TRADE AND POLITICS IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZULULAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES

by

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Abstract

This thesis approaches some historiographical problems of southern Mozambique and Zululand by examining trade and politics in terms of indigenous economies and social structures in the geographical region between the Tugela river in Natal and Delagoa bay. From the mid-sixteenth century, the polities of the region had access to foreign trade conducted largely through Delagoa bay. In the eighteenth century, external trade increased markedly; there were also pronounced alterations in the inventory of commodities exchanged and in the geographical patterns of trade.

Exploration of the region's social structures and their ecological parameters facilitates the interpretation of bodies of oral data and also enables the evaluation of external economic contacts within the matrix of pressures determining production and exchange. In the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, southern Ronga and northern Nguni polities were composed of hierarchies of lineages dominated by a ruling lineage: relations within such hierarchies were expressed in a kinship form.

In this context the history of states which predated the emergence of the Zulu kingdom in the early nineteenth century is traced. The rise of the southern Ronga kingdom of Mabudu from c.1750 was associated with its control of trade along the coastal lowlands between Delagoa bay and the northern Nguni. Among the latter, the ruling lineages of the Qwabe, Mthethwa and Ndwandwe controlled external contacts to their own advantage, resulting in their geographical expansion and increased internal dominance.

At the end of eighteenth century, internal and external relationships between these states were affected by further changes in the volume and nature of foreign trade. There was a general and marked decrease in the number of European ships in Delagoa bay; exports of ivory diminished and the export of cattle, a commodity of much greater value in the societies of the region, increased. Shortage of cattle owing to an extended drought

exacerbated pressure on internal resources.

The ensuing conflict between the major northern Nguni states resulted in the dominance of the Zulu lineage under Tshaka, whose political system reflected the social changes influenced by earlier attachment to foreign trade; it did not, however, alter the kinship basis of social relations. The first Zulu kings, Tshaka and Dingane welcomed the traders and hunters who came to settle at Port Natal (now Durban) from 1824, but monopolised the trade with them and with Delagoa bay to the advantage of the royal lineage; moreover, the Zulu kings placed great value on the political and ideological support which the armed whites and their retainers could provide. Zulu control of these external forces was effective until confrontation with the Voortrekkers in 1838.

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List of Abbreviations

Adm	Admiralty section, Public Record Office
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon
CA	Cape Archives
Cod.	Codice
CO	Colonial Office Section, Public Record Office
Cx.	Caixa
DAHU	F. Santana, ed., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, (2 vols.), (Lisbon, 1964, 1966).
GG	Governor-General of Mozambique
GH	Government House Section, Cape Archives, Natal Provincial Archive
IM	India Maço
IOL	India Office Library
KA	Koloniaal Archief, Netherlands Royal Archive
KCL	Killie Campbell Library, Durban
Moç.	Mozambique
NPA	Natal Provincial Archive, Pietermaritzburg
NRA	Netherlands Royal Archive, The Hague
PRO	Public Record Office, London
RSEA	G.M. Theal, ed., Records of South-eastern Africa, (9 vols.), (Cape Town, 1898-1903).
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal
SP	Stuart papers, Killie Campbell Library, Durban

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Chapter I

Historiography and social history in southern Mozambique and Zululand

The apparently revolutionary circumstances of the beginnings of the Zulu kingdom in the early nineteenth century and the equally revolutionary aftermath - the Ngoni migrations - have become the focus of a historiography of explanation. An historical 'problem' exists, wide and deep in scope, confined in period, which has resulted in a series of unrelated, indeed occasionally partisan, hypotheses. A review of the constraints and disadvantages of such interpretations gives the context of the present study and points surely toward the interpretation of old and new historical material on trade and politics in terms of social structure within the geographical region between the river Tugela and Delagoa bay rather than within accepted ethnic or political boundaries.

The least surprising approach to the Nguni past is that which attributes most political change, creative or destructive,to the actions of a few great men, such as Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa, his contemporaries Zwide of the Ndwandwe, Phakatwayo of the Qwabe, Matiwane of the Ngwane, Ndungunya and Sobhuza of the Ngwane Dlamini, followed by the towering figures of Tshaka and Mswati. Historiographically, the approach has its origins in traditions where these men are remembered as the central figures in an heroic drama worthy of recall. Dingiswayo is said to have adopted a specific policy of unification of peoples lacking any common political institutions, to have embarked on a series of alliances and conquests and to have invented the incorporative age regiment in pursuit of this ideal; he it was who 'began' trade with Delagoa bay where Europeans came to barter. Tshaka, a general in the Mthethwa army and allegedly responsible for further innovations such as the adoption of the stabbing spear and the discarding of footwear, took over this unifying role on the event of Dingiswayo's murder and proceeded to the achievement

of his patron's aims.[1] In a slightly different perspective in Zulu tradition, Dingiswayo and contemporaries are still depicted as heroes, but they are also men whose actions initiated continuous conflict in place of the peace and security said to have prevailed before.[2]

These two versions are partially reflected in the writings of early travellers and some missionaries, administrators and historians. To this group of writers the great figures were still responsible for innovations in weaponry, military organisation and tactics, but they were also responsible for the terror, bloodshed and murder which resulted in a picture of a nation capable of unlimited and acquiescent allegiance to a seemingly monstrous despot. Such descriptions tended to justify the case of early traders and colonists, who found themselves obstructed by the resilience of Zulu culture. One trader, Isaacs, wrote to his senior, Fynn, in 1832 urging him to write and publish his diary making out Tshaka and Dingane as bloodthirsty as possible for the benefit of the Cape and home audience.[3]

Indeed the disentangling of oral history from written tradition originating from nineteenth century sources is a serious problem for modern researchers. The tradition of European influence in the early career of Dingiswayo through his supposed journey to Cape Colony and his

[1] J. Stuart and D. McK. Malcolm, eds., The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, (Pietermaritzburg, 1969), 7; H.F. Fynn, 'History of Dingiswayo and Chaka,' in J. Bird, ed., Annals of Natal, 1495-1845, 2 vols., (Pietermaritzburg, 1888), I, 60f; A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, (London, 1929), 98-9. In this thesis, the orthography 'Tshaka' is used in preference to 'Shaka' because it corresponds closely to usage in contemporary sources and conforms to the pronunciation in Zulu testimonies; KCL SP, V and U series, passim. A. Delegorgue, who visited Zululand in the late 1830s, wrote the Zulu king's name as 'Djacka;' Voyage dans l'Afrique australe, (2 vols) (Paris, 1847), II, 31; see also Fynn in Bird, ed., op.cit., 60f.

[2] KCL SP V 17, evidence of Jantshi, 16 Feb.1903; NPA, Shepstone papers, file 24, 'Historical notes for Zululand;' Bryant, Olden Times, 171, passim.

[3] NPA, Fynn papers, Letters received, No.2, Isaacs to Fynn, Cape Town, 10 Dec.1832.

experience of military organisation there is closely connected with the attempt to portray him as the harbinger of European justice which Shepstone propagated determinedly in Natal in the mid-nineteenth century. According to Shepstone, when installed in Mthethwa Dingiswayo instituted a form of trial with prisoners bound pending judgment, showed clemency to the families of prisoners, formally declared war on his enemies and used his regiments more for the glory of his military system than for plunder; moreover, under his rule the Nguni were individualistically enterprising.[4] Dingiswayo was compared favourably by Shepstone, Alfred Bryant and James Stuart with the supposedly more tyrannical Tshaka, the creator of the system which appeared to threaten Natal in the mid-nineteenth century;[5] Dingiswayo and his interpolated attributes formed the character in Zulu history who most fitted the European ideal of what Zulu and Natal Africans should be like, that is, accepting the basis of European government.

A recent study placing great weight on the role of the heroic figures has sought to fit the Zulu monarchy into a general theory of terror in 'some primitive African communities' so as to 'contravene the artless notion that extensive systems of terror are produced only in advanced societies.'[6] Tshaka and Dingane were the exponents to the furthest extremes of the principles of terroristic despotism. Walter's explanation of this is raison d'etat; warfare was the predominant activity of the state and every part of the kingdom was geared to perpetual conquest, so opposition could not be allowed. Moreover, terror was the means of

4 NPA, Shepstone papers, file 24, 'Mthethwa;' KCL SP R, Conversation between J. Stuart and R. Shepstone, quoting T. Shepstone, 5 Aug.1900; T. Shepstone, 'The early history of the Zulu-Kafir race of south-eastern Africa,' (paper read to the Royal Society of Arts, 22 January 1875), in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 163.

5 Bryant, Olden Times, 99, 100-118; Chapter 12 idealises Dingiswayo as a 'chivalrous knight.' See below, p.24f, for discussion of the evidence recovered by Bryant and Stuart, and Appendices I and II.

6 E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance. A study of political violence, (New York, 1969), ii, vii-viii.

Tshaka's generalised attack on surviving kin groups.[7] However, Walter's concentration on the reign of terror associated with individual Zulu kings prevents any exploration of the social basis of political action in warfare and kinship alignments. Yet the author also quotes the observations of early witnesses showing both Tshaka and Dingane under pressure from the army, ministers and chiefs who had by some means escaped the rigours of enforced incorporation, and he then goes on to deduce that the portrayal of the 'head of the system as an omnipotent and irresistible despot' was an 'official image.'[8]

By whatever route the author reaches this conclusion, it enables the first two Zulu monarchs to be seen as continuously threatened by political insecurity from within and without. For example the Ndwandwe who were defeated against heavy odds in 1819 remained a powerful force until their confrontation and rout by the Zulu in 1826. The intervening period saw the defection of other powerful groups which could, outside the Zulu economic system, recoup their strength, while within the kingdom relatives of such defectors remained undefeated; there was also an attempt on the king's life.[9] The official image was assiduously fostered by Tshaka as a partial answer to the intractable problems of government within northern Nguni social dimensions, and it has beguiled authors of tradition and written works.[10] Indeed, the failure to consider the social structure which necessitated such an image has led to a further distortion. Wrigley claims that Tshaka was 'a raging psychopath (with) insane ambitions;' and that through him 'great and enduring damage was also done to the external reputation of the African race, for it was the experience of this time

7 Ibid., 144, 146-7, 149.

8 Ibid., 202.

9 Chapter VII, below.

10 For the structural dynamics of royal ideology see chapters III, p.77f, and VII p.208f below.

that gave the final sanction to the image of Africa, and especially of Bantu Africa, as a land peopled by bloodthirsty savages.'[11] It would be difficult to find an interpretation more exactly opposite to the reality of Zulu historiography than this: it is rather the concentration on the heroic and terroristic aspects of Zulu history, extended by the need for an exculpatory avenue for the colonising mission, which has produced a false image of Zulu history.

The socio-economic basis of the northern Nguni revolution in which Tshaka is seen as the legatee has attracted considerable attention. Gluckman's explanation is still the most comprehensive attempt to account for the growth of and conflict between the states which preceded Tshaka's kingdom. He depicts northern Nguni life in small tribes 'kept small by constant fission' up to about 1775:[12]

> "The equilibrium of the structure depended on a certain relation of population to physical environment. As the population increased the process of migration over unoccupied land became impossible and tribes were in closer and more continuous relationship. In clan histories this trend becomes noticeable about 1775, and for the next thirty years newly formed tribes percolated into unoccupied land between the land of other tribes, and even ousting possessing tribes. From 1806 to 1816 the process was accelerated and several small kingdoms were established. Instead of warring tribes raiding only for cattle, the pattern became one of stronger tribes extending their rule, and in their turn clashing. These results are not to be ascribed to the simple increase in the numbers of the population. The population of Zululand was not dense until recently, and its present density is partly due to the expropriation of land by whites .... As far as one can understand the process from the almost contemporary records, under the distribution of population then prevailing it became more difficult for tribes to divide and dissident sections to escape to independence; as the Nguni cultural stress on seniority of descent and the relatively great inheritance

[11] C.C. Wrigley, 'Historicism in Africa: slavery and state formation,' African Affairs, 70 (1971), 119-120.

[12] M.G. Gluckman, The analysis of a social situation in modern Zululand, (Manchester, 1958), 30-31; see also, idem., 'The individual in a social framework: the rise of King Shaka of Zululand,' Journal of African Studies, I (1974), for an elaboration of this viewpoint. J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, (London, 1966), 24-27, follows Gluckman's interpretation in a work which synthesises accounts of the Ngoni migrations but does not explore further the eighteenth century origins of the Zulu kingdom.

of the main heir caused strong tensions in the tribes, chiefs began to press their dominion not only on their subordinate tribal sections but also on their neighbours.

Gluckman thus manages to convey the impression that it was the achievement of a particular population density which upset the equilibrium and in preventing fission caused conflict, and at the same time says that while Zululand was well watered and fertile, population was not dense until recently. What may seem a contradiction is perhaps only a problem of generalisation: the overall population may well have been sparse - Gluckman suggests a figure of 3.5 per square mile, though a more recent estimate increases this to 12 per square mile in 1824.[13] However, in favourable areas within the region population was much denser. The coastal belt and the lower river basins and their environs which are known to be high yielding for agriculture - having extensive alluvial soils and more rainfall than further inland - are said to have supported a thick population and many cattle 250 years before Tshaka,[14] while in 1647 the coastal belt of southern Zululand is described as 'a very thickly populated plain studded with kraals and covered with cattle.'[15] Such descriptions suggest a high density of people and livestock in some areas a considerable period before that held by Gluckman to be critical.

It is difficult at this time depth to establish convincing demographic data for any part of the region. Rather, the carrying capacity of any particular zone must be related to important variables including climate, soils and socio-economic organisation; carrying capacity in good crop years is likely to be different from that in much drier years. Periodic

13 R.F. Stevenson, Population and political systems in tropical Africa, (New York, 1968), 45; Stevenson's demographic analysis also concludes that Zululand was generally sparsely populated until recently.

14 RSEA I, M. de Mesquita Perestrello, 'Naufragio da Não São Bento,' (1554), 235.

15 RSEA VIII, B. Teixeira Feyo, 'Naufragio que fizerão as duas nãos da India: o Sacramento e Nossa Senhora d'Atalaya,' (1647), 346.

droughts for which there is some evidence from the sixteenth century are likely to have had an oscillating rather than a sudden effect on resources in some areas.[16] Indeed, Tyson's climatological work and Hall's dendrochonology show periodic droughts and wet phases with a regularity of approximately twenty years,[17] suggesting therefore that the ecological pressures were similar at the end of the eighteenth century to such pressures at other low points in the rainfall cycle. Therefore the social relevance of particular droughts, such as that thought to have occurred c.1801-2, to the political changes preceding the emergence of Tshaka's kingdom requires close investigation of the particular historical circumstances.[18]

However, contradictions in the interpretation of evidence for population and resources are paralleled in Gluckman's interpretation of the social effects of such pressure on resources. In Gluckman's view of northern Nguni social structure, when there was no pressure on resources internal political conflict led to fission and migration; environmental hardship caused a reversal of this norm, since tension between different segments of a lineage was resolved by the imposition of central controls

16 Chapter II below for further exploration of the region's ecology and resource utilisation.

17 P.D. Tyson, 'Spatial variation of rainfall spectra in South Africa,' Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 61 (1971), 720; M. Hall, 'Dendroclimatology, rainfall and human adaptation in the later iron age of Natal and Zululand,' Annals of the Natal Museum, 22 (1976), fig. 3d.

18 The complex interaction of ecological and economic variables such as rainfall variation and the cultivation of maize in systems of production is undertaken in Chapter II below. For the social relevance of drought at the beginning of the nineteenth century, see Chapter VI, p 198 below. See J.J. Guy, 'Cattle keeping in Zululand,' unpublished paper, Research Group on Cattle Keeping in Africa, Centre of African Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1970, for the effect of the madlatule famine (1801-2); idem., 'Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom,' paper presented to the Conference on Southern African History, National University of Lesotho, 1-6 August 1977. The author offers valuable insights into the nature of cattle keeping but the absence of historical detail leaves the role of the envisaged struggle for control of resources unclear.

imposed by lineage heads. This remarkable demonstration of the economic over the socio-political is, prima facie, the reverse of what might be expected: the corollary is that only when food and grazing become scarce do lineages cease to migrate. Indeed traditions suggest that droughts as well as floods do cause minor migrations in search of food and perhaps grazing, and result on occasion in resettlement.[19] The contradiction in Gluckman's argument emerges more starkly from his identification of the period c.1775 as marking the beginning of the process of accretion of chiefs' powers despite the continued existence of unoccupied land; only thirty years later, during the time of Dingiswayo and his contemporaries, was there urgent pressure on resources and hence the emergence of powerful chiefdoms. If, however, the upsetting and reestablishing of the equilibrium was periodic, as the ecological evidence suggests, rather than once-for-all in 1805, a more continuous and less revolutionary accretion of chiefs' powers must be supposed. Gluckman took into account this contrary possibility also: referring to the period 1500-1800, he concludes that 'fission of tribes was one side of the process; but as a section of a tribe split off to become independent, by the complementary process of fusion, it acquired greater unity.' Thus tribes were not always 'kept small by constant fission.'[20]

The problems of the population-ecology hypothesis are thus the difficulty of deciding when pressure on resources became critical and secondly how this pressure affected political structure. Such problems of interpretation can be clarified by delineating the two major areas of inquiry which Gluckman treated singly in his concentration on the creation of the Zulu state out of early nineteenth century conflict. The explanation of the growth of states such as Qwabe, Mthethwa and Ndwandwe and the associated process of centralisation of power by their rulers may be divided from the immediate causes of conflict between some of the states. Indeed

19 See below, p.24f.

20 Gluckman, Social Situation, 29.

an examination of the history and economy of such states is logically separate since some of them were scarcely involved in the early wars of the Mfecane.

These areas of inquiry have been restricted until recently by difficulties of evidence and approach. These stem partly from Tshaka's creation of a Zulu dominated state with the consequent migration of unwilling participants, the disbanding of others and the related attempt to expunge particularist tradition and replace it with Zulu history;[21] and from the tendency of even the most earnest of researches to bend unconsciously some of their material to the perpetuation of this ideology.[22] More recent scholars have also accepted notional barriers implied by colonial boundaries, European and African language differences, and supposed cultural uniformities. These constraints have resulted in the portrayal of pre-nineteenth century history of the region as an ahistorical reflection of nineteenth century domination of the Zulu and Swazi. Thus the Tsonga speakers of southern Mozambique are depicted as living in a tsetse infested lowland where cattle cannot survive and where social organisation failed to allow the emergence of a political structure comparable to that of the Nguni to the south.[23] There is evidence to show that the Tsonga were not such passive victims of the environment, but controlled it systematically, and that the domination of the Nguni over Tsonga polities did not predate c.1800.[24]

Impediments of a linguistic and conceptual nature have been partially overcome in the work of Alan Smith, who has thrown light on both political

[21] Chapter III, p.77f and Chapter VII, p.208f for the social function of such historical ideology.

[22] Explored below, p.24.

[23] M. Wilson, 'The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga,' in M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, eds., Oxford History of South Africa, (2 vols.) (Oxford, 1969, 1972), I, 177-8.

[24] Chapters II, IV and V below.


PEDI
EASTERN
SOTHO
Madolo
Delago
Bay
TEMBE
MABUDU
Ngwane
Ndwandwe
HLUBI
St. Luc
Bay
Zulu
BELE
R. Mf losi
Mthethwa
R. Mhl uze
Qwabe
ZIZI
R. Tukel
(DURBAN)(Port N tal)

structure and conflict by using Portuguese and Dutch material on Delagoa bay. The involvement of southern African peoples in a widespread network of trade, first described in the nineteenth century,[25] is now fully explored from the mid-sixteenth century, showing inter alia the penetration of trade routes from Delagoa bay to the northern Nguni area. The trade was composed essentially of ivory from the interior exchanged for beads, brass and cloth at Delagoa bay. From the mid-eighteenth century, owing to competition between several groups of Europeans, trade increased, mainly with the northern Nguni,[26] and even after the reestablishment of a permanent Portuguese presence at Delagoa bay in 1799, 'the trade of Delagoa bay seems to have been maintained at high levels.'[27]

Smith suggests also how trade affected the politics of the area: accumulation of wealth by chiefs through the prosecution of a royal monopoly enabled them to 'command increased loyalty from both within and without the normal lineage structure.' Hence, for example, Dingiswayo asserted royal control over trade in Mthethwa with the Tsonga Mabudu of southern Mozambique, 'an operational device he may have learned from the Tsonga themselves.' Further, Dingiswayo's line of military conquest was in a northerly and westerly direction which would have 'afforded him greater control of the trade to the north,' a motive that is also adduced for the expansion of the Ndwandwe from the coast in the east to the uplands in the west. Moreover, trade is seen as the dominating motive in the conflict between chiefdoms. Apparently the Ndwandwe were cut off from Delagoa bay trade by the alliance

[25] See W.D. Cooley, 'A memoir on the civilisation of the tribes inhabiting the highlands near Delagoa bay,' Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 3 (1833), 310-33.

[26] A. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 1750-1835,' in L.M. Thompson, ed., African Societies in Southern Africa, (London, 1969), 173, 175, 178; idem., 'Delagoa bay and the trade of south east Africa,' in R. Gray and D. Birmingham, eds., Pre-colonial African trade, (London, 1970), 267f, 277, 281-3.

[27] Smith, 'Trade of Delagoa bay,' in Thompson, ed., African Societies, 175.

between Mthethwa and Mabudu, an exclusion which helped shape Ndwandwe expansion and served as a casus belli; after Dingiswayo's attack on the Ndwandwe, and his subsequent murder at the hands of Zwide, Mabudu was brought under Ndwandwe control.[28]

This account contains seminal argument comparable to that of Gluckman, raising further issues for investigation and producing similar ambiguities. For example, on the question of the volume of trade, if, as a result of the ease of access of Dutch, English and French ships to Delagoa bay, trade increased after c.1750, it seems questionable whether this level of activity was maintained when the Portuguese managed to impose a monopoly after 1799 and when other European traders, not to speak of the Portuguese themselves, were diverted by warfare in Europe. Hence in the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century, at precisely the period that trade is suggested as a cause of conflict between Mthethwa and Ndwandwe, it is as possible to envisage a downturn in the volume of trade from the Nguni as to suggest that it was gaining increasing intensity.[29] Prima facie, a scarcity of valued imported goods would appear to be a more pressing motive for conflict than a superfluity, and would moreover have offset the supposed advantages of a second line of communication to the southern interior brought about by the collapse of Tembe (Tsonga) monopoly of trade to the south and the rise of the neighbouring Mabudu.[30]

Ambiguities also arise on consideration of the sequence of political events surrounding early Mfecane conflicts. The Mthethwa established an

[28] Ibid., 173-6.

[29] Ibid.; idem., 'Delagoa bay,' in Gray and Birmingham, eds., Precolonial African trade, 281; cp. A. Smith, 'The struggle for control of southern Moçambique, 1720-1835,' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), 224-5, passim., where the problem of trade volume and patterns is not explored further. Cf. below, Chapter V, where changes in commodity structure and volume are examined for the second half of the eighteenth century.

[30] Smith, 'Trade of Delagoa bay,' in Thompson, ed., African Societies, 178; Chapter V below, for the rise of Mabudu.

exclusive trading relationship with Mabudu; but the Ndwandwe, parts of whose kingdom abutted on Mabudu, did not attack the latter and Mabudu continued contacts with Tshaka as well as with the Ndwandwe on Dingiswayo's death. If the monopoly of commerce was so important to the Nguni states, the apparently independent role of Mabudu in the complex interaction of trade and politics south of Delagoa bay requires further investigation.

A related and more far-reaching problem concerns the control of trade within the chiefdoms of the area. Smith suggests royal monopoly of foreign trade as a central differentiating factor between northern Nguni chiefdoms and those to the north, enabling centralisation in the former; yet elsewhere, Dingiswayo's experience of trade organisation in Tsonga chiefdoms is said by the same author to have resulted in the introduction of royal monopoly in Mthethwa.[31] Doubt regarding the origins and purpose of royal control therefore remains. Indeed the political significance of foreign trade to the royal lineages and therefore also its signficance in political conflict requires analysis of the social structure in which the products externally exchanged, circulated and attained their value. This group of subjects, unexplored by Smith,[32] is central to the development of the present study.

A major purpose in analysing social relations of production in the Tugela-Delagoa bay region is to explore what constitutes economics, or economic rationality, within the region's particular social structures. The formalistic application of the economic values of one social structure, such as the market principles of capitalism, to explain production in another necessarily distorts the influence in production of political and ideological forces arising from particular historical circumstances. The opposing substantivist position, while emphasising the difference in

[31] Smith, 'Trade of Delagoa bay,' in Thompson, ed., African Societies, 182-4; idem., 'Delagoa bay,' in Gray and Birmingham, eds., Pre-colonial African trade, 269.

[32] See especially, Smith, 'Struggle,' (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis) passim.

economic values of African societies, has nevertheless continued to argue on much the same territory as the formalists: that is, a concern with economic activities and institutions as if they were uninfluenced by the social expression of particular historical circumstances.[33] As A.G. Hopkins has recently suggested, however, the examination of the economy within the concept of social relations bearing on production and exchange seems likely to end the formalist-substantivist debate.[34] According to M. Godelier,

> "there is no economic rationality in itself, nor any definitive form of economic rationality;...it is only one aspect of a wider rationality of social life." Moreover, "The economic optimum is not the maximum possible use of the factors of production, but the use of those factors that is best adjusted to the functioning of societies' structures."[35]

Thus both 'market principles' or principles of 'reciprocity and distribution' have to be comprehended for different social structures.

One approach to the explanation of social organisation of pre-colonial African societies has been to extract from marxian literature the generalised model taken to characterise the history of Europe; affinities with European feudalism have been the focus of some debate,[36] but a recent thesis attempts

[33] For a recent efflorescence of the formalist-substantivist debate, see A. G. Hopkins, An economic history of West Africa, (London, 1973), 4-6, 9-10, 52-3, passim; G. Dalton, 'Review of Hopkins, An economic history of West Africa,' African Economic History Review, No.1 (Spring, 1976), 51-101, esp. 54-5. A further survey of the literature on African economic systems, is in E.A. Alpers, 'Rethinking African economic history: a contribution to the roots of underdevelopment,' Ufuhamu, III (1973), 97-129.

[34] 'Clio-Antics: a horoscope for African-economic history,' in C. Fyfe, ed., African Studies Since 1945, (London, 1976), 35.

[35] Rationality and irrationality in economics, (New York, 1972), 95, 102. Indeed, the generalised category, 'market principles,' suffers from the assumption that economic values in capitalist societies are similar, and not shaped by different political and ideological forces in production in, for example, Britain and Germany.

[36] See, for example, E.M. Chilver, 'Feudalism in the inter-lacustrine kingdoms,' in A.I. Richards, ed., East African chiefs, (London, 1960), 382-92; J. Goody, 'Economy and feudalism in Africa,' Economic History Review, 22 (1969), 393-405; C. Coquery-Vidrovich, 'Research on an African mode of production,' Critique of Anthropology, 4 and 5 (1975), 38-71.

to show the transformation of south east African society through the complete range of social epochs: primitive communism, a homestead mode, feudalism, absolutism, toward capitalism.[37]

The applicability of such a paradigm to African history suffers from a number of disadvantages; central to them is the absence of comparability in the mode of production in the sense of comprising surplus extraction relations and their reproduction or maintenance. Indeed, there is no general agreement as to what constitutes feudal relations within Europe;[38] general features characteristic of social and political organisation have been delineated, such as widespread use of fiefs, vassalage, the fragmentation of authority and the growth of aristocratic power.[39] At this level, many pre-capitalist non-European societies can be described as feudal;[40] however, they can also be regarded as pre-feudal at the same time since features such as cattle clientage (a feature of modern Africa) and the predominance of the ideological over the material in the circulation of goods are characteristic of pre-feudal Europe.[41] Such similarities, which may include comparable modes of utilisation of the product, may indicate the limited number of options open to different societies at similar technological levels;[42] but the relations of production

37 H. Slater, 'Social transitions in south-east Africa to 1840,' (unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Sussex, 1976), 26-7, passim.

38 K. Marx, Precapitalist economic formations, (ed. E.J. Hobsbawm),(London, 1964), 61: Hobsbawm notes that the failure to discover general laws of feudalism despite many recent attempts is 'not insignificant.'

39 M. Bloch, Feudal Society, (London, 1961), 446; G. Duby, The early growth of the European economy, (London, 1974), 161f; G.A.J. Hodgett, A Social and economic history of medieval Europe, (London, 1972), 166-7, 184.

40 See, for example, J. Maquet, The premise of inequality in Ruanda, (London, 1961), 133-42.

41 Chilver, op.cit., 390; Duby, op.cit., 50.

42 Goody, op.cit., 393-4; Chilver, op.cit., 391; see also, John Taylor, 'Neomarxism and underdevelopment: a sociological phantasy,' Journal of Contemporary Asia, 4 (1974), 9, where Baran's assumptions concerning the applicability of English feudalism to all underdeveloped societies are reviewed.

do not emerge from a description of these features.

In feudal Europe tenurial relations between lord and peasant included inter alia politico-legal means of extraction such as those embodied in Roman law contracts, the establishment of title and the spread of leasing arrangements; these extraction relations emerged generally in the same period as the loss of royal authority and the evolution of labour from slavery to a peasantry of largely monogamous families. Even so, extraction relations were far from uniform; the seigneurial class was not homogeneous and it was not able to take advantage of labour in a uniform way; hence class relations evolved differently in the various regions of Europe. Moreover, such relations cannot be analysed without considering the attachment of production to urban centres and trade links.[43] Indeed, it is due to the width both of structural disparity and geographical conspectus that feudalism continues to be regarded as a phase or an epoch in European history, and not as a system of social relations of production, which can be analysed only in terms of the interrelated types of extraction and reproduction in particular historical circumstances.

On the other hand, where such extraction relations are specified within the feudal period, they are clearly the result of European historical circumstances, and only by ignoring such extraction relations can feudalism be held to characterise the mode of production where such relations did not exist; hence if feudalism is used at the conceptual level in the analysis of the social formation of non-European societies, the analysis will necessarily tend to exclude examination of the social relations of production and their reproduction because these are not the

[43] Duby, op.cit., 40, 105, 174, 179-80, 225-6, 264. R. Brenner, 'Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe,' Past and Present, No.70 (1975), 51, 54, 63. See also J. Friedman, 'Marxist theory and systems of total reproduction,' Critique of Anthropology, 7 (1976), 14; P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, (London, 1974), 147, 150; as Friedman points out, Anderson's enunciation of the feudal mode assumes that mercantile enterprise resulted from it, in opposition to the evidence that feudal relations were themselves shaped by their connexion to a larger economic system.

object of such a problematic. This is the fundamental weakness of Slater's thesis;[44] it is responsible for many of the subsequent misinterpretations of Nguni history. Chief among these is the repetitive use of the term mode of production as in 'primitive communal, feudal' and 'absolutist,' when these exclude an analysis of surplus extraction relations.[45] The omission inevitably leads to the delineation of false transitions, such as that between feudalism and absolutism in south east Africa[46] because changes in social relations of production are interpreted only at the level of features comparable to the paradigm. Indeed the false logic of this approach is all the more apparent owing to Slater's failure to define capitalism in relation to the social structures of south-east Africa. The failure to appreciate the fact that productive forces derived from capitalist social relations affected differently structured social relations through foreign trade leads also to the oversight of the real transitional changes brought about by such extraneous productive forces.[47]

The consistency of a viewpoint so directly the antithesis of social relations of production results from rigid interpretation of marxist periodisation as if it constituted the framework for a rigorous historical methodology; thus according to Slater,[48]

> "the historian has no need to devise new sets of observationally derived social categories when confronted with each new situation requiring analysis, unless it is the deliberate intention to furnish the reader with a picture of empirical confusion."

[44] 'Social transitions,' (Unpublished D. Phil. thesis).

[45] Ibid., 66f, 261f.

[46] A transition Slater sees as carried out under the Zulu in the early nineteenth century; ibid., 292f.

[47] Below, Chapter VI, p.193f and VIII, p 225f, for exploration of these points.

[48] 'Social transitions,' (unpublished D.Phil. thesis), 27.

On the contrary, the applicability of social epochs is not rigo rous or scientific; but exploration of the concept of the social relations of production in particular historic circumstances is the only means of comprehending how the mode of production changes. Slater criticises Goody's unwillingness to use the concept of feudalism and the comparabilities it allows;[49] but Goody's reluctance stems precisely from his conclusion that while systems of exchange and military organisation - that is, general features - can be regarded as roughly analogous, productive relations differed in such major respects that feudalism as a concept could not embrace African societies.[50]

Similar difficulties emerge from an approach which in some ways is quite opposite: the study of the 'domestic mode of production' (DMP) as most fully enunciated by Sahlins.[51] By looking at the location of production in the homestead and village, it hopes to reach the fundamentals of production in non-capitalist societies:

> "Penetrating beyond kinship, ritual, chieftainship - in sum the main institutions of primitive society - it claims to see in the household system the first principles of economic performance." [52]

Although Sahlins recognised that this approach could only proceed at a high level of abstraction from the realities of kinship relations - the 'greater institutions' of primitive society - he nevertheless justifies it on the grounds that:

> "The household is to the tribal economy as the manor to the medieval economy or the corporation to modern capitalism: each is the dominant production institution of its time."[53]

[49] Ibid., 95f.

[50] Goody, 'Economy and feudalism,' Economic History Review, 22(1969),394.

[51] M.D. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, (London, 1974), 41-148; the most instructive review I have found to be: Scott Cook, 'Structural substantivism: a critical review of M.Sahlins, Stone Age Economics,' in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16, (1974),(355-79.

[52] Sahlins, op.cit., 75.

[53] Ibid., 76.

This indicates that social relations are scarcely more likely to be explained by a development of this analysis than they are by the conceptualisation of social epochs, for the manor and the corporation may be dominant numerically but they can neither constitute nor determine the mode of production, though they may typify it.

Furthermore, the DMP is seen as the 'economy' in primitive society, whereas the 'political armature' is provided by kinship; and the DMP 'sacrifices the unity of society to the autonomy of its producing groups.'[54] The analysis proceeds by the juxtaposition of further contradictions; although 'the anarchy of domestic production is counterposed by larger forces and greater organisation, these grand forces of integration are not given in the dominant and immediate relations of production.'[55] Moreover, where a surplus is produced by the domestic economy, leadership does not emerge as a result of this surplus: rather leadership generates domestic surplus.'[56]

These contradictions remain starkly unsynthesised, and as a result, a dichotomy between cultural forms (kinship) and concrete human activity, paradoxically regarded as economic infrastructure, is created and maintained. Cultural forms thus remain superstructural, though they are not determined by the 'infrastructure.' This unresolved contradiction appears to be caused by inconsistency in the objectives of the analysis; one of these is to show why primitive economies have 'widespread and profound tendencies of underproduction' and that the location of production in the household or village is the cause of this: Sahlins suggests that 'the household is not organised for...output above the producers requirements.'[57]

54 Ibid., 95.

55 Ibid., 95-6.

56 Ibid., 139.

57 Ibid., 75-6, 86. The notion of underproduction is as arguable as that of the 'original affluent society' (hunter gatherer) ibid. , 1-40; cp. Marvin Harris, 'The economy has no surplus?' American Anthropologist, 61

It seems logical therefore that the political armature (kinship groups and 'leadership') which are held to be responsible for the generation of surplus require much further attention: only in this direction can the relations between Sahlins's (dominant) superstructure and the domestic location of production be analysed.[58]

Although the possible examination of the mode of production in terms of kinship has been mooted in recent British debate on pre-colonial social organisation, its conceptual usefulness has been limited and, indeed, usually rejected owing to the assumption that the expressed kinship unit, the lineage, has social functions necessarily different from those comprised in aggregates such as the village or kingdom, and not apparent in the social relations enabling the exaction of tribute in a tributary mode of production.[59] Hindess and Hirst, for example, perhaps because they draw so little from the evidence available for African societies, give a formalistic and circumscribed meaning to kinship: they appear to take kinship relations as a given expression of particular forms of

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(1959), 185-199, where some of the complexities of this problem are discussed. C.C. Wrigley points out that exports of African agriculture in the last half century increased very much more than population and supported considerable urbanisation without any major change in the methods of production, indicating that the domestic location of production was not a cause of underproduction where this existed; review of M.P. Miracle, Agriculture in the Congo Basin, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVII (1969), 664.

58 Cp. J.M.F. Depelchin, 'From pre-capitalism to imperialism: a history of social and economic formations in eastern Zaire (Uvira zone), c.1800-1965,' (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford, 1974), p.126f, where the opposite conclusion is drawn; viz. that by opting for the domestic mode qua Sahlins 'analysis will begin at a more fundamental level of the productive and reproductive process' than can be achieved by exploring kinship; see also below, p.64 for an explanation of this error.

59 Such an assumption is made in P.L. Bonner, 'Classes, the mode of production and the state in pre-colonial Swaziland,' unpublished seminar paper, Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1977, p.2.

biological relations which limit the participation of lineage elders in relations of production.[60]

The contrary view, developed extensively by Godelier and Rey, is that kinship is a specific social grouping of biological relations which have socially determined functions.[61] The significance of this standpoint for the analysis of African social structure is that if kinship is the form of social relations, the lineage cannot be dismissed simply as representing a particular mode of production such as the hunting band, in which tribute and exploitation do not appear; on the contrary, the configuration of the lineages within the social formation requires examination so as to describe the basis of exploitation and tribute.[62] The analysis of northern Nguni and southern Ronga social relations in the eighteenth century and earlier is conducted in this context in Chapter Three. Within the chiefdom, the totality of the social relations of

[60] B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst, Pre-capitalist modes of production, (London, 1975), 67-8, passim; for an extensive critique of the intellectual basis of this work, see John Taylor, 'Review article: Pre-capitalist modes of production, Parts I and II,' Critique of Anthropology, nos. 4 and 5 (Autumn 1975), 127-155; no.6 (Spring 1976), 56-69; a further expression of the apparent formalism toward kinship expressed by Hindess and Hirst is in their rejoinder, 'Mode of production and social formation in pre-capitalist modes of production: a reply to John Taylor,' Critique of Anthropology, no.8 (Spring 1977), 54.

[61] Godelier, Rationality, esp. 93; P-P. Rey, Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme, (Paris, 1971), 207f.

[62] Cf. Slater, 'Social transitions,' (unpublished D.Phil. thesis), 71; Julian Cobbing, 'Historical materialism and the nineteenth century Ndebele,' unpublished seminar paper, Societies of Southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1975, p.2; Cobbing quotes C. Meillassoux ('Social organisation of the peasantry,' Journal of Peasant Studies,' 1 (1973), 86), to the effect that 'kinship expresses genetic relations only to the extent that they fulfil actual functional relations;' however, Cobbing draws the opposite conclusion to Godelier and Rey and proceeds to discuss major forms of social and economic cooperation as if entirely separate from kinship, and as if they constituted different modes of production; cf. also Depelchin's dismissal of kinship as the focus of the analysis of social relations of production, op.cit., 116-9. There is no consistency in conceptualising the social role of kinship or the lineage; in the present thesis the lineage mode of production is elaborated as a social structure incorporating tribute.

production is constituted by the hierarchical grouping of lineages dominated by a ruling lineage which controls relations between all the lineages, particularly through exchanges of women and cattle, so as to maintain its dominance. This means that the social role of the elder of the lineage is not defined primarily by his membership of the lineage but by his membership of the collectivity of all the lineages.[63]

Conceptualising social relations in this way suggests the need to explore the social function of kinship ideology: this is because the meaning of kinship links is beyond the biological yet is nevertheless embodied in real social relationships. As Rey implies,[64] two levels of kinship meaning can be extrapolated; one, an actual social artefact utilised to reproduce the dominance of a ruling lineage; the second, a kinship terminological in appearance but ultimately real, which represents and also maintains the strength of kinship as the determining relation between the dominant and the subordinate.

Exploration of both is central to the explanation of the coherence of royal ideology and the extent of state intervention in production. According to Taylor, in Vietnamese kingdoms the ideological conception of the monarch's power, not physical coercion, established the basis for the continued exaction of tribute.[65] Godelier makes a similar argument in explaining the success with which Inca conquerors utilised the kinship relations of Andean communities; violence was not the means of ensuring that the conquered population worked for the victors. For the system to work continuously, it was necessary that surplus labour did not appear as such, but as an obligation. The Inca added the cult of the sun God and his offspring, the Inca emperor, to local deifications, while the Inca state

63 Rey, Colonialisme, 43.

64 Ibid., 209.

65 Taylor, 'Review article,' part I, Critique of Anthropology, nos.4 and 5 (Spring, 1975), 137-8.

became the owner of the land and thus furnished the means of production to traditional communities.[66]

> "It is here that the ideological role is seen, a constraint exercised without physical violence on the thought and will of the Inca's subjects."[67]

> "The person of the Inca was considered to be the controller of reproduction both of nature and society, of every individual and of every community...One finds that this ideology in a certain way created a state of general dependence on the Inca on the part of individuals and social groups. Now, the other side of dependence is obligation, and to explain the strength of the Inca state, its capacity for oppression, it is not enough to refer only to physical or military violence; one must also understand this deeply felt consensus which is both conscious and unconscious. Here, ideology functions not only as the 'legitimation' of the relations of domination, but also as an internal and necessary component of the relations of production."[68]

In the eighteenth century, northern Nguni and southern Ronga ruling lineages maintained the fiction that their ancestors were also those of their subordinate lineages, which were depicted as being genealogically related but inferior in status to the ruling lineage. Moreover the king or chief (inkosi), who was the living representative of his ancestors, was closely associated with all stages of the agricultural production cycle, the success of which was attributed to the monarch's well-being and fortitude, and to the strength of his relationship with his ancestors. In the early nineteenth century, the Zulu ruling lineage employed similar ideological forces in the creation and maintenance of its authority. The ideological preeminence of the king was held to justify his control of physical coercion and the continued exaction of tribute.[69]

Exploration of social structure, and especially the ideological

66 Godelier, Horizon, 343-4, 346-9.

67 Ibid., 352.

68 M. Godelier in C. Lévi-Strauss, M. Augé and M. Godelier, 'Anthropology, history and ideology,' Critique of Anthropology, no.6 (Spring 1976), 46.

69 Chapters III, VII and VIII below. According to Lévi-Strauss, (Lévi-Strauss, Augé and Godelier, op.cit., 51), the relationship between economy, kinship and religion can be clarified and detailed by pursuit of this line of inquiry.

forces within it, facilitates the evaluation of testimony emanating from the societies of the region as historical evidence. In the major bodies of oral histories collected by Bryant and Stuart, evidence for pre-nineteenth century history is shaped by the assumption, usually by both questioner and informant, that the subject matter of such early history is largely a record of migration and settlement. Stuart, for example, was particularly inquisitive as to the geographical origins of informants' ancestors, and expressed disappointment on occasion when they could not show whence progenitors had travelled.[70] Bryant's synthesis proceeds by demonstrating how the great figures of the early nineteenth century built states by incorporating peoples whose previous history concerned ancestral journeys and clan fission.[71] Moreover, Bryant further explained the early history of the region by codifying migration patterns: the Nguni of Zululand were composed of two streams of migrants, the Tonga- and Mbo-Nguni, who came via the southern Mozambique coast and eastern Swaziland, and a third, the Pure Nguni, who entered Zululand from the west.[72]

However, such traditions of genesis, often having the form of a migration, settlement in an empty land, and its peopling by the process of natural increase and lineage fission, may be mythical explanations in genealogical terms of the primacy of the ruling lineages: the appearance of historical primacy justifying the reality of social dominance. Nevertheless, as Vansina has recently suggested, the problem for the historian is not simply to identify such traditions and to dismiss them - still less

[70] KCL SP V 26, comment on the testimony of Tununu, 6 June 1903; SP I, 'Notes on clan formation.' The Stuart papers are described in the bibliography; they offer a valuable check and supplement to the material contained in Bryant's Olden Times. Bryant's manuscripts and notes have not yet come to light, while the Stuart papers contain an extensive series of notes on each interview.

[71] For example, his version of the rise of Mthethwa, in Olden Times, 83-118.

[72] Ibid., 3-15; see Shula Marks, 'The traditions of the Natal Nguni: a second look at the work of A.T. Bryant,' in Thompson, ed., African Societies, 126-44, for an extensive commentary.

all traditions - as evidence, but the more intricate task of assessing their real content where possible.[73] Means of doing this include considering what sort of relationships were expressed in the directions supposed by migration or conquest, a subject approached in work on the Nuer and Dinka of the southern Sudan and the Shambaa of Tanzania through an examination of the importance of ecology to economic relationships.[74]

This approach leads to greater understanding of the real character of ethnic boundaries such as that implied by the division between Nguni and Thonga. Linguistically, there were several intermediate dialects between northern Nguni and southern Tsonga languages prior to the late nineteenth century, which suggests the absence of any marked barrier to communication.[75] Study of the ecology, however, shows how systems of production differed in relation to resource distribution in the different ecologies, and also the underlying complementarities between those ecologies and systems; this reinforces traditional evidence on internal trade before the nineteenth century between the sandy lowlands of southern Mozambique, and lowland and upland Zululand.[76] Indeed, the economic links between these three major ecologies have a geographical pattern similar to that of the grandiose

[73] Jan Vansina, Comment: 'Traditions of genesis,' Journal of African History, XV (1974), 320-1; cf. the opposite view, T.O. Beidelman, 'Myth, legend and oral history: a Kaguru traditional text,' Anthropos, LXV (1970) 74-97. For a convincing execution of Vansina's injunction, see J.C. Miller, Kings and Kinsmen: early Mbundu states in Angola, (Oxford, 1976).

[74] See P.J. Newcomer, 'The Nuer are Dinka: an essay on origins and environmental determinism,' Man, 7 (1972), 5-11; M. Glickman, 'The Nuer and the Dinka: a further note,' ibid., 586-94; S. Feierman, The Shambaa kingdom, a history, (Madison, 1974), 17-31.

[75] Bryant, Olden Times, 82, 234; H.A. Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe, (2 vols) (London, 1927), I, language map; O.H. Spohr, ed., The Natal diaries of W.H.I. Bleek, (Cape Town, 1965), 76.

[76] See Chapters II and III below. Cp. F. Barth, ed., Ethnic groups and boundaries, (Bergen, 1969), for the debate on ethnic distinctions and their foundation on ethnic interaction.

scheme of Bryant's migrations.[77]

Perception of ecological differences and social structure thus does not lead to the denial of all migration, conquest or transhumance; it helps explain the content of some traditions. For example, a Swazi tradition collected in the late nineteenth century represents their relationship with the peoples of southern Mozambique thus:

> "During the Thonga king Mtonga's reign his brother Mswazi came to occupy the country along the base of the uBombo mountains. Mswazi wanted to cultivate for food, whereas Mtonga wanted to hunt for food. This was the origin of the separation, which was not due to a quarrel. Mswazi wished to fight with other peoples and obtain cattle, some of which were paid to his elder brothers in tribute. Mtonga received these cattle and ate them. Thus Swazi kings proper begin with Mswazi, for those before him are Thonga kings."[78]

The kings mentioned are almost certainly mythical: Mswati was responsible for much of the extension of power of the Ngwane-Dlamini between 1840 and 1860, but there is no evidence to show that an earlier figure of that name was instrumental in the departure from the eastern coastlands, although there is evidence showing that Mswati's - and Sobhuza's - forbears came from that area in the second half of the eighteenth century.[79] The references to cultivation, hunting, and the acquisition and transfer of cattle are to the ecological differences between the coastlands and Swaziland, and to the cattle trade by which the Thonga replenished their stocks, especially after the growth of the victualling trade to the Europeans at Delagoa bay after c.1790.[80] Royal traditions from the Tembe and Mabudu in the lowlands do not recount a genealogical connection with the Ngwane-Dlamini, and it seems likely therefore that the motivations attributed to

77 Cp. Olden Times, 3f; pp.93-94 below.

78 KCL SP Q, evidence of John Gama, 17 Dec.1898.

79 KCL SP B, 'Preliminary notes on the effects of European influence on the natives of Swaziland,' 3 Jan.1899; this document deals wholly with the period to c.1810 and shows the association of such forbears with particular locations.

80 Chapters II, p .61, and V, p.149, below.

Mswazi and Mtonga in the tradition are interpolations which conceal the real circumstances leading to the movements of the future Swazi royal lineage. Although the tradition ostensibly relates the early history of all Swazi, it actually refers only to the beginnings of the royal lineage, as the history of Sobhuza's and Mswati's reigns confirms.[81]

A second example concerns a founding tradition of the Hlubi, a powerful chiefdom in the eighteenth century, which straddled the watershed between the headwaters of the Pongolo and Mzinyati. According to one of Stuart's informants, the Hlubi once lived in the southern uBombo hills which divide northern Zululand and Swaziland from the coastlands; they left the uBombo because of famine and travelled west along the Pongolo valley. In so doing they were following in the footsteps of the 'Sutho' who are said to have left a footprint on the stones of the uBombo hills.[82] This tradition was an important component of Bryant's corpus concerning the Mbo-Nguni migrations from southern Mozambique. However, the only certain historical content in the myth is the fact that periodic droughts can be serious in and near the north east lowlands;[83] indeed, famine may have been a periodic cause of small groups moving from that zone in search of better conditions. Moreover, in the Hlubi case there is no means of ascertaining whether the tradition originated with the ruling lineage or was subsumed in Hlubi tradition from lesser newcomers such as those known to have traversed trade routes between upland and lowland.[84]

81 See P.L. Bonner, 'The rise, consolidation and disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland between 1820 and 1889.' Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1977.

82 KCL SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 31 Jan.1909.

83 Chapter II, p.32f below.

84 Chapter III, p.94 below; cp. Gickman,' Nuer,' Man, 7 (1972), 589-91, where the myth of Nuer conquest is viewed in terms of the subsumption of individual economic relationships.

The importance of the ecological influence in traditions is illustrated more generally in the categorisation of peoples. The Pure or Ntungwa Nguni, as reported by Bryant, have a legend which relates that they arrived in Zululand with a grain basket, meaning that people were driven from famine-stricken homes inland to wetter areas nearer the coast. Bryant held that the tradition indicated long-distance migration,[85] whereas it probably refers to the ecological differences between uplands and lowlands within Zululand; lower rainfall and sparser soils in the uplands implies a greater threat to agriculture from drought. Uplanders were distinguished by their use of grain baskets rather than pits which lowlanders used, and there are references to trade in grain across the upland-lowland divide.[86] Thus 'Ntungwa' characterised people of a particular environment, and only in this limited sense did the term imply origin. Similarly, 'Mbo' in Zulu is associated with the tropical environment of the north east lowlands.[87]

As Vansina suggests, appreciation of the range of subtle biases in traditions is central to their recognition at all, and to the process of assessing where traditions reflect on past events and where not.[88] For the northern Nguni and southern Ronga, interpretation of traditions apparently relating to the period before the eighteenth century would be too dependent on unsubstantiable kinglists and unproven claims of affiliation to result in definite evidence.[89] For that period, therefore,

85 KCL SP V 74, evidence of Zitshibili, 8 June 1905; U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 27 Jan.1909; Bryant, Olden Times, 222; A.T. Bryant, A Zulu-English Dictionary, (London, 1905), 365; idem, The Zulu people, (London, 1949),11.

86 Chapters II, p.44, and III, p.89, below.

87 Chapters II, p.50f, and IV, p.106, below.

88 Vansina, 'Traditions of genesis,' op.cit., 321.

89 For an extensive review of problems of interpretation in these areas, see D.P. Henige, The chronology of oral tradition, (Oxford, 1974), Chs.I-IV; D.H. Jones, 'Problems of African Chronology,' Journal of African History, XI (1970), 161-76. Appendix I covers such problems of interpretation further.

the presence of Portuguese traders and travellers at Delagoa bay has resulted in more continuous evidence for the southern Ronga than for the northern Nguni; the literary sources show the penetration of foreign trade and how it began to affect Ronga polities before the mid-eighteenth century in the ways suggested by social structural analysis.[90] From approximately the mid-eighteenth century, the traditions can be more fully used to describe the larger pre-Zulu states, the Qwabe, Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Mabudu in terms of the hierarchy of lineages each contained; and changes in the relationships within the hierarchies brought about by participation in external trade can be exposed.[91]

[90] Chapters III and IV.

[91] Chapters V and VI.

Chapter II

Historical Geography and the branches of production

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, almost all the peoples of southern Mozambique and Zululand were involved in a mixed economy structured by the combination of major branches of production, the relative importance of which differed in the various environments of a geographically complex region. A distributional analysis of the material resources supporting each branch of production gives the background to the social relations governing production within the chiefdoms and to the economic complementarities which underlay the exchange system of the region. Moreover, such an approach assists in the evaluation of traditions by indicating the possible material inflections in, for example, local concepts of ethnicity and early 'migration' traditions.

Topographically, the area between latitudes 30°S and 25°30'S is marked by the presence of a number of powerful rivers, the Tukela, Mfolosi, and the Pongolo-Usutu, which extend far to the west to a Drakensberg watershed with the Orange and Vaal at over 6000 feet. In the higher altitudes of the west the upper basins of these rivers are very broad; their erosion of the sandstones and the underlying granites have given much of Zululand a broadly terraced appearance. However, the terraces are not parallel to the coast; relatively narrow spurs of less eroded resistant material extend at a high level toward the sea. The most distinct of these ridges are the Ngoye, between the Mlalazi and Mhlatuze rivers, where the sandstone commences scarcely five miles west of Eshowe; and the Ntonjaneni, between the Mhlatuze and the Mfolosi. These spurs are incised by numerous tributaries of the larger rivers. Hence the landscape of Zululand often displays a high range of altitude at short distances from the coast or from the valley bottoms.[1]

[1] B.E. Beater, Soils of the Sugar Belt, Zululand, (Natal Regional Survey, report, No.5) (Cape Town, 1962) 2f.

To the east are the coastal lowlands; these are fairly narrow south of the Tukela but north of this river they are much broader and in southern Mozambique and eastern Swaziland they are the characteristic topography. However, in these areas the lowlands are divided by the uBombo hills, a range extending from the northern environs of St. Lucia bay in Zululand to the north east Transvaal. The uBombo is scarcely ten to twenty miles in width, but it rises to over 2500 feet and has a steep scarp face in the west. It thus forms a longitudinal barrier in the western hinterland of Delagoa Bay, even though the Mkuze, Pongolo, Usutu, Umbelusi and Nkomati have cut deep gaps in the range.[2]

The distribution of soils in the region generally conforms to a division between the lowlands and the lower river valleys on the one hand, and the upper valley and plateau altitudes on the other. In the first zone, a large proportion of the soils are of outstanding natural fertility. Some of these derive from dolerite and basalt south of the Mfolosi, more frequently from cretaceous beds to the north; moreover, the Mhlatuze, Mfolosi and Pongolo flood plain areas, which extend inland considerable distances, contain alluvial soils with a high phosphate and potash content. Chiefly owing to the extent of these plains, a considerably larger proportion of Zululand's soils are classifiable as 'of extreme natural fertility' than are Natal's. In the higher plateau areas, on the other hand, the soils are often highly organic and strongly acid, and are much less suitable for intensive cultivation.[3]

Climate also varied greatly within the region. To some extent, temperature and rainfall are closely related to topography; the coastlands and lower river valleys are considerably hotter than the uplands, with a

[2] O. Boléo, Mozambique (Lisbon, 1951), geological maps, 26-27; A. Gomes e Sousa, Dendrologia de Mozambique, (2 vols.) (Lourenço Marques, 1966), vol. 1, 62-3.

