to certain two murders in regard to which the Chief was said to have rendered no assistance to the Government. He explained, though not at that moment, that one of the men had 'died' in his ward and the other (Mnqandi) outside it. The latter who, up to the time of his death, had been living at Usutu kraal, had had his throat cut, but after walking a long way, died some eight miles from the kraal. This incident occurred about the same time that Stainbank was murdered. Dinuzulu declared he was unable to offer any explanation as to how the crimes had come to be committed.

These murders, both of which took place during the first half of 1906, are mentioned because it was owing to



them and similar mysterious occurrences in 1907, again associated with Dinuzulu, that the Colony came once more to be placed under martial law, and a large portion of the Militia mobilized for the purpose of restoring order.

Following on a charge of having committed adultery with one of Dinuzulu's wives (a charge which was not substantiated), and on that account, believed to have caused Dinuzulu to become ill, another man, Gence *alias* Nsasa, formerly employed by the Chief as a doctor, was murdered in Nkandhla district in April, 1907.

The latter incident, however, because of deceased's low rank, did not excite nearly as much attention as the murder of a prominent and conspicuously loyal Chief, also of Nkandhla, named Sitshitshili. This man had materially assisted the Government to the utmost of his ability during the Rebellion. Many years before he had saved Dinuzulu's life, when the kraal at which the latter was staying was suddenly attacked by Zibebu's *impi*. Sitshitshili's murderer, who professed to be a messenger, was a stranger to deceased. He was allowed to spend a couple of days at the kraal. Seizing his opportunity when his host was alone at night, and after drinking a cup of coffee with him a few minutes before, he shot him in the chest and stomach with a revolver and, though pursued, escaped in the dark. The effect instantly created on the Native mind by this revolting and brutal murder is best stated in the words of Sir Charles Saunders, written but two weeks after the occurrence :

“Several of the loyal Chiefs from different parts have either visited or sent representatives to me to express their regret and horror at what has happened, and emphatically assert that the life of no loyal person is now safe. . . . There appears to be no doubt in their minds that this murder, as well as others, was inspired at the Usutu kraal. Some say so openly, whilst others, who are not so frank, insinuate in unmistakable terms that they share the same view, and it is not difficult to perceive that they hold Dinuzulu, either directly or indirectly, responsible for the whole.”



MVELI,  
Chief.



SITSHITSHILI,  
Chief.



SIBINDI,  
Chief.



MANKULUMANA,  
Dinuzulu's principal induna.



SIYEKIWE,  
Bambata's chief wife.

*Mr. Bertram  
Mitford.*





To show the people that the Government was alive to the necessity of preventing such crimes, the Police at Nkandhla magistracy immediately set to work to try and discover the murderer. Everything that skill or perseverance could accomplish was attempted. But these exertions did not escape the attention of specially interested parties. Sergeant Wilkinson, the officer who was in charge of the investigations, retired to his room about midnight on the 8th of September. Barely a minute after blowing out his light, two shots were fired at him through a hole in a window-pane with a revolver. One struck about eight inches above, and the other under, the bed. Being very dark, no clue could be got of the would-be murderer, except that the bullets closely resembled those fired at Sitshitshili. As, except in a very limited degree, Natives are not allowed to possess firearms, and, when permitted, almost invariably procure guns, the fact that a revolver was used on Sitshitshili and Wilkinson at once attracted general attention.

Orders were now issued by the Government for the country to be thoroughly patrolled by a strong Natal Police Force, with the object of restoring public confidence. Some such action was sadly needed, but, in the opinion of Native loyalists, far wide of the mark. These and many other people held but one opinion, namely, that Dinuzulu himself was the *fons et origo* of all the mischief. If not he, then puppets directly or indirectly instigated by him or his indunas.

The long dispensation or lease of immunity Dinuzulu had enjoyed was, however, fast coming to a close. Oppressed with the feeling that his misdeeds were gradually coming to light, in spite of all his profound and subtle influence on Zulus in general, in spite, too, of the terrorizing tactics above referred to or still to be described being traceable to his kraal, if not to his personal attendants and himself, he had done his best to enlist the Governor's sympathies on his own behalf. Those of Sir Charles Saunders he felt he could still count on, though he failed to give that officer credit for being



able to see through his prevarication, and affectedly innocent pose.

For some months past, rumours to the effect that Bambata's wife and children were being deliberately harboured by him at his kraal had come to the notice of the Government. As, however, it was extremely difficult for any official Native messenger—a European one would have been hopeless—to obtain information on such point by visiting Usutu, all that could be done was to mark time and watch developments.

The opportunity came shortly after the return from his visit to Pietermaritzburg. He had been asked by Sir Henry McCallum to give orders for the arrest of any rebels who might find their way to Usutu and have them conveyed to the local Magistrate. On this Magistrate subsequently sending a list of eight rebels who had been recently seen in his ward, Dinuzulu caused five, and another not specially asked for, to be delivered two weeks later—3rd July.

On the morning of the same day, however, Siyekiwe, the wife of the notorious rebel Bambata, and two of his children, a girl (about 16) and a boy (about 14), turned up suddenly at Mahlabatini magistracy, having, as they declared, left Dinuzulu's kraal the evening before and travelled through the night. They had deserted, owing to a threat by Dinuzulu to remove them to a remote region in the north. As the Chief had led the Government to believe there were no rebels at his kraal, he determined to rid himself once for all of the woman and children. They had at length become a nuisance, although he believed, or professed to believe, his friend Bambata to be still alive. It was owing to Dinuzulu's not informing Siyekiwe of Bambata's death that she did not shave her head, as is universally customary among Zulus and other Natal tribes. The failure to do this was of the greatest importance in keeping alive the impression among Natives in general that Bambata was not dead, but roaming about somewhere. If his favourite wife, the one who had accompanied him in his flight to Usutu, did not believe in his

being dead, no one else would, as she was not unnaturally looked on as the principal authority in such matter. Who, they argued, can know better than a woman if her husband be dead or not? Not the woman, but Dinuzulu appears to be responsible for the false impression that was circulated far and wide.

When Dinuzulu went to Pietermaritzburg, he had temporarily secreted the woman and children at a kraal a few miles off. That of a thoroughly reliable adherent was selected. But as the woman, quite young and rather good-looking, was not without male friends, she, on being recalled to Usutu, heard of the scheme, whereupon she made a plan and speedily got completely beyond Dinuzulu's reach. Then was the fat in the fire!

The fugitives were passed by the Magistrate to Sir Charles Saunders who, amazed to hear their numerous revelations, had them conveyed to Pietermaritzburg, where the whole story was carefully reduced to writing.

And what was the story? Briefly this. About a month before the attack on the Police in Mpanza valley (4th April, 1906), and when the Police were attempting to arrest Bambata for refusing to obey a summons from the Government, a Native messenger arrived to say Dinuzulu wished Bambata to come to him, the former having heard he was unhappy through being harassed by the Government and Europeans generally. After conferring with members of the tribe until lately presided over by himself, he left for Usutu, taking with him the woman and three children (by two other wives). Travelling on foot, the party reached Usutu in a few days. Here Bambata had several interviews with Dinuzulu and his indunas, Mankulumana and Mgwaqo. He was treated with every consideration. Suitable accommodation and food were found for him, his wife and children. Bambata informed his wife that, at the interviews he had had with Mankulumana and others, he had been reproved for showing cowardice on the occasion of the Police entering his ward to arrest him. It was considered he should have shown fight. Bambata queried how it was possible for him to go to war



with Europeans. "Have you no people?" they asked. "A few," he replied. "Few though they be, you ought to have come into conflict. What do you suppose caused us to fight in 1879? Do you think we did so by the aid of drugs?"

The day before Bambata's departure for Natal, he was summoned to where Dinuzulu, Mankulumana and others were. "The room I was seated in," says Siyekiwe, "was close by where Dinuzulu was with the men referred to, and I could hear distinctly what was said. I heard Mankulumana say to Bambata 'There is nothing more that we have to say to you to-day. To-day we give you this weapon, a Mauser rifle, and we say: Go across into Natal and commence hostilities. We give you Ngqengqengqe, whom we direct to go back with you, also Cakijana. . . . After causing an outbreak of hostilities, you will remove into the Nkandhla district. Do not be afraid through thinking that the fighting is brought about by you. We, not you, are responsible for it. . . .' The words I have given were spoken by Makulumana in the presence of Dinuzulu in an audible voice. . . . My husband said he hoped that they would not deceive him, make a fool of him, and deny the fact that they were the originators of what they wanted him to do. My husband was also instructed thus: 'After you have started the fighting and fled for refuge to the Nkandhla forest, we will meet you there.'"

The rifle, said to have been handed to Bambata by Mankulumana in Dinuzulu's presence, with cartridges done up in a piece of white cloth, were seen by the three. Bambata then left. Some time afterwards, Dinuzulu informed the woman that a rebellion had broken out in Mpanza valley, and that her husband had fled to Nkandhla forest.

When the Commissioner for Native Affairs made his visit to Usutu early in April, 1906, the woman was there the whole time, carefully concealed in the harem.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It will be remembered that Mr. Saunders, while at Usutu, got a telegram saying Bambata had broken into rebellion, and that he told

There is no necessity to refer to other items in the story, such as the visits and harbouring of various rebels, seeing they belong rather to criminal proceedings than to a history. These proceedings, as well as the foregoing crucial fact, will be briefly dealt with later. Suffice it to say, the woman and children had been actually harboured by Dinuzulu, fed, accommodated and medically treated at his own expense for a period of over fifteen months. During that period, the boy was appointed cleaner of the large number of guns possessed by Dinuzulu, many of them illegally held. And yet the Chief had been called on officially from time to time to produce all guns in his possession for registration.

Not long after the woman and children had given their sensational evidence, the one corroborating the other, they were permitted to return to their relations at Mpanza.

The position now became clearer, though still complicated.

Sir Henry McCallum's object, when he had his interviews with Dinuzulu, was so to rouse the Chief to a sense of his duty as to cause him, on getting back to Usutu, forthwith to put his house in order and discontinue his unsatisfactory behaviour. We have seen the way in which he treated the Governor's suggestion about appearing before the Commission, and what he did about handing over the rebels who had taken refuge in his ward. Although called on later to deliver up other rebels, declared by reliable informants to have been recently at Usutu, he neglected to do so, on the plea that the men had not been there. The Governor also advised that all firearms in his possession should be given up. According to the evidence of Bambata's wife and children, especially the boy, and to other testimony, Dinuzulu possessed many more guns

Dinuzulu this, whereupon the latter and his indunas were, says the Commissioner, "unanimous in their expressions of indignation; their frank demeanour left no doubt in my mind that these expressions were perfectly genuine and that Dinuzulu and his people were not in any way associated with Bambata and his doings."—Cd. 3,207, p. 31. And yet the wife and children of the very man whose acts they had unanimously condemned to the principal executive officer of the Government were not 100 yards away as they were speaking!



than had been registered, consequently he had failed between the time of getting home and when the woman and children deserted—a period of at least three weeks—to act on the Governor's advice.<sup>1</sup> What was his object in not wishing to disclose that he had these unregistered guns? He, moreover, had held a hunt in August, extending over a fortnight, in the Black Umfolozi valley, at which, as reliable information went to show, he secretly inspected about 150 breech-loading rifles in possession of his people, including his bodyguard, 'Nkomondala.' On the same occasion, he is said to have told his most confidential advisers "that he had experienced great difficulty in getting Mauser ammunition, but that there was not the same difficulty with regard to the ordinary .303 ammunition, as he could get this from agents at Delagoa Bay . . . and was expecting 2,000 rounds from that source, which would be conveyed to him in bundles of cat-skins, ostensibly brought up from there by Portuguese Natives for sale amongst the Zulus."<sup>2</sup>

In reply to Dinuzulu's remark that he had not assumed the position of Government Induna, that being one of the conditions under which he was repatriated from St. Helena in 1898, the Governor had told him he would at once be given that position, but such appointment would necessitate his coming into closer touch with the Magistrate, Nongoma, than was possible at Usutu. The suggestion that, in assuming the position, he should move closer to the magistracy was, however, apparently ignored.

In addition to these unsatisfactory features, was the far graver one of the murders that had been and were still being committed. Apart from those of the Magistrate of Mahlabatini, Tshikana, Mnqandi and Gence, that of Sitshitshili had occurred in August, and the attempted one of Sergt. Wilkinson early in September. The strongest representations were made to the Commissioner by many

<sup>1</sup> It was definitely proved later that Dinuzulu was in possession of unregistered guns at the time of his arrest (December, 1907). Hence his opportunity of conforming to the Governor's advice extended over six months.

<sup>2</sup> Minute, C.N.A. to Prime Minister, 23rd Aug. 1907.

loyal Natives that "the failure to obtain a conviction against the murderers of the Magistrate (Mr. Stainbank), or to bring to justice the murderers of certain Natives, and the belief that these murders had been instigated by Dinuzulu, were creating a doubt in the minds of loyal Natives as to the power of the Government to redress such wrongs, the fear that further murders would be perpetrated with impunity, and that Dinuzulu, by a course of terrorism, would win over the allegiance of heretofore loyal Natives, increase his power and independence, and so bring on another rebellion."<sup>1</sup>

The Police sent to patrol Zululand after Sitshitshili's murder, visited north-eastern and northern Zululand, and ended by passing by Usutu on the 30th September. Everywhere the people were quiet and orderly. The only uneasiness exhibited was when the force, under Inspector O. Dimmick, got near Usutu. As it approached, many Natives proceeded to the kraal. Halting some distance off, Dimmick sent Inspector C. E. Fairlie and two troopers to see Dinuzulu. The Natives, of whom less than 100 were then seen at the kraal (though reliable evidence received later showed that many others were concealed in a *donga* near by) became disturbed, wondering why an armed force had come that way. After speaking to Dinuzulu, Fairlie inspected the kraal. The Police then moved towards Nongoma.

Intelligence was, at the same time, received that Dinuzulu had, two or three weeks previously, been "doctored for war by a Native doctor, either from Pondoland or Basutoland," and that certain ceremonies had been carried out similar to those in vogue in the days of Tshaka.<sup>2</sup>

An old Boer farmer of Vryheid district, Mr. Conrad Meyer, long a friend of Dinuzulu, paid the latter a visit in October, when, after several interviews, he came to much the same opinion as to the Chief's loyalty as Sir Charles Saunders had so consistently held during 1906.

<sup>1</sup> Administrator (Mr. W. H. Beaumont) to Secretary of State, 29th Aug. 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Minute by Magistrate, Ndwandwe district, 29th Sept. 1907.



Whilst the Government, with the foregoing and other facts before it, was seriously considering what action should be taken, an attempt was made (7th October) to murder Mapoyisa, principal son and heir of the Chief Mbuzo, as well as another Native of the same tribe. The evidence went to show that the two would-be murderers had come from Usutu kraal. But people had hardly grasped the facts connected with this attempt when another cold-blooded murder was committed, this time on an elderly and respected Chief, Mpumela. The lives of two other loyalists were attempted about the same time (November). An attempt is also said to have been made on a storekeeper, George, formerly in the Police. His store, about six miles from Usutu, was destroyed by fire. It is, however, possible the latter occurrence was due to lightning.

Information also came in that the ringleaders of the previous year's rebellion, Mangati and Cakijana, had for long been harboured by Dinuzulu, although well knowing that warrants were out for their arrest. The former, captured in November in Vryheid district, stated on oath that Dinuzulu had been and was still instigating the murders. He (Dinuzulu), in short, seemed "determined," as the Administrator pointed out to the Secretary of State in August, "on a course of self-aggrandizement, of cool defiance or indifference to the wishes of the Government, and of open hostility to those Natives who had been loyal ; and it was clear that his attitude and actions were becoming a serious cause of unrest and apprehension amongst the loyal Natives, and a menace to the peace of the country."

It was in view of all these and other circumstances, too numerous to refer to, that the Government, supported by the Attorney-General, ultimately decided to issue a warrant for Dinuzulu's arrest on a charge of high treason,<sup>1</sup> and to mobilize a large portion of the Militia to reinforce the Police when proceeding to execute the warrants.

<sup>1</sup> There was also another warrant, charging him with being in possession of unregistered firearms.

For other reasons, Dinuzulu became very agitated about this time. The arrival of the Police on the 30th September, and especially their being stationed at Nongoma, twelve miles from his kraal, greatly upset him. He contemplated leaving Usutu and establishing himself on the Black Umfolozi, where the hunt had recently been held. He dispatched earnest letters to the Governor, Prime Minister, and Under Secretary for Native Affairs, asking for fair play, expressing confidence in his rulers, etc.; he followed these up, on the day that the troops reached Zululand (3rd December), with an urgent message through the Magistrate, Nongoma, portions of which ran as follows :

“ I have heard that it is the intention of Government to send and take me by surprise shortly after Christmas. . . . I do not understand this, and want to know if there is any truth in it, as I know of no wrong that I have done. If Government think I am in the wrong over anything, why does it not place me on trial and punish me if found guilty ? I am also surprised to hear that the court-house at Nongoma has been placed in a state of defence. Police are camped all round it. . . . Nothing is wrong in this division, as far as I know. The only place where things are wrong is Nkandhla division, and I am not responsible for what happens there ; and in my opinion, . . . these murders are being committed there on account of Government having given cattle which belonged to rebels to different people in that division, and the original owners of these cattle resent seeing their cattle in other people's possession.”

In the meantime, however, seeing that the several murders and other crimes against public order recently committed in Zululand had caused widespread unrest and fear of violence to law-abiding people, and as, in order to restore order and confidence, it was imperative to arrest all persons concerned in the crimes, a proclamation was issued on the 30th November directing the strengthening of the forces in Zululand to enable the arrests to be effected. Orders were, at the same time, issued for the



mobilization already referred to of the greater portion of the Active Militia. The troops actually called out were 188 officers and 1,928 of other ranks.

There was good reason to suppose that Dinuzulu's immediately available *impi* was comparatively insignificant, notwithstanding his hasty endeavours to augment it under the shallow pretext of the young men being required to 'weed his gardens.' Such appeals had been made to Chiefs living outside Zululand, viz. in Vryheid and Ngotshe districts. Mr. Meyer had reported "one sees at a glance that he (Dinuzulu) is a man of rank without followers." That the force dispatched to deal with him was so overwhelmingly strong, was due solely to the Government's wish to overawe armed rebels or others at Usutu against all forms of resistance. It was recognized that an outbreak at Usutu might be taken by the Zulus as the signal for a general rising. Another reason was that Silwana, a powerful Chief of Weenen, whose levy, it will be remembered, behaved unsatisfactorily during the Rebellion, was said to be calling on his people to rebel.

Units mobilized with the same remarkable rapidity that had characterized their movements in the preceding year, and were ordered to proceed by rail direct to Gingindhlovu. This station, on the Zululand coast and nearly twenty miles from Eshowe, was reached on the evening of the 3rd December.<sup>1</sup> On the same day, martial law was proclaimed, to operate, however, in Zululand only. Owing to the sudden, and necessarily sudden, mobilization, no preparation was made to fill up the places of those who had been called away. The ex-Commandant (Colonel Bru-de-Wold) was hastily summoned from Port Shepstone and asked to arrange for the defence of Natal in the event of hostilities

<sup>1</sup> Of the Carbineers, one of the newspapers reported: "They were the first to get orders . . . and in an incredibly short time were on their way to Zululand. The regiment is to be congratulated on being referred to in a despatch by the Prime Minister to the Governor as having performed 'one of, if not the quickest mobilizations on record.'" Receiving orders to mobilize on the 30th November, the Headquarters squadrons entrained at 5.15 p.m. on the 2nd, and reached Gingindhlovu at 5.35 a.m. on the 3rd December.

breaking out in Zululand. The necessary organization was carried out in a thorough-going manner. The Reserves in sixteen districts (*vide* Appendix VII.) were called out and ordered to patrol their respective districts.

As soon as Dinuzulu's message was received, the Government, although the troops were by then well on their way to Gingindhlovu, thought it necessary to advise the Chief that there was no intention to take him by surprise, and that the Chief Commissioner of Police was being sent "to require him to surrender himself in order that charges against him might be tried." He was, at the same time, directed to proceed to Nongoma and there await the police officer.

A communication such as this could not, of course, do otherwise than bring about confusion among the troops that were concentrating at Gingindhlovu, through altering elaborate arrangements which had already been made for their subsequent advance.

The position, from the Government's point of view, was a difficult one, but with martial law proclaimed, and the troops actually in the field, the stronger and better course, perhaps, would have been to have referred Dinuzulu's communication to the O.C. Troops to deal with as he might have considered necessary under the circumstances. As it was, his hands were tied, and his plans considerably upset.

That the Ministry were not alone in their desire for settlement of a trouble inherited to some extent from their predecessors, can be seen from the following remarks by the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, to the Secretary of State: "Though I am doubtful whether this situation would have arisen if Ministers had at once, after the suppression of last year's Rebellion, or even at a later date, adopted the policy of amnesty and conciliation, and had thereby prevented Dinuzulu from acquiring the power he has done by protecting outlaws and by reason of the country remaining unsettled, yet I recognize that, under existing conditions, with a growing tale of unpunished murders attributed throughout the country to that Chief,



it was not possible for the Government to remain inactive." <sup>1</sup>

The previous Government had, however, been out of office for over a year. During such time, the new Government had had, and had taken advantage of, opportunities of ameliorating the conditions as far as was possible. More was to follow as soon as time had been given to introduce some of the legislation recommended by the Native Affairs Commission. If the Government erred in not declaring an amnesty sooner, or in not releasing prisoners in larger lots than it did, that gave Dinuzulu no right to persist in disloyal and treasonable behaviour. At no moment could a general amnesty have cured such position as then existed. The fact that such policy had answered in other parts of the world, or even in Zululand after the 1888 disturbances, cannot be taken as a formula to apply to circumstances which happen to be similar in a few respects. Had a general amnesty been attempted sooner than it was, it would have been a blunder and enabled Dinuzulu, especially as rumours were current in Zululand at the time that *he* was going to secure an amnesty, to pose as liberator-general, although known to be actively and flagrantly disloyal. It would have been to place a premium on still more serious rebellion in the future. The only remedy was the one adopted, namely, to remove the source of mischief once for all. That the Ministers were not mistaken in the view they took, will be seen further on. As it was, between July and the issue of the warrants for Dinuzulu's arrest, some 500 to 600 prisoners had been released, whilst, as soon as the arrest was made, Ministers decided to release the remainder at short intervals, 300 at a time.

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3,888, p. 182.

## XXI.

### DINUZULU EXPEDITION.—SURRENDER OF DINUZULU.—CALLING IN OF FIREARMS.—SEARCHING FOR OUTSTANDING REBELS.

THE Government's decision to arrest Dinuzulu was communicated at once to the Commandant. This officer had already been put in command of the Natal Police Reserve, under Dimmick, at Nongoma. On the 24th November, 100 Natal Police, under Inspector W. F. Lyttle, left Pietermaritzburg; fifty of these proceeded to Melmoth, whilst the balance reinforced Dimmick.

Dimmick got orders to make it known that the additional men were considered necessary to effectually patrol the district, then in a disturbed state in consequence of the recent murders. Lyttle was instructed to pay a visit by himself to Emtongjaneni heights, and there select a site for a camp a mile from Emtongjaneni store, and along the road to Nkandhla. He was, at the same time, advised that he would be ordered to move his camp there at an early date. The object was, in this and other ways, to create the impression that the next movement of troops would be to Nkandhla for the purpose of arresting murderers, and certain unpardoned rebels known to be still in hiding in that district. A detachment of N.P. that was at Mahlabatini joined Lyttle at Melmoth.

On the Militia being called out to arrest Dinuzulu, a plan of campaign was drawn up by the Commandant and submitted for the consideration of Government. The troops were thereupon ordered to mobilize and concentrate



at Gingindhlovu, the idea being to march from there viâ Emtanjaneni to Usutu.

Sir Duncan McKenzie left Pietermaritzburg on the 3rd for Gingindhlovu. On reaching Durban, however, he received a wire from the Prime Minister embodying the message from Dinuzulu anticipating arrest, and was told that the Magistrate, Nongoma, had been instructed to advise Dinuzulu to surrender at once at Nongoma, where he would be taken charge of by the Chief Commissioner of Police. This arrangement, of course, completely altered the aspect of affairs. After consulting Sir Charles Saunders, the Commandant decided that there was then no object in marching the troops, by that time already at Gingindhlovu, from that station to Nongoma, when they could be taken by rail to Somkele, and thus considerably shorten the march.

There was, indeed, nothing else to be done. Owing to Dinuzulu having been authoritatively informed of the intention of the troops, the necessity for stratagem had completely disappeared.

A small infantry force, consisting of D.L.I. and two guns N.F.A. (C battery), was accordingly dispatched, under Brevet Lieut.-Col. J. Dick, D.L.I., to Melmoth, to augment the Police already at that post. The object of this movement was that the two bodies should combine and proceed, as they eventually did, to Emtanjaneni heights, to be in readiness to co-operate with the troops at Nongoma in the event of Dinuzulu offering resistance. The Z.M.R. were mobilized and ordered to join Dick's force.

The remainder of the troops were directed to go by rail to Somkele and from there by march route to Nongoma. By this time, however, the rail transport that had conveyed the troops to Gingindhlovu was on its way to Durban, and delay resulted from its having to be recalled.

On the afternoon of the 4th, the Commandant, leaving the troops under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. Arnott, and accompanied by Sir Charles Saunders, Chief Commissioner Clarke, N.P., and a small staff, proceeded by train to Somkele to interview the Chiefs of that locality,

and thereafter to move on to Nongoma and personally conduct negotiations with Dinuzulu. It was expected the troops would come on during the night and reach Somkele the following morning. As, however, provision on the Gingindhlovu-Somkele section had been made with the object of running only one train a day, it was impossible to transport the brigade to Somkele as expeditiously as was desired. The regiments consequently arrived at Somkele with considerable intervals of time between them.

Responsibility for failure to convey the troops, etc., with reasonable rapidity, cannot in any way be regarded as falling on the railway authorities who, during this expedition, as well as throughout the operations in 1906, did everything that could possibly have been done to ensure success. Had a few days' notice been given on the occasion in question, there would probably have been nothing to complain of.

As Somkele is very unhealthy both for man and beast (malaria and horse-sickness), especially in December, the brigade was ordered to leave as soon as possible after arrival, proceed to high ground in the vicinity of Hlabisa, and from thence to Nongoma. Owing, however, to the difficulties already referred to, also to rain and bad roads, it was impossible to carry out the new plan. The regiments moved more or less independently of one another. N.C., B.M.R., U.M.R. and N.F.A. reached Nongoma on the 10th, and the remainder of the brigade on the following day.

In the meantime, the Commandant had had interviews on the 5th and 6th with Chiefs at Somkele and Hlabisa. They were told that, as troops would soon be passing through their wards, with the object of putting an end to unrest in other parts of the territory, there was no occasion whatever for alarm. They were very grateful for the warning, and hoped every success would be met with in ascertaining and punishing the wrong-doers.

The Commandant arrived at Nongoma on the 6th, to find 170 N.P., under Dimmick, already on the spot.

