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Great Brit  
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REPORT.

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KAFIR TRIBES.

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Approved by the House of Commons, & Printed by  
the Queen's Printer, 1855.

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(Price 2s. 6d.)



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**R E P O R T**

FROM THE

**SELECT COMMITTEE**

ON THE

**K A F I R T R I B E S ;**

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

APPENDIX, AND INDEX.

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,  
2 August 1851.*

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*Martis, 15° die Aprilis, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the Relations between this Country and the Kafir and other Tribes on our South African Frontier.

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*Jovis, 8° die Maii, 1851.*

Committee nominated, of—

Mr. Secretary at War.	Mr. Evans.
Marquis of Granby.	Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir Edward Buxton.	Mr. Bonham Carter.
Mr. E. H. Stanley.	Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Colonel Thompson.	Mr. Booker.
Mr. Cardwell.	Colonel Estcourt.
Viscount Mandeville.	Mr. Hawes.

*Ordered,* That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

*Ordered,* That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

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*Veneris, 9° die Maii, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members.

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*Lunæ, 12° die Maii, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That Colonel Dunne, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Monsell be added to the Committee.

---

*Veneris, 23° die Maii, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That Mr. Evans be discharged from further attendance on the Committee, and that Mr. Hindley be added thereto.

---

*Lunæ, 2° die Junii, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That Mr. Secretary at War be discharged from further attendance on the Committee, and that Mr. Labouchere be added thereto.

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*Sabbati, 2° die Augusti, 1851.*

*Ordered,* That the Committee have power to report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them to The House.

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R E P O R T.

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THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Relations between this Country and the KAFIR and other TRIBES on our South African Frontier, and who were empowered to Report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them to The House;—

**H**AVE examined various witnesses who have been able to give them valuable information, bearing upon the questions which were referred to their consideration, and beg to report to The House the Minutes of Evidence which they have received.

These examinations were protracted to so late a period of the Session, that Your Committee have not been able to devote that degree of time and attention to the consideration of a Report which the magnitude and difficulty of the subject entrusted to them would require.

It will be for The House to determine in the next Session of Parliament whether it will be expedient to renew the Committee for that purpose.

2 August 1851.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

*Lunæ, 26° die Maii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

The Secretary at War.	Colonel Thompson.
Lord Mandeville.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Edward Stanley.	Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Estcourt.	Mr. Booker.
Colonel Dunne.	Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.	

The SECRETARY AT WAR called to the Chair.

*Lunæ, 2° die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Booker.
Sir J. Walmsley.	Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Thompson.	Lord Mandeville.
Colonel Estcourt.	Mr. Hawes.
Marquis of Granby.	

Mr. MACKINNON called to the Chair.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Veneris, 6° die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Labouchere.	Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Booker.
Colonel Estcourt.	Mr. Hindley.
Lord Mandeville.	Colonel Dunne.
Colonel Thompson.	Mr. Stanley.
Sir J. Walmsley.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Mackinnon.	

Mr. LABOUCHERE called to the Chair.

The Rev. *Joseph Freeman*, examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Jovis, 12<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Stanley.
Colonel Estcourt.	Colonel Dunne.
Lord Mandeville.	Colonel Thompson.
Sir J. Walmsley.	Mr. Cardwell.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Marquis of Granby.	

Dr. *Andrew Smith* and Mr. *John Fairbairn*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, at One o'clock.]

*Lunæ, 16<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Sir E. Buxton.	Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Hindley.	Mr. Hawes.
Sir J. Walmsley.	Marquis of Granby.
Col. Dunne.	Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Bonham Carter.	Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Booker.
Lord Mandeville.	Mr. Stanley.

Dr. *Adamson* and Major *John J. Bissett*, examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Jovis, 19<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Mr. Booker.	Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Stanley.	Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Hawes.	Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.	Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Hindley.
Mr. B. Carter.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Estcourt.	

Colonel *Ovans* and Sir *Andries Stockenstrom*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]



*Lunæ, 23<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHÈRE in the Chair.

Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Hindley.	Mr. B. Carter,
Marquis of Granby.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Booker.	Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Stanley.	Mr. Monsell,
Colonel Dunne.	Colonel Thompson.
Lord Mandeville.	Mr. Cardwell.

Sir *George Napier*, examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Jovis, 26 die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHÈRE in the Chair.

Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Cardwell.
Sir E. Buxton.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Monsell.	Colonel Dunne.
Mr. B. Carter.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Booker.	Colonel Estcourt.
Lord Mandeville.	Mr. Stanley.
Marquis of Granby.	Colonel Thompson.

Sir *Andries Stockenstrom*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, at One o'clock.]

*Lunæ, 30 die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHÈRE in the Chair.

Mr. Hawes.	Mr. B. Carter.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Colonel Dunne.
Lord Mandeville.	Marquis of Granby.
Colonel Estcourt.	Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Monsell.	Mr. Booker.
Colonel Thompson.	Sir E. Buxton.
Sir J. Walmsley.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.

Dr. *Smith*, further examined.

Lieutenant-colonel *Smith*, examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Jovis, 3<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. HAWES in the Chair.

Marquis of Granby.	Mr. B. Carter.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Monsell.
Colonel Thompson.	Sir E. Buxton.
Colonel Dunne.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Estcourt.	Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Hindley.	Mr. Cardwell.

Captain *Owen*, R. E., examined.

Sir *James Alexander*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

*Lunæ, 7<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Sir J. Walmsley.	Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Hindley.
Lord Mandeville.	Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Monsell.	Colonel Thompson.
Mr. B. Carter.	Colonel Dunne.
Marquis of Granby.	

General Sir *Peregrine Maitland*, examined.

[Adjourned.]

*Mercurii, 23<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Mr. Monsell.	Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Hindley.	Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Cardwell.	Mr. Bonham Carter.
Colonel Estcourt.	Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Sir E. Buxton.	

The Rev. *Henry Renton*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

*Jovis, 24<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. HAWES in the Chair.

Sir J. Walmsley.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. B. Carter.  
Mr. Monsell.

Mr. Hindley.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. Cardwell.

The Rev. *Henry Renton*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

*Lunæ, 28<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Colonel Estcourt.

Mr. B. Carter.  
Sir J. Walmsley.  
Colonel Dunne.

Mr. *Hawes*, M.P., a Member of the Committee, examined.

[Adjourned till Wednesday, at Twelve o'clock.]

*Mercurii, 30<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.

Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Sir J. Walmsley.  
Colonel Estcourt.

Mr. B. Carter.  
Sir E. Buxton.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Colonel Dunne.

Sir *Andries Stockenstrom* and the Rev. *Henry Renton*, further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

*Jovis, 31<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. HAWES in the Chair.

Sir J. Walmsley.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. B. Carter.

Mr. Hindley.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Sir E. Buxton.

The Rev. H. Renton, further examined.

The Rev. P. Latrobe, examined.

The Committee agreed to their Report.

*Ordered,* To report, together with the Minutes of Evidence.

EXPENSES OF WITNESSES.

NAME of WITNESS.	By what Member of Committee Motion made for Attendance of the Witness.	Date of Arrival.	Date of Discharge.	Total Number of Days in London.	Number of Days under Exa- mination by Com- mittee, or acting specially under their Orders.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Expenses in London.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
Rev. Henry Renton	Chairman	30 July	31 July	2	2	£. s. d. 9 10 -	£. s. d. 2 2 -	£. s. d. 11 18 -

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## MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

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*Veneris, 6<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

### MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mackinnon.	Marquis of Granby.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.	Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Stanley.
Viscount Mandeville.	Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Booker.	Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Dunne.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE,  
IN THE CHAIR.

---

Rev. *Joseph John Freeman*, called in ; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] IN what way have you been connected with the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—As a Visitor from the London Missionary Society of this country ; not as a resident there. Rev. J. J. Freeman.  
6 June 1851.

2. What time have you passed in the colony?—I spent about a year there in 1830, about half a year in 1836, and a year and a half about a year ago ; I have lately returned.

3. What are the duties of a visitor of the society?—I will instance the last visit, if the Committee please. I went out as a visitor from the Missionary Society which I have just named, that is to say, the London Missionary Society ; deputed by them to visit and inspect all their missionary stations in South Africa, whether within the colony or beyond the boundaries of the colony, and to report upon them.

4. You had no other business or occupation connected with the colony, except that of a visitor from the Missionary Society?—None at all.

5. Are you a clergyman?—A Protestant dissenting clergyman.

Rev. J. J.  
Freeman.

6 June 1851.

6. What are the number and situation of the stations of the mission in South Africa?—We have within the colony, that is to say, between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, about 10 stations; in towns lying to the north of this line, and including Kat River, Graham's Town, Cradock, Graaff Reinet, and Colesberg, 10 more; beyond the colony, that is to say, within British Kafraria, three or four; in the Griqua country, three; and in the Bechuana country, six. We have altogether about 34 stations in and beyond the colony.

7. Will you state the number of the native population which you believe to be in connexion with your society?—That will require a little estimate. We have about 4,000 natives who are communicants; they would form, I should say, perhaps, one-fourth or fifth of the whole number of the congregations without the schools. I should say we have from 25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with our missionary labours.

8. Are they chiefly Kafirs or Hottentots?—The Hottentots within the colony may form about one-fourth of the number; they are mixed with the late apprentices. The latter have no distinct name but that; they are commonly called "late apprentices," meaning, as the Committee are aware, those who were till lately in slavery: I should say they constitute another fourth. The other two-fourths, or one-half of the whole number, I suppose, would be Kafirs, Griquas, Bechuanaas, and Fingoes.

9. Has the number of natives in connexion with your society been increasing of late years?—Not largely; it has increased however since the emancipation; I should say since 1834, 1835, and 1836 it has increased considerably. I do not know the proportion; I presume to the amount of one-third at any rate.

10. Have you been led to form any opinion of the policy pursued by the British Government towards the natives, and have you any observations upon that subject which you are desirous of making to the Committee?—To some extent I think I have been led to make some observations upon that policy; that is a large and comprehensive question; I think by allowing a little time to it, and taking up the matters distinctly and separately, I may be able to throw out a few suggestions. I should like to be allowed to say generally, that having read Lord John Russell's speech on moving his amendment in the House of Commons for the appointment of this Committee, which was an amendment I believe upon Mr. Adderley's motion, and having read his remarks touch-

ing

ing Sir Harry Smith, and that this was not a Committee designed to impugn the character of Sir Harry Smith or of his government, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I do not come with that view at all, and any remarks which I may now offer respecting his measures and government I trust will be understood as not intended to impugn the character of the Governor or of his government. If my observations imply or involve dissent from his measures, I trust I shall not be thought to be making it my object to impugn his character or his policy. But I have looked at the effect of certain Government measures upon the Hottentot population of the Kat River Settlement especially, and I have thought some of those measures to be decidedly unfavourable to the people. Certain measures also affecting the Griquas and Bassutos, I have equally thought unfavourable and undesirable, not to say in some degree unjust, as I endeavoured to state in a communication of mine to Lord Grey, which is in the Blue Book lately published. In speaking of the Kat River Settlement, and implying some dissatisfaction with the Government measures there, I refer rather to individual acts of the local magistrate, who is of course, however, appointed by the Government, than to any general and comprehensive measures of the Government itself. My strong impression has been that the constituting the Kat River Settlement a home for the Hottentots has been a wise and salutary measure for them and for the colony generally, as a part of our border policy. By the Kat River Settlement, I mean the northern part of the district of Victoria, towards Beaufort, and adjoining British Kafria on the north. It would scarcely be important now, perhaps, to discuss the policy of locating a large body of Hottentots there, instead of allowing them to be scattered more extensively over the colony as landowners. That policy has been adopted now for so many years that it may not be needful to go into that question; it seems that that previous question is already settled. But I refer to acts on the part of the late magistrate, which for the last three or four years have been, I think, of an extremely injurious and irritating character, and going far, as I think, to account for, though not to justify, the disaffection under which the Hottentots have now for some time been labouring, and which very unhappily has broken out during this present Kafir war in the shape of disloyalty. If the Committee wish it, I can go into a detail of several of those acts of the magistrate, Mr. J. H. Bowker. He has been removed from the office, and so far the evil is checked; but the previous evil, which was very

Rev. J. J.  
Freeman.  
—  
6 June 1851.



Rev. J. J.  
Freeman.

6 June 1851.

serious, was done, and so much evil was being done, that last June a letter was written to me by a friend on the spot, intimating a fear that if the Kafirs should again attack the colony, it was questionable if the Hottentots would be induced to come forward in defence of the colony, inasmuch as they felt so aggrieved and irritated and goaded by this constant series of what they term acts of oppression.