[3] Beater, Soils, 5, 9, 24-26, 37-9; Natal Regional Survey No.1, (various authors) (Cape Town, 1951) 81; Bryant, Zulu People, 200.

growing season longer often by some months - in some localities extending all year - than in higher altitudes, where frost is a danger to cultivation in perhaps three months of the year over about 4000 feet. In general rainfall varies from over 50 inches to less than 25. Relief has the effect of giving the region two rainfall patterns. For example, in southern Zululand, the Tugela basin widens markedly the coastal strip which receives winter as well as summer rainfall, while inland, the middle and upper parts of the basin are reliant upon the latter only, and are consequently much drier. Further north, the Mfolosi and Pongolo-Usutu basins are partially in the rain shadow of somewhat wetter intervening uplands, and to the north east, on either side of the Lebombo, the drier zones extend much nearer to the coast, though the latter remains quite wet.[4]

In addition to such local variation, the region experiences highly erratic seasonal distribution of rainfall, causing floods and drought in the same locality in consecutive years. Modern statistics show that this type of variation is fairly consistent throughout the region; that is, troughs in the rainfall pattern occur in the same years for most of the recording stations. This characteristic exaggerates the reliability of rainfall in the already favoured zones - such as the south east coastlands - where a figure below 30 inches has only once been recorded - in relation to the drier areas, where the drop may well entail an absolute total so low as to threaten crops. An examination of the statistics by agronomists of the possibility of cyclical behaviour in this type of short term variation has not produced 'any evidence in favour of any opinion.'[5] A further complexity is that monthly rainfall also varies from year to year independently of annual totals: in the two

[4] J.H. Wellington, 'Notes on the Surface Features of Natal,' South African Geographical Journal, vol. 15 (1932) 45; Beater, Soils, 11.

[5] Ibid. 7-8.

RELIEF Map 2


Maputo
Delagoa bay
S W A Z I L A N D
uBombo range
Maputo r.
Usutu
Kosi bay
Pongola
Mkuze
Nongoma
Lake St.Lucia
Mfolosi r.
Emrangeni
Eshowe
Tugela r.
over 5000'
4000'
3000'
2000'
1000'
under 1000'
35 miles


RAINFALL
Map 2a
Maputo
Delagoa
bay
S W A Z I
L A N D
uBombo
range
Maputo r.
Nongoma
Lake
St.Lucia
Mfolosi r.
Empangeni
Eshowe
Tugela r.
over
5 "
40"
30"
25-30"
under
25"
35 miles

most apparent troughs involving consecutive years of below average rainfall, 1926-9 and 1950-53, diminution in the growing season was much greater in the latter period than the former, and probably therefore a greater threat to cultivation.[6] Hence low rainfall is not of itself a sufficient guide to possible effects on crop production.

In this context, what requires particular investigation is the interaction between summer and winter rainfall, and the possibility that either is subject to consistent variation over long periods. Tyson has shown that, in the twentieth century, while there has been no uniform pattern of climatic change, summer rainfall areas have been affected by a quasi twenty year oscillation in rainfall totals.[7] Hall has suggested from dendroclimatological analysis that this pattern of oscillation was also characteristic in northern Natal from the mid fourteenth century.[8] Such oscillations consist of periods of several consecutive years of above or below average rainfall, and amount to between 20 and 30 per cent of total annual rainfall.[9] Continuously low absolute totals exaggerated for a somewhat longer period than normal annual variation the dryness of the lower rainfall zones, and accentuated even further the productive potential of the more favoured zones. On the other hand, successive augmentations increased the risk of damage from floods in the lower river basins, but also reduced the risk to crops in the lower rainfall areas.

6 Ibid. tables I and II.

7 P.D. Tyson, 'Spatial variation of rainfall spectra in South Africa,' Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 61 (1971), 720; P.D. Tyson and T.G.J. Dyer, 'Mean annual fluctuation of precipitation in the summer rainfall region of South Africa,' South African Geographical Journal, 57 (1975) 104; M.A. Peres, 'Preliminary investigations on the rainfall of Lourenço Marques,' South African Journal of Science, 27 (1930), 132-5.

8 M. Hall, 'Dendroclimatology, rainfall and human adaptation in the later iron age of Natal and Zululand,' Annals of the Natal Museum, 22 (1976) , figs. 3A-D.

9 Tyson and Dyer, op.cit., 109; Peres, op.cit., 132.

Evidence from the early reports and traditions supports the conclusion that climatic variation had differential effects within the region. For example, food shortages encountered by a shipwrecked party north of the mid Tukela in 1593 were explained by drought, though the rains were favourable to food production elsewhere in the region.[10] Similarly, in 1647, when shipwrecked mariners reported that much of 'kaffraria' (here meaning Natal, Zululand and southern Mozambique) had experienced five years of drought and a plague of locusts, foodstuffs were in plentiful supply in most of the lowland areas through which the party passed; despite the fact that it was the growing season, grain and bread, as well as cattle, poultry, fruits and vegetables, were available.[11] The widespread drought experienced in Inhambane, Lourenço Marques and the eastern Cape in 1791 does not appear in the dendrochronological graph for inland Natal; in 1792, the drought in Tembe was not experienced to the north of Delagoa Bay.[12] The droughts said in the traditions to have affected parts of central and northern Zululand in the first and third decades of the nineteenth century did not affect the south.[13] Finally, the regularity of the climatic oscillations and the resulting disparities

10 RSEA II, J.B. Lavanha, 'Naufragio da Nau Santo Alberto,' 328.

11 RSEA VIII, Vaz d'Almada, 'Naufragio da Nau São João Baptista,' 339-40, 344-5, 352-4.

12 AHU Moç. Cx 27, Devassa, Monteiro de Matos to Silva Pacheco, 1 May 1792; Vasconcelos e Sá to Governor-General, November 1791.

13 KCL SP v 24, evidence of Tununu, 14 June 1903; SP T, Biography of Dingiswayo, 36-7; Hall, op.cit., 6. The naming of the more general famines is not consistent in the oral data; Bryant, relying on a Hlubi tradition recorded in J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, History of the Abambo, (Butterworth, 1912), 5-6, ascribed the madlatule pestilence to the beginning of the century: Olden Times, 63, 83. However, Lunguza in SP U 32, implies that he lived through madlatule in the 182 s. In Mabudu tradition, the Sileyi famine is said variously to have taken place in Makhasane's reign, or before Mwali's; another famine - ukufa kuka Mwali - took place in the latter's reign, probably about the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hall's evidence shows nevertheless that the first and third decades of the nineteenth century experienced low parts of the oscillation, and thus indirectly confirms the testimonies; op.cit., figs. 3A-D.

in food availability throughout the historic period resulted not only in the need for protection, but also in a complementarity between the favoured and the less favoured zones in the region, which is reflected in patterns of food distribution and transhumance.[14]

II

African farmers in the region adopted definite production strategies to overcome the major disadvantages of the environment, and to exploit it in such a way as to ensure the continuity of supply in staple foodstuffs. Undoubtedly the chief means of so doing was the practice of growing several cereals having different production and harvesting characteristics rather than relying upon monoculture. From the early iron age, these staples were sorghum, pennisetum and eleusine coracana.[15]

The timing of the introduction of maize is less certain, but a brief review of the material indicates that maize was probably available from c1550. A recent botanical report has emphasised the difficulty of relying upon the interpretation that maize was unknown outside the New World before Columbus; while cytology suggests that African sorghum is more like maize than plants hitherto thought to have been responsible for its origin, only American maize has been exhaustively studied, and conclusions concerning the relations between the plants of different continents are regarded botanically as unsubstantiable at this stage. Nonetheless, geographical commentary suggests that despite inconclusiveness in the archaeological and literary record, the great weight of evidence for transpacific voyages and Indian Ocean trade in the millenia before Columbus tend to support the view that maize was present outside

[14] See below, p.89.

[15] R.C. Soper, 'New radio-carbon dates for eastern and southern Africa,' Journal of African History, XV (1974), 180.

the Americas before the sixteenth century.[16] However, recent north Indian excavations and pollen analyses showing the presence of primitive maize pollen in the Kashmir valley have not yielded confirmation of a suspected fifteenth century date. Moreover, literary evidence from China and India so far shows the presence of maize only from the early sixteenth century, some decades after the beginning of European navigation of the Indian Ocean, but suggesting that the cereal was available on other Indian Ocean littorals by the same period.[17]

The records for south eastern Africa, while not offering conclusive proof, do suggest confirmation of the availability of maize from the mid-sixteenth century. The commonest words used to describe grain by the travellers through the region between 1552 and 1647 were nechinim, ameixoeira, and milho. Dalgado shows that nechinim derives from Hindi natcheeni and is used with textual consistency in Portuguese documents to denote finger millet.[18] In some modern Mozambique languages, mchewere is pennisetum; this definition and the physical description of the grain in northern Natal in 1593 suggests that ameixoeira was pennisetum in the sixteenth century.[19] Moreover, the vernacular equivalents given in 1593 for ameixoeira and milho are mabere and masimba respectively; in modern Zulu, amabele is the general term for sorghum and amazimba that for the ears of sweet sorghum.[20] In Ronga, mabele means pennisetum, and matimba

16 G.F. Carter, 'The origins and diffusion of maize', Geographical Review, 58 (1968), pp 492-4.

17 Vishnu-Mittre and H.P. Gupta, 'Pollen morphological studies of some primitive varieties of maize with remarks on the history of maize in India,' The Palaeobotanist, XV (1966), 184; Ping-ti Ho, 'American food plants in China,' American Anthropologist, LVII (1955), 194-5.

18 S.R. Dalgado, Glossário Luso-asiático, (Coimbra, 1919), 21.

19 RSEA II Lavanha, 317; W.H.I. Bleek, The languages of Mozambique , (London, 1856), passim; J. Torrend, A grammar of the language of the lower Zambezi, Grammatica do Chisena, (Chipanga, 1900).

20 Bryant, Zulu People, 309; Santos, 'O carácter experimental,' (see note 22 below) 108.

sweet sorghum, and in Xhosa, through parts of whose territory Lavanha's party passed, amazimba is applied to the sorghum plant generally.[21] In terms of the modern languages, therefore, the vocabularies are mixed, but given that Lavanha's account means to distinguish two different cereals, and that neither vernacular crop term resembles any Ronga or Nguni term for maize, the most likely meanings are pennisetum and sorghum respectively.[22]

The only other cereal reference within the region comes from Perestrello's account of 1554: milho zaburro describing a cereal encountered near Mhlatuze lagoon.[23] Analysts of sixteenth century documents have not given a unified meaning to this term; for west Africa, it has been argued that it meant a variety of pennisetum in the early sixteenth century.[24] However, from the second half of the sixteenth century, m. zaburro was frequently translated as maize in Italy, Portugal and Brazil, and it is used by Miracle as a test for maize from this period.[25]

This interpretation accords well with Zulu traditions: Bryant summarised the information gained from interviews on this subject thus:[26]

> 'The variety of maize first to reach them was the short stalked, small cobbed, yellow grained and quickly ripening kind. Owing

[21] Bryant, Zulu People, 309.

[22] H.A. Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe, (2 vols.) (London, 1927), II, 10-11; M.E.H.M. Santos, 'O carácter experimental da carreira da India,' Revista da Universidade de Coimbra, 24 (1969), 108; P.E.H. Hair, 'Milho and other foodstuffs at the Sofala garrison, 1505-1530,' Unpublished Ms in the possession of Dr. Marks.

[23] RSEA I, 257.

[24] A. Teixeira da Mota and A. Carreira, 'Milho zaburro and Milho caçaroca in Guinea and the islands of Cabo Verde,' Africa, 36 (1966), 73-80.

[25] G.B. Ramusio, Delle navigatione et viaggi, (Venice, 1563), vol I. p 385B; G. Soares de Sousa, Noticia do Brasil, Sao Paolo, nd., quoted in Teixeira da Mota and Carreira, op.cit., 76-77. M.P. Miracle, 'The introduction and spread of maize in Africa,' Journal of African History, VII (1966) 39, 47-48.

[26] Zulu People, 313.

> to the fact that it was first grown about the oNgoye hills (a forest-covered hill range between the lower Mhlatuze and Mlalazi rivers), and thence spread away along the coast (ulwandle, sea), they called it, indifferently, uNgoye (after the hills) or ulwandlekazana (the little sea-side thing.)'

The traditions thus record the introduction of maize in the same zone as Perestrello reported milho zaburro in 1554.

Although maize was thus probably present in the region from about 1550, both European reports and traditional evidence show that it was part of a complex pattern of cereal agriculture and did not become the dominant staple until well into the nineteenth century. For example, the early trader, H.F. Fynn, reported that maize was grown only in small quantities in the Zulu kingdom; sorghum, pennisetum and eleusine were also grown.[27] Stuart's informants held that maize was not widely cultivated in Zululand until comparatively recent times, even though traditions related its introduction to a much earlier period.[28] A mid-nineteenth century source indicates that sorghum was still as important as maize, and others noted - sometimes with surprise - that reliance was placed on a range of staples.[29] A later report suggests, however, that while other cereals were still cultivated, maize had come to be regarded by the Zulu as the staple.[30] Swazi traditions indicate that maize achieved importance as a staple only after the mid-nineteenth century.[31] In southern Mozambique also, maize was only one of several cereals regarded as important by a late eighteenth century observer, although a century later, it was

27 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 304-5.

28 KCL SP V 61, evidence of Socwatsha and Mkehlangana, 19 April 1905; V 84, evidence of Sivivi, 10 March 1907.

29 L. Grout, Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, (London, 1861), 103.

30 J. Tyler, Forty years among the Zulus, (Boston, 1891), 42.

31 KCL, Miller papers, MS. 1478, 13; Honey MS., 13.

predominant.[32]

Further illumination of the pattern of cereal culture is achieved by showing how the characteristics of the different plants suited broad ecological differences. For example, bulrush millet (pennisetum; Ts mabele; Z. unyawothi) is the most drought resistant; it grows well on sandy soils and on others which may be unsuitable for any other cereal. It is quick maturing - about three to four months - thus enabling its cultivation in zones with a comparatively short rainy season.[33] It was, therefore, suited to the dry sandy lowlands north east of St. Lucia bay; indeed, it was the crop associated with national ritual among the southern Ronga, which suggests that it was the most highly esteemed and widely cultivated in this zone before maize came to be more important. It was also grown as a secondary crop in Zululand.[34]

Sorghum (Ts maphila Z amabele) is considered second only to pennisetum in its ability to yield well on infertile and previously cropped soils. By means of its extensive root system and peculiar leaf characteristics, it can remain dormant through temporary droughts occurring after the annual rains have begun and can reverse the wilting process on recommencement of the rains, giving it the ability to survive interrupted rains as low as 15 inches in the growing season. It can also withstand waterlogging, which enables its cultivation in river bank gardens during the rainy season. Maturation is somewhat longer than pennisetum, ranging from at least four to more than six months.[35] The versatility of sorghum

[32] W. White, Journal of a voyage performed in the Lion, (London 1800), 32-3; Junod, Life, II, 10-11; D. da Cruz, Em terras da Gaza, (Porto, 1910), 239.

[33] J.D. Acland, East African crops (London, 1971), 27; T. Scudder, The ecology of the Gwembe Tonga, (Manchester, 1962), 30.

[34] Junod, Life, II, 10-11.

[35] Acland, Crops, 186; Scudder, Ecology, 30; C.G. Knight, Ecology and change: rural modernisation in an African community, (New York, 1974), 90.

explains historical evidence to the effect that in most of Zululand, it was more important than other cereals, and was also extensively cultivated in southern Mozambique.[36]

By comparison, maize is much less versatile. It requires much higher levels of soil fertility and rainfall to survive and to give yield advantages over other cereals; it is particularly sensitive to drought after the inception of the growth period, and to inundation of the roots, both of which usually cause death.[37] Moreover, early maize in south east Africa was of the 'flint' category whose types are quick maturing - about fifty to sixty days - but are relatively low-yielding compared with longer growing types. This combination of features rendered maize much more suitable to the wetter, more fertile lowlands than to the uplands where flint maize offered no yield advantages but a greater risk of total crop loss than sorghum.[38] Thus a Zulu tradition states that lowlanders 'owned' maize while inlanders 'owned' sorghum before maize cultivation became more widespread.[39] Indeed, agronomists report that wider cultivation of maize in most parts of upland southern and eastern Africa followed the introduction into Natal in the nineteenth century of the different 'dent' types, which are much longer growing and higher yielding varieties of the kind developed by extensive maize farming in north America, and that the production of other cereals fell into relative obscurity as a result of the development of a market in maize but not in sorghum or pennisetum.[40]

36 Junod, Life, II, 11; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 305.

37 Acland, Crops, 124-5; Scudder, Ecology, 30; Knight, Ecology, 89; D.M. Doveton, The human geography of Swaziland, (London, 1937), 55.

38 Acland, Crops, 124-6; J. Burtt-Davy, Maize, its history, cultivation, handling and uses, (London, 1914), 314.

39 KCL SP. V 84, evidence of Sivivi, 10 March 1907.

40 Burtt-Davy, Maize, 286; Scudder, Ecology, 83; R.T. Ellis 'The food properties of flint and dent maize,' East African Agricultural Journal, 24 (1959), 251-3.

In favourable soil and moisture conditions in the lowlands, maize culture offered a number of advantages; it could outyield sorghum, it could be consumed on the cob after roasting thus avoiding the labour costs of milling and extensive storage, and, when left in the fields in storage before harvesting, required less protection than other cereals. However, its most striking characteristic stemmed from its short growing period which enabled multiple cropping within a single growing season: early travellers' reports show that this was a normal feature of maize culture in the wet lowlands.[41] Moreover, in water retentive soils, such as those of the river banks and the edges of the lagoons and marshes extending intermittently from the Mhlatuze to Delagoa Bay, it was possible to grow flint maize while the soils were drying out - that is, in the dry season. Indeed, such potential offset to some extent the relative dryness and sandyness of the southern Tsonga ecology, and gave the possessors of such land everywhere in the region an economic advantage over those who did not have access to them.[42] Nevertheless, even in the wet south east, farmers did not rely only upon maize; in the Ngoye area, for example, the advantages of maize cultivation were not such as to exclude those of sorghum cropping in the early nineteenth century.[43]

Owing to high transport costs, high volume trade in foodstuffs could not normally be justified,[44] and the cultivation of a mix of cereals

[41] Isaacs, Travels, II, 127; P.R. Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and Natal, (Cape Town, 1955), 63; ' Historical precis by Dr. Andrew Smith,' in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 267; see also A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, (London, 1973), 31, for double cropping potential in maize production in West Africa.

[42] S. Broadbent, The Missionary Martyr of Namaqualand: extracts from the diary of William Threlfall, (London, 1857), 82-5; E.J. Krige, Report on an ecological study of the Tembe Thonga, (unpublished report for the Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, 1969), 4-7; see also Scudder, Ecology, 83 for similar conclusions on Gwembe Valley resources.

[43] A.F. Gardiner, Narrative of a journey to the Zoolo Country, (London, 1836), 159.

[44] See below p.89 for trade in foodstuffs.

having different soil and water requirements, planting date and maturation period was the usual means of ensuring a supply, as well as of spreading labour inputs. Consequently, microenvironments having a combination of geographical attributes enabling such diversification possessed the most reliable means of food production, and the cultivation of riverbank gardens, hillside and hilltop fields by household or village constituted the preferred land use strategy in much of the region.[45]

Intensity of cultivation varied, however, between these land types. The lower, better watered more fertile fields were the relatively permanent gardens with short or no fallow, while higher fields were fallowed for longer - a distinction corresponding to the infields and outfields which Miracle and Wrigley describe as characteristic of pre-capitalist agriculture.[46] Fertility and the length of the fallow were affected by agricultural techniques: clearance and burning of bush cover at the end of the fallow, and the collection and burning of cereal stalks during permanent cultivation enabled some replacement of soil nutrients through ash distribution.[47] Moreover, although cattle manure was not systematically spread on the land, the practice of moving kraals intermittently, coupled with fairly concentrated winter grazing among the grain fields was an effective means of manure distribution, exploited by using old cattle kraal (and village) sites for intensive crop production.[48]

A further essential in the arrangement of secure food supplies was the organisation of storage. Again, the different storage capabilities of the cereals gave an additional motive for multiple cropping. Owing to

[45] Grout, Zululand, 99; J. Shooter, The Kaffirs of Natal and the Zulu Country, (London, 1857), 16.

[46] C.C. Wrigley, review of M.P. Miracle, Agriculture in the Congo Basin, in Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVIII (1969), 661.

[47] Isaacs, Travels, II, 127, 263; Bryant, Zulu People, 301.

[48] Ibid.; Gardiner, Narrative, 106; see below 52f, for variations in land use strategy, especially in southern Mozambique.

grain size and drying qualities, eleusine and pennisetum were much the easiest to store for very long periods; relatively unaffected by insects they could be kept a minimum of two to three years above ground in grain baskets and huts (Z isilulu, Ts Ngula, Shitlantla) if successfully dried. Sorghum was also palatable after this kind of storage for more than a year.[49]

Although maize could not be stored so long above ground owing to its vulnerability to stalk borer and other pests, underground storage (Z umlindi, umgodi) kept it usable for at least one season and probably longer; this is suggested by the existence of Zulu names for maize of different stages of palatability and decomposition from previous harvests; and the widely reported taste for and use of musty maize in utshwala, the nutritious beer preferred as a major part of the diet instead of other cereal preparations, suggests that long term storage of maize was part of the cereal production strategy.[50]

Underground pits were of variable size, hermetically sealed and usually sited in the cattle enclosure. The suggestion by one of Stuart's informants that they were more typical of lowland than upland agriculture, and the absence of any reference to them in southern Mozambique indicates that they were a requirement of maize, and perhaps sorghum, production in the wetter areas.[51] This distinction gives indirect confirmation of the relative importance of maize in, and offers a further distinguishing

[49] Acland, Crops, 114; Scudder, Ecology, 161; see also A.P.G. Michelmore, 'Food Storage problems in Uganda,' East African Agricultural Journal, 21 (1956), 65-71, for the successful storage of eleusine for more than ten years in ordinary wicker granaries.

[50] Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 51; Gardiner, Narrative, 238; Tyler, Forty years, 44; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 304; A.T. Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, (London, 1905), entries for unyasa, upata and isangcobe; 'Extract of the log book of the Centaur,' 11 February 1688 in D. Moodie, ed., The Record, (Cape Town, 1960), 427.

[51] Tyler, Forty years, 42; Gardiner, Narrative, 116; Grout, Zululand, 104; KCL SP V 84, evidence of Sivivi, 10 March 1907.

feature of, the different ecologies of the region.

Such methods of storage were also used for the non-cereal secondary staples and vegetables grown in the region. These were the tubers - colocasia (Z idumbi, Ts idem), dioscorea (Z umanga, Ts idem) and the sweet potato (Z umhlaza, Ts nhlata), the latter particularly important in the north east sandy lowlands. The banana grew sporadically on the coast, especially between the Tukela and the Mfolosi, but in insufficient volume to be regarded as a staple. A wild yam, (Z inkwa) was usually only used in times of local food shortage.[52] The majority of the wide variety of food preparations depended upon a cereal dish eaten with a vegetable relish. Gourds, pumpkins, melons and black beans were sown along with maize or sorghum, or grown more intensively on occasion in more fertile lands, such as old dwelling sites. Ground nuts (Z indlubu, Ts rumane) grown in most parts of region, and pea nuts (Z intongomane Ts nyume) grown mostly in the coastal zones, were an additional relish.[53]

For much of the region such crop production strategies provided sufficient foodstuffs in most years, and food gathering was not thought of as a supplier of major items of the diet. However, wild fruits, vegetables and insects were available within the microenvironment,[54] and their importance to the food supply varied in the different ecologies. While in the lower areas grain was usually in good supply at the end of winter,[55] and even after a series of droughts,[56] thus indicating little

52 Bryant, Zulu People, 319; Tyler, Forty years, 42; Isaacs, Travels, I, 229; White, Journal, 23; RSEA II, W.F.W. Owen, 'Delagoa Bay,' 469.

53 Bryant, Zulu People, 316-8; Isaacs, Travels, I, 49; 'Extract of the log of the Centaur,' in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 47; KCL, Bryant mss. 'A description of native foodstuffs and their preparation,' passim.

54 Bryant, Zulu People, 289-90.

55 Isaacs, Travels, I, 121; 'Extracts from the diary of William van der Stell, 1689,' in Moodie, ed. Record, 430.

56 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 339-40, 344-5, 352-4.

reliance on gathering, in areas disproportionately affected by the erratic climate, gathering was probably a more frequent recourse.[57] Only in the northeast lowlands was there reliance upon a collected resource as part of the normal diet: ubusulu, the nutritious beer derived from the lala and isundu palms, plants distinctive to the ecology.[58]

III

A further source of food in the region was cattle; however, these were also a means of accumulation and a disposable asset when live; and the combination of pastoralism with the other branches of production underlay much of the economic activity of the region. An investigation of ecological aspects of cattle keeping shows how this combination was practised in the different areas of the region, and hence the distribution of this major resource.

The vegetational cover of the region may be resolved into zones parallel to the coast; the coastal forest and thornveld gives way inland to the extensive lowveld of the lower to middle Mfolosi basins, the upper Mkuze area and much of eastern Swaziland and southern Mozambique. Inland of this type are the derived Ngongoni veld in the lower to middle Tugela and upper Mhlatuze, and the derived Zululand thornveld of the middle Mfolosi basins and parts of central Swaziland. The distinction between the latter types is caused by the higher rainfall of the lower Tugela. Valley bushveld is characteristic of the hot but usually quite dry areas of the upper Tugela - a veld similar to lowveld, with more grass and less trees and bush than the latter.

Although both lowveld and valley bushveld grasses remain palatable throughout the year, more erratic rainfall and sparser grasses, more

57 RSEA I, Perestrello, 251; Krige, Report, 4; KCL Bryant mss., 'Foodstuffs,' 8.

58 Junod, Life, II 42; Krige, Report, 35; A.W. Lee, Charles Johnson of Zululand, (London, 1930), 156.

Vegetation and land use Map 3



easily damaged by excessive grazing, cause a lower carrying capacity of the valley type. On the other hand, both of the derived grasslands, though of sourish nature, can provide good feeding for relatively concentrated herds after burning in the spring and summer months, thereafter becoming progressively less palatable.[59] Thus a mixture of grazing types usually at different altitudes was required for the optimal management of stockholding; such a combination was available within the same dispersed productive environment that surrounded cereal agriculture in much of Zululand.

In localities such as the coastal lowlands the environment posed remarkably few barriers to the rearing and grazing of cattle. Travellers and other records show that cattle were (and are) kept often in large numbers very near the sea shore, in areas covered by sour grassland, sometimes in areas with no grassland at all, and in other less than optimal conditions.[60] Partly this can be explained by the hardy and accommodating nature of the Nguni-Sanga cattle type, which in circumstances where yields of milk and meat were not emphasised, could be allowed to adjust to deficiencies in grazing and climatic variation by weight alteration.[61] Adaptability of this kind was assisted by the presence of nutritious bush foliage in the more arid and sandy zones of the north east coastlands. Additionally, the summer wetness of the coastal marshy areas does not appear to have detracted from the nearby pasture which was good for summer grazing, while during winter, many such marshes dry out, and a lush grassveld with shrubs supervenes, giving

59 J.P.H. Acocks, Veldt types of South Africa, (Pretoria, 1953), 11, 23, 27, 35, 38-40, 47-8, 76.

60 Bryant, Olden Times, 104; RSEA II, Lavanha, 333f; B. Plaisted, A journal from Calcutta to Busserah and journal of the proceedings of the Doddington, (London, 1758), 278; KCL SP V 28, evidence of Tununu, 14 June 1903.

61 I.L. Mason and J.P. Maule, The indigenous livestock of eastern and southern Africa, (Farnham, 1960) 41.

a pasture capable of sustaining intensive grazing.[62]

It is also apparent that disease in the wetter and hotter localities of the region posed no insuperable problem to cattle keeping. Cattle trypanosomiasis is marginally occurrent throughout southern Mozambique and parts of eastern Zululand, and persistent in certain restricted areas. Trypanosomiasis is carried by various types of tsetse fly whose distribution is closely dependent on vegetation. Where human activity markedly affects vegetation, the tsetse habitat becomes more marginal and is often removed. With a motive for the successful confinement of the areas unfavourable to grazing, cattle herders used techniques for controlling the threat. Removal of trees by felling, and of bush cover by burning during the dry season, inhibits the spread of tsetse by removing the shade essential in the breeding period. Annual late burning was the prerequisite for successful retention as grazing of previously forested, and bush-thornveld, areas inhabited by tsetse. Game, which acts as a carrier between marginal and permanent (residual) tsetse grounds had also to be closely controlled.[63]

Records confirm that the use of such methods - according to the particular locality - turned both seasonal and permanent fly areas into safe grazing. For example, the Hlabisa woodland, the Hluhluwe valley and the environs of the Black and White Mfolosi confluence - all relatively low and hot lands - were marginally infested. However, they were good cattle country in the early nineteenth century, and the loss of cattle in the lung sickness outbreak of 1861 resulted in the abandonment of the

62 RSEA II, Lavanha, 336; H.H. Curson, 'Outline of the floral regions of Zululand,' in South African Journal of Science, 20 (1923), 326.

63 C.F.M. Swynnerton, 'An examination of the tsetse problem in north Mossurize, Portuguese East Africa,' Bulletin of Entomological Research, IX (1921), 344-6, 353, 360, 374, 381-2, and end map; C. Fuller, 'Tsetse in the Transvaal and surrounding territories,' Ninth and tenth annual reports of the Director of Veterinary Education in South Africa, (Pretoria, 1929), 359-62; See also F.L. Lambrecht, 'The tsetse fly in Africa,' Journal of African History, V (1964), 16,21.

area as grazing, and the consequent failure to control the vegetation led to colonisation by tsetse. Subsequent outbreaks of tuberculosis, redwater fever, and rinderpest caused more extreme losses of livestock which are thought to account for increased favourability of the tsetse habitat and their persistent foothold at the Mfolosi junction and in the Mhlatuze valley.[64]

A number of references show that the coastal littoral north east of St Lucia was not so uniformly tsetse-ridden as has been supposed from later nineteenth and twentieth century writing.[65] The natural eastern boundary of the fly belt in summer was the beginning of the lala palm zone east and south of the Maputo and east of the Matola. Cattle herding to the east was not particularly hazardous, and the records confirm that cattle were kept in the Nyaka and Machavane-Mabudu areas as well as north of Delagoa Bay.[66] West of the boundary, however, it is likely that cattle keeping required considerable enterprise and planning. In winter, comparatively restricted locations in humid, forest-lined rivers and adjacent bush near the eastern foot of the uBombo mountains were permanently affected by tsetse.[67] In some localities, late winter

64 D. Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, (Glasgow, 1875), 119, 185; KCL Erskine papers, Erskine to anon., 22 June 1871; E. Mohr, To Victoria falls of the Zambezi, (London, 1876), 162; Bryant, Zulu People, 336-7.

65 R.N. Lyne, 'The agriculture of Mozambique province,' Bulletin of the Imperial Institute of Entomology, XI (1913) 102; cp. B.H. Dicke, 'The tsetse fly's influence in South African history,' South African Journal of Science, 29 (1932), 793; L. Thomson and M. Wilson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, (London, 1969), I, 177; Krige, Report, 10; Junod, Life, II 46.

66 RSEA II, D. do Couto, 'Naufragio da Não São Thomé,' 138-9; Lavanha, 343; VIII, Bento Teixeira Feyo, ' Naufragio das nãos Sacramento e Nossa Senhora da Atalaya,' 336; E. and H.W., Soldiers of the cross in Zululand, (London, 1906), 174.

67 Fuller, op.cit., 337-41,367; T. Baines, The gold regions of south east Africa, (London, 1877), 108-9; St. V.W. Erskine, 'Journal of exploration to the mouth of the Limpopo,' Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 39 (1869), 233.

burning of the bush cover was carried out to prevent the expansion of the fly belts in the humid summers, while in other parts where burning was less effective, animals were moved to safe areas as summer advanced.[68]

That the potential cattle pasture was ensured in this way is confirmed by further nineteenth century references to zones which had experienced cattle losses, decontrol of previously safe pasture and the subsequent reassertion of the natural bush-tsetse habitat. In 1837, Louis Trigardt reported that the size of old cattle enclosures in the lowveld west of Delagoa Bay suggested to him a history of sustained pastoralism in an area then heavily infested by tsetse.[69] A similar sequence affected parts of Tembeland north west of the Maputo, in which early Tembe kings had built capitals and kept stock: after the shift of Tembe power south eastward in the period of Mabudu (in the eighteenth century), and Nguni raids in old Tembeland in the nineteenth, these localities suffered a regression to the 'natural' plant succession, and hence came to be regarded from the mid-nineteenth century as 'tsetse infested.'[70] Such sequences and Nguni practices in cattle herding are illustrated most graphically in the history of the Gaza Ngoni after the death of Soshangane, whose successor Mzila took measures to organise the environment of Mossurise district to favour the grazing of herds augmented by raids on the Shona; the Ngoni purposefully attacked the vegetation with iron and fire, removing the bush and creating barriers through which game could not pass alive, and systematically concentrating their subject populations in such a way as to maintain the pasture.[71] For the lowland area west of the

68 Fuller, op.cit., 337, 343, 367; Durban Museum, F. Toppin's map of tsetse distribution in Zululand.

69 G.S. Preller, ed., Dagboek van Louis Trigardt, 1836-8, (Bloemfontein, 1917), 224f.

70 Fuller, op.cit., 333, 367; Baines, Gold regions, 108.

71 Swynnerton, op.cit., 332-3.

Lebombo, there is less clear evidence of the history of cattle herding; however, nineteenth century reports suggest a summer boundary in conditions of decontrol and climate favourable to fly, within thirty miles of the range at the furthest, with a relatively low incidence of tsetse anywhere west of the mountains normally.[72]

The management of cattle was closely combined with management of agriculture. However, the nature of the combination differed in the various parts of the region; in most of Zululand, the optimum arrangement could be achieved within the dispersed microenvironment, with closely worked lowland agriculture separated from the more scattered upland fields and spring and summer grazing. In autumn and winter, when the risk of disease was lessened, cattle were moved to the lower areas to graze in the cereal stubble and in other parts not required for winter crops. This procedure, together with milking requirements and the need to protect domestic stock from human and animal marauders necessitated close control over day-to-day and seasonal movements, effected by means of extensive enclosures at the centre of settlements, the separation of crops from pasture by lengthy fences, and the practice of close human attention during grazing.[73]

Although cattle keeping was carried out in the northeast lowlands, the records suggest that the animals were scarcer than to the south and west.[74] Moreover, cereal production and pastoralism were somewhat differently related; the spread of resources required for successful grazing in the sandy zones and the presence of tsetse in the riverain localities meant that cattle were less often kept within reach of the

72 Fuller, op.cit., 333, 336.

73 RSEA II, Lavanha, 324; VIII, J. de Cabreyra, 'Naufragio da Não Nossa Senhora de Belem,' 216; Feyo , 345; 'Account of W. Rogers,' in S. Bannister, ed., Humane Policy, (London, 1830) ix; Grout, Zululand, 99.

74 Lee, Charles Johnson, 154; passim; E. and H.W., Soldiers, 174; RSEA II, Lavanha, 337; VIII, Feyo, 349.

homestead or village, which were usually more permanently sited near the water resources and more fertile soils of the major rivers, marshes and lagoons. Hence, homesteads and villages were not always grouped round cattle enclosures in this ecology.[75]

IV

The differences in settlement types and patterns also reflect the relative importance of a further branch of production, fishing, which was of much greater significance in the diet and economy of the lowlands than in that of the interior. Rivers and streams inland were usually too seasonal, and yet too rapidly flowing during the rains, to provide good breeding conditions. On the other hand, the coast is dotted with tidal lagoons caused by sand bars, which offer good prospects for fishing; Kosi and St Lucia bays are the largest. The extensive shallows of these can be staked out with stripped foliage from the adjacent bush, making a pattern of submerged 'nets' which trap the fish when the tide recedes. Similar methods can produce high yields on the ox-bow lakes left by the Maputo river, and other traps and individual lines were used in the rivers themselves.[76]

Fishing became part of the economy in early times; indeed, it has been suggested that the first Bantu-speaking occupants of south east Africa relied primarily on fishing before the sophistication of iron-working and agriculture.[77] From the sixteenth century, fishing was part of a mixed economy including agriculture and stockraising for some of the peoples of the lowlands; when the first Europeans traversed the area, they

75 Junod, Life, I, 311-2; Lee, Charles Johnson, 154.

76 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 341; Krige, Report, 4, 7; Junod, Life, II, 84-6.

77 R. Oliver and B. Fagan, 'The emergence of Bantu Africa,' unpublished paper, African History Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1971.

reported the purchase of cattle, cereals and fish from the same group of people near Mhlatuze lagoon; similar reports for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confirm the continued importance of fishing in the lowland economy; in Delagoa Bay it was possible to acquire beef, and fish from the same people.[78] Oral testimonies indicate that fish were consumed by those who could catch them before and during the nineteenth century; they also show that inlanders who had no fishing grounds and for whom fish were not part of the diet often distinguished coastal peoples by referring to them as fishers. The distinction was thus based on ecology, and did not differentiate Tsonga from Nguni, as is held by Wilson,[79] and others.

V

Hunting, like fishing, was also closely linked to other branches of production. In addition to the provision of food, and, more rarely, decoration, hunting was essential to the protection of settlements, crops, safe grazing and fishing. Whether land or water based, the larger animals grazing individually could trample crops; riverain agriculture was especially vulnerable. On the other hand, elephants and rhino were the source of the ivory which came to be so valued in the external trade of the region.

The sporadic European records do not allow great precision concerning the distribution of game, and traditions rarely mention it in a region-wide context. However, game, unlike most other resources, was mobile and responsive to human activity; evidence from the Cape and other situations suggests that the dominant influences in the pattern of

78 RSEA I Perestrello, 238, 323; VIII de Cabreyra, 113; Feyo, 342; White, Journal, 51.

79 KCL SP V 64, evidence of Maziyana and Mcotoyi; cp. Wilson and Thompson, eds., Oxford History, I, 96; E.J. Krige, The social system of the Zulus, (London, 1936) 388.

game distribution were the seasonal availability of grazing - in effect, a preference for winter grazing at the lower levels - and continuous hunting by man which resulted in areas less desirable for human habitation and production being the permanent breeding and grazing grounds - the natural game reserves.[80] Thus, some early travellers mention seeing elephant herds first in southern Natal, and then continuously in central Natal, southern Zululand and the lowlands north east of St. Lucia, while others report specifically that such large game was only to be found in the northeast coastal flats.[81] Nineteenth century references suggest that the northeast lowlands remained relatively better stocked with big and small game.[82] Indeed, in the northeast flats, the northern parts of the Muzi and Futi marshes, and the depression between lakes Piti and Satine were a particularly favourable breeding habitat, with a constant supply of water and lush vegetation - and a very sparse human population. Similarly, inland the bigger game was usually confined to the Drakensberg.[83]

Near such areas of permanent game occupation, hunting was the dominant activity of small groups; in 1593, in the upper area of Natal, 'near mountains covered with snow,' - a rocky locality otherwise free of settlement, and agriculture - Lavanha's party came across a village whose inhabitants subsisted mainly from hunting; though they had small quantities of grain, possibly acquired by exchange for hunted produce.[84]

80 KCL H.C. Bryden, 'The decline and fall of the South African elephant,' (extracts from Fortnightly Review, July 1903), 100-2; A. Hamilton, A new account of the east Indies, (London, 1930), 15; RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 110; Feyo, 312, 347.

81 RSEA I, Perestrello, 258f; II Lavanha, 334.

82 Isaacs, Travels, I, 185; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 48; KCL SP V 24, evidence of Tununu, 14 June 1903; V 32, evidence of Bikwayo, 10 October 1903.

83 Bryant, Olden Times, 501; Krige, Report, 4.

84 RSEA II, Lavanha, 314-5.

'Bushmen' are known to have hunted in some areas east of the Drakensberg until well into the nineteenth century, some of them operating not far west of the Tukela-Mzinyati confluence until 1826, hunting ivory destined for the Zulu court.[85] 'Abatwa' were encountered by the escaping eMbo heir, Siyingela, in the upper reaches of the uLovu (Illovo) and Mkomazi rivers during Dingane's reign.[86] Moreover, 'abatwa' hunters were providers of ivory to the early Natal traders on the coast, and to Afrikaner farmers; and the Mapumulo middleman, Dumisa, achieved the respect and rank of a chief by allying with 'abatwa', who hunted in the Drakensberg north east of Giant's castle, for the supply of tusks he eventually traded to the whites at Port Natal.[87] A nineteenth century source indicates the presence of 'so called Bushmen' who might have been 'to some extent Zulu half breed' and who 'cultivate little' in the sources of the Pongolo and Mkhonto rivers - an area from which 'Bush' children were repeatedly taken by white farmers.[88]

A dominantly hunting economy was not always occasioned by proximity to natural game reserves; on occasions of political and economic displacement and migration such as happened to several groups in Natal in the Mfecane, hunting was the part of the mixed economy which became disproportionately emphasised. For example, parts of the Nhlangwini section of the Natal Dlamini rescued themselves in the 1820s by adopting hunting as the means of subsistence, while the ruling lineage seems to have

85 Bryant, Olden Times, 501; Isaacs, Travels I 140; J.B. Wright, Bushman raiders of the Drakensberg, 1840-1870, (Pietermaritzburg, 1971), 61-2 passim.

86 KCL SP V 23, evidence of Mbokodo, p40.

87 KCL SP V 68, evidence of Melapi, 28 April 1905; V 30, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 January 1909; V 68, evidence of Maziyana, 24 April 1905; Bryant, Olden Times, 531.

88 KCL Ms 1518a, 'Reminiscences of J.M. Orpen,' (one time Landrost of Winberg and Harrismith) quoting an interview with Chief Nyamainja (Swazi).

maintained its preeminence by using products of the chase, especially feathers, in trading relationships with Tshaka and Dingane. As a result of this increased reliance on hunting, other groups then described them as 'abatwa.'[89]

In some areas hunting was the specialisation of men whose families were mixed agriculturists. This was especially true of southern Mozambique, where the presence of more extensive natural game reserves and the necessity of agricultural settlement near rivers required sustained protection. Junod describes some hunters, in this case, north of Delagoa Bay,[90]

> 'who had made a kind of trade out of hunting, regular, professional hunters, who were called phisa (pl.maphisa). They were not satisfied to kill an occasional antelope near the village, but undertook big expeditions to the great deserts of the Hlengwe country where game was plentiful, and where the most precious of all, i.e. elephants abounded.... They were known and recognised as a kind of superior caste and were very proud of their name maphisa. They claimed a special power over big game owing to the mysterious rites which they practised; thus they partook more or less the nature of magicians.'

Another group of specialists were the hippo hunters of the major rivers. Junod's references do not contain material from which a precise history of this specialisation can be written, but they do indicate that such hunters, and their complex ritual system and folklore were strongly established before the advent of the white hunters who made such extensive use of their skills from the mid nineteenth century.[91] There are descriptions of this type of specialist in Zululand and Natal. Bryant refers to the professionals who came to be considered by Europeans as the equals of the 'Bushmen' as animal trackers; and ipisi was used

89 KCL SP V 6, evidence of Dinya, 27 February 1905; V 77, evidence of Mahaya, 8 July 1905; SP H, Letter of J. Stuart to Miss Colenso, 27 May 1920; Gardiner, Narrative, 185-6, 310-7; 'abatwa' and 'bushmen' did not therefore necessarily refer to race characteristics of groups isolated from the majority of the population.

90 Junod, Life, II, 59.

91 Ibid., 60, 67.

to describe a 'great hunter of large game.'[92]

For most of the peoples of the region, hunting was part of a mixed economy. In the areas between the more permanently stocked zones, the continuity of hunting was influenced by the seasonal movements of game which tended to concentrate in the warmer lowlands in winter, and migrate from these areas in spring; hunting tended to be a winter activity designed mainly to reduce to an acceptable level dangers to the rest of the productive system in the ensuing growing season. Although in much of Zululand, therefore, hunting was not so continuous, it was carried out with vigour; especially in the wetter lowlands with good soils - mainly south of the Mfolosi - efficient hunting was an essential feature of winter cropping and cattle grazing.[93]

The techniques of hunting have also been recorded and show some distributional features. Big game, such as elephants, hippos and buffalo, were sometimes caught in camouflaged pits, especially where the subsoil allowed easy digging and the insertion of spikes. There were many such pits in the coastal lowlands from the sixteenth to mid nineteenth centuries.[94] Junod records that a number of such pits could be aligned together, with fences as much as two kilometres in length, so arranged that game was chased in herds toward the pits. Game was often hunted thus at night, the proceedings being lit by flaming torches, a practice which assisted the chase by temporarily blinding the game, thereby making large scale hunting somewhat less dangerous.[95] The more usual method of

[92] Bryant, Zulu People, 687; J.W. Colenso, A Zulu-English dictionary, (Pietermaritzburg, 1861), 397.

[93] RSEA I, Perestrello, 272 f.; 'Account of W. Rogers' in Bannister, ed., Humane Policy, x; Shooter, Natal, 40; Plaisted, Journal, 279-80, 285.

[94] RSEA VIII, de Cabreyra, 223; Feyo, 312, 342-3; Junod, Life, II, 58; Shooter, Natal, 42; Bryant, Zulu People, 687-90.

[95] Junod, Life, II, 58; Plaisted, Journal, 279-80.

hunting in the more varied landscape of Zululand was to drive the game into valley defiles which guided the animals between rows of waiting hunters who attacked with lances, possibly poisoned, and then with assegais and axes. The axe was the essential instrument for immobilising elephants - the cutting of one hamstring was sufficient to paralyse them.[96]

VI

The distribution of population within the region was affected by the intensity with which manpower and material resources could interact in the different environments. Useful explanatory concepts in this regard are the 'cultivation' and 'land-use' factors used by economic geographers. The first, an estimate of the proportion of land capable of cultivation within a given area, depends on many variables, such as rock outcrops, steep slopes and propensity to flooding. No detailed studies which might specify numerically such proportions for this region have yet been made; however, maps, descriptions and comparative evidence suggest that the undulating lowlands of the coast south of the Mfolosi and the lower valley basins contained a considerably higher proportion of cultivable land than the interior uplands. Secondly, owing to the greater natural fertility of lowland soils, as well as normally higher and more reliable rainfall, the land could be used more intensively - with longer periods of cultivation and shorter periods of fallow; similarly, higher rainfall enabled somewhat more intensive grazing. Hence, the area of land required to support each person's food consumption was lower. Thus, both factors imply considerably higher population densities in the favoured lower zones and the adjacent valleys and hillsides than elsewhere. Moreover, such areas fared better

96 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 272; Isaacs, Travels I, 49; Shooter, Natal, 42.

in periods of adverse climatic variation.[97]

Reports of the concentrations of population and wealth generally support this theory of the historical demography of the region. In 1554, Perestrello described the lowlands of northern Natal and Zululand as thickly populated and full of cattle, while north east of St. Lucia, the inhabitants were somewhat poorer, though apparently well fed.[98] The account of 1593 draws a contrast between the sparsely populated areas of inland Natal and the wealthier areas of northern Natal, particularly near the Tugela. North of the Tugela there was more rugged country, but in what is now northern Zululand, the mid-Mkuze and mid-Pongolo basins contained plains covered with grain fields, watered by streams from the nearby hills.[99] Nearer the sea, on the sandy flats, although cattle were scarcer, Kosi bay was described as the 'river of abundance' because of its plentiful food supplies.[100] The report of 1647 mentioned the abundance of food in lowland Natal compared with inland whence the travellers had come; southern Zululand contained a 'very thickly populated plain studded with kraals and covered with cattle.' Large numbers of cattle were seen near St Lucia, and though fewer were to be found further north, southern Tsongaland was thickly populated and there was a plentiful supply of food along the sandy flats and at Nyaka.[101] In 1687, lowland Natal was described as 'incredibly populous and full of cattle'. In the following year, Delagoa bay was described in equally glowing terms, though there were fewer cattle and

97 See above pp.32-4,41-2; cp. J.L. Newman, The ecological basis for subsistance change among the Sandawe of Tanzania, (Washington, 1970), passim; W. Allan, The African Husbandman, (London, 1965), 26.

98 RSEA I, Perestrello, 235, 244-5.

99 RSEA II, Lavanha, 328, 333.

100 Ibid., 337, 339.

101 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 336, 340, 349, 352-4.

sheep.[102] The Mabudu plain, coast and river was said to be fertile and highly populated in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century references.[103] By contrast, the impression Bryant derived from both traditions and personal experience was that the uplands of Zululand were relatively sparsely populated.[104]

Such differences in the distribution of population add to the mix of visible features which distinguished the three major ecologies of the region: the wet, fertile, maize growing, pit using lowlands (zantsi), densely populated though dispersed in settlements on the hillsides away from the valley bottoms. Secondly, the drier, sandy lowlands of the north east (zantsi wasebutonga), identified by the lala palm belt, widespread use of pennisetum and fish, with high concentrations of population, more permanently settled on the Maputo river and near the coastal lagoons, separated by a sparsely populated area of sands and marshes; thirdly, the uplands (enhla), which had less rain, sparser soils, grew sorghum and pennisetum, grazed cattle extensively and supported fewer people. However, although the divisions between the ecologies were categoric,[105] they were not monolithic: there were infinite variations between them - such as in the mid Mfolosi homelands of the Zulu clan.

Material and technological resources affected production only to the extent that they set parameters to productive forces: thus land use

[102] 'Extracts of a despatch from Simon van der Stell,' in D. Moodie, ed., The Record, (Cape Town, 1960), 431.

[103] F. de Sta. Thereza, 'Plano e relação da Bahia denominada de Lourenço Marques,' in C. Montez, Descobrimento e fundação de Lourenço Marques, (Lourenço Marques, 1948), 164; RSEA II, Owen, 'Delagoa Bay,' 468-9; Broadbent, ed., Threlfall, 84.

[104] Bryant, Zulu People, 38.

[105] See the expressions used in Stuart's collection, KCL SP, for example, ms.Q evidence of John Gama, 19 xii 1898.

systems were influenced by the practicability - within the environment and given the existing technological level - of combining pastoralism with a complex cereal agriculture; much higher population densities were possible in some areas than others; but human resource control, including the concentration of population - such as that involved in cattle keeping - could remove natural barriers to production. However, the intensity and nature of resource utilisation within such limits, and the appropriation and distribution of the product of human labour are explained by an analysis of the socio-economic structure of the political units of the region; it is to this that the next chapter turns.

Chapter III

Kings, kinsmen and the social relations of production

The previous chapter considered the evidence for the material and technological basis of the mixed economy; it attempted to describe the technical organisation of each of the major articulations of the economy in their geographical environment. It cannot, however, be supposed that this amounts to an analysis of production in the sense of an examination of all the forces bearing upon production; still less does it mean that the branches of production are in any way the determining base of the economy; rather, it provides the material background to the hypotheses analysing the total organisation of the economy. The development of a 'problematic' for the social relations of production, including surplus extraction relations, is the central purpose of this chapter; the paucity of evidence for an exploration of social relations of production before the nineteenth century poses some dangers, but a preliminary consideration of alternative approaches indicates the dangers of proceeding without such a problematic.[1]

The centrality of kinship to the social life of the Nguni and Ronga has been long appreciated in the ethnographic literature.[2] However, recent developments in anthropological thinking have given the broader study of kinship in Africa a more purposive and less autonomous

[1] See Chapter I, p.14f 'Problematic' is used in the sense of the conceptual response to a particular problem or interrelated group of problems, here the analysis of the totality of social relations of production; see its usage in John Taylor, 'Neo-Marxism and Under-development - a Sociological Phantasy,' in Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol 4 no 1, 1974, pp 6-7, n6. For its relevance to sociological theory of knowledge, see K. Williams, 'Problematic History' in Economy and Society, vol. 1, No.4, 1972, and idem, 'Unproblematic archaeology' in Economy and Society, vol. 3, No.1, 1974.

[2] E. J. Krige, The Social System of the Zulus, (London 1936), 23f; Junod, Life I, 219f; Bryant, Zulu People, 425-431, 433; KCL SP I "Notes on clan formation," by James Stuart.

meaning than that which social anthropology has traditionally invested it: kinship is not so much the given form of social organisation whose principles govern social action, but it is rather the expression of the totality of the social relations of production. This does not mean that kinship merely mirrors productive relations as 'superstructure;' on the contrary, the dichotomy between superstructure and economy[3] is resolved by incorporating these into an infrastructure of which kinship is the form. The centrality of kinship has been thus expressed by Godelier:

> "...It is not enough for an institution such as kinship to assume several functions for it to be dominant within a society and to integrate all levels of social organisation.... Over and above this, kinship...must function as the system of relations of production regulating the rights of groups and individuals in respect to the means of production and their access to the products of their labour. It is because the institution functions as the system of relations of production that it regulates the politico-religious activities and serves as the ideological scheme for symbolic practice."[4]

Kinship can thus operate at two levels: the level of real kinship, the relations of descent and heritability; and the terminological and ultimately real level which maintains the relationship between the dominant and the dominated in the social formation.[5]

The focus for the following analysis is therefore the descent group

[3] This dichotomy is sustained - in effect if not intention - by some of the French anthropologists who have nevertheless advanced thinking on the mode of production of some African societies: see for example, E. Terray, Marxism and 'Primitive' societies,(New York, 1972) (esp. pp145-7), and the critique by P-P. Rey in Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme, (Paris, 1971), 35f, and idem. 'The lineage mode of production' in Critique of Anthropology, No.3 (1975) 27-79.

[4] M. Godelier, 'Modes of production, kinship and demographic structures,' in M. Bloch, ed., Marxist analyses in social anthropology, (London, 1975) 14.

[5] Rey, Colonialisme, 207-210; as Rey points out, the former level operates in this way in other social conditions; cp. Duby, op.cit., 171, where the kinship measures taken to preserve the unity of aristocratic estates in early feudal Europe are discussed. The failure to explore the distinction between the two levels, and the persistance in studying the form of real kinship at the first level, Rey regards as a mystification of the ethnological approach (Colonialisme, 207); Depelchin, op.cit. 126, mistakes Rey's argument by referring to his view of the 'mystification' of kinship, but not to his exploration of its real meaning.

in terms of which (sensu strictu) social relations of production were organised: the lineage. However, there is no case for viewing the relations of production from the viewpoint of the single lineage without the collectivity of lineages and their hierarchisation, because the latter define the role and indeed the form of the lineage. Thus social relations cannot be reduced to the lineage as the fundamental or given unit of production on which hierarchies are built.[6] Moreover, because analysis of social relations in these terms essentially encompasses domination and extraction, the term 'lineage mode of production' is preferable to 'lineage-tribute mode,' though the latter may carry a stronger impression of the concept.[7]

Analysis of the northern Nguni and southern Ronga social formation from this perspective enables the role of its productive elements to be considered in relation to each other; the village, where most of the processes of agricultural production took place, was closely involved in the reciprocity between lineages which governed exchange and reproduction, and was linked at the ideological and political level with the inkosi (chief or king). Neither the village nor the individual lineage

6 C. Meillassoux appeared to do this in 'Essai d'interpretation du phénomène économique dans les sociétes traditonelles d'auto subsistence,' in Cahiers d'études africaines, 1 (1960), 58, 61-2, 65, and 'From reproduction to production' in Economy and Society, 1 (1972), 101, where transference of economic and social prerogatives to the dominant class, an aristocratic lineage, is seen as following usually from contacts with foreign formations, and the entry into the traditional system of products such as iron; (thus it appears to deny the circulation of metal goods and hierarchisation of clans in 'traditional' society.) This conclusion results from the attempt to explain the importance of kinship in terms of the evolution of the immediate processes of production; see also idem. 'The social organisation of the peasantry; the economic basis of kinship' in Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 (1973), 81-9. Thus kinship is a reflection of functional relations and then evolves so as to comprise an ideological role. Kinship in this view remains therefore superstructural.