On Saturday the 7th, three messengers, including Mankulumana, arrived from Dinuzulu, notwithstanding



that the Government had on the 3rd clearly directed the latter "to proceed at once to the Nongoma magistracy and there await the arrival of Mr. Clarke (Chief Commissioner of Police)." They came to say that Dinuzulu did not know what offence he had committed to necessitate his surrendering. He desired to know his alleged offence, and who the informant was. The messengers were considerably surprised to find Sir Duncan McKenzie at Nongoma, as Dinuzulu's instructions were that Mankulumanana should apply through the Magistrate and Commissioner for permission to see the Governor, of whom they felt the information above referred to should properly be sought. It was explained that Dinuzulu would have made the journey himself, but was prevented from doing so through having a bad knee. They added that he feared being taken by surprise, as had happened when Sitshishili was murdered. He could not understand why fortifications had been constructed at Nongoma<sup>1</sup>; if such were necessary, why was not notice of the impending danger given him, in order that he, too, might avail himself of the protection? He denied the rumoured accusation of arming his people. All he had done was to summon boys in the usual way to hoe and weed his gardens.<sup>2</sup> He could not understand how the Government

<sup>1</sup> This referred to the bags of earth and barbed-wire that had been placed by N.P. along the verandah of the court-house. As Dinuzulu was known to be calling up an indefinite number of young men from neighbouring Chiefs, on the pretext of hoeing his gardens, it is not surprising the police, being a small military body, felt it necessary to entrench themselves. One of the Chiefs appealed to by Dinuzulu, Maboko by name, who had two years previously married a sister of Dinuzulu, deposed as follows (24th Jan., 1908): "Just after the first body of troops (*i.e.* the Police Reserves) had arrived and camped at Nongoma, Dinuzulu sent me . . . the following message; That the Amakosi (meaning troops, not the main body) had arrived at Nongoma, and he, therefore, asked me to send boys of my tribe to him to do hoeing. These boys were to bring their weapons (*izikali*) with them. They were to come stealthily (*nyenya*) by twos and threes. The boys of the Mavalana and Hayelwengwenya regiments were said to be the ones required. . . . In reply, I said: 'I cannot comply with Dinuzulu's request, having regard to the fact that European forces have just arrived at Nongoma, and seeing that Dinuzulu requires these boys to go to him armed.'—Cd. 3,998, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> As seen from the foregoing note, the calling up was not done *in the usual way*, as far as one Chief at any rate was concerned.

could have gone the length of thinking he was arming against it.

In reply, the Commandant said it was quite unnecessary to send a messenger to Pietermaritzburg, as he was in a position to answer all the questions that had been put. The charge was high treason, and had been laid by various witnesses, whose statements were in the Government's possession. The best thing the Chief could do, seeing that martial law had been proclaimed in Zululand, was to surrender before the troops got to Nongoma. To enable him to come in, as he said he was unwell, a suitable conveyance would be placed at his disposal.

A lawyer (Mr. E. Renaud, of Durban), who had been engaged on behalf of Dinuzulu, and who arrived before the messengers had left, was allowed to write advising the Chief as to the course to pursue. Permission was, moreover, given him to communicate with Dinuzulu at any time, on condition that his letters were produced for inspection.

On the 8th and 9th, further messages came from Dinuzulu, the main subject of which was the ways and means of surrendering. It was decided to send an ambulance as far towards Usutu kraal as it was possible to get, leaving the intervening three miles to be traversed by him on horseback. Capt. Stuart proceeded on the 9th to receive the surrender at the spot agreed on. Instead of being at the place about noon as arranged, Dinuzulu did not get there till 7 p.m. He arrived with a small following, a number of whom accompanied the waggon all the way to the magistracy (fifteen miles). In consequence of Dinuzulu's delay, hilly country, and a dark night, Nongoma was not reached until 11.15 p.m. As accommodation was naturally very limited and as it was drizzling, the Chief was given a room within the gaol and made as comfortable as possible. It turned out he had previously dispatched a party with a marquee and tents in charge of Mankuluma to the magistracy by another route, in the hope that there would be no objection to his putting up outside the lager. This, however, could not be allowed, though



there was no objection to his pitching and occupying the tents within the lager. Under the circumstances, he preferred to remain where he was, *i.e.* in one of the gaol cells.

The formal interview with the Commandant took place at 3 p.m. on the following day. Mankulumana, Mgwaqo and Ncapayi (his secretary) were allowed to be present. Dinuzulu, who was well dressed in European costume, and wore a military helmet, walked with ease from the gaol to the court-house, a distance of about 150 yards.<sup>1</sup> As, by this time, many of the troops had arrived, there was a large gathering of spectators when the interview took place. The Commandant said he was glad Dinuzulu had had the good sense to surrender because, had he not done so, it would have been necessary to enforce the orders of the Government, when many innocent people might have been injured. There had been various murders of black as well as white people going on in the country. The Government was determined to put a stop to such crimes. Dinuzulu had evidently been exercising an evil influence in the country, and had become a menace to law and order. The three columns then in Zululand and Vryheid district had, he was told, entered Zululand to put an end to the disorder, and would not leave until all the prevailing unrest had disappeared.

The Chief replied that he could not imagine what offence he had committed. That he should be charged with high treason, as he had been informed was the case, was ridiculous. How could a man like himself think of taking up arms against the Government? Where was he to procure the men wherewith to oppose his father? He requested to be informed of the specific accusations that had been made against him. These, said the Commandant, were known to the Government, and would be communicated in due course by the proper authorities. It was on these that the warrant for his arrest had been issued. The Government would, no doubt, arrange for a fair and

<sup>1</sup> And this in spite of having so 'bad a knee' three days before as to be unable to proceed to the magistracy as directed!

impartial trial by civil tribunal, and ample time would be afforded within which to prepare a defence.

Dinuzulu maintained that, ever since his return from St. Helena, he had conducted himself in a proper manner. He was surprised to learn that he was regarded as exerting a harmful influence. Moreover, it was strange that he, who was nothing more than a Chief, with jurisdiction confined to a limited and definite area, could be said to have exerted an influence throughout the entire country.

Neither Mankulumana nor the other two Natives made any remarks at the interview, which lasted about forty minutes.

No sooner was it noised abroad in the tribe that their Chief had been put under arrest than the principal men collected and proceeded in a body, on the 10th, to the magistracy. There were between 200 and 300 present. They said they had come to ask why Dinuzulu had been arrested. After the foregoing interview, they were called up. They sat in a semi-circle as Sir Duncan McKenzie addressed them from the verandah of the court-house. His remarks were similar to those he had just made to the Chief himself. The Government, he said, was tired of the murders that had been and were still going on, and its determination to put a stop thereto was apparent from the fact of troops having been sent into the country. Full powers had been given him to act as he saw fit, and he intended to exercise them should necessity arise. Martial law had been proclaimed, hence it was very lucky that the event, of which they all knew,<sup>1</sup> had taken place, for had the troops been obliged to go into the field, many innocent people might have lost their lives. Many of those present were no doubt averse to being dragged into matters of that kind. All who were loyal to the Government would be supported. Some eighteen months before, when in command at Nkandhla, he had dealt somewhat leniently with the insurgents. Had a single shot been fired at Nongoma, and had there been a recrudescence of rebellion, he would have been obliged to act in a far more drastic

<sup>1</sup> That is, Dinuzulu's surrender.



manner, hence it was extremely fortunate things had turned out as they had done. He concluded by advising all to go back to their homes and live there quietly and peaceably.


Whilst negotiations for the surrender were in progress, intelligence was received that Dinuzulu was either forwarding, or had already forwarded, his guns to certain Chiefs of Vryheid and Ngotshe districts for concealment. There was, moreover, ground for believing that certain Natives in the same districts had recently taken up arms at his request. For these reasons, the Northern Districts, with the exception of Utrecht, were, on the application of the Commandant, also placed under martial law on the 9th, to enable him to deal with all Natives concerned.

With the object of obtaining full information of what was occurring in Vryheid district and Usutu kraal, the Minister of Justice (Hon. T. F. Carter, K.C.), proceeded to Nongoma, reaching there on the 12th.

As it was not unlikely that a few of the rebels of 1906 were still in hiding at or near Usutu, and that firearms were also concealed there, arrangements were made for a surprise visit to the notorious kraal. McKenzie arranged to converge thereon from different directions. The three columns employed, under Lieut.-Cols. Arnott, Weighton and Mackay, left Nongoma at different times on the night of the 12th. The night was misty and dark, especially as the grass of much of the area traversed had been recently burnt. The intention was that the columns should arrive simultaneously at the kraal, viz. at daybreak. The only one, however, that arrived in time, was that which took the nearest, though not the easiest, route. The reason for the delay on the part of two of the columns was the steep, rugged and trackless country through which they had had to march.

It was soon manifest that every care had been taken to remove as many traces of incriminating evidence as possible.

The kraal, which was situated on a small hill in a long, well-watered and fertile valley, was roughly divided



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**ESUTU KRAAL, DINUZULU'S PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE.**

Dinuzulu's quarters are behind the trees on the left.





into three parts : (a) Dinuzulu's private dwelling-houses, visitors' house, secretary's hut, etc. ; (b) his mother's hut, and the harem ; (c) the indunas' huts and military barracks. Apart from these, were small kraals and isolated huts within a radius of three hundred yards of, and immediately connected with, Usutu. On a high hill, nearly a mile from and overlooking Usutu, was a small fort erected by Dinuzulu some years before, but which, owing to having been recently struck by lightning, had apparently been abandoned. A considerable number of trees had been planted, but it was clear the establishment had, on the whole, been sadly neglected ; it was overgrown with weeds, not so numerous as to be beyond the powers of one or two boys to have kept down. The buildings, too, were out of repair. None, except the round brick hut, known as the secretary's office, seemed to have been well constructed, whilst not much more than the foundations of what once promised to be a more commodious and imposing structure had been built. The other huts about the grounds were small, of ordinary wattles and thatch, and also required attention. Those belonging to the 'regiments' stood on the eastern slopes of the hill, and were probably not as many as sixty in number.

The occupants of the huts, as well as about a score in the harem, were semi-civilized and, for the most part, poorly clad. This refers to the men, as well as the women and children. Altogether the kraal, if kraal it could be called, and its inmates, gave one the impression more of indolence than of health and activity. Briefly, Dinuzulu's residence fell far short of what might have been expected of one who had acquired so great a reputation amongst the Natives of Natal, Zululand and elsewhere.

After the people had been made to collect at one place, Dinuzulu's apartments were entered and thoroughly searched. Such articles as letters, also some small and large shields, were removed for purposes of evidence. The barracks, too, were searched, though not the Chief's mother's hut or the harem.

As it was supposed that rebels might still be living at



Usutu, Bambata's son, Ndabayake, accompanied the troops. Opportunities were afforded him of examining those present, about 200 in number. No rebels, however, could be detected. Nor, in spite of thorough investigation, could any firearms be found, except two shot guns and a rifle, all evidently lawfully held. The residents were all exceedingly reticent. Although pressed, Dinuzulu's wives even denied that Bambata's wife and children had ever been or lived at Usutu, or that they knew anything whatever of Bambata, Cakijana or any other rebel having been harboured there.

It was carefully explained to the occupants, including others who arrived during the day, why the troops had come into the country, many of the former not having been present at the magistracy on the 10th. They and the rest of the tribe were directed to bring all their guns and assegais to Nongoma on the following Sunday, failing which, the troops would come and look for them. Dinuzulu, the Commandant went on to say, would be sent out of the country for trial, and would never return. Shortly after the meeting, the columns returned to Nongoma.

During the Chief's detention at Nongoma, his secretary attempted to pass a letter out of the gaol to his lawyer, Mr. Renaud. Although, with the assistance of Native warders, who happened to be members of Dinuzulu's tribe, it succeeded in getting outside, it was intercepted by the authorities, upon which the warders concerned were severely punished. It can be seen from this incident that the influence exerted by Dinuzulu on people of his own race was remarkably subtle and far-reaching, and this was afterwards found to be the case whatever tribe they belonged to and wherever he happened to be confined.

There being no necessity for detaining him at Nongoma beyond a few days, arrangements were made for his removal to Pietermaritzburg, in order that a preliminary examination might be begun as soon as possible. Such examination, which is of a formal character, is invariably held in the case of a person charged with a serious offence. An escort of 100 N.R.R., 100 N.N.C.

(Hoare) and a battery of N.F.A. (Wilson), under Major J. Fraser, N.R.R., having been provided, Dinuzulu and his attendants left Nongoma by mule cart and waggons on the 14th *en route* for Pietermaritzburg, viâ Hlabisa and Somkele. He reached his destination a couple of days later, no incident of any importance having occurred on the way.

With the surrender and removal, the principal object of the expedition had been accomplished. There remained : (a) the securing of unregistered firearms known to have been secreted by Dinuzulu at Usutu ; (b) the calling in of those belonging to other members of the Usutu tribe, and other tribes closely connected therewith, notably some of those which lived in Ngotshe and Vryheid districts ; and (c) the arrest of various outstanding rebels. Many of the notorious and other rebels, who had been deliberately harboured by Dinuzulu, had been obliged, in consequence of his arrest, to disperse in various directions. It afterwards transpired that, on the 9th, a couple of hours before his surrender, Dinuzulu had addressed them in the following terms : " I am going, men ; here is a letter from the white people calling me on account of the . . . Chiefs who have been killed. . . . I now tell you all to scatter and go and hide with your relatives, you must not be arrested here. . . . I will send and let you know if the white people are going to come down to search this place." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3,998, p. 14. As far back as March, 1907, Dinuzulu's friend, Miss Harriette Colenso, had advised him in these terms : " If I could advise those who are being sought after, I would say that anyone who is aware that a serious charge is laid against him, had better take a long leap until he reaches a safer place . . . but any and every person of no importance, who is merely panic-stricken, let him betake himself to Sir C. Saunders at Eshowe, and perhaps (if you see fit) present himself as having been advised by you, for thus they may be but little condemned. For those who are in hiding are not only hurting themselves, but they are the key that locks up the many who are in gaol, and who are dying there. If only the matter of those who are in hiding could be ended, we might venture to beseech the Governor, and you might join us in our petition, for we (you and I) are not alone, there are others, but we are stopped by the position of those who are in hiding."—Cd. 4,328, p. 24. This edifying counsel was not followed by Dinuzulu. The spirit, however, of the advice, was followed exactly, *i.e.* do anything rather than loyally surrender those who have deliberately broken the law ; it was just that advice that led to his ruin.



As it was considered the foregoing objects could be effected with a much smaller force than was then in the field, the escort in charge of Dinuzulu received orders to demobilize on reaching its destination.

The arrangements for dealing with the Zululand situation had included the locating of a column at Vryheid. This column, formed on the 10th December, consisted of N.D.M.R. and Utrecht, Newcastle (town and district), Vryheid and Ladysmith (town) Reserves, with Lieut.-Col. B. Crompton, D.S.O., in command, and Capt. O. Schuller as Adjutant. As, however, Dinuzulu's arrest had taken place quietly, the necessity for the column soon ceased to exist. It was demobilized on the 18th.

On the 15th December, the Natal Carbineers, under Weighton, left Nongoma and, moving via Ngome forest<sup>1</sup> and Louwsburg through Ngotshe district—dealing *en route* with allegations against two important Chiefs of that part, Mapovela and Maboko—reached Vryheid on the 22nd.

As directed by McKenzie at Usutu kraal on the 13th, about 500 members of Dinuzulu's tribe came during the same day to hand in their guns and assegais, when, on the advice of Sir Charles Saunders (whose presence at this time at Nongoma was most opportune), it was arranged that control of the tribe, until the Government's pleasure had been ascertained, should be carried on by certain twenty-one headmen, whose names were publicly announced. Only twenty-four guns were handed in. Not many assegais were brought, owing to a misunderstanding.

In consequence of Dinuzulu's having been arrested and to their being subjected to other inconveniences through the arrival of the troops, members of the Usutu party became much incensed with such rebels as had been harboured at Usutu and elsewhere in the tribe. It was to them that they attributed the misfortunes which had come upon Dinuzulu and themselves. So angry were they that it was commonly reported that any rebel not leaving forthwith would be stabbed to death. If Dinuzulu had been

<sup>1</sup> Where Cetshwayo was captured in 1879.

a "father" to them, the tribe was not prepared to extend the same consideration.

The U.M.R. (Newmarch) and B.M.R. (Arnott) remained at Nongoma on Weighton's moving to Vryheid, but, after marching out on two occasions to search for concealed arms, they left the magistracy on the 20th viâ Somkele to demobilize in Natal.

Instructions were, at the same time, issued for the whole of the Police force to remain in Zululand, subject to such dispositions as the Commandant might wish to make. The Chiefs, moreover, were held responsible for the "maintenance of law and order, for the delivering up to the authorities of all persons implicated in or suspected of crime, and for the surrender of all unregistered firearms."

By the 22nd, the Active Militia actually in the field, including detachments of departmental corps, numbered 1,102 (all ranks), with 156 Militia Reserves, stationed at Weenen, Estcourt and Krantzkop.

One would have thought that the invasion of Zululand by over 2,000 troops would have disturbed the aborigines far more than it did, especially as the object was to arrest Dinuzulu. The effect produced, however, was of an exactly opposite character. This can only be explained in one way, namely, that Dinuzulu was universally known by Natives to be really harbouring rebels and believed to be secretly planning the murders of various loyalists. They, in short, had had enough of Dinuzulu, and were only too glad to see the troops arrive and carry him off. There had been peace for some years when, in 1889, he was removed to St. Helena, and a similar prospect seemed once more to be within view. He had deceived the rebels by not actively and openly supporting them at Nkandhla, as he had promised to do, or was understood by them to have promised to do, and now he or his immediate attendants (presumably on his instructions), were causing loyalists to be shot down in cold blood. As that was not a rôle that had ever been played by a Zulu king, it is not surprising that the great majority were relieved and even rejoiced to get rid of the man.



With Zululand once more in a peaceful and settled condition, the Commandant left Nongoma with his staff and an escort of Natal Police (25) for Vryheid, viâ Ngome forest. After reaching Vryheid on the 22nd, simultaneously with the Carbineers, he proceeded by train to Pietermaritzburg, for the purpose of discussing the situation with the Government. The intention of the latter was that all firearms belonging to Chiefs known to be more or less associated with Dinuzulu were to be called in. For this purpose, as the Active Militia were demobilizing, it became necessary to form a Militia Composite Regiment. The Natal Carbineers were the last Militia corps to demobilize. This they did at Christmas, except about seventy men who had, at Vryheid, joined the force referred to.

One of the reasons for calling so strong a force into the field at the beginning of December was, as has already been observed, because the most powerful Natal Chief, Silwana, was believed to have assumed a menacing attitude. The evidence against him, though strong, was, however, much less conclusive than that against Dinuzulu. As the arrest of the latter Chief, as well as of his brother-in-law, Maboko, and his indunas, Makulumana and Mgwago, immediately created a profound impression throughout Natal and Zululand, the Government was of opinion that such incidents were sufficient to serve as a warning, not only to Silwana but to all similarly disposed Chiefs. The project, therefore, of invading his district was abandoned.<sup>1</sup>

The M.C.R., 500 strong, was placed under the command of Major Colin Wilson, N.F.A., with Major J. W. V. Montgomery, N.C., as Adjutant. Moving from Vryheid on the 2nd January, the force camped near Mr. C. Birkenstock's residence at Hlobane. Patrols were sent out to

<sup>1</sup> In the following year, however, chiefly owing to gross misconduct towards the Magistrate, Greytown, when engaged collecting taxes, Silwana was summoned by the Supreme Chief and, after inquiry, deposed from his position and sent to live in another part of the Colony. Such action rendered it necessary to divide the tribe into parts, placing each under a separate Chief.

Ceza on the border of Zululand and to Ntabankulu. The Commandant arrived at the camp on the 7th. Further efforts were made in various directions to find guns that were unlawfully held. On the 14th, the regiment moved to Louwsburg in Ngotshe district, and from there, on the 17th, to Nyalisa police camp. At Louwsburg and Nyalisa (the latter place is some thirty miles from the Ubombo mountains), the Chiefs were ordered to bring in all their unregistered guns. The order was immediately complied with.

In addition to disarmament, useful work was done in these and other parts of the country in tracing rebels, cautioning those who had harboured them, as well as generally restoring public confidence. The troops received every encouragement and hospitality from the various Boer farms visited. The same occurred in Paulpietersburg and Luneberg districts during January and February. The determination that had been shown in calling in the firearms produced a salutary effect in every tribe, with the result that the weapons were promptly handed in by those from whom, at the conclusion of the Boer War, it was supposed they had all been taken. On no occasion was the slightest opposition met with, although, of course, there was sometimes considerable reluctance. This was no doubt due to the firmness, perseverance and discretion displayed by Sir Duncan McKenzie. The work, was, however, put a stop to before half of it had been completed. An opportunity more favourable to such enterprise will probably not again present itself for years. Illicit possession of firearms by barbarians is most effectively and satisfactorily coped with during the operation of martial law.

By the 17th February, some 130 unregistered firearms of various patterns had been handed in to the M.C.R. in Vryheid and Ngotshe districts alone, whilst the general aggregate for the Northern Districts and Zululand was over 400. Had the same policy been quietly and yet firmly pursued in parts of Zululand other than Nongoma district, it is certain better results would have been obtained than by leaving the matter to be dealt with by



ordinary police methods. It was because the police were thought capable of carrying out this difficult duty under the common law, that the M.C.R. was disbanded at the end of February. And yet, on the 12th of that month, the total number of unregistered guns that had been collected without the direct assistance of the Militia, from the whole of Zululand, minus Nongoma, was but twenty-two. That result alone was sufficient to condemn the adoption of a policy of leniency. As it is, the uncollected arms remain for use on other occasions! It was to the unregistered firearms in possession of the Natives that all our gun-shot casualties during the Rebellion, and the various murders thereafter, were due.<sup>1</sup>

A very smart piece of work was carried out by the Police Reserves on the 1st January, 1908. Intelligence had been received at Nongoma that a number of rebel desperadoes were living in broken country at the junction of the Black Umfolozi and Mbekamuzi rivers. Dimmick took the N.P. Reserves out at 1.15 a.m. on the day in question. Fairlie, after the waggon drift had been reached (soon after 5 a.m.), was sent with a couple of troops down the left bank of the former river, whilst Dimmick, joined by Lindsay with a detachment from Mahlabatini, took up positions along the road between the two streams. Fairlie's report is: "Having crossed the Ivuna, near the junction of that river, and reached some high ground, I noticed some fires some three miles to my right front, on the north side of the Umfolozi, where it takes a big bend to the south. I sent to inform you (*i.e.* Dimmick) of this, also stating that Mciteki's men had not arrived as had been arranged,<sup>2</sup> and asking for reinforcements, as I concluded from the amount of smoke from the fires mentioned that the people we were in search of were in the vicinity. At 8.15 a.m. my messenger returned, but I waited until 9 a.m. for reinforcements; longer delay I considered

<sup>1</sup> Many of the unregistered guns were of the Martini-Henry, Mauser, or Lee-Metford types.

<sup>2</sup> This Chief and his men were present, as also some 200 of Mpikanina's, though late in moving towards the road and drift; the delay arose through having to search *dongas*, etc., for firearms.

would be inadvisable. I, therefore, proceeded with the men I had with me in the direction of the fires. . . . After going some distance, I linked the horses and went on foot, with about twenty-five men, and having traversed about two miles, sighted some shelters, which I advanced on in a half-circle. We were then sighted by the inmates, of whom I saw six. I called on them to stand in the Native language. This order was repeated by several Natives with me, and also by the Europeans who had a knowledge of the language. The inhabitants referred to made a bolt for it. Two were shot, and I am bound to conclude that the other four were wounded. We pursued some considerable distance without result, and then returned to the shelters and found two dead bodies. By the side of each was a magazine rifle, magazines charged and cut-offs open.<sup>1</sup> One had a cartridge half in the breech, and both appeared to have been fired recently." The killed turned out to be notorious rebels, for whom search had long been made. One of them, Mqumbeyana, was, it turned out, the man who was in command of the *impi* that attacked Royston's Horse at Manzipambana on the 3rd June, 1906. He is said to have killed a trooper on that occasion and seized his magazine rifle, possibly the very one in his possession when shot by Fairlie's party.

Other important miscellaneous work connected with the Rebellion or Dinuzulu's case was done by the Police during the year. They were, for instance, remarkably successful in capturing at Johannesburg and elsewhere, and bringing to justice, the murderers of Sitshitshili, Mpumela and two or three others previously referred to. These arrests were effected before the end of February, and prior to the withdrawal of martial law.

By the middle of March, so many of the outstanding rebels had either surrendered or been captured, that the Governor was advised to release about 2,000 of those still in gaol, leaving only 116, that is, men who had been convicted of serious offences.

<sup>1</sup> The guns were unlawfully in the possession of these Natives, as was conclusively proved by letters and figures stamped thereon.



## XXII.

### PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND TRIAL OF DINUZULU.—WITHHOLDING OF HIS SALARY.—HIS SETTLEMENT IN THE TRANSVAAL.

WITHIN ten days of Dinuzulu's removal from Nongoma, a beginning was made with the preliminary examination. Mr. T. R. Bennett, one of the senior Magistrates, was appointed, by virtue of being a Justice of the Peace for the Colony, to hold the inquiry, under the authority of Ordinance No. 18, 1845. Mr. W. S. Bigby, an advocate of the Law Department, appeared for the Crown, and Messrs. E. Renaud and R. C. A. Samuelson for the accused. The examination was held at the Central Gaol, Pietermaritzburg. The gaol rather than the Magistrate's court-room was chosen so as to obviate the necessity of escorting the prisoner twice daily through the streets of the town for the whole time the examination lasted, viz. seven months. Numerous witnesses, mainly Natives (of both sexes) gave evidence, much of it very lengthy. The longer the inquiry continued, the better the understanding obtained by those concerned of the case in all its bearings. Charges, at first somewhat vague, soon began to assume definite shape, thereby facilitating the labours of the prosecution, whilst confining the efforts of the defence to specific issues. At the same time, much evidence of a loose, general and hearsay character was given, inevitable with Native witnesses, which, though it may have prejudiced, and perhaps did prejudice, Dinuzulu to some extent in one way, often benefited him

in another ; and the longer the inquiry lasted, the more numerous were the opportunities of the evidence for the Crown being weakened or deliberately undermined.

Ever since the beginning of the Rebellion, Dinuzulu's name had been freely referred to in all parts of Natal and Zululand as associated therewith. The great majority of Europeans regarded him as having exerted a distinctly evil influence, whilst a few held he was rather sinned against than sinning. The opportunity had at last come for sifting things to the bottom. Of this the Government resolved to take full advantage. It is, therefore, not surprising that the scope of the inquiry was wide ; that European and Native witnesses were exceptionally numerous ; that they had to be procured from all parts of Zululand, Natal and the Transvaal ; and that the investigation was as rigorous and protracted as it was. At the same time, probably better results, from a judicial as well as political point of view, would have been attained by concluding it sooner.

Among the means available to Dinuzulu for meeting the expenses of his defence was his salary of £500 per annum. This he had been in the habit of drawing regularly from the Natal Government ever since his return from St. Helena in 1898. As soon as he was arrested, however, the Natal Government suspended payment, on the ground that he was no longer discharging the functions in virtue of which it had been granted. As the Imperial Government was concerned in his appointment as Chief, its approval was sought, but, owing to a difference of opinion, this was withheld.

☞ In order to appreciate the situation that then arose, it would be well to refer to the conditions under which the Chief was repatriated, quoted at length on p. 478.

The Natal Government's view was that : (i) Suspension of salary was in accordance with universal practice, and the Imperial Colonial Service rules ; (ii) only so long as the Chief behaved well and obeyed the laws laid down for his guidance would the salary not be withdrawn, except with the approval of the Secretary of State ; (iii) arrest



and detention carried with them suspension from the service of the Government,—there was a clear distinction between *suspension* from office and salary, and *withdrawal* of an office and salary. It was, moreover, feared that the attitude of the Imperial Government would prejudice the merits of the criminal proceedings being taken against Dinuzulu, as well as embarrass the Natal Government in connection with the demand that had already been made by Dinuzulu's legal advisers for payment of the salary.

The Secretary of State consented neither to suspension nor to withdrawal, and for these, among other, reasons : (i) According to Imperial Colonial Service rules, proceedings for suspension are not taken against a public officer pending criminal proceedings ; (ii) the case could not be dealt with as an ordinary civil service appointment,—being without precedent, it should be dealt with on its own merits ; (iii) Dinuzulu's position, as Government Induna, could not, even temporarily, be taken away without the approval of the Secretary of State, and, before signifying such approval, it would be necessary for the Natal Government to show satisfactorily that the Chief had contravened the laws laid down for his guidance ; suspension, therefore, should follow and not precede the trial ; (iv) Dinuzulu must be assumed to be innocent until proved guilty ; (v) it was most important, in giving a fair trial, to leave him in possession of means to arrange for his defence.