11. What was the nature of those acts?—Two or three of those acts, which will enable the Committee to judge of others, I should say were these: one of them was the case of fining very heavily a number of people residing at the settlement called Buxton. A quantity of cattle belonging to the people had trespassed upon some corn lands, and done some damage.

12. Mr. *Hawcs.*] Corn lands belonging to the settlers?—Corn lands belonging to the settlers in Buxton; corn lands, however, wholly unenclosed. I mention that because usually in awarding damages some consideration is given to that circumstance, that the lands are unenclosed. There is then a temptation of course to cattle to trespass, and it is a reason why the proprietor of the ground should have his lands enclosed. However, in this case about 100 head of cattle had trespassed, and the field cornet, that is, a sort of high constable there, authorised for the purpose, assessed the damages at 50s.; 8d. a head. The people being poor, and not having the money, paid it in value: that is to say, they paid two young oxen, fit for yoking into a waggon, and a cow in calf, which was supposed to be, and all parties thought to be, a fair and just consideration for the damages which had been done. The people were then allowed to drive their oxen away, but through some bungling or other, which I cannot fully understand, the parties to whom the land belonged said they had not received a sufficient amount for damages, and the case was then wholly referred to Mr. Bowker, the resident magistrate. He set aside the decision of the field cornet, and assessed the people in damages eight head of cattle; but as the allegation was set up by the constables, who, however, were not cross-examined, that in bringing the cattle, the owners, five in number, had attempted to rescue them, he fined them 10l. a head, which was the extreme penalty of the law, being 50l. for an attempt at rescue. The cattle, however, belonged to only three of the parties; the other two had neither cattle nor money. Thirty head of cattle were then taken as an equivalent for the 30l., or 10l. each, the fine imposed for the offence of attempted rescue. The other

two men were accused of interrupting the constables and being insolent, and they were put in irons and set to work upon the high road, a punishment which a local magistrate has not by law the power of inflicting. The Supreme Court alone can put a man in irons, and order working on the road. I saw the people themselves bitterly aggrieved amidst all this, and they begged me to communicate it to the Governor. I wrote to Sir Harry Smith, and he very promptly and suitably instituted an inquiry. In the meantime, the people themselves had applied to the circuit judge, Sir John Wilde, and got the magistrate's decision reviewed at the circuit held at Beaufort. Sir Harry Smith appointed a commission, the result of which was that his Excellency severely blamed the magistrate: for that I have his Excellency's own letter in reply to my communication. He reprimands him strongly for his severity. He ordered the fines to be returned to the people, and recommends the magistrate to compromise the matter with the men who had been imprisoned and put in irons. It was a long time before those fines were repaid; I had to write a second time to his Excellency, and ultimately the 30% has been repaid. The men who were put in irons have never received any kind of compensation. The Governor did most promptly what could be done in the matter, but the mischief was done, and the whole of the people there sympathizing one with another, felt exceedingly aggrieved and indignant at this treatment. I may also refer to the case of turning out what are called the Gonah Hottentots, residing near to Buxton, and whose friends do reside there. Among those expelled as being squatting Kafirs, but who were in fact resident Gonah Hottentots, having lived there for 20 years, and been recognised as having a full right to reside among them, were some of the parties who had complained of the magistrate; and it seemed to them to be a kind of revenge on the part of the magistrate concerned. An appeal had been made by the people to the Governor, to have certain squatting Kafirs in their neighbourhood turned away. They were chargeable, I believe, with thefts; and to say the least, they were interlopers. They were residing about Blinkwater, and all that neighbourhood. Sir Harry Smith had again very properly desired inquiry to be made as to the number of those squatting Kafirs of whom the people complained, and had sent an order that they should be removed, and proper arrangements to that effect were made; but in carrying them into execution by that same magistrate, Mr. Bowker, not the squatting

Rev. J. J.  
Freeman.  
6 June 1851.

Rev. J. J.  
Freeman.  
6 June 1851.

Kafirs alone were turned out, but about 50 families of other people, who had the same right in law to reside there as any of us have to our own residences here. They were people who had resided there since the formation of the settlement, and had been recognised by the Government as having a right to be there. They had served in the war from time to time, and had received the commendations of the Government. When I called on Sir Harry Smith, at the Cape, I mentioned to him this case of the expulsion of the Hottentots, and especially the burning of their huts as soon as they had been driven out, which is to them the most painful insult you can offer; his Excellency assured me at once that it was never his intention to have had them turned out, he felt that they had rendered essential service to the colony, and he would have preferred to do them a service, rather than to see any injury inflicted upon them. I think Sir Harry Smith was led into a mistake by the act of the magistrate and the report of the police, who, instead of saying, We have expelled so many Gonaah Hottentots, simply said, We have turned out all those squatting Kafirs. As soon as his Excellency found out the real facts of the case, he appointed a commission of inquiry. He has allowed to return to their settlements all those who have a right to be there; but in the meantime their minds have been greatly aggrieved; their property was taken from them, in fact they were driven out. Their wives and children were turned out in the coldest season known there for a long time. I have passed over the same country before, and I can speak to its being most intensely cold; we have nothing in England or Scotland more intense. It was on a Sunday, in the coldest weather, when this order was carried into execution; a thing I am sure which the Governor never intended, but it has given rise to a state of disaffection in the minds of the people. That has been followed also by numerous other circumstances.

13. What was the date of the transactions to which you have referred?—The events I have last referred to took place about the middle of June 1850; the previous event, with respect to the fines inflicted upon the people, took place about the middle of 1849.

14. Colonel *Dunne*.] That is the coldest season there?—I should say that our Midsummer is their Christmas. I am desirous of adverting for a moment to the case respecting how forests, which perhaps the people had simply from usage had need to belong to the respective allotments or settlements. then takenmittee will understand that the whole district is fine imposed't River Settlement, but that it embraces some

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12 or 18 divisions, which are also called settlements; Buxton Settlement; Wilberforce Settlement; and so on. The people had supposed the forests to be attached to their several localities, villages, or settlements, and the cutting timber and selling it has been a great source of profit to them. But within the last four years, since the war of 1847, the Government has seen it right to impose a tax of 6*s.* per load on the timber cut, claiming of course for the Crown a right over that forest land, which may be very proper; I only name it as having tended to discourage the people. The people had lost their all during two or three successive wars; first in the war of 1834-35, and again in the war of 1846-47; they were reduced then to extremity, and by cutting timber, and selling it in the neighbouring countries for 50 or 60 or 100 miles round, many of them obtained a comfortable livelihood. I saw when I was there about 80 or 90 saw pits at work among those people. The imposition of a tax of 6*s.* a load came very heavily upon them after having suffered the loss of all during the wars. It is just one of the matters relating to the policy of the Government towards them, which is important in the consideration of the question proposed.