7 In this sense, Rey's use of the concept of lineage and kinship is an advance on that of Meillassoux; see Colonialisme, 207-10. It is impossible to dismiss the lineage mode as if it characterised simple agricultural societies with no hierarchisation, as does Slater, op.cit., 71.

constituted the totality of the social relations of production.[8] Some labour processes, such as hunting, were organised outside the village and the lineage. However, the inkosi was the head of a lineage which dominated a number of others; one instrument of this domination was the ideological penetration of the economic infrastructure which was expressed in a kinship idiom. Moreover, the economic and social links between the amakosi reinforced the dominance of the ruling lineage within each chiefdom; hence the totality of the social relations of production comprised the collectivity of chiefdoms.

The evidence for this analysis comes from observations of the nineteenth as well as previous centuries and is used to establish the kinship basis of social structure rather than the changes in the articulation of kinship relations in specific instances.[9] This procedure enables the analysis to identify the contradictions in the social formation which explain much of the history of individual chiefdoms before the apparently more radical changes of the eighteenth century[10] in addition to the explanation of these latter changes.[11] The discontinuities in the evidence for political history before the nineteenth century are thus partially obviated.

8 Cp. Godelier, 'Modes of production,' 4: "Social conditions determine the role of the domestic group in the social process of production."

9 Changes in the articulation of kinship relations and ultimately - especially during the eighteenth century - the emergence of a transitional mode of production did not lead to a change in the mode of production in the sense of removing the dominant kinship basis of social organisation, as distinct from changes in its functions; see below, ChVI-VII; in this sense the use of nineteenth century ethnographic evidence is generally justified: for specific examples, see pp 70-71

10 Chapter IV.

11 Chapters V-VI.

II

An Nguni and Tsonga sibongo was a patrilineage whose members believed they shared descent from the same patrilineal ancestor. Most of the neighbouring villages within a confined geographical conspectus, such as a small valley or hillside, were of the same sibongo, such that the area itself came to be known and identified by the sibongo.[12] Relations of genealogical seniority existed between the major village heads of the sibongo, the abanumzane, the senior of whom was the most direct descendant of the lineage's founder.[13]

The sibongo derived its cohesion and its elders their authority from its mediation between the forces which derived from the collectivity of lineages in the chiefdom and the location of production in the villages. In particular, the lineages were exogamous and the acquisition of a wife required the transfer of cattle to the wife's lineage; marriages were surrounded by ritual which emphasised the distinctiveness of the contracting lineages, not merely that of the respective villages.[14] A description of the internal structure of the lineage, including the ruling lineage, is required so that the relationship between reproduction and production and their importance in the achievement of lineage dominance may be seen.

Most agricultural and pastoral production was carried out by forms of labour cooperation centred on the village; but the nature of production

[12] D.H. Reader, Zulu tribe in transition, (Manchester, 1966), 71, 93, 110, 115; Bryant, Zulu People, 425, 431-2, 436, 596.

[13] Reader, Zulu tribe, 94.

[14] Krige, Social system, 138-48; Reader, Zulu tribe, 200-212; ZP 584-5; Junod, Life I 254-6; Junod differentiates between the northern and southern Thonga in this respect: a Ronga may not marry a girl where both lay claim to a common ancestor - the same prohibition as in northern Nguni; the rule is 'not so stringent in the northern Thonga clans.' Cp. Krige, Report, 98f, where exogamous clans are reported to be unlike those of the Zulu since they do not observe milk and hospitality rules; and Reader, Zulu tribe, 85-6, where the attenuation of strict observance of such rules is explained by modern economic pressures.

was shaped by the lineages and the control of its elders over reproduction. The abanumzane collectively regulated village, field and grazing sites, and they thus retained overall control of the resources of the locality.[15] Most villages had a similar appearance, consisting of an outer circular fencing with huts arranged near the inner perimeter, and a central cattle enclosure;[16] most of the huts were occupied by the wives of the village head (umninimuzi, or umnumzane) and their offspring.[17] Other huts were occupied by relatives for whom the village head was responsible, such as his widowed mother, brothers who had not been able to build their own villages, and non-relatives who took refuge or preferred residence in the village. The latter adopted the sibongo of the village head;[18] thus all the inhabitants of the village were related to the lineage. Indeed, the occupants of the individual village were described by the same genealogical terms in relation to the umnumzane or umninimuzi as they were to his brothers in neighbouring villages, thus suggesting that the villages were visualised collectively as the reproductive units of the sibongo.[19]

The technical processes of production in the village show how the shaping of production and appropriation through reproduction enabled the

15 Bryant, Zulu People, 465; Reader, Zulu tribe, 12-14, 116.

16 Extensive descriptions are found in Junod, Life, I, 310-8; Bryant, Zulu People, 75-7; Krige, Social system, 32-4.

17 Bryant, Zulu-English dictionary, 189,457. The difference between the two was one of wealth and status, including descent ranking; the umnumzane was a village head, but the reverse did not necessarily obtain. Bryant's English equivalent for umnumzane is 'gentleman.' In practice, the umnumzane was a 'lineage segment head.'

18 Bryant, Zulu People, 233.

19 Ibid. 426; Reader, Zulu tribe, 121; Krige, Social system, 35. Another sign of the corporateness of lineage reproduction was the fictitious parenthood allowed in the case of childlessness; see M. Gluckman, 'Kinship and marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal' in A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde, eds., African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, (London, 1950), 185.

abanumzane to maintain their authority. Exogamy at the lineage level was paralleled by strict division of labour between pastoralism and cultivation in the village; a range of prohibitions prevented women from owning or associating with cattle. Although the males of the village might be responsible for initial clearing and burning of trees and bush, cultivation was carried out by the female inhabitants. Each wife was responsible for the fields which the sibongo and village head allocated to her, while grazing and milking was carried out by the boys and young males of the whole village under the direction of the village head.[20]

The management of the cattle stock of the village gave the umninimuzi considerable power over the labour and product of each of his wives' houses: this followed from her male offspring's need of cattle to acquire their own wives, and begin their own villages; from the integration of milk products in the daily diet, and from the need for access to long term security of food supplies in the village cattle herd. Where cattle were assigned to a particular house for the supply of milk, they remained under the control of the village head. Cattle exchanged for the daughter of a particular house remained assigned to the house for use as lobola for the sons, but where there was no such heir, they reverted to the village head. Moreover, cattle allocated to a particular house could nevertheless be used to acquire further wives for the village, the debt being held against the new houses, which could discharge it through the marriage of a daughter or the sale of produce.[21] Most marriages were probably conducted against a debt in this, or other ways; many villages were not self-sufficient in cattle in the sense that enough were held to finance the marriages of all sons, and to maintain a

[20] Bryant, Zulu People, 179-80; Krige, Social System, 185; KCL SP A, 'Notes on Zulu economics,' 143; Junod, Life, I, 337-8.

[21] Bryant, Zulu People, 178-9; 'Evidence of H.F. Fynn before the Native Commission, 1852,' in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 116.

reserve for milk production, breeding and long term security. Cattle were therefore borrowed from the wealthier elders.[22] Hence a wife appeared to be in debt to the village head until the costs of the lobola had been repayed.[23]

Such control over cattle determined the circulation of other products in the village, especially foodstuffs. Each wife produced food in the harvesting season for her own hut's occupants and for the village head,[24] who in turn supplied his non-productive relatives. Short term storage of cereals was controlled by each wife for the immediate needs of her household, but long term storage was under the supervision of the village head who filled grain bins with produce from all his wives, and disbursed them during the winter and at other times of scarcity. Indeed, storage in underground pits in the cattle enclosure where women could not gain access symbolised the transfer of resources from female production units to the village head and lineage, in the interests of its long term security.[25]

22 Bryant, Zulu People, 412, 438. Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, 592; KCL SP A 'Notes on Zulu economics,' 105; Surveys of cattle numbers and herd self-sufficiency have not been undertaken in the region; however, Bryant suggested for the nineteenth century that ninety per cent of villages in Zululand were poor compared with a wealthy ten per cent; cp. R.W. Fielder, 'The role of cattle in the Ila economy,' African Social Research No.15, (1973), 339, where the figure of c.40 cattle is given as the number required for self-sufficiency of a village herd; only c.5-10% of adult Ila own this number. Where insufficient cattle were available through climatic or long term ecological causes, metal goods such as hoes and brass rings, and occasionally beads, were used in lobola; KCL SP A. 'Notes on Zulu economies,' passim; SP Q, evid. of Mgoqo, 19. xi. 1898; evid. of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 ii 1897; 'Extract of the logbook of the Centaur,' 11 Feb.1688 in Moodie, ed., Record, 427; Junod, Life I, 275. These products were scarce and highly valued in terms of cattle; see below, p.91f.

23 Cp. A. Delegorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique australe, (2 vols.) (Paris, 1847), I, 154, for comments on the industry of Zulu wives toward the enrichment of their husbands.

24 Bryant, Zulu People, 179; Junod, Life, I, 338.

25 See above p.44 for the distribution of cattle pits.

Although much of the apparent surplus of crops and cattle was notional in the sense that a considerable proportion was required for subsistence during the dry season and possible droughts, production of these major commodities was also shaped by participation in exchange;[26] the surplus realised from this exchange was expressed in terms of cattle which the umninimuzi or umnumzane accumulated. Thus surplus was extracted from the direct producers, the wives, as from the young males who herded cattle. Cattle clientage (ukusisa) was also a means of extracting surplus from the labour of villages which had insufficient stock, since it resulted in the reproduction and increase of the donor's herd.[27]

The patrilineage and the villages which reproduced it could not be maintained in this manner in isolation: the capacity of the abanumzane to promote the lineage and their own authority depended on their ability to operate exchange relations with other lineages, principally for the acquisition of wives; the payment of cattle between lineages in order to maintain their demographic structure indicates the existence of reciprocity between the lineages which had identical interests in maintaining the system of cattle exchange for wives. The reciprocity between abanumzane enabled cattle to be employed in the kinship system so as to perpetuate their power, and also to ensure the reproduction of the social formation as a whole.

The reciprocity which prevailed between the lineages of a chiefdom was established and maintained by the domination of one lineage over all the others; and the dominant lineage was central to the continuity of all the others: as will be seen, this is because the dominant lineage reproduced its own domination by its control over the reproduction and hence the production of the other lineages, and also by its control

[26] The evidence for exchange is discussed below, pp. 83-94.

[27] Cf. Depelchin, op.cit., 141f for data on such cattle clientage in eastern Zaire.

of the power of the elders of the subordinated lineages. The nature of the domination exercised by the dominant lineage can be seen in relation to control of the work processes which were not centred on the village, and to the possibility of lineage expansion.

Although cultivation and cattle raising could be carried out in the village, other labour processes, closely related to the continuity of the lineage, were organised outside the village, and were more directly under the control of the collectivity of elders; these were certain types of hunting and defence.[28] In the absence of firearms, hunting of the larger animals was extremely dangerous: elephants were deadly enemies owing to the sweeping power of the trunk and the strength of the charge - often in stampede; buffalo, rhino and hippo were equally capable of rounding upon attackers and trampling or goring them to death. Yet the removal of these was essential to cultivation and pastoralism, and the supply of meat in some localities. While the capture of birds, guinea fowl and even buck could be attended to by individual trappers, big game required the combined efforts of a large number of men, preferably the youngest and most agile, from several villages or localities, and their employment over a wide geographical area.[29] Only in this way could the various roles such as intelligence gathering, chasing, harassing, killing and stripping be fulfilled.

Within the area of a particular lineage, the hunt (inqina) was called by the abanumzane who appointed a hunt master (umthonga); the latter controlled the practice manoeuvres, dances and doctoring, as well as the hunt itself. Responsibility for the distribution of the product lay with the elders - whether every village head in the case of birds and small game caught by the herd boys, or the hunt master in the case of

[28] Cp. Krige, Social System, 203f; however, the writer does not draw out the structural implications.

[29] Bryant, Zulu People, 687; Isaacs, Travels, I, 95-6.

a collective hunt; much of the product of the latter was distributed to the participants on their dispersal at the end of the hunts, but products of exchange value were appropriated by the elders.[30] Certain types of fishing, such as the kutjeba in southern Mozambique, also involved collaborative organisation: here exploitation of the seasonally contracting ox-bow lakes by means of large nets covering a wide surface area was managed by the elders.[31] Thus in hunting and fishing, the elders extracted surplus from the labour of the direct producers, (as in cereal agriculture and pastoralism.)

Defence of the lineage territory was also a collective task in which the authority of the elders was predominant: indeed there was a close affinity between collaboration in hunting and defence. The dangers requiring such collaboration were similar and the means of confronting them the same - large congregations of the physically active male population. This may be seen in the identity between hunting and defence formations: the ugiwu was the semi circular formation used in both. This was particularly effective in sweeping the prey from wide expanses of bush and in concentrating the attack on a human or animal enemy.[32] The younger unmarried males were usually stationed at the ends of the formation, and undertook the first, most dangerous encounters; the mature men were positioned in the more protected central section - the isifuba (z/ts chest).[33]

Weaponry was also similar: two types of assegai, the one for throwing at rapidly moving objects and the other for close quarter

30 Bryant, Zulu People, 682, 685, 670; Reader, Zulu Tribe, 291.

31 See above, pp.53-4

32 KCL SP U 29 evidence of Mabonsa, 30 I 1909; Bryant, Zulu People, 682-4; Reader, Zulu Tribe, 292; See RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 109, for an early report of an encounter with such a formation.

33 Reader, Zulu Tribe, 285-6; Junod, Life, I, 459.

stabbing of man or beast, were usually carried in hunting and warfare, depending on the requirements of the attack. In hunting, the ability to stab dangerous animals from very close quarters was highly esteemed, and in particular circumstances only one assegai was necessary; indeed a hunting party was thus seen in Natal in the late seventeenth century.[34] Another sign of the close identity between hunting and warfare is the range of epithets of voice and movement in the dances which took place after harvest; these contained references to bravery as much in hunting as in warfare.[35]

The need to defend and retrieve cattle, and to protect favourable arable lands from human and animal predators were constant incentives for the exercise of such social force. The achievement of domination by one lineage over others resulted partly from the successful deployment of force, which could also contribute wealth in the form of captured goods.[36]

In order to maintain its domination, a royal lineage limited the social force which the subordinated lineages could dispose. Two forms of warfare are recorded in the traditions as being chronologically related: a circumscribed level of clan warfare entailing the use of light weaponry and little destruction, said to have been typical in the

[34] 'Extract of the Declaration of 10 Officers of the ship Stavenisse,' 2 March 1687, in Moodie, Record, 417; cf. Owen's description of Nguni weaponry in 1822: warriors carried assegais and spears, the one broad and long with a stronger staff for the thrust, the other narrow in the blade and small for throwing; W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of a Voyage to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar, 2 vols., (London, 1833), I, 95. The conclusion that Tshaka 'introduced' the single assegai is therefore a misinterpretation of the uses of weaponry; cf. for example, Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 16.

[35] Plaisted, Journal, 279-80; Gardiner, Narrative, 58-61; Grout, Zululand, 195.

[36] Cf. G. Duby, The early growth of the European economy, (London, 1974), 49; where war from the seventh century is described as 'a regular form of activity of prime importance as much for the profits it secured as for the losses it threatened rural communities.'

eighteenth century and earlier, gave way to more intense conflict only in the period of Dingiswayo, Zwide and Tshaka.[37] Sufficient evidence of extensive warfare survives from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries to throw doubt on the literal accuracy of the first half of the tradition[38] and, therefore, to suggest that the two forms of warfare existed simultaneously and were structurally related; the former being a ritualised conflict used to settle local disputes between the lineages so that it was not capable of destabilising royal dominance, the latter referring to conflict in which all the forces of a chiefdom were pitted against those of another.[39]

While the power of disposal of social force might give domination to a particular lineage, the infrastructure of a chiefdom was shaped so as to maintain royal hegemony with greater permanence: to reproduce its domination so that the extraction of wealth from within the chiefdom occurred more regularly than could be effected by sporadic use of force.[40]

The achievement of dominance resulted in the establishment of different levels of reciprocity between the ruling lineage and the others on the one hand, and between the non-royal lineages on the other:[41] the dominated lineages were in a tributary relationship so that daughters

37 KCL SP, V 17, evidence of Jantshi, 16 February 1903.

38 Evidence for large congregations of manpower in hunting and warfare comes from shipwreck records; for example: RSEA I, Perestrello, 247; VIII, d'Almada 109.

39 KCL SP X, evidence of Ndukwana, 29 September 1900; cp P-P Rey, Lineage mode,' in Critique of Anthropology, 3 (1975), 49, for other examples of such ritualised conflict.

40 Cf. Duby, European economy, 49, for a similar feature and description in early feudal Europe.

41 The central contradiction implied by the imposition of tribute in the kinship system is explored below, p.94f.

were contributed to the ruling lineage without payment of cattle, while marriage of royal daughters to members of other lineages required much larger numbers of cattle than between two ordinary lineages.[42] By maintaining a system of cattle exchange - in which it set the rates - tied to the reproduction of the authority of the non-royal elders, the ruling lineage supported a system which gave its demographic reproduction expansive characteristics and gave it in addition cattle capable of social investment. A patrilineage identified with a particular locality was not necessarily expansive, because villages were constantly being destroyed on the death of their founders as well as being created through segmentation; owing to the imbalance in the exchange of cattle, however, a royal lineage could expand and establish villages with a substantial complement of cattle outside its own locality, which then became involved in the reproduction and production of the ordinary lineages by means, for example, of compromises in the powers of land allocation with the local lineage. As long as cattle were required to obtain wives, its ability to 'tax' other lineages gave the royal lineage the power to control their reproduction.

Moreover, the royal lineage could employ its cattle surplus to the same end by lending (Z ukusisa) the cattle to abanumzane whom it approved: the reproduction of these patrilineages was then directly tied to the royal lineage, and the elders obligated to the inkosi, whilst the royal lineage secured the ecologically desirable dispersal of its cattle stock and its reproduction in the villages; the cattle had eventually to be repaid with a proportion of the interest.[43]

[42] Isaacs, Travels, I, 49, II, 286; Gardiner, Narrative, 89; Shooter, Natal, 50; J.Y. Gibson, The Story of the Zulus, (London, 1911), 32.

[43] Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, 592. Cattle were not therefore valued simply as the visible sign of an individual's success in economic management as is implied by Hopkins, Economic history, 42, and H.K. Schneider, 'Economics in East African aboriginal societies,' in M. Herskovits and M. Harwitz, eds., Economic transition in Africa, (London, 1964), 75. Cf. D. Forde, 'Ecology and social structure' in Proceedings

The non-royal abanumzane were thus an integral part of the structure of domination, reflecting their identification with dispersed localised production. Although their power to dispose social force was attenuated, they could still call hunts in their own localities, were responsible for arranging the ijadu (marriage making) dances attended by the young members of two lineages,[44] and retained considerable authority over the extent of lineage exogamy when marriage between descent groups hitherto regarded as part of the same patrilineage was under consideration.[45] Furthermore, the authority of the elders was associated with the ideological system through which the royal lineage linked its authority with reproduction and production in the chiefdom.

III

The ideology of production centred on the powers which the nkosi and the senior abanumzane held by virtue of their relationship to their ancestors: the elders were the living representatives of the ancestors whose dispositions when alive concerning the favourable reproduction of

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of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 51, (1970), 24. Forde gives an explanation for the prominence of livestock in social relations: "It is because the product of stock raising provides uniquely durable and transferable units of wealth that are at once scarce and constitute capital for further production." According to P.J. Greuel ('The leopard skin chief: an examination of political power among the Nuer'), in American Anthropologist, 73 (1971), 1119. "All of these methods (of using kinship to integrate the community) require that the kin group controls sufficient cattle resources to attract and hold the alliance of its members." Cattle as transferable units of wealth were central to the earliest form of European feudalism; indeed, 'feudal,' and 'fief' derive from the mediaeval German 'Vieh,' meaning cattle; see M. Bloch, Feudal society, (London, 1961), 165.

44 Bryant, Zulu People, 225-228, 567-8.

45 KCL SP I, 'Notes of clan formation,' 123; Bryant, Zulu People, 585; Krige, Social System, 35. Such fission occurred usually when male agnates of the sibongo chose to live geographically apart, and - by good management, or taking advantage of changes in the forces of production - achieved similar control of local resources to that exercised by the original patrilineage.

of the lineage were seen to continue after death. Thus in strictly material terms, the network of cattle loans and land allocation requiring adjustment or litigation by the living, necessitated reference to decisions of the dead through the abanumzane. But the influence of the ancestors was more generalised: the actual circumstances of a wealthy ancestor's descendants were seen to be dependent on the goodwill of the ancestor - a force mediated by the abanumzane in so far as they were responsible for conducting the lineage's affairs.

Omens of future disaster were attributed to ancestors, and sacrifices of cattle to prevent its onset were made in ceremonies at which the elders officiated.[46] Both inkosi and abanumzane were held responsible for intercession for the general progress of the productive season - especially the arrival of the rains; if the rains failed in a particular locality, the umnumzane bore the responsibility of relaying prayers to the ancestors; when drought was more widespread, the inkosi was the rain-priest who interceded with the ancestors of the royal lineage. Indeed the relative importance of the ancestors was the same as that of their most senior living representatives.[47] Since each lineage's ancestors perpetuated its interests, the arrangements of ancestral spirits was the ideological expression of the reproductive structure.[48]

[46] Shooter, Natal, 161.

[47] Bryant, Zulu People, 523-5; Krige, Social System, 289-90; Junod, Life, II, 316; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 33.

[48] Cf. M. Godelier, Horizon, trajets marxistes en anthropologie, (Paris, 1973), 331f, where the marxian precepts concerning 'primitive' ideology are discussed. Not merely supernatural powers of nature are reflected in such beliefs: 'All religion is merely the fantasised reflection in the hearts of men of the exterior forces which dominate their daily existence, a reflection in which terrestrial forces take the form of supernatural forces." (quoted from Engels, Anti-Duhring). 'Analogy is the general principle of organisation of the world in and by 'primitive,' thought; hidden causes regulating the world order are represented by super humans, that is beings the same as humans, but different because they do what humans cannot do. They form an ideal society and maintain relations between themselves and the daily world.' ' In primitive societies,

Moreover, ancestral cults provided the legitimising equipment required to complete the ideological preeminence of the inkosi: by reference to the fiction that the royal ancestors were those of the whole chiefdom, the actual ranking of the exogamous lineages in the chiefdom was explicable in terms of their descent from the royal lineage. Traditions apparently referring to the earliest historical period often contain stereotypes of 'migration' by the ancestors of the royal lineage into an empty land - or a land easily conquered - where, often after a long hiatus, the other lineages emerged as offshoots. Hence the chiefdom had the appearance of a genealogically homologous clan:

> "The Zulu clan was but a magnified family, consisting of the offspring of a single forefather, the clan's founder, gradually multiplying and expanding itself by a process of geometrical progression, until it mustered at least several 100 or even several 1000s of souls all settled together in a single patch of country, sometimes as large as a small English county, all speaking the same language practising the same customs and united in their allegiance to their common ancestors' direct living representative, the tribal grand patriarch, its chief or king (iNkosi)."[49]

Kinship ideology thus represented the largest political unit. The 'migration' traditions may be regarded as fictitious since they stem from the need of an ideology of genealogical primacy of the ruling lineage.[50]

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kinship relations constitute the dominant structure of social relations, and therefore there is an intricate correspondence between the role of kinship in social life and their central role in the ideal world of myths.' (pp338-9)

[49] Bryant, Zulu People, 422-3; Bryant took this reconstruction as historical explanation; hence the confusion created by terminology such as 'clan' in the literature; see above, p24f, where the distortive effects of such ideology are reviewed; cp. K. Marx, Precapitalist economic formations, ed., E. J. Hobsbawm, (London, 1964), 69-70, where the belonging to the 'higher community or highest unity,' a supernatural reality, is discussed.

[50] This does not mean that 'migrations,' transhumance and travel did not take place; only that they must be distinguished from justifications of royal preeminence. The tendency for this kind of justification to take place is exemplified by 19th century Zulu traditions, where the royal genealogy extended backward during the century so as to enable ideological

The ideological preeminence of the inkosi and the ideological structure of the chiefdom was demonstrated and renewed through the penetration of ideology in the annual sequence of agricultural production. While the allocation of resources and their exploitation through the lineage mode of production depended on the decisions of the elders of the lineage, the general progress of production was conceived as resulting from the successful management of the agricultural cycle by the inkosi.

Complex ceremonials linked the inkosi to the agricultural cycle: these were the luma in Rongaland, the incwala in Swaziland, and the umkosi in Zululand. The style of the ceremonials differed somewhat in each chiefdom: indeed, the differences were a sign of the distinctiveness of each royal house. However, the purpose and general outline was similar: they took place at each of the major stages of crop production and showed the decisive influence of the inkosi in the planting, harvesting, and consumption of the crop.

Thus planting in Zululand began in Mfumfu (Late September-early October) only after a prognosis of climate was undertaken by royal messengers in the warmest and most luxuriant part of the chiefdom, and the carrying out by the king of an initiating ceremony, ukukota igeja, (to lick the hoe).[51] Royal messengers again inspected the most favourable areas at the end of November or early December, looking particularly at the early vegetables; the maturity of these indicated when the full cereal harvest might be expected.[52]

The umkosi and luma proper were held in several stages, usually

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reinforcement of the coherence of the kingdom at a time of stress upon its unity; Bryant, Olden Times, 29-35.

[51] Bryant, Zulu People, 509-10; H.C. Lugg, 'Agricultural ceremonies in Natal and Zululand,' Bantu Studies, III, (1929), 360; J. Stuart, UHlangakulu, (London, 1924), 108.

[52] Bryant, Zulu People, 510-11.

spanning much of January; during the course of this period ceremonies involving first the inkosi and the abanumzane, and subsequently a much wider attendance at the great umkosi, initiated the consumption of the new harvest. The inkosi was the first to partake ritually of the first fruits - such as the pumpkins, melons and cereals grown in the riverside beds, which were suitable for consumption at the opening of the umkosi; and cattle had to be safeguarded ritually before being turned into harvested fields for grazing.[53]

The ritual surrounding the inkosi during this period served to buttress and display his supremacy in relation to his own lineage and chiefdom and also to their collective enemies. Indeed, it was at this transition from apparent dearth to full harvest that the definitive qualities of kingship, collectively known as ubukosi were developed.[54] The celebrations required the annual blessing of the royal ancestors, a feat achieved by the gathering of the 'spirits of the land' (viz. those of the royal ancestors) by members of the royal lineage.[55] Furthermore, the chiefs' specialists in medicine (izinganga) gathered with great secrecy examples of all crops produced, preferably from enemy fields and cattle, and made medicaments according to formulae differing in each chiefdom; the izinganga then administered to the inkosi who remained in seclusion for some days. The expressed purpose of the treatment was to strengthen the king by emphasising his uniqueness: no ordinary being was held to be capable of withstanding such powerful medicines. The sacramental stage of the umkosi was concluded by the administration of more beneficial substances.[56]

53 Junod, Life, I, 394-99; Lugg, 'Agricultural Ceremonies,' 363.

54 Junod, Life, I, 404, 407-8; II, 411.

55 Bryant, Zulu People, 515; J. Stuart, uKulumetule, (London, 1926), 222.

56 H. Callaway, The religious system of the amaZulu, (London, 1870), 346; Lugg, 'Agricultural Ceremonies,' 361, 364-5.

With the king's position thus fortified, similar but simpler ceremonies could proceed in the villages of other royal notables, then in those of the abanumzane, and finally at ordinary villages. The hierarchy of authority in relation to the king was thus widely demonstrated; in the ordinary village consumption of the new crops was prohibited until the hierarchy of ceremonial had been completed. Breach of the order of planting, harvesting and consumption was regarded as a breach of the hierarchy and thus a threat to royal authority and was met with heavy fines or death;[57] as Gluckman puts it, " a special object of the umkosi is to protect the chief from his being harmed by coming into contact with transgressors."[58]

Moreover the period of fortification of the inkosi and the hierarchy was also the occasion for some of the most intense political activity, regarding for example the allocation of land and the organisation of warfare and hunting which took place usually after the fields had been harvested. After the completion of the sacramental reinvestiture, the inkosi emerged from seclusion to become involved in political action with freshly demonstrated authority and could proceed to utilise this, whether in royal tours in the chiefdom or in leadership in hunting and warfare. Indeed, by the early nineteenth century, the final stages of the umkosi had developed the shape of a great military festival prior to engaging neighbouring chiefdoms.[59]

The involvement of the inkosi and the political hierarchy in the agricultural cycle not only demonstrated the strength of the links between the inkosi and the actual work processes of agricultural

[57] Shooter, Natal, 25, 392, (n9); Lugg, 'Agricultural Ceremonies," 363; Bryant, Zulu People, 511-3; Isaacs, Travels, II, 241.

[58] M. Gluckman, 'Social aspects of First Fruit ceremonies among the south eastern Bantu,' Africa, XI, (1938), 36.

[59] Lugg, 'Agricultural Ceremonies,' 362, 364, 366; Gluckman, 'Social Aspects,' 30.

production; it was also the vehicle for establishing the social acceptance of his ideological supremacy; the latter was essential to sustaining the organisation of the economy to the advantage of the ruling lineage, without continuous recourse to physical coercion within the chiefdom. Hierarchical authority was sustained at the village level through the performance of labour by juniors from the earliest age, involving the acceptance of the authority of the village head, abanumzane and the inkosi. This was the ideological equivalent of the economic pressures used in the system of reproduction, such as the need for cattle for marriage.[60] The effectiveness of this political and ideological authority, known in Zululand as ukwesaba,[61] is shown by the evidence concerning the channelling of the product in the regional economy.

III

The circulation of goods within the region was determined by the combination of forces deriving from the structure of lineage-tribute domination and from the complementarities of production: the extent to which one branch or geographical area of production could make good the deficiencies of another. A.G. Hopkins suggests that complementarity in precolonial Africa was dominantly affected by the costs of transport: goods which could normally be produced in most places were of low complementarity and could not bear the costs of transport as well as

60 Cf John Taylor, 'Pre-capitalist economic formations,' in Critique of Anthropology, nos. 4 and 5, 1975, pp 137-8, "The role of the state is ideologically fetishised so that for example in the Vietnamese kingdoms the success or failures of the harvests are directly attributed to the monarch, to his use or misuse of rituals which express his relations with the deity, the cosmos and the fertility of the soils. It is this ideological fetishisation in which real relations are expressed ideologically in an inverted form that establishes a basis for the monarch's further exaction of tribute in the form of commodities (which are exchanged with other kingdoms or stored) or labour (used in the construction of monuments exalting the divine power of the monarch, etc.").

61 Bryant, Zulu People, 155.

those which were not so widely produced.[62] Complementarity was thus affected by the regional distribution of resources.

Most products were ultimately capable of being valued against cattle;[63] much of the production and exchange in the region was motivated by the need to acquire cattle for subsistence and exchange, including wives, and hence the reproduction of the lineage.[64] As Lavanha reported in 1593:

> "They value the most essential metals, such as iron and copper, and thus for very small pieces of either of these they will barter cattle, which is what they most prize, and with cattle they drive their trade and commerce, and cattle forms their treasure."[65]

However, lineages which were oversuccessful in the accumulation of stock could pose a threat to the ruling lineage by threatening its means of domination. Hence internal exchanges of chiefdoms, and that between them, was shaped by the requirements of the ruling lineage, which could use the proceeds to further entrench its domination.

Within the chiefdom, even quite small disparities in resource endowment were sufficient to generate trade, and most microenvironments possessed a wide variety of resources, so that there was considerable scope for exchange over short distances. Local trade depended on household production strategies to take advantage of these circumstances rather than upon the chance accumulation of commodities which might enter the exchange system when they were conceived as surplus to a notional idea of subsistence.[66] Among the most important items exchanged

62 See Hopkins, Economic History, 53-4.

63 See above, pp.69-70.

64 In this way social structure determined the value of goods by shaping the 'market' for which they were produced; cp. Godelier, Rationality, 25, where he states that analysis of the technical and social conditions of production explains the value of goods 'even before they appear on the market.'

65 C.R. Boxer, The Tragic History of the Sea, (London, 1959), 123.

66 See Hopkins, Economic History, 53-4.

locally were cereal foodstuffs, livestock and craft products. Households having the advantage of living near especially fertile soils disposed of their cereals and other foodstuffs for cattle; the existence and meaning of the term amasondo, described by Bryant as the bonus - usually an extra basket of grain - paid to the seller of an ox for the costs of transport, indicates that such transactions were quite common.[67] The owner of cattle or sheep in a particularly favoured grazing ground could offer payment in livestock for labour specialised in the preparation of hides. One of the commonest items of exchange was igula, the animal fat used as soap in everyday washing - Stuart calculated that an average annual requirement per capita was about two hundred tablespoonsful, and reported a typical rate of exchange for it in the early nineteenth century: a large calabash of igula was sufficient to acquire a medium sized heifer while a large beer pot (upisi) full fetched a fully grown cow. Stock depletion caused by deaths or exchange could thus be recouped by the sale of fat or hides.[68] Similarly exchanges of pots, mats and baskets reflected differences in the availability of resources in relation to other skills being practised in the microenvironment.[69] Pots and mats were probably too costly to transport over long distances, but Bryant says of such craft production:

> "These traders were specialised; one basket maker confining himself solely to the manufacture of food baskets, another to plaited beer holders; one potter making nothing but washbasins, another only beer pots; one wood carver supplying only milk pails, another only wooden spoons."[70]

Most of the skills where the product or labour was exchanged were limited

67 Bryant, Olden Times; idem., Zulu-English Dictionary; Junod, Life, II, 40.

68 KCL SP A, 148.

69 Bryant, Zulu People, 398.

70 Ibid. 376.

to men, who might thereby acquire cattle and wives.[71]

The most highly valued skills were those of the metal smiths (Z isitandu) and the medicine men. The production and exchange of metal goods falls into two categories: the useful artefacts made of iron, such as hoes, axes and military weaponry; and the more purely decorative metal wares, usually made of copper or brass, but occasionally of iron. Iron was a comparatively scarce raw material in the region, but owing to its centrality in agricultural production, hunting and warfare, it was a common article of exchange.[72]

Traditions and travellers reports show that copper and brass artefacts were highly valued as a medium of exchange and as a repository of wealth; in these respects, they were comparable to and sometimes used in place of cattle. Some traditions contain the interpolation that cattle can only have come recently (that is, the nineteenth century) into the region, and that metals, especially neck rings and occasionally hoes, were used in the lobola and umgano transactions.[73] The evidence showing that cattle were kept in considerable numbers in most parts of the region is sufficient to cast doubt on the literal accuracy of such traditions;[74] rather, it is probable that certain groups did not have cattle at all times as a result of loss of stock in warfare, and resorted to metals as a substitute, while others valued metals more than cattle because they could not control sufficient grazing grounds or defend stock, but could purchase cattle inexpensively. For example, the Thuli, who, in the eighteenth century lived in the south east lowlands which had the most secure food supplies in the region, have a tradition to the effect that izimbedu (brass collars) were more highly valued than cattle in

71 Ibid., passim.

72 KCL SP Q, Notes on metallurgy, 19 X 1897; Bryant, Zulu People, 377.

73 KCL SP A, 150; SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 xi 1897; evidence of Mabola, 25 xi 1898.

74 See Chapter II above , p.48f.

pre-Tshakan times.[75]

Copper and brass artefacts were inessential to food production, but they were highly prized as personal ornaments and used in lobola. In 1554, Perestrello's party encountered Africans west of St. Lucia wearing bracelets (amasongo and izingxota) and other metal ornaments.[76] Copper bracelets were seen in the mid Thukela zone in 1593 and again in Natal in 1687.[77] Copper or brass neck collars (izimbedu, imnaka, litlatla) were reported in Natal in 1622 and again in 1687.[78] In the eighteenth century, a high demand for brass collars was reported by eye witnesses in Natal, Zululand and southern Mozambique.[79] Other decorative metal artefacts were copper or brass beads, ubuhlalu, and more rarely, larger and heavier brass neck beads, izindondo.[80] The records also suggest that it was the amakosi and others of high rank who possessed most of the larger brass and copper ornaments.[81]

Indeed, owing to the high value placed on their products, the smiths

75 KCL SP v 66, evidence of Mcotoyi, 16 iv 1905.

76 RSEA I, Perestrello, 247.

77 RSEA II, Lavanha, 326-7; S. Van der Stel, 'Journal' in Moodie, Record, 418.

78 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 110; S. Van der Stel, 'Journal' in Moodie, Record, 419.

79 Plaisted, Journal, 283; AHU, Moc. Cod 1348, Mello e Castro to Cunha e Menezes, 6 Aug. 1788, 32.

80 KCL SP R, evidence of Gedhle, 17 viii 1899, 83, 123; SP X, idem and J. Stuart, 17 viii 1899; SP Q, evidence of Mabola, 25 xi 1898. Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, 115. See also Bryant, Zulu People, 387; KCL SP Q, passim, and KCL, Carl Faye Mss., 'Paper re Brass ornamentation in Zululand.' The ubedu was usually c 1/16" thick and c 2½" wide and was worn in multiples. According to Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, 27, the ubedu was a very old decoration of the highest class, already obsolete in Tshaka's time.

81 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 110, 112; n.80 above. S. van der Stel, 'Journal', in Moodie Record, 419; KCL, Faye Mss., 'Brass ornamentation,' passim.

had a greater capacity than most specialists to accumulate wealth in cattle; and there is some to evidence to suggest that they were subject to particularly close social control lest their lineages become too powerful. Among the northern Zulu a smith was usually called umTonga; while in the south he was known as ilala.[82] Both expressions were used pejoratively in the nineteenth century to describe people who were poor or were outsiders to the community. An explanation for the paradoxical identity of high social value of labour and its pejorative description is suggested by the practice of the Zulu kings, Tshaka and Dingane, toward iron specialists: in their reigns such workers could only be paid in perishable goods such as foodstuffs and not capital goods such as cattle.[83] They were thus denied the immediate benefit of their labour and appeared to be poor; similarly, the specialist hunt master was described as umthonga; he worked according to the instructions of abanumzane, to whom all exchangeable products of the chase had to be made over.[84] The meaning of such terminology, often regarded as an ethnic given in the literature, may thus be regarded as deriving from the function of the ideological and political levels in the mode of production.

Long distance exchange within the region reflected greater disparities in the resource endowment and in the development of specialisation than within a chiefdom; owing to the exchange value of most products ultimately against cattle, and the fact that the latter were central to the structure of lineage domination, the inkosi attempted to enforce controls on external trade. Thus early European travellers reported

82 KCL SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 30 ix 1900; Bryant, Zulu People, 385; Zulu-English Dictionary.

83 Gardiner, Narrative, 105-6; A. Delegorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique australe, (2 vols.) (Paris, 1847), II, 31; see also KCL SP V 73, evidence of Madikane, 27 May 1905, where he states that the term Lala (and the similar Nyakeni) became widely known and used in Tshaka's day, though it was probably in existence before that.

84 See above, p.73.

that trade with the inkosi took precedence over that of others in the chiefdom; internal products capable of exchange outside the kingdom, such as ivory, were appropriated by the inkosi and the producers rewarded from his cattle store.[85]

The major disparity between the warm, more fertile lowlands and the cooler uplands, resulted in the interchange of foodstuffs: a Hlubi tradition states that maize was obtained from the Mthethwa before the Mfecane.[86] Coastal products such as plantains - from Mbonambi and Mlalazi - and sugar cane - from the Mfolosi and eastern uBombo - were carried into central Zululand in the early nineteenth century.[87] Complementarity in food production varied from year to year with the differential effect of climatic variation, thus affecting the relative costs of transport. Shepstone characterised the resultant interchanges before and during the nineteenth centuries thus:

> "Then as now the seasons favoured the highlands one year, and the low the next, and interchanges of commodities for food went on, as it still continues to do between the two classes of country."[88]

During the longer droughts, the complementarity of foodstuffs was at its height; in these circumstances trading for food, usually in exchange for easily transportable commodities such as cattle or beads took place over long distances; the wetter areas of the south east were the focus of most such trade.[89] Hlubi tradition indicates that most such

85 'Extracts from the log book of the Centaur' in Moodie, Record, 428; RSEA I, Perestrello, 268-9, 273; II, Lavanha, 321; (for the contradictions implied by trade control, see below, p.94f .)

86 KCL SP v 84, evidence of Sivivi.

87 Isaacs, Travels, II, 267; KCL, Lugg Ms, 1417; SP v 55, evidence of Dinya, 1 iv 1905; SP v 61, evidence of Socwatsha and Mkehlangana; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 77.

88 From a paper read to the Royal Society of Arts, 29 Jan.1875, in Bird, ed., Annals I, 157.

89 KCL SP V 24, evidence of Tununu, 14 June 1903; SP T, Biography of Dingiswayo, 24.

trade was carried out by appointees of the amakosi.[90]

Some crops were the subject of specialism: although tobacco (for snuff) and dagga (for smoking) were grown in most parts of the region, some peoples such as the Zulu and their neighbours in the mid Mfolosi valley were particularly renowned as producers and traders of these products, and others such as ikathazo, the medicinal plant which grew in mistbelt and upland soils. Tobacco and dagga were particularly valuable since they improved in quality and marketability when dried and stored, unlike most crops, so that a stock of such products was a reservoir of exchangeable wealth. Again the traditions indicate that the royal lineage controlled and profited from such external trade.[91]

Trade in decorative rather than useful skins reflected the specialism of peoples living near the permanent game habitats.[92] Skins to indicate high rank or for use in ceremonial or battle were usually those of the smaller game. Large quantities were used in battle; the standard warrior dress in the 1820s consisted of head-ringlets of otter skin and eagles' feathers, cranes' feathers adorning the forehead, ox tails on the arms and shoulders, kilts of monkey and genet skins, with genet tails decorating the shield. Dress for higher ranks used greater quantities of skins and feathers.[93] Stuart's informants told him that most of these products were obtained from Mabudu, Gazaland and the Drakensberg, rather than Zululand itself.[94] The only reference to such

90 KCL SP v 84, evidence of Sivivi.

91 KCL SP u 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 Jan. 1909; SP v 38, evidence of Mbovu, 12 ii 1908; SP u 48, evidence of Ngidi, 9 xi 1904; Bryant, Zulu People, 222-3; Delegorgue, 'Voyage' in Bird, ed., Annals, II, 482; Gardiner, Narrative, 106; Acland, Crops, 224-5.

92 See Chapter II, p.55.

93 Bryant, Zulu People, 146-9; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 74, 89, 122.

94 KCL SP v 32, evidence of Bikwayo, 10 Oct. 1903; see also Junod, Life, II, 145, and E. Casalis, The Basutos, (London, 1861), 169.

trade before the nineteenth century refers to the Transkei, where men of high status are said to have acquired sables from inland where furred animals abounded;[95] however, there is no reason to suppose that trade in these commodities was entirely new further north in the nineteenth century, although increased militarisation and warfare may have provided a stimulus to the market.[96]

The high though differential value of metals relative to cattle in some parts of the region is shown in the shipwreck accounts. In 1593, Lavanha's party managed to acquire a herd of twenty four cattle in northern Natal for pieces of copper of 'small value' to themselves. In north central Zululand an ox and a cow cost respectively three and two pieces of copper such as could be salvaged from utensils in the wreck and carried with the party.[97] In 1647, cattle were so abundant near St. Lucia that the Portuguese were able to buy 140 head on one occasion with the copper they were carrying.[98] However, in other parts of the region cattle were much more expensive: in 1593, the mid-Thukela zone had suffered poorer crop yields than areas to the north or south, and only one head could be bought for the same amount which acquired three elsewhere. Similarly in the north east lowlands, where cattle were generally scarcer, their value in terms of metal was higher than elsewhere in the region.[99]

Complementarities such as these resulted in specialisation and trade. Peoples living in the areas containing the most easily worked ores are

95 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 96.

96 KCL SP v 32, evidence of Bikwayo, 12 Oct. 1903.

97 RSEA II, Lavanha, 318, 330.

98 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 349.

99 RSEA II, Lavanha, 326-7, 337; VIII, Feyo 349; it is probable that the value of copper declined in the north east lowlands: RSEA VIII, Feyo, 348.

identified in the traditions as the suppliers of finished iron artefacts and of smelted iron ready for local fashioning. Thus the Qwabe who controlled extensive deposits in the Ngoye and to the west from the mid-eighteenth century are said to have 'armed their enemies as well as themselves.' Further west the Cunu, Cube and the Bele were also recognised as specialists and traders in iron goods; and the Nxumalo exploited the ore of the upper uMona valley in this way.[100]

Although copper and brass artefacts were made by local smiths, only part of the raw material came from within the region. Copper was much scarcer than iron: only two sites of mining are mentioned in the sources - in the Ngoye hills and in the hinterland of St. Lucia bay. Tin and Zinc deposits used in the manufacture of brass were even scarcer.[101] Southern Mozambique north of Delagoa Bay was much better supplied with minerals, through trade with the uplands of the north east Transvaal and south east Rhodesia. Thus Vasco da Gama reported in 1498 that the inhabitants of the Inharrime valley wore many copper ornaments;[102] and Lourenço Marques, on his exploratory voyage of the south east Africa coast in 1544, encountered people at the mouth of the Limpopo who claimed to have great quantities of copper, and who were prepared to sell it at a low rate by Portuguese standards.[103] In the eighteenth century, peoples adjacent to Delagoa Bay acquired copper from African traders, including

100 KCL SP v 49, evidence of Ngidi ; Bryant, Zulu People, 388; Olden Times, 347; Isaacs, Travels, I, 112-3; Delegorgue, Voyage, II, 30-31.

101 Isaacs, Travels, I, 112-3; KCL, Bryant Ms. 2168/3. The lack of a consistent supply of workable copper, and to a lesser extent iron, is illustrated by the systematic salvaging of European shipwrecks; see RSEA I, Perestrello, 224; 'Declaration of W. Knyff' in Moodie, Record, 416.

102 E. Axelson, Portuguese in south east Africa, 1488-1600, (Johannesburg, 1973), 23-4.

103 'Carta de D João de Castro,' 1545, in L.M. Jordão (Visconde de Paiva Manso), Baie de Lourenço Marques. Question entre le Portugal et la Grande Bretagne, (Lisbon, 1873), Documentos, p 2.

the Lembe, who travelled from their homes in the uplands to the north west; indeed they resorted to this source when supplies from the European traders diminished or were of dubious quality.[104] Owing to the price disparities, the Lembe found a good market for their metals in the northern Nguni area; that they did so is indicated by traditions to the effect that the Lembe were itinerant blacksmiths who were to be found living among several Nguni peoples.[105] Indeed, metals were not imported through Delagoa Bay in appreciable quantities until the mid-eighteenth century, but after this date artefacts originating in Europe and Asia increasingly replaced African supplies in the region.[106]

The lines of greatest complementarity in such products formed an open grid: on the one hand were the east-west routes following generally the lines of the river valleys and the spurs between them, along which flowed agricultural products of the different ecological zones of the Nguni area; on the other, a north-south route connected the lowland ecological zones at the coast. At the various critical points in the regional environment, such as the larger river crossings and the ecological boundaries, the circulation of products such as metals, skins, foodstuffs, beads and ivory was controlled by the amakosi. Thus in the eighteenth century, the Qwabe ruling lineage derived wealth from its control of the lower Mhlatuze which intersected the littoral trade route;[107] the Hlubi chief traded with coastal partners but also sent merchants to

[104] NRA KA 12199, Swertner to Cape, 5 June 1721, pp 31-2. Bannister, Humane Policy, xx; AHU IM 137, Processo, 136; Bolts to Pollet, 16 July 1777, 14; Pollet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780, 135v.

[105] H.A. Junod, 'The Balemba of the Zoutpansberg,' Folklore, 19, (1908), 280; KCL SP B, evidence of Jantshi, p 49.

[106] See below Chapter IV, passim, Chapter V, p.132f.

[107] See below, Chapter VI, p .170.

trade to the west across the Drakensberg;[108] Mabudu straddled two ecological zones, was the focus of inland and littoral routes, and controlled river crossings as well as access to European trade: its ihosi could therefore utilise the complementarities in metals and other products to offset deficiencies in cattle and acquire ivory, for example.[109]

Chiefdoms linked by these routes required effective commercial relations between them so as to protect those entrusted with the trade and regulate the exchange; in the eighteenth century, for example, Hlubi and Mthethwa and Mthethwa and Mabudu established preferential relationships to govern trade.[110] These were relationships between ruling lineages partly dependent upon each other for a proportion of their social wealth; they were usually stabilised by marriage links, in which the heir-bearing wife was married through the exchange of very large numbers of cattle contributed by the non-royal abanumzane.[111] Such links were thus integral to the mode of production.

A number of contradictions were inherent in and diffused, if not resolved, in the social formation; other contradictions were the focus of socio-political change. The contradiction between male and female, and village head and juniors in the social division of labour, posed by the

108 KCL SP u 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 Jan. 1909; NPA, Shepstone papers, 22, evidence of Mnyanda.

109 NRA KA 12205, 'Togt naar de Zuid rivier,' March 1729; see also below Chapters IV and V. The Hlubi word abaRwebi was used in the traditions to describe the peoples who conducted trade along the routes in this manner; it referred especially to the Hlubi and Ronga, but also to the Zulu, Cunu and Qwabe: KCL SP v 65, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 24 iv 1905; v 70, evidence of Magidigidi.

110 KCL SP v 84, evidence of Sivivi; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 7.

111 Such economic and social links, and the actual transhumance along such routes of traders and specialists correspond generally in geographical shape to the migration traditions and genealogical apparatus as reported by Bryant in Olden Times and Soga in South Eastern Bantu. See above, pp. 25-26.

extraction of surplus labour from the women and juniors was more apparent to European observers than to the producers themselves;[112] diffusion of the contradiction occurred because the surplus product in the village was usually used for the acquisition of further wives, thus reducing the labour of individual producers, and for the lobola of the sons of the producer, thus reducing the dependence of both wife and junior on the village head in terms of immediate and long term subsistence. Delegorgue notes thus the motives of the first wife of the future village (before leaving the husband's father's home:)

> "...Chaque première femme d'un cafre doublera son travail, autant que ses forces de lui permettront, afin de rendre son mari assez riche pour en acquérir une seconde. Une fois acquise, cette seconde est unie à la première par des liens qui ne trouvent pas d'expressions dans notre langue. Ces femmes sont infiniment plus intimes que deux soeurs..... plus les membres d'une communauté sont nombreaux, plus il revient d'aisance à cette communauté. En effet, le travail de chaque femme fournissant un excédant, plus il y aura de femmes, plus la source des excédents sera forte."[113]

Moreover, wives and juniors shared in the surplus product of the village head's skills, whether in the economic or political sphere.

As Rey implies,[114] the difficulty of describing the relations between elders and juniors as exploitation derives not from the 'continuism' of their generational status, but from the generality of the opposition: indeed, all juniors become old but they do not all become elders - direct descendants of the lineage founder, having authority within the lineage over marriage or for example the power to appropriate ivory from hunting parties. Rather, the reciprocity existing between the collectivity of the abanumzane of different lineages through which they controlled

[112] See, for example, comments on the apparent slavery of wives in RSEA VIII, de Cabreyra, (1633), 205, and Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 298.

[113] Delegorgue, Voyage, I, 154; cp. RSEA VIII, de Cabreyra, 205, where he remarks on the lack of conflict between the wives.

[114] Colonialisme, 48, 55.

the circulation of women and cattle was the basis of their extraction of surplus by means of which (accumulated as cattle) they reproduced their domination and the dependence of the commoners. In this sense, therefore, the ruling lineage and the abanumzane exploited the majority of commoners, through the reproduction of surplus extraction relations.

Diffusion of this class contradiction resulted from the lineage basis of cattle ownership and keeping, and the participation of juniors in incorporative ritual at the lineage level before marriage. The owners of ukusisa (lending) cattle belonged to the same sibongo as the recipients; this is implied by the need of the abanumzane to protect and promote their own lineage's well-being rather than another's and, indeed, by the strict rules against the consumption of milk deriving from cattle belonging to a different sibongo.[115] The abanumzane were closely involved in the complex of incentives and rewards of all the juniors of their sibongo; travellers' accounts and traditions show that the northern Nguni and southern Ronga practised circumcision until well into the eighteenth century.[116] Prof. Wilson has concluded that before the late eighteenth century, circumcision schools incorporated contemporaries from one locality[117] - with which the lineage was identified.[118] Spencer has argued that the emphasis on ritual and traditional authority in age organisation serves to enhance the monopoly of the elders over cattle and hence marriage.[119] D'Almada's testimony characterises such

115 Krige, Social System, 383.

116 RSEA, II, Lavanha, 294; VIII, d'Almada, 92-3, 116; KCL SP v 79, evidence of Mahaya, 27 viii 1905.

117 Oxford History of South Africa, I, 125.

118 See above p.67.

119 P. Spencer, "Opposing streams and the gerontocratic ladder: two models of age organisation in East Africa," Man II (1976), 171-2; (this article draws inferences from the more fully articulated generational separation - "age-sets" - of east Africa.)

relations for the Nguni and southern Ronga:

> "It is their custom when their sons are ten years old to turn them into the woods; they cloth themselves from the waist downwards with the leaves of a tree like the palm and rub themselves with ashes till they look as if they were painted. They all assemble in a body but do not come to the kraal, their mothers taking them food. Their duty is to dance at weddings and feasts which it is the custom to hold, and they are paid with cattle, calves and goats where there are any. When one in this way has got together three or four head of cattle and has reached the age of eighteen and upwards his father goes to the (umnumzane) and tells him that they have a son of fitting age who by his own exertions has gained so many head of cattle and the said father or mother is willing to help him by giving him something further and they further request the (umnumzane) to give him a wife..... he arranges the payment the husband is obliged to make to his father-in-law, and in making these contracts something always falls to the share of the (umnumzane).[120]

In cattle lending, the contradiction between the donor and receiver of cattle posed by the extraction of surplus labour from the village head, wives and juniors in the recipient village was partly resolved by the potential it gave to the recipients to build their own herd by careful management of the donor's cattle.[121] Ukusisa beasts could not usually be used for lobola, and where their presence freed for lobola cattle otherwise needed for subsistence, the recipient had no expectation of reward in terms of cattle for his labour on the donor's behalf;[122] thus greater surplus was extracted from villages with insufficient cattle to ensure subsistence than from those which possessed enough of their own for the village's food consumption and the occasional bride-price. In

120 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 1623, 92-3. In this account the Portuguese 'rey' (meaning 'king') is used to describe an individual having authority over any particular locality through which the ship-wrecked party passed; as the account makes clear in other places, 'rey' means umnumzane in these circumstances: the Portuguese text has 'Manamuze' as the proper name of several such men of authority; ibid., 34-5/102-3, 38/106, 42/110-1. Cf. 'Extract of the log book of the hooker Centaur,' 11 February 1688, in Moodie, Record, 431, for a similar example of local authorities having the same undifferentiating European title as their king.