After several months' correspondence, with no prospect of a solution being arrived at, the Imperial Government decided, on the 21st July, " to pay the amount of Dinuzulu's salary, so far as it had accrued to date," viz. £333 6s. 8d. This decision was at once taken the strongest exception to in Natal and discussed at length a few days later in Parliament, when the Attorney-General (The Hon. T. F. Carter) reviewed the position at length. As, however, the Natal Ministry were equally anxious with His Majesty's Government that the defence should not be prejudiced for lack of funds, the Secretary of State was advised that " whilst maintaining that their (Natal

Ministers') contention is correct on question of suspension, . . . they are prepared, if approached by Dinuzulu, to provide a sum of money to assist him in his defence." Further discussion thereupon became unnecessary. On the 1st October following, a sum of £500 was paid by the Natal Government to Dinuzulu's agents for the purpose named.

The preliminary examination was finally closed on the 30th July, the prisoner being formally committed for trial before such court as might be directed by the Attorney-General, on the following charges: High treason; public violence; sedition and rebellion; murder of, or being accessory to murder of, or conspiring to murder, Gence; inciting to murder Gence and Mapoyisa; contravening the Firearms Act, 1905. Dinuzulu emphatically declared his innocence. He complained of an opportunity not having been given him of "arranging" his defence. "A selection of criminals," he added, "and of my personal enemies has been made, to testify to deliberate untruths." His indunas Mankulumana and Mgwaqo were committed at the same time, on charges of high treason. The three examinations had extended over the period 23rd December, 1907, to 30th July, 1908.

Early steps were taken by Dinuzulu's friends to obtain the services of one of the ablest lawyers in South Africa. The brief was offered to and accepted by the Hon. W. P. Schreiner, K.C., formerly Premier of the Cape Colony, though Mr. Schreiner did not proceed to Natal until a few days before the trial began.<sup>1</sup>

The notorious rebel Cakijana, after evading the police in Zululand and Natal, proceeded direct to Dinuzulu's friend, Miss Colenso, at Bishopstowe. This took place on the 9th March, during the continuance of martial law, and serves to show how necessary it was to maintain

<sup>1</sup> Ten days after Dinuzulu's arrest, Mr. E. G. Jellicoe, K.C., an English barrister, was selected to assist Mr. Renaud in the defence. He arrived in Pietermaritzburg on the 19th January, attended the examination on two or three occasions, after which, because unable to make the Government conform to his wishes in various particulars, he threw up the brief and, on the 7th February, returned to England.



such law in Zululand. Instead of promptly handing him and his companion over to the police, Miss Colenso instructed an attorney at 10 p.m. to take their statements at length. Only by working through the night could this be done, and not till the day following were the rebels put into a cab and conveyed by Miss Colenso to the Chief Commissioner of Police. There is reason to suppose that Dinuzulu or his friends in Pietermaritzburg had directed Cakijana to proceed to Bishopstowe in connection with the defence. Thus, even principal rebels seem to have been acting under the Chief's orders, and this whilst his own preliminary examination on charges of high treason, sedition, murder, etc., was actually in progress.

The question has sometimes been discussed as to the advisability of holding examinations, such as that of Dinuzulu, under the ordinary law, even though, as in this instance, the trial takes place before a specially-constituted court.

In the first place, the offences were of an unusual nature. As they did not fall within the category of ordinary crimes, it would seem they ought to have been treated abnormally. Special procedure was followed in the cases of Langalibalele (in 1874) and Dinuzulu himself (in 1888), whilst, during the Boer War, special courts were again appointed to deal with European prisoners charged with high treason, sedition, etc. Legislative authority under which this could have been done was wanting.

Owing to Dinuzulu's enormous influence in Natal and Zululand, witnesses could be got to give evidence against him only with the greatest difficulty, especially at the outset. Such influence was a most serious obstacle to the Crown. The circumstances were exceptional. Particularly those able to give the most incriminating evidence were in a chronic state of fear, for they knew that a number of loyalists of high and low rank had already been murdered at different times (presumably

by the order of Dinuzulu), at any rate it was generally so supposed. In the act of giving evidence unreservedly in open court on behalf of the Crown, they, too, became transformed into "loyalists" and "prominent loyalists," and therefore marked men. Although most of the murderers had, by the time the trial began, been apprehended, none had been tried and punished. There was, therefore, in the eyes of the witnesses, no guarantee that they would not, in some way or other, lose their lives, seeing the friends of Dinuzulu had the right, under the law, of having interviews with him from time to time. As for the witnesses for the defence, they spoke without that peculiar sense of dread which oppressed Native witnesses for the Crown, although every assurance and visible means of protection were afforded the latter by the Government. The spectacle, moreover, of these witnesses being liable to the menacing influences of Dinuzulu and his friends, was extremely detrimental to the prestige of the Government, especially in a country occupied by over a million warlike savages.

To counteract this state of affairs, it became necessary, in the absence of explicit provision in the law, to take certain administrative action which, however, was at once strongly objected to by counsel for the defence. For instance, martial law, proclaimed on the 3rd December, was maintained without a break until the 11th of August, 1908, although the primary reason on account of which it had been promulgated, had ceased to exist within ten or twelve days of such promulgation. The effect of this law, operating as it did in Zululand alone, was to confer on the Crown the right of vetoing entry of any and all persons into that territory, whose actions, however well-intentioned, might have had the effect, in the opinion of Government, of keeping alive the unrest and once again endangering the peace, besides emboldening outstanding ringleaders to remain still longer at large. That a number of Dinuzulu's legal advisers, whilst vigorously procuring evidence in Zululand, would have promoted unrest, quite apart from tending seriously



to defeat the ends of justice, needs only to be stated to be accepted by those who do not happen to belong to that admirable but sometimes rather indiscreet profession.<sup>1</sup>

It was not until the beginning of March that the murderers had all been arrested, and not till the 10th of the same month that Cakijana had surrendered.

Whilst the examination was proceeding, the Magistrates at Nkandhla (B. Colenbrander), Nongoma (G. W. Armstrong), and elsewhere, were actively engaged accumulating evidence on behalf of the Crown, most of which, of course, was given under martial law, though not on that account improperly obtained. It is on record that such prominent witnesses as Mangati, Cakijana, Rolela, Mayatana, Mgunguluzo and others all gave their evidence voluntarily.

Another complaint was that a number of witnesses, whose evidence had been taken, were not called at the preparatory examination. It was consequently felt that the Crown was in possession of information, possibly of vital importance, which was being withheld, with the object of in some way injuring the prisoner. This is seen at once, by anyone acquainted with criminal procedure, to be futile if not frivolous, because, under the Ordinance of 1845, under which the preparatory examination was held, the greatest latitude is given to the Crown, particularly where crimes are only *supposed* to have been committed. It must be remembered that, although there was reason for believing that Dinuzulu had committed two, three or more specific acts of high treason, there was also ground for supposing that a number of other similar offences had been committed. Such inference, to anyone who has read the foregoing pages, especially those describing the state of affairs at Usutu, is a perfectly legitimate one, especially as Dinuzulu was known to have been surreptitiously communicating with the Chiefs of various other tribes throughout Natal and

<sup>1</sup> As soon as martial law was withdrawn, counsel for the defence proceeded to Zululand to work up their case, a period of two months being allowed before the accused was brought to trial.

Zululand ever since the proclamation of the Poll Tax Act in 1905. Nothing, then, was more imperative from the point of view of the Crown, than not only to confine attention to such overt acts as had already come to notice, but to make special, persevering, and exhaustive efforts to probe to the bottom Dinuzulu's conduct throughout the whole period of unrest. The Attorney-General and the Justice of the Peace, and all those working under these officers, were within their rights in doing what they did, as reference to the Ordinance would show. Indeed, when one comes to go into this side of the case, he cannot but wonder that the prosecution was, in some respects, as lenient and considerate as it was.

The appointment of a special officer to hold the inquiry was necessary, as, for political reasons, it was desirable to remove the prisoner from the district in which the various alleged offences had been committed to another. The case, being an extraordinary one, of far greater gravity than the one that occurred in 1888, it is not surprising the Government did not foresee that the various difficulties above referred to were likely to arise. Nor, for the same reason, could they anticipate, except in a vague way, the profound effect that would be created by Dinuzulu on Native witnesses of Zululand and Natal, even when he was in custody.<sup>1</sup> In attempting resolutely, though not illegally, to secure all rights and privileges, the impression was given to the Defence that the endeavours of the Crown were dictated more by bias and prejudice, than by a desire to ensure justice being done. As the Crown was so active, and quite properly so, it is not to be surprised at that the Defence displayed a like degree of energy.

Ever since the arrest, it was the intention of the Government that the Zulu Chief should be tried by a civil tribunal. It would, indeed, have been possible to have arraigned him before a general or special court-martial. Such

<sup>1</sup> In 1888, although preliminary examinations were held, the same difficulties were not experienced. The reason for this was that the issues were far simpler than those of 1907.



procedure, however, was not at any time contemplated. In view of the great length of the case, it was impossible to bring it before the Supreme Court, firstly, because that court had quite as much work to do as it could manage, secondly, because, under the law constituting it, it would have been necessary to empanel a jury, and, with a jury of Europeans in a purely Native case and one which had already excited so much animus against Dinuzulu, the prisoner might have incurred serious risk. Instances had already occurred in preceding years of miscarriages of justice, just as they have arisen in other parts of South Africa, owing to jurymen allowing their feelings to get the better of them. In these circumstances, it was decided to create a new court consisting of three judges, similar to the one which, in 1888, tried the same man and his uncles—a court which, as far as could be seen, gave every satisfaction both to the Crown and to the defence.

The Bill creating this court<sup>1</sup> was brought before Parliament in July, *i.e.* shortly before the conclusion of Dinuzulu's examination. It became law<sup>2</sup> on the 15th August. The judges appointed were: Sir William Smith, Kt., Puisne Judge, Transvaal Supreme Court; Henri G. Boshoff, Puisne Judge, Native High Court, Natal; and Henrique C. Shepstone, C.M.G., ex-Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal.

It may not be out of place here to call attention to machinery in another part of the Empire provided to meet contingencies similar in some respects to those which confronted Natal in 1907. It is common knowledge that political offences occur from time to time within the Indian Empire. Only a few months ago, the world was startled to hear of a bomb being thrown at His Majesty's representative, with severe bodily injury to himself and fatal results to one of his attendants. In regard to such crimes, delay of a year in bringing the accused to trial could not occur. The procedure is governed by Act of

<sup>1</sup> For trying, not only Dinuzulu, but other Native political prisoners.

<sup>2</sup> Act No. 8, 1908.

India, No. 14, 1908, which provides for the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the offence, or any other Magistrate to whom the case may be transferred, holding an inquiry on receipt of an order in writing to that effect from the Governor-General-in-Council or the Local Government. Such inquiry is for the object of seeing if "the evidence offered upon the part of the prosecution is sufficient to put the accused upon his trial" for the offence, and the Magistrate "shall, for that purpose, record on oath the evidence of all such persons as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and may record any statement of the accused, if voluntarily tendered by him." The Act goes on to provide that "*the accused shall not be present during the inquiry . . . unless the magistrate so directs, nor shall he be represented by a pleader during any such inquiry, nor shall any person have any right of access to the court of the magistrate while he is holding such inquiry.*" If the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to put accused upon his trial for the offence specified, he frames a charge, makes an order directing the latter to be sent to the High Court for trial, and causes him to be supplied with a copy of the order, of the charge, and of the evidence taken. The Magistrate, moreover, has the power of examining supplementary witnesses after the order for trial, and before the commencement thereof.

Thus, we see, the Indian legislation governs, not only the trial, but the whole of the preliminary examination, and accords the Crown far greater facilities than were enjoyed by the Attorney-General in Natal under the Ordinance. Provision, such as this, would go a long way towards removing the various obstacles encountered by the Crown in the Dinuzulu affair. Under the Indian law, no martial law is required to exclude the accused or his lawyer from being present during the inquiry.<sup>1</sup> There is not a word in the Indian Act about the existence of martial law, and yet the procedure provided is of a

<sup>1</sup> Many of the depositions in Dinuzulu's case were taken in Nkandhla district whilst the country was still under martial law.



far more rigid, exclusive and seemingly unjust character than what counsel for the defence took exception to in Natal. The Indian Act further stipulates that all persons sent for trial shall be tried by a special bench of the High Court, consisting of three judges, and that "no trial before the special bench shall be by jury."

The Indian Court, although a special one, is always composed of judges of the High Court, and, therefore, prepared to come automatically into existence as soon as the occasion arises. In the case of the Natal Act, the court ceased to exist when the objects for which it had been appointed had been served, consequently, should similar offences arise in the future, a fresh Act would be required.

It would seem, then, that the Union Government would be well-advised to pass an Act similar in principle to the one above referred to. By so doing, the disagreeable position Natal found herself in during the trial of Dinuzulu would be largely mitigated by eliminating, *ab initio*, elements of discord and all appearance of injustice.

An Act indemnifying all authorities and persons acting under them, in regard to acts during the existence of martial law, similar to that of 1906, was passed by the Legislature and assented to by the Governor in August, immediately after which martial law was revoked (11th). A decision was come to at the same time to appoint Mr. R. H. Addison, acting Magistrate at Nongoma, Chief over the Usutu (Zulu) tribe, until the result of Dinuzulu's trial had been made known. "The appointment of a European Magistrate as Chief over a Native tribe, though not frequent, is occasionally resorted to as a temporary measure when, in circumstances like the present, it is considered desirable to keep in close communication with the tribe, and there is no Native headman through whom this can satisfactorily be done."<sup>1</sup>

After Dinuzulu's counsel had collected all the evidence they were able and wished to do in Zululand, and their

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 4328, p. 92.

client's case had otherwise been sufficiently prepared, arrangements were made for the Special Court to begin its session at Greytown, viz. on the 3rd November. The Town Hall was suitably fitted up for the purpose. The venue was appropriate, seeing it was in the district in which the Rebellion had started. Besides Dinuzulu, there were five other Natives to be indicted. A beginning was made with the case of Cakijana, charged with high treason. After a trial extending over a week, the prisoner was found guilty and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment with hard labour. Jombolwana, charged with the murder of Chief Sitshitshili, was next tried. The sentence of death passed on him was carried out in December.

The trial of Dinuzulu, the most important event that had ever occurred in Greytown, began on the 19th of November. The accused had, however, already pleaded on the 10th to an indictment of high treason, consisting of twenty-three counts. His plea was 'not guilty' to each. The Attorney-General (The Hon. T. F. Carter, K.C.) with Messrs. D. Calder, W. S. Bigby and G. E. Robinson, appeared for the Crown, whilst the Hon. W. P. Schreiner, K.C., with Messrs. E. Renaud and R. C. A. Samuelson, were for the defence. Among those specially, though unofficially, concerned were Misses Harriette E. and Agnes M. Colenso.

Although a large number of European witnesses gave evidence, the case was purely a Native one. The proceedings were conducted in English and Zulu, the principal interpreter being Mr. J. W. Cross, J.P., one of the senior Magistrates of the Colony, and Magistrate at Greytown, as will be remembered, when the Rebellion broke out.

In view of the large numbers of witnesses required by the prosecution and the defence, and the long duration of the trial, it became necessary for separate camps to be erected for them.

At the beginning of the trials, considerable interest was taken in the proceedings by residents of Greytown and neighbourhood. This, however, soon began to wear off until Dinuzulu himself gave evidence and, later on,



when counsel for the Crown and for the Defence were addressing.

The Court adjourned on the 22nd December, and resumed on the 4th January, 1909. The prosecution closed on the 18th. Beginning on the following day, the defence terminated on the 23rd February. By this time, the Court had sat sixty-seven days; ninety-five witnesses had been examined for the Crown, and sixty-eight for the Defence.

Of the witnesses called for the prosecution, forty-seven were Europeans and forty-eight Natives. Of those for the defence, sixty-four were Natives, including Dinuzulu (who took no less than ten and a half days to give his evidence), and four Europeans. The evidence amounted to no less than 6,148 typed folio pages.

Mr. Carter addressed on the 24th and 25th, and Mr. Schreiner, beginning on the 25th, concluded on the 2nd March.

Judgment was delivered on the 3rd, that is, on the seventy-third day's sitting. The prisoner was found guilty of high treason: (a) by harbouring and concealing Bambata's wife and children for over fifteen months; (b) by harbouring and assisting the ringleaders Bambata and Mangati during the actual progress of the Rebellion; and (c) by harbouring and concealing 125 named and other rebels at various times between May, 1906 (when the Rebellion was at its height), and the date of his arrest.

With regard to the most serious count of which he was found not guilty, one of the judges felt it necessary to say: "The matter has given me a great deal of concern, and, up to this very morning, the thought has occurred to me again and again whether it would not be my duty to stand out from the majority of the Court in the conclusion to which they have arrived on this point." There "certainly is evidence which makes one hesitate very much, as far as I am concerned, in giving the prisoner a clean bill."

The Attorney-General had already withdrawn two counts whilst some of the others unavoidably overlapped,



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*Photograph, Gregynion.*





consequently it was felt unnecessary to consider them. In respect of one, the Judge President said as "two of the alleged conspirators are to be tried before this court . . . I think it better that we should give no finding." Dinuzulu, after admitting a previous conviction for high treason in April, 1889, (his age then being between twenty-one and twenty-two) was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in respect of (b) and (c) "to date from the 9th day of December, 1907" (*i.e.* the date of his surrender), and a fine of £100 or twelve months' imprisonment in respect of (a), the "twelve months to be cumulative, not concurrent."

Thus ended a State trial which will long be remembered in South Africa. Remarkable for its intricacy and duration, it was even more so for the deep and sustained interest aroused by its various issues among all sections of the community, in Natal and Zululand, throughout South Africa, and in England and elsewhere. Although practically the whole of the evidence for the Crown and the Defence was laid by the press before the public, attention tended to become more and more focussed on the judgment of the court, a judgment from which there was no appeal. And it was generally anticipated and hoped that such judgment would supply a complete and decisive answer to the question as to the exact extent to which Dinuzulu was implicated in the Rebellion of 1906. It is, however, impossible to deny that the judgment, notwithstanding the honest, persevering and exhaustive efforts of the Bench and the Bar, failed to carry conviction home to many who, having followed the proceedings, were at least familiar with the principal features. Convicted on but three counts (and these not including the most important) out of twenty-three, Dinuzulu was commonly believed to have escaped far more lightly than he deserved, or than the evidence appeared to permit. But, owing to the extreme length and complexity of the case, people felt they had to be content with the result, as there was neither opportunity nor inclination to examine the masses of evidence for themselves in detail.



The result of the conviction, as anticipated by the President when passing sentence, was that Dinuzulu not only forfeited the position of Government Induna, but was formally deposed from his chieftainship.

To have left standing the Usutu kraal or the house constructed for him at Eshowe, would have been but to perpetuate an impression amongst a credulous people, that a Chief, convicted for the second time of high treason, was returning to the country. It was because the Natal Government could not for a moment contemplate such contingency that the establishments were either removed or dismantled. Other action, moreover, had to be taken. When the ex-Chief was arrested, as previously pointed out, headmen were appointed to take charge of the tribe. The arrangement, however, was purely temporary. But with the deposition of the Chief, it became necessary to introduce some more permanent and final arrangement. It was decided to break the tribe up into three parts, and attach a section to each of three adjoining tribes. Under the circumstances, the settlement gave satisfaction to all concerned, and has continued to work well from that day to this.

On the conclusion of the trial, the President of the Court (Sir William Smith) returned to the Transvaal, his place being taken by Mr. Justice Dove Wilson of the Natal Supreme Court; Mr. Schreiner, too, went back to Cape Town. Dinuzulu was removed to Pietermaritzburg.

It is but right here to call attention to the fact that notwithstanding the consummate ability with which Mr. Schreiner had defended Dinuzulu, necessitating absence from his practice at Cape Town for a period of over four months—thereby, no doubt, involving him in considerable pecuniary loss—the whole of his services in connection with the trial were given gratis, an act which cannot but redound to his credit, especially when one considers the inability of the prisoner or his friends to pay such heavy charges as Mr. Schreiner might very properly have made.

Instead of Greytown, the venue for the remaining cases became Pietermaritzburg. Dinuzulu's indunas Mankulumana and Mgwaqo, also charged with high treason, were tried on the 9th and 10th of March, the Attorney-General prosecuting and Mr. Renaud appearing on behalf of the accused. Both were found guilty of three counts in the indictment. The former was sentenced to nine, and the latter to fifteen, months—in respect of two counts—whilst both were sentenced to a fine of £50 or eight months' imprisonment in respect of the third. In passing the sentences, account was taken of the fact that they had already been fifteen months in gaol.

As soon as the Union of the South African Colonies became imminent, and shortly after the conclusion of Dinuzulu's trial, the Natal Ministry proposed to the future Prime Minister the desirability of removing Dinuzulu to some suitable part of South Africa, beyond the borders of Natal. It was recommended that such portion of the sentence as remained unexpired on the advent of Union should be remitted on condition that the foregoing settlement was agreed to by the prisoner. The suggestion at once met with the approval of General Botha. Dinuzulu was thereupon taken from Pietermaritzburg to Newcastle, so as to be in readiness to conform to the terms of his proposed release. He, however, was not made acquainted with the reasons for his removal to Newcastle, except that that place was regarded as more beneficial for his health than Pietermaritzburg had appeared to be. Union came into force on the 31st May, 1910. Towards the end of that month, Mr. J. C. Krogh, one of the senior Magistrates of the Transvaal and formerly Special Commissioner in Swaziland, was instructed by General Botha to proceed to Newcastle and there, assisted by the Magistrate, Mr. B. Colenbrander, interview Dinuzulu with the object of placing before him, and securing his acceptance of, the following proposition, which the ex-Chief was told General Botha was prepared to recommend to the Governor-General :



That he should be released from prison and the remainder of his sentence remitted on the following conditions :

(a) Acceptance of domicile in the Transvaal at a place to be put at his disposal by the Government.

(b) That, as from the date of release, his salary of £500 per annum be again paid to him during good behaviour.

The result of the interview was that Dinuzulu unreservedly accepted the conditions, and signed a formal document to that effect. On the 31st, the authority of the Governor-General-in-Council having been obtained, and with the knowledge of Dinuzulu's friends (Miss Colenso and the Hon. W. P. Schreiner), Dinuzulu was released and left Newcastle by the afternoon train for Pretoria. At Pretoria, he came under the Native Affairs Department of the Union, it being arranged that all instructions would, in future, be received by him from or through that Department.

Steps were taken to secure a farm on which he, his family and immediate dependants could reside, with sufficient ground for agriculture, grazing, etc. Some difficulty was at first experienced in finding land suitable for one who, like Dinuzulu, had lived most of his life in the mild climate of northern Zululand. The farm Rietfontein, seven or eight miles from Middleburg, was eventually selected. To this he proceeded early in 1911, accompanied by certain members of his family; his induna Mankulumana was also permitted to join him.

The release, prior to expiration of the sentence and on the terms above set forth, was generally approved in Natal, as also throughout South Africa, and in England.

Almost simultaneously with Dinuzulu's expatriation, those Native rebels who were still in prison, including the ones at St. Helena, were released and allowed to return to their districts, except such ex-Chiefs as Ndhlovu and Meseni, who were obliged to take up their residence in districts other than their own.

### XXIII.

#### REVIEW OF POLICY FOLLOWED IN CONNECTION WITH DINUZULU.—HIS STATUS.—HIS ATTITUDE DURING, AND SUBSEQUENT TO, THE REBELLION.

THE amount of misunderstanding that has arisen in connection with Dinuzulu, both in England and South Africa, is astonishing. Probably no other case in South Africa has called forth quite such volumes of criticism and vituperation. Natal has been accused of following towards him a policy of petty injustice and malice—either because of refusal to hold a non-judicial inquiry ; or because, when the ex-Chief was arrested, it suspended his salary without the consent of the Imperial Government ; or for deferring release of the rank and file of the rebels ; or maintaining martial law longer than appeared necessary, or for some other reason. In these and other connections, the Colony and its public officers have been reviled and held up to scorn by those who did not know the facts, or did not care to know them. As Natal is still held by various persons, chiefly such as live outside her borders, to have been mistaken, and Dinuzulu nothing but a martyr to official spleen and vindictiveness, it is perhaps not unfitting, in a work of this kind, that an attempt should be made to examine the position from a somewhat wider point of view than was possible during the trial or, indeed, on any other occasion.

The history of the Zulus has already been dealt with briefly in the Introduction, whilst the earlier events in



Dinuzulu's life have also been touched on here and there. It is necessary now to consider the position he assumed on his return from St. Helena in 1898.

During the latter portion of his imprisonment, a great deal of agitation arose among the colonists in favour of Zululand being annexed to Natal, largely because land was required for growing sugar. As the Imperial Government had, since 1887, been directly responsible for the management of Zululand ; as the cost of that territory's administration was constantly increasing ; and because of the agitation referred to, a settlement was necessary under which Natal would assume the administration and become responsible for Native affairs.

So anxious was the Imperial Government to repatriate the prisoners, that negotiations with Natal began in the year following that in which responsible government was granted. The desire was that they should return as soon as possible. The Natal Government, however, repeatedly urged postponement of the execution of such decision. But, as the Imperial Government was wholly responsible for sending Dinuzulu to St. Helena, and as his stay there depended on the length of his sentence, it was essential to bear in mind that repatriation was later on inevitable. It was accordingly resolved to make this one of the conditions of annexation. The agreement finally arrived at between the Governments was that, although Dinuzulu was to be restored, he should not return until Zululand had been actually annexed, and then only on condition that he agreed to become a servant of the Natal Government at a salary of £500 per annum, and to serve in the capacities of Induna and Chief on clearly defined terms. These terms, being of great importance in appreciating the position and difficulties that subsequently arose, are set forth *in extenso* :

“ Dinuzulu will be taken into the service of the Government of Zululand, his position being that of Government Induna. A house will be provided for him on a site to be selected by the Governor, and a salary of £500 per annum will be attached to his office.

“ He must clearly understand that he does not return to Zululand as Paramount Chief. He must respect, listen to, and obey those officers of the Government who are placed in authority over him. The position assigned to him by the Government, and the salary allotted to it, will be held during the pleasure of the Government, and will be strictly dependent on the manner in which he behaves and obeys the laws laid down for his guidance, but will not be withdrawn without the approval of the Secretary of State.

“ As Government Induna, he will be liable to be employed in Native matters that may arise and be brought to the notice of the Governor’s representative in Zululand, such as questions of inheritance and others on which it may be desirable to obtain independent evidence and opinion.

“ He will be the Chief over those people residing in the location marked off for the Usutu. He will govern amongst and will rule them by the same laws and form of Government as other Chiefs of tribes in Zululand, and he will himself, like those Chiefs, be under the laws of the Government of Zululand.”<sup>1</sup>

The foregoing was agreed to before Dinuzulu left St. Helena. He knew that, in accepting the office of Induna, it would be obligatory on him to live within three or four miles of the principal Government officer in Zululand,—for an induna is the principal Native executive officer on anyone’s staff, be he Secretary for Native Affairs, Resident Commissioner, or Magistrate.

On his arrival with his uncles at Durban, on the 6th January, 1898, seven days after issue of the proclamation of annexation, a copy of the conditions, as well as a translation thereof into Zulu, were handed to him by the senior officer of the Native Affairs Department. The Chiefs were thereupon escorted to Eshowe by the Magistrate of that district. At Eshowe, Dinuzulu occupied the house which had been specially constructed and furnished for him at public expense. Although it was not expressly

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3998, p. 7.



stated in the conditions where he should reside, it was understood by the Governments that he would live at Eshowe, at any rate for the time being. It was inexpedient, with matters as they then were, to name a particular place in conditions intended to be permanent. Although the Resident Commissioner had, ever since the Imperial Government took over the administration, been stationed at Eshowe, except for a short while during the disturbances of 1887-88, it was conceivable that, with a change of control, the headquarters might have to be altered. As a matter of fact, they have not been changed to this day. At the same time, as Chief over a tribe nearly 100 miles from Eshowe, it was recognized that he would have a little difficulty in controlling its affairs. There were, however, and still are, many Chiefs in Natal whose tribes are broken up and distributed over various magisterial districts, thereby necessitating the appointment of headmen to exercise jurisdiction over each section in the absence of the Chief. Thus, for Dinuzulu to manage his tribe from Eshowe, was a by no means unexperienced or insuperable difficulty.