15. *Chairman.*] What is the principal occupation of the people; is it agriculture, or pasturage, or both?—Agriculture, pasturage, and the conveyance of goods. Many of the people have waggons and oxen of their own, and they are carriers. The same remark would apply very extensively to the Hottentots throughout the whole colony; they are carriers of goods from the ports into the towns in the interior; large mercantile houses employ them. For example, Messrs. Barry, a respectable house at Zwellendam, paid two years ago 600*l.* sterling during one year to the Hottentots of Zuurbrak, for the conveyance of goods.

16. What is the number of the native inhabitants within the settlements?—About 5,000, it may be rather more; they have said from year to year from 5,000 to 7,000; I should say 5,000 is the minimum.

17. Are they well-conducted people, generally?—Extremely so. There is but one of those small settlements where there is any disposition to intoxication, and that is marked, it has a stigma upon it as such; there are but few families there. I visited the whole of those 10 or 12 settlements, and I found the people extremely well conducted.

18. Is the whole population in connexion with your society?—No; there is a congregation in connexion with the Dutch Reformed Church at Balfour, of which the Rev.

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W. Thompson is the minister; he is sustained by the Government, as the other Dutch clergymen are.

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19. But the greater number of the people are in connexion with your society?—Yes, I think I may say nine-tenths of them are in connexion with our society.

20. Do the children attend your schools?—Yes, we have had as many as 1,000 children on the books, and 700 or 800 in attendance. Since the war we have not had more than perhaps 500; the people have been too impoverished to spare their children from attention to their gardens and their flocks and herds.

21. Are they generally able to read and write?—Yes, many of them, and they are familiar, to a large extent, with the English as well as with the Dutch language. I have given them publicly addresses in English, and was distinctly understood by them speaking simple English. I should add that Mr. Bowker has resigned his office as magistrate, in consequence of those measures to which I have referred, after being severely reprimanded. But still the facts which I state, I have stated merely to show that a disaffection and restlessness and vexation have been created in the minds of the Hottentots by this series of measures. I lament that he was ever appointed, because his known feelings were not so much with the coloured race as against them.

22. Are these settlements of the coloured race mixed up with settlements of the European race?—There are very few Europeans there. In the Kat River Settlement I should not think there are 25 Europeans resident. The settlement was granted, as the Committee is aware, under Sir Lowrie Cole's administration, sanctioned by the Home Government, as an experimental settlement for the Hottentot race. I believe by Sir Andreis Stockenstrom, at that time an officer of high standing in the colony, a selection of Hottentots had been made from the different missionary institutions, the Moravian and ours; well-disposed men, men of some little property, were taken from those other settlements in the colony, and located in the Kat River Settlement.

23. What is about the extent of country which they occupy?—It extends about 25 miles north and south, by 20 miles east and west.

24. You have stated certain circumstances which, in your opinion, have constituted particular grievances with respect to this population, and which have produced an irritating effect upon their minds; are you prepared to state to the Committee an opinion as to any general change in the exist-  
ing

ing relations between the British Government and those people which it would be expedient to adopt?—No; the main thing, I think, would be to secure for them a magistracy in which they would have confidence. I feel sure that, upon the whole, they are a thoroughly loyal and devoted people. Their present state of disaffection and disloyalty is entirely a new thing; I believe the disaffection to have been general, but the disloyalty to have been very partial.

25. You think that nothing more is required than the residence of a discreet and judicious magistrate among them to meet all their wants and wishes?—That is the main thing; it would lead to others. I think an important end would be gained by encouraging them to become *bonâ fide* landholders there. Give them a personal interest in the land; the greater the interest they have at stake, I think, the more anxious they will be to preserve peace, and to stand by the Government.

26. What is the tenure by which they now hold their land?—In the Kat River Settlement the Hottentots were allowed, through their headmen, to make a selection of certain spots for villages, depending of course upon the supply of water; the fountains and streams. Then so many feet, I do not remember now exactly the amount in width and in depth, were allotted to each one, but they have not received diagrams. They simply dwell there as part of the Hottentot nation, but not as the holders of those erven, as they are called; allotments for building, we should call them here. The people have not got diagrams; they have been promised those diagrams, which would make a certain amount of land theirs, which might be conveyed to others under given circumstances. Those I think should be given them, but I think there should be a provision at the same time that that land should not be alienated, say, to Europeans and colonists, but that it should be kept for the Hottentot nation, which was the design originally of the settlement. That I think could be done without improperly infringing upon the liberties of such landholders.

27. Mr. Mackinnon.] Will you be kind enough to state somewhat more distinctly the nature of their present tenure?—They have simply permission to occupy.

28. Can they be turned out at any time?—I do not know what the right in the colony is; I believe that occupation for a certain number of years gives them a right against being expelled, but it would not be sufficient to enable a man to sell the property; they do not feel it to be secure. I have

sometimes

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sometimes said to them, "Why do not you build better houses and cultivate your land more?" They say, and I think reasonably say, "But we have no security upon the property; we can be excluded, if the Government chooses to interfere."

29. *Chairman.*] In point of fact, has any one of them ever been disturbed in his occupation?—That which I have mentioned was a very strong measure, the turning out of those Gonah Hottentots.

30. But there the error was set right as soon as it was discovered?—The people obtained permission to return after losing a large amount of property, and suffering a great deal.

31. Colonel *Dunne.*] Was not that case the result of an accident?—Sir Harry Smith certainly did not intend it; he did not intend, he assured me, to turn out those Gonah Hottentots; it was entrusted to parties whose feelings were not kindly towards the people.

32. Colonel *Estcourt.*] Those people you say are living in villages, but they have no actual division of property amongst themselves?—There is common land attached to each settlement. Suppose it to be a village having 100 or 200 inhabitants, they have all their respective houses and allotments, with so many feet of frontage, and a general right to commonage at the back of the settlement. That which is common in the colony is, that each real landowner shall have a recognised diagram, provided by a sworn Government surveyor, which is to be the basis of any measure he may adopt in the disposal of his land. The Hottentots at present feel that they are resident there by a kind of permission only; no man feels himself secure in point of law for the continued occupation of his land.