121 See above, pp.70-71,76.

122 Reader, Zulu tribe, 40; Krige, Social system, 187.

favourable conditions, however, cattle multiply rapidly,[123] and the expectation that early dependence and relative poverty would be followed in a short period by increasing accumulation was a material incentive to the producers in the recipient village. Moreover, where the surplus amounted to a herd more than sufficient for subsistence and immediate lobola needs, the village could benefit from the surplus labour resulting from ukusisa. Hence there was a complex gradation of incentives and rewards surrounding the productive activities of the village.

Moreover, the cohesion of each lineage was closely related to the reciprocity obtaining between the abanumzane: the latter were part of the structure of domination by the ruling lineage; their role was not therefore determined from within the lineage. Lineage exclusiveness, including exogamy, was socially determined and the freedom of choice for the juniors to move from the lineage was strictly limited: the junior could not achieve advance in status or wealth outside the lineage without at first attaching as a junior to another lineage.[124]

The capability of the lineage system to resolve the contradiction between the wealthy and the poor within each lineage resulted in the major overt contradiction in the social formation being that between the ruling lineage and the subordinated lineages, produced by the differing levels of reciprocity existing between the ruling lineage and the non-royal lineages on the one hand, and between the subordinated lineages on the other. The extent to which this contradiction was resolved

[123] Cf R.W. Fielder, 'The role of cattle in the Ila economy,' African Social Research, 15, (1973), 351-2, where it is estimated that a herd of c 40 can produce a natural annual increase of c 15%. KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897, who testify to the importance of the annual 'interest' even in the comparatively less favourable cattle country of the north east flats.

[124] See above pp .65-71 . Rey, 'Lineage mode', 50, points out that lineage exclusiveness amounts to hostility, the structural complement of reciprocity at the level of the elders.

depended on the ranking of lineages in a hierarchy according to their idealised genealogical relationship to the ruling lineage and hence the strength of the dominant historical ideology, and the controls on the disposal of social force.[125] In the lineage mode of production the valuation of most products in terms of cattle implied that ultimate control of the circulation of these products remained with the ruling lineage. Iron, for example, which was scarce and used for weaponry, implements and lobola could be exploited by a lineage with access to a source of supply to build wealth and numbers with which it could challenge the ruling lineage's control of reciprocity between the lineages and hence the system of dominance. The potential inability to enforce controls on circulation which existed in the absence of a centralised standing army before the eighteenth century thus placed great emphasis on the ideological content of the lineage mode, on the control of access to highly valued raw materials, and especially on control of physical locations - such as river crossings and unloading points - on trade routes. The attachment of European trade to existing links markedly affected control over circulation owing to rapid changes in inventory, complementarity and volume; it is to the working out of socio-political change in this focus that subsequent chapters turn.

[125] See above pp.74-5, 79.

Chapter IV

The Tugela-Delagoa Bay region before the mid-eighteenth century

Portuguese contact with Delagoa Bay and the accounts of voyagers shipwrecked on the coast to the south provide a fragmented though tangible record of the region's history before the eighteenth century. Except in rare instances, or at the very general level, traditions do not correlate well with the literary records. Indeed, use of traditions in previous attempts to reconstruct the history of this period has led to its being depicted in anachronistic terms of immigration, settlement or conquest.[1] Nevertheless, political outlines can be explored against the patterns of resource control and social structure discussed in the previous chapters; and the extent of penetration by foreign trade emerges.

Literary evidence comes primarily from reports of Portuguese mariners shipwrecked on the south east African coast between 1552 and 1647.[2] There are a number of problems in using these as sources for the region's history. For example, most of the accounts, even when written in Portuguese, were not first hand: rather they were written by chroniclers in Lisbon after interviews and submissions - occasionally accompanied by a ship's log - of the travellers themselves. Some of these accounts have not survived in first edition form, still less in manuscript; there is thus considerable scope for distortion from the effect of loss of memory and transcription. Hence, criticism of the text in a manner comparable to that adopted for traditions - in order to uncover the original information - is necessary. However, the most valuable of the reports, dating from 1589 to 1622, have already been subject to a variety of specialist criticism, notably by Boxer, who looked afresh at the

[1] See Chapter I, p.24f.

[2] These are collected in G.M. Theal ed., Records of South Eastern Africa, (RSEA), 9 vols, (Cape Town, 1898-1903), especially vols. I,II and VIII.

sources, considering in particular their order of appearance - hence indicating where interpolations entered the process of published transmission - and the meaning of the original Portuguese where it uses archaic Asian, African and geographic expressions.[3] Thus there is a check on Theal's collection of the accounts which have additionally inspired criticism from those with special knowledge of southern Mozambique.[4]

Further problems result from the chronological and geographical specificity of the reports: the information is mainly confined to the immediate period of the shipwrecks and is therefore occasional rather than continuous for much of the region. Moreover, the routes taken by succeeding parties differed except when nearing Lourenço Marques, their point of rescue. Thus much of the 1554 journey was undertaken along the beach where little could be learned, whereas the 1593 party took an interior route to the latitude of the Mkuze river in northern Zululand.[5] Hence there are few correspondences between the accounts, except near Lourenço Marques, an area for which in any case the density of material is higher than for Zululand owing to the fairly regular presence of Portuguese traders.

I

The first of the sixteenth century reports to mention specific

[3] C.R. Boxer, The Tragic History of the Sea, 1589-1622, (London, 1960).

[4] H.A. Junod, 'The condition of the natives of South East Africa in the sixteenth century according to the Portuguese sources,' South African Journal of Science, II, (1914), pp 137-61; C. Montez, "Os Indígenas de Moçambique," Moçambique, No. 20, 1939, pp 5-31; H.P. Junod, 'Os Indígenas de Moçambique, no século 16 e começo 17 segundo os antigos documentos Portugueses da época dos descobrimentos,' Moçambique, Nos.17-19, (1939), 5-38, 15-48, 5-44;

[5] RSEA I, Perestrello, 219-285; RSEA II, Lavanha, 288-346.

political units was that of do Couto, who compiled a synthesis of the narratives describing the wreck of the Sao Thome at Sordwana Bay in the north east lowlands in 1589.

> 'The place where the boat came ashore is commonly known to our navigators as the land of the Fumos, and is so marked on our charts, which name was given to it by the first of our people who visited, from the quantity of smoke which they saw on the land at night.....
> All this land of the Fumos is under the king called Viragune; it extends more than thirty leagues into the interior, and on the southern side is bounded by another land called Mokalapapa, which extends from the river Saint Lucia, which is in the latitude 28¼ degrees to the land of Natal. Here it joins another kingdom, that of Vambe, which runs south where our people also carry on trade in ivory. From this kingdom, which includes a great part of the land called Natal, to the Cape of Good Hope, there are no other kings, but all is in the possession of chiefs called inkosis, who are the heads and governors of three four and five villages.
> From the kingdom of Viragune, which is all that land of the Fumos, the kingdom of Inhaka runs to the north east and to the point of the bay of Lourenço Marques on the southern side....'[6]

The distinction between the kings of southern Mozambique, Zululand and Natal on the one hand and the chiefs called inkosis on the other is misleading: inkosi (Zulu or Xhosa) and its variants, iyosi (Lala) and ihosi (Ronga) can mean chief or king in all the languages of the area and refers to the type of allegiance tendered rather than to the scale of territorial control; it is so used by Lavanha in the succeeding shipwreck account of 1593.[7] The impression given in the 1589 account that the scale of organisation was greater north of the Mzimkulu is supported by Lavanha only to the extent that population was denser and villages were bigger north of the Mzimvubu.[8]

Moreover there are grounds for doubting whether the 'kingdoms' named to the south west of Nyaka ever existed as such. One reason for this is the lack of descriptive detail of such polities; indeed, the Sao Thome party landed in the most northerly of the 'kingdoms', Viragune,

6 RSEA II, do Couto, 199.

7 See Chapter III, p.66 et seq. for the powers of the inkosi.

8 RSEA II, Lavanha, 309.

Map 4

Information from the shipwreck reports of 1554 and 1589



Information from the shipwreck report of 1593 Map 5



travelled along the coast, and did not experience conditions inland.[9] On the other hand, Lavanha's party which traversed inland Natal and Zululand mentions none of the kingdoms of do Couto's synthesis. In the area of 'Viragune,' said to have extended between 75 and 90 miles into the interior, Lavanha passed through three chiefdoms: Panjana, and Malangana occupied the Ngome-Nongoma area which became central to the Ndwandwe chiefdom in the late eighteenth century. To the north east in the plain of the mid Pongolo and Mkuze rivers near the southern Lebombo was the more extensive chiefdom of Gamabele. Between these centres of power were zones of insecurity through which inhabitants of the chiefdoms feared to pass, indicating the absence of a polity encompassing these zones.[10]

Bryant's interpretation that 'viragune' means the people called the vaNguni is thus likely;[11] it is supported by evidence to the effect that Mnguni/Nguni was a term which came to connote antiquity and give authority to ruling lineages in the later centuries, stemming from its association with early residents of lower areas of Zululand.[12] Similarly, Vambe probably refers to the people of Natal rather than to a specific political unit. Lavanha's account of Natal names and describes several chiefdoms not apparently subjected to any higher authority.[13] In the late seventeenth century, survivors from the Stavenisse reported the people of southern Natal as 'emboas' or 'semboes' but gave no political detail except that there were several kings in Natal.[14]

9 RSEA II, do Couto, 197-200.

10 RSEA II, Lavanha, 326-337.

11 Bryant, Olden Times, 289; See also Chapter I, p.25 for ecological categories.

12 KCL SP v 72, evidence of Magidigidi, 12 May 1905; v 65, evidence of Maziyana, 24 April,1905; see Chapter I, p.25f and Appendix I.

13 RSEA II Lavanha, 318-324.

14 'Extracts from the logbook of Hooker Centaur,' in Moodie, Record, 426; 'Despatch of S. van der Stell,' 15 April 1689, in ibid., 431.

According to Bryant, Natal was known to the Xhosa before the nineteenth century as eMbo: at the place of iMbo,[15] one meaning of which relates to a part of the distinct ecology of coastal Natal, Zululand and Mozambique - the fever of tropical diseases prevalent until recent times, which extended no further south.[16]

The reports of 1593, 1622, 1647 or of the 1680s do not give sufficient continuity of evidence in the northern Nguni area of specific political units or geographical areas to reconstruct the history of centres of power and their relationship to subsidiary centres. Hence developments such as changes in the control of highly valued resources, rearrangements in the hierarchies of lineages, expansion and conquest cannot be described. Moreover, the same lack of continuity in the evidence renders conclusions of broader, including structural, changes extremely tenuous; for example, the encounter in the southern borders of Natal of the 1622 party with a large well-armed force which attacked the Portuguese before proceeding to trade[17] with them cannot be taken as evidence of increased centralisation because there is no comparable information for this area for any other year. Nor can the lack of reportage of nomanslands or hunter-gatherers be evidence of centralisation or improvement in the subsistence base.[18]

The pre-eighteenth century reports do give important evidence of features usually thought to be innovations of the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. They show that some chiefdoms were better at

15 Bryant, Olden Times, 314-5.

16 Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary; Olden Times, 52; KCL SP B, evidence of Jantshi, 11 Feb.1903, 65; SP B, evidence of Ndukwana, 28 Dec.1901; Callaway, Religious System, 426.

17 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 109.

18 Cf. Slater, D.Phil. thesis, 181-2, 194, where such extrapolations from negative evidence are made; see Chapter II, p.54f, for the varying importance of hunting and gathering.

fighting than others, that their armies sometimes used large shields covering their bodies and a variety of weaponry, including the single assegai; nor did hunters or fighters seem to wear the sandals they carried.[19] Moreover the reports describe features of the economy of the northern Nguni sufficiently to support a hypothetical mode of production.[20]

However the lack of continuity of information for the northern Nguni extends into the period for which traditions become useful, after about the mid-eighteenth century. There were occasional visits to Port Natal from 1685 and 1719 from Dutch and English ships; these resulted mainly from accidents of navigation, the need of refuge and the exploration of the coast. Apart from the exchanges conducted by shipwrecked sailors, only one commercial transaction is recorded.[21] Indeed, there is no evidence from such sources concerning any specific political unit in Natal or north of the Tugela in this period or for the remainder of the eighteenth century. Only to the north, at Delagoa bay, is the data sufficiently continuous to support a description of political change and some estimate of the importance of foreign trade before the mid-eighteenth century.

II

Given the level of European marititime technology in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the first essentials for trade were a harbour

19 RSEA VIII, d'Almada (1622), 109; 'Extract of the Declaration of 10 officers of the ship Stavenisse,' 2 March 1687, in Moodie, ed., Record, 417; see above, Chapter III, p.74 (fn.34); RSEA VIII, S. de Rezende, 'Do Estado da India,' (1635), 204.

20 Chapters II and III above.

21 'Journal of S. van der Stell,' in Moodie, ed., Record, 416-9, 430; 'Capt. Rogers account of Natal,' in Bannister, Humane Policy, vii; R. Drury, Madagascar, or Robert Drury's Journal, (London, 1729), 445.

which could be easily entered and which gave adequate protection, allowing opportunities for victualling, and a means of access to the hinterland populations. Most of the potential harbours of south east Africa did not fulfil the first condition: Kosi and St. Lucia bays, two of the largest and deepest on the coast, and the Tugela and Mfolosi rivers, were obstructed by sand bars.[22] Port Natal (now Durban) was much inferior to Delagoa bay; the submerged bar at its entrance made it hazardous to enter, and it had a comparatively small anchorage, with no navigeable river emptying into it. Despite many wrecks on the bar, it was well known to Indian Ocean sailors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, more as a place of refuge in extremis and occasional trade, than as a regular port of call.

Delagoa bay was much larger, and together with its inner estuary - called the Espiritu Santo by the Portuguese - offered many square miles of protection. Though not hazard-free, it was easy to enter by a northern channel which facilitated the crossing of a submerged bar.[23] Moreover, communication with the interior was possible via high volume rivers extending into the hinterland. To the south, the Maputo's lower course, through the sandy lowlands east of the uBombo range, was navigable for most of the year. It was described in the nineteenth century as a 'noble river' with sufficient water summer and winter for shallow boats to reach offloading points well into the interior: there was usually at least three and a half feet of water as far as the Pongolo-Usutu confluence, eighty miles from Delagoa bay. Though its banks were covered with mangrove in parts, there were sites sufficiently high and dry for offloading.[24]

[22] Farewell to Someset, 1 May 1824, in Bird, Annals I, 71-2; Isaacs, Travels, II, 274.

[23] F.M. Bordalo, 'Ensaio sobre a estatística de Moçambique,' J.J. Lopes de Lima, Ensaio sobre a estatística das possessoes portuguesas, (Lisbon, 1859), 264-70, 276-82.

[24] Leslie, Among the Zulu, 245-6, 249; Santa Theresa "Plano" in Montez, Descobrimento, 164; Owen, Narrative I, 212.

Two other rivers enter Delagoa bay, from the south west: the Tembe, though navigeable in its lower reaches, rises in the uBombo only a short distance from the bay, while the Umbelusi, which receives the waters of a complex system in Swaziland, does not permit navigation through the uBombo gap. Indeed, the uBombo barrier, the difficulties of passage in foreign terrain and the transport economics of water-borne commerce conducted from ships' boats combined to give north-south commerce along the rivers of the littoral the advantage over trade to the west. Before the nineteenth century, the changing fortunes of river borne traffic in the north eastern parts of the region came to have a greater influence on its trade patterns than commerce based upon permanent settlement.

The exploration of the south east coast by Lourenço Marques and Antonio Caldeira in 1554 resulted in a favourable report to the authorities in Mozambique on the potential of Delagoa Bay: in particular, the area appeared to contain a large number of elephants, and Africans were willing to dispose of ivory at low rates.[25] Portuguese contact with the bay from that period to the early eighteenth century depended on voyages from Mozambique during the south west monsoon, usually in November or December, returning after the winds changed, in May or June. For most of the second half of the sixteenth century, while Portuguese Indian ocean commerce was enjoying the fruits of its newly established dominance, a ship was sent annually by the government; in the seventeenth century, contact was maintained with less frequency, and with some lengthy interruptions of several years.[26]

Throughout this period the Portuguese made no attempt to construct a permanent settlement on the mainland; rather, owing to lack of manpower for such a purpose, they preferred to exploit the mobility of their ships by tapping various sources of commerce around the bay, thus avoiding

[25] Carta de D.João de Castro, Sept., 1545, in Jordão, Baie, 3.

[26] RSEA I, Perestrello, 281-2; VIII, Feyo, 355; Montez, Descobrimento, 40.

complete dependence on the goodwill of any particular African chiefdom and promoting competition advantageous to themselves. Thus, in the mid-seventeenth century, they had factories at five locations to which they customarily came to trade for short periods on each visit to the bay. Trade to the north via Maniça and the the south via Nyaka was the most valuable, and Nyaka provided security in the form of a base on little Nyaka, Setimuro, the small uninhabited island to the north of Nyaka proper, Xefina island, at the mouth of the Nkomati, fulfilled the same function occasionally on the north side of the bay. At these two bases, ivory from the factories was collected to await transhipment to Mozambique.[27]

The evidence shows that even the intermittent Portuguese presence at Delagoa Bay affected trade far into the southern interior. In 1554, Perestrello's party observed ivory at the Mfolosi being carried northwards to trade with Europeans.[28] In 1593, Indian beads identified by Lavanha as being of the type used in trade with Nyaka were observed in the south of present-day Natal; further north, a party of Africans was reported as having entered Nyaka from the south with ivory for the barter trade. In the same vicinity, near the southern hills of the uBombo, there was a village within Nyaka where ivory from the south was exchanged for read beads.[29] In 1647, ivory destined for Delagoa was offered to a shipwrecked party near St. Lucia, where the presence of European cloth had earlier been observed.[30] Moreover, even in areas some distance from the coast, such as north central Zululand, where the ivory trade was not acutally witnessed by travellers, the existence of the village in Nyaka where beads could be obtained was well known to the local amakosi.[31]

27 RSEA I, Perestrello, 267, 281; VIII, Feyo, 355; Montez, Descobrimento, 13-22, 32, 40.

28 RSEA I, 245.

29 RSEA II, Lavanha, 333, 337.

30 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 349; VIII, d'Almada, 115.

31 RSEA II, Lavanha, 330, 333.

Although no figures for ivory exports exist for this period, the fact that the Portuguese usually sent only one ship suggests a low gross volume of commerce;[32] and the dispersal of the trade around the bay further suggests that the amount of ivory emanating from any particular locality was small. Furthermore, while occasional English shipping had traded at the bay for ivory as early as 1597, there is no evidence of regular non-Portuguese enterprise in the ivory trade for much of the seventeenth century. Indeed, in the years the Portuguese missed out their voyage, Nyaka found itself in possession of large ivory stocks which it could not dispose of to anyone else.[33]

III

Of the two Ronga chiefdoms, Nyaka and Tembe, which were in contact from the mid-sixteenth century with the Portuguese on the one hand and the peoples to the south west on the other, Nyaka was the better known. The reports of shipwrecked mariners show that in the 1550s the chiefdom extended from Nyaka island over much of the sandy lowlands east of the Maputo river.[34] Ihosi Nyaka's capital was in the northern part of the mainland and was described thus by Perestrello in 1554:

> "Its natural and ancient poverty did not fail to show a certain policy and order of government, sufficient for its limited traffic. It was large and with many inhabitants, with its courtyards and paths in a not very disorderly state, and was surrounded by a kind of prickly pine tree which grows in that country, thickly set, with three or four entrances where necessary."[35]

Portuguese testimony on Nyaka's economy needsto be considered in the

[32] This is also the conclusion of P.B. de Resende, "Do estado da India," 1635, in RSEA, II, 405.

[33] RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 119-120, Montez, Descobrimento, 159; Boxer, Tragic history, 81 n.2.

[34] RSEA I, Perestrello, 262-66.

[35] RSEA I, Perestrello, 270.

light of their hazy appreciation of African economic organisation and the social circumstances of European travel and residence in Nyaka. Reports suggesting general poverty, especially the lack of cultivation and storage,[36] contain contrary evidence of the complexity of the economy. Hunting of elephants, hippo and other wild game, fishing in the lagoons and rivers, and collecting of fruits and roots were of greater importance in this ecology than in most other parts of the region; cattle herding was concentrated in favoured zones on the mainland and on Nyaka island; and grain, usually mchewere (pennisetum) was produced in sufficient quantities to supply Europeans on occasion.[37]

The extent and strength of Nyaka depended on the coherence with which the ruling lineage organised the material and human resources so as to maintain the subordination of non-royal lineages as well as its success in minimising rivalries within itself.[38] In the mid-sixteenth century, Nyaka was not the most powerful or extensive chiefdom south of Delagoa bay; in 1552, ihosi Nyaka told Portuguese mariners that he was at war with a more powerful neighbouring chief - probably Tembe. Nor was he unopposed within the chiefdom: Nyaka required the assistance of the mariners to defeat a rebellious chief who lived scarcely twenty miles to the south west of the capital.[39] Indeed, the shipwreck records suggest that occasional military association and especially trade with the Europeans was a considerable advantage to the ruling lineage in succeeding decades.

The importance of commerce with Europeans is shown not only by

[36] For example, RSEA I, Perestrello, 272, 274. But Nyaka was wealthier in the 1590s: below p113

[37] RSEA I, Sao João, 138-9; RSEA I, Perestrello, 269, 272, 274. See pp.40-3f for a fuller exploration of agricultural organisation in the sandy lowland ecology.

[38] See p.71f above.

[39] RSEA I, Sao João, 139.

evidence of the demand for beads and cloth within Nyaka,[40] but also by the efforts which ihosi Nyaka undertook to ensure that European parties travelled to and stayed within his chiefdom rather than any other. When a shipwrecked party approached the south of Nyaka, officials were sent to guide it safely to the capital; once there the Portuguese were usually informed that neighbouring peoples were hostile to them; when the trading vessel from Mozambique rescued such stranded mariners, a large bounty in beads was paid to the ihosi.[41]

However, European trade and the presence of parties of foreigners resident for periods of several months emphasised contradictions in the social formation such as that between ruling and subordinate lineages: lest the advantages of European arms and products - especially the metals and cloth which the shipwrecked mariners usually carried with them - accrue to potential opponents, Nyaka did not allow the foreigners to reside or trade freely. Perestrello's party, which stayed at Nyaka for four months, found themselves restricted to their billets, constantly spied on to prevent secret exchanges for foodstuffs of their goods for which there was no lack of hopeful unofficial customers.[42]

Nyaka's success in managing such aspects of the connexion with Europeans gave the ruling lineage increased coherence and power against its rivals and enabled it to adopt the role of chief intermediary with peoples to the south west. In 1593 amakosi far to the south west of Nyaka's boundaries testified to ihosi Nyaka's reputation as the only trader with the Europeans, thus suggesting that Tembe was excluded from an important intermediary role at this stage.[43] The wealth of the royal

[40] RSEA I, Perestrello, 268-9.

[41] RSEA I, Perestrello, 266, 270, 281; RSEA II, do Couto, 206, 212.

[42] RSEA I, Perestrello, 273, 276.

[43] RSEA II, Lavanha, 333.

lineage, to which this favoured position in foreign trade contributed, accumulated in the form of cattle, kept in the lush security of Nyaka island.[44] By the 1590s Nyaka had expanded toward the southern extension of the uBombo hills, where a sister of the ruling lineage resided in a royal village and controlled the trade to the south through the Mkuze and Pongolo gaps.[45] Moreover, the fear shown by inhabitants of the southern borderlands of retribution from Nyaka if they interrupted communications, the banishing of a rebellious son to an obscure village, and the expulsion from the south of a chief unwilling to recognise Nyaka's sovereignty,[46] suggest that at this time Nyaka had developed the ideological and physical means of defending his lineage's unity and dominance. The extension of the hierarchisation of lineages subordinate to the ruling lineage and therefore the extension of extraction, reflected the ihosi's ability to limit the independence of its subordinates by such means as removing their cattle, and thereby altering patterns of reproduction and production. The apparently greater wealth of Nyaka than in the 1550s[47] was partly due to this process, as indeed was the comparative poverty of groups in the south west borderlands who were not allowed to keep cattle.[48]

To the west, between the Maputo and Umbelusi rivers, was the chiefdom of Tembe. From the early eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries the ostensible justification for the preeminence of the Tembe ruling lineage in this zone was a tradition of origin which portrayed Tembe as the eponymous founder of an invading lineage; Tembe was a 'war

44 RSEA II, do Couto, 207.

45 Ibid. 199-200; RSEA II, Lavanha, 274-5, 333, 339.

46 Ibid. 322-3, 337-8, 342-3.

47 RSEA I, Perestrello, 274; cp. RSEA II, do Couto, 207; Lavanha, 341.

48 RSEA II, Lavanha, 337.

lord of the Makalangas' who migrated from the north, settled with his followers on the northern side of Delagoa bay and then crossed the estuary to settle in unoccupied lands.[49] This tradition was reinforced by the use of 'Nkalanga' as the address name or salutation (sithakazelo)[50] of the royal lineage. Portuguese sources show only that Tembe was established by the 1550s,[51] but do not show whether the founding tradition was current at that stage; nor do they offer other evidence that such a migration took place. Indeed, the claim that the land was unoccupied and the strength of the tradition over at least two centuries in the absence of other material referring to such an early period suggests that the tradition's remembrance was more related to its social function - explaining Tembe primacy - than to historical fact.

The origin and continuation of Tembe dominance are more likely to be founded in the ways in which the ruling lineage managed local and extra-territorial resources to its own benefit. Before the development of the Portuguese ivory trade, Tembe was the more powerful of the two states south of Delagoa bay.[52] Its ruling lineage probably gained considerable wealth from its easy land and water communications to the north and south - including the trade in copper from the north thought to have predated Portuguese contact.[53] At this juncture the river dividing Nyaka and Tembe was named after the latter, indicating that it was under Tembe control.[54]

49 NRA KA 12205, Van de Capelle to Cape, 2 May 1730, p.208; P. Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in F. Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções de Lourenço Marques; respostas aos quesitos feitos pelo ministro dos indígenas, Dr Francisco Ferrao, (various authors), (Lourenço Marques, 1909), 144-5. Junod, Life, I 22-3; H.P. Junod, 'Os indígenas de Moçambique,' Moçambique, 18 (1939), 39.

50 Junod, Life, I, 23.

51 RSEA, I, Perestrello, 267.

52 RSEA, I, Sao João, 139.

53 See above p.93.

54 RSEA, I, Perestrello, 267.

From the 1550s the Portuguese collected ivory from Tembe; but although ihosi Tembe seemed anxious to maintain good relations with the Europeans,[55] there was no trading station such as that at Nyaka, nor did shipwrecked mariners make for or take refuge in Tembe. Moreover, the exclusive intermediary role of Nyaka with the peoples to the south west suggests that Tembe had to rely on its own supplies of ivory and those available from the west. In the latter, however, there were interruptions: in 1589 Tembe's neighbouring chief atop the Lebombo hills was reported as willing to do without the trade in ivory, of which he had large stocks, because of the rapacious conduct of the lowlanders.[56] It seems therefore that in the sixteenth century the Tembe ruling lineage did not benefit from the ivory trade as much as did Nyaka.

Nyaka's advantage did not long outlast the sixteenth century: in the early years of the seventeenth century, the political coherence of its ruling lineage collapsed. In 1623 there were two chiefs known as Nyaka; Sangwane, who lived on the mainland, regarded himself as dispossessed by Nyaka Manganheira of the large island in the bay, which had been so attractive to the Portuguese. By 1647 part of the right bank of middle Maputo was known as Machavane, a separate and wealthier chiefdom than Nyaka Sangwane.[57]

The causes and perpetuation of this fission stem from contradictions within the ruling lineage as well as those in the relationship between European traders and their African suppliers. While the exact nature of the dispute between Manganheira and Sangwane cannot be ascertained, it is clear that the divisions in the chiefdom affected the ivory trade.

[55] Hence, for example, the willingness of Tembe to solve to Portuguese satisfaction a commercial dispute with a lesser induna: see RSEA I, Perestrello, 282-3.

[56] RSEA II, do Couto, 201.

[57] RSEA VIII, Feyo, 354-5.


The southern Ronga area, c.1720
Map 6
M f u m o
Delagoa
bay
T e m b e
Nyaka
Sangwane
uBombo
range
M a c h a v a n e
Kosi
bay
Lake
Sibayi
Lake
St.Lucia
ov r
1000'
30 miles

The Portuguese continued to trade at Nyaka island until 1621 when Manganheira executed four Portuguese including a priest in retaliation for the murder of one of his brothers. Although Manganheira still managed to acquire ivory, the Portuguese temporarily refused to buy from him; and in the succeeding years, they preferred to rely on their base at Xefina island in the north of the bay and on trade by ships' boats and canoe with the chiefdoms of the Maputo.[58]

The fragmentation of Nyaka resulted in the renewed ascendancy of Tembe. The ease of communication across the Maputo between Machavane and Tembe in 1647, and the familiarity of the canoe pilots with Portuguese indicates both that Tembe's access to the south had been restored and that the canoes were used to transport ivory to ships in the bay.[59] It is therefore likely that the river trade redounded mainly to Tembe and Machavane; indeed, Feyo reported in 1647 that these were the wealthiest chiefdoms south of Delagoa bay.[60]

The records of the mid seventeenth century show the contradiction between the interests of the mahosi of Delagoa bay on the one hand and the Portuguese traders on the other. The Portuguese were able to overcome difficulties in their relationships with an individual ihosi by using existing commercial arteries, the rivers, to deal with other chiefdoms. No such option was available to the mahosi; the inability to acquire goods in continuous demand such as beads or cloth except through the sale of ivory to the Portuguese amounted to partial dependence affecting the chiefdoms to varying degrees. It gave the Portuguese commercial and political influence despite the absence of any permanent European settlement, cession of territory or informal political dominion. Thus Manganheira admitted to mariner refugees in 1623 that his dispute with the Europeans had resulted in his being left with a large stock of unsaleable

58 Ibid., 357-8; d'Almada, 119-20.

59 RSEA VIII, Feyo, 355; d'Almada, 118.

60 Ibid., 356.

ivory and that it was now in his own interests to treat the Portuguese well if communications were to be reopened.[61] In the following decades the decreasing regularity of the voyages from Moçambique and the probable reduction in volume of trade put further pressure on the Delagoa chiefs' trading position relative to the Portuguese.[62]

Only toward the end of the century did the ivory trade receive renewed stimulus. This followed chiefly from the increased interest by Europeans other than Portuguese - the Dutch and English: before the 1680s there is no evidence of English shipping at Delagoa bay apart from the visit of a single convoy in 1597; and Dutch commanders at the Cape seemed more concerned to solve their immediate labour problems by acquiring slaves from Madagascar than in the development of a coastal trade.[63] In the 1680s however several English merchantmen visited Delagoa bay and began to take advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese political and commercial position.[64] By 1686 the English trade was sufficiently voluminous and competitive in price to undercut the Portuguese; by 1703 they could no longer afford the increasing subsidies required to support voyages from Moçambique and their contact with the bay temporarily ended.[65] Increased competition altered the terms of trade in favour of the Ronga chiefdoms; in the mid-1690s, demand exceeded supply to the extent that some Portuguese ships returned to Mozambique

61 RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 119.

62 Above p.109. For example, in 1647, there had been no ship and no trade, for four years; RSEA VIII, Feyo, 355.

63 Montez, Descobrimento, 29, 37; 'Journal of Simon van der Stell,' in Bird, ed., Annals I, 25-6.

64 W. Foster, ed., A new account of the East Indies, by Alexander Hamilton, 2 vols, (London 1930), I, 15; 'Account of Captain Rogers,' 1699 in W. Dampier, ed., Voyages et descriptions, II, pt 3, 108.

65 RSEA V, Letters of d'Almada to Viceroy of India, 6 August 1686 and D. Rodrigo da Costa, 24 Jan. 1687, p 295-6; Montez, Descobrimento, 42.

with no ivory cargo. The advantage was shortlived: English ships continued to call in the first decades of the eighteenth century, but irregularly, and they did not provide a market for the ivory which had accumulated as a result of their previously more energetic activity.[66]

In 1683, the English ship Johanna was wrecked near Delagoa bay, and its survivors who travelled overland to the Cape brought intelligence of the favourable commercial opportunities which the region seemed to present.[67] The Dutch administration followed up the information by sending expeditions to Delagoa and Natal; these confirmed the advantages of the region but also discovered the difficulty of using Port Natal for regular shipping.[68] The administration moved toward more systematic exploitation by establishing a permanent settlement at Delagoa which, in the absence of the Portuguese, could tap the resources of the area by remaining in sustained contact with its peoples while protecting the trade from the English.[69]

The ten year period of Dutch settlement from 1721 showed that a continuous European presence was not necessarily conducive to profitable trade. Dr Smith has shown that the Dutch East India Company spent approximately ten times more than it gained from the Delagoa settlement. The main cause of this loss was their failure to offset the costs of the

66 Drury, Madagascar, 445; Foster, ed., Account by Hamilton, 16; T. Boteler, Narrative of a voyage to Africa (London 1835), I, 22-3.

67 Foster, ed., Account by Hamilton, I, 15.

68 'Journal of S van der Stell, Declaration of W. Knyff,' in Moodie, Record, 416-9, 430; C.G. Coetzee, 'Die Kompanjie se besetting op Delagoa Baai,' Archives Yearbook for South African History, 1948, 2, 225.

69 See J.P. Purry, Memoire sur le pays des Caffres et la terre de Nuyts, (Amsterdam 1718), for a highly optimistic justification of European settlement on the East Coast.

settlement by exploiting the full potential of the ivory trade. This in turn was explained by the fact that the Dutch did not have the goods to which the Ronga were accustomed, especially Venetian or Goan beads.[70] Although ivory exports were probably more consistent than ever before, their volume was low. The highest estimate of the annual totals gives an average of about 5000 pounds of ivory a year.[71] By comparison, the English ship Northampton, which visited the bay in 1723 acquired more than twice this amount in only two months of trading. The inability of the Dutch to compete is also shown by their insistence upon a commercial monopoly - albeit ineffective - and the response of the Ronga chiefs, who hoarded the best ivory in anticipation of the arrival of more English ships; none were to come for more than two decades.[72]

It is difficult to be conclusive about the direction of commerce in the Dutch period. However, it is clear that much more attention was paid to commerce to the north; communications with the northern interior were easier from the Settlement, and intelligence from African traders who came from the north-west suggested that it was in this direction that the much desired trade in metals could be developed. When the Hlanganu of the mid-Nkomati interrupted trade in 1723, the total quantity of ivory purchased by the Dutch fell considerably, indicating their reliance on northern suppliers. Trade was further disrupted by wars among the northern chiefdoms between 1726 and 1730, but the Dutch were again unable to make good these losses by recourse to the southern trade route, though in these periods of shortfall, Tembe was the largest single supplier of ivory.[73]

70 Smith, Struggle, 73.

71 'Trade of the Dutch factory' in Bannister, Humane Policy, 144; cp Smith, Struggle, 45, where lower figures are quoted.

72 Smith, Struggle, 36.

73 NRA KA 12201, Dag Register, 20 Sept.1726, 276; KA 12205, Van de Capelle to Cape, 2 May 1730; Smith, Struggle, 39-40, 45, 56, 68-9, 100.

There is no record of any European commerce at Delagoa bay between the departure of the Dutch in 1730 and the early 1750s. This negative evidence is supported by the report that in 1747 Ronga chiefs sent word to the Portuguese settlement at Inhambane to request the resumption of the annual voyage,[74] indicating the absence of an alternative.

Hence in the first half of the eighteenth century, foreign trade reflected similar features to those of the previous 150 years. The chief of these was the great elasticity of demand at Delagoa bay caused by long periods during which no trade was effected owing to the absence of merchantmen coupled with intermittent periods of low volume commerce and very occasional large volume exports. Moreover the fact that the low average exports were supplied from all quarters of the bay suggests further that the quantity of ivory from any one source was very small, a deduction which explains the experience of travellers who reported on the ivory trade and the high demand for European products but saw few tusks being transported northward.[75]

Furthermore, it is probable that, as a consequence of low average demand, ivory continued to be supplied as a by-product of hunting carried out to protect settlement and agriculture. Hunting was a production process susceptible to modification by the aggregation of greater manpower; but there is no sign of such changes resulting from participation in the ivory trade before 1750. The long interruptions in the flow of beads

[74] AHU Moc., Cx.5 Francisco de Souza, undated letter; Smith, Struggle, 154; cp. Montez, Descobrimento, 84, where it is said that between 1731 and 1755 the English were predominant in the Delagoa trade. No evidence has come to light to support this; the Royal Africa Society (London) had accumulated information on the Delagoa trade as a result of the English activity in the late seventeenth century, and had inspired the visit of the Northampton in 1723, but no known commercial ventures followed this. White, Journal, 47, reports that an English ship visited in 1747, but it appears to have been engaged, unsuccessfully, in slave raiding; see also C.G. Coetzee, 'Die Stryd om Delagoa-baai,' Ph.D. thesis (Univ. of Stellenbosch, 1954). I am grateful to Prof. Coetzee for the loan of a personal copy of this work.

[75] See for example, RSEA I, Perestrello, 245; RSEA II, Lavanha, 333.

and cloth imply a low price and no incentive to develop changes in production which might improve continuity of supply, but suggest on the contrary, an encouragement of the steady accumulation by the amakosi of stocks produced by processes largely unaffected by demand.[76]

Nevertheless foreign trade continued to affect contradictions within and between the ruling lineages of Delagoa bay and resulted in rivalry between the Dutch and the producers, and between the Dutch and the intermediaries. These were especially clear to the north during the Dutch occupation; then considerable political strife resulted from Dutch attempts to conduct long distance trade with parties of Africans bringing copper tin and gold from far to the north west. The Delagoa mahosi reacted to their possible exclusion from the profits of trade by appropriating the copper and tin from the trading parties and then proceeding to war among themselves over the correct destination of such spoils.[77] Indeed, so anxious were the mahosi for access to European goods such as beads that they were reluctantly prepared to dispose of their major form of wealth, cattle, to the Dutch; retrieval of such cattle from the Dutch or their replacement from the herds of their neighbours were a consistent source of conflict. The exhaustion of cattle supplies in Mfumo (in whose territory the Dutch had built their factory), in 1727 was a major cause of the most extensive series of battles which the Dutch witnessed, and which eventually prompted their withdrawal.[78]

Before 1723 relations between the Dutch and Tembe were limited; however, after the defeat of the Dutch exploratory expedition to the west at the hands of the 'Hottentoten" in 1723, ihosi Tembe came to the

[76] See above, p.72f, for evidence of the organisation of hunting; cp. the structural changes of the succeeding period, p.193f.

[77] Smith, Struggle, 83-4, 86.

[78] Ibid., 67, 103.

fort to offer assistance against the attackers if the Europeans would supply firearms in order to effect such aid. The request for arms was denied but the episode showed the willingness of the Tembe ruling lineage to collaborate with the traders.[79] In 1725 Tembe forces crossed the Maputo river and invaded Machavane, defeating its forces. Tembe acquired a large number of cattle from the territory, and confiscated what the Dutch described as marketable goods, probably ivory.[80]

At this juncture Tembe was ruled by a regent, Mangobe, the uncle of Madommadom, who was still a minor.[81] Tembe's expansion to the east indicates that Mangobe had acquired considerable authority in his own right; in the next few years, when Tembe became involved heavily in the warfare to the north, the ruling lineage split around the conflicting interests of Mangobe and his nephew.

In 1728 Tembe allied with Mfumo in a series of conflicts with Magaia, the erstwhile overlord of Mfumo. The combined forces succeeded in forcing Magaia to retreat northward to the left bank of the Nkomati. By October 1728, they had penetrated further north to the village of Massanguano, located on the Nkomati. The army then turned to attack Madolo, whose chief was also forced to abandon his lands.[82] In 1729

[79] NRA KA 12199, Journaal gehouden door Jan Christoffel Steffler, 9 Aug. 1723, 530-4; Dagregister, 13 Sept.1723, 561; 22 Sept.1723, 564; KA 12201, Dagregister, 20 Sept.1726. "Hottentoten" in this context means 'click' speakers: viz. Nguni; cf. the occasional use of "Hottentot" generally for Bantu in other Dutch sources: 'Extract of the log book kept in the hooker Centaur,' deposition of the men of the Stavenisse, in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 41-2; cf. "Hollontontes" used by Owen in 1823 to describe Ngoni migrants from Zululand and the Zulu themselves: Owen, Narrative, I, 93,passim; and H.F. Fynn, 'Delagoa Bay,' in RSEA II, 485-6 passim, where 'Orontontes,' occasionally 'Olentonts,' refers to Nguni speakers.

[80] NRA KA 12201, de Koninck to Cape, 3 July 1726, 30; 'Rapport van de Zuijdelikste revier,' Sept.1726, 239.

[81] NRA KA 12201, Dagregister, 20 Sept.1726, 276; E.C. Godée Molsbergen, Reizen in Zuid Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd, (The Hague, 1922), 'Journaal van de Snuffelaar, 252.

[82] NRA KA 12203, Dagregister, 3 Feb., 5,14 Mar., 4 Apr., 25 May, 13 Oct., 1728, pp 261,263-4,266,271; Van de Capelle to Cape, 15 Apr.1729.

Mfumo and Tembe moved successfully further north again to Mambe. In April 1729 however, a combined force from Mambe, Madolo, Mateke, and Magaia marched against and defeated Mfumo who, on this occasion, was not aided by troops from Tembe; nevertheless chief Biri of Mfumo took refuge in Tembeland.[83]

According to Dutch reports, the Tembe chief prosecuting the forward policy so extensively in these years was Madommadom;[84] there is no mention of Mangobe in the conflicts to the north of the bay and the documents do not indicate specifically when Madommadom became ihosi. In 1731, however, the Dutch ship investigating conditions in the bay after the company's withdrawal reported that shortly after Madommadom's accession, Mangobe challenged the new chief's authority, and launched a series of attacks against him from Machavane. In November 1731 Mangobe controlled Tembe and Madommadom was in exile in Mfumo, whose chief attempted to help his dispossessed neighbour regain his throne.[85] These events suggest that even while Madommadom was occupied in warfare, Mangobe had successfully turned to his own benefit the resources available to the ruling lineage; these included the ivory trade which continued with the Dutch during Tembe's involvement to the north. Moreover, Mangobe's reliance on Machavane after his nephew's installation indicates that he controlled the Maputo and the routes to the south. A further indication of the value of trade with the Europeans to members of the royal lineage is the report that Madommadom was prepared to barter ivory and even slaves -

83 NRA KA 12205, Dagregister, 15 Dec.1728, 6 Feb., 29-30 Apr.1729, pp.229,234,239,240.

84 NRA KA 12203, van de Capelle to Cape, 11 Aug.1728, 32, 15 Apr. 1729, 443.

85 Molsbergen, 'Journaal van de Snuffelaar,' 252; see also CA C661, Journaal van de Zeeposte, 11 Nov.1731, and 'Journaal van de Snuffelaar,' 20-21 Nov.1731; I am indebted to Dr. Marks for these references from the Cape Archives.

an extremely valuable commodity - to the Dutch while in exile.[86]

Nonetheless the dispute between the two branches of the Tembe ruling lineage continued well into the period in which there was little external trade. Informants questioned in 1777 by A.D. Pollet, the manager of the Austrian factory then established at Delagoa bay, stated that there were a number of indecisive conflicts between the rivals until at some length the legitimate chief was entirely defeated and Mangobe emerged a much strengthened monarch from the conflict.[87] Dutch visitors to the bay reported that in the 1750s Mangobe ruled an extensive kingdom which stretched from the Indian Ocean to the uBombo hills and from the shores of the bay a distance of twelve days journey to the south.[88] The might of Mangobe and the immensity of the area he controlled is reflected in traditions collected more recently which show that his status as the 'maker' of the kingdom is equally high in the two main branches into which the Tembe ruling dynasty later split.[89] Most later capitals, as well as having particular names, bear his name in remembrance of his deeds and authority.[90]

86 CA C 661, 'Journaal van de Snuffelaar,' 24 Nov.1731.

87 AHU India Maço, 137, 'Processo da feitória austríaca; diary,' 3 Aug.1777, 26; see below p128-30, for the 'Austrian' occupation of Delagoa bay.

88 RSEA VI, J. Francken, 'Reizen in van het Schip de Naarstigheid,' 477-9.

89 Viana Rodrigues, in Ferrao, ed., Circumscripcoes, 147 for the Catembe branch; KCL, Stuart Ms.30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 10 Nov. 1897, passim; interview with Amon Makanya, Maputa, 31 Jan.1970; see also AHU India Maço, 137, 'Processo,' 26 for a similar description of Mangobe in 1777.

90 Interview with Amon Makanya, Manguzi, 10 March 1970.

Chapter V

Trade, Tembe politics and the rise of Mabudu, c1750-c1800

In the 1750s European interest in Delagoa Bay quickened rapidly, and for much of the remainder of the eighteenth century it was the focus of increasing competition for the African trade, which underwent a considerable magnification of volume compared with previous periods. Furthermore, the price and commodity structure of the trade altered. Toward the close of the century, however, there were more radical changes in the trade pattern. Records and traditions indicate more fully than earlier how southern Ronga and northern Nguni politics were affected by foreign trade. In particular, among the Ronga, they show the final disappearance of Tembe unity and the rise of the powerful kingdom of Mabudu.

I

The main initiative behind increased external activity at Delagoa Bay derived from English and Indian sources. According to the available documentation, the first English entrepreneur to exploit systematically the Delagoa trade was Captain Edward Chandler, who operated there from the mid-1750s to 1768.[1] Chandler used English and Indian capital goods and labour to form an organisation which combined the advantages of the earlier Portuguese system with some far reaching innovations of his own. Chandler built a small central depot in the main estury but did not commit funds to the construction of a permanent European establishment such as the Dutch had attempted. Instead he employed Indian agents who traded in the rivers by means of a number of shallow draft longboats

[1] The beginning of Chandler's trade in the bay cannot be established exactly; Plaisted's party, shipwrecked far to the south, were given a passage to India in one of his ships at Delagoa in April 1756; he seems to have been well established at this time and not merely conducting commercial reconnaissance; Plaisted, Journal, 285-6.

which could reach well in to the Maputo and Nkomati.[2]

Few other details of Chandler's operations in the bay have survived; but there is little doubt of the volume and success of the trade. This may be judged from the number of vessels employed: as many as twelve long-boats were used to collect ivory in the rivers,[3] and the gross exports were sufficient to justify the use of two ships on the route to Bombay and Surat every year for at least seven of the years in which Chandler maintained contact.[4] Moreover, Chandler's success was attested by the authorities in Mozambique, who reported that the English were so well entrenched and the Ronga so satisfied with the trade that undercutting the English would be impossible without highly subsidised goods, or the alternative of armed intervention.[5]

Chandler died in a shipwreck off Sofala in 1768, but such was the renown of the Delagoa trade that several other traders had opened communication with the bay.[6] Indeed, the trade was so profitable that it became part of William Bolts's scheme to found a trading network in India and Africa which could challenge the might of the British East India Company.[7] Sponsored and financed by the Imperial Austrian government,

2 AHU Moc., Cx 13, José de Melo, report, 1763.

3 IOL, Bombay Public Consultations, vol.48, R 341, 561-2.

4 AHU Moc., Cx 13, José de Melo, 1763.

5 AHU Moc., Cx 13, José de Melo, 1763; 'Instrucção que Pereira do Lago deu a quem lhe succeder neste governo,' in A. de Andrade, Relações de Moçambique Setecentista, (Lisbon, 1955), 319; AHU Moç., Cx 23, Galvão da Silva to Pereira da Sá, 28 May 1761; Cx 23, "Extracto das cartas do Governador," no.8,1769.

6 IOL BPC 48 R341 561.

7 N.H. Hallward, William Bolts, (Cambridge,1920), passim: Bolts was born in Holland, but was English; a civilian adventurer who accumulated a fortune of at least £90,000 in six years in the territories of the (British) East India Co; was deported in 1768, published a bitter attack on the Company administration, pursued a career of competition with the Company as a personal vendetta; died in great poverty in Paris in 1808; see also, W. Markov, 'L' expansion autrichienne outre-mer et les intérêts portugais,' Congresso International de História dos Descobrimentos, Actas, 5 (Lisbon,1961),281-5.

Bolts's establishment in Delagoa Bay lasted from 1777 to 1781, and was the most rigorously planned and ambitious yet attempted.[8] Most of these plans were frustrated by obstacles similar to those which had plagued the Dutch settlement.

Nevertheless, commerce was conducted at a high volume in the Austrian period. Indian traders operated from launches in the rivers, and large quantities of ivory were accumulated at the company's main factory in Madolo for despatch to India. Although the statistical data in the documents of the period is inconsistently compiled, the magnitude of the ivory trade can be suggested: taking into account the probability that not all of the shipments were recorded, the average weight exported per annum by the Austrians was about 75,000 pounds.[9] Moreover, English ships continued to call at the bay; there were usually two of these every year during the Austrian occupation. No figures are available for their cargoes, but the fact that they traded even more successfully than the Austrians suggests a total export figure well in excess of 100,000 pounds a year between 1777 and 1781.[10] The exports of ivory from Delagoa were

[8] These plans are outlined in letters of Bolts to his local factory manager, A.D. Pollet; AHU, India Maço (IM), 137, Processo da feitória austríaca, 21 May, 1 July, 16 July 1777, 11 Feb.1778, pp.12,14,18,50-1. These and other details of the organisation of the Austrian factory are covered in Smith, Struggle, Ch.V, passim. The Processo consists of a bound volume of letters and diary entries, mostly dated and signed. Unsigned and undated entries are referred to by page numbers.

[9] AHU IM, 137, Processo, 92, 109, 125.

Ship	Success	68,733 lbs	4012 tusks	Year 1777
	Conde deProli	35,408	2219	1778
	Ferdinand	c40,000	2508	1779
	Ottino	15,300	c 900	1779
	Ferdinand	45,945	2576	1780
	"	39,901	2435	1780

[10] AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet to Bolts, 3 June 1778, 1 Aug.1779; Pollet to Luiz Bareto de Souza, 9 Apr.1779. A later Portuguese estimate supports this figure: Andrade, 'Descripção,' in Arquivo das Colónias I, 1917, 77. This account gives the export figure (in 1789) as 200 bares; a median value for the bar is 250kg. 200 bares equals 110,000 lbs; cp Smith, Struggle, 123, where a more complex calculation yields 109,296 lbs.

thus considerably more than those from Inhambane or the Zambezi basin at the beginning of the 1780s.[11]

The success of the English and Austrians, and the necessity of founding a more secure system for the exploitation of trade in the south occasioned by independence from Goa in 1752, combined to persuade the Portuguese to respond to the Austrian 'occupation' with vigour; in March 1781 a Portuguese naval force removed the Austrians without difficulty. In 1782 they founded their first permanently manned station in the bay, with which they hoped to monopolise the trade.[12] However, they soon discovered how difficult this task was: English merchants, and later, English and French whalers, frequented the bay, and soon reasserted non-Portuguese domination over the bay's commerce.[13] Thus in 1791 seventeen foreign ships visited the bay; and while the ivory trade quickly regained the high volume it reached in the 1770s, the Portuguese controlled only about a quarter of the total in their best year.[14]

The upturn in the volume of trade from Delagoa bay in the second half of the eighteenth century was characterised by several features which illustrate the nature of the relationship between external trade and the southern regional economy. Two of these are closely associated: competition among Europeans and a sustained local price for ivory.

An important instrument in the competition were the longboats which

11 Smith, Struggle, 192-3.

12 Carta de Melo e Castro, 15 March 1779, in Jordão, Baie, 16-19; Godinho de Mira, 20 Sept.1781, in Jordão, Memória, 112-3.

13 AHU Moc., Cx 23, A.M. de Melo e Castro to M de Melo e Castro, 15 August 1786; AHU, Cod. 1348, A.M. de Melo e Castro to da Cunha e Menezes, 6 August 1788, 30-1.

14 Andrade, 'Descripção' in Arquivo das Colónias, 77; AHU Moç, Cx 31, J. da Costa Soares to Gov. General, 2 Sept.1795; J.T. Botelho, História militar e política dos Portugueses em Moçambique, (Lisbon, 1934), I, 547; AHU Moç, Cx 23, Melo e Castro to Melo e Castro, 15 Aug.1786; Cod. 1348, Melo e Castro to Cunha e Menezes, 6 Aug.1788.

were capable of carrying several tons of freight, yet were defensible: they dispersed the trade in such a way as to make monopoly by either African chief or European trader a practical impossibility without political controls over a wide area. Thus, for example, the Tembe chief tried to insist without success that Austrian trade with Mabudu and Mpanielle along the Maputo river be carried on only with his permission. On the other hand the Austrians could not control the activities of the English and occasional Dutch traders in the rivers.[15]

The effective free trade coupled with the increasing frequency and regularity of visits by English ships resulted in strong upward pressure on the prices paid for ivory in the rivers. From the late seventeenth century the Portuguese had observed that they were being outdone in the market by the cheaper goods offered by the English, and the price competitiveness was even greater in the second half of the eighteenth century when the Portuguese tried to reestablish their commerce. African traders were acutely conscious of price and the corresponding quality and size gradations of ivory; they were known to reserve the best tusks for the English, sometimes for several years, while disposing of the lesser tusks and rhino ivory to the Dutch and Portuguese.[16]

Between 1770 and 1780 the price paid for ivory in the bay doubled: most of the commerce of the 1760s had been based on a price of half a rupee per pound; by 1780, the Austrians could not acquire even the worst tusks for much less than one rupee per pound, and the average for all qualities was 1.1 rupees.[17] When the Portuguese finally reopened trade

15 AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780; AHU Moc., Cx 23, Melo e Castro to Melo e Castro, 17 Aug.1786; See below p.137f for the expansion of Mabudu in the second half of the eighteenth century.

16 AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780, 134; AHU Moç, Cx 19, Saldanha e Albuquerque to Melo e Castro, 13 Aug.1783; Smith, Struggle, 38-9.

17 AHU IM 137, Processo, 4, 92, 135.

in 1782 they discovered that English traders were normally paying twice what they customarily paid themselves.[18] Such competition forced the Portuguese rates up; although they probably did not reach the levels paid by the English, selling prices at Mozambique doubled in the 1780s, remaining at their peak between 1789 and 1795.[19] Under the rates supervening before 1775 India-based English traders were making profits of 400, 500 and sometimes 800 per cent; it is probable that such large margins were used to finance price competition against the Austrians and Portuguese, whose trade had also to support the costs of settlement in the bay, and, in the case of the latter, heavy state duties.[20]

Another changing feature of the trade was the alteration in its commodity structure. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries beads and ivory were the staples of the trade. Although occasional items of European clothing were noticed by travellers, imports of cloth seem to have been low. In particular, there is no mention in the records of this period of metals being imported into Delagoa bay by Europeans, nor any observation of recognisably foreigh copper or brassware.[21] On the contrary, both Portuguese and Dutch regarded southern Mozambique more as source of metal ores and artefacts with which to supply their own deficiencies than as a market. Indeed, the Dutch discovered at an early stage that locally made copper and brass products were of higher quality than the

18 AHU Moç Cod. 1345, Representação que fiçarão os homens de negoçio desta capital sobre o commercio da Bahia de Lourenço Marques, 14 Feb.1781, 133.

19 Andrade, 'Descripcão' in Arquivo das Colónias, 78, 81. A. Lobato, Historia do Presídio de Lourenço Marques, (2 vols), (Lourenço Marques, 1949, 1960), II, 280,354. Upto 1784 ivory was purchased at 60-70 cruzados per arroba; after 1784, 80-100 cr. per arroba were paid; the price reached 120 cr. in 1789.