After an absence of nine years, he and the others very naturally desired to return to their respective homes. This desire was so strongly urged, that the Minister for Native Affairs (Mr., now Sir, J. L. Hulett) agreed, on the 22nd January, to allow him and his uncles to go back permanently. The same concession was granted to his old enemy, Zibebu, who had, for some years, been required to live in Eshowe district. Dinuzulu was allowed to build kraals for himself, including that which he named Usutu. His position then gradually became that of a Chief pure and simple, instead of Government Induna, as prescribed in the conditions. It is true that he paid periodical visits to Eshowe and Pietermaritzburg, and there discussed political and other affairs with the Commissioner for Native Affairs, but these were of short duration and discontinued altogether after the appointment of the Commission in 1903 (of which Mr. Saunders was a member), to set apart land for the occupation of Natives and

Europeans. We find, then, that between 1898 and the beginning of the Rebellion, the principal condition under which Dinuzulu had returned to Zululand was being practically ignored. During this time, the house at Eshowe was available whenever he felt disposed to reside there. Although not discharging the functions of the principal appointment, he continued to draw a salary, liberal when at Eshowe, but excessive when in so remote and uncivilized a quarter as Usutu kraal, with only a Native Chief's duties to perform.

Living the indolent life he did at Usutu, he, as has been seen, became exceedingly corpulent. This, no doubt, is one of the reasons why, after the Commission referred to ceased to exist, he failed to visit Eshowe.

He, as well as the Commissioner, knew that his residing continuously at Usutu was an infringement of the conditions. His friends also, among them Miss Colenso, knew. It would have been possible for him, or for them, at any time to have insisted with success on the original terms being fulfilled. He might have been given a piece of land near Eshowe on which to locate a few of his kraals, as was done in the case of the previous Government Induna. For reasons best known to himself, nothing appears to have been done, not until he urged Sir Henry McCallum to take action, nearly ten years after his release. That the man was allowed to go on as he was doing, was undoubtedly an error on the part of the Governments. And yet the Imperial Government had, in 1897, foreseen with remarkable clearness what might arise. Here are the words of Lord Ripon :

“The internal politics of Zululand are such that under the arrangement referred to [*i.e.* installing Dinuzulu as a tribal Chief, with authority over a strictly-defined district, inhabited by devoted followers], Dinuzulu might, in the course of time, have been drawn into a false and embarrassing position with respect to the Government, however desirous he might be at the outset to work loyally under it.”

When one looks back on this period, he cannot but



wonder how it happened that successive Secretaries of State omitted to inquire how far the conditions under which Dinuzulu had been returned to his country were being fulfilled, and, if inquiries were made, why the Natal Government was not pressed to conform to the spirit and letter of the agreement.

One of the chief indirect causes of the Rebellion, as well as the key-note of Dinuzulu's trial, was the isolated position he occupied at Usutu. That it put him into a false position is undoubted ; that Dinuzulu knew he was in a false position, and that he knew he was himself primarily responsible for being therein, admits of no question. The reason why he tolerated it was because he realized it gave him an opportunity of gradually building up his influence among the Natives without the knowledge of Government, until too late to exercise effective control. If responsibility rests to some extent with the Natal Government for permitting him to drift into the position he did, he himself (30 years of age when repatriated) cannot be absolved from blame, especially as it was at his own request that he was permitted to go to his tribe.

This is the state of affairs which anyone who desires to understand the underlying causes of the Rebellion must have clearly in mind. After leaving Eshowe, Dinuzulu assumed the duties of a Chief, though because of his parentage, not of an ordinary Chief, whatever the wording of the conditions might have been. Instead of being in close touch with the larger political and social affairs of the territory, as would have been the case had he continued to reside near the Commissioner, he preferred to limit himself ostensibly to those of his tribe and be under the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the district within which his ward happened to fall. Being the eldest son and successor of Cetshwayo,—descendant of still more notable kings,—it was impossible to repress feelings of loyalty and affection exhibited towards him by many staunch adherents of the royal house in all parts of the territory. More than this, in consequence of the military assistance given him in 1883 and 1884 by the Boers, a large section

of the north-western portion of Zululand was granted by him to the Boers. Such land, although promptly cut up into farms, was extensively occupied by some of his most devoted followers, among them the Baqulusi. To this day, the staunchest followers will be found in the districts of Vryheid and Ngotshe. If many people showed loyalty towards the senior representative of the royal house, it is not surprising that even greater devotion was displayed by those in the districts named. Nor is this all. With large numbers of those in Zululand and many others in the districts referred to (which, of course, were under an entirely different government,—for annexation to Natal did not take place until after the conclusion of the Boer War), it is only natural to suppose that numbers of other Natives in Natal, Transvaal and elsewhere should also have become partial to Dinuzulu. With the increase of European population in Natal, scarcity of land, higher cost of living and higher rents, in addition to other exacting conditions, Natives keenly felt the necessity for having a protector of their own flesh and blood—someone whom they could trust to voice their interests, and one who, because of his rank, would ensure adequate and prompt attention being given thereto. The more Dinuzulu allowed these exhibitions of feeling to go on, the more Natives in an ever-widening circle looked on him as their natural champion, and as one who in every way *ought* to lay their grievances before the Government. They wanted him to stand up for them with a view to the ancient life, habits and customs—with which, for so many centuries, they had been intimately associated—being allowed to continue with less restrictions and innovations than had become customary. Dinuzulu, of course, had no complaint to make on account of receiving these demonstrations. He would have been the last person in the world to have complained about such a matter as that. It would have been unnatural in him to do so. He felt and knew he was being gradually driven by multitudes, living far beyond the confines of his own area, into a position much falseer than the one in which, as we have seen, he had deliberately placed



himself. But it exactly suited his plans. In his dealings with the Natal Government, he perpetually bore in mind that behind him was the Imperial Government. His constant effort was apparently to bring about by degrees such a state of affairs in Zululand as to induce, if not compel, the latter Government to intercede with Natal on his behalf, and get himself appointed Paramount Chief, instead of being merely an Induna and Chief. The latter appointments, although accepted by him, were not really to his liking; they were restrictive, and derogatory. In the countries of Basutoland and Swaziland, formerly subject to Zululand, there were Paramount Chiefs. In India, too, many states had their Feudatory Princes or Paramount Chiefs; what had Zululand done, asked Dinuzulu, to be so discriminated against as to be without a Native protector of its interests? Even the Boers, though recently conquered, had been granted the most liberal form of autonomy.

Throughout the time he was at Usutu, up to the outbreak of rebellion, is nothing but a tale of the spreading of his influence by one means or another in all directions, and this notwithstanding the clearly-expressed condition that it was not as Paramount Chief that he was returning to Zululand. With such an environment, the people so prone in many parts to regard him as their natural head, is it surprising that when the mysterious order that all pigs, white fowls, European utensils, etc., were to be killed or discarded was circulated, reference should have been made to him by many to ascertain his will and pleasure?

One of the ways in which his influence was considerably augmented, but which involved him in trouble with the Government at a later time, occurred towards the conclusion of the Boer War. Guerilla warfare was then going on in the Transvaal and elsewhere. To denude country occupied by the Boers of stock was recognized as one of the most effective means of bringing hostilities to a close. The idea of organizing raids along the north-western border of Zululand occurred to the authorities, whereupon

one Colonel Bottomley was dispatched to arrange accordingly. Bottomley went to Dinuzulu and, without obtaining the authority of the Natal Government, ordered the Chief to arm and assemble his men. Dinuzulu reported to the Magistrate, who objected to Natives being employed in such way. The Magistrate, however, as well as the Commissioner, were overruled under martial law, then in force in Zululand, whereupon Dinuzulu went forth with some twenty-four companies (*i.e.* about 1,500 men), and, at a hill called Dhleke, successfully performed the required duty. It is claimed by him that, in consequence of this demonstration and other assistance in the shape of scouts, the magistracy was prevented from being attacked, as happened at four other magistracies in Zululand.

During the Dhleke expedition, besides looting stock, some firearms were taken from a Boer waggon. Dinuzulu seems afterwards to have attempted to call in the guns, but, because there had been bloodshed (a couple of his force having been killed), his men refused to produce them. He declares that Bottomley then allowed the men to retain the guns. Later, in 1902, the Magistrate ordered the weapons to be brought in for registration. A few that were produced were not, apparently, returned to the holders. Such retention seems to be the reason why other holders refused to produce theirs. The matter seems then to have dropped. It is idle to suppose that Dinuzulu could not have called in every gun had he been so inclined. Universally-recognized Zulu law requires that all loot shall go to the King as a matter of course, who thereupon deals with it as he sees fit.

During the same War took place the Holkrantz massacre referred to in a former chapter. Owing to the tribe (Baqulusi) which carried out the massacre being known to be intimately associated with the Zulu royal house, credit for the achievement was regarded as attaching principally to Dinuzulu as head of the house. The massacre created a profound impression on Natives in general; it revealed new and unexpected possibilities.



The attitude assumed by him when questioned by the Government for allowing messengers to come and see him about the poll tax and the pig-killing order can be readily understood. He practically said: "You allowed me to come back, but gave me a position not in keeping with my rank. This, Natives at large, have begun to see. Although my jurisdiction is limited to my particular ward, and such fact is well known, it is impossible for me to prevent people coming to see me." When Sir Henry McCallum spoke to him at Nongoma in 1904, he was distinctly instructed to report the arrival of people from tribes other than his own. These instructions he frequently disobeyed, and such disobedience was subsequently admitted by his induna, Mankulumana, as well as by himself.

There is another aspect in regard to the man which should not be lost sight of. The question arose many years ago as to whether the Chiefs of Zululand were prepared to surrender the status conferred on them by Sir Garnet (afterwards Viscount) Wolseley, in order that Cetshwayo should become Paramount Chief. On the Chiefs in question being approached, several objected in the strongest terms, among them Zibebu and Hamu. The Zulus regarded it as impossible to serve a King who had been conquered by another race, and whose restoration was on the condition, *inter alia*, that the regimental system should be done away with, and his jurisdiction confined to territory reduced by about a third of its original size. This opposition to his father or his becoming Paramount Chief, is what was always uppermost in Dinuzulu's mind, and what it was ever his greatest care to break down or remove. The long-continued warfare (1883 to 1887) between Cetshwayo (and, later, himself) and Zibebu took place for no other reason than that the latter had refused to acknowledge his father's and, therefore, his own authority. It was in consequence of this attempt, vigorously carried on as it was after formal assumption of the administration by the Queen, that Dinuzulu was arrested, tried and convicted of high treason, and banished to St. Helena. On coming back, he realized the futility

of waging war as a means of attaining his object. The problem then was: How am I, by adopting means to which the European Government can take no reasonable exception, to induce the great mass of the Zulu people to become unanimous in the proposal of my being appointed Paramount Chief? Here, as we believe, is the motive for his sedulously promoting the development of his influence in the extraordinary, irrepressible and obscure manner outlined above.

It can, therefore, be seen that he found himself ere long in a serious dilemma. His position has, indeed, always been recognized as difficult. But, owing to being a Native, and therefore living out of touch with the European community, the nature and intensity of his embarrassment could not be realized as completely and as vividly as they were by him and his immediate followers.

And yet at the beginning of the Rebellion he stood in a singularly favourable light as far as the Government was concerned. The Commissioner had, as is commonly known, implicit confidence in his loyalty; he lost no opportunity of supporting the Chief, repudiating every allegation and calumny in the most vigorous manner. The earnest and determined way in which Dinuzulu was defended by this officer excited the admiration of all who observed it.<sup>1</sup> By his ready response in paying the poll tax, as well as by protestations of loyalty, coupled with an offer to take or send an *impi* to Nkandhla to deal with Bambata, Dinuzulu at once ingratiated himself with the Government and the European public, who, though not absolutely believing in his loyalty, were only too anxious for him to co-operate at that most critical juncture. But, as it happened, he had already cast the die which, as time went on and the truth eked slowly out, rendered it more and

<sup>1</sup> Shortly after the Rebellion began, and public suspicion had been aroused as to the Chief's loyalty, Sir Charles Saunders reported as follows (20th April): "At my first interview with Dinuzulu on his return from exile, I told him I would be perfectly frank and open in all my dealings with him and I expected the same demeanour on his part towards myself." That this promise was faithfully kept by Sir Charles Saunders is undoubted, only, however, to be met with gross deception on the part of Dinuzulu.



more impossible for him to restore those good relations which, but for his own lapse, would undoubtedly have been even more cordial than ever before.

It would, we believe, be unfair to assume that he deliberately and systematically persuaded people to come and see him. He was astute enough to know that, by adopting a merely passive and nonchalant attitude, many would be seized by an overpowering inclination to pay their respects, especially when they observed that an increasing number of other people came to do so. To visit and get in touch with him became, from their point of view, quite the proper thing to do. There is no instinct among the Zulus stronger than that of desiring to do what everybody else is doing. Such arises, no doubt, from the force of long-continued custom. Living, as they once did, under the rule of as despotic kings as could be found anywhere on the globe, whose political and social habits made all sorts of demands on the people, they became alive to the necessity of being always on the alert for fear of being punished unless conforming to what others were doing. For, whatever others did was supposed to be in accordance with the will or desire of the king, even though unproclaimed. Apart from this, respect for authority is ingrained in their natures to a remarkable degree. As proof of this, it is necessary merely to mention the custom of *hlonipa*, which universally enforces propriety of behaviour, especially in the female sex.

Instead, therefore, of sending out messages to persuade people to come and see him, Dinuzulu adopted the more law-abiding and dignified policy of waiting until they called.

When, after the promulgation of the Poll Tax Act, agitation arose among the Natives to such an extent that many sent messages to him, including Chiefs who, it would seem, had never communicated with him before, he had a valid answer always ready: "What is the use of your coming to me? I can do nothing. You are a Chief just as I am. I do not refer to you when in a quandary. Go to the Government and lay your case before it for

yourself." Profiting by his experience at St. Helena, and not again wishing to come into conflict with the Government, he at once made his own tribe comply with the demands. They did so at the earliest date, viz. January, 1906.

His attitude of allowing people to come and see him began at length to assume a character more or less criminal. Instead of the messengers coming to pay their respects, in order to discuss various matters appertaining to their tribes, they, one and all, came to consult him about a particular matter, and one having reference to a law already enacted. This law, moreover, had received the sanction of the representative of that Government which, as we have seen, was party to the agreement under which Dinuzulu was restored to the country. In no case did he report to the Magistrate, the Commissioner, or the Governor that these visits were being made, and that his advice was being solicited as to what action should be taken. We have seen the form of reply to those who came about the poll tax. As regards the pig-and-white-fowl-killing rumour, he said: "Such order did not emanate from me; I know nothing whatever about it."

Judging from his antecedents and his conduct during the period immediately before the Rebellion, we cannot come to any other conclusion than that his decision to pay was actuated, not by a natural desire to comply with the law, but rather because afraid, his social rank being what it was, that the first attention of the Government would be directed to himself, when he might, before he knew where he was, find that a *casus belli* had arisen between him and people whom his father's entire army had been unable to withstand. It is, therefore, not surprising that he should have paid, and that his people paid four months before they need have done, in order to escape the prescribed penalty. Just as his compliance did not arise out of a natural desire to obey (any more than, at that time, there was such disposition on the part of hundreds of thousands of other Natives in Natal and Zululand), so it cannot be said that his object was to parade before other



Chiefs his approval of the new and strongly-resented law. He was never tired of referring to, and, at his trial, never ceased to quote, his action in being among the first to pay the tax and claiming greater credit therefor than he actually deserved. His compliance was undoubtedly a satisfactory feature, but the act should not be considered except in connection with the general political situation and his own to a large extent underhand conduct at that time and afterwards.

In or about 1903, Chiefs living outside Zululand and north of the Pongolo sent messengers to complain to him of being taxed £3 per hut in the Transvaal, whereas only 14s. was being paid in Natal. The Governor later on spoke to Dinuzulu about this, asking why he had interfered. It was bad enough to exercise influence over Chiefs in Natal and Zululand, but a far more serious matter to do so in regard to those of a different administration. He replied that he had reported the incident to his Magistrate, when he received orders not to concern himself with the matter. These orders, he added, were obeyed. He pressed the Governor to produce the informant, but as this could not be done, he felt aggrieved that an insinuation of his having done wrong was allowed to drop, although informed that his explanation was satisfactory.

This accusation, in conjunction with the further allegations that he and his tribe were in possession of unregistered firearms obtained at Dhleke and Holkrantz, were the origin of a definite application by him that a full inquiry into his conduct should be held. The application was repeated on various occasions, but the Government was unable to comply. At the same time, the Governor strongly supported him in connection with the Holkrantz affair, and told him he had done so.

In consequence of evidence given at various courts-martial tending to implicate him in the Rebellion, the Government had no alternative but to decide to hold some form of inquiry. A difficulty arose as to the composition of the proposed Commission. In the meantime, an investigation had been started by the Magistrate,

Mahlabatini, into the circumstances attending his predecessor's murder. The evidence therein, too, was found to some extent to implicate Dinuzulu. Under all the circumstances, Ministers, in November, 1906, resolved to refrain from holding an inquiry until a *prima facie* charge could be established against him, as the effect of any inquiry being abortive would have been greatly to increase his prestige.

The desire for inquiry was again referred to by the Chief in May, 1907, when, with his indunas, he paid Sir Henry McCallum a visit at Pietermaritzburg. By this time, however, the Government was in possession of a good deal of other reliable information tending to prove that he was personally concerned in the Rebellion, especially by harbouring rebels, including the ringleaders, at Usutu, well knowing warrants were out for their arrest, and either inspiring, or being privy to, various murders of Native loyalists that had taken place in Zululand.

Shortly after Dinuzulu's return to Usutu, the murder of Sitshitshili occurred, followed by the escape from Usutu of Bambata's wife and children.

After fully considering the situation, the new Governor (Sir Matthew Nathan) "reluctantly came to the conclusion . . . that Ministers are right in view that the peace of the Colony requires the removal of Dinuzulu from Zululand."<sup>1</sup> He concurred in the advice that Dinuzulu should be required to attend an inquiry into "the present state of affairs in Zululand and into his alleged connection with last year's Rebellion." He also agreed with the proposal that two companies of Imperial troops should be stationed at Eshowe, to discourage breaches of the peace and reassure loyalists more than was possible for a detachment of Militia to do. Representations were made accordingly to the Secretary of State by cable. The latter replied on the 14th October that His Majesty's Government would no doubt be "prepared to concur in the policy of enquiry, and, if necessary, to move the troops as desired, if the enquiry is to be into the best means of securing the peace

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3888, p. 109.



of the country, including the redress of grievances and if the Natal Government will pledge itself to do its best, in consultation with His Majesty's Government, to carry out the reforms recommended by the Commission [Native Affairs]. Such enquiry might be based on Dinuzulu's own request . . . [and] be an important open enquiry . . . not a mere police enquiry. . . ." <sup>1</sup> Dinuzulu, in the meantime, nervous on account of the police patrol that had passed Usutu on the 30th September, contemplated leaving Usutu to live in a still more isolated quarter by the Black Umfolozi and nearer the sea.

Shortly after receipt of the Secretary of State's message (14th October), another Chief, Mpumela, was murdered by being shot after dark when sitting in his own hut—again was the murder commonly associated with Usutu kraal, not, in the first instance, by Europeans, but by Natives. Ministers now advised that a warrant of arrest should forthwith be issued against Dinuzulu and a strong body of Militia be sent to reinforce the Police when executing it. The Imperial Government abode by the policy, quoted above, with the result that the two companies of infantry applied for were not sent as requested. Had this comparatively minor point been conceded, it is probable that the murder of the loyal Chief, Mpumela, not to refer to attempts to murder others, would not have occurred. It is not surprising that, under the circumstances, the Colony decided to effect Dinuzulu's arrest with its own troops, without further appeal for Imperial assistance.

Having seen how Dinuzulu's desire for a public inquiry became, through gradual denouement, transformed into a decision to arrest him on a charge of high treason, we will now pass on to consider other aspects of the case.

One often hears it said that, with the country in so disturbed a state, a magnificent opportunity for plotting and fomenting rebellion was afforded the Chief during the latter end of 1905 and beginning of 1906 had he been so inclined. That is true. But the outlook from Dinuzulu's own point of view should not be lost sight of. Here was

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3888, p. 149.

a man, by far the most important in Natal and Zululand, in so far as social rank was concerned, who, but a few years before, had returned from a long exile. He was in a better position than was any Native in Natal to know what it meant to take up arms against Europeans. This had been tried in 1879 as well as in 1887, but had failed. It was not likely that, with his men in a disorganized condition and the nation split up into hundreds of separate tribes, the prospects of success would be any greater in 1906. Had he shown resistance, it was inevitable that the Government would have attacked him forthwith, before a strong *impi* could have been assembled and supplies collected, quite apart from his being physically unfit to take the field. In other words, the widespread feelings of loyalty towards him by hordes of undisciplined barbarians meant little or nothing against organized troops, armed with modern weapons, until an opportunity had been afforded for openly mobilizing them and evolving order out of chaos. Dinuzulu had taken part in military operations, and was sufficiently a soldier to know *that*.

A further reason for disinclination was because, living but a few miles from him in different directions, were three Chiefs, Tshanibezwe, Mciteki and Kambi. These were all important men: the first was the son of Cetshwayo's prime minister; the second a son and temporary successor of Zibebu; and the third a son of Hamu (one of Dinuzulu's uncles). That is, sons of three of the thirteen 'kinglets' appointed by Sir Garnet (later Viscount) Wolseley. But the opportunity at hand, such as it was, was too good to lose. It might not occur again. He knew that the great mass of the people, already incensed against the Government, were looking to him. He knew that the large number of Chiefs in Natal and Zululand, and even beyond, expected him to take the lead. He knew they were ready to follow if he did. But the risks of failure were too imminent. Like Hamlet, he began to soliloquize. What, in this predicament, he actually did will perhaps be never fully known. Whether he specially sent for



Bambata, on hearing this petty Chief was being harassed at Mpanza, or that Bambata came of his own accord with one of his wives (and children) to seek a place on which to live; whether Mankulumana, in Dinuzulu's presence, actually incited him to start a rebellion and flee across to Nkandhla, where Dinuzulu would meet him, or that Dinuzulu simply confined himself to saying he was unable to give a site; whether Mankulumana handed Bambata a rifle with which to begin the fighting, and provided him with emissaries to assist in inciting Natives, or that Dinuzulu, on hearing from Bambata of a certain doctor who could cure the ailment from which Dinuzulu was suffering, sent two messengers merely to summon the doctor: all this is to a large extent obscure. Witnesses have testified on oath to each of the alternatives. The Special Court found Dinuzulu not guilty of inciting Bambata to rebel, owing mainly to the evidence of the wife and children appearing to be an improbable version of what actually happened; but, whilst discrediting this evidence, the Court did not say it accepted Dinuzulu's own plausible story.

It is unnecessary to deal with other counts than the one referred to. The prosecution and defence were at one in concluding that: (a) Bambata fled to Dinuzulu, with his wife and children, after wilfully disobeying an order of the Government; (b) he had two or more interviews with Dinuzulu and his indunas towards the end of March; (c) he received exceptionally favourable treatment during the three or four days he was at Usutu; (d) he was accompanied to Mpanza, Natal, by two 'messengers' from Dinuzulu; (e) on reaching Mpanza, he made preparations to rebel, being actively assisted therein by one of the 'messengers' referred to, who, in Dinuzulu's name, openly incited members of his tribe to rebel; (f) with the assistance of Dinuzulu's messenger, three distinct acts of rebellion were committed on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th April; (g) Bambata, along with the same messenger and about 130 men then fled to Nkandhla; (h) at Nkandhla, it was represented by the said messenger that Bambata had the

authority of Dinuzulu to rebel and take refuge there ; and (i) Dinuzulu's messenger thereupon usurped control of Siganda's tribe in order to assist Bambata. As there is unanimity in these and other particulars, and as the Court found Dinuzulu not guilty, the question arises : Who, then, was the cause of the Rebellion ? The question is a fair one and obviously demands an answer, if one can be given.

Let us attempt an analysis. The names of the ring-leaders were Bambata, Cakijana (Dinuzulu's messenger), Mangati, Siganda and Mehlokazulu, whilst those who are declared to have instigated it are Dinuzulu, Mgwaqo and Mankulumana. If the author of the Insurrection is not among these, then he is nowhere.

Mgwaqo and Mankulumana may be eliminated because, being indunas of Dinuzulu, the latter must be held to have been privy to, and responsible for, everything they did. Bambata would never have been incited, nor would he have agreed to rebel, except on receiving an assurance from Dinuzulu himself that they were voicing his wishes.

Mangati and Mehlokazulu, again, only appeared on the scene *after* the Rebellion had started, and Bambata was at Nkandhla. No one who knows the facts would regard either of them as the cause. They were accessory, but *ex post facto*.

Now, as regards Bambata, Cakijana, Siganda and Dinuzulu. We have seen that Cakijana was a ' messenger.' The prosecution declared he was an emissary, but, assuming him to have been merely a messenger on his way to fetch a doctor, it is agreed that, when he accompanied Bambata to Natal, he did not receive his instructions from Dinuzulu or at Usutu, but at his own kraal many miles away.<sup>1</sup> But for having been ordered to accompany Bambata, he would probably not have gone at all. Cakijana declares Bambata had already arrived at the decision to rebel when he joined him ; consequently, if this be true,

<sup>1</sup> This, though not in accordance with Zulu practice, is a method that would naturally commend itself to a man like Dinuzulu, who would realize the danger of adopting normal procedure.



the instigator could not have been Cakijana—for instance, when he represented to Bambata's and Siganda's tribes that it was Dinuzulu's order that they should rebel.

There is not a shred of evidence that any communication passed between Siganda and Bambata until after the Rebellion had started, and this notwithstanding the blood relation between the tribes. Siganda, at his trial at Nkandhla, in June, 1906, a couple of weeks after Mome, stated that, in the absence of Dinuzulu and Mankulumana, he would say nothing, they being the people "who drew this man (*i.e.* Bambata) along here. . . ." *President of Court-Martial*—"I want the names of the people who brought you into trouble." *Answer*—"I say their names are Dinuzulu and Mankulumana. . . . This man Bambata came from their country." Another of Siganda's reasons for not giving his evidence was because he had just heard the messenger he sent to Dinuzulu to report Bambata's arrival at Nkandhla give evidence. With such evidence he fully concurred. What was it? Briefly that Dinuzulu had sent the following reply: "Tell my grandfather, Siganda, that he is to receive my man Bambata into his bosom and take care of him." The witness added that Dinuzulu was at the bottom of the Rebellion, and had said he would assist by ordering various tribes to support Siganda. And the tribes referred to *did* actively support. Other evidence was given showing conclusively that Siganda rebelled solely because of the instructions he had received from Dinuzulu. Now, this is independent and remarkable testimony by one of the oldest and staunchest supporters of the Usutu cause in Zululand.

There remain the names of Bambata and Dinuzulu. We know Bambata rebelled. But was he the principal, or merely an agent or instrument? He has been called a 'madman.' The word '*hlanya*,' however, that was commonly applied to him, also means 'firebrand,' 'desperado,' or 'anarchist'; it was in the latter senses that it was used. Cakijana was the same type of man, though, in addition, with considerable experience of European warfare, arms,

ammunition, etc. This Dinuzulu knew when he directed him to accompany Bambata. Indeed, had the mission been merely the absurdly trivial one of fetching a doctor from a low-caste tribe, a hundred other equally suitable and less martially-inclined messengers could have been got within ten miles of Dinuzulu's kraal and within his own ward. And then not two but one would have been necessary and usual for such a purpose, especially as the man who had recommended the doctor was himself accompanying the messenger. Cakijana lived in another ward, and was not a member of Dinuzulu's tribe.