33. *Chairman.*] What is the extent of one of those diagrams?—I think it is about an acre; but I cannot speak with certainty.

34. Colonel *Dunne.*] What is the tenure by which occupants generally hold land?—They have in all cases a diagram recognised by the Government, and entered in the Transfer Court.

35. Colonel *Estcourt.*] In fact the Hottentots are treated with as a united village; the individuals are not treated with?—They are not.

36. Viscount *Mandeville.*] Was any ground given for the expulsion of those Hottentots in the case you have mentioned?—Yes; the people themselves had requested the Government

to expel certain squatting Kafirs, which was the term used. Certain Kafirs had come in and settled in the neighbourhood without permission. The people had requested to have those removed; and it was under the general idea of the removal of those squatters that these burghers themselves were expelled.

37. Colonel *Dunne*.] Who made the application for their expulsion?—The residents of Blinkwater.

38. Were they Hottentots?—Yes.

39. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] If the Government at home or the Government in the colony gave a positive title to those Hottentots to hold their land for ever, would it not tend to retard the civilization of the colony by preventing Europeans, or persons who would efficiently cultivate the land, from having the opportunity of doing so?—Many of the Hottentots have greatly improved their lands; they have built good houses, and have furnished their houses very decently. They have acquired horses, oxen, waggons, and various other moveable property; and I think, as a whole body, they would do much more for the improvement of a given locality than Europeans; not as individuals perhaps, but as a body. That is to say, the Kat River Settlement will now sustain 5,000 or 6,000 Hottentots, but it would not sustain one-tenth of that number of Europeans, who would require farms so much larger, and whose means of support must be upon a greater scale. It may be well to say here, that there were evidently two views on the part of the Government in granting the Kat River Settlement to the Hottentots. The one was, to reward the Hottentots for the faithful services of many past years, especially in the war; and secondly, to have a body of men who might serve as a defence to the colony in the event of a Kafir attack. Now, having 5,000 or 7,000 men just upon that spot, if you secure their fidelity and loyalty, you have that defence; but you would not have it in the small number to which a body of European farmers would be limited. Not only would there be fewer men to defend the colony, but you would present much greater temptations to the Kafirs to come in and steal the property of the Europeans than the more trifling property of the native Hottentots.

40. *Chairman*.] Is there a feeling of dislike existing between the Kafirs and the Hottentots?—There is a great deal of jealousy, and on this ground: The whole of that settlement belonged some few years ago to the Kafirs. Maquomo, the chief, of whom the Committee has probably heard, was expelled from a part of the Kat River Settlement

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to make way for the Hottentots, and the jealousy between them, I may say, has continued from that moment to the present.

41. Mr. Hawes.] Is the Kat River Settlement in the ceded territory, as it is called?—Yes, it is; that was where Maquomo resided.

42. That territory was ceded, was it not, by treaty with the British Government?—It was said to be ceded, but it never was.

43. Are you acquainted with the circumstances which occurred at that time?—I have read them over and over again, and conversed about them with different parties there. I have been most strongly assured by those who know all the facts, that the Gaikas never said nor implied that they ceded it. Lord Charles Somerset was then the Governor, and it was his wish and plan to get it, and to get it without the force of the sword; but there is no document I believe existing, which would go to show that it had ever been really ceded.

44. Though there is no document, is not it a fact, stated upon the highest authority in the colony, that the chiefs who were consulted at that time did cede the territory, and that with a view of being separated from the settlers?—I have heard it affirmed, of course, and it so appeared in some of the Blue Books, that there was a cession; but I never could ascertain in what way any cession was made; I could find no document, nor any distinct declaration on the subject. And a further question arises, which implies that there was not a cession; namely, that the people there, and I may say the people throughout all South Africa, do not recognise any right on the part of their chiefs to part with the territory occupied by them. The people regard themselves as the rightful owners of the soil which they cultivate and occupy; they recognise a general authority over their conduct in all matters of theft, or anything else of that kind, on the part of their chiefs, but they do not recognise that they have the power to cede any part of their territory.

45. Was not Lord Charles Somerset in direct communication with Gaika at that time?—I have understood that he was. And an attempt was made to put up Gaika as the paramount chief, much to the annoyance of all the other chiefs, and that led to those successive misunderstandings which terminated in the expulsion of the Gaika tribes from what we have since called the ceded territory. The agreement, first of all, was to make it a neutral territory, that neither party should occupy it.

46. Was

46. Was that policy generally sanctioned by the leading colonial authorities at the time?—I think it was; I think the liberal press of the colony, as it may be called, which defended the interests of the native tribes, scarcely concurred in the propriety of the measure, and for the same reasons they have not, to the present day, changed their views upon the matter. We have had nothing but a series of misunderstandings and expensive wars with the Kafirs since that time.

47. Do you think that that has arisen from a neglect of the stipulations which for the moment I will call the treaty or understanding with Gaika, or from an infraction of those stipulations?—I think Gaika, so far as I could understand the case, sincerely believed that the country was not to be granted to others, or to be occupied by them. When he yielded it, it was agreed that the Kafirs should cease to be the masters and occupiers of it, but he had no expectation that the colonists were to be made the occupants of it. Neither he nor the other chiefs ever sincerely yielded that point, and up to this day Maquomo keeps on asking the question, "Why was I expelled from my country?" The Committee are aware that he put that question last year to his Excellency.

48. Was not it at that time as clear an understanding as could be come to with barbarians, that that tract of country should be considered as neutral, and neither occupied by the Kafirs nor by the settlers?—I think it was so.

49. Will you favour the Committee with your opinion upon that arrangement as a means of preserving the tranquillity of the border?—I am incompetent to give any opinion touching what would be properly a military view of the matter. I have always thought, from what information I could gather, that upon the whole it was a wise thing to occupy that neutral territory, and to give to the Hottentots the occupation of it. It seems to have been a wise policy; but I think something more should have been done at the time to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the Kafirs who were excluded, and especially of Maquomo; I think you ought to have provided for him more distinctly. Though he has turned out, I will admit, an unworthy man, still at that time he was not so; and I think a distinct provision being made for the necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have secured more fidelity and more affection on their part. Whether the boundary line which we have adopted, namely, the Keiskamma, be the best for the colony in a military point of view, I do not know; whether it is better than the Kei I cannot say.