20 AHU IM 137, Processo, 3.

21 See the shipwreck reports of Perestrello, Lavanha, and d'Almada in RSEA I, II and VIII.

few artefacts which they offered.[22] Even in the 1780s the Portuguese regarded Delagoa as a possible source for copper.[23]

The importing of brass artefacts as a substantial proportion of the traders' inventory began with the increasing visits of English merchants to Natal and Delagoa in the 1680s.[24] Easy access to inexpensive supplies of brass goods in Britain and India gave English traders a consistent advantage over their Portuguese and Dutch counterparts; this factor was closely associated with the increasing volume and dominance of English trade after 1750. Indeed, according to the Governor General of Mozambique, by 1788 brass goods had become the most important part of the inventory; but the Portuguese could only acquire them from Surat indirectly, through Banian merchants whose charges the Portuguese found too high to generate profitable trade.[25]

Although the Governor-General's remarks referred to the whole of the bay's trade, they were particularly applicable to the trade to the south; because the chiefdoms to the north of the bay had easier access to the copper and tin supplies of the north eastern Transvaal,[26] European metal goods were much less in demand than to the south. Weight for weight, brass artefacts were worth three to four times the value of the largest and most highly esteemed beads in the Maputo, but much less in the Nkomati. They were also considerably less bulky than either cloth or

22 NRA KA 12199, Swertner to Cape, 5 June 1721, 32; Montez, Descobrimento, 43, 76.

23 Santa Theresa, 'Plano' in Montez, Descobrimento, 168.

24 'Journal of S. van der Stell, accounts of H. Witkins and J. Kingston,' in Moodie, Record, 418-9; Drury, Madagascar, 445.

25 Andrade, 'Descripçao' in Arquivo das Colonias, 77. For a comparable example of the increasing volume and value of brass in trade inventories in eighteenth century Senegambia, see P.D. Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, (Wisconsin, 1975), 252,313.

26 See above p.92.

beads, and were thus more economic in terms of shipping costs.[27] The English traders maximised their profits by selling their metal goods almost exclusively in the Maputo: this is shown by an analysis of the sample inventories drawn up by Bolts's station commander in 1780 after three years experience of the trade, and put forward as the best means of meeting the competition.[28]

	Maputo	Nkomati
Brass	30.4%	2.5%
Beads	44.4%	43.4%
Cloth	23.3%	51.4%

Moreover, the economies of the brass trade were such as to overcome the thirty per cent higher ivory price in the south; more than half of the Austrian trade was conducted in this area, and in 1782, Santa Theresa reported that most English trade was carried on along the Maputo.[29]

II

Tembe politics in the mid-eighteenth century were closely associated with developments in the trade pattern. When ihosi Mangobe Tembe had consolidated his authority in the lowland area between the Umbelusi and the Maputo, he established his main capital near the present day village of Madubula next to the forest where his remains lie in the royal cemetery, in the southern part of the province known as Matutuine. Though the exact location of previous Tembe capitals is not known, it appears that Mangobe

27 AHU IM 137, Processo, p2; Rilet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780, p 134.

28 Ibid.; proportions according to value in rupees.

29 Ibid.; Santa Theresa, 'Plano,' in Montez, Descobrimento, p.164.

was the first to make his so far south.[30]

The site of Madubula offered several advantages; its immediate area was naturally protected, with lake Mandjene to the south, the Pembenduene river to the west, the Maputo in the east, and, during a substantial period of the year, hazardous marshes in many directions. Secondly, the hinterland of Madubula to the south and east of the Maputo was a more attractive area than northern Tembeland (Catembe) for elephant hunting on the one hand and cattle ranging on the other. The favourable fertility of Maputo river soils was an additional advantage. Thirdly, the capital was within twenty kilometres of the junction to the south-south west of the Great Usutu and Pongola rivers where they form the Maputo. From his capital the Tembe chief could control all means of passage to the south along the eastern face of the uBombo mountains into northern Nguni-land as long as the farther bank of the Maputo was in favourable hands; similarly control of access to the west via the Usutu gap into what is now southern Swaziland was also possible from the capital.[31]

Mangobe further ensured his control of the lowlands, including the right bank of the Maputo, by the placing of his sons. Of his chief wife, Mitshydyhlwate, Mangobe had three sons, each of whom took responsibility for a major province of Tembeland: Nkupo was given the northern province bordering the shores of Delagoa bay; Mpanyela ruled eMatutuine (near the capital), while Mabudu was appointed to the area south and east of the river to which later custom gave his name; a fourth son, Ndumu, was given the area near the confluence of the Pongola and Great Usutu rivers.[32]

[30] Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 147; Interview with Simon Mathenjwa, Manguzi (near Maputa, north-east Zululand) 4 March 1970; KCL, Stuart Ms. 30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 10 Nov. 1897, passim.

[31] Chapter II, p.31f, for exploration of the environmental features.

[32] Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 147; KCL Stuart Ms. 30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 10 Nov.1897, 135; AHU Moç., Cx.13, undated report of de Melo; Junod, Life, I, 25.

Map 7

Tembe and Mabudu in the late eighteenth century



Though there is no certainty about the date of Mangobe's death, it seems that this occurred in the period 1758-1765.[33] Nkupo, the eldest son, was the legitimate heir, and succeeded Mangobe. However, Nkupo's capital remained in an afforested part of northern Tembeland in the area immediately south of the bay rather than in the south near that of Mangobe. Tradition relates that Nkupo had none of the spirit of a ruler, but was weak and indecisive. His conduct of affairs was so out of keeping with that of his father that his brothers in the southern borders of the kingdom were inspired to declare themselves independent.[34] Thus the territorial integrity of Mangobe's kingdom lasted for little more than its founder.

In the remaining decades of the eighteenth century, the breach in Tembe unity widened; this was largely the result of the evolution of a new kingdom south of the Maputo since the appointment of Mabudu. According to tradition, Mabudu was Mangobe's favourite son;[35] when he crossed the river from his father's capital to take up his appointment, he is said to have made a present to Mangobe of a woven grass basket (igoma) full

[33] RSEA VI, Francken, 'Naarstigheid,' 477-9. Mangobe was still alive when the 'Naarstigheid' visited the bay in 1758. Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 147, puts the date of Nkupo's death at 1765. Mhali, his successor, seems to have been in power in 1773 when William Bolts visited the bay, for no mention is made in the very detailed documents left by Bolts of a change of rule occurring between that date and the establishment of their factory in 1777. An estimate of approximately ten years to cover the events in the dynastic struggles outlined below, p.143, suggests Mangobe died in the early 1760s.

[34] Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo,' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 147; Junod, Life, I, 25.

[35] Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo,' in Ferrao, ed., Circumscripções, 150; 'Mabudu' is the orthography used by Stuart after questioning Ronga speaking informants; KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897. See also Junod, Life, I, 16,329,462,466, II, 439, who assesses the pronunciation as 'Maputjo,' while the river is called Maputo. Although there is no evidence that the river was so called before its crossing by Mabudu, the distinction is maintained here for clarity. Bryant, Olden Times, 291, 304, uses 'Mabudu' for the chief and chiefdom.

of earth and food in token of the award of so valuable a new territory.[36] Mabudu proceeded to build upon his father's gift: he is remembered as 'the most intelligent, proud, arrogant, warlike, and intrepid (of Mangobe's sons); he knew how to impose his authority and to dominate not only the people of the lands which his father had given him but also the peoples who lived outside these frontiers.'[37] In Mabudu, he is known as the ihosi who 'lit the fire,' the man who 'founded the kingdom.'[38] The beginning of Mabudu's ascendancy probably dates from the late 1740s or early 1750s; Mangobe's high status in the 1720s suggests that his sons were of age by c1750; and indeed, this is implied by Mangobe's claim to control the lowlands east of the Maputo in 1758.[39]

In the mid-eighteenth century a number of centres of power were located between the Maputo and Mkuze rivers. In the northern section were peoples calling themselves 'emaLangeni,' some of whom, described by Bryant anachronistically as 'Matshabanas' after one of their later chiefs, accepted Mabudu's expansion with little demur.[40] However, other sections of the emaLangeni offered resistance: it is probable, for example, that in the course of Tembe-Mabudu expansion and consolidation across the Maputo, the lineage which later became the ruling Ngwane-Dlamini lineage of Swaziland was dislodged. Nineteenth century Swazi royal traditions suggest that the ancestors of their kings lived near the lower slopes of uBombo hills in close proximity to the Tembe,[41] and even that

[36] KCL, Stuart Ms 30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897, 14.

[37] Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrao, ed., Circumscripçõe̊s, 150.

[38] Leslie, Among the Zulus, 217.

[39] RSEA VI, Francken, 'Naarstigheid,' 477-9.

[40] KCL, Stuart Ms 30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripçõe̊s, 150.

[41] H. Kuper, 'The development of a primitive nation,' Bantu Studies, 15, (1941), 340; Bryant, Olden Times, 316, et passim; KCL SP Ms. 20461, 51;

the Swazi were an 'offshoot of the Tonga people.' Moreover, the same group of traditions indicates that the incipient Ngwane-Dlamini moved from east of the uBombo to the west via the Pongola in several stages in the second half of the eighteenth century. At one stage the lineage controlled part of the southern uBombo and were engaged in conflict with a power in the lowlands to the east.[42] The emaLangeni who remained in Mabudu withdrew southward nearer to the Mkuze. Mtonga, who is said to have been their leader, appears to have lived and died in the middle third of the eighteenth century.[43]

A Khumalo lineage is said to have dominated much of the area south of the Maputo and east of the Pongola; the expansion of Mabudu resulted in conflict in which many Khumalo were killed, and others fled south. Some groups of Khumalo and Gumede remained, however, perpetuating their claim to be the 'owners' of the land long before the arrival of the Tembe.[44] Near the coast, in the Kosi bay region, the Ngubane have a similar claim. Tembe tradition from the area relates that they had no difficulty in overcoming the Ngubane owing to the latter's unsophisticated level of iron technology; there is no reference to military conflict. The Ngubane traditions recount that they recognised the superiority of the Tembe by presenting them with the correct tribute - paid by inferiors as a token of their subjection - after a hunt. Further south, however,

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Ms. 29392, 'Preliminary notes on the effects of European influence on the natives of Swaziland,' 3 Jan.1899. Despite its title, this four page Ms. deals wholly with Ngwane-Dlamini history up to c1810; it is unfinished, and the records of some of the interviews on which it is based have not come to light.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.; KCL, Stuart Ms. 30091, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897, 14; Bryant, Olden Times, 159, 335-7.

44 Krige, Report, 84-5.

near Lake Sibayi, where the Ntuli were predominant (though their claim to be the legitimate 'owners' of the land is disputed by both the Mlambo and Malambule) conflict did occur. The Tembe are said to have allied with other contenders for political supremacy in the area, the Mdletshe, and to have attacked the Ntuli in the dead of night. Subsequently they overran the country, killing Ntuli leaders and seizing their women.[45]

Traditions collected in the populous coastal province near Kosi bay show how Mabudu's part of the Tembe ruling lineage expanded. Madinghi, a lesser grandson of Mabudu, is said to have been told by his father that since he could not succeed to the kingship, he must go to establish himself and rule in his own area; he was given a wife, arms and cattle. He obeyed these instructions, succeeded in cementing Tembe rule at Kosi bay, and subsequently expanded it toward Mbazwane. The combination of Mabudu's reputation, wealth, and military capacity enabled such expansion and dominance. Moreover, the ruling lineage maintained its integrity. When Makhasane ascended to the kingship on Mabudu's death in the last years of the eighteenth century, potential conflicts within the lineage were resolved by his demonstration of leadership and authority. He is said to have attacked all of his brothers, including Madinghi, on his accession, but to have lived in peace with them thereafter, commanding their loyalty by his great power.[46] However, the expansion of the Tembe aristocracy did not always result in the complete demise of local power; thus the Ngubane at Kosi bay and the Khumalo in the Pongola river area continued to officiate until recently at public ritual and sacrifice.[47] It is probable that this was a means of resolving the

[45] Ibid., 11-15; Interview with Walter Tembe, Kosi Bay, 4 March 1970.

[46] Krige, Report, 10-11; Interview with Simon Mathenjwa, Manguzi, 4 March 1970; Interview with Walter Tembe, Kosi Bay, 4 March 1970; Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo,' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 150.

[47] Krige, Report, 12, 15, 133-6.

conflict of interests between the ruling lineage and its new subordinates.

A major source of the wealth Mabudu used to promote the interests of his lineage were trade links to the north and south. One consequence of the increasing trade to the south of the bay from the mid-eighteenth century was the growing attachment of the northern Nguni economy as well as that of the Ronga to the Delagoa trade. In 1756, after Chandler's first contact with the bay, a party of Ronga were reported for the first time as having travelled south to trade at the Mfolosi.[48] The rise in ivory prices in the 1770s increased considerably the profitability of such trade by increasing the margins over transport costs. By the late 1770s ivory from the northern Nguni area had become a substantial component of the high total exports of the Maputo river.[49] Indeed for this reason, the Austrians attempted to arrange political alliances with the chiefdoms of Mabudu and Mpanielle high up the Maputo, not merely to exploit local trade but so that they could control the river, and thus, as Bolts put it, 'secure communications with the Nguni.' To judge from a comparison of the sample inventories, two thirds of Austrian trade south of the bay was conducted via the Maputo, and only one third with Tembe proper.[50]

Increased external trade and its altered commodity structure involved changes in the relative value of foreign as against internal products. While beads and cloth continued to be in demand as items of apparel, the market for these goods was variable; and colours which had been imported over several years tended to lose their value as penetration increased

[48] Plaisted, Journal, 285.

[49] Santa Theresa, 'Plano,' in Montez, Descobrimento, 162, 164.

[50] AHU IM 137, Processo, Bolts to Pollet, II Feb. 1778, 51, 10 Aug. 1778, 76; Pollet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780, 134.

and demand dropped.[51] The changes in value suggest that they were not regarded as a repository of wealth to the same extent as copper and brass ingots, wire or artefacts. Moreover, beads and ivory belonged to a separate sphere of exchange from metals and cattle: beads were sufficient to buy ivory, which was not highly valued within the region, as well as food, poultry and small animals, but the records do not mention the use of beads for the purchase of cattle; these were almost invariably bought for pieces of copper or brass.[52]

The southern Ronga may well have profited from the early trade in metals with the Lembe on the one hand and the northern Nguni on the other; but the import of large quantities of European metal goods gave Mabudu in particular the prospect of much increased revenue because it could purchase cattle from the Nguni on a large scale. The trade is well remembered in the traditions which state that the Mabudu used to carry European metals and cloth to the northern Nguni to exchange there for cattle, sheep, shields and mats.[53] Indeed, the southern Tembe chiefdoms occasionally sent cattle acquired in this way to the Austrian factory as a gift.[54] Moreover, the fact that ivory in the Maputo river cost a third more than that in the Nkomati, and that approximately a third of the standard Maputo inventory (in price terms) consisted of metal goods[55] suggests that the ivory exports were financed mainly by beads and

51 E.C. Godée Molsbergen, Reizen in Zuid Afrika in de Hollandse Tijd, (The Hague, 1922), Journal of the Snuffelaar, 252; NRA KA 12200, Van de Capelle to Cape, 9 July 1725, 249; AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet to Bolts, 14 Aug.1778, 83; see also A. Smith, The diaries of Dr Andrew Smith, (Cape Town, 1939), I, 225,250, for the devaluations of beads among the Tlhaping.

52 See above, Ch.III p.86f; see also Smith, Diary, I, 382 for the refusal of the Ndebele King Mzilikazi to sell cattle rather than ivory for beads.

53 KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 June 1897.

54 AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet to Bolts, 13 June 1778, 98.

55 See above, p.134 for the inventory proportions.

cloth, while effectively Mabudu used most of the metals to purchase cattle, which they retained. This reconstruction is supported by evidence from the inventory used by the Austrians to make up their cargoes: much smaller proportional supplies of metal wares were maintained to the Tembe proper, who, living north of the Maputo nearer to Delagoa bay, did not have the advantage of such easy access to the Nguni.[56]

A further cause of the sustained division in the Tembe dynasty after Mangobe's death was the continued weakness of the northern Tembe. In addition to the secession of his brothers, Nkupo's much reduced kingdom faced another threat. Madommadom, the 'legitimate' chief defeated by Mangobe, had left a son, Sikuke, who claimed his rightful inheritance shortly after Nkupo's accession. Tradition recounts that Nkupo succeeded in capturing the pretender, who was bound hand and foot and thrown in the river; however, Sikuke had the good fortune to escape this predicament.[57]

Nkupo's short reign was followed by that of Mhali, who seems to have been a statesman of much greater energy. His leadership was soon challenged by Sikuke, whose second attempt to install himself also failed. On this occasion, however, Sikuke was not captured, but became a fugitive, eventually taking up residence in Madolo. The arrangement with the chief of Madolo became a cause of dispute between Madolo and Tembe, and in July 1777, Sikuke was expelled from Madolo. Toward the end of July, Mhali called a meeting of his councillors to discuss the situation brought about by his rival's expulsion. Sikuke went to the Tembe capital and appeared at the meeting, determined on a conciliatory course; he asked, however, for the restitution of the province which he had governed

[56] AHU IM, Processo, 137, Pollet to Mainwaring, 28 July 1780, 134. About a sixth of Austrian trade with Tembe was in metalwares.

[57] AHU IM 137, Processo, 137, Pollet, Diary, 3 Aug.1777, 26. The name used in this document is Chicuco; he is identified as the son of the man formerly king of Capelle in the time of the grandfather of Mhali (the great Mangove).

as a young man. Mhali and his council decided to use the opportunity to remove the threat to their rule; in early August 1777, Sikuke and fourteen of his family were executed.[58]

Though Mhali thus regained authority and prestige in northern Tembeland, he did not succeed in achieving control over his uncles to the south. During the famine of spring 1777 Mpanielle was host to Mabudu, Ndumu and Mahulule but not Mhali when they gathered to slaughter cattle as a sacrifice to their ancestor Mangobe.[59] Mpanielle ruled over the province which included Mangobe's gravesite, and was probably the recipient of the respect due to a son favoured with this historic and strategically advantageous area.[60] Moreover, Mhali was unable to control the relationships between his uncles and the Austrians, despite the fact that the Austrian factory was in his territory and his claim to Bolts when signing the treaty of agreement that Mabudu and Mpanielle belonged to his kingdom.[61] Mhali did not control commerce along the Maputo, and separate treaties had to be made with Mabudu and Mpanielle to facilitate trade.[62]

Mpanielle was, however, much less well placed than Mabudu to take advantage of trade to the south; his territory was limited by the same geographical confines as Mhali's - the Maputo river and the uBombo hills, barriers it was difficult for either to penetrate. Indeed, there was a contradiction in the relations between Mpanielle, the Austrians and Mabudu: Mpanielle could not take advantage of trade to the northern Nguni

58 Ibid.; Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 147.

59 AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet, Diary, 11 Oct.1777, 28v.

60 See above, p.135.

61 AHU IM 137, Processo, Cópia do tratado feito por G. Bolts com oRaja Mohaar Capell, 3 May 1777, 7.

62 Ibid., Bolts to Pollet, 11 Feb.1778, 49v; Pollet to Bolts, 10 Aug. 1778, 76v.

without Mabudu's aid, and it is likely therefore that Mabudu could control the extent to which his brother traded with the Austrians. Commerce between the Austrians and Mpanielle was not as smooth or regular as that with Mabudu; in September 1778, Mpanielle attempted to divert some of the Maputo trade away from Mabudu by threatening the Austrians with force.[63] Early in 1779, his dispute with the Austrians widened; in April his men attacked and robbed an Austrian boat on the Maputo. Jose Pedro, the trader, captured three prisoners as a reprisal, but, unable to effect further action, retreated to the Austrian base at Catembe. There Mhali settled the differences between the two by pleading for the release of the prisoners and promising that such an attack on the trading boat would not occur again.[64] Thus, although there is no evidence of increased authority of Mhali over his nearest uncle, it is probable that Mpanielle's independence of action was also limited by territorial contiguity and the more cordial relations between European traders and Mhali.

III

The pattern of trade progressively established from 1750 underwent major changes as the century drew to a close. The first of these was a marked downturn in the ivory trade. A Portuguese report suggests that in 1789 ivory exports almost reached the level of the Austrian period a decade earlier.[65] Nevertheless, there are signs that the ivory trade was already beginning to diminish. The East India Company refused official or financial support to merchants who challenged the political authority and trading monopoly the Portuguese were trying to erect at

63 Ibid., Diary, 28 Sept.1778, 87.

64 Ibid., Pollet to Bolts, 9 April 1779, 121.

65 Andrade, 'Descripçao,' Arquivo das Colónias, I, 1917, 79.

Delagoa Bay after 1782.[66] A lower proportion of the exports was carried in English ships, and the Portuguese succeeded in diverting some of the trade to Mozambique.[67] Indeed, Indian merchants seem to have begun turning toward the Mozambique ivory market, where the advent of more enlightened excise policies than hitherto justified the prices the Banians were prepared to pay, and resulted in a marked upturn in exports (and prices) at the capital between 1787 and 1793.[68]

Moreover, warfare in Europe increased the risks to and costs of shipping owing to the presence of French corsairs operating from Mauritius after 1793; but at the same time, the Mozambique authorities, facing mounting indebtedness, imposed higher duties, resulting in a steep decline in ivory exports.[69] Then in 1796 French ships entered Delagoa bay, expelled other merchant vessels - mostly whalers - and the Portuguese garrison; the latter was not reestablished until 1799.[70] The reports of an English visitor in 1798 and of a Banian merchant at Mozambique in 1801 confirm that this disruption resulted in the diminution of the Portuguese ivory trade to very low levels.[71] There is no evidence of a

66 IOL, Bombay Reports on External Commerce, 1802/3.

67 Botelho, História, I, 547; AHU Moç., Cx. 31, J. da Costa Soares, 2 Sept.1795. As Lobato concludes after his close study of the shipping lists, ladings and Mozambique customs house entries, statistical precision concerning exports from Lourenço Marques in this period is impossible; Presídio, II, 414-5.

68 E.A. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves in East and Central Africa, (London, 1975), 174-6.

69 Lobato, Presídio, II, 384-5, 389; Alpers, Ivory, 174.

70 Lobato, Presídio, II, 424.

71 White, Journal, 37; AHU Moc. Cod. 1370, Requerimento de Lacamichande Motichande, 25 Nov.1801.

resurgence of the Portuguese trade in the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century; despite the maintenance of the garrison, the authorities did not have sufficient resources to support commercial involvement.[72] Furthermore, merchants in India and their counterparts in Mozambique turned increasingly to the exploitation of Swahili coast ivory supplies to obviate the high tariffs at Mozambique, rather than attempt to revive the Delagoa trade;[73] and although an English ship on an apparently rare visit took a cargo of ivory to India in 1801, no other English vessel called at Delagoa bay until 1815.[74]

Although the ivory trade had reached a very low level, European activity in the bay was by no means extinguished. This was primarily the result of the continuous visits of English and north American whalers after 1787. These came to the bay usually in June following their prey which came to Delagoa in the winter to cub in its protected waters.[75] This industry was not connected with Indian markets or finance, but its operations were nevertheless partially affected by warfare at sea. Precise figures are not available, but an estimate for the early 1790s suggests that there were fifteen whalers in the bay every year;[76] in 1798 there were only six.[77] However, whalers continued to call at this

72 AHU Moc. Cx. 52, Mappa do Destacamento, J.A. Caldas, 1810; Cx 52, fragment reporting the proposal of Vicente Tomas dos Santos and Carlos Baptista to erect a factory at Lourenço Marques, 1810; Cx 56, Pereira Ramos, Feitor da Real Fazenda, 1813. Cx 59, idem., LM 244-5, 8 Mar. and 17 Apr.1815.

73 Alpers, Ivory, 175; IOL, Bombay, Report on External Commerce, 1802-3.

74 AHU Moç., Cod. 1380, d'Azevedo to de Abreu e Menezes, 30 Sept.1815, 151; M.V. Jackson, European Powers in South East Africa, (London, 1942), 126. For the debilitating effect of French and Malagasy raids on Mozambiques Coastal Commerce, see RSEA IX, Tomkinson (Cllr. H.M. Sloop 'Caledon') to Bertie, 7 June 1809; Lynne (Cllr. H.M. Sloop 'Eclipse') to Stopford, 21 May 1812.

75 White, Journal, 21-2.

76 Lobato, Presídio, II, 416, 418.

77 White, Journal, 14.

reduced level during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.[78]

The nature of the whalers involvement with the local economy differed considerably from that of the ivory traders. Owing to the fact that their major concern was the acquisition of a full cargo of whale oil, their objectives in the bay were to facilitate the operations of flensing and boiling on shore, and to procure sufficient food for sea journeys, including the long homeward passage. They showed little interest in tapping the full potential of ivory supplies,[79] although some of the ships' crews seem to have traded for ivory on their own account with members of the Portuguese garrison. The whalers frequently supplied the garrison with lighting oil and other goods, including the special presents which the Portuguese gave to the chiefs every year, and the most likely form of payment for these was ivory.[80] This apart, the whalers were entirely taken up with their own productive tasks, and had little opportunity to explore or trade in the rivers; indeed, an English captain with several years experience of Delagoa whaling reported only what the Portuguese had told the whalers about the trading potential of the rivers.[81]

[78] AHU Moç., Códice 1370, Declaraçao de Luis José, (Commander of Lourenço Marques, 1799-1803), Mozambique, 28 Sept.1803; Cx 57 Mappa dos navios ... por todo o anno 1813, T.J.P. Ramos, 9 July 1814; Códice 1380, Abreu e Menezes to Azevedo, 30 Sept.1815,151; Albuquerque to Arcos, 2 Sept.1817, 189. Largely on the strength of foreign success in whaling, and the fact that the garrison was dependent for its oil on the foreign whalers, a contract was given to a Portuguese company to establish a factory in 1817; this plan came to an abrupt end when its protagonists were killed in Tembe attempting to rush the project through after insufficient negotiations with the chief; ibid., Albuquerque to Arcos, 17 Sept.1818, 206-7.

[79] AHU Moç., Códice 1370, Declaração de Luis José, Moçambique, 28 Sept. 1803.

[80] AHU Moç., Cx 26, Nunes to Governor-General, 5 Aug.1790; A. Lobato, Lourenço Marques, Xilunguiné: biografia da cidade, (Lisbon, 1970), 79.

[81] White, Journal, 22-3.

The major economic nexus between Africans and the whalers was the sale and purchase of food. The whalers required vegetables, staples and meat to be consumed during operations in the bay; beef was particularly desired to offset the deficiencies of the sea diet, but was also needed in large quantities for salting. One of the most consistent difficulties of previous European settlement in the bay had been the inability to grow sufficient food, and reliance on neighbouring chiefs for supplies posed political problems.[82] Such difficulties were overcome by the Austrians partly by the purchase of food in the rivers, and the Portuguese eventually had commodities such as rice ferried from the Maputo, apparently in Mabudu canoes.[83] Previous attempts to exploit the cattle resources of Delagoa Bay had met with little success; in 1756 Chandler bought a herd of a hundred cattle only to see them recaptured by their vendors before they could be slaughtered, and there is no record of the experiment being repeated.[84] In 1787 the Governor General of Moçambique sent a consignment of salt to Lourenço Marques in an attempt to initiate a salt beef industry, but the prospect seems to have foundered two years later for lack of equipment and personnel.[85]

However, the whalers were much more successful in purchasing staple foodstuffs and large numbers of cattle. Whereas most previous purchases of foodstuffs were tangential to the major trade of the bay, the whalers were prepared to spend most of their resources of cloth, beads and brass on such goods. Moreover, with the decline of the ivory trade, the export

82 AHU IM 137, Processo, Pollet, Diário, 1 Aug.1778; AHU Moc., Cx 28, Monteiro de Matos to Governor General, 12 May 1793; Cx 31, Costa Soares to Governor General, 2 Sept.1795.

83 AHU Moç., Cx 30, Balanço-Geral, Feb.-May 1795, Costa Soares, 14 June 1795.

84 Plaisted, Journal, 285-6.

85 AHU Moç., Cx 26, Pereira to Governor General, 28 April 1789; Lobato, Presídio, II, 415.

of foodstuffs offered the only means by which African chiefdoms could acquire the goods they had formerly acquired by selling ivory. The new trade thus came to be of great value to the chiefdoms: in 1793 the Portuguese noted that chiefs Tembe and Madolo were competing with each other to deal with the whalers.[86] Owing to the fact that the whalers were paying higher prices than previous buyers, the rates inflated generally, much to the consternation of the Portuguese garrison.[87] The novel circumstances of the 1790s resulted in greater flexibility in the spheres of exchange: in the absence of a market for ivory, cattle could now be bought for 10 to 12 yard lengths of coarse blue dungaree which was usually part of the whalers' inventory.[88]

Most of the whalers anchored in the main estuary off Tembe, whose foreshore they used for whale processing.[89] Cattle were bought from Tembe through a well-established procedure; purchases were controlled by the king and a powerful attendant. The latter had personal charge of a large herd of cattle and was considered by the whalers to be a very wealthy man; but he could not dispose of any cattle until the king had been informed of the arrival of a ship and had travelled to his residence on the shore. Here the ship's captain opened relations by giving presents of liquor and clothing. Thereafter trade proceeded with the 'attendant', usually at the rate of one or two head of cattle per day.[90]

86 AHU Moç., Cx 28, de Matos to Governor General, 16 May 1793. Aspects of trade-related dependence and changes in productive structure are explored below, p .193.

87 AHU, Moç., Cx.28, de Matos to Governor General, 12 May 1793; Cx 31, Costa Soares to Governor General, 2 Sept.1795; Owen, Narrative I, 108: to judge from Ronga preferences and their comments concerning Portuguese trading practices, the Portuguese were as outpriced in the victualling trade as they had been in the ivory trade.

88 White, Journal, 48.

89 AHU Moç., Códice 1347, Mello e Castro to Testevim, 7 Nov.1791, 167; Cx 27, Devassa, de Matos to Pacheco, 1 May 1792.

90 White, Journal, 50.

Increased export of foodstuffs affected local supplies. In the summer of 1791-2 Delagoa bay experienced its first extended drought since whalers had begun their operations in the bay.[91] It seems that Tembe's trade with the whalers left it with insufficient reserves of cattle, and many of its people resorted for their meat to the whale carcases left on shore, not realising in their desperation that such food was unfit for consumption.[92] According to a report reaching the Portuguese, the Tembe king witheld much of the royal store of grain, nuts and beans, preferring instead to hoard them, probably in anticipation of greater gains from the whalers.[93]

Despite the drought of the previous year, in 1793 Tembe had sufficient foodstocks to trade freely with the whalers.[94] Partly this was because the problem of food trade and the maintenance of local supplies was beginning to be met by increased production of crops required by the whalers. This was noted in the early 1820s, when members of Owen's survey squadron reported that Tembe specialised in the production of rice and easily preservable vegetables.[95]

However, Tembe did not have a high proportion of territory suitable for cattle raising, and they were scarce and more expensive than in areas to the southwest even before the inception of cattle exports.[96] Yet if

91 AHU Moç., Cx 27, Devassa, Costa Soares to Pacheco, 5 June 1792, 289; this was one of the droughts having widespread effects: see p.35 above.

92 AHU Moç., Cx.27, Devassa, de Matos to Pacheco, 1 May 1792, 293-5.

93 Accounts and Papers, LXXXIII, Testevim to Governor General, 6 June, 1792, 307; Lobato, Presídio, II, 120.

94 AHU Moç., Cx 28, de Matos to Governor General, 16 May 1793.

95 Owen, Narrative, I, 108; of particular importance were the components of the diet used against scurvy. According to Boteler, onions were the most carefully cultivated vegetable because of the ready and good market with the whalers; Narrative, I, 40.

96 See above, p.52f.

the observations of 1798 are more widely applicable, Tembe may have been supplying 100 cattle per ship per year, and possibly twice this number.[97] Since the whalers did most of their business with Tembe, and the ivory trade in the rivers was at a low level, Tembe became the only entrepot for Mabudu and Nguni trade and could therefore purchase from the Nguni through Mabudu. This inference is supported by evidence from the 1820s to the effect that Tembe's usual recourse for making good the shortfall in cattle was to the area southwest of Mabudu.[98] Tembe also acquired cattle from the west: in December 1823 porters carrying ivory brought large numbers of cattle from that direction;[99] and in the following decade, a Portuguese source confirmed that the Delagoa area was dependent upon the Nguni for the cattle sold to Europeans.[100] Indeed, King Tembe's own statement to the English merchant officer, White, in 1798 also suggests that Tembe had extensive trading arrangements to the south west and west.[101]

97 The ships operated in the bay for only three months; White, Journal; 50.

98 PRO, Adm. 1/2269, Petition of Anselmo Jose do Nascimento, encl. in Owen to Croker, 27 Aug.1823; see also above, p.109, for Tembe's reliance on cattle from the Nguni a century earlier.

99 PRO Adm. 1/2269, Owen to Croker, Mauritius, 19 June 1824.

100 KCL Fynn papers, 4. Antonio Jose Nobre, Lourenço Marques, 10 Oct.1834.

101 White, Journal, 41. Muhadane apparently said that he controlled a large tract of country extending ten days up country and five along the coast (which White computed at 200 miles by 100), and his tributary chiefs included (inter alia) Mabudu and Mpanielle (in the south) and Ngomane (in the west). A literal interpretation of this testimony is not supported by other evidence; Mabudu and Mpanielle were independent at this time, and there is no evidence to show that Tembe ever controlled most of Swaziland. The ships' officers at Delagoa knew that Tembe's claims were exaggerated too, for although they were reluctant to trade in the rivers for food, one of their invariably successful bargaining points with Tembe was the threat to go to trade with other chiefs in the rivers; ibid., 41. See also below, p.227f.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century therefore the change in trade patterns began to favour Tembe rather than Mabudu. There is however no evidence that this led to a reassertion of the older dynasty's political authority over the younger. Ihosi Mabudu was still alive in the early 1790s; tradition recounts that his son, Mwayi, was as forceful and authoritative as his father, and is remembered particularly for his defeat of Sabi, the ambitious son of Mpanielle, whose territory was brought within the ambit of Mabudu. Mwayi died in this operation before attaining the kingship, and his son, Makhasane, succeeded Mabudu, probably in the late 1790s.[102]

Makhasane was the heir to a tradition of military prowess, and the power and prestige of his kingdom was well known in areas to the south long before Tshaka's wars; indeed, it was to the chiefdom of Mabudu that Dingiswayo turned for military assistance as well as commercial attachments when he began to establish himself in Mthethwa.[103] This aid was of decisive importance in the growth of Mthethwa, and thus of far-reaching consequence in northern Nguni politics. One source of Mabudu's political and military strength in relation to Tembe or Mthethwa was the development of centralised manpower organisation which gave cohere nce to its dispersed concentrations of population. A list of Mabudu amabutho gives none of the names normally related by Zulu informants, thus showing the independence of Mabudu's military system; the earliest named amabutho were those associated with Mwayi's military activities, indicating

102 Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrão, ed., Circumscripções, 150; KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 9 Nov.1897. Makhasane lived until the early 1850s, and died an old, blind man; Owen visited him in 1822 and described him then as about sixty years of age; ibid.; Bryant, Olden Times, 304-5; Viana Rodrigues, op.cit., 151. The exact date of Mabudu's death cannot be specified by an examination of the amabutho (next paragraph); there is no means of establishing the interval between them, even if the sequence was entirely correct; cp. Bryant's note to this effect, Olden Times, 644.

103 Stuart and Malcolm, eds. Diary of H.F. Fynn, 7.

their use by the 1790s at the latest.[104] Their early evolution may be assessed in the context of northern Nguni political change and eighteenth century social structural change, to which the next chapter turns.

[104] KCL Stuart Ms. 30091, 138; cp. Bryant, Olden Times, 645-6; cp. Junod, Life, I, 449-50f, for an ambivalent attitude toward Ronga military organisation. Junod regarded all Thonga as incapable of warlike activity; however, he reports that the Ngoni thought they 'had a certain aptness for war,' and used them in the vanguard of the attack. Indeed, Mabudu forces were so used at Ndondakusuka in 1856. Makasane's reign was relatively peaceful; but his successor, Msongi (also known as Noziyingili) (c1852-1877), revived Mabudu's reputation. While the Zulu were embroiled in their civil war, he reconquered Matutuine, defeated the Tembe proper, and established control of much of the uBombo hills. His successor Ngwanase was involved in bitter resistance against Portuguese encroachment, 1894-6; Viana Rodrigues, 'Maputo' in Ferrao, ed., Circumscripçoes, 151-2; NPA GH 702, Message of Ngwanase and Zambile, Pietermaritzburg, July 1879.

Chapter VI

Political and social change in northern Nguniland from the mid-eighteenth century

The evidence for the northern Nguni in the eighteenth century is of a different character from that for the southern Ronga. The absence of travellers reports,[1] or of a body of evidence comparable to that of the Austrian factory or Portuguese traders places greater emphasis on traditions, which have been collected with great assiduity. However, in these the political disruption and migration of the Mfecane have resulted in great unevenness of quality: the lacunae for the northern subregion contrast with the considerable detail for the south. Nevertheless a pattern of political change emerges in which certain lineages expanded their power and territory at the expense of others which, in the main, became subordinate; and in the north, sufficient data survives to detail important aspects of the conflict developing in the early nineteenth century.

I

In the northern subregion of Zululand, between the Mfolosi and Pongolo rivers, the traditions are very scanty until well into the nineteenth century owing to the migration of many lineages, including the ruling ones, in every direction - to the Cape, the highveld, Mozambique and Swaziland. Hence, although there is no reason to suppose that the chiefdoms known to have existed in northern Zululand in the sixteenth century[2] disappeared in the seventeenth, there is no way of relating the

[1] The only exception is Plaisted, Journal; this party landed at St.Lucia, stayed a fortnight, and travelled extensively inland before continuing their journey to Delagoa bay by sea. Detail of their experiences inland are missing from the published account, and searches in the India Office Library have failed to reveal fuller reports.

[2] Chapter IV, p.105.

earlier political structure to that dominated by the Ndwandwe in the late eighteenth century. However, an examination of the fragments which have survived shows some of the centres of power and the relationships between them.

Bryant grouped the Ndwandwe in the emaLangeni sub-group of the Mbo-Nguni along with the Ngwane-Dlamini, in whose company the Ndwandwe are said to have travelled from southern Mozambique in the last third of the eighteenth century.[3] One justification for Bryant's reconstruction was an apparent link between the Ngwane and Ndwandwe royal families through Ludonga on both king lists, a tie-in supported by Stuart's only Ndwandwe informant, who named Ludonga and Mavuso as predecessors of Zwide.[4]

Consideration of the potential distortions in the royal genealogies shows, however, that genealogical links between the two families cannot be proven and are probably unlikely. The reconstruction of an acceptable genealogy for the Ndwandwe royal family is complicated by the imprecise relationship of the Nxumalo to it. Bryant reported that the whole Ndwandwe 'clan' (including the Nxumalo) claim to be descendants of Mkatshwa, a name by which they were known - rather than Ndwandwe - for part of the nineteenth century.[5] But Mkatshwa does not appear on the Ndwandwe or Ngwane-Dlamini king lists, though he is remembered as an Nxumalo leader before the nineteenth century.[6] Hence the problem of

3 Bryant, Olden Times, 159, 317.

4 KCL SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov.1904; Bryant, Olden Times, 134; cp. idem, A history of the Zulu and neighbouring tribes, 12-13: there Ndwandwe history appears differently; e.g. they are classed as Ntungwa. However, from his account of Nxumalo-Gasa relationships, it seems the later version ('Olden Times') was more considered.

5 Bryant, Olden Times, 161; KCL, Miller Papers, Ms 1478, 'A short history of Swaziland,' 7.

6 KCL SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov.1904; W. Elmslie, Introductory grammar of the Ngoni (Zulu) language, (Aberdeen, 1891), viii.

explaining why Mkatshwa, or indeed Ndwandwe, are not remembered despite their evident ancestral importance, while Ludonga and Mavuso who did not give their names to the royal family are recalled.

With such contradictory evidence, Bryant introduced what he called 'consistent harmony' into the discrepancies by suggesting that Langa I on the Ngwane-Dlamini king list was Mkatshwa.[7] However it is at least as likely that the contradictions in the evidence result from a conscious interpolation in Ndwandwe traditions in the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, when the Ndwandwe royal lineage, with part of its army and followers, took up residence within the emergent Swazi kingdom of the Ngwane-Dlamini.[8] It is probable that the neglect of Ndwandwe names and the insertion of Dlamini ones in the king list results from the situation in which the Dlamini were involved in a precarious struggle for the establishment of their domination over several Sotho groups. Ndwandwe assistance was crucial to Dlamini success and the genealogical link a means of ensuring the ideological and political unity of the two lineages.[9]

There is further doubt that the Dlamini and Ndwandwe lineages were linked in the way supposed by Bryant, or that the Ndwandwe migrated from the east with the Dlamini. While Ndwandwe leaders are supposed to have travelled separately from the Dlamini, there is no record of any particular leader being associated with the initial or any succeeding stage or place on the journey, whereas there is evidence of this kind for the Dlamini.[10] Secondly, the informant who gave Stuart Dlamini names on the king list confirmed the general relationship by saying that the Ndwandwe 'originated'

7 Bryant, Olden Times, 161.

8 KCL, Miller papers, Ms 1748, 'Short history,' 12.

9 Ibid., repeated in Bryant, Olden Times, 173.

10 KCL, Stuart, Ms.29392, 'Preliminary notes,' 3 Jan.1899.

with the Swazi and 'amaNhlwenga' (Tsonga speakers) and were thus similar to the Mthethwa. This, however, reflected a geographical proximity as expressed in the phrase 'si ngabe senzansi' (we are all peoples of the lowlands') rather than any genealogical relationship. Hence the same informant was able to report that the Ndwandwe 'originated' at emaGudu hill (Magudu) between the Mkuze and Pongolo rivers, and did not mention any period of residence further east.[11] Thirdly, the Ndwandwe seem to have been firmly established as the rulers of northern Zululand much earlier than the Dlamini asserted themselves west of the uBombo; indeed, Ndwandwe control of the lower Pongolo valley caused the Dlamini to turn away to the north.[12] The extent and strength of Ndwandwe political sway in the very earliest years of the nineteenth century can scarcely have been effected in the short period implied by the supposition of a contemporaneous 'arrival' at the end of the eighteenth century of both groups west of the uBombo.

It appears from this review of the evidence that the emergence of Ndwandwe chiefly power in northern Zululand cannot be precisely dated to the period 1780-1810, and that a much earlier date is probable. No evidence exists to specify when the Ndwandwe came to predominate; but the lineage established overall control in a region where some other lineages continued to retain considerable independence of action from the royal Ndwandwe. This independence came to be a critical weakness in relations with Mabudu in the north east and Mthethwa in the south east in the later years of the eighteenth century.

The ruling lineages in the subregion were associated with geographical centres of power. The northernmost centre of Ndwandwe control was emaGudu, equidistant from the lower Pongolo and mid Mkuze rivers. The Magudu hills were politically and economically advantageous on a number of counts;

11 KCL, SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov.1904.

12 Ibid.

their height, rising to over 2500 feet was sufficient to allow adequate defence, including that of the royal graves in the mountain top forest.[13] The hills are not over rugged and access to the lower foothills and plains was easy. The variety of altitude and hence vegetation within short distances allowed the practice of a complex mixed agriculture. Zwide's own kraal at emaGudu was situated on the eastern margins of a belt of thornveld, ten to twelve miles wide; this area of dense summer grazing was bordered on the east by the lower levels where cereals could be grown without interference from cattle ranging in the summer, but where the lowveld ensured adequate winter grazing.[14]

However, average rainfall in this area of Zululand was less than the region's average, which is likely to have caused extra emphasis on the possession of the most advantageous crop fields - those in the Pongolo floor itself, less than ten miles directly north of emaGudu. The retention of the long stretches of alluvial terrace was the cause of a major dispute between the Ndwandwe and the Dlamini of Sobhuza in the first decade of the nineteenth century.[15]

Traditions to the effect that the Ndwandwe 'originated' at emaGudu and that several kings are buried in the sacred forest atop the hills suggest that Ndwandwe domination expanded southward to the Black Mfolosi having first secured the north. Royal kraals in Zwide's time were in the Nongoma area where in the late sixteenth century the chiefdoms of Panjana and Malangana had effected similar control over the terrain. Indeed, similar ecological conditions to those at emaGudu extended fifty miles

[13] Bryant, Olden Times, 159; KCL SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov. 1904; Leslie, Among the Zulus, 120.

[14] J.B.McI.Daniel and C.deB. Webb, 'A geographical study of pre-Shakan Zululand,' in South African Geographical Journal, 55 (1973), 28.

[15] KCL, Miller Papers, Ms.1478, 'Short History,' 7; KCL, de Symons Honey, Ms., 'History of Swaziland,' 17; Bryant, Olden Times, 318.

Map 8

Ndwandwe power centres in the late eighteenth century



southwards through the upper basins of the Mkuze, Msunduze, Mona and iVuna rivers, and formed the geographical basis of Ndwandwe dominance of northern Zululand.[16]

A further major centre of Ndwandwe power in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was that of the Gasa lineage of Soshangane on the southern uBombo and the lowlands between the Mkuze, and Msunduze to the west. This location included defensible, continuously watered hilltop sites, including eTshaneni, the grave site of Gasa ancestors.[17] Summer grazing was available in the thornveld of the uBombo itself while in the cooler winters the plains of the Mkuze provided the winter grazing when carefully managed with tsetse control techniques.

Other centres of power associated with the Ndwandwe were those controlled by the Msane (Nxaba's lineage), the Ncwangeni-Jere (Zwangendaba's lineage) and the Nzimeleni. All these occupied lowland zones with a slightly different range of ecological conditions from the Ndwandwe proper. All three lineages derived security from the occupation of hilltop settlements and other refuges from the surrounding lowlands; the latter, especially in the vicinity of St. Lucia bay, were more affected by both human and animal disease than central Ndwandwe areas. On the other hand, there were some extensive zones of the much favoured thornveld in the higher parts of the Ncwangeni-Jere lands, and there was easy access to soils of high natural fertility in the numerous marshes of the lowlands as well as to the constant fishing of St. Lucia bay. Thus food supplies were assured even in comparatively dry seasons, while the presence of coastal diseases was some disincentive to attack and occupation by inlanders more accustomed to cooler, disease-free zones.[18]

16 KCL SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov.1904; SP V 74, evidence of Madikane, 27 June 1904; Bryant, Olden Times, 164.

17 Bryant, Olden Times, 448.

18 Ibid., 276-280; chapter II, p.52f.

The traditions do not show how the Ndwandwe ruling lineage achieved its advantage over the subordinate lineages and the dispersed centres of power. A probable source of the ruling lineage's wealth was the control of east-west trade across the ecological zones between the coast and the uplands, including that to and from Delagoa bay.[19] The relations between the power centres have been described in traditions and interpolated by their collectors in terms of genealogical ties expressing the common origin of the ruling families in the different centres from the central Ndwandwe lineage. Hence the internal history of Ndwandwe has been written as if it were the history of a single dominant lineage.[20] However, some pre-existing lineages and possibly some derived from the ruling lineage maintained partial independence.

Analysis of the surviving evidence suggests the independent stature of the Gasa, Ncwangeni-Jere, Msane and parts of the Nxumalo lineages. For example, traditions of the southern Nxumalo suggest that Nxumalo was a person who was ikohlo la s'endlunkulu ka Zwide, that is of the side of the family which could not inherit; but genealogical information is insufficient to suggest which of Zwide's predecessors was the father of Nxumalo, or indeed, whether the relationship was real or titular; for there is equally no explanation showing how if this were the relationship, the royal family of Zwide called itself Nxumalo.[21] Since the historic lands of the Nxumalo, as distinct from the Ndwandwe Nxumalo, extended between the iVuna and Mona rivers northward to the Nongoma plateau, it seems probable that these discrepancies conceal unrecoverable details concerning the expansion of the Ndwandwe from emaGudu into the Nongoma area.

In the case of the Gasa, who are usually also credited with the name

19 Chapter II, and Chapter III, 93f.

20 Bryant, Olden Times, 161 ff. Cp. Chapter III, above, p.79.

21 KCL SP V 50, evidence of Luzipo, 21 Nov.1904; Y.M. Chibambo, My Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1942), 9; Bryant, Olden Times, 161.

Nxumalo, Gasa is said to have been the renowned predecessor of Soshangane and the founder of the lineage which controlled the southern uBombo. However, the genealogical links between these two members of the lineage area uncertain, and it is still less possible to demonstrate a genealogical link between Soshangane's lineage and Zwide's.[22] The Gasa lineage was dynastically separate from, though perhaps politically subordinate at times to, that of Zwide: they possessed the trappings of kingship (ubukosi), consisting of the lineage's own royal gravesite, and place of ritual devotion, eTshaneni, where rain-making ceremonial was carried out.[23] From the uBombo stronghold, the Gasa could control the lower Pongolo and Mkuze valleys in terms of production and trade. Their geographic position gave the Gasa an advantage in their relations with Zwide; their control of these routes enabled them not only to maintain their own wealth, but also to regulate the passage of goods from southern Mozambique to the interior. The Ndwandwe on the other hand could not gain easy access to the north east lowlands without sustained friendly control of this area.

To the south south east of the Gasa, the ruling Ncwangeni-Jere, Msane and Nzimeleni are said to have been closely related to each other and to be 'first cousins' of the Ndwandwe. The Ncwangeni are thought to have been expelled from emaGudu by one of Zwide's predecessor's.[24] Again, no genealogical evidence has survived to specify such relationships.[25]

[22] Chibambo, My Ngoni, 9; D.G. Lancaster, 'Tentative chronology of the Ngoni,' in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 67 (1937), 90; G. Liesegang, 'Ngoni migrations between Delagoa bay and the Zambezi, 1821-1839,' in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 3, (1970), 337.

[23] Bryant, Olden Times, 338.

[24] Ibid., 276.

[25] See Chibambo, My Ngoni, 9, 12-13; Lancaster, 'Tentative chronology,' in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 67, (1937), 85-90; M. Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1956), 51-2.

Moreover, Zwangendaba's lineage also possessed ubukosi; a Malawi Ngoni praise song extols the power of Hlatshwayo, Zwangendaba's father, indicating that his political authority was paralled by religious and economic sanctions. The Ncwangeni-Jere had also adopted the title Mnguni, and considered themselves more entitled to its use than the Ndwandwe ruling lineage.[26]

By the turn of the nineteenth century, both Zwangedaba Jere and Nxaba Msane were the heirs of a military tradition which was only partly under Ndwandwe control. Zwangendaba's immediate predecessors were chief izinduna of the Ndwandwe. In this respect, Hlatshwayo appears to have enjoyed the particular favour of Zwide's father, Langa.[27] Indeed, he acquired a royal Nxumalo daughter as chief wife for Zwangendaba,[28] thus emphasising at the same time the similarity of status of his dynasty to that of Zwide and the political interdependence of the two lineages. However, this relationship was interrupted during Zwide's reign: praise and war songs collected in Malawi refer to a great dispute between the Nxumalo and the Jere in Zwide's reign.[29] But when Zwide attacked the Jere, he was defeated, captured and apparently held prisoner for some time before release.[30]

[26] M. Read, 'Songs of the Ngoni people,' Bantu Studies, 11 (1937), 10,20.

[27] Read, Ngoni, 52; Chibambo, My Ngoni, 9.

[28] Ibid., 26; Lancaster, 'Tentative Chronology,' Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 67, (1937), 89.

[29] Read 'Songs of the Ngoni,' Bantu Studies, 11 (1937), 27, 31; W.A. Elmslie, Among the wild Ngoni, (Edinburgh, 1901), 18; see also testimony of Mlonyeni Jere, in Read, Ngoni, 7.

[30] Ibid.; Bryant, Olden Times, 162; cp. RSEA II, Owen, 'Delagoa bay,' 470: Owen was apparently told by Ngoni or Tembe informants in 1822 that Zwide was a minor at his father's death and that Zwangendaba's taking control of Ndwandwe caused a longstanding dispute between them. According to traditions relating to the battles between Zwide and Tshaka, Zwide was about 50 c1818 and his armies were led by his grown up sons. This

This episode brings out the underlying importance of the geographic location of eastern power centres in Ndwandwe; they were of strategic interest to three chiefdoms, Ndwandwe, Mabudu and Mthethwa. Since the expansion of Mabudu in the north east littoral in the mid-eighteenth century, the Msane, Ncwangeni-Jere and Gasa were in a position to derive profit from, and influence the course of trade between Mabudu and Mthethwa; its continuation depended on their tolerance and probably participation, as did the political cooperation between the two litoral states. Zwide's attack on the Ncwangeni-Jere can thus be seen as an attempt to reassert Ndwandwe influence at the weakest part of the link between Mabudu and Mthethwa, but where the littoral was coming steadily under Dingiswayo's sway after his expansion north of the Mfolosi. Furthermore the repulse of the Ndwandwe from this direction ensured not only the security of the Jere dynasty, but also that of coastal trade route. This interpretation of the diplomacy is supported by the fact that only when Dingiswayo had been decisively defeated by Zwide alone did Zwangendaba and Nxaba come into alliance with Zwide, against Tshaka.[31]

II

The sub-region of southern Zululand extends between the Mhlatuze and the Tugela. Some thirty five miles in extent at the coast, and about seventy five miles from the ocean to the Mzinyati in the west, this sub region contained geographical centres of power analagous to those in the sub-regions to the north. In the eastern section are the Ngoye hills, from which in the eighteenth century the Qwabe lineage came to dominate most

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indicates that Zwangendaba was a powerful figure in the 1790s; he died an old man in the 1840s in uFipa; see Chibambo, My Ngoni, 22-3; W.H.J. Rangeley, 'Mtwalo,' in Nyasaland Journal, 15, (1952), 33-7.

31 See below, p187f for Mthethwa policy to the north.

Qwabe, c.1720 Map 9



of the area below 3000 feet.

An eastern spur dividing the Mhlatuze and Tugela basins, the Ngoye and its subsidiary, the Ndulinde, extend very close to the Indian Ocean. It is well watered and gives rise on its northern slopes to the several tributaries of the Mhlatuzana, a river which discharges in to extensive marshland at its confluence with the Mhlatuze; before this point the latter meanders through a broad flood plain, and after it, sweeps first south-eastward and then northward to the coastal marshes and lagoons.

Both the Ngoye and the lowlands are well-suited to the production of cereals, legumes and other crops; rainfall is generally higher and more reliable than in the other sub-regions, while even on the higher slopes of the Ngoye at Eshowe (c 1700') the growing season is not much shorter than in the lowlands. However, owing to higher winter temperatures and the presence of water retaining alluvial soils in the Mhlatuze flats east of Nkwalini and in the environs of the coastal marshes and lagoons, annual multiple cropping was possible in the lowlands; this potential gave these areas high strategic significance, especially in times of drought.[32]

The sub-region also contains man made savana, here called Ngongoni veld, covering most of the Ngoye and extending westward across the Nsuze tributary of the Tugela to a general altitude of 4000 feet. This savana is comparable to the derived Zululand thornveld in the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe areas to the north, but has a slightly different botanical structure owing to the higher rainfall, which allows somewhat higher densities of grazing than its northern counterpart.[33]

In the terminology of the traditions, the population of the eastern section of the sub region in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, consisted of lowland (zansi) peoples associated with the Cele and Tuli lineages, and of uplanders (abas'enhla) such as the Qwabe. Traditions

[32] Beater, Soils of the Sugar Belt, 5, 11; chapter II, p.38f.