Bambata was killed during the Rebellion, hence his evidence is not available. His wife and children (the latter aged about 17 and 14 in 1907), declare that he was presented with a rifle and ammunition at Usutu with Dinuzulu's knowledge, whilst the first-mentioned adds that she heard Mankulumana, in Dinuzulu's presence and hearing, incite Bambata to rebel and to use the rifle and ammunition referred to for the purpose. Bambata, too, is known to have informed other people that Dinuzulu had given him the rifle.

On no occasion had Bambata fought against the Government until he met and conversed with Dinuzulu and his indunas, and the fatal blow was struck within a few days of the interviews. The first thing any Native would do when meditating resistance would be to calculate if his force is likely to succeed. That such is Native character, just as it is the character of other races, was brought out by witnesses both in Dinuzulu and Sigananda's trials, to refer to no others. That the same calculation was made by Bambata is probable. That it was because he recognized the futility of taking up arms that he fled when a handful of Police were sent in March to arrest him is abundantly clear. From where, then, did he derive that confidence to attack which at first he lacked? Like a wise man, wishing to oppose the Government when depriving him of his chieftainship, but realizing his inability to do so with success, he went to the only person who *was* able to assist, one described by Natives themselves as "a high



tree, upon which all the birds fed or congregated." That another Chief would be appointed in his place became a certainty to him as soon as he deserted. He, an old Natal resident, well knew the consequences of defiant conduct. Hence, feelings of hostility, together with the motive to fight, were already in his mind when he went to Dinuzulu. They did not arise merely after he got back and saw his uncle had been appointed, for the choice of a successor necessarily lay between the uncle and Bambata's brother, Funizwe. Support is given to this view by the boast Bambata is said to have made to his tribesmen when leaving for Usutu in March: "When next you set eyes on me, I shall be at the head of an army!"

We believe that Bambata went to Dinuzulu *with the resolution to rebel already formed*, and that the sole object of the visit was to obtain from Dinuzulu, at that time believed by ignorant Natives to be all-powerful, an assurance that if he, Bambata, belled the cat, he would obtain the Zulu Chief's support. We believe, after a long and careful study of the facts, that such assurance was unequivocally, though subtly, given. The proof of this is that Bambata fled unhesitatingly to Nkandhla as soon as he rebelled, where he immediately got the support of an acknowledged Usutu adherent, and such was given because Siganda was directed by Dinuzulu to 'protect' Bambata. We do not believe Dinuzulu went out of his way to incite the man to rebel, still less that he sent for him in a cold-blooded way with the object of inciting him to rebel, nor even that he suggested his so doing, because, as we have endeavoured to show, the intent was probably already latent in Bambata's own mind. The 'suggestion' theory is plausible and appears to fit the case exactly, except for the *animus injuriandi* that may reasonably be supposed to have been present in Bambata's mind *before* he started for Usutu. In other words, we believe he was the author, but only because Dinuzulu was accessory. But for the feeling to rebel having occurred spontaneously, we can hardly picture to ourselves his going off to start

a rebellion with only a couple of Dinuzulu's men in attendance. Surely, had the initiative come from Dinuzulu himself, Bambata would not have been content with the terms. On such a hypothesis, they would have been most unusual. No mere agent would have acted with the dash and daring Bambata did. His actions were those of a principal. But for Cakijana, the whole of the men who struck the first blow were members of Bambata's own tribe and entirely under his command. What experience had Dinuzulu of Bambata's fighting capacity that he should select him, a young man, to carry out so vast an undertaking, assuming Dinuzulu to have been actively directing its execution ?

Then, it should be remembered, Dinuzulu was nothing very much to Bambata. His allegiance was allegiance-for-the-time-being, mere opportunism. Bambata belonged to a class (not only a tribe, but a set of tribes) generally looked down on by the Zulus. He was a Lala. Lalas were and are still held by Zulus to be an inferior people ; ancient slanders to the effect that they do not wash before meals, and habitually lie down to sleep in an indecent manner, are indications of the attitude assumed by the aristocratic Zulus towards them. It was with that hereditary social antipathy in mind, conscious that he was accused of being the actual fomentor of insurrection, that Dinuzulu, in his famous message to the Government protesting loyalty and innocence, spoke of the man, with whom he had just had intimate dealings, as ' this dog Bambata.' Zulus regard dogs as filthy creatures and keep them at a distance ; the term, therefore, was intended to give the impression that it was opprobrious. As a matter of fact, it was nothing of the kind. Under these circumstances, it can be seen Bambata's loyalty towards Dinuzulu was not pervaded with that depth of affection and sincerity of devotion which would have animated tribes of a higher class.

As regards ' this dog Bambata ' being connected with Dinuzulu through the latter's marriage with a girl, Nomadhlangala, the contention can be dismissed in a



word. The girl belonged to the Bomvu tribe, that is, to a tribe living next to Bambata's, whose services to the Government, by invading and spoiling Bambata's ward along with the troops, besides other acts of conspicuous loyalty during the Rebellion, have become widely known.

Bambata was naturally impulsive, determined and daring, with an experience of fighting, if only faction fighting. A man of that kind, already inclined to intemperance, with all his substance wasted, and ruin, in the shape of loss of chieftainship, staring him in the face, would not require urging to take up arms. The only point for him to consider, then, would be the amount of support that could be reckoned on.

That the foregoing theory is reasonable is further borne out by what actually happened. Testimony was repeatedly given at various trials—which cannot all be brushed aside by Dinuzulu's petulant exclamation that the witnesses are personal enemies—that Dinuzulu had, at different stages of the Rebellion, either “*given* Sigananda to Bambata,” or “*given* Mehlokazulu to Bambata,” or *given* some other Chief. The meaning was that Dinuzulu had instructed these Chiefs, in some way and at different moments, to assist or support Bambata in fighting the Government. And all the Chiefs that were named did assist. The probabilities are, moreover, that the gun and ammunition obtained by Bambata at Usutu, if given by Dinuzulu, were given not as ocular proof of incitement, but in token of his sympathy and support—not in the shape of fighting material, but to influence others who controlled such material. Such sympathy, however, we believe, was extended only on condition that the identity of the giver was not revealed.

Messengers were sent from Uzutu to Sigananda soon after Bambata got to the forests, directing him to “place Bambata under his armpit,” implying, of course, that the man was to be protected from the Government troops that were sure to follow.

A strong reason why Dinuzulu did not incite Bambata to rebel, except in the sense of assuring him of indirect

support, is the fact that he did not send with him an *induna*, *i.e.* one who is usually an elderly, headringed man. This omission will appeal powerfully to all who know the Zulu character.<sup>1</sup> Cakijana was a man of no rank whatever, though he had once been a servant of Dinuzulu, as well as a member of his bodyguard (Nkomondala); moreover, he was not more than 33 years old, and without that customary sign of manhood and responsibility—a headring. Dinuzulu himself drew the attention of the Government to these facts in defence of his conduct. But, although *prima facie* proof of his not having instigated Bambata, the sending of Cakijana and the other messenger was proof to Bambata and to others of Dinuzulu's readiness to assist, and that was precisely what Bambata wanted. He, as well as Cakijana, made such use of the fact that, as we believe, a false impression was conveyed to Natives at Mpanza, at Nkandhla, and other places, that Dinuzulu himself was rebelling, instead of only *assisting* Bambata to rebel—that is, assisting by using the influence he possessed to practically 'direct' Chiefs to support, although always in a position to retort to the Government that, being only a Chief, he obviously had no authority over other Chiefs, as clearly stipulated in the conditions of repatriation. The conveyance of such impression, and especially its probable communication to the authorities, greatly alarmed Dinuzulu, and possibly was the motive why he so persistently concealed from the Government the fact that Bambata's wife and children were being harboured by him, and, from Bambata's wife, that her husband was dead.

The main feature of this aspect of the case was Dinuzulu's absolute fear of taking any step to start a rebellion in his own name. He could, of course, have made the attempt, but, because closely watched by the Government (particularly during the unrest), by the three Chiefs and hereditary foes that have been named, as well as by

<sup>1</sup> Too much emphasis should not, however, be laid on this, as Dinuzulu was shrewd enough to know that, only by not conforming to normal procedure, would he stand the best chance of cloaking the true intent of his words and actions.



other Chiefs, the game was not worth the candle. He might as well have committed suicide. These are the reasons why he did not embark on a rebellion (as some seem to think it was open to him to do), except to the extent of cautious wire-pulling from a considerable distance. No doubt he did the best that could possibly have been done under the circumstances to embarrass the Government. It certainly was not because he was wholeheartedly loyal that he refrained from rebelling, for the Special Court found him guilty of high treason, and the justice of that finding has never been questioned by anyone.

When Mr. Stainbank was murdered, Mankulumana, as has been seen, was sent with a few men by Dinuzulu, on application being made to him by the Government, to help in arresting the murderer or murderers. The mission met with no success whatever. Only after six years' police inquiry, carried on altogether independently of Dinuzulu's assistance, was the murderer discovered, brought to trial and convicted (July, 1912). This man, Mayatana, turned out to be the son of one of Cetshwayo's principal political messengers. He was well known to Dinuzulu, had for months resided at Usutu, and, during the Boer War, was a member of his bodyguard. It was the same man who, as he himself declared, was sent with Cakijana by Dinuzulu to shoot a man called Gence for having committed adultery with one of Dinuzulu's wives, and causing the Chief to become ill. Gence was accordingly murdered, not, as Mayatana was careful to point out, by himself (though he also fired), but by Cakijana.<sup>1</sup>

The case of Dinuzulu is of many-sided interest, but

<sup>1</sup> When the troops arrived at Nongoma (December, 1907), the same Mayatana volunteered to assist as a 'spy.' As he appeared to be acting in a *bona-fide* manner, his services were accepted. On one occasion, he led the way by night to a cave near Usutu, where a couple of useless guns and a *kamba* full of old cartridge cases were found. It was not, of course, known then that he was a murderer. It is not improbable that, although *apparently* assisting the troops, he was *really* acting in his master, Dinuzulu's, interests the whole time. To have done so, would have been in keeping with Zulu character in time of war.

we cannot stay to examine it further. It is, we believe, destined to become classic, as demonstrating the impossibility of dealing with the Native or, indeed, any subject races on other than lines natural or as natural as possible to themselves. The story is a sad and painful one. No one who goes into it can fail to find a deep pathos running through the whole. That is only to be expected, because of the limitations that were placed on one of such outstanding rank, and after he had already experienced the dangerous honours and pleasures that belong, as of right, to the heir of every vacant throne. It is a story of political faults, and these by no means only on Dinuzulu's side, but it is also the story, especially in later days, of deep-rooted intrigue on the part of the ex-Chief, culminating in a memorable, though merciful, débâcle. He was, as we have seen, placed in an extremely awkward predicament, but the restrictiveness and distastefulness thereof would not, we venture to think, be held by even his most devoted friends to have justified the disloyalty of which he was found to be guilty. At the same time, it is fair to bear in mind that, ever since the Zulu War, he has had to contend with difficulties of so extraordinary a kind as no other Zulu has ever been called on to face.

One cannot but regret that he was allowed to drift as long as he did. The irrationality of his position was practically unperceived, except by those closest to him, and, if perceived by others, insufficiently appreciated, so that a more suitable and timely remedy could be found and applied. But here again, as the reader will have already inferred, both the Imperial and Natal Governments were face to face with obstacles of no ordinary character, which could not have been removed, except by incurring grave risks and, perhaps, even graver than those that were incurred.



## XXIV.

### CONCLUSION.

THAT unusual significance attaches to the events narrated in the foregoing pages, can hardly fail to have impressed the reader. It will, no doubt, have been borne in on him that he is here face to face with the spirit of Africa itself. Attempts have been made to explain the position as it developed. What remains now is to deal with the subject in a more general way—see if what occurred amounted to rebellion ; if so, when it began and came to an end ; estimate the various underlying causes ; attempt replies to some of the criticisms that were passed ; and, finally, put forward one or two suggestions as to future relations between the European and Native races.

#### (i) *Nature of the Rising.*

A number of people, swayed by false accusations of rapacity, unfairness or what not against the colonists, would appear to have come to the conclusion that the Rebellion was of a merely superficial nature. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not that the colonists were or are without blame, for they are of the same type of British settler as is to be found in any other part of the Empire, but such faults as they were responsible for were certainly not, as far as we can see, the principal or moving cause. There was something more fundamental than that.

But before dealing with the causes, let us inquire if what occurred was a rebellion or an insurrection. What

is rebellion? It is "organized armed resistance to the ruler or government of one's country."<sup>1</sup> What is insurrection? It is "the action of rising in arms or open resistance against established authority or governmental restraint."<sup>2</sup>

It would be difficult to prove that the attack on the Police at Trewirgie amounted to rebellion or even to insurrection. It was, however, active resistance to constituted authority at a time when practically the whole country was in a state of unrest and seething with disaffection. The attack was, no doubt, intended to be an act of insurrection or rebellion, though prematurely carried into execution.<sup>3</sup> This conclusion is supported by the fact that it was followed by no other overt act of violence on the part of others; at any rate, not until two months later. But for such occurrence, the Mpanza one would probably not have taken place in the way it did. The former, no doubt, paved the way for the latter, though, at the same time, as a general rebellious spirit was abroad, Trewirgie may be said to have disturbed the formation of plans that were either incubating or would certainly have incubated in an environment favourable for a general rising.

When, however, we come to Bambata's attack, there can be no question but that such was a premeditated act, intended to be the first step in a revolt which, it was hoped, would rapidly become universal.

The Mpanza affair was further characterized by the plans formed in connection therewith. Evidences of plan are found in Cakijana, in the name of Dinuzulu, inciting Bambata's people to rebel, and warning them not to kill European women and children, or other than members of the Militia and Police forces; in the insurgents forth-

<sup>1</sup> J. A. H. Murray & others, *A New English Dictionary on historical principles*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Those concerned were charged and convicted of public violence, murder and "being in arms against the Government and actively resisting constituted authority, and aiding and abetting rebels against the Government."



with crossing to the Nkandhla forests, where the Chief of that part, on receipt of 'instructions' from Dinuzulu, proceeded to protect Bambata; in Siganda, Mehloka-zulu and other Chiefs or headmen promptly assisting Bambata. A war-cry, badges and pass-words, which presently became general, were, moreover, ordered to be used, and so on.

The plan undoubtedly was that the rising should eventually involve the whole of Natal and Zululand. To begin with, hostility was to be allowed to develop out of a spirit of unrest and opposition to the Government, known to have more or less infected the entire Native population. After the insurgents had to some extent established themselves at Nkandhla, they began coercing neighbouring Chiefs to join their cause by raiding their stock. Had suitable opportunity occurred, these methods would have been practised on men living at even greater distances. Later on, two indunas, Macala and another, were, as declared by Mangati, appointed by Dinuzulu—the former to take supreme command of the rebel forces.

But evidences of plan and organization are not of themselves sufficient to decide the point. The character of the motives is also a determining factor.

There is abundant evidence that the Natives of Natal were satisfied with the Crown Colony government that existed up to 1893, whilst those of Zululand were equally contented with the Imperial control which continued until the end of 1897. The majority were averse to being autocratically ruled by Zulu kings of the type of Tshaka, Dingana or Cetshwayo.<sup>1</sup> It is, moreover, certain that they knew themselves to be powerless against European troops. With the recent object-lesson of the Boer War before them, they realized the utter futility and madness of attempting to regain their independence as a nation. There is no evidence of any such thought having been seriously entertained, in spite of Ethiopian propaganda.

<sup>1</sup> They would, however, probably not have objected to being controlled by Dinuzulu as Paramount Chief, provided that he had been appointed by the Government, and became answerable to, and was effectively controlled by, such superior authority.

The most they hoped for was that, as the Imperial troops had been withdrawn, the King would not assist the Colonial Government in the event of hostilities. The mere fact of withdrawing the troops appeared to their limited outlook to show that His Majesty disapproved of the manner in which the Colony, and especially the Native people, were being governed, and would, therefore, probably refrain from helping. Because of apparent disapproval of Natal policy, the sympathies of the King, they thought, would be with the Zulus in any conflict that might arise; and any opposition by them would be held to be justifiable. The mere fact of a quarrel occurring would be good cause why the Imperial Government should intervene and readjust matters. After interfering, a general inquiry would ensue and possibly lead to reversion to the former mode of government, and, perhaps, to the setting up of Dinuzulu as Paramount Chief.

This is the loose reasoning that Dinuzulu and Mankulumana probably indulged in, and this is the only motive that we can assign for the Chief aiding and abetting Bambata as he did. The pronounced way in which the numerous Chiefs, headmen and other Natives that appeared before the Commission approved of Sir Theophilus Shepstone's management of their affairs under Crown Colony government goes to support the theory.

The peculiar instruction that European women and children were not to be murdered or molested, or men other than Police or Militia injured, is also in harmony with the idea, for Dinuzulu knew the Natives would forfeit all sympathy with their cause in England had they put their ordinary methods of warfare into practice. Clearly this extraordinary instruction was issued to gain approval. It was certainly not to placate the rebels. If not the Imperial Government, we fail to see what other people it was intended to influence. No doubt, the severe manner in which Europeans condemned the murders of European women and children as well as civilians by the Matabele (Zulus) in the Rhodesian Rebellion of 1896, had come to Dinuzulu's notice. If the motive was



simply to destroy European government and set up their own in its place, it is obvious no such order would have been issued.

It may be incidentally remarked that many Europeans, particularly at the beginning of the rising, were in a great state of alarm lest the Natives should rise *en bloc* and massacre them. The great difficulties of combination between Chiefs were, however, insufficiently realized, especially as many were loyal, or at least neutral, and would have reported any hostile plans or intentions that came to their notice.

We believe the order about not putting European women and children to death was issued, and it is not unlikely that credit therefor should be given to Dinuzulu himself. At the same time, one should bear in mind that the Natives of Natal and Zululand, upwards of a million in number, were in a completely disorganized condition. To a great extent, they looked to Dinuzulu as their head, and he, no doubt, desired to be their leader. They would have wished for nothing better than that he should lead in an active manner. The fact remains that he did not take up such position, and certainly a man like Bambata could never have done so. Therefore, although Dinuzulu might have given the order, there was no guarantee, had the Government dealt with the Rebellion in a less rigorous manner than it did, that the rebels, especially if they had secured a few successes in different parts of the country, would not have become so elated as to act *as they saw fit*, in the belief that the day had at last come when the white man was to be driven back into the sea 'from whence he came.'

As proof that the foregoing supposition is not incorrect, we find that the civilians Veal, Sangreid and Walters were murdered, and Robbins seriously wounded.<sup>1</sup> And these incidents happened two or three months after issue of the order.

<sup>1</sup> Sangreid was murdered and Robbins wounded, in direct contravention of the orders issued by the Chief (Ndhlovu), who was in command of the *impi*. Ndhlovu was only a mile or two away when the incidents occurred.

One can understand Bambata's animus towards the Government, but, as has already been shown, Bambata was backed or supported by Dinuzulu. Had his actions not been so directed, it is impossible to understand how the many rebels that joined him could have done so merely for the sake of fighting against the Government in the certain knowledge of being speedily annihilated. So many members of a normally sane and phlegmatic people would never have followed an *ignis fatuus* and sacrificed themselves on the mere chance that the public would benefit. It is inconsistent with Zulu character for a man to sacrifice himself, unless there be a reasonable probability of material advantage accruing. We, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that their only reason for taking up arms was because they believed, and believed on what appeared to be the best possible authority, that Dinuzulu desired and had 'ordered' them to fight to further some practical, profitable scheme or another which he had in mind.

Another possible motive was, by offering sharp and stubborn resistance, to demonstrate to all concerned, more plainly than words could do, that the people resented the way in which they were being governed, and so urge their local rulers to bring about a change for the better. These aimless or improvident tactics are, indeed, of a merely animal type, such, for instance, as a dog, continually irritated by its master, might resort to.

Having regard to Dinuzulu's association with the rising in the capacity, to some extent, of invisible mentor and director, we cannot believe that, with his by no means scanty knowledge of Imperial rule and of Natal responsible government, especially of the conditions under which he had been repatriated, and of the political relations subsisting between the Home Government and Natal, he would not have had some ulterior object in view, even though not given expression to at the time. His personal preference for the Imperial Government has always been strong, consequently restoration of something akin to Crown Colony government was naturally



what would have been uppermost in his mind and supplied a sufficiently practical goal. If, however, responsible government could not be revoked, the conditions under which he had been repatriated might conceivably have been revised by establishing him as Paramount Chief and, through him, improving the status and condition of the people at large. That such thoughts were actually in his mind is proved by his own words to Sir Henry McCallum at the important interview that took place in Pietermaritzburg in May, 1907: "I do not wish," he said, "to conceal it from your Excellency that the whole of the people, the Zulus, like me, as the son of my father, who was their king formerly. . . . Now, I feel it very hard on me, as I have been placed on a level with all other headmen and Chiefs in the country. We are just like a flock of goats, we are all the same. . . . I feel very pained about something that I wish to state. My father went to war with the British Government; he was beaten; he was taken away from the country, but afterwards, . . . allowed to return. . . . Notwithstanding that he was returned by the kindness of the Home Government to his home in Zululand, I feel, and I wish to speak plainly here, that he was not treated as he should have been, nor I, nor the people of Zululand, as other nations or peoples who have gone to war with the Government have been treated. . . . We cannot help feeling that we Zulu people have been discriminated against, and have not had the same treatment meted out to us as to other races. . . . There is no one over us all who might be held responsible and as a superior to keep them together and to give them advice and direction."<sup>1</sup>

We do not believe the ordinary Natives were well enough informed to appreciate the general motives here imputed to Dinuzulu, but it was not at all necessary that they should know them before acting as 'directed' by their supreme head. In the patriarchal system, blind and unquestioning obedience is rendered, as a matter of course, even to Chiefs; much more so in the case of a

<sup>1</sup> Cd. 3888, pp. 79, 80.

Paramount Chief or King. For all they knew, the ordinary Natives might, in 1906, have been fighting for anything else. It was sufficient to know that they were acting by direction of their 'King,' the adequacy and practicability of the end in view being a matter left entirely for him to decide. Loyalty and devotion such as this could not but be admired by all who witnessed it.

It is just as well, from the rebels' point of view, that Dinuzulu did not reveal his objective (assuming the one imputed to him to be correct), otherwise many must have realized at once the futility of their endeavours. After all, he himself saw the game was hardly worth the candle, which accounts for his contenting himself with working through other tribes, *i.e.* through those over whom, *ex hypothesi*, he had no official jurisdiction.

Although he was, by birth, the supreme head, his authority was not recognized by many Natives, especially in Natal, *i.e.* where the new taxation pressed most heavily. Armed opposition was, therefore, contemplated to some extent independently of his control. The murder of Smith at Umlaas Road, the incident at Trewirgie, the exhibitions of defiance to various Magistrates, cannot be explained, except as spontaneous, isolated and purely local outbursts of hostile feeling in which Dinuzulu was not implicated. He had his reasons for promoting hostilities, whilst the Natives in general, particularly those in Natal, had theirs. He distinctly appears to have exercised restraint, and prevented the rising from resolving itself into isolated outbreaks in all parts of Natal and Zululand, regulated by nothing but the caprice of self-appointed leaders.

In these circumstances, the only conclusion we can come to is that the rising, dominated as it was from start to finish by Dinuzulu's personality, was more of the character of an insurrection than of a rebellion, for, although apparently aiming at a change in the constitution, such change, as we believe, was intended to be brought about by the Imperial Government of its own motion, as soon as the time came for intervening. It



was what may be styled a limited or incipient rebellion, although the rebels themselves, and certain sections of the people, appear to have acted in the belief that the object was or ought to be nothing less than expulsion of the white race from Natal, if not from South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

That the taking of action against Dinuzulu was deferred until sixteen months after the conclusion of the Rebellion, is accounted for by his at first being presumed to be loyal; his having quickly paid the poll tax; and his offer of a levy. Had Colonel McKenzie received, prior to August, 1906, the subsequently-obtained information of the Chief's treasonable conduct—it is needless to say that he would have been dealt with without delay.

(ii) *Causes, motives, etc., of the Rebellion.*

The vexed question of the causes of the Rebellion appears simpler now that practically the whole of the evidence is available, by which we mean that of the Native Affairs Commission, of Dinuzulu's and other trials, and of numerous other official and private records. But, in dealing with the subject, one is at once confronted with a number of difficulties. The so-called 'causes' are found to resolve themselves into causes, motives and occasions, these again being capable of further subdivision. The word 'cause' will here be restricted to any action on the part of the Government or colonists that tended to bring about in the Natives an attitude of hostility or rebelliousness; 'motive' will be limited to anything which was an inducement to advance from attitude to action; and 'occasion' will be regarded as an opportunity, time, or state, favourable for rebelling. It is one thing for Dinuzulu to have had motives and occasions for promoting insurrection, quite another as to what causes had been at work in bringing about a rebellious spirit in the people.

<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding the above conclusion, we have not felt justified in altering the title of the book. Throughout South Africa and elsewhere, the rising is spoken of as a rebellion.

The first, elementary, and most striking fact in connection with the upheaval is the profound and natural differences that existed between the contending races. Their civilizations were widely different. They had different creeds; different social systems; different habits and customs; different languages, history and traditions; a different physical, moral and intellectual nature and equipment; different tastes, ideals and outlooks on life, and countless other differences. Although the causes of any general conflict between a higher and a lower race are not, perhaps, necessarily deep-seated, in this particular instance we believe they arose out of the all-round radical differences referred to, and were as fundamental as it was possible for them to be.

Because of being a different race, the Natives, as has been seen, were governed by a set of laws different to those of the Europeans. This they strongly approved. It was, indeed, after their heart's desire. But, with the introduction of Responsible Government and development of European towns, commerce, industries, institutions, etc., Native Affairs received a gradually diminishing amount of attention on the part of the European community. As the Europeans progressed and became more engrossed in their own affairs, necessity for safeguarding purely Native interests seemed to recede further into the background. This was, to some extent, due to Members of the Legislative Assembly being invariably elected by a purely European electorate. When, as a result of the Boer War, severe financial depression came about, and Parliament was compelled to raise money, the Poll Tax Act was passed, though without being specially referred to the Natives. Theoretically there was no necessity for reference, for they were represented by Members of both Houses. The fault was not really attributable to the Government, still less to the colonists, but was rather one of the inevitable results of Responsible Government, and especially of Western Civilization, of which such Government was a natural outcome. In



the Constitution Act,<sup>1</sup> elaborate provision was made for the protection of European interests, but no other than general provision on behalf of the Natives. That the action taken in respect of the latter was indefinite, was owing to their being barbarians, and in a very backward state of civilization. Nothing, therefore, was more natural than that the pendulum should eventually swing unduly in favour of the Europeans. As, however, the grant of Responsible Government came from the Imperial Government, such Government cannot be absolved from a share of the blame for the one-sided—and perhaps, for the time being, necessarily one-sided—tendencies inherent in the Constitution Act.

The specific grievances date, for the most part, from this granting of Responsible Government. Prior to that time, the Natives were under the immediate control of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, or officers who managed their affairs on more or less similar lines. On such regime, all still look back with affection and gratitude. But the seeds of friction and discord were nevertheless latent, only time being needed for them to develop into actual antagonism.

Apart from the system of Responsible Government, another disturbing cause was the immigration of Europeans and Indians. This had gone on steadily before 1893 and since. These increases, combined with a greatly-augmented Native population, seriously affected the conditions of living and, on account of the keener struggle for existence in a changing environment, the easy-going and comparatively indolent Native was obliged to go more and more to the wall.

It was, therefore, impossible to prevent the impression gaining ground, especially in later times, with an accelerated spreading of enlightenment, that the Natives were being discriminated against and, with such impression, accentuated by the sinister Ethiopian propaganda disseminated throughout the country since 1892, loss of confidence in the white man's rule became inevitable.

<sup>1</sup> That is, the Act of 1893, inaugurating Responsible Government.