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50. Are the Committee to understand you to say that in your opinion the policy which was then followed, namely, the establishment of a neutral territory between the Kafirs, on the one hand, and the settlers upon the other, was or was not a policy which was wise and judicious?—I think it would have been wise and judicious, if it had been well followed up by all those other measures which might have been brought to bear upon the Kafirs, whom we were then shutting out of that part of their country.

51. Are the Committee to understand that in your opinion it would have been judicious, subsequently to the carrying out of that arrangement, to have located the Hottentots in the neutral territory?—Yes, I cannot blame it; I should have thought it would have been better also to have put some Hottentots in other portions of the colony, simply as landholders, so as to give them a deep interest in the soil.

52. Supposing the Hottentots had been located in the neutral territory, what would have been their pursuit; would it have been agricultural?—On the exclusion of the Kafirs the Hottentots were brought in. It did not remain a neutral territory.

53. Their pursuits are chiefly agricultural, are not they?—Agricultural and pastoral together, with the carriage of goods; many of them are artisans, masons, carpenters, and so on.

54. Would not the effect of that have been, and was not the effect of that location of the Hottentots to bring them more immediately into contact with their fiercer and more warlike neighbours, the Kafirs?—Yes, and so far it would seem to endanger them; but here was the difference: the Kafir was still left to his own wild and undisciplined habits of warfare, and the Hottentots were our soldiers. Our Cape corps and mounted rifles were all Hottentots; and I need not say that 100 well-disciplined Hottentots would be a match for 1,000 undisciplined Kafirs.

55. Such was the fact, was not it, that the location brought these new settlers immediately into contact with the Kafirs?—Yes.

56. Is not it also true that the Kafirs committed a series of depredations upon the settlers, both Hottentots and emigrants, in that territory?—Yes. There have always been thefts committed by the Kafirs; I believe, however, that from about the year 1835 to 1845, the number of those thefts, on the part of the Kafirs, was very much upon the decline.

57. The Committee understand you to say that there were depredations constantly occurring on the part of the Kafirs upon the settlers, both Hottentot and emigrant?—Yes. I presume that to have been the case from the charges which were brought before the magistrates; but I do not believe that all the charges, nor anything like all, were well-founded charges; because if the farmers lost their cattle, their temptation was at once to say, “The Kafirs have stolen them.” And instances have certainly occurred in which cattle said to have been stolen by the Kafirs, have been found to have been stolen by other parties; stolen it may have been, in the colony, or killed and destroyed by the farmers’ own servants. Many cases could be mentioned in which the charge of cattle stealing has not been established; but beyond all doubt there were thefts on the part of the Kafirs.

58. Were there any more serious crimes than those thefts committed, which you have heard of?—There is the particular case which led to the late war in 1846–7, which Sir Peregrine Maitland took up, the murder of a Hottentot constable. I do not think, generally, there were very serious cases.

59. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Was there no one but a Hottentot murdered then?—In that particular case two persons were killed; one of them was a Kafir, and the Kafirs killed the Hottentot, to whom a Kafir prisoner was handcuffed.

60. Was not there a farmer killed also?—I think not at that particular time; it may have been so.

61. Mr. *Hawes*.] Passing from the conduct of the Kafirs in reference to the occupation of this neutral territory in the Kat River Settlement, to the conduct of the settler and the Government generally, is it clear, in your opinion, that the Government was altogether free from the imputation of having made encroachments upon or having committed any act of injustice towards the Kafirs, notwithstanding their depredations; take the period you have mentioned, from 1835 to 1845?—I should say that during that period, from 1835 to 1845, there was a gradual diminution of crime, so far as appears in the magistrates’ courts and books, and that things were working, upon the whole, tolerably well for the preservation of peace between the Kafirs and the colony, and promoting the improvement of the Hottentots in this neutral territory, then called the Kat River Settlement.

62. May the Committee presume it to be your opinion that Sir Peregrine Maitland, when he issued his proclamation

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in 1846, declaring war against the Kafirs, was perfectly correct in stating this: "So far as a feeling of hostility amongst the Kafirs might be provoked or palliated by even one solitary act of violence, outrage, or injustice committed by any colonist in Kafir land, the Kafirs are without excuse; no Kafir can charge the commission of any such act during, at all events, the last seven years. It is with pride and pleasure that I make this statement, which I believe to be accurate even to the letter"—Yes, I presume that statement was well founded.

63. Would your experience and knowledge of the colony lead you generally to concur in that expression of opinion?—Yes, I should concur in it, taken as a whole. In the proclamation of war I do not coincide with Sir Peregrine Maitland; I do not see that a *casus belli* was made out.

64. You were understood to say that you thought the formation of the Kat River Settlement was a wise and judicious step on the part of the Government?—Yes.

65. Will you state the grounds of your belief to the Committee?—So far as the Hottentots who were located there are concerned, I think it was due to them to secure at least a fraction of the colony to them in perpetuity. None of us can doubt that the whole of South Africa had been originally occupied by the Hottentot race.

66. Upon whom the Kafir was an intruder?—As far as history goes back, I think they have about met; the Hottentots have come down on the western side, the Kafirs have come down on the eastern side, and they have met, say 100 years back, somewhere about the Gamtoos River, which is now within the colony.

67. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Are you acquainted with the Hottentot language?—I am not.

68. Can you say whether the names of the rivers resemble the Hottentot language?—Many of them I have heard stated to me as being Hottentot names. The monosyllabic names are Hottentot words, certainly.

69. Mr. *Hawes*.] Will you continue the statement you were about to make as to the grounds upon which you thought the settlement of the Kat River a wise and judicious one?—My first reason for thinking it a wise and good and useful measure would be that we owed it to the Hottentots to preserve for them some portion of the whole colony, which originally belonged to their ancestors.

70. What do you mean when you speak of the settlement of the Hottentots; do you mean to say that the settlement as

founded and as conducted was wise and judicious ; or do you merely mean to express a general opinion that the location of the Hottentots in the territory was due to the Hottentots who owned the territory originally ?—In the first instance I meant to say that the obtaining a piece of land for them was desirable, leaving out of the question how we got that piece of land, whether from Kafirs or Dutchmen. I think it was wise that a piece of land in the colony should be reserved in perpetuity to the Hottentot race. It was a fair consideration for our having obtained all the rest of the land. With respect to the particular mode of settlement, I should say that it was a wise thing to arrange that the best of the Hottentots which could be found in the colony should be selected and brought there. It was a reward to them, and an encouragement to them ; a reward for services during the past, and an encouragement, I think, for time to come. It was putting them upon their trial ; it was a new position to put them in. For the most part they had either been residents upon the lands granted by Government for missionary institutions, where of course they had no individual right in the soil, or they were simply residents in the colony, settling down wherever they could.