[33] Acocks, Veld Types, 35; chapter II, pp.46-8.

of the Cele and the Tuli state that they were occupants and rulers of the sub region before the 'arrival' of the Qwabe.[34] However, there are few details conveyed by such traditions concerning the extent or nature of Cele-Tuli power before their lineages left Zululand to establish themselves in positions of dominance south of the Tugela.[35] Portuguese sources are unhelpful for this sub region, except that a report written in Lisbon in 1589 mentions that it composed one country.[36] Cele-Tuli history is therefore considered below only in relation to the emergence of Qwabe dominance.

Although the traditions cannot provide absolute dating for Qwabe history, they do suggest a sequence through which Qwabe power expanded to control the sub region. In terms of chronological parameters, the reconstruction undertaken below covers predominantly five reigns before c.1810, the approximate date of the death of Kondlo, that is the eighteenth century.[37] However, the traditions do also refer episodically to stages in Qwabe history earlier than the eighteenth century which are essential to comprehension of the subsequent course of expansion.

These stages include the foundation of the Qwabe lineage in the lowlands of the Mhlatuze, and the beginnings of Qwabe wealth. This period in Qwabe history is represented on the received king list by the names Malandela to Sidinane. Depending on the variant either Malandela or Qwabe travelled from the Babanango area to the Lower Mhlatuze, where the earliest royal settlement is said to have been on the slopes of emaNdawe

[34] KCL SP V 67, evidence of Melapi, 27 April 1905; V 51, evidence of Mageza, 18 February 1905; V 69, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 30 April 1905; V 40, evidence of Mbovu, 11 September 1904.

[35] KCL SP v60, evidence of Mcotoyi, 16 April 1905; V 51, evidence of Mageza, 18 February 1905; Cp. Chapter I, pp.28-9.

[36] RSEA II, do Couto, 199.

[37] See the variant Qwabe king lists in Appendix I.

hill, between the Mhlatuze and the Mhlatuzana, and below the Ngoye,[38] an area still called 'kwa Nozidiya,' after Malandela's only wife, in the nineteenth century.[39] There is no record directly referring to the means by which the early Qwabe obtained these lands; however, the absence of an early tradition of conquest, the reference to Malandela's poverty and small number of adherents suggests that far from being dominant leaders or kings in the early period, the Qwabe were allotted land as relatively powerless newcomers, if indeed they were newcomers at all.[40]

A tradition reported by Bryant supports this and indicates the subsequent importance to the Qwabe of the land they initially occupied. Malandela is said not to have survived the trek east long, leaving Nozidiya an unsupported widow. She is said then to have made a profitable living by lining the Mhlatuze river banks with fields of uJiba (sorghum), and by selling the surplus grain, thereby obtaining first goats and then cattle. This wealth passed subsequently into the hands of Qwabe, Malandela's heir.[41] There are no further details of Qwabe, however, nor of his immediate successors.

Indeed, statements in the traditions about Qwabe political power do not appear before the reign of Kuzwayo, whose history eclipses that of most of his predecessors. Kuzwayo, who lived in the early eighteenth century, is credited with militaristic activity, the possession of many wives and great wealth. He is remembered particularly for the grandiose manner of his funeral: he was cremated under a great pyre near the confluence of the Nkwalini and the Mhlatuze, and his ashes were swept

[38] Bryant, Olden Times, 17-19; KCL, SP B, evidence of Kambi, 9 April 1903; F, evidence of Meseni, 9 August 1904.

[39] KCL SP V 61, evidence of Mkehlanga, 19 April 1905; Bryant, Olden Times, 186-7.

[40] Ibid., 19; cp. KCL SP V 38, evidence of Mbovu, 11 August 1904; and chapter I on the question of ' migrations,' p.24f.

[41] Bryant, Olden Times, 19.

into the river.[42] From the site of this ceremony, it appears that Kuzwayo's power was rooted in the lowlands of the Mhlatuze, and that despite his renown, the Qwabe did not have secure control over the Ngoye to the south where later kings were buried.

Indeed, throughout the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth, the Qwabe coexisted with the Cele and Tuli, the Cele occupying positions of dominance on the Ngoye.[43] Although there are no details from either Qwabe or Cele sources concerning Kuzwayo's conquests, an Ngangeni tradition confirms that Qwabe power extended toward the coast before encompassing the Ngoye, and Cele-Tuli traditions of movement from Zululand date from a later Qwabe reign.[44] Though restricted to the lowlands, their location enabled the building of lineage wealth: cattle were acquired in exchange for grain, a trade likely to have yielded increased profit on the spread of maize, first cultivated in this locality of the region. Their location also enabled them to take advantage of lowland trade in ivory, metals and beads; Qwabe expansion toward the coast gave them control of the coastal trade to north and south. By such means the Qwabe acquired the wealth and prestige with which to invest their lineage with the mystique of leadership and dominance (ubukosi), as seems to have occurred in Kuzwayo's period.[45] These lowland beginnings of Qwabe dominance are reflected in a nineteenth century aphorism in which the Qwabe referred to the Mhlatuze as their 'original homeland.'[46]

[42] KCL SP V 40, evidence of Mnemi, 7 Nov.1904.

[43] KCL SP V 69, evidence of Socwatsha and Maziyana, 30 Apr.1905; v 37, evidence of Mbovu, 8 Feb.1904; Bryant, Olden Times, 538.

[44] Ibid., 545; the Ngangeni were 'expelled' from the seaward reaches of the Mhlatuze to the Matigulu, whence they were dislodged in Lufuta's reign; see below, p.173 for Lufuta's reign.

[45] Chapter IV, p.100f and V, p.144f for trade patterns; Isaacs, Travels, I, 113, confirms also that these lowlands were well inhabited by elephants.

[46] KCL SP V 36, evidence of Mbovu, 7 Feb.1904.

Qwabe in the late eighteenth century Map 10



However, the lower altitudes of the Mhlatuze and the coastal flats posed strategic and economic problems for the Qwabe. The extension of their power over the lowlands brought them into competition with the Cele who had hitherto dominated the lowlands, and maintained close geographical, economic and genealogical ties with the Mthethwa-Nyambose to the north.[47] Qwabe political control of the Mhlatuze interrupted these ties, and indeed the Qwabe seem to have replaced the Cele in such relations to the north. Signs of this appear in the evidence indicating Qwabe dynastic links with the Nyambose in the period of Kuzwayo.[48] The conflict occasioned with the Cele by these changes was exacerbated by the geographical insecurity of the Qwabe while the Cele occupied the overlooking heights of the Ngoye. Control of the Ngoye became essential to the Qwabe for reasons additional to political security: possession of the surrounding uplands could give a wider range of grazing for increasing Qwabe herds and give access to the extensive deposits of iron and copper in the mountains.[49] However, Kuzwayo's cremation in the lowlands indicates that he had not built a capital on the Ngoye, and that, the conflict in this direction being unresolved, fear of disinterrment by his opponents may have been the reason for this unusual funeral.[50]

In the subsequent reigns of Simamane, Lufuta and Mncinci, the Ngoye came progressively under Qwabe control. This process is indicated by several traditions including some concerning the sites of kraals and graves. Simamane's burial site, the first such royal grave specified in

[47] KCL SP V 69, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 30 April 1905; V 51, evidence of Mageza and Maqonga, 18 Feb.1905; V 67, evidence of Melapi, 27 April 1905.

[48] KCL SP V 40, evidence of Mmemi, 7 Nov. 1904; V 37, evidence of Mbovu, 8 Feb.1904.

[49] Above, p.167 ; on metallic ores in this area and the hills to the west, see Isaacs, Travels, I, 112-3.

[50] KCL SP V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 19 Oct.1904.

Qwabe traditions, is on the northern slopes of the Ngoye near Magqwakazi hill (1245'), while Lufuta's is somewhat higher; Mncinci is said to be buried on the southern slopes of the Ngoye, south-east of the present Eshowe.[51]

According to Qwabe tradition, Simamane's chief wife was an Mthethwa-Nyambose woman called Sengqani, who bore two famous sons, the heir Lufuta, and Makanya, the eponymous founder of a Qwabe sub-dynasty.[52] The traditions suggest that it was in the reign of Lufuta - approximately spanning the mid-eighteenth century - that the Qwabe achieved unchallenged authority over the sub region; indeed, subsequently some Qwabe came to express their dominance by their descent from Lufuta.[53] Makanya seems to have assisted Qwabe expansion by exerting authority over the southern Ngoye area, and by so doing to have achieved quasi independence: neither Makanya nor his son Mnengwa are reported as having challenged Lufuta or Mncinci for possession of ubukosi, and they attended the annual umkosi ceremony at the capital. However, the location of Mncinci's gravesite, and the fact that Mnengwa is said to have crossed the Tugela in his reign indicates that the southward shift of the capital lay behind Makanya departure from the sub-region. The width and flood characteristics of the Tugela undoubtedly hindered communication and political control; nevertheless, ultimate politico-religious authority for the Makanya remained at the royal Qwabe capital, for permission to guba umkosi is said still to have emanated from there.[54]

This interpretation of Qwabe traditions relating to the establishment of their control over the Ngoye is supported by an analysis of traditions

51 Ibid.; V 37, evidence of Mbovu, 8 Feb.1904; Bryant, Olden Times, 186.

52 Reader, Zulu tribe, 23-4; KCL SP V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 19 Oct.1904.

53 Ibid.; Bryant, Olden Times, 499, 537.

54 KCL SP V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 19 Oct.1904.

from the Cele and Tuli and others relating to their displacement in southern Zululand. Although there are no direct references detailing the conflicts which disrupted Cele occupation of the Ngoye and the Tuli presence on the Matigulu, information from all three sources confirms that Qwabe expansion was the cause of the movements. Some informants referred to a 'disturbance' in southern Zululand causing the removal,[55] but others reported specifically that the Cele and Tuli were expelled by the Qwabe.[56] References to the crossing of the Tukela give chronological confirmation of Qwabe expansion and its effects. Although neither the Tuli crossing nor their occupation of Durban bluff are associated consistently with a particular ruler, a complex tradition exists narrating episodes of the crossing.[57] Other traditions indicate that the first Cele to move from Zululand did so with the Tuli, and after an undefined period, the major part of the Cele ruling lineage crossed under the leadership of Mkokeleli.[58] A comparison of the Qwabe and Cele king lists shows that Mkokeleli, universally regarded in Cele traditions as the grandfather of Magaye, whose death is documented in 1829, belongs to approximately the same period as Qwabe nkosi Mncinci.[59]

After establishing control over the Ngoye, the Qwabe began to expand to the south west, where a lineage related to the Makanya, the Mbedwini, came to predominate over the Mpapala flats, a plateau area between 1000 and 2000 feet at the sources of the amaTigulu river.[60] Similarly, Qwabe

55 KCL SP V 37, evidence of Mbovu, 8 Feb.1904; V 51, evidence of Maquza, 2 Feb.1905; v 58, evidence of Mcotoyi, 13 April 1905.

56 KCL SP V 37, V 40, evidence of Mbovu, 8,11 Feb.1904; V 51, evidence of Mageza, 18 Feb.1905; v 69 evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 30 April 1905.

57 KCL SP V 58, evidence of Mcotoyi, 13 April 1905.

58 KCL SP V 69, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 30 April 1905.

59 See Appendices.

60 Bryant, Olden Times, 188, 499; KCL SP V 46, evidence of Ngidi, 4 Nov.1904; V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 19 Oct. 1904.

power is said to have extended to the north west as far as kwaMagwaza, near the present Melmoth, about ten miles north west of Nkwalini.[61] However, it seems that Qwabe westerly expansion was most securely held in the uplands contiguous to the Ngoye, including the Ntumeni hills, and extending as far as the iMvuzane tributary of the Mhlatuze.[62] This is confirmed by the location of kraals belonging to Kondlo and Pakatwayo, though not their predecessors, in the Ntumeni some ten miles west of the present Eshowe, at a height of slightly over 2000 feet. Indeed, Kondlo is said to be buried at his kraal in this area.[63]

Bryant characterised Qwabe expansion thus:

> 'In a couple of hundred years, the children of Qwabe had trebled in numbers the children of Zulu. Indeed, of all Ntungwa-Nguni clans that of the aba-kwa-Qwabe (the people of Qwabe) was in Shaka's time the largest. From a tiny nucleus beneath the emaNdawe hill south of the Mhlatuze, the family had expanded, on the one hand, seawards along the Ngoye hills and Mhlatuze river, till it had reached the Dube and Mtetwa borders, and on the other, up the Mhlatuze river almost as far as the Nkandla forest, winding up by peopling all the country between the Mhlatuze and the Tukela, and finally overflowing into Natal.'[64]

This impression was based on the relatively large number of lineages claiming to belong to the Qwabe, yet fulfilling the exogamy rules.[65] These lineages are conventionally described as 'offshoots' of the Qwabe, and the apparently rapid process of lineage fission required to have produced these within the comparatively short span of Qwabe history recoverable from the traditions has been taken to show rapid population expansion.[66] However, analysis of the lineage and address names recovered

61 KCL SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 17 Sept.1900, p 96.

62 KCL SP V 46, evidence of Ngidi, 4 Nov.1904.

63 Bryant, Olden Times, 185-6.

64 Ibid., 185; cp.NPA, Shepstone papers, 24: Shepstone also described the Qwabe as 'the largest tribe in Zululand previous to Dingiswayo.'

65 See Appendix II for the full list of isibongo

66 M.G. Gluckman, Analysis of a social situation in Modern Zululand, (Manchester, 1958), 30-31; cp. Chapter I above, p.5f, and Chapter III, p.79.

by Bryant shows that only five out of twenty nine lineages derive with certainty from the Qwabe ruling lineage; and the explanation for the larger number of lineages claiming to be Qwabe is that most of them became associated with the Qwabe in the process of expanding political domination where the environment favoured a greater density of settlement than elsewhere.[67] Undoubtedly, the Qwabe, through their growing control of resources and territory, increased their numbers, but they did this, and their political sway by intermarriage with locally important lineages who signified their political dependence by the gift of daughters to the dominant Qwabe. Such pre-existing lineages identified with Qwabe religious and political leadership, and conformed to the kinship idiom of Qwabe political relations and traditions.

Qwabe expansion to the east brought it up against the Cube, Mbo and Cunu chiefdoms in the broken country of the Tugela-Ntsuze area; these were powerful though much smaller chiefdoms which remained in peaceable independence from Qwabe. All three were dominated by ruling lineages which controlled the iron and copper resources of the area through their possession of defensible mountain fortresses.[68] Detail of the achievement of their dominance is absent; however, tradition recounts that the Cunu pressed the erstwhile rulers, the Kanyile, into abandoning the ubukosi to them without resistance, the Kanyile thenceforth remaining as a subordinate lineage.[69]

For most of the eighteenth century, Qwabe expansion based on their central capitals in the northern Ngoye was paralleled to the north by Nyambose control of the Mhlatuze-Nseleni interfluve, an area of upland

67 See Appendix II and KCL SP V 37-40, evidence of Mbovu and Mmemi, 8-11 Feb.1904, 7 Sept.1904.

68 Bryant, Olden Times, 262, 404, 415; KCL SP H, Historical notes on the amaCube by James Stuart.

69 KCL SP V 70, evidence of Magidigidi, 6 May 1905.

thornveld, the possession of which enabled Mthethwa influence to reach the north bank of the Mhlatuze. During the reign of Kuzwayo, Qwabe-Nyambose relations were close enough to permit the choice of a Nyambose chief wife for Kuzwayo's heir, Simamane.[70] The Mhlatuze was a difficult obstacle to political control for both sides in the rainy season, and it seems that a modus vivendi recognising the two separate geographical spheres of control operated for much of the eighteenth century.

However, this accord broke down toward the close of the century. Qwabe traditions illustrate these points. Kondlo (c1788-1813) took as his chief wife a Nyambose woman; however, when in his later years Kondlo nominated Nomo, first son of his wife, heir to the Qwabe ubukosi, the Qwabe council refused to accede to this customary practice on the grounds that the Queen mother would then be an Mthethwa, and that she would as a result be an adverse influence in Qwabe affairs. Pakatwayo was thus proposed as heir and indeed reigned.[71] This indicates both the importance of a Nyambose wife in Qwabe politics in that her influence could be thought of as so considerable in weight in relation to the future king's council, and that between the time of the marriage as chief wife and the declaration of Nomo as heir, political relations with the Mthethwa had deteriorated to the extent that the nkosikazi's influence was now regarded as inimical to Qwabe interests. In Pakatwayo's reign, worsening relations between the two chiefdoms led finally to open warfare. The course of this struggle and its place in the wider conflicts of the Mfecane are considered below.[72]

III

The sub region of central Zululand extends between the Mhlatuze and

[70] KCL SP V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 19 Oct.1904.

[71] Ibid.; V 45, idem, 24 Oct.1904.

[72] See below, 191f.

Mfolosi rivers, which are about twenty-seven miles apart for much of their respective lower courses. The geography of the subregion is complicated by the very size of the Mfolosi, and by the formation of its basin by the conjunction some thirty miles from its estuary of its two major tributaries, the White and Black Mfolosi. The coastal plain of this sub region is much wider than that to the south, and the average distance from the coast to the 3000' contour is some sixty miles. Nevertheless, there are a number of hills, such as Mngqayi and Dondota, reaching about 1000', in the lowlands less than twenty miles from the flats and marshes of the Mposa, and lower Msunduze and Mfolosi.

Although rainfall is somewhat lower, and occasionally less reliable than in southern Zululand, there is a much wider extent of relatively rich lowland soils; moreover, because of the slightly lower rainfall, most of the sub region above 500 ' (fifteen to twenty miles from the coast) is covered by Zululand thornveld, extending toward Mtonjaneni, over 3000' in the west, thus producing an exceptionally well favoured and extensive environment for mixed farming.[73]

It was from the easternmost extension of the Mtonjaneni ridge near the mountains named Mgilane and Mduba that the Mthethwa-Nyambose dominated the subregion below 3000' in the eighteenth century. In the terminology of nineteenth-century Zulu traditions, the inhabitants of the Mthethwa area generally were regarded as lowlanders (abasezanzi), and, as such, the oldest residents of Zululand.[74] Although there are traditions that some groups such as the Sokulu and the Mpukunyoni moved into the area during the eighteenth century or somewhat before, suggestions by Bryant and Soga that the ruling Nyambose lineage derive from a group

[73] Beater, Soils of the Sugar belt, 6 passim; above Chapter II,41,48f.

[74] See for example, KCL SP B evidence of Ndukwana, 28 Nov.1901; evidence of Bunu, 7 Nov.1902.

Mthethwa in the eighteenth century Map 11



of conquering invaders are incapable of proof.[75]

Indeed, although Nyambose is regarded as a great man and founder of the royal lineage bearing his name as well as that of the Cele and Mbo-Mkize lineages, there are no traditions describing him as a migrant or the royal lineage as characteristically different from the rest of the population. The late sixteenth-century Portuguese report that eastern parts of central and southern Zululand composed one country and the traditions that the Cele, who controlled southern Zululand before the Qwabe, were linked genealogically to the Mthethwa lend support to the notion of extensive power in the age of Nyambose, but the traditions do not permit the proof or exploration of such a relationship.[76] Only from approximately the mid-eighteenth century do the traditions show how the Nyambose dominated the other lineages of the sub region; much has been lost through the dispersal of Mthethwa power in the early nineteenth century, and through the mythology and hagiography surrounding Dingiswayo.

Kraal sites of the royal Nyambose and associated details are not mentioned in surviving Mthethwa traditions until the reign of Jobe, Dingiswayo's father. Two of Jobe's sites were close to the south bank of the Mfolosi: ebaLungwini, the capital, near the confluence of the Mvamanzi, and oYengweni, near the Mfule to the west.[77] These sites were near the agriculturally productive Mfolosi alluvium beds, and were overlooked by hills rising near the river, such as Mgilane (819'), Zikayizenkosi (probably named after Kayi) and Shashweni. Occupation of these provided political security for control of the riverain lowlands, and for the grazing of cattle on their slopes.

Traditions of non-Nyambose groups indicate that before Jobe's period

75 Bryant, Olden Times, 83; Soga, South eastern Bantu, 300.

76 RSEA II, do Couto, 199.

77 Bryant, Olden Times, 86; KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, by James Stuart, 24.

the Nyambose controlled most of the lower Mfolosi eastward to the ocean from their capital. The Sokulu have a tradition to the effect that their leaders came to Mthethwa in the reign of Kayi, universally regarded as Jobe's immediate predecessor, who allowed them to establish and maintain authority on his behalf in Mfolosi-Msunduze marshlands.[78] Traditions of the Mbokazi and the Mbonambi show Nyambose control of much of the higher ground to the south and the coastal lowlands toward the Mhlatuze in the time of Kayi. Here a double ridge of hills extends north-north-east to the south-south-west, from Mngqagayi (1271') and Dondota (917') in the north the Ntondweni (981') and Ndondwane (857') in the south, divided by a rich valley watered by the tributaries of the Msunduze and the Ntseleni. The Mbokazi, who lived on the slopes of these hills south-east of Mngqagayi, have traditions indicating a close relationship with the Nyambose in the time of Kayi, their lineage retaining quasi-independence until Dingiswayo.[79] The Mbonambi, seaward of the Mbokazi, also have a tradition of subordination to the Mthethwa considerably before Dingiswayo.[80] Similarly, the Dube near the Mhlatuze mouth, were in range of Jobe's forces.[81]

The Nyambose also had sufficient strength to control the area north of the Mfolosi for some time before Dingiswayo. This is indicated by the traditions of the Mkwanazi, Mpukunyoni and Ncube which state that these

[78] KCL SP G, evidence of Nhlekele, 2 June 1907; according to this version, the Sokulu came from the uSutu river (eastern Swaziland), were driven seaward by a flood, and made their way to Mthethwa along the coast, taking with them new crops such as sugar cane, collocasia and sweet potatoes. Bryant, Olden Times, 108-9, confirms the main elements of the story and adds that the Sokulu 'came from' the Kumalo, See Chapter I, p.24f, for the relevance of this type of tradition.

[79] Bryant, Olden Times, 84.

[80] Ibid.; KCL SP G, evidence of Nhlekele, 3 June 1907.

[81] KCL SP V 83, evidence of Ngidi, 30 Oct.1905; Bryant, Olden Times, 89, 106; the epitaph to Jobe (in Zulu) refers to his attacks on Kushwayo the Dube chief.

groups were migrants from the uplands who came to live in the narrow lowland corridor between the Mfolosi and the Nyalazi, and in so doing were obliged to become the allies of Kayi and Jobe.[82] A further indication of Nyambose influence north of the Mfolosi comes from a tradition of the Ntlozi and the Nxele, west and east respectively of the southern half of St. Lucia lake; they are both said to be parts of the royal lineage resident in these areas before Dingiswayo.[83]

Thus the Nyambose controlled most of the lower Mfolosi, with its high agricultural potential and extensive hunting grounds; their influence in the areas immediately to the north of the lower Mfolosi shows that the crossing points of the river were under their control. This enabled them to regulate and profit from the lowland trade in ivory, beads and metals known to have flowed at least intermittently during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and to have gained in intensity thereafter.[84] It is probable that in the eighteenth century, Nyambose wealth thus increased, and further bolstered the prestige and patronage essential to their extensive political control.[85]

The nature of the traditions does not allow a very detailed account of the manner in which Nyambose power operated territorially. However, the traditions of groups within Mthethwa such as the Mbonambi, Sokulu, and Mbokazi indicate the continued local independence of action of their ruling lineages in the period before Dingiswayo, and that Nyambose power in relation to the local power centres varied according to the strength and needs of the Nyambose. For example, Mbokazi tradition suggests that political relations with their rulers were regulated by a marriage alliance

82 Ibid., 113-4.

83 Ibid., 116-8.

84 Chapter V, p.141, passim.

85 Chapter III, p.76f for the wealth and reproduction of ruling lineages.

and that their leaders retained the locally esteemed sign of high rank - such as the possession of an isigodlo - until Dingiswayo removed them by force. Similarly, the Tembu, occupying a centre of power on a hill site south of the Ntseleni, remained independent possessors of ubukosi until Dingiswayo killed the Tembu chief.[86] Nevertheless, Mthethwa traditions record the existence of amabutho before Dingiswayo, thus indicating that centralisation was not initiated entirely by Dingiswayo.[87]

According to the traditions, the circumstances of Jobe's choice of heir and of Dingiswayo's accession to power were unusual, and they surrounded the inception of the latter's reign with heightened political insecurity and an aura of the supernatural. During Jobe's reign, Dingiswayo, the heir, was forced into exile and presumed lost; when Jobe died, a younger son, Mawewe, became inkosi.[88]

Assessment of the traditions concerning Dingiswayo centres on two points of criticism. The first is the possibility that he was a usurper and that the tradition of his exile and return legitimised his rule.[89] Secondly, the tradition that he possessed a horse and a gun on his return, his association with Europeans and experience of their military methods and his encouragement of industry and commerce appear to lend weight to the possibility of Dingiswayo's being a usurper or a complete outsider.[90]

86 Bryant, Olden Times, 84, 101.

87 Ibid., 99; KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 33; See below, p.195.

88 Bryant, Olden Times, 86-7, testimony of Socwetshata; KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, passim. H.F. Fynn, 'History of Dingiswayo and Chaka,' in Bird, Annals, I, 60 f.

89 See John Argyle, 'Who were Dingiswayo and Shaka? Individual origins and political transformations,' Institute of Commonwealth Studies (University of London), Societies of Southern Africa Seminar Paper, 1976, for an elaborate statement of this viewpoint.

90 Fynn, 'History,' in Bird, Annals, I, 60-63. Europeans in nineteenth century Natal idealised Dingiswayo: see chapter I, p.3 . Myths of

However, the available evidence does not support the legend of an exogenous origin of the attributes supposedly introduced by Dingiswayo, but shows the endogenous form and content of Mthethwa (and Zulu) institutions, albeit influenced by external productive forces. Dingiswayo did not initiate the 'regimental' system, which was a region-wide adaptation to changed productive forces;[91] he did not inaugurate trade with Delagoa bay, though he ensured that it passed through his hands,[92] nor begin the manufacture of useful artefacts.[93] Owing to their use - often to considerable effect - by shipwrecked travellers through the region and Portuguese mariners at Delagoa bay,[94] firearms were well known and respected. Guns were also occasionally used to purchase goods by Anglo-Indian traders at Delagoa bay; the Portuguese were scandalised by Chandler's sale of firearms in the 1750s, and some were given to Tembe in 1777.[95] Moreover, although owing to trypanosomiasis horses required careful stabling at Delagoa bay, Chandler kept two mounts there to facilitate his exploration of the countryside,[96] and it is possible that

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European genetic influence through Dingiswayo, Tshaka and others have also occurred, principally to Europeans: see NPA Fynn papers, Miscellaneous notes, (unattributed note) where Nandi (mother of Tshaka) and Sobuza appear as the progeny of Dingiswayo and a Portuguese widow of Jama Zulu, whose daughter by the same woman married Zwide. Cp the version in NPA, Colenso papers, vol.87, note containing information apparently originating from R.F. Morcom, 25 July 1910, where Nandi is said to be the daughter of the Portuguese widow of Jama and Dr A. Cowan.

91 See below, section IV, p.193f.

92 Chapters IV,p.110f,and V, p.141.

93 Chapter III,p.87f.

94 See for example RSEA II, Lavanha, 326; RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 109.

95 AHU, Moç., Cx.13, letter of A.J. de Mello, 1763; AHU, IM 137, Processo, Bolts to Pollet, 16 July 1777, 24 Dec.1777.

96 AHU, Moç., Cx.13, letter of A.J. de Mello, 1763; Bryant, Olden Times, 93, generalises from the experience of the Voortrekkers, 1837-44, that there could be no horses at Delagoa bay; but see above Chapter II, p.48f, for the limits and implications of the tsetse belts; Cp. Kirby, ed., Andrew

he or his Indian or African agents used these on the trade routes to the south west. Thus some elements of the tradition may have a historical foundation.

Their association with Dingiswayo, however, remains unproven. Neither Bryant's nor Stuart's informants were able to throw conclusive light on these aspects of Mthethwa history; although several of Stuart's informants had heard that Dingiswayo had acquired experience of European ways in Cape Colony, they could not give the origin of the story, nor did they place any credence in it.[97] Hlubi informants recounted that Dingiswayo had lived in their chiefdom for some time prior to his accession, but did not associate him with a European despite a common tendency in Hlubi tradition to attribute a causal role to whites in political, economic and ecological events prior to their actual appearance.[98]

According to Bryant's Mthethwa informants, on his return, Dingiswayo was accompanied by several African men who appeared to be foreigners, probably hunters or traders.[99] The subsequent role of his companions is

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Smith, 61, extracts from F.G. Farewell's diary: Tshaka told Farewell of a chief who used to ride a horse, the origin of which was unknown.

97 KCL SP N, evidence of Socwatsha, 2 Jan.1912; SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 18 Sept.1900; Bryant, Olden Times, 91; see KCL SP V 53, evidence of Dinya, 27 Feb.1905, for the Qwabe tradition that Dingiswayo killed the white man on a horse. See also Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 43, for a Delagoa tradition of a white man and coloured woman arriving from the Cape at an unspecified juncture.

98 KCL SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa and Paul Ngwenya, 27 Jan.1909; Ayliffe, and Whiteside, Abambo, 5; these references probably derive from the presence of the missionary, J. Allison, to the Swazi in the 1830s; SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 27 Jan.1901.

99 Bryant, Olden Times, 89; the date of Dingiswayo's return and accession is usually given as c.1808 owing to the supposed association with Cowan and Donovan, ibid., 92-3, for which Bryant opted, as he implies, in the absence of evidence for Delagoa bay; (footnotes 95 and 96 above). Portuguese officials reported the presence of the naturalists and explorers (Cowan and Donovan) from the Cape in the hinterland of Sofala late 1809, and the annihilation of the party near Tete somewhat later; AHU, Moç. Códice 1380, de Mello e Castro to Conde de Anadia, 25 Jan.1810; idem to Conde de Galveas, 11 Dec. 1811; de Abreu e Menezes to the Royal Court, 15 Dec.1812; see also the circular letter to all Presídio governors south of Mozambique, Codice 1377,

not mentioned in the traditions, and the conflict which ensued followed the lines of a contradiction within the ruling lineage. The disputed leadership involved the arbitration of Jobe's surviving brother, Nqola, who, already associated with Mawewe's rule, decided against Dingiswayo; the latter attacked Nqola's kraal with a force of Mawewe's rebellious younger warriors, and murdered the occupants. This show of force was sufficient to convince the leading Nyambose of Dingiswayo's invincibility and legitimacy, and Jobe's amabutho and the population of the capital henceforth supported him.[100] However, Mawewe escaped, perpetuating and extending the crisis by becoming an exile with the nearby Qwabe south of Mhlatuze. In the subsequent war with the Qwabe, Mawewe was eventually returned to Mthethwa and then killed.[101]

Dingiswayo's hold over the several power centres in Mthethwa was achieved by establishing control of the hill range between the Mfolosi and the Mhlatuze. Whereas Jobe's capital was in a lowland site, Dingiswayo's

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de Mello e Castro, 12 Dec.1810. Fynn estimated that 'commotion' in Zululand began c.1750 and that Dingiswayo reigned from c.1780;'History' in Bird, Annals, I, 60, 62. The evidence of Chandler's activities makes the earlier date of Dingiswayo's accession more likely, but not certain, as indeed does the very extent of his achievements. Evidence of the widespread famines, the only known period of food shortage in the lowlands, (KCL SP Q, evidence of Mohungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; Chapter II above p.35) one of which occurred during Dingiswayo's reign (below p.199), indicates that he probably began his reign before 1790 and certainly before 1801-2.

100 KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 3; Bryant, Olden Times, 3; B.W. Vilakazi, uDingiswayo, (London, 1939), 2.

101 Fynn, 'History' in Bird Annals, 62; Stuart and Malcolm, ed., Diary of Fynn, 7-8; NPA Shepstone, Ms., 'Historical notes.' In Fynn's earlier version (Annals, 1839), Dingiswayo contracted only commercial arrangements with Mabudu; the later version in the Diary mentions muskets and 'Portuguese' soldiers procured from Mabudu for use against the Qwabe. There is no evidence from Portuguese sources of this action, and every sign that there were no spare resources for it; however, the Mabudu may have had small numbers of firearms at this stage. See Chapter VII for the significance of small numbers of arms.

first major kraal and capital, oYengweni II, was much higher and further to the south on the watershed of the Ntseleni and Mfolosi near the headwaters of the Mvamanzi (c.1000').[102] Indeed the removal of the Tembu inkosi, Jama, early in Dingiswayo's reign suggests that unchallenged power in the uplands neighbouring his capital was essential to the new Mthethwa leader's security in the period of danger from Mawewe and Qwabe. The subsequent removal of the Mbokazi lineage to a less secure frontier north of the Mfolosi gave Dingiswayo undisputed control of the hills and the coast lands to the east.[103]

One of the major sources of Dingiswayo's wealth was the trade to the north. He achieved greater control over this than his predecessors by his expansion north of the Mfolosi. In addition to relocating his mother's lineage, the Mbokazi, in a zone opposite the Nxumalo on the east bank of the Mona river, Dingiswayo secured the allegiance through a marriage link of the part of the Ncwangeni which lived between the Nyalazi and Hluhluwe rivers.[104] Further north, the history of Ndwandwe shows that its eastern power centres overlooking the littoral were relatively independent of their capital, and did not interrupt Mthethwa's communication in the north. Indeed, according to information recorded by Fynn, very early in his reign Dingiswayo contracted a commercial alliance with Mabudu some fifty miles north of the Mfolosi.[105]

With the security of the lowlands thus established, Dingiswayo extended Nyambose control westward into the higher lands of the Mfule river; the Ngadini lived in the mid and lower parts of the river, and the Xulu dominated the upper Mfule basin from eLumbi hill. The Xulu king and court

102 Bryant, Olden Times, 95; KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 42.

103 Bryant, Olden Times, 101.

104 Ibid., 164.

105 Fynn, 'History' in Bird, Annals, 63; p.152f above.

Mthethwa expansion Map 12



are said to have been driven across the Mhlatuze into Qwabe, the north western areas of which the Mthethwa now threatened. Nyambose influence thereafter extended further inland, controlling the strategic Mtonjaneni heights above the Mfule, and the White Mfolosi basin. Here, the Zulu and Buthelezi lineages, hitherto intermittently dominated by the Cunu from the heights of Qudeni and Babanango, came under Nyambose hegemony.[106] However, this area was more than forty five miles - at least one and a half day's march - from oYengweni, and the locally dominant Zulu, though compelled to submit through the act of ukukonza, were left in situ. Indeed, the Zulu under Senzangakona, became firm allies of the Mthethwa in Dingiswayo's reign. Their close political association is indicated by the tradition that a large number of Senzangakona's daughters were married to members of the Nyambose lineage, and indeed by the tradition that Tshaka was taken under Dingiswayo's wing.[107]

Nyambose control of the mid White Mfolosi was completed by the subjection of the Kumalo of Donda.[108] Further to the west, in the upper White Mfolosi, and in the headwater areas of the Mzinyati and iNcome rivers, the Hlubi dominated from the watershed between the Tugela and Pongolo basins. There is no record of conflict between the Hlubi and the Nyambose; indeed, the traditions suggest that the two powers cooperated in controlling the resources of the Mfolosi basin, including the big game of its extensive woodlands.[109] However, it is recorded that Dingiswayo's forces attacked the Ngwane of Matiwane in the upper Bivane, and that the Hlubi assisted them; Matiwane was defeated, but his lineage,

106 Bryant, Olden Times, 101-2, 228, 255.

107 KCL SP W.1, evidence of Baleni, 10 May 1914; Bryant, Olden Times, 63, passim.

108 Ibid., 102, 172.

109 KCL SP U 29, evidence Mabonsa, 27 Jan.1909; Bryant, Olden Times, 217.

like others distant from central Mthethwa was left intact after expressing submission to the Nyambose.[110]

The extent of Hlubi political sway in the eighteenth century, the coherence of their political leadership and the prowess of their warriors are attested in non-Hlubi as well as Hlubi traditions. Dlomo, the first inkosi whose reign is remembered in any detail, is said to have been a successful wild game hunter who controlled the allegiance of most Hlubi young men. He probably usurped the kingship; according to one tradition his predecessor failed to produce an heir; his brother Radebe married the great wife and produced the heir Dlomo indirectly.[111] However, a different tradition relates continued conflict between Ngcobo's heirs and Radebe's after Dlomo's death.[112]

Dlomo is said to have been killed on the appearance of an enemy near the mountain which bears his name, at the eastern extremity of the Ngome ridge. The Hlubi then retreated via the southern tributaries of the Pongolo to the Pongolo-Tugela watershed (near the present Utrecht) where Bungane reestablished Hlubi royal authority.[113] Although the tradition is couched in terms of a migration of the ubukosi, it is probable that it refers to an expedition to the east which, encountering a superior force such as that of the Ndwandwe, resulted in Dlomo's death. A further tradition recounts a migration from the uBombo via the Pongolo, but this relates to a lineage which became subordinate to the Hlubi, and thus alludes to the hunting and trading which required travel to and from the

110 NPA, Shepstone Ms. 24, 'Historical Notes;' KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 37; Bryant, Olden Times, 137.

111 W. von Flintel, 'Traditions and customs of the amaHlubi tribe,' in Native Teachers Journal, vol.11, 1932, (229-36) 229.

112 Ayliff and Whiteside, Abambo, 4.

113 Ibid.; von Flintel, op.cit. 229.

lowlands via the uBombo.[114] Indeed, Hlubi lands were abundant in game, and their high esteem of hunting and warfare is associated in the traditions with a reputation as traders eastward to the lowlands and to the west across the Drakensberg.[115]

In the process of establishing close control over the lower areas of the subregion below 3000 feet and of much looser hegemony with the Hlubi above this, the Nyambose impinged upon areas hitherto under the purview of other chiefdoms. In the upper Mfule valley, Qwabe power is said to have extended toward kwaMagwaza, though with what consistency cannot now be ascertained. Political relations were complicated by the refuge given to Dingiswayo's opponent; having been overpowered militarily over this issue, and perhaps others, Qwabe reaction to expanding Mthethwa influence on their borders and their ability to intrude into Qwabe at will is remembered in Qwabe tradition by the account of the rejection of Nomo, Kondlo's son by a Nyambose wife, as heir to the Qwabe ubukosi.[116] According to one informant, the issue brought about further conflict between the two chiefdoms; Dingiswayo gave Nomo lands in Mthethwa, but the Qwabe attempted his removal which resulted in their iziNkhonde regiment being driven to the Tugela. However, Qwabe forces were finally able to resist Mthethwa pressure to install Nomo,[117] and there was no act of submission by Kondlo or Phakatwayo. The traditions do suggest however some continuity in economic contacts between the two lineages, greatly to Mthethwa advantage.[118]

114 KCL SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 27 Jan.1909.

115 Bryant, Olden Times, 148; Ayliff and Whiteside, Abambo, 2; KCL SP V 65, evidence of Socwatsha and Maziyana, 24 May 1905.

116 Above, p.177; KCL SP V 43, evidence of Mmemi, 13 Oct.1904, for a lengthy account of Dingiswayo's interference in Qwabe affairs.

117 KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 37-9; V 43, evidence of Mmemi, 13 Oct.1904.

118 Ibid.; KCL SP V 36, evidence of Mbovu, 7 Feb.1904.

Northern Nguni and southern Ronga, c.1800 Map 13



With the submission to Dingiswayo of the Ngwane in the upper Pongolo basin, Mthethwa political influence was felt to the east, south and west of Ndwandwe. The sequence of events as related in the traditions indicates that the Ndwandwe leadership recognised this as a threat to their interests, especially in the western uplands, from which the Nyambose or Hlubi could invade or prosecute economic warfare. After Matiwane's subjugation by Dingiswayo, Zwide attacked the Ngwane and put them to flight through Hlubiland, thus initiating the Mfecane.[119]

The traditions relate next the development of direct conflict between Ndwandwe and Mthethwa over the diplomatic and strategic position of the Nxumalo in the Mona valley. Nyambose-Nxumalo relations were expressed in the marriage between one of Dingiswayo's sisters and the Nxumalo leader, Malusi. The strength of this tie and its disruptive consequence in Mthethwa-Ndwandwe relations is expressed in Ndwandwe tradition: after removing the Ngwane to the west, Zwide accused Malusi of befriending Dingiswayo and then had him murdered. Dingiswayo intervened on behalf of his sister, Nomatuli, Malusi's chief wife; he challenged Zwide to produce the murdered man, only to be lured to his own death.[120] This began the well-known series of conflicts between Ndwandwe and the remaining Mthethwa-Zulu forces.

IV

Underlying the conflicts between the major northern Nguni chiefdoms in the first two decades of the nineteenth century were the region-wide changes in productive forces and social structure of the closing decades of the eighteenth century. The incipient dependence of the southern Ronga upon foreign trade is indicated by seventeenth and early eighteenth century

119 Bryant, Olden Times, 138; NPA, Shepstone, Ms.24, 'Historical notes;' KCL SP Q, evidence of John Gama, 17 Dec.1898.

120 Bryant, Olden Times, 163-4; KCL SP T, biography of Dingiswayo, 41.

reports of the anxiety of Ronga chiefs to resume trade with the Portuguese during the long absences of merchant vessels at Delagoa bay. The dependence was also expressed in the conflict between the chiefs for the favours of the traders; and there was an extensive demand for European and Indian beads, cloth and then metals. These goods were acquired in exchange for ivory, a commodity of low value in the societies of the region, though occasionally used for decorations such as bracelets and some bone implements.[121]

The low value of ivory was determined by its lack of value in the mode of production. In the lineage mode which characterised the productive structure of the region, the ruling lineages reproduced their domination by controlling the reproduction of subordinate lineages through management of the exchange system.[122] There is no evidence of ivory having been used to maintain the dominance of the ruling lineage. However, there are instances of all imported goods having such a value in some, if not all, parts of the region; thus, for example, a Mabudu tradition relates that in very old times lobola in beads consisted of a double string of izinhlalu - large green beads - approximately four to five yards long.[123] The export of ivory was therefore particularly profitable because it resulted in much increased potential for the dominant lineage which controlled the exchange, without the disposal of a valuable commodity.

In the two centuries between 1550 and 1750, the ivory trade was at a low volume but drew its supplies widely: small quantities emanated from most northern Nguni chiefdoms and somewhat larger quantities from southern Ronga chiefdoms. In that period, the demand for ivory was fulfilled from

121 See above, p.110 passim.

122 See above, p.76 passim.

123 KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; see also p.212.

hunting carried out after harvest as part of the normal agricultural cycle to reduce the threat to fields from game; ivory was a by-product, not the central ob ject, of hunting, although owing to its exchange value, much of it was appropriated by the amakosi.[124]

In the succeeding period, between 1750 and 1790, the marked increase in the ivory trade and the increase in its price consequently magnified the advantages to the lineages which exported it. Moreover, during this period participation in the ivory trade became the most accessible means of acquiring highly valued metals such as copper and brass as well as less valued goods such as beads. The ingress of large quantities of overseas goods and advantageous terms of trade were matched by a high volume of ivory exports, evidence of a rapid response to external demand by means of increased hunting.

Hunting was a labour process which enabled increased efficiency and output through the augmentation and reorganisation of collaborative manpower. Changes in trading conditions in the second half of the eighteenth century were accompanied by alterations in the organisation of social force. According to travellers accounts and traditions, the Nguni and southern Ronga practised circumcision until well into the eighteenth century.[125] This was an incorporative device ideologically associating the young men of a particular age group with a male member of the ruling lineage who passed through the circumcision school at the same time. In the earlier period social force was not constructed through incorporative age grades; armies and hunting parties fought according to the localities from which they were drawn, as indeed they continued to in southern Nguniland in the succeeding period.[126] In the second half of the

[124] See above, p.89.

[125] RSEA II, Lavanha, 294; RSEA VIII, d'Almada, 92-3, 116; Junod, Life, I, 72; KCL SP V 79, evidence of Mahaya, 27 Aug.1905.

[126] KCL, Stuart Ms.30055, evidence of Socwatsha, 4 June 1912; M. Wilson, 'The Nguni people,' in M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, Oxford History of South Africa, vol. I (1969), 124.

eighteenth century, however, the organisation of social force began to replace circumcision schools as the major incorporative device affecting young males, who were the most efficient members of social force. After the harvest, youths were inducted into age grades (amabutho) under the direct control and tutelage of the amakosi, but in place of the three to four months ceremonial and isolation of circumcision, there followed training and practice in hunting and warfare.

Despite the lack of evidence of the stages through which this reorganisation passed, there is circumstantial evidence of the connexion between the changes in productive forces, the expansion of certain ruling lineages and social structural change. In terms of chronology, traditions from Mthethwa suggesting that circumcision schools lapsed before Dingiswayo's reign are paralleled by others suggesting that Dingiswayo's predecessor, Jobe, had formed amabutho.[127] This is confirmed by reports to travellers in the 1820s and 1830s and traditions that only the very oldest Zulu men had passed through a circumcision school.[128] Further evidence also indicates that reorganisation of social force preceded the period of extensive warfare of Tshaka and Zwide. For example, the Mkize-Mbo of the Nkandla record amabutho in the reign of Gcwabe in the late eighteenth century, as do the Qwabe in the reigns of Kondlo and Phakatwayo.[129] There is doubt whether Senzangakona Zulu ever passed through a circumcision school and amabutho names survive from his allegedly peaceful reign.[130] Ngoni informants in Malawi refer to a long history of

[127] Bryant, Olden Times, 99; amabutho is here used to refer to military age grades; see below, p.210 for their other work roles.

[128] A.F. Gardiner, Narrative of a journey to the Zoolo Country, (London, 1836), 95; S. Kay, Travels in Caffraria, (London, 1833), 406; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary of Fynn, 12; Isaacs, Travels, II, 254; KCL SP V 67, evidence of Melapi, 27 April 1905.

[129] KCL SP U 43, evidence of Mbokodo, 5 Nov.1913; Bryant, Olden Times, 198; KCL SP V 43, evidence of Mmemi, 13 Oct.1904.

[130] Bryant, Zulu People, 492; NPA, Fynn papers, 32; Bryant, Olden Times, 642, 645; KCL SP Q, evidence of Ndukwana and Bunu, 9 Nov.1902, 138,141-2.

centralised manpower before the break up of Ndwandwe.[131]

Consideration of the mode of production explains the changes. The increased ivory trade of the eighteenth century resulted in the sharpening of the contradiction between ruling and subordinated lineages. On the one hand, access to the ivory trade enabled the expansion of some lineages at the expense of others, requiring the continued subjugation of newly subordinated and often widely dispersed lineages; on the other, hunting increased, yet the product had to remain in royal hands. The magnified social value of hunting - of continuous and systematic gatherings of large aggregations of manpower - required heightened identification of social force with the ubukosi to resist the threat to the ruling lineage from local use of collaborative manpower. Although this does not mean that all hunting was centralised, it is probable that most of the annual hunting was directed by the amakosi after the harvest. Such centralised control of social force gave the amakosi the capacity to impose further controls on non-royal lineages, firstly by controlling the age at which the amabutho were allowed to marry and secondly by enabling the payment of lobola as a reward for good conduct from royal sources[132] - effectively from participation in the ivory trade. The development of the amabutho as a means of ensuring centralisation of the product and control of the proceeds of foreign trade thus implies much intensifed extraction of surplus labour from, and exploitation of, the subordinate lineages by the dominant lineage, since the work process more effectively reproduced the domination of the latter over the former.

The changes in the social relations of production resulted from the accommodation of the lineage mode to the productive forces of a different mode, effected through foreign trade at Delagoa bay. Taylor defines the

131 M. Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, (London, 1956), 52.

132 Fuller exploration of the relationship of the amabutho and the kingship in Tshakan Zululand takes place below, p.208f.

essential quality of transitional modes of production thus:[133]

> "The labour processes existing under the previously dominant relations of production begin to be transformed in directions required by subsumption under the newly emerging form of extraction of surplus labour."

The late eighteenth century adjustments in the work processes of the region suggest the very early stages of such a transitional mode, where the productive forces affecting hunting were transformed but those affecting agriculture were unaltered. The mechanisms of the lineage mode, especially the ideological mechanisms, were sufficient to ensure the continued domination of the mode as expressed in the hierarchy of lineages, albeit in an altered social relationship.

However, further changes in productive forces in the final decade of the eighteenth century resulting from the sharp decline in the ivory trade and its replacement by trade in cattle[134] had deeper effects. While preceeding changes had been associated with the disposal mainly of a commodity of low local value, accompanied by small numbers of cattle, such centralisation had now to be maintained (reproduced) by the export mainly of a commodity with a very high local value, the basis of internal exchange and social investment; cattle stocks were also the most durable form of food storage available. The result of the demise of the ivory trade was a strong incentive to dispose of a further part of the cattle surplus and to organise its replacement from outside the chiefdom by use of the amabutho. Thus, according to tradition, the Mthethwa, could afford to send 100 cattle to Mabudu on the occasion of Dingiswayo's accession,[135]

133 John Taylor, Review of B. Hindess and P. Hirst, 'Precapitalist modes of production,' in Critique of Anthropology, No.6, (1976), 59; Cp. J. Goody, 'Economy and feudalism in Africa,' in Economic History Review, vol.22, (1969), 395: "The impact of trade on social organisation of course depends upon the degree to which productive activity is diverted to serve the purpose of foreign trade."

134 Above, p.151f.

135 Fynn, 'History,' in Bird, Annals, I, 63.

but in subsequent years, probably after the lengthy drought of 1801-2, they faced food shortages which they could not meet from their own resources but which they made good by acquiring cattle from the Qwabe.[136]

The altered productive - including ecological - forces in the transitional mode of production constituted a major pressure in the evolution of the amabutho. Before the mid-eighteenth century the acquisition of cattle and other booty was a frequent enough outcome of the deployment of social force.[137] From the late eighteenth century, however, the protection and acquisition of cattle by the amabutho was the only means of ensuring the inflow of goods - metals and cattle - required for the operation of the transitional infrastructure.[138] These forces underlay early nineteenth century conflict and the emergence of Tshaka's Zulu kingdom, to which the next chapter turns.

136 KCL SP T, Biography of Dingiswayo, 26-7.

137 See for example, RSEA I, Perestrello, 247-8; II, Lavanha, 335-7; VIII, Feyo, 336.

138 According to Fynn, much of Dingiswayo's expansion was accompanied by the distribution of a proportion of every defeated people's cattle to his warriors - these were usually the oxen; other cattle, on the other hand were returned to their owners, thus facilitating the continuity of local reproduction and production; Fynn, 'History,' in Bird, Annals, I, 64.

Chapter VII

The emergence of Zulu domination

The death of Dingiswayo in the course of conflict between Ndwandwe and Mthethwa began a further ten years of warfare at the end of which, in 1826, the newly emergent Zulu kingdom under Tshaka was sufficiently strong to crush the Ndwandwe. Tshaka achieved this result through the elimination of opposition and the centralisation of the manpower of the non-Ndwandwe north of the Tugela. The nature of Zulu organisation under Tshaka and Dingane reflected the intensity of the conflict, mainly with the Ndwandwe, but also with other centres of power in the south of the region; it also reflected the necessity to reproduce the transitional mode of production. The Zulu kingdom was composed of hierarchies of lineages in which the dominance of the Zulu ruling lineage was closely associated with its control of the amabutho. Previously dominant ruling lineages remained largely intact and their leaders fulfilled powerful roles. The effectiveness of Zulu domination resulted in powerful opposition being expressed only through members of the ruling lineage.

According to traditions and the first European accounts, Tshaka assumed the ubukosi of the Zulu not long before Dingiswayo's final campaign, c1816;[1] shortly thereafter followed the meeting between the Ndwandwe and the Zulu at Gqokli hill south of the mid-White Mfolosi. Tshaka's forces of Zulu and Mthethwa were heavily outnumbered and though the battle was fought to an indecisive conclusion, the Zulu managed only with difficulty to retain part of their cattle stock. Tshaka's reaction to his inability to remove the Ndwandwe threat was to move southward toward the Mhlatuze and to attempt to bolster his forces with those of

[1] Fynn, (Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 1, 13), arrived at the date of 1816 for Tshaka's accession by counting the number of umkosi festivals Tshaka had held; see also, Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 89, quoting the original fragment of Fynn, where 1817 is given; cp. F.G. Farewell, 'Character of Chaka,' in Bird, Annals, I, 93, where an estimate that Tshaka had ruled for eight years in 1825 is given.

new allies, including those of the Qwabe and Ndwandwe defectors such as Mzilikazi.[2]

In the following year, Ndwandwe forces crossed the Mfolosi and marched almost to the Tugela before Tshaka engaged them, weakened by travel, in a two-day battle near the Mhlatuze. This ended in the Zulu's favour, but Zwide was not killed and the Ndwandwe, though subsequently chased across the Pongolo, retained a considerable part of their force.[3] While therefore Tshaka's army was the most powerful south of the Pongolo from the end of winter 1819, the threat from Ndwandwe had not disappeared. Indeed the first British visitors to the Zulu reported how seriously the possibility of invasion from the north appeared to the Zulu. In August 1824 Tshaka was wounded in an attempted assassination by supposedly Ndwandwe agents.[4] Before the small force sent out to locate Zwide returned, Fynn reported that Tshaka was in fear of impending attack after receiving intelligence of the presence of Ndwandwe men north of the Mfolosi; in the event this was a false alarm, and Tshaka's army returned with approximately eight hundred Ndwandwe cattle, having failed to locate Zwide himself.[5] Early in 1826 the Ndwandwe were thought to have penetrated far into Zululand, and their forces, now led by Zwide's heir Sikunyane, were considered the equal of Tshaka's;[6] Farewell thought they exceeded

[2] Leslie, Among the Zulus, 94; Bryant, Olden Times, 174-5, 193,198,422; E.A. Ritter, Shaka Zulu, (London, 1955), 149.

[3] Bryant, Olden Times, 205; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 17-18; Ritter, Shaka, 167f; KCL SP Ms.21357, evidence of Sihlulu Mhlongo.

[4] Fynn, 'Visit to Chaka,' in Bird, Annals, I, 81; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 83.

[5] Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 68, quoting original fragment by Fynn; Stuart and Malcolm, Diary, 89, 91.

[6] Isaacs, Travels, I, 79; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 68; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 126.

the Zulu army by many thousands.[7] A Zulu tradition relates that an Ndwandwe defector told Tshaka of the inadequacy of his forces compared with those of the Ndwandwe.[8] Moreover, Tshaka's insistence that some of the traders accompany his expedition against Sikunyana at the end of winter 1826 suggested to them that Tshaka was not confident of victory, though the Europeans themselves considered defeat unlikely.[9] However, when battle was joined at Ndololwane hill to the north of the upper Pongolo, the Ndwandwe were routed in one and a half hours.[10] Isaacs, who was not at Ndololwane but visited the Zulu capital after the return of the expedition, reported Tshaka in a better mood than the traders had experienced before 'having now destroyed the most powerful tribe with which he had ever contended; and in fact the only one which could have held out so long.'[11]

The military success of the Zulu in 1826 resulted from Tshaka's reorganisation of northern Nguni political structure, much of which was achieved by the judicious exploitation of rivalries within the existing

7 'Character of Chaka,' in Bird, Annals, I, 93.