That Natives arrived at the conclusion that they were being discriminated against must be taken as fact. Dinuzulu's interview with the Governor proves that he personally had arrived at the same conclusion. Instances of like views will be found throughout the Evidence given before the Native Affairs Commission. We are not prepared to deny that this view is to a large extent correct, though cannot go the length of condemning Natal Native policy in such unmeasured terms as some are inclined to do. The clashing that occurred seems to have arisen more out of the innate character of Western Civilization than out of specific injustice, repression or inordinate self-seeking on the part of the colonists.

When once a people begins to feel that it is accorded no particularly definite status in the country, that its welfare is of no special concern to the rulers, except as a means to the latter's material advancement, that its members, in short, are pariahs in what, but a few years before, was their own country, then the time is not far distant when they may be expected to make a bid for liberty. It is beside the question to set about to defend the principles of any policy when such impression is abroad and the country in a ferment; if people believe they are being down-trodden, the *belief*, justifiable or not, is what has to be reckoned with. In Natal, it was a fact that many Natives believed themselves to be a down-trodden race, and it was this general fact which seems to us to have been a main underlying cause of their rebelliousness. But, whilst being a cause, one thing must be borne clearly in mind. The insurrection was partial, not universal. Had various Natal governments shown no regard whatever for the people's interests and welfare, and been content merely to exploit them for the benefit of the white race, no one will deny that such feelings of hatred would have been engendered as to have caused the rising to be far more extensive and formidable than it was. That there should have been warfare at all is bad enough, but it is at least fair to Natal to remember that the great mass of the people did not feel that pro-



vocation, sufficient for taking up arms, had been given. This testimony is manifestly in favour of successive governments not having been quite so callous as some have endeavoured to make out. Of course, the comparatively few who actually armed—between 10,000 and 12,000—wished to organize a general insurrection or rebellion; of that there is abundant evidence; and such plan might have succeeded had the rising not been sternly met and speedily repressed. The malcontents, knowing that the effects of European rule were felt as more or less oppressive by the majority of their kinsmen—just as the majority would, in time, have regarded as oppressive the rule of the highest type of British or any other rulers that could possibly have been selected—and knowing that the poll tax had still further embittered their race against European rule, calculated that the time was ripe for general rebellion. They reckoned that far greater numbers would have joined than actually did. But they were disappointed. They failed to allow sufficiently for the inertia of those who, though not particularly enamoured of European rule, saw nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by resort to arms. Even Dinuzulu, in spite of his promise, and after exerting his influence on Siganda, Mehlokazulu and others, failed at the critical moment to afford active support. The fact is that the Natal Government had not become altogether intolerable, except to such recognized renegades as Bambata. In every State of the world, numbers of malcontents are ever ready to rise against any government that happens to be in power. Natal was no exception to the rule. And when her day of trial came, she had perforce to depend on the loyalty of the remainder of the people, and the strength of her own right hand. If the management of the Native races by Natal was worse than is here made out, how comes it that her entire Native population throughout the Boer War, which began but six, and ended four, years before the Rebellion, was as consistently loyal as it was throughout that protracted war; that Dinuzulu assisted

as he did with scouts and levies (though not for the purpose of actual fighting); that, so far from wanting to rebel, the Chiefs offered their services, which, however, could not be accepted on the ground that the war was 'a white man's war'—and all this notwithstanding that the Colony had been invaded, and one of its principal towns besieged by the enemy for upwards of three months? Clearly, Natal's rule had not, at that time, become so unbearable as to cause the people to prefer a regime set up by Dinuzulu, or some other Zulu despot.

Under the circumstances, we come to the conclusion that the fundamental cause was the introduction and imposition on the aborigines of a type of civilization radically different from their own. The Government, first Imperial, latterly Colonial, was necessarily the instrument whereby such civilization was introduced and imposed. Responsibility for all that occurred must, therefore, be thrown, as it was thrown by Natives, on the Government, even the breaking down of their social system through the unremitting effects of Missionary teaching, the undermining of the tribal system by European landlordism, the innumerable deleterious effects caused by degraded or dishonest classes of Europeans, and in other ways.

This establishment and promotion of Western Civilization operated in various ways on the Natives: (*a*) restrictions were imposed on former conditions or modes of life; (*b*) indiscriminate licence was extended to various sections, as well as to Europeans, whilst, at the same time, (*c*) obligations to conform to the new conditions of life were enforced.

Let us consider some of the principal causes of discontent that sprang from this action.

Under (*a*): Natives were prohibited from undergoing military service, or joining in various military occupations, which, as shown in Chapter IV., took up a very large portion of their time; they were precluded from leading the nomadic life customary with them for ages; individual kraalheads were restricted, by the setting



up of a system of freehold tenure by Europeans, from going to live where they wished, and many of the old and recognized thoroughfares were closed by the fences put up ; polygamy became more difficult because of the hut tax, and there was prescription in respect of *lobolo* claims ; the national Feast of the First-Fruits, as well as other feasts and social gatherings, were either stopped, or interfered with, not, however, without good reason ; Chiefs' powers of criminal and civil jurisdiction were circumscribed, as also the control exercised by heads of families over their wives and children ; diviners were prohibited from practising their calling ; restrictions were imposed on hunting game, cutting wood, or making gardens in forests ; and Natives were unable to enter towns, except when clad in European dress.

Under (b) : Too many Chiefs were appointed, a number of these not being entitled by hereditary rank or position to the posts ; usurpation by some European landlords of several of the functions of Chiefs, or otherwise imposing restrictions on their authority ; making consent by all girls to marriage obligatory ; permitting boys and girls to break away from their parents or guardians, in order to be converted or educated ; creating undue facilities for women to obtain divorce, or break away from their homes to lead immoral lives, etc. ; exaction of excessive rents by various European landlords ; excessive charges by certain lawyers ; too many Native herbalists allowed to practise, a large proportion being unqualified and unscrupulous ; usury by certain Europeans, especially lawyers, farmers, and other employers of labour.

Under (c) : In a Christian community, with children being converted to Christianity and educated, parents were obliged in various ways to adapt themselves more and more to the changing conditions, even though themselves against being converted or educated on European lines. Enlightenment, religious and secular, accentuated by Ethiopian propaganda, infused a spirit of equality in the people. This, in a polygamistic environment, was destructive of marital and parental authority, besides

undermining the authority, privileges and prestige of every Chief in the country. In the case of Dinuzulu, such influences would have been particularly acute and rapid.

Besides the inconveniences involved, the spectacle of a rapidly-disintegrating and decaying tribalism was always before the people, and, with this, the vanishing of cherished national ideals, traditions, beliefs, folklore, etc.

Other permanent obligations were the having to pay various taxes, rents, and other charges; to carry passes; to register births and deaths; the census-taking, 1904.

Under the same head, may be included other causes which were but inevitable where two such races lived together in the same country: Interference by certain Europeans with Native women and girls; communication of human and stock diseases formerly unknown, *e.g.* leprosy, small-pox, bubonic plague, consumption,—lung-sickness, rinderpest, East Coast Fever.<sup>1</sup>

Among miscellaneous causes were: Laying off large numbers of farms in Zululand for the occupation of Europeans; the inconsiderate manner in which the police, especially Native police, behaved towards Natives; punishment and removal of Chiefs without proper trial; obligation to work on roads and public works (*isibalo*); impoverishment of the people through the effects of locusts, rinderpest, East Coast Fever, etc.; introduction of indentured Indians, thereby supplanting Native labour. Of these, the laying off of farms in Zululand was far the most important.

The alienating of land in Zululand to Europeans has always been regarded by the royal house as a serious menace. Although liberal grants were made to mission societies and to the Boers, it was never intended that Europeans should obtain holdings in the heart of the country, as they did shortly before the Rebellion, and thereby break up the nation by subjecting individuals to the payment of rent, as in Natal. It will, therefore, be

<sup>1</sup> Blame for the introduction of such diseases is held by the Zulus to attach to Europeans. But for their being in the country, Natives, they say, would not have been so afflicted.



understood that the laying off of farms along the coast and elsewhere for sugar planting, etc., would have been deeply though silently resented by Dinuzulu as nominal head of the people.

In addition to the foregoing, the semi-educated class of Natives, known as Kolwas, had complaints, but as the people affected were comparatively few, there is no necessity for specifying them, except to point out that the charging of rents on mission reserves, and difficulties in obtaining (a) the franchise, (b) exemption in respect of certain children, (c) firearms, and (d) European liquor, were regarded by some as indications of being distrusted or unreasonably discriminated against.

As the root-cause of the Rebellion was, briefly, the attempt made to impose the European character and civilization on the Native races, the various causes above given were of a merely subsidiary or contributory nature. Hence it is unfair to charge Natal governments with failing to circumvent what, in the nature of the circumstances, was largely unavoidable, just as many similar causes now and for long existing in other parts of South Africa are more or less unavoidable.

When, however, through the operation of the foregoing causes, the people felt disposed to take up arms, other things were required before they would *act*, among these, what may be called *the inciting cause*. This, of course, was the poll tax. This is what tended to bring about combination. It gave the Natives heart, or *ubudoda* (manliness) as they called it. It was precisely what they needed, in their loose, disintegrated state. And so, curiously enough, the poll tax played exactly the same part among them that a similar tax did in the Wat Tyler Rebellion in England in 1381, and as the 'greased cartridges' did in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. It is a mistake to speak of the poll tax as having caused the Rebellion; it was merely a contributory cause, and not among the most important of those that have been cited.

The principal *motive* of the Rebellion would appear to be the one indicated on pp. 506, 507. But there was also

a general desire by the people for a form of government more in harmony with their national and individual aspirations. Reference should also be made to Ethiopian propaganda, especially the political cry "Africa for the Africans," the text of many an address shortly before the Insurrection. It was perpetually put forward, no doubt, in order to furnish people with a motive for opposing or counteracting European domination and alleged oppression. The cry was heard, not only in Natal, but throughout South Africa. Natives were told that the Europeans had forfeited the right to rule, and that it and the country had accordingly reverted once more to the Black House. There were yet other inducements, viz.: the Baqulusi having succeeded in massacring the commando at Holkrantz, thereby lowering the prestige of the Europeans in the eyes of Natives; the lessons of the Boer War, such as the guerilla tactics that were practised; and the contempt by Natives for Europeans, owing to the familiar manner in which many had been treated by British troops. There is no doubt that these motives also powerfully influenced the people.

Among the *occasions* may be mentioned: Withdrawal of Imperial troops from Natal; inability of the Germans to suppress the rising in Damaraland (West Africa); sense of superiority felt by Natives through being much more numerous than the colonists; palpable growth of Dinuzulu's influence; general decay of the authority of Chiefs, kraal-owners,<sup>1</sup> etc.; increase of hooliganism and lawlessness; belief that such fastnesses as Nkandhla were impregnable; belief that they (Natives) were impervious to bullets; belief, engendered by the widely-spread pig-fowl-killing order, that the time had arrived when the white race must be driven out or exterminated.

<sup>1</sup> This decay arose out of refusal on the part of many to conform to ancient tribal observances, habits and customs; of their detaching themselves from tribes to live under European landlords, etc.; of women refusing to render obedience to husbands, or breaking away to lead immoral lives; of the failure of boys to return to their homes, and so forth. The following has reference to European authority: detachment from European ecclesiastical control, even of long duration, to set up independent churches.



(iii) *Replies to Criticisms.*

The way in which the campaign was conducted was sharply criticized by persons in England and elsewhere, chiefly from two points of view, viz. the disparity in losses sustained, and the rigour with which the rebels were dealt with. Now, it is one of the principal objects of a commander to prevent unnecessary loss to his side, and no part of his plans to make sacrifices merely because heavy punishment is being meted out to the enemy. The greater the injury inflicted, with the least loss to himself, is one of the highest marks of generalship, particularly where his opponent vastly exceeds him in numbers. As, in every military school, one finds it approved to strike effective blows at the enemy's *moral*, under what circumstances can this be better done than when he is driven to finding himself out-generalled at every point, and losing more men than his adversary? What, more than cheaply-achieved successes, is better calculated to depress the exuberant spirits of barbarous rebels and sooner bring about their surrender? Justifiable or unjustifiable, rebellion should, in the interests of the community, be stamped out and stamped out thoroughly.

The losses of European troops in various Native wars in South Africa, particularly in recent times, have almost always been greater than those sustained by Natal in 1906, relatively to the personnel engaged.<sup>1</sup> When it is considered that the casualties sustained by the enemy totalled only about 2,300 in a four-month's campaign, with upwards of 9,000 European troops and some 6,000 Native loyalists engaged, it will be seen that the losses were proportionately less severe than in other South African Native wars.

The disparity in losses was accounted for primarily by the insurgents being in an unorganized condition. It is inevitable that, where hordes of more or less disorganized barbarians attack properly-trained troops, armed with

<sup>1</sup> For statement, showing casualties among European troops during the Rebellion, see Appendix I.

modern weapons, mortality among the former will be far greater than among the latter. One thing, however, is quite clear. Had the O.C. Troops not dealt with the situation in a prompt and resolute manner, but afforded opportunities to the rebels to augment their forces, the proportion of casualties would have been even more striking than it was.

Most of the criticism in question came as usual from a few noisy people in England, who quite forgot the absurdly few casualties that were sustained by the Imperial troops in the Zulu War, as compared with the number of Zulus who were killed ; nor did they remember that Pretorius, at the famous battle of Blood River, had three men wounded (including himself), as against 3,000 Zulus killed. It is one of the ironies of life that persons wholly ignorant, or almost wholly ignorant, of local conditions, succeeded in getting many to attend to and believe their clamour. Such incidents as the cold-blooded attack on the Police at Mpanza were glozed over or forgotten by these zealots, whose chief glory consisted in traducing the motives and actions of their own kin to the best of their ability. Everything the savages did was right, everything that those of their own race did was wrong, wrong, not because of any inherent defect, but wrong just because they are white and not black. All murders, mutilations of corpses, looting, incendiarism and terrorization of loyalists were condoned. It occurred not to these 'judges' to study the facts. If the rebels did anything that wore the appearance of wrong-doing, the act was justified by asserting (wholly regardless of the facts) that the act was but a consequence of the commission of some greater wrong. No act was isolated and considered on its own merits. If Bambata waylaid 150 Police along a difficult road, firing a broadside into a twenty-men advanced guard at a distance of five yards, in the dark, before outbreak of hostility of any kind, the act was justified by the fact that the ringleader had been deposed from his chieftainship by the Government, and because he was but protesting against the imposition of a poll tax of £1 per head. If



the reasons why Bambata was deposed, or the circumstances under which the poll tax was levied, had been advanced, other excuses would have been found, and attempts made to justify at every point, with an ardour born of such as had not actually lived in the country and had nothing to lose.

The unbridled resentment and public defiance exhibited at Mapumulo, Umzinto, Nkandhla, Pietermaritzburg and Durban magistracies—at each of which places the Natives vastly outnumbered the civil authorities then present; the audacity of the murders of Hunt and Armstrong; and the still cooler attack at Mpanza,—with isolated, cold-blooded murders, such as Stainbank, Veal, Walters, Powell and Sangreid, accompanied by horrible mutilation (where this was possible),—were all these exhibitions of barbarity to have no effect whatever on the troops, most of whom had been born and bred in the country, and knew the place of the Native in the community?

Natal was being governed in accordance with Native law. Such condition naturally conferred on the higher race a position of privilege and ascendancy, whilst maintaining the Natives in a social system inherited from a far-off past. This eminence had, in the course of two generations, become settled or habitual. The Natives recognized it and had accommodated themselves thereto. When, therefore, the foregoing incidents occurred, they were rightly regarded as serious. This is one of the reasons why the shooting down of the rebels was occasionally as severe as it was, though not on nearly so large a scale as has been supposed.

There remains another and, perhaps, the chief explanation. The spectacle of a subject, lower and uncivilized race rising against its conquerors and lawful masters, with whom it had lived at peace for many years, could not fail to evoke the best energies of the latter to maintain its prestige, though to have to do this in the face of the odds possibly becoming one to ten, demanded the greatest energy, and a drawing on all available resources. It was not a time for half-measures. Rebellion had broken out.

Rebellion by subjects, so long in a state of subjection, was expected to be capable of rapidly infecting the entire mass, unless sternly repressed. The possibility of universal massacres of women and children arose before the calmest minds. Such wanton butchery had taken place in the Matabele Rebellion in 1896, the Matabeles being, as is well known, off-shoots of the Zulus. It was a fire that had started, and in a country covered with long, dry grass. If allowed to spread, it would soon have given rise to winds that would have swept it still further along in every direction. Once out of control of their Chiefs, as many were known to have got, others would have followed the example. The best way of pandering to such condition was to have dealt leniently, patiently and mercifully with every transgressor. But, with the elemental forces of human fury let loose, Dinuzulu, as rebel or as loyalist, would have been unable to control or to check them; he was largely a figurehead. Nor, as has already been pointed out, were the ordinary Chiefs able to control. It, therefore, behoved the Government to deal with the situation promptly, and with the same severity that any wise man would be expected to use towards a fire threatening to destroy his house and all his belongings. That is why the ablest soldiers were employed. That is why McKenzie was placed in supreme command, and that is why he, almost in spite of himself, became the exponent of a drastic policy—the policy of necessity. The Government was manifestly under every obligation to protect the people, not less Native loyalists than members of its own and other European and Asiatic races. After all, there is such a law as that of self-preservation. That is what mainly warranted these undoubtedly severe, but unavoidable measures. And yet the troops were exceedingly well-disposed to the Zulu race as a whole. Satisfactory relations exist to-day between the Natives and the colonists, and will long continue to exist, unless petty, misguided policies be brought into practice.

The severity of the punishment during actual hostilities, or rather until such moment as it appeared certain



the Rebellion had been "got under," received the fullest approval of every loyalist Native.<sup>1</sup> Nor was their commendation other than sincere. It was spontaneously and repeatedly, though, of course, cautiously expressed. There were, indeed, isolated actions which did not meet with such or anybody else's approval. The commission of irregularities in the circumstances depicted, under a general licence to stamp out rebellion at the earliest moment—a rebellion started by the Natives themselves—was only to be expected, just as they occur and are rightly condemned in every war.

It may be pointed out here that, on leaving Zululand, after witnessing the operations for several weeks, Major-General Stephenson expressed his satisfaction with the way in which they had been conducted, and also testified to "the gallantry displayed by the men, and to the readiness with which they fought their way through the scrub."

Since the Rebellion came to an end, Natal has made special endeavours to remove all reasonable and remediable complaints. Her efforts to improve the relations between the two races, especially by appointing a sympathetic Council for Native Affairs, as well as Native Commissioners, have met with success, so that restoration of mutual confidence and good feeling on a satisfactory basis is rapidly becoming an accomplished fact.<sup>2</sup>

The arrest of Dinuzulu and his subsequent removal to the Transvaal have completely put an end to the unrest that existed both before and after the disturbances. Zululand and Natal are in a more peaceful state now than they have been at any time since Dinuzulu came back from St. Helena.

It is generally allowed that, after a man has been tried and punished, he is entitled to enjoy once more all the rights of citizenship, but the circumstances connected with Dinuzulu being what they are, we cannot but

<sup>1</sup> One of these, a Chief, expressed the view that the youths who had rebelled would not fight again, "no, not till their grandchildren are born."

<sup>2</sup> In 1912, however, the Union Government abolished both the Council and three of the four Native Commissioners.

consider the haste with which he was appointed one of the Presidents of the newly-formed South African Native Congress as somewhat unseemly and unwise.

(iv) *Remarks concerning Native policy.*

Now that there has been time for sober reflection, the one great fact that seems to emerge, after reviewing the situation in its many aspects, is the inadequacy of organic connection between the Europeans and the Natives. As it is, the needs of the people as a nation are apparently insufficiently expressed. The half-educated Natives, especially if they be those who have, or appear to have, turned their backs on the modes of life of their parents and ancestors, are the ones who succeed most in catching the eye of the European public. The masses, to whom in fact they belong, remain in the meantime practically inarticulate; they are, as Milton might have called them, but 'blind mouths.' Their wants and necessities, *from their own peculiar points of view*, are given expression to by no one. No one seems to have courage enough to champion their cause and to defend a system of life which, if evolution means anything whatever, must be of intrinsic value, from the mere fact that it exists after the countless generations the people have lived in the land. And yet the Natives, even the uncivilized masses, are, in the fullest sense of the words, British subjects, and, as such, entitled to at least the elementary rights of such subjects. Surely, among these rights (as with all European governments) is the ability to live in accordance with a system sanctioned probably by thousands of years of continuous usage,—the great, natural system of Africa.

Under the form of administration established for the Natives, numerous Magistrates have been appointed in various localities, whilst at least twice as many police stations have also been set up. The Police, however, were unwisely detached from the Magistrates; the unwisdom lay in the fact that the action was taken much too soon. This, in the main, with head offices in Pietermaritzburg,



is the machinery for bringing the Chiefs and ordinary Native public into touch with the Government. Aided in subsidiary ways by Missionaries, teachers and other agencies, this is what has aimed at establishing a healthy organic connection between the one race and the other. Was it, is it, sufficient? So long as the great majority of Natives live under the tribal system, many of whose peculiar laws and customs have been embodied in a Code, given the force of law by Parliament, it does not seem that the link between the two people is as strong and effective as it ought to be. If the tribal system is to succeed, it should be given a chance. That chance, it would appear, should be to revive and encourage such unobjectionable and salutary forms of control as were customary under the old system. For

“Nature is made better by no mean  
But Nature makes that mean.”

It is absurd to suppose that Magistrates and Police, Missionaries or educationists, the whole varying in their methods as their idiosyncrasies, can so dovetail into a more or less normal system of Native life as to supply such influences, necessary under the system, which Chiefs, assisted by councils and with extensive judicial and administrative functions, were formerly able to afford. In the first place, they have not the time to give that close, expert attention to purely Native matters, social and domestic, which Chiefs and their councils were able to do. In the second, supposing them to have the requisite knowledge, which it is safe to say is very far indeed from being the case, they have not the inclination. Their inclinations are in the direction of their own racial affairs, and rightly so. Thus, the Natives experience a need, a need which no Magistrates, Policemen, Missionaries or teachers are able to supply, even though further assisted by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Native High Court, or Supreme Chief. In consequence of an insufficiently intimate supervision of a thousand and one questions of interior economy, social and domestic, grievances of all

descriptions arise and exist for months and years before they are removed. Such state of affairs is by no means peculiar to Natal, one finds it prevailing throughout South Africa, and apparently wherever else in the world a white race presides over the destinies of a coloured one.

The lesson here, then, not only for Natal but the Union of South Africa, seems to be just this. If the tribal system is to exist, and there are a thousand reasons why it should, it should be permitted to nourish and comfort the people more than it does. It should be recognized as a good,—to be maintained and reinforced, although in time doomed to be supplanted by something else,—not as an evil to be suppressed by European, *i.e.* *alien* agency, at the earliest possible date.

If the proposal above referred to be gone into, it would, we believe, be found to involve Europeans and Natives living, to a great extent, in separate and clearly-defined areas (always allowing for reasonable exceptions), each with substantially their own organization and controlling machinery, and each developing along lines that accord with common sense and are, at the same time, in harmony with the law of nature. It would also be found that the peoples would be firmly linked together from the mere fact of their independent existences being formally recognized for all purposes, say, in the Constitution itself. In that way and probably in that alone is it possible for such alarming relative positions between white and black, as one sees between Negroes and Europeans in America, to be avoided in South Africa, temporarily and possibly permanently. It would be just as well, too, to bear in mind that the ratio between white and black, so far from being about seven to one, as in the United States, is about one to four.<sup>1</sup> Hence it is not unlikely that the letting loose of such forces as are now operating with so much harm in North America will, before long, bring on a crisis of altogether exceptional severity in South Africa. With the ever-increasing European education we are

<sup>1</sup> At the Census of May, 1911, there were 1,276,242 Europeans, 4,019,006 Natives, and 678,146 other Coloured Races.



giving the people, coupled with countless opportunities of increasing their material prosperity, it follows that only lapse of time is necessary for all sorts of demands to be put forward more or less justly, and this by a race that is being compelled *against their natural instincts* to take on the European character. They will, of course, demand the franchise and press for admission to all grades of the civil service, the bench, and the bar ; show cause why existing restrictions in regard to firearms, passes, liquor, etc., etc. shall be removed ; and so forth. And so the movement of independence, once the people have fairly broken away from the simple, strong and wholesome restraints of their own systems of life, will go on increasing in volume and intensity, until visions of Hayti and Liberia begin to rise before European imagination.

Thus, the price of our precipitate destruction of Native modes of life, or rather callousness in not subserving these modes to the best of our ability, not by way of amusement or sentiment, but because imperatively necessary for the welfare of the State and the interests of the Natives themselves, is that our own character, traditions, creed, language, etc., will ultimately be undermined and displaced by those of the people. As it is, they are ever laughing at our supreme and obviously suicidal folly. We are, in fact, not competing with the coloured races at all in the way races are supposed to do, and do, in accordance with the theory of evolution, we are rather carefully and continually loading the dice against ourselves. The inevitable result of not permitting free-play to the principle of natural selection will be that, from their greatly preponderating numbers, if for no other reason, they will ultimately survive, whilst the European community will cease as such to exist. No other result apparently can flow from a wanton ignoring of, or running counter to, the immutable principles of nature. Let us but continue as we are doing, to suppress and eradicate the habits, customs, languages, traditions, ideals, etc., etc., of the people, and our ultimate expulsion or absorption by the Bantu races who, in our present ascendancy, we so much

neglect, will follow as surely as day follows night. And many are already beginning to see this.

It cannot too often be called to mind that our Natives differ vastly from the Negroes in America through having social systems, creeds, traditions and ideals of their own, all many, many generations old. Why does not the State use these precious assets more than it does? Why are they wilfully allowed to die out, through disuse or being ridiculed and defamed, far more rapidly than they need? As they are congenital, for what reason did the Creator endow the people with these various propensities, if not for some eminently necessary purpose? May man with impunity run counter to and thwart such purpose? Surely no one will contend that Nature must be undone because the people are so plastic as to be capable apparently of assuming the European character in all its attractiveness and defectiveness, as if that were the greatest and final effort of social evolution. Our motive should be to act in accordance with the desires of the majority of the people, and not to impose this or that restriction or condition mainly because, in our limited vision, it appears to be right.

One cannot but see how strongly the case of Dinuzulu supports these views. It shows that the people were in favour of his being appointed, with the assistance of a council or other advisory body, to protect their interests. They knew they were acting wrongly in dealing with him in 1906, but, in the absence of any other national representative, *i.e.* one of their own flesh and blood, it seemed there was no other course left. Zulus look at the world's affairs in the concrete. To do so in the abstract, as so common amongst ourselves, is foreign to their nature. That is why what organic connection between their race and that of the white man takes the form of a request for the appointment of a *person* to act as intermediary, one to whom they can go with their troubles, and one who would lay these before the Government for favourable consideration.

What Dinuzulu himself said about this to the Governor



has been briefly noticed. He also observed: "The Natives of India are governed and treated in a correct manner, and according to the law. The Boers, who have recently been at war with the British Government, have also been settled down . . . but we who were subdued . . . before the Boers and these people I refer to,<sup>1</sup> are not treated in the same manner as they have been treated. The laws are not the same. We cannot help feeling that we Zulu people have been discriminated against. . . . We are people who have no representatives in the affairs of the country, no one to speak for us,<sup>2</sup> and the laws of the country simply come over us by surprise. . . . We are all of us in the country like my fingers, each one has his own authority, and does what he thinks right in his own district. . . . We feel that, whilst we should own obedience and allegiance to the Government. . . there should yet be somebody amongst us who represents the people."<sup>3</sup>

When the Native Affairs Commission met the local Chiefs and headmen at Vryheid in January, 1907, the first speaker said: "I would ask the Commission this: Of whom are they making the inquiry as to what the Zulu people as a whole feel; who is that spokesman? Where is he? Where is he who is the eyes and ears of the Zulu nation, the guardian of the people?" Another Chief said: "Why is it the Governor puts such questions, as the Commission has itself put, to mere blades of grass? Where is our guardian? Where is that guardian that should have been given to us by the Governor? . . . The Government does not rule us with its right, but with its left, hand. . . . When a State is conquered, there always remains, according to our ideas, some representative or

<sup>1</sup> He was evidently thinking India was conquered during the Indian Mutiny.