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71. With reference to this settlement, are the Committee to understand you to say that the system upon which it was founded and conducted was a wise and judicious one ?—I think so.

72. Have you acquainted yourself with the reports which Sir Henry Pottinger has made respecting that settlement ?—Yes ; I have read Mr. Biddulph's report particularly ; that was drawn up, I think, at the request of Sir Henry Pottinger, and published by Sir Henry Pottinger ; in which report I am aware that Mr. Biddulph, in common with many other gentlemen in the colony, is of opinion that the locating of large numbers of labouring people together in that manner is not favourable to the colonial interests ; it is locating in one spot labourers whom they think might be advantageously distributed over the colony.

73. Is your notion of a settlement this, that the persons so located should have lands granted to them with a good title ; that they should cultivate them and maintain themselves, and be ready, if necessary, to take their share in the defence of the frontier ?—That is my opinion.

74. Does that description correspond with the Kat River Settlement, from your knowledge of it ?—Only that the parties have no right in the soil as individuals, or even as vil-

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lagers, but merely as a whole body; it is this, that 5,000 people may go and live at a place called the Kat River Settlement; it conveys no right of property.

75. Were not those Hottentots, to a great extent, supported by the Government?—I do not see in what particular direction they were so.

76. Did they earn their own subsistence by their own labour?—Entirely; even during the war they never received wages, nothing but rations.

77. Rations means food, does not it?—Yes; while they were in service.

78. Was not clothing also given them?—I should think possibly it may have been; but I do not know.

79. Are you quite sure that rations and clothing were given only to those who were actually in the service of the Government?—To the best of my belief only those who were serving, or who had been in the service, and were allowed to return home for the sake of their families, received rations. I am certain of this, that they could have employed their time far more profitably for themselves as labourers and carriers and sawyers, and so on, than they could in the service of the Government. What they have done has been of service to the Government, but not to themselves, in a pecuniary point of view.

80. Would you describe the Kat River Settlement as an industrious and thriving settlement?—I should, looking at all the circumstances. It did not fully meet all my wishes and expectations, I candidly confess; but when I saw that the people had been utterly ruined by the war of 1834-5, and as soon as they recovered from that, were again ruined by the war of 1846-7, I being there in the middle of 1849, I was not surprised to find a considerable degree of poverty, and a deficiency of the signs of industry which I had hoped for. But will the Committee allow me to say this: Mr. Biddulph's report goes to represent the Hottentots as wanting in industry, and therefore in the signs of industry on the spot. When Sir Harry Smith went there immediately afterwards, and saw their orchards and enclosed lands, with many good houses and decent huts, he said most properly, in relation to Mr. Biddulph's report, "If that is a failure, the whole world is a failure." That was Sir Harry Smith's own declaration.

81. According to your opinion the Kat River Settlement is a thriving, industrious, and successful settlement?—Yes, all the disadvantages being considered.

82. Did

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82. Did the Hottentots ever complain of any want of protection on the part of the Government?—The principal complaints which I heard while I was there recently, were of a series of oppressive acts on the part of the magistrate, very heavy fines being imposed in many more cases than I have just described.

83. I am now speaking of the period from 1835 to 1845, the Kat River Settlement having been established many years before 1835. Taking that period, have any instances come to your own knowledge, or have you from the missionaries heard any complaints of the want of efficient protection on the part of the Government, or the want of efficient magistrates, excepting for a moment the cases to which just now you referred?—No; I should say there have been no complaints; I am not familiar with any complaints during that earlier period. I think Mr. Biddulph was the first magistrate appointed at the Kat River Settlement.

84. Considering your description of this settlement as a thriving, industrious, well-protected settlement, upon fertile land, how do you account for the general disloyalty which has recently prevailed there?—That is a most mysterious thing, a thing which strikes me with great surprise. I am as much surprised at it as Sir Harry Smith himself, who, in his communication to Lord Grey, says it is the most wonderful thing in history, in his opinion, that a religious body of men, such as this professes to be, should at once have gone over and joined the heathen. There is a little mistake in that; a large body has not gone over, as I am prepared to affirm. General Somerset is under a mistake in his communications, as can be proved. In the next place, they have not gone to join the heathen, if any reference to religion be there meant. It is a political movement, and not at all a religious one. I am not going to say it was religious to rebel, of course; I do not mean anything of that kind; but I mean to affirm that the Hottentots never were idolaters, and consequently have not gone back to idolatry, as charged on them by some writers. They have made a creditable profession of Christianity; and now, in some fitful moment, in sad dissatisfaction, some of them have joined the Kafirs as a political movement, but it has nothing at all to do with heathenism.

85. You are connected with the London Missionary Society, are you not?—Yes.

86. Who is your oldest and principal missionary in South Africa?—Mr. Read, senior, who has been there 50 years.



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87. Has not he married a native woman?—He married, 40 years ago, a Hottentot; she is lately deceased; she brought up her family very creditably. Young Mr. James Read, who was examined by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1845, was a son of Mrs. Read.

88. Mr. Read is one of your missionaries?—Yes.

89. Has he made any communications to his brother missionaries, or has he written home to give any explanations of this extraordinary change of feeling on the part of these people towards the Government, which seems to have done all it could for them during many years past?—Yes, he has written home. I have here a letter of General Somerset, which is contained in the "Graham's Town Journal" of the 15th of March of the present year, being addressed to Sir Harry Smith. Upon that I have Mr. Read's remarks, which he has addressed to our agent in Cape Town, and which by him have been transmitted to us.

90. Does he assign any reasons for this singular disaffection?—No; in this particular document he does not.

91. What is the date of that letter?—March 26, 1851.

91.\* Have you any objection to give that letter from Mr. Read to the Committee?—I will readily furnish the Committee with a copy of it. (*Vide Appendix.*)

92. Is Mr. Bowker, the magistrate to whom you have referred, a settler of long standing and of some property there?—He was an Albany farmer; I do not know for how many years, but he has been several years in the colony as an Albany farmer.