8 KCL SP V 61, evidence of Socwatsha, 18 April 1905.

9 Ibid.; Isaacs, Travels, I, 117; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 65, quoting original notes of F.G. Farewell.

10 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 123-8; the role of the Europeans at the battle remains obscure: both Farewell and Fynn claim to have travelled to the Zulu base camp, but then to have attended the battle alone, leaving the other behind. Fynn states that firearms were used only by Tshaka's men and to little effect; it is possible that both writers adjusted their testimony so as to minimise their role to conform with instructions received from Cape authorities whose favour they sought; see Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 65; Cp. Farewell to Somerset, 1 May 1824, and 6 Sept.1824; Brink to Farewell, 5 May 1824, in Bird, Annals, I, 71-3, 191-3; see also KCL SP V 62, evidence of Maziyana, 21 April 1905, where Fynn is also said to have assisted Tshaka in the battle; the manner of the assistance is not specified, but Fynn received a share of the captured livestock for his trouble. See below, p233f for the importance of Europeans to the Zulu political structure, including the fear wrought by their arms.

11 Isaacs, Travels, I, 124.

The emergence of Zulu domination

Map 14



ruling lineages combined with superior tactical, though not initially numerical, force. The security of the southern part of the region was founded upon the allegiance to Tshaka of the Qwabe, the most numerous of the northern Nguni chiefdoms.[12] According to traditions, shortly after the indecisive battle of Qgokli hill with the Ndwandwe, Tshaka requested support from Phakatwayo who refused. Several versions of the ensuing conflict exist; Qwabe testimonies seek to explain how they were overcome through witchcraft or dishonest subterfuge against Phakatwayo:[13] a short battle occurred in which Qwabe forces were quickly neutralised by the capture of their king and the Zulu possession of the Hlokohloko heights above the royal town. Tshaka is alternatively said to have demonstrated his superiority by jumping over the injured Phakatwayo who afterwards died of shock, or to have allowed the Qwabe inkosi's own family rivals to kill him.[14]

Indeed the coherence of the Qwabe ruling lineage was already weakened by the defection prior to the combat of one of its strongest characters, Phakatwayo's brother Nqeto.[15] Between 1818 and 1828 Nqeto and Tshaka supervised Qwabe affairs to their mutual benefit. Initially the Qwabe ruling lineage gave up a proportion of its cattle to the Zulu, who thus made good their losses to the Ndwandwe, and its amabutho were combined with those of Tshaka for expeditionary purposes. Nqeto became the inkosi in all but name and a close friend of Tshaka,[16] who according to

12 Chapter VI, p.175.

13 KCL SP B, evidence of Kambi and Mtshwayiza, 74-5; SP V 43, evidence of Mmemi, 13 Oct.1904.

14 Ibid.; Bryant, Olden Times, 198-9.

15 KCL SP F, evidence of Meseni ka Musi, 9 August 1904.

16 Ibid; SP V 46, evidence of Mmemi, 25 Oct.1904; V 43, idem, 15 Oct. 1904; Bryant, Olden Times, 200; Cf. the telescoped version of Nqeto's early career in Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 17, 165.

Qwabe testimony, took care to foster Qwabe confidence in their new ties with the Zulu: other members of the ruling lineage, Kondlo's sons Godolosi, Godide and Vubukulwayo had chosen flight to Zwide rather than submit to Tshaka, but the Ndwandwe proved hostile and Godolosi with most of the exiled Qwabe returned to their own country, where Tshaka allowed them to resettle and marry.[17]

The removal of Qwabe independence, the addition of its manpower and access to its agricultural resources enabled the Zulu to repulse the Ndwandwe at the Mhlatuze - in Qwabe territory - in 1819, and thereafter to impose their domination successively over the remaining non-Ndwandwe northern Nguni chiefdoms. After 1819 there was no alternative to ultimate submission to Tshaka except escape; however, Tshaka continued to expand his power by the use of existing ruling lineages, the exploitation of rivalries within them, and between them and their subordinates. Thus the Zulu achieved undisputed power in Mthethwa in 1821. After Dingiswayo's death and the ensuing Ndwandwe attack, the Nyambose ruling lineage recovered some of its authority in the person of Dingiswayo's young heir Somveli, who was, however, under the tutelage of Mlandela, an older Nyambose cousin, and personal confident of Tshaka.[18] After an apparently minor dispute with Tshaka, Somveli and other Mthethwa dissidents escaped northward via Tembe in July 1821, leaving Mthethwa governed by Mlandela and other members of the royal lineage favourable to Tshaka.[19] Part of the major subordinate lineage of the Ndwandwe, the Nxumalo, related to the Mthethwa, had already joined Tshaka, and after

17 KCL SP V 41, evidence of Mbovu, 16 Sept.1904; v 43, evidence of Mmemi, 13 Oct.1904.

18 Bryant, Olden Times, 202-3.

19 AHU Moç. Códice 1393, da Costa Matoso - Governor General, 11 July 1821 and 28 July 1821; Cp. Bryant, Olden Times, 422, 451, 472, where the date of Somveli's flight is estimated at 1824, a date based on the estimate given for Mzilikazi's defeat (1822) at which Somveli is said to have been present.

Zwide's defeat at the Mhlatuze, resettled near Nongoma.[20]

To the west of the Qwabe, Zulu control was established by similar means through the subjugation of the Cube, Tembu, Cunu and Mbo. Traditions recount that the Cube succeeded in repulsing Tshaka's attempt to occupy the valuable military strongholds in their territory near the Nkandla forest before the battle of the Mhlatuze. However, with the aid of defectors the Zulu were able to penetrate Cube defences and kill their inkosi. The ruling lineage then split, with Zokufa, a relative of Tshaka contesting the ubukosi against Duluzana, who supported and assisted Zwide. On Tshaka's victory over the latter Zokufa became the chief over the Cube, though a subject of Tshaka.[21]

In the case of the Mbo, inkosi Zihlandlo submitted to Zulu authority without serious conflict and deprived of most of his amabutho, the king himself became a firm ally of Tshaka, accompanying him on several campaigns, including those against the Pondo and Sikunyane; he was also required to conduct minor campaigns for the Zulu.[22] The Tembu inkosi, Ngoza, attempted resistance to the Zulu by drawing under his control the smaller chieftaincies of the lower Mzinyati such as the Kuze and Ntlangwini, and by involving the Cunu in his defence. Although he managed to defeat one unsupported Zulu impi, Ngoza lost most of his stock and people to another and fled southward deep into Natal. Subsequent Zulu domination was facilitated by the prior defection of leaders of the Tembu's subordinate lineages, the Kuze and Sithole, one of whom, Jobe Sithole, became an ally of Tshaka and ruler in Ngoza's place of

20 Bryant, Olden Times, 214.

21 KCL SP H, Historical notes on the AmaCube tribe; Bryant, Olden Times, 415; Cp. the split among the Zungu before Tshaka's tactical withdrawal toward Qwabe territory; Leslie, Among the Zulus, 94.

22 KCL SP U 23, evidence of Mbokodo, 5 Nov.1913; Isaacs, Travels, I, 139, 149; KCL SP V 72, evidence of Madikane, 26 May 1905; Bryant, Olden Times, 511, 513.

much of the lower Mzinyati.[23]

Other chiefdoms came under control through the ruling lineages or their internal contradictions: most of the subordinate lineages of the eLangeni submitted to Tshaka before the final elimination of inkosi Makedama.[24] In the coastal zones south of the Tugela, the Cele inkosi, Mande, was killed and replaced by his heir Magaye, who was deprived of some of his forces but retained others which he used to acquire livestock and perform limited operations for the Zulu.[25] In the subsequent strife between members of the Cele ruling lineage, Tshaka called upon other ruling lineage heads to assist in arbitration.[26] In the case of the Ngcobo, on the northern bank of the lower Tugela, Tshaka himself chose between two contestants for leadership of the ruling lineage.[27]

II

The main purpose of Tshaka's expansion was the removal of alternative loci of ideological, political and economic independence which could result in opposition and its corollary, cooperation with Zwide and Sikunyane; coupled with that motive was the need to ensure continued economic production by households and the collection of tribute. Political change in Tshaka's reign did not result necessarily in the removal of existing ruling lineages or their hierarchies of subordinate lineages but it did subject these to the newly dominant Zulu lineage. Hence Tshaka became the only inkosi between the Tugela and the Pongolo; and

23 KCL SP U 30, evidence of Lunguza, 13 March 1909; U 14, evidence of Lugubu, 4 March 1909; Bryant, Olden Times, 250-1, 253.

24 KCL SP V 47, evidence of Ngidi, 7-8 Nov.1904.

25 KCL SP V 66, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 26 April 1905; V 72, evidence of Madikane, 26 May 1905.

26 KCL SP V 56, evidence of Dinya, 8 April 1905.

27 KCL SP H, evidence of Socwatsha, n.d.

like predecessors such as Dingiswayo, he became the only legitimate authority over social force, while the amakosi of pre-existing ruling lineages became the abanumzane of the kingdom.[28]

The formal ties between the Zulu royal lineage and its subordinates were expressed by the gift of daughters to the inkosi; these were the umdlunkulu girls, whose marital arrangements the inkosi handled as if they were closely related to him. They were married individually to selected people of advanced years on state occasions, with a very high lobola of approximately a hundred cattle.[29]

The effective ties between the ruling lineage and its subordinates originated in the political and ideological levels of the lineage mode of production; in particular, the ideological level had a pronounced military and authoritarian character. The ideological preeminence of the inkosi was closely linked to his control of social force and of social reproduction. Tshaka and Dingane monopolised the holding of the umkosi ceremonial at the beginning of the harvest season; some local ceremonies were still held and often retained distinctive attributes of the pre-existing ruling lineages, but they could only take place after the Zulu umkosi, and could not be called such; hence they appeared to signify annually the submission of local power centres to the Zulu. Thus for example the Hlubi umkosi was forbidden by Tshaka and a simpler feast called the igagane substituted.[30]

The major distinction of the royal umkosi from the local ceremonies was its role in asserting the ideological identity between the inkosi and the amabutho. The latter were formed at the great umkosi, and their

28 KCL SP V 17, evidence of Ndukwana, 4 April 1903; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 87.

29 KCL SP A, Notes on the isigodlo, by James Stuart; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 298-9.

30 Isaacs, Travels, II, 241-2; KCL SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 Jan. 1909; Lugg, 'Agricultural ceremonies,' in Bantu Studies, III (1929) 367,376.

initiation proceeded at the same time as the ritual fortification of the inkosi. The physical and spiritual welfare of the ibutho was associated with that of the inkosi; the loyalty of the ordinary Zulu soldier to the king stemmed from their strength appearing to originate from the same source: they seemed to be formed and bound together. Some of the materials used in the rituals undertaken by all the amabutho on this occasion or immediately before war were added to the king's inkata yokusonga izwe, the coiled mat of medicated straw which physically symbolised the binding together of the country.[31] Such ties were reinforced by ceremonial before each battle, and indeed by the performance of the king's praise singer on the march.[32]

The series of campaigns undertaken by Tshaka to establish Zulu dominance led to the creation of a large number of amabutho. Their manpower came from the amabutho left by his predecessors Dingiswayo and Senzangakona, and others bodily removed from defeated amakosi, such as Qwabe, Mbo and Cele; from young men coming of age; from individuals detached or captured from erstwhile enemies, and refugees from conflicts in which the Zulu had little or no part.[33]

On its foundation, each ibutho built a military village or ikanda which was placed at a strategic location; for example, Tshaka's first wholly new ibutho, the Fasimba, was garrisoned near the present Eshowe in Qwabeland.[34] Within the ibutho and ikanda were divisions such as

[31] KCL SP V 27, evidence of Ndukwana, 26 June 1903; Bryant, Zulu People, 476-7, 519, 520-1.

[32] KCL SP P, Stuart's notes, 5 March 1926; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 88-9; Isaacs, Travels, I, 164-5.

[33] For lists of amabutho, and their composition see KCL SP V 49, evidence of Ngidi, 9 Nov.1904; SP Q, evidence of Johannes Kumalo, 10 Sept.1900; Bryant, Olden Times, 64-5; see also KCL SP V 6, evidence of Mkando, 10 Aug.1902, for the absorption of captives into the amabutho.

[34] Bryant, Olden Times, 643, for the list of amakanda; see also KCL SP V 28, evidence of Tununu, 14 June 1903, for Dingane's royal towns.

izigaba and amaviyo, or battalions and companies. The latter were formed from men of the same locality, to facilitate communication in the heat of battle; the command of these units offered some scope for the maintenance of local hierarchies of leadership.[35] One ibutho, the Iziyendane, was composed entirely of Hlubi refugees who were regarded as especially brave fighters and were usually employed in the vanguard of the attack.[36] However, this ibutho had no ikanda of its own, but remained in charge of Tshaka's cattle kraals, which they had helped fill by gathering much of the stock of Natal remaining after the passage of the Cunu and Tembu.[37]

Each ikanda was also a royal town: at its head were royal quarters for the inkosi's female relatives, including the older and authoritative women, such as Langasana, one of Senzangakona's surviving wives, who were responsible to the king for conduct of the umdlunkulu girls assigned to the ikanda, and who were the visible presence of the ruling lineage.[38] According to Fynn and Bryant, only a proportion of each ibutho was always required to staff the garrison of the ikanda, the remainder returning on call up.[39] The garrison was thus the nucleus of the defence force, but it also performed a range of labour services for the inkosi such as the growing of crops, herding of cattle and maintenance of the town. Other garrisons formed the royal bodyguard at the capital and on tour.[40]

35 KCL SP V 27, evidence of Ndukwana, 10 June 1903; SP N, evidence of Socwatsha, 4 June 1912; evidence of Mpatshana, 28 May 1912; see also Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 283-286; NPA, Fynn papers, 38, for physical descriptions of the amakanda.

36 KCL SP V 49, evidence of Mbovu, 13 Nov.1904; SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 Jan.1909.

37 Bryant, Olden Times, 644; KCL SP V 66, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 26 April 1905.

38 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 284; Gardiner, Narrative, 63; Leslie, Among the Zulus, 71; Bryant, Olden Times, 497.

39 Ibid.; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 286.

40 KCL SP V 55, evidence of Dinya, 1 April 1905; Bryant, Olden Times, 497.

The system of rewards to the amabutho was central to the reproduction of Zulu domination over the newly subordinated lineages. The relationship between war service and payment in cattle is suggested by an early tradition to the effect that after his first encounter with the Ndwandwe, Tshaka acquired young soldiers from the Zungu by paying over cattle to their chief.[41] Tshaka is said to have promised cattle to individuals for effective leadership in battle,[42] and the prospect of acquiring the enemies' cattle was a consistent motive in the ranks.[43] Both Tshaka and Dingane rewarded their soldiers liberally with cattle captured in battle.[44] Dingane's successful raid against the Ndebele south of the Limpopo in October 1837 was followed by systematic distribution of the proceeds:

> "Then cattle were given to the captains and highest in rank by the king, some ten perhaps to the highest, while the lowest must be satisfied with two, four or six."[45]

Indeed, the occasional failure to distribute livestock resulted in discontent.[46] On the other hand after the assassination of Tshaka, Dingane ensured the loyalty of many of his predecessor's officers by means of what Fynn described as excessive gifts of cattle.[47]

The structural contradiction between the reproductive interests of

41 Bryant, Olden Times, 177.

42 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndengezi, n.d.

43 KCL SP V 80, evidence of Ngidi, 18 Oct.1905; see also, A.R. Booth, ed., Journal of the Rev. George Champion, (Cape Town, 1967), 106.

44 Isaacs, Travels, I, 283; KCL SP N, evidence of Mpatshana, 28 May 1912; SP U 31, evidence of Luguza, 14 March 1907; NPA, Fynn papers, 21; Booth, ed., Champion, 106.

45 Booth, ed., Champion, 115.

46 KCL SP V 39, evidence of Ngidi, 14 Aug.1904.

47 NPA, Fynn papers, 10; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 162.

the Zulu and those of their subordinates was overcome at the economic level by the flow of goods from royal sources, mostly cattle gifts to the amabutho, in return for the surrender of manpower to the inkosi. Exchange of cattle for wives (lobola) remained an essential feature of the mode of production;[48] at least in the latter half of his reign, Tshaka had immense reserves of royal cattle partly acquired from subjugated chiefdoms, and largely distributed around the amakanda for the maintenance of the amabutho.[49] His control of rewards to the latter indicates the achievement of domination in the lineage mode of production with the social apparatus developed from the inception of the transitional stage in the later decades of the eighteenth century.[50]

In Tshaka's reign, Zulu political and ideological strength enabled the inkosi to use the system of rewards to control lobola and marriage to his own advantage. Many informants attested to the dearth of cattle in Zululand early in Tshaka's reign, as indeed in Mabudu in Makhasane's;[51] indeed, it is probable that early nineteenth-century warfare exacerbated the losses of stock from trade and drought through, for example, the Ndwandwe removal of Mthethwa and Zulu herds, and the heavy expenditure on military campaigns.[52] Both Tshaka and Makhasane used their authority to adjust the general level of lobola, in the Zulu case to a nominal figure.[53] However, the size of royal Zulu herds in the mid 1820s, before

48 Cf. above, Chapter III, 67, 75-6, passim.

49 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 75f.

50 See above, Chapter VI, 197-9.

51 KCL SP A, Notes of J. Stuart; SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; Bryant, Zulu People, 590-1.

52 See Chapter VI, p.198 and Chapter II,p.35 ; above p.200f.

53 'Evidence of H.F. Fynn before the Native Commission, 1852', in Bird, Annals, I, 114; KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; Isaacs, Travels, I, 40 suggests the level was 3 cattle in Tshaka's reign; Cp, Gardiner, Narrative, 89, where 4-6 is given as the general level in Dingane's reign.

the acquisition of very large numbers from the defeated Ndwandwe in 1826,[54] and Tshaka's success in preventing his own amabutho from marrying suggest that the reports of the lack of stock stem partly also from the over-centralisation of cattle in the early years of the Zulu monarchy. The prevention of marriage aided the maintenance of the high level of centralised manpower required for the prosecution of warfare, raiding and internal security in the 1820s. Not all the Zulu military remained unmarried in Tshaka's reign; a number of amabutho taken over from his predecessors and newly subordinate chiefdoms had achieved this status earlier; nor is it certain that such age groups were prevented from acquiring additional wives.[55] Controls on marriage were completed through the formation of female amabutho which were allowed to associate with and, after Tshaka's death, marry specified male amabutho;[56] however, the female age groups seem only occasionally to have been called up for labour service, and remained at their fathers' homes until married.[57] Moreover, particular marriages continued to be supervised by the abanumzane.[58]

The effectiveness of the military inflection in the hierarchical ideology of the lineage mode of production is attested in a European commentary of 1837:

> "For war the nation is trained from youth. Even children are full of their miniature prowess. The dances inspire them with ideas of war. The custom of yearly going out to fight keeps the subject fresh in their minds and from the way in which cattle are divided to the brave, they learn that by this craft they have their wealth."[59]

[54] Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 75f; Fynn reckoned that the Zulu acquired 60,000 cattle from the Ndwandwe in 1826: ibid., 126.

[55] Ibid., 300; Bryant, Olden Times, 642.

[56] KCL SP L, notes by James Stuart; SP B, evidence of Socwatsha, 29 Dec. 1901; Bryant, Olden Times, 645; Cp. Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 297.

[57] Bryant, Zulu People, 495.

[58] Isaacs, Travels, II, 254-5.

[59] Booth, ed., Champion, 106.

The successful outcome of warfare justified the praises of the king: it was Tshaka who conquered the nations, and Dingane whose greatness and wisdom, epitomised in successful raiding, increased the wealth of the kingdom.[60] Tshaka became the object of veneration as the possessor of ubukosi and the initiator of a successful political order. According to Fynn:[61]

> "The success that had always attended him in his numerous wars and his own pretensions to superiority led his followers to believe that he was more than human; and in this light he was ever adored by his subjects."

The need to reproduce the close association between the mystical appeal of the Zulu inkosi and the loyalty of the amabutho underlies the need for frequent military campaigns; the military inflection in social ideology required demonstration for its perpetuation, and the inkosi required cattle for reward. Moreover, success in warfare and raiding enabled the continuous use of the amabutho for the removal of political opponents within Zululand as a challenge to the inkosi's spiritual authority; the cattle of his opponents accrued to the royal herds which succoured the amabutho.[62]

Neither Tshaka nor Dingane ruled alone; the size of the country and its army necessitated considerable delegation of authority. The most trusted of the inkosi's advisors and delegates were members of the ruling lineage. Preeminent among these in both reigns was Mapitha, a cousin of Tshaka,[63] who entrusted him with the control of the sub-region north of the Mfolosi hitherto dominated by the Ndwandwe and under threat of invasion

60 KCL SP L, Extract of Tshaka's praises; SP M, Dingane's praise songs.

61 Fynn, 'History,' in Bird, Annals, I, 67.

62 Ibid.; Isaacs, Travels, I, 198; II, 246; for instances of such political executions, see Isaacs, Travels, I, 129f.

63 Mapitha's title was 'uyise benkosi' or 'mtanenkosi" father of, or even the same as, the king, a relationship implying that there was no motive or possibility of a threat to the king; KCL SP V 4, evidence of Ndukwana, 28 October 1902; SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 18 March 1909. The precise

from them until 1826 and from Swazi raids thereafter.[64] Mapitha built his town in the upper Mona valley near the sites of Zwide's main southern kraals; he was responsible for the revival and reorganisation of the sub region in the interests of the Zulu royal lineage, including the resettlement of refugees and exiles from other parts of the kingdom.[65] According to traditions, his powers were exceptional and far-flung; at the ideological level, he could supervise homage and sacrifice to Zulu royal ancestors in the same way as the inkosi,[66] a rare privilege but an essential focus in a hitherto hostile territory.

Mapitha's town was effectively a royal court where political and judicial matters were investigated, only the most serious being channelled to the Zulu capital; his royal authority gave Mapitha power of decision and arbitrary execution. His mother, Bondile, and brothers, though of lower rank, lived at his court and had considerable authority in their own right.[67] Among the responsibilities of Mapitha and his family were the small chiefdoms in the sections of the uBombo south of the Usutu gap, such as the Mgomezulu and Nyawo. Though not incorporated into Zululand in the sense of contributing to the amabutho, they were tributaries governed by Mapitha,[68] who thus supported the security of the routes to Mabudu and

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relationship to Tshaka is uncertain, probably obscured by propaganda generated by the role of Mapitha's son, Zibhebhu, in later Zulu politics; Bryant, (Olden Times, 45), writes that Mapitha's father Sojiyisa was the illegitimate son of Jama's brother, Mhlaba. Stuart's reconstruction has Sojiyisa simply as a brother of Senzangakona; KCL SP I, genealogy of the Zulu based on information of Mangati, Tshingana, Cetywayo, and Mmemi.

64 KCL SP V 4, evidence of Ndukwana, 28 October 1902.

65 KCL SP U 14, evidence of Lugubu, 4 March 1909; Bryant, Olden Times, 214, 258; Delegorgue, Voyage, II, 30-32; See also below, p

66 KCL SP B, evidence of Socwatsha, 28 Dec.1901.

67 KCL SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 20 Oct.1900; SP V 4, idem, 27 Oct. 1902; SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 18 March 1909.

68 KCL SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 20 Oct.1900.

Delagoa bay.

Although there is no record of any Zulu ikanda under Mapitha's command, he probably controlled several sections of different amabutho; his high rank and favour with Tshaka and his authority with the army in the absence of the king was shown in 1828 when Tshaka charged him with secret instructions regarding the conduct of the Zulu impi to the Transkei, and its possible encounter with Europeans.[69] Mapitha was also loyal to Dingane, and dealt closely with the inkosi's highest officers on his visits to the capital.[70] Moreover, he supported Dingane on his flight northward in 1839 in the first Zulu civil war; one informant related that Mapitha remained for a time at the uBombo with the stricken king.[71] On Dingane's death, Senzangakona's aged sister, Mnkabayi, is said to have ordered the removal of the remaining royal herds to Mapitha.[72]

Apart from his brother Ngwadi, an independent figure much favoured by Tshaka, though not with any political role,[73] other powerful members of the ruling lineage under both kings were women. These included their aunts Mnkabayi, Mmama, and Mawa, who were stationed in the amakanda; they channelled intelligence on the affairs of the army garrisons and their appointed officers to the capital, and supervised the general conduct of the amakanda, ensuring their loyalty to themselves and the inkosi.[74]

The heads of the pre-existing ruling lineages or their replacements,

69 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 144; below, p.230ffor Tshaka's relations with Europeans.

70 KCL SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 18 March 1909.

71 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndukwana, 28 Dec.1901.

72 KCL SP B, evidence of Socwatsha, 28 Dec.1901.

73 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 156, 158-9; Ngwadi was, however, not Senzangakona's son, and therefore not a prince of the same rank as Dingane, or Mpande; ibid., 156, 158.

74 Bryant, Olden Times, 42-4, 50; see Leslie, Among the Zulus, 70, for the description of Langasana and her position in Mpande's reign.

whose actions and circumstances resulted in the inkosi's favour and trust were usually known as izikulu, or great men, a title distinguishing them from less favoured abanumzane. Some izikulu had few resources and surviving relatives, but retained the residual authority from their lineage's erstwhile ubukosi, and were given cattle and land by Tshaka, who thus removed a motive for escape to the Ndwandwe, Gasa or Swazi. Indeed, one of Zwide's sons, Somapunga, fled to Tshaka on his father's death and became a prominent isikulu; he nevertheless had to conduct his relations with the inkosi through Mapitha.[75] Other izikulu were Mlandela Nyambose, responsible for Mthethwa lands, and Jobe Sithole, governor of the former Tembu domain in the lower Mzinyati; of the remaining leaders of previously ruling lineages, Nqetho (Qwabe), Zihlandlo (Mkize-Mbo) and Magaye (Cele) seem to have been particularly trusted by Tshaka.[76] Such men could not organise manpower as the king did (ukubutha abantu), however, although they could be entrusted with several amaviyo.[77]

Appointed officers, izinduna, commanded the amabutho and carried out other royal tasks; most of these owed their positions to prior service in the amabutho, and conformed to a hierarchy of authority in which the superior officials, izinduna ezinkulu, were the king's closest military advisors who also channelled the rewards of service to the amabutho. The ikanda commanders were responsible for the maintenance of local security to the court izinduna and the carrying out of royal justice near their towns.[78] However, the presence of members of the royal lineage in each ikanda, the reward system, and the ideological ties between the

75 KCL SP V 4, evidence of Ndukwana, 27 Oct.1902.

76 Ibid.; SP V 17, idem, 4 April 1903; above, p.204 for Nqetho and Zihlandlo and below, p226 for Jobe Sithole.

77 KCL SP V 17, evidence of Ndukwana, 4 April 1903; SP V 4, idem., 28 Oct. 1902.

78 For the responsibility of the izinduna see for example, Booth, ed., Champion, 92, passim; Isaacs, Travels, II, 245.

inkosi and individual members of the amabutho ensured that the authority of the commanders at court and garrison was wielded in the interests of the ruling lineage rather than its subordinates. The amabutho did not therefore constitute an institution integrally separate from the lineage hierarchy; its dispersal in the amakanda and the difficulty of collusion between its commanders enabled royal discipline to be maintained, ultimately by the use of one ibutho against another.[79]

In addition to the ceremony of the great umkosi at which all the notables and commanders were present, Tshaka asserted and demonstrated his ideological and political preeminence on other occasions. Fynn reported Tshaka's insistence on the public reiteration of the inferior status of the subsidiary chiefs gathered around him in southern Natal on the departure of the impi to the south in the dry season of 1828; on the army's return with an estimated 30,000 cattle, Tshaka devised a scheme to test and demonstrate its loyalty by inducing its commanders to request permission to embark on a further campaign, the most ambitious yet attempted, against the Gasa to the north west of Delagoa bay.[80] Potential ideological sources of political action other than the ubukosi had to be controlled. The izanusi, the diviners of guilt, had considerable independence of stature stemming from the need to appear distant from the kings who in practice influenced their decisions.[81] Tshaka brought the izanusi, who had formally helped buttress the power of pre-existing amakosi, under Zulu aegis: he is said to have gathered some of them at the royal capital and to have murdered those who failed his test of political acumen.[82] Reports of divination ('smelling out' or umhlahlo) from Dingane's

79 See for example KCL SP V 75, evidence of Mayinga, 8 July 1905.

80 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 145-7.

81 See the inverted tradition of enmity between inkosi and isanusi in Callaway, Religious System, 427, n.93.

82 KCL SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 18 March 1909; SP V 39, evidence of Ngidi, 14 August 1904; Callaway, Religious System, 120.

reign indicate that the death sentences arrived at were carried out only on the king's decision.[83] Probably owing to the ascription of illness to evil doing, the medical problems of the izikulu and izinduna required the attention of the royal doctors, to discover the source of the malefaction.[84]

Tshaka's removal of the centres of non-Zulu political and ideological independence and the coherence of Zulu control over social force enabled the Zulu lineage to reproduce its dominance over lineages of hitherto powerful amakosi, who nevertheless continued to have authority in the kingdom; as one of Stuart's main informants expressed the relationship, 'the country continued to be ruled by kings but by reducing them to ordinary status.'[85]

The coherence of the domination of the Zulu ruling lineage over the newly hierarchised subordinate lineages is shown by the nature of the opposition which led to the assassination of Tshaka and by the manner of Dingane's taking power. The close ties between the ruling lineage and the amabutho enabled the removal of political opposition from subordinate lineages.[86] Opposition could be mounted effectively only by members of the ruling lineage. Moreover, the likelihood of opposition being so expressed was enhanced by the fact that the ruling lineage was collectively identified with the ubukosi since the ancestors of the inkosi were also those of other members of the ruling lineage;[87] the latter could therefore take on the mantle of the inkosi's ideological preeminence without a

83 KCL SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 19 March 1909; see also Booth, ed., Champion, 85.

84 Gardiner, Narrative, 73-4.

85 KCL SP V 17, evidence of Ndukwana, 4 April 1903.

86 See above, p208 for such links.

87 See Chapter III above, p.77 et seq., for the ideological importance of the royal ancestors.

change in the hierarchical arrangement of lineages.

In Tshaka's reign, appointed ministers such as Mbikwana Nyambose, the inkosi's chief minister and confidant until his death in 1826, and his successors Mdlaka and Ngomane remained loyal despite opposition voiced at the excesses during the aftermath of the death of Nandi, the king's mother.[88] However, Tshaka did not eliminate his brothers, but usually sent them on campaigns.[89] According to some Zulu informants, Dingane and Mhlangana had plotted against Tshaka for some time before 1828, and were responsible for the attack on him in 1826 and again near Pondoland in mid-1828.[90] Their successful assassination of Tshaka in September 1828 took place when the army was away to the north east: a tradition relates that Dingane and Mhlangana returned when their ibutho was north of the Pongolo.[91] According to Fynn, there were five possible heirs and the proclamation of a successor had to await the return of the amabutho which had reached Gasaland, resulting in an interregnum of almost two months. Ngwadi, Tshaka's brother by the same mother, was regarded as the major threat to the new rulers because he was a potential focus of loyalty to the army. At the time of Tshaka's death, Ngwadi was in Zululand and controlled more forces than the assassins; however, he and his army were annihilated in a surprise attack.[92] Dingane and Mhlangana espoused the cause of peace; moreover, after the elimination of Mhlangana and the

88 KCL SP B, evidence of Socwatsha, 26 Dec.1901.

89 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndukwana, 26 Dec.1901; KCL SP V 80, evidence of Ngidi, 17 Oct.1905; CA GH 19/3, Fynn to Somerset, 28 Nov.1828; see also below for the removal of brothers by Dingane.

90 KCL SP V 39, evidence of Ngidi, 14 August 1904; SP R, evidence of Makewa, 8 October 1899; see also Isaacs, Travels, I, 259.

91 KCL SP V 80, evidence of Ngidi, 1905; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 151 f.

92 CA GH 19/3, Fynn to Somerset, 28 Nov.1828; Isaacs's deposition, Port Elizabeth, 19 Dec.1828; Isaacs, Travels, I, 290.

return of the amabutho in November, Dingane is reported to have sent cattle to the abanumzane of the formerly dominant lineages before they came to the installation, where they would receive more of the stock Tshaka removed from them.[93]

The transition between the two reigns, before Dingane succeeded in establishing his personal preeminence in place of Tshaka's, was a period of potential weakness for the Zulu ruling lineage. The demoralisation of the amabutho after its experiences in Gasaland, the permission given to some of the amabutho to marry, and Dingane's initial determination for internal peace[94] implied the relaxation of royal control over the leaders of previously dominant lineages subjected by Tshaka. Many such leaders had been appointed by, and were favourites of, Tshaka, and were ideologically associated with his rule; they could become the focus of opposition by attracting those opposed to Dingane as well as by attempting to reassert the independent authority of their lineages. Moreover the presence of the traders at Natal and Lourenço Marques increased the danger by appearing to offer the possibility of armed support to such opposition. Such a challenge to the ruling lineage occurred shortly after Dingane's accession when the inkosi determined to impose his authority over Nqetho Qwabe and indeed other chiefs by overturning a legal adjudication given in Nqetho's favour by an assembly of the major abanumzane. Nqetho, an appointee of Tshaka said to have regretted his patron's death, mounted a rebellion of several thousand Qwabe.[95]

Dingane, however, succeeded in retaining the loyalty of the amabutho;

93 Ibid., I, 290; CA GH 19/3, Fynn to Somerset, 28 Nov.1828.

94 Ibid.; Isaacs, Travels, II, 21.

95 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary 165; Fynn describes the number of Nqetho's followers only as 'a large body;' cf. 'Inhabitants of the territory now the Colony of Natal,' (Notes of information collected from African informants by Shepstone), in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 150, where it is stated that much of the 'tribe' deserted with Nqetho.

while allowing some of them to marry, he did not disband them. Indeed he asserted his own authority over them by the murder of Mdlaka and Ngomane and their replacement with Ndlela and Nzobo;[96] he also removed the chief induna of the Hlubi Iziyendane ibutho, which had been specially favoured by Tshaka.[97] The effectiveness of Dingane's control over the amabutho is suggested by Nqetho's flight across the Tugela and the capture of his herds by a Zulu impi near Port Natal. However Nqetho's attempt to escape to Mzilikazi after his defeat by the Pondo and Ncapayi underlined the threat to the Zulu monarch.[98] Thereafter Dingane removed a number of abanumzane, including Magaye Cele, who was suspected of aiding Nqetho, Nzwakele Dube, Sirayo Ngcobo and Zihlandlo Mkize.[99]

The flight of refugees from these prominent lineages to the protection of the Natal settlers posed an intractable problem for much of Dingane's reign. He had declared his friendship to the traders during the interregnum;[100] however, the refusal of the whites to give up the refugees resulted in consistent efforts to subject the traders to his rule, and in the absence of this, to ensure their allegiance to the Zulu ruling lineage rather than its subordinates. In the latter objective Dingane succeeded, despite interruptions in relations, until 1838[101] when one of

96 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 162-3.

97 KCL SP U 29, evidence of Mabonsa, 30 Jan.1909.

98 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 171-3.

99 Ibid., 162-3, 165, 167; KCL SP V 69, evidence of Melapi, 2 May 1905; SP V 65, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 26 April 1905; SP H, evidence of Msime, 23 Dec.1906.

100 CA GH 19/3, Fynn to Somerset, 28 Nov.1828; Farewell to Somerset, 15 Dec.1828.

101 See below, p.241f ; F. Okoye, 'Dingane: a reappraisal,' in Journal of African History, X (1969), for a review of Dingane's relations with the whites; Okoye sees Dingane's attitude of friendship toward the whites up

his cousins, Siguebana, allied with the whites in their expedition against the Zulu after the murder of Retief's party.[102] Moreover Dingane's removal of all the remaining sons of Senzangakona except Mpande minimised the threat to his personal preeminence from within the ruling lineage.[103] Only the heavy defeats inflicted on the amabutho by the Boers in 1838-9 dissolved the ideological authority which Dingane exerted over them, thus enabling their attachment to Mpande.[104]

The strength of the links between the ruling lineage and the amabutho survived in spite of Dingane's personal inactivity in warfare. Unlike Tshaka he did not travel on campaign and his failure to do so left him over dependant on his great izinduna. For example, Ndlela and Nzobo (Dambuza) misreported the heroic deeds of battle so as to use the reward system to their own advantage.[105] Traditions suggest also that the two izinduna had greater power over life and death than their counterparts in Tshaka's reign.[106] According to European reports they expressed decided misgivings over Dingane's tolerance of the presence of the refugees with the whites at Port Natal.[107] Mpande informed members of the Volksraad in October 1839 that Ndlela and Nzobo had urged his own murder

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to 1835 resulting from his coveting of their goods, and the refugee issue as leading only to deterioration of relations. That interpretation fails to recognise the ideological significance of white support and the presence of the refugees from 1830; cp below, p.234f.

102 KCL SP A, notes by James Stuart; for the flight of Siguebana, see Booth, ed., Champion, 119f.

103 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndukwana, 26 Dec.1901; SP U 4, evidence of Mangati, 1 July 1918; Gardiner, Narrative, 44-7.

104 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndukwana, 26 Dec.1901.

105 KCL SP U 1, evidence of Mandlakazi, 22 May 1916.

106 KCL SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 14 March 1909.

107 Gardiner, Narrative, 162.

while Dingane had prevented it.[108] The great izinduna seem therefore to have been as zealous in promoting Dingane's cause as their own.

[108] 'Minutes of the Volksraad,' 15 Oct.1839, in Bird, ed. Annals, I, 538.

Chapter VIII

Zulu political economy: production and trade

The capacity of the Zulu ruling lineage to reproduce its domination is shown by evidence of the extent of royal authority in production and trade under Tshaka and Dingane. The emergence in the northern Nguni area of a single preeminent centre of power resulted in a pronounced geographical centralisation of the political and ideological forces in production. Long distance trade was under close royal supervision. Goods from Delagoa bay were extracted via Ronga intermediaries. The Natal traders and hunters, and armed personnel at Lourenço Marques were valued for their contribution to the Zulu king's ideological and political supremacy, as well as for the products to which they gave access. Despite conflicts in the relationships between the interests of the Europeans at Delagoa bay and Port Natal and those of the Zulu ruling lineage, the latter succeeded in monopolising trade and the whites' military skills exclusively to its own advantage until Dingane's defeat.

The role of the amabutho in cattle raiding was a form of production and extraction over which the inkosi had personal control. Campaigns such as those against the Pondo and Ndwandwe in Tshaka's reign, and against the Ndebele and the Swazi in Dingane's resulted in the acquisition of large reserves of cattle,[1] socially reinvested by the king. The redistribution of a proportion of these to individual members of the amabutho, to the amakanda and to the major abanumzane enabled further exploitation of centralised manpower in raiding and warfare. Moreover, the amabutho carried out cultivation, pastoralism, hunting and building for

[1] For the campaigns, see Bryant, Olden Times, 621-4; KCL, SP V 63, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 22 April 1905; SP V 47, evidence of Ngidi, 5-6 Nov.1904; Booth, ed., Champion, 115; Letter of Champion, Grout and Adams, August 1826, in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 210; Statement respecting Dingane, by W. Wood, ibid., I, 378; see also Gardiner to Bell, 13 June 1837, ibid., I, 320.

the king, and occasionally accompanied trade missions as porters.[2] The process of raid and reinvestment in Zululand resulted in the long distance extraction of wealth from other peoples, and the comparative impoverishment of the latter. Hence Fynn's judgment of the Pondo and Swazi, whose forces the Zulu had not succeeded in destroying, that they had lost more cattle than men, who were now 'reduced to cultivation.'[3]

The lending of cattle from royal Zulu herds to subordinate lineages resulted in the extraction of surplus in the form of cattle and other products. For example, the Tembu under Jobe Sithole became the chief suppliers of fat-tailed sheep to the Zulu court. Jobe also had to supply cattle from his own stock in return for the loan of large numbers of royal cattle; consignments of cereals, skins and feathers were also exacted by the inkosi. The Umkulutshane ibutho, stationed in Jobe's area for part of Dingane's reign, consumed part of the product of the royal cattle, and ensured ultimate compliance with royal authority in an area cut off by high mountains from central Zululand. After his removal further west to eLenge hill (Jobe's kop) at Dingane's command, allegedly to allow the accommodation of the Fasimba ibutho in the lower Mzinyati, Jobe continued to receive royal cattle and to consign goods in return.[4] More generally the emergence of the new Zulu hierarchy did not result in the attenuation of powers in production of the umnumzane and umninimuzi; and cereals, animal products and artefacts could be exchanged for cattle and beads.[5]

The Zulu inkosi kept close control over the production of metal

2 Isaacs, Travels, II, 236-7, 241; Booth, ed., Champion, 105.

3 Evidence of H.F. Fynn before the Native Commission, 1852, in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 123; W. Beinart, 'Economic change in Pondoland in the nineteenth century,' Unpubl. Seminar paper, Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Univ. of London, 1975.

4 KCL SP U 31, evidence of Lunguza, 14-19 March 1909.

5 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 270, 273-4, 286.

artefacts, preventing potential opponents from realising their exchange value. Thus weapons, for which there was a continuous royal demand for use in warfare and hunting, although made in various parts of the country, were fashioned only by royal smiths who were rewarded by continuous gifts of foodstuffs and occasional gifts of cattle.[6] A major centre of iron production and forging, located in the upper Mona valley where the hills contained rich veins of ore, was under Mapita's control. There, the population of a tributary of the Mona earned its living from the iron industry; its blacksmiths, who had formerly made weapons for the Ndwandwe, were forbidden by Tshaka to keep cattle and were dependent on Mapita for animal products.[7] Brass and copper neckrings, armlets and wristbands were a sign of rank and favour at the royal court and were required apparel as a badge of identification and authority for the three to four months ceremonial and public activity lasting from harvest through winter.[8] Such insignia were manufactured only at the royal capital and at Mapita's town.[9]

The grip of the Zulu on the economy of the region is most clearly exemplified by the controls which Tshaka and Dingane exerted over long distance trade. To the north east, this followed the extension of Zulu power over the major southern Ronga states in the wake of the refugee Mthethwa and Ndwandwe chiefs between 1819 and 1824. All three refugee groups, led by Nyambose, Zwangendaba and Soshangane, passed through

6 KCL SP N, evidence of Mpatshana, 2 June 1912; SP X, 'Notes on metal working,' by J. Stuart; SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 30 Sept.1900.

7 Delegorgue, Voyage, II, 30-32.

8 KCL SP V 55, evidence of Dinya, 1 April 1905; 3-4 of the neck rings might be worn, with a leather collar to prevent chafing between neck and rings: KCL SP X, 'Notes on metalworking;' Booth, ed., Champion, 36; Gardiner, Narrative, 27, 49, 59-60; Isaacs, Travels, II, 237.

9 KCL SP X, evidence of Ndukwana and Gedle, 14 Oct.1900.

Tembe causing extensive disruption;[10] as an observer in 1823 reported, they appeared to be 'anxious for a footing near the sea for the benefits of trade.'[11] Indeed the Nyambose leader and Zwangendaba opened discussions with the Portuguese for the supply of brass, beads and cloth.[12] However Tshaka's interest in Delagoa stemmed partly from his need to eliminate the refugee amakosi; early in 1823 he sent an embassy with a gift of more than thirty elephant tusks to the Portuguese governor at Lourenço Marques, Cardinas.[13] Tshaka's leverage was considerable: in July 1823 Captain William Owen of the visiting British survey squadron reported that Cardinas had undertaken an armed sortie against Zwangendaba 'with a view to please Chaka of whom the commandant was in some dread.'[14] After expeditions of the Zulu to the Delagoa area, Zwangendaba and Soshangane moved to the north west of the bay, and in mid-1824 the states of Tembe, Madolo and Moamba were tributary to Tshaka.[15]

Mabudu had not been involved in the conflicts between the Ndwandwe and Mthethwa: after Dingiswayo's defeat, Mabudu maintained good relations

10 For these movements and the interrelationships between the refugee Nguni chiefs, the Portuguese, Ronga kings and the visiting British Naval squadron, see the clear and detailed account in Smith, Struggle, (Ph.D. thesis) 250-66. Smith concludes that the Nguni chief who intimidated the Portuguese in July 1821 was Zwangendaba; however, the sithakazelo Nyambose (Mthethwa) and the locality of the chief's home - south of Lake St.Lucia - throw doubt on this; AHU Moç., Códice 1393, Matoso to Governor General, 11, 28 July 1821. Cp.Ch.VII n.18, where this information is linked with the flight of Somveli Nyambose.

11 PRO Adm 1/2269, Osborne's description of Delagoa bay, encl. in Owen to Croker, 8 June 1823.

12 AHU Moç., Códice 1393, Matoso to Governor-General, 11,28 July 1821; PRO Adm.1/2269, W. Owen, 'Report on Portuguese settlements and Dominions of the Eastern Coast of Africa,' 15 April 1823.

13 Anselmo Nascimento, 'Extracto de um Protest,' 23 May 1823, in Jordão, ed., Baie, 161-2.

14 Owen, Narrative, I, 255.

15 PRO FO 97/303, Owen to Croker, 11 Oct.1826; Adm.1/2269, Owen to Croker, 19 June 1824.

with Zwide and Tshaka resulting in immunity from attack from both quarters.[16] After Zwide's defeat and the loss of many cattle to Soshangane, Mabudu also became a tributary of Tshaka,[17] some of whose officers were resident at Makhasane's capital in the winter of 1823.[18] According to Fynn, Makhasane had attempted to marry a daughter to the Zulu king, requesting fifty five bullocks in return; however, Tshaka refused to send the cattle and instead sent a party to take the daughter by force. Although it did not accomplish this task, the tolerance of the Zulu messengers by Makhasane and the payment of frequent tribute to the Zulu[19] indicates Mabudu's powerlessness against Zulu force.

The reports emanating from Owen's mission show that the Zulu did not despoil the country but took advantage of its strength and the products it offered. Mabudu remained productive and wealthy. William Threlfall, who visited the kingdom with Owen's assistance in September 1823 with a view to establishing a mission there, described the route from the trading post in the mid-Maputo valley to the capital: in a distance of approximately twelve to fifteen miles the country's rich soil was continuously cultivated; the area was populous, with homes grouped in clusters of fifty or sixty.[20] In comparison to the other southern Ronga kingdoms, Mabudu was more peaceful, its inhabitants wealthier and more confident; indeed, Owen found the contrast so marked that he attributed Mabudu's abundance to improvements brought about by the introduction of Nguni industry,[21] rather than its political security under the Zulu which was in

16 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 47-8.

17 RSEA II, Owen, 'Delagoa bay,' 468; KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897.

18 Broadbent, Threlfall, 83.

19 RSEA II, Fynn, 'Delagoa bay,' 482, 487.

20 Broadbent, Threlfall, 82-4.

21 RSEA II, Owen, 'Delagoa bay,' 469.

fact responsible.

As a Zulu informant testified, Mabudu was 'the great supplying country for Zululand.'[22] Notified of the royal demand after the harvest by Tshaka's messenger, Makhasane collected at his court the required quantity of local animal products of Mabudu hunters - the skins and furs of animals such as buck and monkeys; and articles such as calabashes, beer baskets and other goods made of materials common in the north east lowlands. Mabudu carriers then transported the goods to Zululand along with the beads, brass wire and cloth acquired from European ships and the Portuguese factory. On arrival at the Zulu court, the carriers were given cattle and shields for the Mabudu ihosi, and ivory and horn when the Zulu king required goods from the Europeans.[23]

Owen reported that in the early 1820s most of the ivory reaching the Portuguese settlement emanated from Mabudu itself and Zululand, and communication to the latter was via the narrow coastal lowlands south of Mabudu.[24] Prompted by the appearance with Owen's mission in 1823 of men such as Fynn and Maynard who hoped to open direct trade with Makhasane and Tshaka,[25] the Portuguese governor requested from Tshaka the cession of land near the southern uBombo for the establishment of a trading post.[26]

However the trade at Delagoa bay was subject to interruptions. Communication between Mozambique and Lourenço Marques was irregular owing to lack of shipping; Owen reported that the 'annual' vessel had not sailed

22 KCL SP V 32, evidence of Bikwayo, 12-13 Oct.1903.

23 Ibid; KCL SP Q evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 8 Nov.1897; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 47-8.

24 PRO, Adm 1/2269, Owen to Croker, 19 June 1824.

25 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 36, 40-1, 55-6; Maynard was the representative and nephew of H. Nourse, (brother of the Commander of the Cape Naval station), owner of the vessels which transported Fynn and Maynard; ibid., 36-7.

26 PRO, Adm 1/2269, Owen to Croker, 19 June 1824.

for three years in 1823, and Mozambique government officers were obliged to use British ships for the transport of personnel and documents. Moreover the Governor of the Presídio was charged with maintaining a monopoly of the trade with African chiefs, but did not have territorial authority over them or possess sufficient force to police Delagoa bay effectively.[27] The result was uncertainty of access for European and African traders; on the one hand the Governor purchased the cargo of visiting ships, mainly whalers, where he could enforce his authority.[28] On the other, traders who tried to communicate directly with the chiefs risked a raid and confiscation by the Portuguese garrison. Although brass wire, beads and cloth continued thus to be imported through Delagoa bay to Zululand,[29] the prospect of more direct contact with Europeans via the settlement at Port Natal proposed to Tshaka by Fynn in May 1824[30] moved the Zulu *inkosi* to refuse the Portuguese request for land to the south of Mabudu.[31]

However the expectations of the Natal traders and those of Tshaka and Dingane proved to be contradictory. As the first traders discovered, Tshaka refused to allow free trade between them and individual Zulu:

> "Chaka had an extreme aversion to anything like commercial traffic and forbade it among his people. Toward the Europeans he always expressed himself decidedly opposed to any intercourse having for its object the establishment of a mercantile connection with his subjects."[32]

27 PRO Adm 1/2269, W. Owen, 'Report on Portuguese East Coast Possessions,' 15 April 1823; Owen to Croker, 1 June 1823.

28 PRO Adm 1/2269, W. Owen, 'Report on Portuguese East Coast Possessions,' 15 April 1823; Petition of Anselmo Jose Nascimento, encl. in Owen to Croker, 27 August 1823.

29 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 41, 48; PRO Adm 1/2269, W. Owen, 'Report on Portuguese settlements and dominions,' 15 April 1823; Adm 1/2271, Deposition of John Hemsten, Cape, 29 Oct.1825.

30 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 58.

31 PRO Adm 1/2269, Owen to Croker, 19 June 1824.

32 Isaacs, Travels, I, 284.

Exchange with the Europeans was monopolised by the inkosi; although Isaacs was allowed to travel about Zululand to locate and acquire ivory, royal surveillance on transactions was strict. Thus when visiting the Mkize Mbo in December 1826, Isaacs found Zihlandlo unwilling to hand over ivory, claiming uncertainty over Tshaka's orders; indeed during Isaacs's stay royal messengers arrived to ascertain how much ivory the Mkize had amassed from their lands in the Mzinyati where the numerous elephants were hunted by the 'abatwa.' Isaacs encountered similar resistance from the Dube chief, Nzwakele, who nevertheless finally gave up his ivory.[33] Tshaka's wish to monopolise the trade also applied outside the kingdom: Fynn reported the inkosi's dislike of his trading with the Mpondo.[34]

Fynn's expeditions there were prompted by the discovery that trade with the Zulu was not as easy as the Europeans had anticipated. The Zulu king did not ensure the regularity of supply which the traders expected in the absence of free trade. According to Fynn, only in the winter of 1827 did Tshaka commence systematic hunting of elephants with the amabutho.[35] The difficulty of supply is confirmed by Isaacs's report early in 1828 that after almost three years trading less than one ship's cargo was transported to Port Elizabeth; much of this was the hippo and sea cow ivory Tshaka permitted them to hunt in the south east lowlands of Zululand.[36]

Indeed the traders at Natal recognised that commerce at Delagoa bay was on a more regular and business like footing: in February 1828, when a vessel en route there called at Port Natal, Isaacs consigned brass and

33 Ibid., 149, 181.

34 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 110.

35 Ibid., 131; see below, p.239f for the purposes of the royal hunt.

36 Isaacs, Travels, I, 182, 189, 215; Fynn was regarded as bankrupt early in 1829: CA GH 19/3, Campbell to Aitchison, 29 Jan.1829.

beads to be sold on their account; the vessel was reported trading in the Maputo a month later.[37] The presence of Ronga tribute bearers and ivory collectors in Zululand in 1824 and 1826[38] indicates that the supply of goods from that quarter continued. The Portuguese governor appears to have continued to press for direct links with Tshaka: in December 1825 a European Portuguese visited the Zulu capital to request cattle the factory required for sale to the whalers and French slavers who were well established at that juncture.[39] The garrison did not enforce the restriction against all the whalers and the occasional trading vessels; and the Zulu continued to benefit from the European trade through tribute from Mabudu and Tembe, while permitting the Ronga mahosi to trade with whom they could.[40] Moreover from 1826 the official trade monopoly at Lourenço Marques was transferred to a trading company, which nevertheless had to compete with the garrison's stock of trade goods it received from the Government as payment,[41] thus further undermining restrictions on trade with the Ronga chiefs. Competitive barter, resulting in the establishment of a known value for ivory in terms of brass or cloth to buyer and vendor at the time of the exchange, thus continued at Delagoa bay. At Port Natal, on the other hand, the absence of intermediaries led to direct relations with Tshaka who refused to

37 Isaacs, Travels, I, 211; Cape of Good Hope and Government Gazette, No. 1163, 25 April 1828, report of Cllr. Acland (H.M.S. Helicon).

38 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 93; Isaacs, Travels, I, 205; messages for the traders came via Delagoa bay, as did some of their medical supplies; ibid., 90, 185-6.

39 Ibid., 58-9; for the French slave trade, see Smith, Struggle, (Ph.D. thesis), 278f; PRO Adm 1/71, Anon (a Portuguese officer at Lourenço Marques) to Acland, 4 Feb.1828.

40 CA CO 6096, Ship arrivals from Delagoa bay, July 1826; Isaacs, Travels, II, 282; F. Santana, ed., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino,(2vols) (Lisbon 1964,1966), I (DAHU), Costa e Sá to Noronha, 2 April 1827, 355; GG to J.A. Teixeira, 16 June 1828, 940.

41 A. Lobato, Quatro estudos e uma evocação para a história de Lourenço Marques, (Lisbon, 1961), 123-5.

establish a value in terms of ivory for the goods he received, but preferred to licence the Europeans to collect ivory, mainly south of the Tugela.[42]

Although there is evidence of Tshaka's wish to acquire European goods such as beads and brass from the traders at Natal,[43] the evidence also shows that he was determined to add the weight of the white man's military technology and their manpower to his authority and to exclude the possibility of their being used by his enemies inside and outside the kingdom. Moreover the support which the Europeans could give was as much ideological as purely military. Owing to the close identification of the amabutho with the ubukosi, warfare was conducted at an ideological as well as a military level.[44] The aim was to fortify the morale of the amabutho and the authority of the inkosi by reinforcing their belief in the superiority of their ubukosi and diminishing the credibility of the enemy's, thus producing in advance of armed conflict the apparent probability of victory. These effects were usually produced by the acquisition of izidwedwe, parts of the personal articles used by the enemy king such as mats, skins or even the hut; these were treated by the royal doctor. The inkosi then washed himself over the izidwedwe, a physical demonstration of his ascendance over his adversary.[45] Thus Zwide 'attacked' Dingiswayo before their last encounter, and Tshaka undermined Phakatwayo's authority.[46] Subsequent military success proved the invincibility of the ubukosi and the effectiveness of the measures taken to strengthen it.