<sup>2</sup> This, of course, is largely incorrect, as the Minister for Native Affairs as well as every member of both Houses of Parliament have, for many years, voiced the interests of the Natives, inadequately though that may have been. Apart from this, the U.S.N.A., assisted by Magistrates all over the country, has continually brought to the notice of Government, wishes, suggestions and grievances of the Natives.

<sup>3</sup> Cd. 3888, pp. 79, 80.

another who carries on the government of the conquered people. . . . The King will continue to be at a loss as to exactly what we feel, because His Majesty has failed to appoint somebody in a way that we are accustomed to to represent our interests."

Others said: "The whole Zulu people are unanimous as to the need of some person to voice their feelings." "Formerly Cetshwayo used to conduct negotiations, etc., with Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Who was in his (Cetshwayo's) place now? . . . Dinuzulu was their great induna, and nothing had occurred between the Natives and him which should cause them to pass by him and affiliate themselves to the Government." "They were all in a state of dispersion; sheep without a shepherd."

Although, for years, many Chiefs were opposed to being "governed" by a Paramount Chief, such as Cetshwayo was (after his restoration), it is remarkable how widespread this desire latterly became, particularly in 1905 when the poll tax was imposed. That such aspiration assumed exaggerated proportions during a time of rebellion is not to be surprised at. The universal use by insurgents of the "Usutu" war-cry, of the Usutu badge (*tshokobezi*), and of Dinuzulu's name, only shows the need they felt for a head. As this need existed then, is it not possible that the Rebellion was brought about largely through the need not having been seen and satisfied in one way or another?

And this need still exists and will continue to do so until adequate steps have been taken to supply it. How often has it not happened in the world's affairs that large and liberal action towards a people, so far from making foes, has transformed them into loyal and permanent allies. Let us, therefore, not blind ourselves too much to the fact that our Native races, although they may have fought us in the past, stand in as great, if not greater, need of similar consideration, though on humbler, simpler lines, than any other corporate people.

Stress has been laid on the foregoing point because the Commission omitted to face and deal with it with the



directness obviously desired by the Natives. And yet that a general and permanent protector of their interests should be appointed, because, no doubt, of Ministers for Native Affairs being movable officers, was the most important of their requests.<sup>1</sup> It may be said to have come, although often unassociated with Dinuzulu's name, from no less than 95 per cent. of the people. The great body of Native opinion was emphatically in favour of the existing tribal system being maintained, and steps being taken to remove as far as possible the numerous abuses that had crept into it.

The position of the Native races is worthy of attention from many points of view. The dying out of many of their habits and customs, interesting and picturesque to us, but the very life-blood of the people themselves, is inevitable. With such disappearance, the social system itself has begun to decay. Many persons, indeed, have for long observed these disintegrating tendencies and proposed various religious, political, social or economic makeshifts. That is to say, that these tribes, hastening on as they are doing to the collapse of their tribal organizations, have nothing else to stem the universal undermining that is going on, always with acceleration, than the creeds, moral code, habits, customs, social and political systems of Western Civilization, that is, the equipment of a people differing essentially,—physically, morally, and intellectually. It seems to occur to no one that a State policy which resolutely and deliberately aims at maintaining the *status quo ante* in a sane and judicious manner, instead of assuming its downfall as inevitable, and forthwith setting about in a thousand ways to make it even more ruinously rapid and catastrophic than it would be without these reckless methods, is worthy of serious and sober consideration. Misreading the religious, political and other aspirations of a few half-educated Natives, many of the dominant

<sup>1</sup>The Government afterwards appointed the late Mr. A. J. Shepstone, C.M.G., as Secretary for Native Affairs,—an appointment that gave great and general satisfaction.

European race fondly believe it is along the same road that the great inarticulate majority desire to travel. No one, of course, is infallible, ourselves among the number, but a personal experience of over forty years in the country, together with an intimate knowledge of the people, does tend to convince us that such is not the general desire,—not at present, whatever may be the case in the future,—and has only become that of the half-educated because, the various European administrations being what they have been and are, it seems to them so inevitable that nothing remains but to adopt European civilization in its entirety, and that as speedily as possible.

The doing of justice to the Natives, in the sense of eventually conferring practically every privilege which Europeans enjoy, is to blind oneself to the fact that the two races are congenitally separate. Ideal justice can be said to be possible only when meted out within the limits of a country in which the people are all of one race. Within such environment, privileges are and should be capable of extension to all. But when there are two or more separate races in a country, that is not justice which extends privileges peculiar to the dominant race to the radically-differing subject race or races. It is simply a *belief*, resting on no proper foundation, that justice is being done. The result of following it is gross injustice to the masses, and, later on, to the dominant race itself. The situation is manifestly governed by the idea of nationality and consanguinity. Thus, the highest justice becomes not the concession of rights and privileges of the dominant class, but a plain and constant recognition of the fact of nationality, and keeping the sense of justice well in hand, instead of allowing it to wander away to the clouds.

The spectacle of so many Natives in South Africa pressing on as they are doing to obtain higher rights and privileges than they already possess, and of forming a general Congress to give force to their demands and supposed necessities, is due to nothing else than the failure of the State to recognize the aborigines as a distinct nationality, and as, therefore, worthy of being specifically



provided for in the Constitution to enable them to be managed on lines different from those of the other and widely-differing race. The misdirected energy of these 'enlightened' Natives, in the event of such provision being made, would exert itself within its proper sphere, not in agitating eternally against the Government for superior rights, but by promoting the positive welfare of the tribes or races to which they belong.

All this, we believe, was the underlying meaning of the Rebellion, and the situation will not be cured by granting the franchise, or initiating elaborate systems of land occupation as exist in the Cape Province. Fundamental experimenting of this kind may, for a season, appear to satisfy, but the day is coming when the Natives, in spite of all our education and evangelization, our concessions of the franchise and other so-called privileges, will remember that they, for the most part, are members of the Bantu family, in spite of the fact that some have already been persuaded to think, and speak, and act like Europeans,—at least, that is what is naïvely supposed by their teachers, as well as by themselves, to be the case.

As the clashing in 1906 arose apparently out of a general attempt to impose Western Civilization, we venture to say that, so far from the Rebellion having come to an end, its essential spirit is still abroad. This is not because Natal or the Union Government have not made numerous and special endeavours to remove the contributory causes of the unrest, but because the root-cause, or what a Zulu would call *unomtebe*, is still existing.<sup>1</sup> Bambata, as many Natives believe, in spite of every proof to the contrary, is still living. For them his spirit, *i.e.* dissatisfaction with European rule, or, to put the same thing positively, a desire to control their own affairs, not on European lines, but on those sanctioned by the collective wisdom of their own race, is certainly alive, though he may be dead. It

<sup>1</sup> There is a saying among the Zulus, when a country, after being in disorder, is at peace once more, that *it has returned to Nomtebe* (the queen of white ants), that is, *to its mother*. This may have been true of former conditions; it cannot be true of those which exist under European rule.

lives, not in Natal alone, but throughout South Africa, and is fostered by the various Ethiopian or Separatist churches. Then, again, attempts are being made throughout the Union to impose Western Civilization on *all* the other Native tribes, be they in the Cape, Transvaal, or Orange Free State, Provinces. And so, unless radical change be effected in our State policy, it seems we may expect to witness periodical recrudescences of rebellion and on a far greater scale than in 1906. The moral is that the aborigines resent the manifold restrictions they are perpetually and systematically subjected to; these and the rigid application to their affairs of the principles of Western Civilization, by means of legislation or otherwise, as well as the thousands of opportunities afforded unscrupulous Europeans and semi-educated Natives of exploiting the people, tend to fill up their cup of bitterness. They yearn for practical sympathy and that friendly recognition of their deeper needs which ends not in mere perception. "They are not the best that might have been framed," said Solon of his laws, "but they are the best the Athenians are capable of bearing"—there is the type of statesman they would adore. The Zulus are a noble race of savages, but none the less deserving of our consideration because they are savages. The headlong collapse of such a people is a tragedy of the first magnitude. That it should be taking place before our very eyes, without reasonably adequate steps being taken by the State to resist it by providing the most natural and effective machinery for controlling it, is a crime. If this mischief be permitted to go on, it requires no prophet to predict heavy retribution, and in the near future, on those responsible. Such will probably be, not only in the forms of rebellion and civil strife, which can be quelled, but in miscegenation (unthinkable though this be at the present), complete effacement of the two races, and general degradation of the whole.

If the principal conclusion come to in these pages be correct, the Rebellion stands revealed as nothing less than a *protest*, and about the plainest that could have been



made, against the methods employed, not only by members of the British race, but by all pioneers of Western Civilization among barbarians. The methods followed in Natal and in the rest of South Africa are but characteristic of those adopted towards lower races in other parts of the globe. The British Government is naturally most affected by this indictment, but the Governments of France and Germany, the United States, Belgium, Portugal, etc., are implicated as well. Each of them will one day have to answer for the havoc they have created and are still creating, and this primarily because of their rush after material benefit. In Mr. Benjamin Kidd's well-known work, *Social Evolution*, occur the words: "The lower races disappear before the higher through the effects of mere contact." In this history an attempt has been made to furnish some of the reasons why a typical 'lower race' is tending to become disintegrated. These serve to explain why and how dissolution, the antecedent of 'disappearance,' in smaller areas than South Africa, occurs, and prove that the phenomenon results not from "mere contact," as Mr. Kidd supposed, but from the restrictions, conditions and opportunities above mentioned which have invariably accompanied the inauguration of so-called civilized government among the people of lower, and especially coloured, races. The reasons, as a matter of fact, are laws; and we venture to think they will be found operating wherever, in the past, Western Civilization has been imposed on lower races, and wherever this may take place in the future.

And so this minor Rebellion turns out to be a fact charged with the highest possible significance, inasmuch as it is a concrete, analysable illustration of that strange, destructive and inexorable contact between races hitherto insufficiently studied, and, therefore, insufficiently appreciated.

## APPENDICES



## I. CASUALTIES.

REGI-MENT.	RANK.	NAME.	CAUSE OF DEATH.
N.C.	Corpl.	Christopher, V. J. W.	Killed in action.
N.M.R.	Tpr.	Bull, W. G.	Internal obstruction.
"	"	Clements, S. T.	Broken neck.
"	"	Powell, Albert.	Killed in action.
Z.M.R.	"	Coll, Gudman.	Wounds received in action, Macrae's Store.
N.F.A.	Gunner	Walker, H. S.	Bullet wounds ; self-inflicted.
N.P.	Tpr.	Armstrong, G.	Killed in action.
"	"	Aston, Arthur H.	" "
"	Sergt.	Brown, E. T. N.	" "
"	Tpr.	Greenwood, J. P.	" "
"	Sergt.	Harrison, J. C. G.	" "
"	Sub. Insp.	Hunt, S. H. K.	" "
R.H.	Corpl.	Alexander, E.	" "
"	Tpr.	Bouck, J. L.	" "
"	"	Harding, J.	" "
"	"	Hawkins, J.	Wounds received in action, Manzipambana.
"	"	Malone, Thos.	Killed in action.
"	Lieut.	Marsden, C. G.	Wounds received in action, Mome.
"	Tpr.	Ohlson, C.	Pneumonia.
"	"	Robertson, S. J.	Killed in action.
"	"	Strecker, J.	Coma epilepsy.
"	"	Walsh.	Concussion of brain.
T.M.R.	"	Glover, F. H.	Wounds received in action, Mome.
"	"	Knight, Robert.	Killed in action.
"	"	Maw, H. C.	Wounds received in action, near Kombe.
"	Capt.	McFarlane, S. C., D.S.O.	Wounds received in action, Mome.
"	Tpr.	Steyn, H. W.	Wounds received in action, near Mome.
N.R.	Lieut.	Campbell, J. A.	Wounds received in action, Nomangci.
"	Pte.	McInnes, A.	Heart disease.
U.D.R.	Tpr.	Steele, H. Scott.	Killed in action.

Note.—Among Nongqai, N.N.H., and Native

## (a) KILLED OR DIED.

DATE OF DEATH.		PLACE OF DEATH.	PLACE INTERRED.
July	5	Near Hlonono Mission Station.	Ladysmith.
May	15	Addington Hospital, Durban. - -	Durban.
June	28	Tongaat. - - - - -	_____
June	19	Otimati. - - - - -	Mapumulo.
July	3	Thring's Post. - - - - -	_____
May	2	Fort Yolland. - - - - -	Fort Yolland.
February	8	Near Byrnetown. - - - - -	Pietermaritzburg.
April	4	Mpanza. - - - - -	Near Mpanza.
"	4	" - - - - -	" "
"	4	" - - - - -	" "
"	4	" - - - - -	" "
February	8	Near Byrnetown. - - - - -	Pietermaritzburg.
June	3	Manzipambana. - - - - -	Nkandhla.
"	3	" - - - - -	"
"	3	" - - - - -	"
"	3	Nkandhla Forest. - - - - -	"
May	29	Tate. - - - - -	"
June	17	Addington Hospital, Durban. - -	Durban.
July	29	Grey's Hospital, Pietermaritzburg. -	Pietermaritzburg.
June	3	Manzipambana. - - - - -	Nkandhla.
May	10	Nkandhla. - - - - -	"
May	3	Dundee. - - - - -	Dundee.
June	13	Eshowe. - - - - -	Eshowe.
July	2	Insuze, Natal. - - - - -	Esidumbini.
May	14	Ntingwe. - - - - -	Ntingwe.
June	10	Eshowe. - - - - -	Eshowe.
June	20	" - - - - -	"
June	9	Addington Hospital, Durban. - -	Durban.
July	8	Thring's Post. - - - - -	Stanger.
May	28	Mpukunyoni. - - - - -	Buffalo River.

Levies, there were about six killed.



## (b) WOUNDED.

REGIMENT.	RANK.	NAME.	DATE.	PLACE.	REMARKS.
N.N.C.	Leading Seaman	Murchie, H.	July 11	Ngudwini.	
N.C.	Tpr.	Reed.	July 8	Izinsimba.	Severe.
N.M.R.	Corpl.	Errington.	May 5	Bobo.	
"	Q.M.-Sergt.	Knox, L. E.	June 19	Otimati.	
B.M.R.	Tpr.	Forder, C.	June 27	Peyana	
N.D.M.R.	"	Scabbert.	June 10	Mome.	
"	Lieut.	Wilkins, H.	May 17	Insuze, Zululand.	
Z.M.R.	Sergt.-Maj.	King.	June 10	Mome.	
D.L.I.	Pte.	Williams.	May 17	Insuze, Zululand.	
N.P.	Tpr.	Braull.	Apr. 4	Mpanza.	
"	"	Dove.	" 4	"	
"	"	Emanuel.	" 4	"	
"	"	Ferguson, F.	June 10	Mome.	
"	Trumpeter	Milton, C.	Apr. 4	Mpanza.	Dangerous
"	Tpr.	Sells, A. J.	May 3	White Umfolozi.	
R.H.	"	Barnet, H. D. M.	June 3	Manzipambana.	
"	Capt.	Clerk, E. G.	" 3	"	Severe.
"	Tpr.	Flynn, F.	" 3	"	
"	"	Holmes, W. C.	" 3	"	Severe.
"	"	Hopkins, W. H. E.	" 3	"	Severe.
"	Lieut.	Male, P.	" 3	"	
"	Tpr.	Mann, J.	" 3	"	
"	Lieut.	Oswald.	" 3	"	
"	Tpr.	Swart, D. C.	" 3	"	Severe.
"	Corpl.	Woolnough.	" 3	"	
T.M.R.	"	Carlick, F.	June 10	Mome.	
"	"	Hosford, F.	" 10	"	
"	Lce.-Corp.	Leigh, A. E. T.	" 10	"	
"	"	McEvoy, P.	" 10	"	
"	Tpr.	McLean, R.	" 10	"	
"	Capt.	Mitchell, J. T.	July 3	Ponjwana.	
"	Tpr.	Simcox.	July 2	Insuze, Natal.	
"	Act. Q.M.-S.	Tobin.	" 2	"	
U.D.R.	Tpr.	Braithwaite, P.	May 28	Mpukunyoni	
"	"	Mackenzie, S.	" 28	"	
New Han. Reserves	"	Freese, F.	July 4	Near Ponjwana	
Krantzkop Reserves	Leader.	van Rooyen, T. J.	May 28	Mpukunyoni	Severe.

Note—Among Nongqai, N.N.H., and Native Levies, there were about thirty wounded.

## II. HONOURS.

## OFFICERS.

*K.C.M.G.*

Col. (now Brigadier-General) Duncan McKenzie, C.B., C.M.G.,  
V.D.

*D.S.O.*

Col. H. T. Bru-de-Wold, C.M.G., V.D.  
,, G. Leuchars, C.M.G.

*Hon. Lieut.-Col. in the Army.*

Lieut.-Col. J. R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

*C.M.G.*

Lieut.-Col. W. F. Barker, D.S.O.

*Distinguished Conduct in the Field.*

(*Natal Government Gazette*, 26th June, 1906.)

Capt. E. G. Clerk, R.H., 3rd June, Manzipambana.  
Lieut. A. H. G. Blamey, N.M.R., 5th May, Bobe.

(*N.G. Gazette*, 3rd July, 1906.)

Inspr. O. Dimmick, N.P., 4th April, Mpanza.

*Meritorious Service.*

Col. Sir A. Woolls-Sampson, K.C.B.  
Lieut.-Col. J. Hyslop, D.S.O., V.D.  
,, T. McCubbin, C.M.G., Supernumerary List.  
,, M. C. Rowland, Staff Officer, Transvaal.  
,, J. S. Wylie, D.L.I.  
Major R. A. Buntine, N.M.C.  
,, S. G. Campbell, D.L.I.  
,, S. Carter, U.M.R.  
,, W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.  
,, W. H. Smith, N.M.R.  
,, W. A. Vanderplank, Z.M.R.  
,, S. B. Woollatt, N.V.C.



Capt. C. V. Hosken, Transport.  
 „ G. A. Labistour, N.R.R.  
 „ M. G. Pearson, N.M.C.  
 „ A. Prior, N.S.C.  
 Lieut. J. S. Hedges, Z.M.R.  
 Chief Leader J. A. Nel, U.D.R.

WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED  
 OFFICERS, AND MEN.

*Distinguished Conduct Medal.*

(*N.G. Gazette*, 10th September, 1907.)

Squad. Sergt.-Maj. W. Cal- verley, Z.M.R.	Sergt. C. W. Guest, N.P. Tpr. W. Deeley, Z.M.R.
Sergt. S. Titlestad, Z.M.R.	„ W. Johnson, Z.M.R.
Farrier-Sergt. C. B. Mitchell, T.M.R.	„ G. W. Oliver, Z.M.R. „ O. L. M. Folker, N.P.

*Meritorious Service Medal.*

(*N.G. Gazette*, 10th September, 1907.)

Reg. Sergt.-Maj. J. Webber, R.H.	Sergt. E. B. Brand, T.M.R. „ F. L. Malan, T.M.R.
Sergt. T. P. Catchpole, N.C.	„ G. P. Bagnall, N.M.C.
„ E. I. Dicks, N.C.	„ J. A. Butcher, N.S.C.
„ H. G. Le Mesurier, N.M.R.	„ J. F. Crawford, N.T.C. „ J. F. Pemberton, N.T.C.
„ I. E. Sjoblom, N.M.R.	
„ S. J. Wadman, N.M.R.	

*Distinguished Conduct in the Field.*

(*N.G. Gazette*, 26th June, 1906.)

Tpr. W. C. Holmes, R.H.

*Good Service.*

(*N.G. Gazette*, 10th September, 1907.)

Sergt. Maj. P. J. Higgins, N.C.	Reg. Q.-M.-Sergt. W. C. Savage, T.M.R.
Reg. Sergt.-Maj. G. W. Garn- ham, T.M.R.	Squad. Sergt.-Maj. A. Swan, N.C.
Sergt.-Maj. T. C. Ogden, N.R.R.	„ H. Fraser, R.H.
„ O. E. Powell, N.M.C.	„ S. L. Neville, T.M.R.

Col. Sergt. W. K. Edwards, N.R.	Cpl. J. Lawson, N.R.
„ G. C. Mulcaster, N.R.	„ D. J. McCarthy, N.R.
„ C. H. Smith, N.R.	„ P. Murrow, N.R.
„ H. N. Smith, N.R.	„ E. D. Rex, N.R.
Staff-Sergt. E. W. Marshall, N.S.C.	„ S. Stollard, N.R.
First-Class P.O., C. S. Kirk, N.N.C.	„ J. Utterton, N.R.
Sergt. J. Humphries, N.C.	Lce.-Cpl. D. Stevenson, N.R.
„ C. L. Mulcahy, N.C.	Tpr. H. Brown, N.C.
„ G. L. Thompson, N.C.	„ C. P. Francis, N.C.
„ B. Wray, N.C.	„ G. Leathern, N.C.
„ C. H. Holder, T.M.R.	„ H. A. Taylor, N.C.
„ C. R. Coombes, N.R.	„ A. O. Zunckel, N.C.
„ R. E. Cross, N.R.	„ E. W. Larkan, N.M.R.
„ J. Doherty, N.R.	„ T. J. Bentley, N.D.M.R.
„ C. Domone, N.R.	„ R. W. Sharpe, N.D.M.R.
„ J. Fletcher, N.R.	„ J. P. du Plessis, R.H.
„ C. A. B. de Lasalle, N.R.	„ L. Rudland, R.H.
„ W. R. Lewis, N.R.	„ E. F. Gatland, T.M.R.
„ J. McCann, N.R.	„ H. A. Oxenham, T.M.R.
„ D. H. Nelson, N.R.	Signaller J. Ball, N.R.
„ F. H. Worby, N.R.	„ W. Hay, N.R.
„ J. A. A. Davidson, N.S.C.	Pte. W. E. Adams, N.R.
„ D. Davis, N.S.C.	„ J. Boylan, N.R.
„ J. A. Niblett, N.S.C.	„ T. J. Cellarius, N.R.
„ T. Pittam, N.S.C.	„ H. J. Coulter, N.R.
„ T. B. Willoughby, N.S.C.	„ T. Cunningham, N.R.
„ J. Winter, N.S.C.	„ L. Guttenberg, N.R.
Second-Class P.O., R. C. Dickinson, N.N.C.	„ J. Hanson, N.R.
Cpl. J. W. Peebles, T.M.R.	„ W. Hay, N.R.
„ P. Allen, N.R.	„ W. Heath, N.R.
„ D. Band, N.R.	„ N. Kedian, N.R.
„ J. Cunninghame, N.R.	„ T. McCall, N.R.
„ C. L. Gillham, N.R.	„ J. McCook, N.R.
„ W. Johnson, N.R.	„ D. Mitchell, N.R.
„ J. Keith, N.R.	„ J. H. Morrison, N.R.
	„ V. Pennefather, N.R.
	„ G. Pothecary, N.R.
	„ J. Scott, N.R.
	„ L. H. Smith, N.R.
	„ J. Whittick, N.R.
	„ H. Wiles, N.R.
	„ F. Wood, N.R.



III.—STRENGTH OF FORCES IN THE FIELD,  
7TH MAY, 1906.

REGIMENT.	Number in the Field.	Number still available.
Natal Naval Corps - - - - -	100	—
Natal Carbineers - - - - -	596	82
Natal Mounted Rifles - - - - -	287	—
Border Mounted Rifles - - - - -	—	254
Umvoti Mounted Rifles - - - - -	260	—
Northern District Mounted Rifles - - - - -	120	—
Zululand Mounted Rifles - - - - -	120	—
Natal Field Artillery - - - - -	229 <sup>1</sup>	134 <sup>2</sup>
Natal Royal Regiment - - - - -	154	22
Durban Light Infantry - - - - -	444	60
Natal Medical Corps - - - - -	63	33
Natal Veterinary Corps - - - - -	7	10
Natal Telegraph Corps - - - - -	34	7
Natal Service Corps - - - - -	78	14
Transport - - - - -	28	—
Natal Police - - - - -	210	—
Zululand Native Police - - - - -	90	—
Royston's Horse - - - - -	548	—
Transvaal Mounted Rifles - - - - -	481	—
	3,849	616
Newcastle Reserves - - - - -	78	—
Estcourt „ - - - - -	101	—
Dundee „ - - - - -	68	—
Umsinga „ - - - - -	50	—
Umvoti „ - - - - -	88	—
Krantzkop „ - - - - -	82	—
	467	—

<sup>1</sup> With ten guns.

<sup>2</sup> And eight guns.

*Note.*—Conductors, drivers, leaders, scouts and servants are not included herein. With exception of scouts and servants, their numbers will be found in Appendix V.

## IV. DISPOSITION OF FORCES ON MAY 7, 1906.

PLACE.	REGIMENT.	NUM- BER.	GUNS.	COMMAND.
BABANANGO ( <i>en route to Nkandhla</i> ) (Colonel D. McKenzie).	Transvaal Mounted Rifles	481	—	Colonel D. McKenzie.
	Royston's Horse - -	548	—	
	Durban Light Infantry -	58	—	
	Natal Field Artillery -	32	2*	
	Departmental - -	32	—	
FORT YOLLAND (Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mansel).	Natal Police - - -	210	—	
	Natal Naval Corps. -	100	—	
	Natal Field Artillery -	31	2	
	Zululand Native Police -	90	—	
	Departmental Corps -	8	—	
ESHOWE (Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Wylie).	Natal Mounted Rifles -	30	—	
	Durban Light Infantry -	251	—	
	Departmental Corps -	12	—	
GINGINDHLOVU (Lieutenant T. McCubbin).	Durban Light Infantry -	70	—	
	Departmental Corps -	8	—	
GREYTOWN (Captain J. Fraser).	Natal Royal Regiment -	50	—	
	Departmental Corps -	6	—	
	Reserves - - -	88	—	
KRANTZKOP (Major H. G. Plant).	Natal Royal Regiment -	50	—	
	Umvoti Mounted Rifles -	7	—	
	Reserves - - -	70	—	
	Departmental Corps -	8	—	
MAYOUGUATE KOP (Colonel G. Leuchars).	Umvoti Mounted Rifles -	223	—	
	Natal Field Artillery -	49	2	
	Departmental Corps -	25	—	
KEATE'S DRIFT (Lieutenant J. H. C. Nuss).	Umvoti Mounted Rifles -	30	—	
MAPUMULO (Lieutenant-Colonel H. Sparks).	Natal Mounted Rifles -	105	—	
	Durban Light Infantry -	65	—	
	Departmental Corps -	9	—	
<i>Carry forward,</i>		2,746	6	



IV. DISPOSITION OF FORCES ON MAY 7, 1906—*Continued.*

PLACE.	REGIMENT.	NUM- BER.	GUNS.	COMMAND.
	<i>Brought forward,</i>	2746	6	
NKANDHLA (Lieutenant- Colonel D. W. Mackay).	Natal Carbineers - -	381	—	Lieutenant- Colonel D. W. Mackay.
	Natal Field Artillery - -	32	2	
	Departmental Corps - -	40	—	
NTINGWE (Major W. A. Vanderplank)	Zululand Mounted Rifles	120	—	
	Northern District Mounted Rifles - - - -	120	—	
	Departmental Corps - -	9	—	
HELPMAKAAR (Major W. Murray- Smith).	Natal Carbineers - -	215	—	Major W. Murray- Smith.
	Natal Mounted Rifles - -	152	—	
	Natal Field Artillery - -	85	4	
	Natal Royal Regiment - -	54	—	
	Departmental Corps - -	30	—	
	Newcastle Reserves - -	78	—	
	Estcourt        " - -	101	—	
	Dundee         " - -	68	—	
Umsinga       " - -	50	—		
<i>Supply Depôts.</i>				
Maritzburg	Natal Service Corps - -	12	—	
Durban	"       " - -	6	—	
Ladysmith	"       " - -	5	—	
Dundee	"       " - -	3	—	
Stanger	"       " - -	5	—	
Vryheid	"       " - -	4	—	
		4,316	12	

\* Pompoms.

## V. STATE OF GENERAL TRANSPORT ON 7TH MAY, 1906.

DISTRIBUTION.	Mules.	Ox Waggons.	Oxen.	Con- ductors.	Drivers and Leaders.
Zululand Field Force - -	16	121	1,948	9	252
Helpmakaar Field Force - -	24	51	850	4	110
Mackay's Force - - - -	11	36	612	4	84
Umvoti Field Force - -	39	23	364	3	56
Gigindhlovu, Eshowe, and Fort Yolland - - - -	12	19	358	2	49
Northern Dist. M. Rifles - -	4	17	268	2	57
Mapumulo Force - - - -	—	8	128	1	16
Dundee Base - - - -	8	3	48	1	8
Total - - - -	114	278	4,576	26	632

*Note.*—There were also 2 mule waggons, 12 ambulances, 4 water-carts, and 1 trolley.

VI. STRENGTH (ALL RANKS) OF ACTIVE MILITIA CALLED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE DINUZULU EXPEDITION, DECEMBER, 1907.

UNIT.	First Mobilization, Nov. 30.	On Dec. 11.	On Dec. 22.
Natal Carbineers <sup>1</sup> - - - -	491	795	581 <sup>3</sup>
Natal Mounted Rifles <sup>1</sup> - - -	209	264	—
Umvoti Mounted Rifles <sup>1</sup> - - -	202	221	184 <sup>3</sup>
Border Mounted Rifles <sup>1</sup> - - -	200	204	194 <sup>3</sup>
Northern District Mounted Rifles -	—	215	—
Zululand Mounted Rifles - - -	— <sup>2</sup>	140	—
1st Brigade Natal Field Artillery <sup>1</sup>	177	85	—
“C” Battery, Natal Field Artillery <sup>1</sup>	77	34	—
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve <sup>1</sup> -	95	150	—
Natal Royal Regiment <sup>1</sup> - - -	184	319	—
Durban Light Infantry <sup>1</sup> - - -	349	400	—
Natal Medical Corps <sup>1</sup> - - - -	55	43	43
Natal Veterinary Corps <sup>1</sup> - - -	18	11	11
Natal Service Corps <sup>1</sup> - - - -	25	58	58
Natal Telegraph Corps. <sup>1</sup> - - -	34	31	31
Searchlight Detachment - - - -	—	8	—
Total -	2,116	2,978	1,102

<sup>1</sup> Given authority on 30th November to recruit up to war strength.

<sup>2</sup> Ordered to be in readiness to mobilize on short notice.

<sup>3</sup> Approximate.

VII. STRENGTH OF RESERVES ACTUALLY IN THE FIELD DURING DINUZULU EXPEDITION, DECEMBER, 1907.

DISTRICT.	On Dec. 11.	On Dec. 22.
Dundee, 1st - - - - -	39	—
Umsinga - - - - -	16	—
Weenen - - - - -	46	46
Umvoti - - - - -	90	—
Ixopo - - - - -	30	—
Louwsberg - - - - -	40	—
Newcastle - - - - -	50	—
Estcourt - - - - -	50	60
Lion's River - - - - -	45	—
City, 1st - - - - -	58	—
Umgeni - - - - -	26	—
Newcastle, Town - - - - -	26	—
Ladysmith, Town - - - - -	9	—
Utrecht - - - - -	150	—
Newcastle Division - - - - -	46	—
Vryheid - - - - -	50	—
Krantzkop - - - - -	—	50
Total -	771	156



VIII. EXPENDITURE INCURRED BY THE NATAL GOVERNMENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE REBELLION AND DINUZULU EXPEDITION.

THE manner in which monies were raised for covering the cost of the Rebellion was set forth briefly at the conclusion of Chapter XVIII. From the beginning of the Rebellion (February, 1906) to the 31st May, 1910, the total net expenditure amounted to £883,576 7s. 2d. The following is a detailed account thereof :

Militia Staff, Travelling Expenses, Clerical Assistance, etc.	- - - - -	£2,726	6	11
Pay, Allowances, Messengers, etc.	- - - - -	319,980	4	3
Rations, Men and Horses	- - - - -	107,946	14	5
Remounts	- - - - -	50,159	2	4
Transport	- - - - -	108,737	4	6
Equipment of men and horses	- - - - -	89,466	0	9
Medical Supplies, Hospital and other Expenses	- - - - -	4,176	19	10
Compensation—				
Injuries	- - - - -	222	19	9
Horses	- - - - -	7,790	1	10
Property	- - - - -	5,822	17	0
Rebellion Losses Claims	- - - - -	42,611	7	9
Veterinary	- - - - -	2,827	9	1
Stationery, Printing, etc.	- - - - -	3,282	3	9
Arms and Ammunition	- - - - -	51,482	8	3
Lagers	- - - - -	1,787	6	11
Miscellaneous	- - - - -	3,129	1	10
Prisons	- - - - -	1,972	6	1
Uniform Allowance	- - - - -	11,309	18	0
Upkeep of Rebel Prisoners	- - - - -	85,524	17	1
Construction of Rebel Prisons	- - - - -	7,456	7	2
		£908,411	17	6
Less Revenue Received for Hire of Rebel Prisoners	- - - - -	23,196	15	8
		£885,215	1	10
Add Outstanding Liabilities	- - - - -	122	17	10
		£885,337	19	8
Deduct Transport and Remounts utilized by transfer to Transport Service	- - - - -	1,761	12	6
		£883,576	7	2

In addition to lump sum gratuities paid in respect of injuries received, annual allowances amounting to £5,912 4s. are paid from ordinary revenue to disabled militiamen and to widows and children of militiamen who died or were killed during the Rebellion.

Revenue benefited to the extent of approximately £38,000 on account of fines imposed on certain rebels and sale of stock captured by the troops during the operations.

## IX. ZULU SONGS SUNG AT USUTU KRAAL BEFORE THE REBELLION.

### I.

Ubani o za ukufel' esilungwini ?  
 Mana, Nkosi !  
 U ngezwa be bubula,  
 Ba ya sola.

### II.

Si kulu les' isizwe, e si twal' imiqiqingo,  
 Si hamba ne mpahla, si teng' izinkomo ngo lembu.  
 Ngi ya ku yi raya bo !  
 I za ku li qed' izwe.  
 I lu zwambuzwambu,  
 I suka pansi, ya qond' izulu.  
 I njenge nyoka e yadhl' isizabu sa ba mhlope.  
 Ba yi cupa, ya bajwa.  
 Ba yi dons' amalang' amabili, 'matatu ;  
 Ba yi nquma ngo mese.  
 Kwa gqabuk' ilangab' esizibeni,  
 La ba rangula.  
 Kwa gqabuk' izintutu,  
 Za qond' izwe lonke, la vuta !  
 Na seMbilane,  
 Lapa kade beti i ya puma,  
 Beti i gewel' iziziba zonke, nya !

Translations of the above appear on p. 116.

## X. THE CAUSES, SUPERSTITIONS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MATABELE REBELLION, 1896.

THE Matabele War of 1893 came to an end owing to the King, Lobengula, fleeing from the country after his capital, Bulawayo, had been seized and burnt by the British South Africa Company's forces. He died in January, 1894. No one, of course, was appointed to succeed him. As many of the Natives desired to continue the war—a number of the regiments not having fought at all—it is not surprising that, although a settlement was arrived at, the people did not



regard themselves as having been really conquered. Still less did they look on the Company as entitled to appropriate their cattle as they proceeded to do. These, indeed, all belonged to the King in theory. The Company held that, having conquered the country and expelled the King, right of possession had reverted to themselves. The cattle thereupon began to be confiscated by way of indemnity. A large number was taken, whilst the remainder, about 90,000, were branded with the Company's brand and allowed to remain with the Natives for the time being. Seizure of smaller lots took place periodically during 1894 and 1895. Had confiscation been made immediately and universally on the conclusion of the War, far less irritation would have been caused than actually occurred. As it was, it was believed the Company intended to so impoverish the people as to reduce them to a position of slaves and paupers.

There was in Matabeleland another class of Natives known as amaHole. These were found living there by the Matabele on arrival from the south with Mzilikazi (Moselekatze) about 1836. After conquering them, the latter proceeded to make slaves of them, and this was the position when the Chartered Company, taking advantage of concessions previously acquired, entered the country in considerable numbers in 1890 to prospect and mine for gold, etc. After the war, the Company recruited some 400 Natives, chiefly from the amaHole, and formed them into a police force. The latter, remembering their former subjection, were not slow to avenge themselves on the Matabele as opportunity offered. "In days gone by you had your turn," they jeeringly said to the Matabele, "it is ours now." And opportunities presented themselves in two principal ways. First in regard to the cattle question, by the police hunting about in all directions to see who possessed any. On secretly obtaining information, they conveyed it to the authorities, showing cause why the stock should be seized. Confiscation usually followed. Secondly, in regard to the labour regulations. The Company required each Chief to furnish periodically a certain number of labourers to work on the mines, etc. The police were employed on this duty by the Native Commissioners; the manner in which they dealt with the people was frequently exasperating.

Although, towards the end of 1895, the Company waived all further right to the cattle after receipt of two-fifths of the whole (70,000), much strong dissatisfaction continued to prevail on account of the tactics that had been employed. And this was accentuated by the disease rinderpest breaking

out in 1895 and sweeping off many of the cattle still possessed by Natives. A plague of locusts and a long-continued drought added still further to their troubles. Underlying the whole was the deep resentment felt by men who, under their own regime, had held high rank, but were now condemned to inferior status, with corresponding loss of influence, material perquisites and opportunities for advancement. The feeling, moreover, was still latent that the nation had never been really conquered.

It being characteristic of all Bantu races, and particularly so of those of Matabeleland, *e.g.* Makalanga and Matabele, to resort to diviners (*izangoma*) to ascertain the causes of troubles as well as the remedies, it is not surprising something of the kind should have taken place at the present juncture. Perhaps the most famous of the oracles was one reputed to inhabit a cave in the well-known Matoppo Hills. To this cave many had repaired from time to time, in connection with their private troubles, such as cases of illness or other misfortune, mysterious loss of property, and so forth. So great was the reputation that had been acquired by this particular oracle and, under so weird circumstances and in so peculiar a manner did it impart the knowledge obtained, as believed, direct from the departed spirits (known by Matabeles as *amadhlozi*), that it was commonly referred to as Umlimo, that is, the Deity himself. Such Umlimo—really the god of the oldest residents of the country, the Makalangas—is said “to be able to speak all languages, as well as to be possessed of a faculty of roaring like a lion, crowing like a cock, barking like a dog, etc.” The truth of the matter, however, is that the oracle was an *isangoma*, that is, an ordinary person who, whenever it was known anyone had come to seek advice, would stealthily proceed to the cave and there, on being consulted, communicate the reply to the inquirer. This reply was given by means of ventriloquism and, as the speaker was inside the cave and invisible, the voice appeared to the inquirer (who was outside) to issue from the very bowels of the earth. The extreme ingenuity of the device will be better appreciated when it is known that the spirits of the departed are universally believed by Natives to dwell in an underworld. For a ventriloquist to practise his calling as diviner in the foregoing manner is probably not unworthy of that oracle which Socrates himself felt it necessary to consult at Delphi.

On being appealed to by Mlugulu, one of the principal men in the country, and others, as to the troubles that were



afflicting the people in general, the Umlimo directly attributed them to Europeans. It was they who were the sorcerers that had caused the disasters. But for their presence, neither locusts nor rinderpest would have invaded the country. The aborigines were thereupon exhorted to rise and deliver themselves from their thralldom. A recent total eclipse of the moon was said to portend that the white man's blood was to be spilt; Lobengula himself was not dead, but about to return from the north at the head of a huge army, whilst other armies were advancing to his assistance against the Europeans from the west and east. The tremendous potency of such a 'voice' at such a time can hardly be over-estimated. The reason why most obvious precautions, *e.g.* blocking the main road to Mangwe (50 miles south-west of Bulawayo) were not adopted by the rebels was said to be due to the Umlimo's explicit instruction "to give the white man an opportunity of escaping from the country." Possibly this also explains why the telegraph wire between Bulawayo and Mafeking was not cut. "It certainly seems very strange," says Selous,<sup>1</sup> "that no attempt has ever been made to stop waggons and coaches on this road, . . . nor was Government House (less than three miles from the centre of Bulawayo) burnt, the reason for this being, it is said, because the Umlimo told the people that when Bulawayo had been destroyed, and all the white men in the country killed, they would find Lobengula sitting there, ready to rule them once more; for, be it said, Government House has been built in the centre of the old kraal of Bulawayo, just where the King's house once stood."

Another man, who claimed to be a prophet of the Umlimo, so influenced people through swallowing stones, dancing on ashes, putting burning coals into his mouth, etc., as to induce an *impi* to take up their quarters where they were subsequently found by the troops "and there wait for the white men to attack them. They were on no account to endeavour to prevent their enemies from crossing the Umguza [a river some twelve miles north of Bulawayo] but were to offer them every encouragement to do so, 'for,' said the stone-swallower, 'once they have crossed to the east of the river, the Umlimo will strike them all blind; you will then be able to kill them without trouble, and go on and murder all the women and children in Bulawayo.'"

The rising in Mashonaland, which began in the middle of June, 1896, was probably "brought about by the leaders of

<sup>1</sup> *Storm and Sunshine in Rhodesia*. Rowland Ward. 1896.

the Matabele insurrection through the instrumentality of the Umlimos or prophets . . . North-west of Salisbury there lives a prophethess," between whom and the leaders of the Matabele or agents of the Umlimo messages passed during the Rebellion.

In these circumstances, one can understand the observation commonly made as to the inscrutability of the Native mind. That it is a closed book to the vast majority of Europeans is proved by the fact that no adequate preparation was made by the Government to meet a possible rising, and that only one of the colonists had predicted that a rebellion would occur.

When, with the country seething with discontent, the people learned that the great majority of the European police had been withdrawn to assist Dr. Jameson in his raid from Mafeking towards Johannesburg, and that Dr. Jameson himself, who claimed to have conquered them in 1893, as well as his entire force, had been captured by the Boers, they felt that a unique occasion had arisen, and one of which immediate advantage should be taken.

The population of Matabeleland in 1896 was: Europeans, about 4,000; Natives, about 120,000. About nineteen-twentieths of the latter rebelled, their fighting strength (independently of Mashonaland) being nearly 20,000.

The Rebellion started on the 20th March with the murder of a Native policeman. This, though evidently premature, became the signal for a simultaneous rising. European men, women and children were forthwith murdered in many outlying parts. A number of Native servants took part in the murders. It is computed that 205 persons were massacred during the rising, the great majority being killed before the end of March. Of this number, six were women and twenty children. In addition, ninety-nine were murdered in Mashonaland, chiefly about the middle of June; of these, four were women and three children. There seems to have been little or no mutilation of bodies by way of obtaining medicines, for warding off danger, obtaining ascendancy, etc.

The rebels had no settled plan, consequently community of action between the various groups was wanting. They seemed to be obsessed with the idea that supernatural aid would be derived by them in some way from the Umlimo.

A large number of Native police, especially such as had been less than a year in the force, joined the rebels, carrying off with them the Winchester repeaters with which they had been supplied. The older hands remained loyal, but were



disarmed. On the other hand, the Makalanga people refrained from participating in the Rebellion. Such, indeed, was but in accordance with the neutral attitude observed by them during the War of 1893.

Hostilities did not terminate until the end of November, that is, after a campaign of about eight months. The combined forces employed in suppressing the Rebellion were 3,000 in Matabeleland and 2,200 in Mashonaland, including 1,200 Imperial troops.

The casualties among the troops were: Matabeleland—34 killed, 100 wounded; Mashonaland—7 killed, 18 wounded. The number of rebels killed is believed to have considerably exceeded that of the War, viz. 3,000.

On the conclusion of hostilities, the rebels were directed to hand in their guns and assegais. They were known to be in possession of several thousands of firearms—about 2,000 breech-loading rifles and many muzzle-loading guns. "The Matabele kept on evading [the order], promising to give up rifles one day, the next saying that in their own particular tribe there were none, and making all sorts of excuses. They were repeatedly told that, unless they came to a decision shortly and surrendered to our satisfaction, hostilities would be recommenced and they would be blockaded in the hills. . . . In [certain] districts they came to surrender, . . . bringing in 200 or 300 rifles." As to the rest, only another hundred or so guns, with some 4,000 assegais, were given up, "each Chief professing he did not know where his men had put their [guns], and promising to bring all he could. Needless to say these promises were never fulfilled."<sup>1</sup>

"It is worthy of remark that whilst, in the first war, the Matabele attacked strong positions defended by artillery and Maxim guns, thereby suffering very heavy loss themselves but killing very few white men, in the present [rebellion] all the fighting has been amongst broken ground, and in country more or less covered with bush, and all the killing has been done with rifles; for, in the first war, the Natives learnt the futility of attacking fortified positions, and now only fight in the bush in skirmishing order, giving but little opportunity for the effective use of machine guns; so that, although a good many rounds have been fired from Maxims at long ranges, only a very small amount of execution has been done by them."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plumer, *An Irregular Corps in Matabeleland*. Kegan Paul. 1897. pp. 195, 199.

<sup>2</sup> Selous, *Storm and Sunshine in Rhodesia*.

## XI. NATIVE CORPS.

(i) *Natal Native Horse.*

REFERENCE was made in a note in the Introduction to the Natal Native Police organized in 1848. Since their disbandment in 1854, no other Native corps has been permanently established in Natal. In times of trouble, however, apart from the ordinary Native levies and contingents, settlements of Native Christians, such as Edendale and Driefontein, invariably offered their services to the Government. The fact that these men, a number of whom were Basutos, were mounted, added greatly to their usefulness. The first occasion of importance on which they volunteered was the Bushman Expedition of 1866. During the Langalibalele Rebellion, 1873, they again took part, under Col. A. W. Durnford,<sup>1</sup> several being killed in the action at Bushman's River Pass. By that time, Durnford, who arrived in Natal in June, 1873, had already begun to take an exceptional interest in the training of Natives for military purposes. Under his sympathetic control, the people evinced the keenest desire to assist the Government. The same spirit was shown by the large contingents of uneducated Natives, recruited and organized to a great extent by Durnford at the beginning of the Zulu War, not to refer to those called out on other occasions under other officers. The men of Edendale and Driefontein under Jabez Molife<sup>2</sup> and Simeon Kambule<sup>2</sup> respectively, as well as Basutos under Chief Hlubi, served throughout the 1879 campaign, and rendered very valuable assistance. They took part in the battles of Isandhlwana, Kambule, Hlobane and Ulundi, and suffered considerable losses.

The same communities, with Hlubi's Basutos, again volunteered during the Boer War, 1899-1901. To these communities should be added that at Nyanyadu, as well as members of Chief Newadi's tribe. Although, in a "white man's war," allowed to serve only as scouts, drivers and leaders and in limited numbers, some 150 came from Driefontein alone, and 200 from Chief Newadi. Under Capt. R. C. Samuelson, N.C., a considerable section of the Drakensberg Mountains was thoroughly patrolled. A portion of the men went through

<sup>1</sup> The same that commanded and fell at Isandhlwana in 1879.

<sup>2</sup> Enthusiastic and life-long supporters of the movement.



the siege of Ladysmith, whilst conspicuous gallantry was displayed by individual members of the corps on several other occasions during the same war.

By 1906, the great majority of those who had served in the earlier campaigns were, of course, no longer able to turn out. They, however, strongly influenced their sons to do so in their stead, with the result that the Natal Native Horse, under Major G. Moe, U.M.R., with Samuelson as adjutant and second in command, was raised with surprising rapidity. On instructions from the Government, Samuelson, by the 2nd April, succeeded in enrolling nearly 1,000 picked men, including Chiefs and Chiefs' sons. This number was, however, reduced by the Government to 326. As only about half the men had horses, the principal difficulty experienced was in obtaining mounts for the remainder.

The corps did not take the field until the middle of May, largely owing to its having to be equipped and trained; it was consequently unable to take part, like the Nongqai, in some of the main operations and engagements.

It was found necessary, during the campaign, considerably to the disappointment of the members, to break the corps up and distribute sections about the country. To whatever command, however, they happened to be attached, the men proved to be thoroughly reliable and serviceable, and their conduct exemplary. With better training, which in common fairness should have been available in some way *before* the necessity for recruiting arose, they would have been even more valuable than they were.

(ii) *Zululand Native Police (Nongqai).*

This corps was originally formed in April, 1883, under the authority of the Imperial Government, by Colonel G. Mansel (late Chief Commissioner of Police, Natal). The 50 non-commissioned officers and men of whom the corps consisted, half of them recruited in Natal,<sup>1</sup> were under the command of two European officers, and were originally enrolled as bodyguard to the Resident Commissioner (the late Sir Melmoth Osborn, K.C.M.G.). They served with distinction during the disturbances of 1884. Although attacked at Maqonga, near Nkandhla, by about 2,500 Zulus—the Resident Commissioner being with them—they held their ground and drove off the enemy with considerable loss, and this in spite of warning as to their probable untrustworthiness from

<sup>1</sup> Those recruited in Natal were mounted.

John Dunn, a man intimately acquainted with the country. The force was augmented in succeeding years and became almost entirely an infantry one. During the Zululand disturbances of 1888, the men again greatly distinguished themselves, notably at Ceza, Lower Umfolozi magistracy and Hlopekulu. On every occasion, though pitted against overwhelming odds, they fought steadily, effectively and with the utmost courage, without betraying at any time the least sign of breach of faith or disloyalty.

The personnel continued to increase from 250 in 1889 to 500 in 1899. During the Boer War, the numbers were again raised to 600, with 8 European officers, Inspector C. E. Fairlie taking command. The corps was then employed chiefly in and about Melmoth, in putting the place into a state of defence and escorting convoys. In September, 1904, it was suddenly disbanded by direction of the Natal Government.

During such time as the force existed, the men were disciplined, drilled and equipped to a large extent on the same lines as European troops; they were armed with Martini-Henry rifles, and lived in barracks. Each man was obliged to serve for three years, with the right of re-enlisting. Many took advantage of the right. It is estimated that, between 1883 and 1904, some 3,000 to 4,000 served in the ranks.

When the 1906 Rebellion broke out, the Government re-established the force under Fairlie. With Mansel's assistance, about 100 men were recruited, but only with the greatest difficulty, owing to their feeling sore at having been summarily disbanded in 1904. The reader will find several references in this history to the conspicuous services rendered by this really excellent body of men, notably at Bobe and Mome. They were disbanded once more in November, 1906.

The following, from a report by Colonel Mansel, will be perused with interest: "I wish to bear full testimony to the value of Zulus as soldiers. Their instincts are wholly military. When you enlist a Zulu, you have a ready-made soldier. . . . All you have to do is to teach him how to handle a rifle. This you can do in about three or four months. He is then as good as he will ever become. He is, as a rule, the best-tempered, most easily-managed man in the world; understands discipline by instinct; is docile, plucky, proud of himself and his corps; kindly-disposed towards his officers; full of mettle, and capable of enduring the extremes of marching and hunger. . . . Though often fighting against his own kith and kin, not a single case of treachery or breach of faith ever occurred."



(iii) *Proposed Creation of a Permanent Native Corps.*

The oft-repeated experiment of forming corps of coloured people inhabiting countries conquered by England, has apparently met with success in the main. The problem is, however, by no means an easy one to deal with, and it is generally owing to inability on the part of the rulers to formulate sound and workable schemes that failure has occasionally attended their efforts. Utilization of often excellent fighting material, as, for instance, may be found in the Zulus, is obviously a matter of importance, and any intention by a Government to establish such corps is deserving of careful consideration. But irresolution in a matter of this kind does more harm than good. Rather not make any attempt than be half-hearted or lukewarm. It has been seen that a Native police corps was formed as long ago as 1848, only to be disbanded a few years later without any reasons being given. Similar half-heartedness is observable in the foregoing account of the N.N.H. and the Z.N.P.

Any reflecting person will, we venture to think, arrive at the conclusion that a Native corps, established on a sound basis, is a wise and necessary provision, and this from several points of view. It does what nothing else can do so well, namely, proves to the people that the Government has confidence in them (as it unquestionably ought to have) and, by enabling them to share directly in the defence of the State, powerfully induces them to take a deep and abiding interest in the welfare, not only of themselves, but of the entire community, white and black. Thus the primary object in establishing a corps is not so much the intrinsic value of the fighting material recruited, as that it is an outward and visible sign to Natives in general that the rulers look on their interests as indissolubly connected with those of Europeans, which is only another way of saying that a premium is set on the promotion of patriotism, loyalty and contentment. As matters are at present in South Africa, anyone can see with half an eye that, in the absence of these corps, the respective Governments have neglected to use material that lies near at hand. The splendid record of the N.N.H. and Z.N.P., and the consistent loyalty of each in all vicissitudes, are as sure a guarantee as could be desired, that they would be loyal. If a permanently-established corps be but treated in a fair and reasonable manner, it is impossible to see what object any of its members would have for becoming mutinous or disloyal.

The martial ardour and courage of the Zulus are world-famous. Here are born soldiers, if ever there were any such. Should the Government be unable to adopt the suggestion on a large scale, it might at least try the Zulus. Many efforts have in the past been made to raise men. The labours, however, were in each case foredoomed to failure, because the authorities were not behind the movement, or, if behind it, then only half-heartedly so.

Amongst those who have interested themselves particularly in this matter is the late Commandant (Colonel H. T. Bru-de-Wold) whose views, without professing to be in any way complete, and admittedly based partly on those of his predecessors and other men, are briefly as follows: That the Government should form one or more Native regiments drawn from the different tribes of Natal and Zululand. Lads should be recruited at the age of fifteen or sixteen from the kraals of the most respectable and influential Natives in a tribe. They should then be formed into a permanent force, always to be kept in barracks. Each lad should be subject to long service, viz. 25, 30 or more years.

A Native location, similar to that of Zwartkop in the neighbourhood of Pietermaritzburg, would be suitable for the purpose. Permanent barracks should be erected in the location.

White officers, who should be married men and be most carefully selected, should reside in or near the barracks with their wives. Only those should be chosen whose pride of race is highly developed.

The Natives (non-commissioned officers and men) should be allowed to marry, and the Government might assist them in finding their *lobolo*. They should, however, each be limited to one wife. The location should be laid out in plots, conveniently situated, each married non-commissioned officer or man having his house, with adjoining garden for growing any desired minor articles, but the principal ration should be supplied by the Government, so that all would be dependent entirely on the Government for their food. The married men should be allowed to keep cattle for milk and to breed horses on their own account.

Any menial work, such as road-making, erecting buildings, etc., on the location should be done by hired labour, and not by the Native soldiers. The men should, however, be required to keep their respective dwelling-houses in repair. The reason for such provision is to keep up their pride as soldiers, and not demean them by putting them on the same level as ordinary labourers.



After certain periods to be determined upon, those of good character might be permitted to go on furlough, in the same way as any other Native in the service of the Government, when they would receive remuneration in addition to soldier's pay.

The officers' wives would naturally take an interest in the wives of n.c.o.'s and men, and provide, with the assistance of the State, for the education of the children. Thus the institution would, not only subject the men to strict military discipline, but enable their children to be educated and instructed in civilized ways of living. And so, in time, a separate class would be created on a small scale, the members of which might be designated "The King's Men," whilst the boys growing up in such environment would themselves become soldiers. A pride would be fostered in the men, arising out of a consciousness of being superior to the ordinary tribes. Although, at the outset, drawn from various tribes, they would gradually lose their tribal instincts and form a community of their own. Such influences would probably be more potent and productive of good than any other existing agency that could be named. But success would, it is felt, be dependent primarily on the officers.

There are many other details which might have been touched on. Attention has been drawn to the matter only because it seems wrong for the Government to refrain from identifying itself with an aspiration which is, perhaps, more deeply rooted in the people than any other. If they are ever to be trusted, why not make a beginning on some such lines as these? To go to them for assistance in time of war, and yet turn our backs on them in time of peace is not worthy of our race. A people that is prepared to shed, and has repeatedly shed, its blood for its rulers, is surely deserving of more recognition than the occasional issue of medals to a few favoured individuals.

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