The efficacy of such ideological warfare was most fully completed

42 KCL 17403/8, H.F. Fynn to Napier, 10 Aug.1843.

43 Isaacs, Travels, I, 59,61,92-3; CA GH 19/3, Deposition of Isaacs, 19 Dec.1828.

44 Above p.208f and Chapter III, p.77f , for this connexion.

45 KCL SP R, evidence of Ndukwana, 18 Sept.1900; Bryant, Olden Times, 196.

46 Ibid., 163-4; 196-7.

when the invincibility of the ubukosi could also be demonstrated before battle to the enemy, thus attacking the latter's morale. The Europeans and their unfamiliar equipment were particularly suited to a role in these final preparations. The traders arrived in Zululand before Tshaka's achievement of supremacy over the Ndwandwe; and between 1824 and 1826, the Zulu inkosi evinced a keen interest in the weapons Fynn and Isaacs carried and which they allowed some of their workers to use.[47] Tshaka induced the Europeans to describe and demonstrate to him and the izinduna the advantages of firearms, and other unfamiliar items of equipment. While publicly deprecating the effectiveness of the guns as offensive weapons owing to the problem of reloading and supply of materials, Tshaka acknowledged to the traders the value of their arms.[48] He and members of the amabutho were fearful of their effect;[49] the lengths to which Tshaka went to obtain European assistance before the confrontation with Sikunyane and the manner of his employing the Europeans indicate his appreciation of the fear which they and their artefacts could engender in the enemy.

According to their own accounts, the traders demurred when requested to assist in the attack on Sikunyane; however, as Tshaka made clear to Isaacs in July 1826, the Europeans were dependent on him for cattle, and would receive no more if they failed him.[50] In addition to the presence

[47] KCL SP V 17, evidence of Jantshi, 16 Feb.1903, for the tests Tshaka carried out on firearms.

[48] Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 80-82, 120; Isaacs, Travels, I, 48-9, 93-5. For a narrative and commentary of Zulu relations with the whites at Port Natal see F.N.C. Okoye, 'Tshaka and the British traders, 1824-1828', in Transafrican Journal of History, I (1971), 10-32; while the author sees the importance of firearms, the absence of any reference to the structural significance of ideology leads to his diminishing the 'moral support' the traders could give to Tshaka.

[49] Ibid., 146.

[50] Ibid., 94, 114; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 122-3; indeed, Tshaka refused Isaacs cattle on his next visit: he had stayed in Natal during the final Ndwandwe campaign; Travels, I, 134.

of the traders, Tshaka also sent to Port Natal for a tent. When this was erected before him, he showed 'inconceivable gratification, for he thought the sight of it would strike his enemy with dismay and panic,' and that 'his appearance before the enemy in the tent would give his warriors an easy victory.'[51] After the acquisition of a musket, Tshaka informed Fynn and Farewell that they need not take part in the fighting; what he wanted was their 'moral support.'[52] At the battle of Ndololwane hill Fynn at least was present: whether the tent was used is not reported; however, the final prelude to conflict was the firing of three shots at the massed Ndwandwe ranks by the king's Xhosa interpreter.[53] The short duration of the battle despite the numerical strength of the opposition, and the fact that the Ndwandwe forces had retreated to Ndololwane from much nearer the Zulu capital probably in the knowledge that Tshaka was recruiting the Europeans,[54] indicate the success of Tshaka's employment of the whites within his overall tactics.[55]

In February 1827 the effects of firearms were again displayed when Isaacs, Cane and their employees assisted in the attack on the much less powerful but more resistant Ndwandwe allies, the Kumalo under Beje, whose refuge among the large rocks of the Ngome forest was capable of defence against assegais. The Zulu izinduna directing the campaign told Isaacs that they wanted the firearms used in order to cause terror and thus

51 Isaacs, Travels, I, 106, 114.

52 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 123.

53 Ibid., 126.

54 Okoye, ('Tshaka' in Transafrican Journal of History, I, 1971, 24), suggests that the Ndwandwe were intimidated by Isaacs presence at the Zulu capital for a week in April 1826; it is more likely that Tshaka's messages to Natal, and the European expeditions to Bulawayo confirmed to the Ndwandwe his ability to enlist their support; see Isaacs, Travels, I, 91, 97.

55 See Chapter VII, p.202 and n.10.

subdue the enemy. The reverberations of the muskets's reports and the reaction of the Zulu soldiers - lying under their shields during the firing - had the desired effect. The Kumalo surrendered without fighting a full engagement; they indicated that they did so because of their inability to contend with the Zulu king's white men and their superior medicines, which were held to give the Zulu such power to demoralise.[56]

Indeed the white man's medicines and medical skills also had to be controlled by the inkosi lest his enemies acquire them. Thus when Fynn's medical knowledge was displayed before his arrival at the Zulu capital on his first visit, Tshaka denounced him for treating his subjects without royal leave; this, however, was given shortly afterwards for the successful treatment of Mpangazitha, an important induna resident at a distant ikanda.[57] Furthermore, Tshaka had particular medical needs resulting from the extensive ideological ramifications of his own health in relation to the power of the ubukosi; because the latter and hence the ideological strength of the kingdom were closely associated with the person of the king,[58] decreasing powers of the inkosi owing to age could also signify a weakening of his authority, thus rendering him more susceptible to attack from his enemies. Moreover, the development of the militaristic tendencies in the mode of production, especially the identification of the interests of ubukosi with the amabutho as a work force and as warriors, resulted in higher estimation of youth than age, an ideology promoted by Tshaka himself.[59] According to Zulu informants, Tshaka was middle-aged

[56] Isaacs, Travels, I, 163-70; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 130.

[57] Ibid., 76-8; KCL SP V 63, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 22 April 1905; Mpangazitha was the commander of the Fasimba ibutho.

[58] See above, p.208f and Chapter III, p.77f.

[59] Isaacs, Travels, I, 60, 268.

when he assumed the Zulu ubukosi;[60] the travellers' reports show that he had grey hairs and was fearful of ageing in 1827; he wanted substances which could remove the appearance of old age.[61]

Tshaka's need to monopolise the Europeans, their skills and artefacts in the exclusive interests of the Zulu ruling lineage underlay his attempt to regularise contact with the whites at an official level at the Cape. Although the Natal traders had stated they they came from the Cape, they explained to Tshaka that they did not represent the government but were subjects of it. The major principals of the trade, Farewell and King, had agreed that relations with the Zulu king be undertaken only in the name of Farewell who was the main instigator of attempts to obtain official backing for a settlement at Port Natal.[62] However, shortly after the defeat of the Ndwandwe in 1826, differences between Farewell and King and between them and Tshaka led to a disruption of trade. Tshaka complained that he had given a quantity of ivory to Farewell who had stored it privately instead of forwarding it to the government; this, he deduced, was the explanation for his receiving small gifts in return.[63] The traders found it difficult to answer this argument, partly because the absence of shipping at Port Natal restricted their ability to sell the ivory and to ensure a supply of the items the Zulu required; they also found that the Zulu inkosi had little conception of the value of ivory compared to their costs.[64] Moreover, during 1828 the supply of European goods from Delagoa bay

60 KCL SP B, evidence of Ndhlovu and Ndukwana, 9 Nov.1902; the informants suggested that Tshaka was the same age as members of the Nokenke ibutho at the time of questioning: viz. 54.

61 Isaacs, Travels, I, 91-2, 239; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 142.

62 Isaacs, Travels, I, 126; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 56-7; Farewell to Somerset, 1 May 1824 in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 71-2.

63 Isaacs, Travels, I, 135-7, 192, 205; CA GH 19/3, Farewell to Dundas, 10 Sept.1828.

64 Isaacs, Travels, I, 192, 206.

decreased, adding to Tshaka's dependence on Natal.[65] Tshaka proposed to obviate the problems of supply by making direct contact with the Cape government through his own ambassadors and by rewarding the traders on their safe return.[66]

However the embassy was also of political and ideological significance to Tshaka. From 1823 he had received intelligence from several quarters of the extent of British military power. The first of these was Hlambamanzi, the Xhosa interpreter who had accompanied Owen's naval expedition to Delagoa bay in 1822 and who in the succeeding year, having escaped drowning at St Lucia, became an important figure at the Zulu capital on account of Tshaka's interest in European military institutions.[67] When the traders arrived, impressions of European politics such as the relative power of the Portuguese and the British were confirmed by nationals of both countries.[68]

The instructions given to Lt. King who accompanied the izinduna, Sotobe and Mbozamboza, to Algoa bay in May 1828 show that in addition to acquiring goods, Tshaka wished for Cape acquiescence for the mounting of his raids on the Xhosa; Tshaka would not attack the Xhosa without an indication of Cape policy.[69] The expedition against the Pondo and Xhosa was in preparation from September 1827; its purpose was to reach the possessions of the white people, but not to engage in any conflict with

65 South African Commercial Advertiser; 18 Oct.1828, quoting an interview with J. Cane, Grahamstown, 10 Oct.1828.

66 Isaacs, Travels, I, 192.

67 See ibid., II, 209 f., for the biography of (Jacob) Hlambamanzi; Tshaka can scarcely have failed to learn from him the size and power of Owen's fleet and its capacity to intimidate the Portuguese, Zwangendaba and Soshangane.

68 Ibid., I, 60-61, 127-8.

69 CA GH 19/3, J.S. King to Van der Riet (Civil Commissioner, Uitenhage), 10 May 1828.

them; the amabutho were to subjugate the Pondo and Xhosa so that the Zulu might have contact with the whites.[70] After both embassy and army had departed, Tshaka indicated to Fynn that his objective was the collaborative suppression of the frontier peoples so that the colonists could take all the ivory without paying anyone but the Zulu in beads.[71] The urgency of the need for collaboration for Tshaka was expressed by his ambassadors when detained at Port Elizabeth: they informed the Cape authorities that Tshaka had no other motive in defeating the Xhosa than to ally with the British; and that their inkosi assumed the Governor would rather assist the Zulu in removing the power of the troublesome Xhosa than lend the latter aid against the Zulu.[72]

When the mission to the Cape appeared to have failed in mid-1828, resulting in further distrust of the Natal traders, Tshaka sent another embassy with a similar objective: the emissaries were to inquire what had happened to the previous consignment of ivory to the Crown and to acquire goods such as clothing, blankets, hatchets, knives, brassware and medicines for Tshaka. On its departure, the Zulu inkosi told his izinduna that the embassy was going to find the white men who would come to take ivory from the Zulu.[73] Cane, in relaying Tshaka's message at the Cape, reported that Tshaka would not proceed to attack the Xhosa so long as the latter would 'permit him to have free intercourse with the Colony, an object which he had much at heart and which he was determined to obtain at all risks.'[74]

70 Isaacs, Travels, I, 205; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 144.

71 Ibid., 145-6.

72 CA GH 19/3, Cloete to Bell, 27 June 1828.

73 CA GH 19/3, Deposition of the Zulu emissaries, 10-11 Nov.1828; see also Cane's deposition in Campbell to Bell, 18 Oct.1828: ibid. Tshaka requested a seal to ensure the security of future communications with the Cape; deposition of Tshaka's messenger, Nonagali, encl. in Somerset to Bell, 10 Oct.1828.

74 CA GH 19/3, Campbell to Bell, 10 Oct.1828; cf Okoye, 'Tshaka and the British traders,' Transafrican Journal of History, I, (1971), 29, and Smith, Struggle, (Ph.D. thesis), 292, quoting Okoye, where the failure of the first

Dingane's interest in and use of beads and brass as commodities with which he could reward his izinduna were probably greater than Tshaka's.[75] A Zulu informant stated that the Isipezi ibutho was rewarded as a whole with brass rings which they were required to wear on occasion.[76] Dingane publicly emphasised his royal authority by decrees limiting the type and colour of beads worn. He also took care to specify to the traders the sort of beads he required.[77]

For most of the 1830s, Delagoa bay continued to provide most of the brass and beads entering Zululand. The interruption in the supply of goods from that quarter early in 1828 was shortlived; according to Fynn, shortly after Tshaka's death, Dingane 'carried on no trade other than with the natives of Delagoa bay.'[78] Much of the supply came from the whalers whose number off the Natal coast and in Delagoa bay increased considerably

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mission is seen as a decisive turning point in the relations between Tshaka and the British traders, with Tshaka no longer anxious for their presence at Natal. The only source quoted, Isaacs, Travels, I, 256, does not bear this interpretation; on the death of Lt. King, Tshaka offered Isaacs a kraal of cattle to conduct a further mission and promised to send his warriors to hunt elephants for him; he also granted him a tract of Natal and "the exclusive right of trading with his people;" Tshaka's intention was to recall Cane's expedition and to replace it with Isaacs's; (Travels, I, 255-6). This was not effected, however, and Cane reached Grahamstown overland early in October 1828. Relations with the traders were not determined simply by their inability to supply goods to Tshaka's satisfaction; see above, p .234f.

75 See the descriptions of Dingane's profligacy with beads and brass in Gardiner, Narrative, 39, 59-60; Booth, ed., Champion, 31; Isaacs, Travels, II, 182. There are no similar descriptions for Tshaka's reign; such negative evidence is thus not conclusive on this point. However, Fynn's observation that Delagonians were more inclined to wear brass rings than the Zulu tends to confirm it; Fynn's impressions of Zululand were largely shaped in Tshaka's reign; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith, 80.

76 KCL SP U 30, evidence of Lunguza, 14 March 1909.

77 Grahamstown Journal, 6 April 1832, letter of C.J. Pickman; 'Extracts of the Journal of Rev. G. Champion,' in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 208.

78 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 175.

in the late 1820s. In June 1834 Cane reported in Grahamstown that Zululand was glutted with beads brought to Delagoa bay by whalers and marketed at much cheaper rates than those in the Colony.[79] In the following year, the missionary Gardiner reported that the ivory trade with Delagoa bay was increasing and that the bulk of the brass smelted at the Zulu capital came from there; Dingane assured Gardiner of his wish to divert this trade to the British if supplied with similar quantities of brass.[80]

Zulu reliance on Delagoa bay indicates the continued favourability of the terms of trade at that entrepot: the whalers could pay for their cattle, foodstuffs and ivory partly from oil revenue. Natal traders on the other hand had to meet the costs of the lengthy overland journey or the high risks of shipping to Port Natal - still hazarded by its bar - and the costs of provisions at Natal such as cattle from the Zulu, entirely from the sale of ivory.[81]

The reliability of the Delagoa sources of supply owed much to Zulu capacity to exert political control over the disposal of foreign goods in that quarter. To the south of Delagoa bay Mabudu and Tembe remained tributaries of the Zulu, thus giving Tshaka and Dingane access to the goods acquired from the shipping, the trading company and the Portuguese fort. However, Dingane succeeded in establishing tributary status on the northern shores of the bay also. The Zulu inkosi took advantage of

79 Isaacs, Travels, II, 280,283-4; South African Commercial Advertiser, 4 Dec.1830, reporting Cane's evidence; 6 Oct.1832, reporting Isaacs's evidence; Grahamstown Journal, 5 June 1834.

80 Narrative, 105, 200, 405.

81 For the costs of the Natal operations, see Grahamstown Journal, 6 April 1832, letter of Pickman; 24 August 1832, itinerary of the route from Grahamstown to Natal by Andrew Smith; see also above, p.232.. Cp. Smith, Struggle, (Ph.D. thesis), 293, where the Portuguese are described as attempting to wrest the trade of Zululand from the hands of the British; this seems an overstatement of the achievements of British traders in view of the foregoing evidence.

differences between Portuguese official interests and those of the company, and those between the former and the northern Ronga states which the Portuguese subjected during the tenure of the ambitious Governor Ribeiro (1829-1833).[82] The Zulu could exert considerable leverage over intermediaries such as Nascimento and Nobre of the company owing to their dependence on Dingane for the cattle which were the mainstay of their trade with the whalers.[83]

Informed by agents of the company that the Governor had goods in his store of a quality he was unwilling to send to the Zulu, Dingane sent a mission in October 1830 demanding that the Governor become a tributary like all the other powers of the area; if the Governor failed to respond, the Zulu would install Nascimento in his place.[84] Ribeiro's response was apparently satisfactory and Dingane sent a small number of cattle as a sign of his subjugation; Isaacs reports the presence at the Zulu capital in December 1830 of a contingent of musket bearing African soldiers delivering a quantity of beads and brass rings from Ribeiro. In the following year Ribeiro was induced to assist the Zulu inkosi with men and arms on the same expedition in which the Natal traders were involved.[85]

Expeditions mounted by Ribeiro against the Ronga states north of the bay in 1831, partly aided by the Zulu, resulted in the extension of

82 The major source for these conflicts and for much of the detail of Zulu-Portuguese relations in those years is in DAHU, I, A.J. Nobre, 'A Guerra dos Reis Vátuas Vizinhos do Presídio de Lourenço Marques em 1833,' 216-226; both Smith (Struggle, Ph.D. thesis) and G. Liesegang, 'Dingane's attack on Lourenço Marques in 1833,' Journal of African History, X (1969), 565-579, draw heavily from this source. Only those aspects concerning the establishment and maintaining of royal Zulu control of trade are further explored here.

83 KCL, Fynn papers, 4, letter of A.J. Nobre to the British traders at Natal, 10 Oct.1834; inter alia Nobre requested Dingane to permit cattle trade with the Swazi at this juncture.

84 AHU, Moç., Códice 1428, de Brito to Ribeiro, 26 April 1831, p.18.

85 Isaacs, Travels, II, 113-114; AHU, Moç., Maço 23, Ribeiro to de Brito, 29 Aug.1831.

Portuguese authority; in mid 1832, Ribeiro again extended Portuguese influence, to Magaia and Moamba. However, according to Nobre, a favourite of Dingane's, in the following year Ribeiro called upon Soshangane's forces in maintaining and extending Portuguese authority north of Delagoa bay,[86] indicating that the Zulu no longer controlled the loyalties of the Governor. In May 1833, Dingane expressed his dissatisfaction with the tribute sent from Ribeiro, and in September the Zulu organised a force in Mabudo drawn from the Ronga chiefdoms, sacked the fort and subsequently murdered Ribeiro. The statement of the Zulu emissaries before the execution shows Dingane's cognisance of Ronga objections to Portuguese expansion and to the slave trade. Nobre was then installed as Governor, and inhosi Madolo, the last obstacle to complete Zulu domination of the fort, was forced into exile in June 1834.[87]

Shortly after his accession Dingane sent a third Zulu mission to the Cape. According to Dingane's messengers the Zulu king regretted that he was 'prevented by the defective means of communication from keeping up a more frequent intercourse with the Colony.'[88] However, the Colonial government was unable to regard the successive missions as more than tokens of friendship rather than attempts to conclude commercial and political agreements.[89] Contradictions between the interests of the Zulu inkosi and those of the traders remained unresolved. Dingane wanted the whites to stay, partly as bearers of firearms against his enemies,[90] but

86 DAHU I, Nobre, 'Guerra,' 224.

87 Ibid., Ribeiro to GG., 28 May 1833, 209; Nobre, 'Guerra,' 219-223,226.

88 South African Commercial Advertiser, 4 Dec.1830; see also Campbell to Bell, 26 Nov.1830 in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 196-7.

89 See British Parliamentary Papers, 39, 1835, 'Further instructions concerning the mission to Tshaka,' encl. no.4, in Cole to Murray, 31 Jan. 1829.

90 Isaacs, Travels, II, 28-9,32,206-15; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 194-5.

also as traders. Some of the latter were favoured with large consignments of ivory between 1830 and 1835; but the traders remained dissatisfied with the rate of exchange. The inkosi was the only trader and he refused to bargain: the absence of alternative buyers and the inability of the traders to argue resulted in Dingane giving what he thought fit in return for foreign goods.[91]

From an early stage in his reign Dingane attempted to bring the traders at Natal within the authority of the Zulu ubukosi. In May 1830 he tried to persuade Fynn, the most widely respected trader, to become his agent in Natal under Zulu rule, reporting to the inkosi as if a subject isikulu but sovereign in Natal. One of the purposes of this appointment was to ensure Zulu control of the ivory trade with inland African hunters such as the Ntlangwini, with whom Fynn and Isaacs had developed exclusive relations since Tshaka's death; this was a matter of some concern to the Zulu inkosi since Zulu cattle were being exchanged for ivory without his authority.[92] Fynn refused the offer, and emphasised his unwillingness to act in the interests of the Zulu ruling lineage in September 1831 when, despite the intervening scares of a Zulu armed raid and Dingane's successful attempt to detach one of Fynn's major African acolytes, he refused to carry out executions Dingane ordered against members of the newly exiled Cele royal lineage residing at Port Natal.[93] Fynn's determination to embark on flight rather than carry out the orders exposed the Zulu inkosi's dilemma. As Dingane explained forcefully to Andrew Smith, the Cape representative who visited the Zulu capital in 1832, he valued the contacts

91 Grahamstown Journal, 30 March 1832, letter of Collis; 6 April 1832, letter of C.J. Pickman; 18 May 1832, letter of Cawood; 28 Sept.1832, idem; 22 August 1833, Cawood's information to ed.; 9 Oct.1834, letter of Collis. For a chronological review of Dingane's relationships with Natal whites see F. Okoye, 'Dingane: a reappraisal,' Journal of African History, X (1969), 221-235.

92 Isaacs, Travels, II, 34-5,37,45,59,62-3,176; for the Ntlangwini, see Chapter II, p.56.

93 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 210-1.

with the British traders too highly to cause their interruption.[94] Moreover, informed by messengers returning from the Cape of British official and military authority there, Dingane formed as high opinion as had Tshaka of the power of the Crown and showed himself anxious to remain on its side.[95]

Between 1833 and 1835 the number of traders, hunters, their African employees and firearms at Port Natal increased considerably; by 1836 the stand of arms available to the combined European population was 2-300.[96] Dingane succeeded in compelling the traders to support his amabutho in the attacks against Mlotsha in 1831 and the Swazi in 1836, thus ensuring that the use of firearms in Zululand was in royal interests.[97] However, his inability to assert an effective tributary status over the Europeans, their continued harbouring of rebels from Zululand and their reluctance to trade in firearms resulted in the appearance of a growing threat to the Zulu ubukosi. By supporting the inkosi in battle the Europeans affirmed their ultimate loyalty to and dependence on Dingane, and received cattle as reward; Cane for example who led the attack on the Swazi received part of the captured stock.[98] Although Zulu royal interests were served by such participation, the apparently close relationship between the whites and the inkosi was contradictory to that between the latter and the amabutho. On the one hand non-Zulu appeared to be the most effective means of removing the inkosi's most determined opponents; on the other their insistence on independence and on protecting his enemies posed a

94 'Historical Precis by Andrew Smith,' Bird, ed., Annals, I, 263.

95 Isaacs, Travels, II, 108.

96 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 255-6; 'Evidence of D.C. Toohey to the 1852 Commission,' Bird, ed., Annals, I, 550-1.

97 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 249-51.

98 W. Wood, 'Statements respecting Dingane,' Bird, ed. Annals, I, 378.

potential threat to the physical well being of the king and an actual threat to his authority over subordinate lineages.

The hostility of the amabutho toward the whites bearing arms in the service of the king was first reported in February 1827 on the occasion of the attack on Beje Kumalo, an opponent so difficult to dislodge that the amabutho assigned to the task were demoralised before attack. After victory, the Zulu were resentful of the confidence which the possession of firearms gave the whites and of the success which the weapons brought them.[99] The gift of large numbers of cattle to the Europeans in addition to the ivory given in return for foreign goods also distressed the izinduna and led to Dingane's seeking to disguise the reward he was presenting.[100] Fynn's personal firmness with Dingane drew fear, enmity and a plot to kill him in 1831. According to one of Fynn's accounts, on his next visit to the Zulu capital he threatened the inkosi with a gun whereupon Dingane explained himself with humility; on his departure, the European was shadowed by an ibutho as far as the Tugela in order to protect the inkosi.[101]

The confused attack by the Natal settlers on the returning Zulu impi against Ncapayi in June 1833 resulted in 200 Zulu deaths, and the flight of the Europeans to Pondoland in the expectation of an immediate Zulu counter attack.[102] However, Dingane's response was to induce the traders to return and stay; he removed the amabutho normally stationed in northern Natal to a location north of the Tugela, and returned a European inadvertently captured in battle and cattle not captured from Ncapayi. In the

99 Isaacs, Travels, I, 73-70.

100 Ibid., II, 113; Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 210.

101 Ibid. 189f; KCL SP G, evidence of William Bazley, 26 June 1907; Fynn's full account is in Grahamstown Journal, 29 November 1832.

102 Ibid., 21 Nov.1833.

following year he sent a further mission to the Cape,[103] supplied his favourite trader, Collis, with nearly two tons of ivory and ordered his amabutho to hunt elephants for the European. In the same year a body of dissidents from an ibutho escaped to Natal; Dingane refused to allow them to be pursued by other amabutho across the Tugela lest the whites leave Natal in alarm.[104]

As Dingane stated to Gardiner in May 1835, his refusal to use force to impose his authority in Natal, especially to remove the refugees, resulted in opposition to him from within.[105] At that juncture, Dingane hoped to remove the conflicts entailed by his relations with the whites by means of a treaty with the settlers, who undertook to return future refugees from his authority, and by dealing with Natal's problems only through Gardiner. Thus on the next infringement by a trader after the signing of the treaty, Dingane refused to allow any European across the Tugela except Gardiner. The latter recognised the ultimate jurisdiction of the Zulu king over the settlers whether there was a treaty or not and that the treaty was 'popular' with Dingane and his izinduna. They attempted to make Gardiner the chief over Natal, an arrangement undermined, however, by his subsequent absence.[106]

The possibility of closer control over Natal in 1836 and 1837 through Gardiner was accompanied by the prospect of acquiring firearms, the possession of which, along with the skills to operate and maintain them was a potential means of resolving the contradiction between the amabutho and the whites: their use by the amabutho would make raiding, hunting and

103 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 226-230; see also ibid., passim, for a narrative reconstructed by the editors of these events; Gardiner, Narrative, 289.

104 Grahamstown Journal, 9 Oct.1834, letter of Collis.

105 Gardiner, Narrative, 162.

106 Ibid., 37, 129-33, 162, 192, 261; Grahamstown Journal, 27 Nov.1836, letter of 14 Natal residents.

subjugation of enemies easier while rendering the amabutho dependent on foreign trade. From early in his reign Dingane hoped to acquire guns from his association with the British. According to Isaacs, by mid-1830 he had asked for arms on several occasions.[107] In 1835 and 1837, Dingane and his great izinduna insisted to Gardiner and Owen that the primary need of the Zulu from foreigners was arms and instruction in their use.[108] In 1836 the Zulu inkosi began to purchase arms; he was prepared to exchange large numbers of cattle for them.[109] However, only after the murder of Retief did the king have sufficient weapons to arm a number of Zulu for attack.[110]

The relationship of the Zulu to the whites at Natal was thus more complex than that with the Delagoa intermediaries. The assertion of regular tributary status through subordinate chiefs proved impossible at Natal; nevertheless, a form of irregular tribute was paid through armed service and the presentation of gifts. By both means the interests of the Zulu ruling lineage rather than those of its enemies were largely fulfilled. The extent of Zulu dependence on foreign trade and the containment of the contradictions it brought about are further illuminated by consideration of the mode of production.

The Zulu ruling lineage's political dominance under Tshaka and

107 Isaacs, Travels, II, 49.

108 Gardiner, Narrative, 68; 'Owen's Diary,' 26 Nov.1837, in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 335.

109 Stuart and Malcolm, eds., Diary, 255, quoting Grahamstown Journal, 27 Nov.1836; Gardiner to Bell, 18 March 1837, in Bird, ed., Annals, I, 314.

110 'Journal of the expedition against Dingane,' Bird, ed., Annals, I, 448; 'Despatches of Commandant A.W.J. Pretorius,' 22 Dec.1838, ibid., 453; 'Government Notice, C.O. CapeTown, 28 January 1839,' ibid., 500-1; KCL SP V 39, evidence of Ngidi, 14 Aug.1904; SP V 24, evidence of Tununu, 1 June 1903; according to this informant the Zulu salvaged 130 guns from the encounters with Retief, and had learned from Gardiner and Grout how to use firearms for hunting. Dingane formed a small ibutho, the isitunyisa, of arms bearers; ibid.

Dingane reproduced a form of the lineage (or lineage-tribute) mode of production characteristic of the social formation in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The diverse forms of collaboration in agricultural production centred in the village and the role of the lineages in local management of resources continued. Land remained the possession of the total community, and the hierarchy of inkosi, izikulu, and abanumzane controlled its allocation.[111] The extent of the Zulu ruling lineage's social domination is shown by the role ascribed to Zulu ancestors as the forbears and guardians of all subordinate lineages and its extensive involvement in agricultural production through the umkosi ceremonial;[112] the Zulu royal lineage formed an aristocracy which ideologically represented the community. In these respects, the preeminent Zulu replaced the lineages which had formerly dominated northern Nguni chiefdoms between the Tugela and the Pongolo rivers.

The development of the amabutho as standing and centrally controlled bodies of manpower predated, and indeed made possible, Zulu dominance. Their emergence in the particular historical circumstances of the late eighteenth century constituted a structural change in the lineage mode of production because it gave ruling lineages new powers of domination over, and therefore extraction from, subordinate lineages.[113] However the change was transitional: it resulted from the response to changes in productive forces brought about by variations in foreign trade patterns; it did not result in the superceding of kinship as the dominant institution in social relations. Indeed the amabutho were central to

111 KCL SP V 4, evidence of Ndukwana, 28 Oct.1902.

112 Chapter VII, above, p.208f.

113 Cf. Godelier, Horizon, 343-4, 346; the imposition of Inca rule over Andean communities produced a profound transformation in the mode of production because it resulted in novel forms of extraction despite the continuation of previous forms of production and land use.

the newly established relations between ruling and subordinate lineages. Mael's conclusion that Tshaka 'struck resolutely at the roots of kinship structure,' and that 'if the empire was to survive, kinship ties had to be subsumed by allegiance to the nation,'[114] cannot be sustained: although particular ruling lineages lost their power, their loyalties were subsumed in a structure of dominance in which kinship remained central. Thus the use of the isigodlo system by Tshaka and Dingane was not a 'direct assault on the kinship structure,'[115] but its utilisation by the Zulu kings to ensure the domination of their lineage over others. The controls on marital ties of the amabutho did not represent, as Guy has suggested,[116] a means of controlling the expansion of population following from an appreciation of the dangers of high density; such controls were a major source of elders' authority within the lineage[117] and were employed by Tshaka and Dingane in association with their appropriation of young males' labour.

The evolution of the amabutho as warriors and raiders for cattle reflects the need of those ruling lineages which were successful in controlling the ivory trade of the eighteenth century to reproduce their dominance when the nature of the trade changed; the ruling lineages had strengthened their authority by centralising the physical force and labour power of young males. The near-collapse of the ivory trade and the rise in cattle exports resulted in the necessity to acquire cattle for exchange and reward.

[114] R. Mael, 'The problem of political integration in the Zulu empire,' (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974), 40.

[115] Ibid., 44.

[116] J.J. Guy, 'Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom,' paper presented to the Conference on Southern African history, National University of Lesotho, August 1977, 15-17.

[117] Chapter III, above, p.p.71, 96, passim.

The emergence of a single dominant lineage in the northern Nguni area which reproduced its domination through the reward of the amabutho with cattle and which was able to impose tributary status on Ronga states south of Delagoa bay resulted in a different relationship between the Zulu and foreign traders from that prevailing in the late eighteenth century. Successful use of the amabutho to acquire cattle in both Tshaka's and Dingane's reigns implies that the Zulu were not dependent upon foreign trade for the maintaining of their dominance; indeed, Zulu use of their dominance to extract foreign goods from their tributaries to the north east and political support from the south indicates the contrary.

However, foreign goods such as brass, beads and cloth were very highly valued and the reproduction of Zulu lineage dominance required strict control of foreign trade lest access to such goods become the focus of a struggle between them and their enemies; this was especially true of the trade in firearms. Moreover, owing to the potential fortification capable of being supplied by armed whites and their followers to opponents of the ruling lineage, the allegiance of the Europeans was essential to the Zulu. Only with the much greater pressure occasioned by the arrival of the Voortrekkers and their defeat of the amabutho did the presence of whites, with interests very different from those of traders, result in the mounting of effective opposition to Zulu dominance of these external relations.

Appendix I

a) Clarification of Nguni and Thonga

The population of the region between Delagoa bay and the Tugela is normally considered to fall into two broad categories: Nguni in Natal, Zululand and Swaziland, and Thonga or Tsonga in southern Mozambique. The wide use of these terms is modern in provenance, stemming from the work of early ethnographers and historians, especially H.A. Junod for the Thonga and A.T. Bryant for the Nguni.

Of the two terms, the origin and etymology of Thonga is ostensibly easier to perceive. Some peoples of southern Mozambique called themselves Tsonga; these are the numerous Hlengwe north and east of the Limpopo. Others calling themselves Tjonga (though Junod used the word Djonga) lived south west of the lower Limpopo. Similarly, the inhabitants of Lourenço Marques district called themselves Ronga, a term which permutes to Thonga when spoken by people of modern Zululand. Junod suggests that this became widely applied to the Tjonga, Tsonga and nearby inhabitants who spoke a similar language (Hlanganu, Nwalungu, and Bila) by invaders from Zululand in the early nineteenth century. Junod's reasons for using Thonga were then its self application by certain groups and its permutation and extension by nineteenth century invaders such as the Nguni. Moreover, Ronga carries the meaning 'dawn', hence 'east', which made the Zulu usage more comprehensible.[1]

However, Junod goes on to write of the 'Thonga tribe', describing the 'totality of the Thonga nation,'[2] and to organise the presentation of his ethnographic material around this concept. Although it is possible to gain the impression that such material is uniformly descriptive of all Thonga, an examination of his work suggests that the concept was merely

[1] Junod, Life, I, 15-16.

[2] Ibid., 14.

a device for the comprehensible presentation of voluminous material, and that there are no political and few cultural uniformities to be implied by the term Thonga.[3] Junod himself wrote that 'there is no national unity amongst the Thongas,' and of the wide differences in traditions of origin and political structure which were visible even among peoples speaking the same dialect.[4] Partly, the cultural implications of Thonga are to be found in Zulu usage dating from the nineteenth century: Thonga came to have a pejorative meaning - 'low class person' or men without cattle. Other words used by the Zulu for the Thonga confirm this tendency: Nkengane, poor low class foreigner, amahobe, poor people, and the term Ntlwenga, Nhlenga, lowlander.[5] Such sobriquets are inappropriate to preceding centuries, even though modern synthesizers have accepted them in a somewhat sweeping view of cultural differences between Thonga and Nguni.[6]

Nguni has suffered a similar history. According to Bryant, ebuNguni was the Thonga name for people who spoke Zulu. However he does not indicate when it became current.[7] This definition is supported in a Portuguese collection of traditions made at the beginning of the twentieth century, where Nguni rather than Ngoni is used to describe Soshangane's kingdom in Mozambique, while the Zulu and Swazi appear as such.[8]

Nguni has also been applied to the Xhosa: by Colenso in 1861, and by

3 See, for example, ibid., 108f, 116-7f.

4 Ibid., 14, 32.

5 Ibid., 15; Bryant, Zulu-English dictionary, 343, 346.

6 Chapters IV and V above; cp. Wilson and Thompson, eds., Oxford History, I, Chapters III and IV passim.

7 Zulu-English dictionary.

8 Ferrao, ed., Circumscripções de Lourenço Marques, 3, 85.

several of Stuart's informants, who suggested that the Xhosa were the 'proper' Nguni.[9] Mnguni is said to have been the remotest ancestor, or indeed, the father, of Xhosa, the eponymous founder of the lineage. However, the Xhosa king lists of 1840 and 1858 make no mention of Mnguni, and its appearance in the twentieth century may be an interpolated expression of a deeply felt but unspecified connexion between the Xhosa and ancient relatives in Zululand and Natal.[10] The supposed ancestral relationship between the widely separated Zulu and Xhosa, both of whom venerated the terms Nguni or Mnguni, and the linguistic uniformities resulting from nineteenth century political changes seem to have justified Bryant and Soga in using Nguni as embracing all peoples from Swaziland to the eastern Cape.

Traditions collected by Stuart and Bryant suggest that Nguni was a word which connoted great antiquity and extensive political authority. The clearest statement of this comes from one of Stuart's informants:

> 'The amaNtungwa like the Zulu, Qwabe and Cunu have a keen desire to speak of themselves as abaNguni whereas the name appears to have been applicable to some anciently resident people, already here when the above came, but I cannot indicate these people.'[11]

Other informants suggested that lineages such as the Langa, Cunu and Zulu should be called Ntungwa, but could not properly be called Nguni.[12] Similarly, some informants asserted that it was the Ntungwa, not the

[9] J.W. Colenso, A Zulu-English dictionary, (Pietermaritzburg, 1861); KCL SP V 53, evidence of Dinya, 27 Feb.1905; V 72, evidence of Magidigidi, 12 May 1905; V 77, evidence of Mahaya, 26 Aug.1905.

[10] Soga, South eastern Bantu, 102, 268; J. Maclean, Compendium of Kafir laws and customs, (Grahamstown, 1906), 8-9.

[11] KCL SP V 72, evidence of Magidigidi, 12 May 1905.

[12] KCL SP V 49, evidence of Mbovu, 13 Nov.1904; V 54, evidence of Madikane, 3 March 1905; V 78, evidence of Mahaya, 26 July 1905.

Nguni, who were originally associated with the isilulu legend,[13] and who were the later 'arrivals.' Informants also suggested that of the Ntungwa, the Qwabe came to call themselves Nguni because they came to dominate an area formerly occupied by the Nguni whose speech modified the Qwabe-Ntungwa (Sutu) dialect circumstances which distinguished them from the Zulu and other Ntungwa groups.[14]

The association of Nguni with early lowlanders is confirmed by other sources. Mnguni was commonly used as an address name among their chiefs.[15] It was the sithakazelo of the Nzimeleni and Myeki-Myeni peoples of lower Zululand in the nineteenth century.[16] And the Portuguese account of 1589 mentions 'viragune' or 'virangune,' a word held by Bryant to be vaNguni - people of Nguni, in the lowlands between the Mfolosi and the Pongolo.[17]

Further support for the antiquity of Nguni in the lowlands derives from the meaning and usage of the terms Mnguni and Nguni in later centuries; they are said to have been much venerated expressions within Zululand itself, in Gazaland and among the Malawi Ngoni. The Qwabe appear to have adopted it as an address name as a means of legitimising their occupation and control, in the terms of the traditions, after their immigration to the lowlands.[18] Mnguni became a sobriquet of leadership and an expression of profound salutation: Tshaka initiated its

13 KCL SP V 65, evidence of Maziyana and Socwatsha, 24 April 1905; V 73, evidence of Qaliswe, 28 May 1905; W 1, evidence of Baleni, 14 May 1914.

14 KCL SP V 44, evidence of Mmemi, 26 Oct.1904; V 77, evidence of Mahaya, 26 Aug.1905.

15 KCL SP V 72, evidence of Magidigidi, 12 May 1905.

16 Bryant, Zulu-English dictionary, 430; Olden Times, 109, 112, 691, 694; KCL SP V 65, evidence of Maziyana, 24 April 1905.

17 RSEA II, do Couto, 199.

18 See n.14 above, and Chapter VI, for early Qwabe history.

use for Zulu kings, and had it in his praises,[19] and it was similarly used in Malawi.[20] Although the use of Nguni in the praise of authority may have derived from the need of succeeding royal families to associate themselves with the ancient inhabitants, it is also possible that (M) Nguni was important because it described attributes of political authority per se. Evidence for a historical explanation for this connexion, such as a powerful ancestor called Nguni, is lacking. However, nineteenth century usage does reflect the contemporary ideological requirements: reinforcing social dominance by the appeal to historical primacy.

[19] KCL SP V 72, evidence of Magidigidi, 12 May 1905; A.T. Cope, Izibongo: Zulu praise poems, (London, 1968), 112-3.

[20] M. Read, ' Songs of the Ngoni people,' Bantu Studies, XI (1937), 10; Society of Malawi Library, Rangeley papers, 1/1/4, Rangeley to District Commissioner, Songea, 5 Aug.1948.

b) King lists and chronology

Genealogies and king lists were assiduously collected by both Bryant and Stuart. In Olden Times Bryant reproduced many of the lists together with dates added by himself. The basis of his chronology was an average of 18 years per reign and 30 years per generation. There is little doubt that in giving these dates, Bryant's aim was to make south-east Bantu history a little more intelligible to the reader; however, he notes the possible distortions which could affect lists and genealogies, and enjoined caution beyond names belonging to approximately the early to mid-eighteenth century.[21] Henige's recent analysis of a wide range of African and non-African lists and genealogies has reemphasised the difficulty of using such material to construct a chronology according to the western calendar with any reliability, especially owing to the likelihood of the incorporation of collaterals who did not reign in lists ostensibly of rulers.[22]

The dangers of assumptions regarding king lists are shown in the case of the Mabudu, where Bryant's version indicates that Mwali reigned from c1782 to c1800.[23] Traditional evidence not available to Bryant suggests that he did not reign, although it also gives detail of Mwali's political role before Mabudu's death. A further illustration of the hazards appears on comparing the Tembe-Mabudu list obtained by Stuart with the extensive royal Ngwane-Dlamini (Swazi) list. The names reported by Mahungane and Nkomuza as father-son successions after Mangobe are largely corroborated - with the exception of Mwali - by other sources, notably the Dutch and Austrian documentation for Delagoa bay. As Stuart

21 Bryant, Olden Times, 30-31, 185-6; for the lists, see, for example, ibid., 406, 482, 509, passim.

22 D.P. Henige, The chronology of oral tradition, (Oxford, 1974), esp. 91-4.

23 The Tembe-Mabudu list collected by Stuart and the reconstruction given by Bryant are shown below.

indicated in his note, there is doubt about Mangobe's predecessor as ihosi Tembe, and therefore about the exact relationship between the Tembe and Mabudu lineages. Their alleged connection through Dhlankumbe and Silambowa is of some interest, since these names appear on the Swazi list, and thus ostensibly suggest a genealogical connection between the Swazi royal lineage and the Tembe. However, the doubt shown by Stuart's informant is justified by Junod's evidence to the effect that Dhlankumbe and Silambowa are mythical figures commonly regarded among Tsonga speakers as the ancestors of mankind: the one who brought fire and the other the cooker of food.[24] Their representation on the Swazi list is therefore an interpolation and, although it gives indirect support to the Ngwane-Dlamini account of their early ancestors' residence in the coastal lowlands, it gives no support to their claim of a genealogical relationship with the Tembe.

No documentary corroboration is available for northern Nguni lists until the early nineteenth century. However, in the case of the Qwabe, for example, there are three consistent versions of eighteenth century kings, about some of whom there is considerable political detail.[25] Although the expansion of Qwabe power can be shown from this, it cannot be dated more precisely than to approximately the mid-eighteenth century owing to the lack of information on actual regnal lengths between Kuzwayo and Phakatwayo, who died in one of Tshaka's early campaigns. No satisfactory means of overcoming this disadvantage is apparent; lists of the amabutho are an unreliable guide even in the early nineteenth century, owing to the practice of naming sections and reforming them after substantial losses in battle into different units, thus resulting in the possible interpolation of the names of amaviyo being confused with those

[24] Junod, Life, I, 21, 24, II, 349; the names also occur as Sinambora Samukiti, and Lidahumba; see Bryant, Olden Times,

[25] Reproduced below.

of amabutho in the testimonies.[26] Moreover, the form of traditions indicates that the establishment of a chronology except in general reference to the primacy of the ruling lineage was not their objective; the rare comments on time are usually generalities about comparative reign lengths, which are useful given other detail, and the occasional and uncertain location of drought in particular reigns.[27]

[26] See Bryant, Olden Times, 646.

[27] Chapter II, p.35 and Chapters V, p.150 and VI, p. 199 .

King list of the Tembe-Mabudu:

I KCL SP Q, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 9 November 1897

(A) Silambowa

(B)

1 Sikuke
2 Nkalanki
3 Nkupo
4 Mhali
5 Mayeza
6 Bangwane
7 Bukude
8 Nabaya

(C)

1 Dhlankumbe
2 Mangobe

(D)1

Mahulule 3 MABUDU Mbendane Mpanyela Nduma

4 Mwali 2 Sabi

(E)

5 Makasane Madinghi 3 Sigibana

Hluma 4 Mahlombe

6 Noziyingile 5 Sabi

7 Ngwanase

"Care was taken with the above genealogies. Mahungane knew most about the old people, but although he asserted positively that Silambowa was the father of both Sikuku and Dhlankumbe, I was not satisfied, because he hesitated as to Sikuku's father, although yesterday he said Silambowa was Dhlankumbe's father.....(there) appears to be no doubt that the two lines are very closely connected, if not as stated, then in some other manner." (ibid., Stuart's note.)

(Lettering and numeration added.)

II

Bryant's reconstruction: from Olden Times, p.293.

Tembe (living 1554)

|

(gap of more than a century)

|

Sikuke (r.c. 1692-1710)

|

Ludahumba (1710-28)

|

Silamboya (1728-46)

|

Senior branch	Junior branch
Muhali (no reign)	Mangobe (1746-64)
|	|
Mayeta (beg.r. Dec.1822)	Mabudu (1764-82)
|	|
Bongwana (son of Muhali)	Mwayi (1782-1800)
|	|
Bukude (Bukutshe) (d.1857)	Makasana (1800-54)
|	|
Mabayi (banished 1890)	Hluma (no reign)
|	|
Bukude II (Felepu)	Msongi (Noziyingili) (1854-86)
	|
	Ngwanasi

Qwabe king lists

Variant I KCL SP V 38, evidence of Mbovu 11 viii 1904

Mahlobe	
Sidinane	
Kuzwayo	
Simamane	
Lufuta	
Mncinci	
Kondhlo	
Godolozi (Pakatwayo)	d. c1818
Musi	d. 23 ii 1892
Meseni	

Variant II KCL SP B p 82, evidence of Tununu ka Nongiya

Mahlobo	
Sidinane	
Kuzwayo	
(Ngwe)	
Simamane	
Lufuta	
Mncinci	(Informant gave the impression of certainty with all names, but was not certain of the order of the first two.)
Kondhlo	
Pakatwayo	(Stuart's note.)

Variant III From KCL SP I, Stuart's genealogy 'put together 17.i.1926 based on Mangati, Cetywayo and especially Mmemi.'

Malandela

Qwabe (unina: uNozidiya)

Mahlobo

Sidinane

Kuzwayo

Simamane

Lufuta

Mncinci

Kondlo

Pakatwayo

Musi

Appendix II

Hierarchies of lineages

As is explored in Chapters I, III and VI, the traditions relate 'clan' history as if only one 'clan' was involved, and the (varying) number of intermarrying lineages is explained by fission from the original 'clan,' thus giving the impression of numerical expansion. However, when viewed as a hierarchy of lineages ruled by a dominant lineage which expresses its domination formally in kinship terms, and which achieved its power over its subordinates in particular historical circumstances, the notions of population expansion and indeed, of 'clan' migration fall away. An analysis of Bryant's 'clan' and lineage names contained in the list in Olden Times shows that many of the subordinate lineages did not have a demonstrable genealogical relationship with the ruling lineage, thus supporting the conclusion that they were subordinated by the expansion of socio-political dominance. The Qwabe list is given below; a similar result obtains, for example, for the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe.

Lineage names and address names of the Qwabe chiefdom

(extracted from Bryant, Olden Times, pp.681-697)

Lineage name (sibongo)	Parent Lineage	Address name (sithakazelo)
KwaQwabe		Gumede, Mnguni
*emaBongeleni	(kwa Kuzwayo)	
KwaCili		Lushaba
Cinekeni		
Fakazi		
Gabuza		
Gcaba		
Gcabashe		
emGobozini		
kwaGumbi		Lufu
emaGwabeni		
ebuKazini		
*kwaKuzwayo		Gumede
*kwaMakanya		Jwapa
* Mbedwini	(kwaKuzwayo)	Mpunzi
Mlanduli		
Mnguni		
* Mpunzi		
Njobe		
Ngadini		
emaNyandwini		Mngunyana
Sabeleni		
Sanini		
Shobeda		Sitatu
KwaSishi		Mtuli, Ncwaba
Siwela		
emaSomini		Hlombe
kwaVilakazi		
Yimba		
emaYizeni		
kwaZincume		
Ncwana		Gwamanda

* denotes derivation from royal lineage.

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A. Archival sources.

I Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon

II Cape Archives, South Africa

III India Office Library, London

IV Killie Campbell Library, Durban

V Natal Provincial Archive, Pietermaritzburg

VI Netherlands Royal Archive, The Hague

VII Public Record Office, London

B. Published documents

C. Newspapers

D. Published works

E. Unpublished theses

F. Fieldwork in South Africa

G. Maps

A. Archival Sources

I Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon

Mozambique: Caixas, Códices, and Maços

Caixas

76 boxes covering the period 1700-1825, largely containing letters from governors of the ports to the Governor-General of Mozambique. There are considerable gaps in the continuity of the series from Lourenço Marques and the majority of the correspondence concerns administration, requerimentos (petitions) and devassas (investigations).

Códices

Bound volumes of letters copied from outgoing correspondence from the Governor-General of Mozambique. These are a valuable check on the contents of the Caixas because they are a more complete serial record of correspondence in which reference is made to events at subsidiary ports concerning which the original correspondence may be lost.

Maços

39 boxes covering the period c1820-1833, a series which succeeds the Caixas. Maços 1-20 have been summarised in F. Santana, ed., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, which facilitates the consultation of originals: its index of place and proper names is valuable, but location of the originals is still partially impaired by misplacement of documents in the maços.

India

Maço 137

This box contained the Processo da feitória austríaca, a copy of the documents seized by the Portuguese from the agents of the Austrian Company which traded in Delagoa bay between 1777-1781. This group of documents forms the most continuous source of information on Delagoa bay and its polities in the second half of the eighteenth century, largely owing to the care with which William Bolts drafted his plans and instructed his aides. As a source, it is therefore complementary to the lengthy range of documents concerning Portuguese activity in Delagoa bay, which do not as fully detail events in the rivers until well into the nineteenth century.

II Cape Archives, South Africa

Government House Series, 19/3: "Papers relating to the Caffer Chief, Chaka." This volume contains correspondence between Cape officials at Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and Cape Town concerning the missions sent by Tshaka and Dingane to the Cape; it also contains depositions of some of the emissaries.

III India Office Library London

Bombay Public Consultations, Despatches and Home Miscellaneous series; these series provided only fragmentary additions to the Portuguese material for Delagoa bay, despite the frequency of shipping between India and Lourenço Marques.

IV Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban

Stuart Papers

This collection consists of the notebooks of James Stuart, which form the most extensive record of orally transmitted data available on the Zulu and their neighbours. Stuart was a Natal-born son of an early settler, and gained a command of the Zulu language at an early age; from his early twenties he was employed in a succession of jobs demanding his fluency by the Natal government.

From his first appointment as a magistrate at Ingwavuma in 1895, Stuart spent much of his leisure time building a large fund of knowledge on northern Nguni history, customs and politics. His methods of acquiring and recording data were reasonably systematic. Stuart made short notes in Zulu while informants were speaking; immediately after the interview, the notes were translated, amplified with comments and then copied into exercise books. Each entry has the date of the interview and time of copy marked, with the comments easily distinguishable from the body of the testimony. 140 such books form the nucleus of Stuart's material. Individual interviews usually began with a personal history of the informant, a narration of his chiefdom's history, proceeding to its fortunes during the times of Tshaka, and its situation and role in the slightly more peaceful aftermath. A group interview frequently started in the reverse direction, when the conversation was more likely to begin with the revered military achievements of Tshaka. Particular effort seems to have been made to elicit testimonies from men whose fathers had fulfilled some special role at the royal court, or who could give an account of important battles. Moreover, Stuart did not restrict himself to Zulu informants, but gained much from Swazi and Tsonga men too.

Some informants were old men who had lived in the great days of the Zulu under Tshaka and Dingane: there is much evidence on non-Zulu lineages for the eighteenth century stemming from such informants. In addition, Stuart's own syntheses of his historical data offer valuable insights into subjects such as the working of the lineage system. The collection as a whole offers an exceptionally valuable check on the synthesis by A.T. Bryant (Olden Times in Zululand and Natal), which suffers from its lack of source citations for its large body of oral data, and from confusion generated by the frequent shift from evidence to speculation, the borderline between which Stuart's collection helps expose.

Various indexes to Stuart's material have been attempted, and a further version was in preparation while I was consulting the papers. The two series of notebooks containing original notes of interviews are indicated in this thesis by the letters U and V. Since the research was completed, volume 1 of a multi-volume collection, The James Stuart Archive, edited by C. de B. Webb and J.B. Wright, has appeared, containing verbatim reproductions of the interviews. The editors have adopted the simple and effective format of alphabetical order of the interviewee's name, followed by the date of the interview, which obviates most sources of confusion. I have kept the book series and numbers for citation here to facilitate reference to the interviews as yet unpublished.

I also consulted manuscripts by Bryant, Lugg, Miller and Honey.

V Natal Provincial Archive, Pietermaritzburg

Shepstone Collection. This contains occasionally useful information from interviews, some of it embodied in Theophilus Shepstone's own synthesis such as his 'Historical notes.'

I also consulted the Colenso collection, and the Fynn papers, which consist largely of H.F. Fynn's diary as edited by Stuart and Malcolm.

The Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) files contain reports of interviews with Africans in Pietermaritzburg.

VI Netherlands Royal Archive, The Hague

Records from the Dutch settlement at Delagoa bay are found in the Koloniaal Archief, books 12199-12203 and 12205. I consulted these on the microfilm in the possession of Prof. Alan Smith, Program of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, to whom I am indebted for his assistance in translation and discussion of the diary entries recorded in these books.

VII Public Record Office, London

Admiralty

Adm.1/62 to 1/69 are documents from the Cape Naval base, 1809-25, and concern suppression of the slave trade. The last of these, and Adm. 1/2268-2271, contain correspondence generated by Owen's mission, (to east African and Asian waters); there is valuable information concerning Portuguese and British relations with African chiefs, and the British mission, which visited Delagoa several times between 1822-5, also explored the rivers and encountered Ronga and Nguni chiefs.

Colonial Office

The 48 and 415 series (nos.62, 66, 163 and 7-9 respectively) contain documents relating to British interest in Delagoa bay dating from Owen's visit.

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F. Fieldwork in South Africa

I undertook a period of a month interviewing potential oral informants in the north east of present day Zululand. There were several reasons for this; firstly, although useful material from Portuguese archives and libraries, and testimony in the Stuart papers at the Killie Campbell Library had thrown new light on the Tembe and Mabudu who straddle the Mozambique-South Africa boundary, the general quantity of evidence was less than for areas more extensively covered by Bryant and Stuart. Secondly, even though a short period of fieldwork was not expected to reveal a wealth of unknown traditions, it would test the depth of what was still related. A third motivation was my concern to gain familiarity

with the area from the geographical and ecological viewpoints. Most of the information retrieved from interviews indeed referred to events of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and there was only the occasional reference to earlier periods. However, the interviews did give a greater familiarity with the structures of the Mabudu kingdom and its geographical environment, despite its disruption during the wars of 1894 to 1896 and the imposition of the international boundary, which bisected it. Interviews utilised in this study are quoted in Chapter V above. An extensive commentary on my field work is contained in my 'Report on study leave in Portugal and southern Africa,' African History Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1970.

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