93. Has the general administration of his duties been satisfactory to the inhabitants?—Not to the inhabitants of Kat River.

94. Not at any time?—No; from the first they looked upon him with suspicion and were prejudiced against him, and that chiefly from some letter which he had published, before he was magistrate, in some journal of the colony; that gave them a dislike to him.

95. Do you recollect about what was the date of his appointment?—I am not sure whether it was 1848; I think it was.

96. Do you know whether he was recommended to the Governor by the residents?—I do not know that.

97. With reference to these transactions to which you have referred, in June 1850, had the inhabitants of the Kat River Settlement made complaints to the Governor of depredations and incursions committed upon them by the Kafirs?—Yes; it was at their request that this interference was made.

The inhabitants of Blinkwater had made a representation to the Governor.

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98. That led to an inquiry, did not it, by a local commission?—I think his Excellency desired Colonel Mackinnon to institute an inquiry as to the parties who had located themselves, that is, in provincial language, squatted in the vicinity of Blinkwater, with a view to making some arrangements for removing those who ought to be removed and retaining those who might be retained.

99. Had not the settlers there long complained of the number of Kafirs and squatters among them, and of the great losses which they sustained in consequence?—Yes.

100. Complaints had been made long before June 1850, and they continued to be made after the severity of which you have spoken, down to November; is not that so?—Yes.

101. Some gentlemen, it appears, wrote to the local magistrates there, calling for some inquiry. Will you have the goodness to look at this document, and at the names signed to it, and tell me whether they are men of whom you have any personal knowledge as men of standing and respectability in that district?—There are but two names that I know at all, and only one that I know personally. Mr. Blakeway I have heard of, but further than that I do not know him. Mr. Painter is a gentleman whom I have seen at Fort Beaufort; he is a merchant there, in a moderate way of business, and I presume a respectable man.

102. Notwithstanding the severities which you have complained of, it appears that the colonists were still suffering from the depredations of the Kafirs?—I should presume so from this document. Upon a requisition like this, I should think it would have been important at once to have looked into the matter.

103. The Committee understand you to say that the main thing wanted in the government of the Cape, especially on the frontier, is the appointment of magistrates in whom the people would have confidence?—Yes, provided they possess the other magisterial qualifications of sound sense and a knowledge of law. In the case of Mr. Bowker, the Governor himself says he had found out that he had not sufficient knowledge of the law.

104. Do you know anything of the steps which are taken previously to the appointment of a magistrate; is there any inquiry made into his qualifications?—I know his Excellency possesses the power of making the appointment; but in those

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cases, as far as I know, it has been exercised when the person has been recommended to him.

105. Colonel *Dunne*.] From what class do you think that the magistrates should be taken; are there any men among the natives of sufficient standing and intelligence to act as magistrates?—There may not be precisely in the same locality; but still I cannot but believe there are respectable men in the colony, many perhaps in Graham's Town, but certainly in Cape Town, which is the seat of Government, who are very well qualified to act as magistrates.

106. *Chairman*.] What is the salary generally given to a magistrate?—About 400*l.* a year.

107. Colonel *Dunne*.] In that particular locality you think there are not any?—In Fort Beaufort there would not be, probably; it is a small military town, which has sprung up in the last few years.

108. Are there European settlers?—Yes.

109. What would be the reasons which would make the Hottentots have more confidence in one stranger to them rather than another?—When men have committed themselves by the expression of a strong opinion as against the coloured races generally, and the Hottentots particularly, there would almost certainly exist a suspicion and jealousy in their minds. Mr. Bowker had done that previously to his appointment.

110. That is only an individual case. There are not many men who do that, are there?—There are two classes of persons in the colony. There are those who take what I should be disposed to regard as a just and benevolent and liberal view of the question, and who would endeavour to raise and improve the coloured races; and there are others who deem them utterly incapable of improvement, and would sweep them from their land entirely.

111. *Chairman*.] Is it a fact that the coloured race within the limits of the British colony are increasing in number?—I presume they are increasing; but there are no statistics on which you can depend upon that subject.

112. There is no manifest diminution in their numbers?—No, I think not.

113. Mr. *Booker*.] Did you ever hold any official appointment at the Cape?—No, not at the Cape, nor have I done so at any time, except while residing some years ago in Madagascar, and that was a mere nothing; I received simply a request from the Governor of the Mauritius that I would correspond with him a little while on the state of Madagascar.

114. Does religious or sectarian feeling or rivalry reign

high in that part of South Africa?—I think not; there is a little of it.

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115. You were in connexion, as you state, with the London Missionary Society?—Yes. 6 June 1851.

116. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] In reply to a question with regard to the neutral territory, which was put to you by Mr. Hawes, you stated your impression to be that it was better to locate the Hottentots on the neutral territory than to leave it open?—I think so.

117. In another part of your evidence you stated that the chief cause of difference between the persons under the control of the British Government and the Kafirs was the disputes which took place about cattle, and the difficulty of ascertaining by whom the cattle were taken. Would not that cause of difference cease if there were a certain space of territory left between the two races?—Perhaps if you could really secure an absolutely neutral, unoccupied ground, it might have that result; but where there was a beautiful piece of pasturage, and beautiful springs and streams, I think it would be impossible upon the one side and the other. You could not keep the Kafirs who were in sight of it from trespassing upon it, and you could hardly keep some of our own colonists either from doing so.

118. If there were a tract of neutral country between them, would not that render it much more difficult for any differences of this sort to take place?—But that becomes an impracticability. My objection would be that the thing is impracticable, and could not be done without keeping a great body of troops there to keep off the men on both sides.

119. *Chairman*.] Is there any system of local self government among the Hottentots, through the medium of their chiefs?—No; there are head men of the villages; the people have the appointment themselves of a head man; but the field cornets, who are a superior kind of constables, are appointed by the officers of the Government.

120. Among themselves is there any self government at all?—There are headmen.

121. What are the functions of the headmen?—In the event of any dispute occurring between them involving a petty question, which the parties might settle amongst themselves without going to a magistrate, the headman would be referred to.

122. Are the magistrates always Europeans?—Yes.

123. Do you think any change of the existing system in that

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that respect would be desirable?—I think that some men could be found who have been brought up in the colony, or who have been brought up in Europe, capable of acting as magistrates; respectable members of colonial families could be found, of enlarged mind and knowledge, who would be acceptable to the people.

124. You do not think that there are any persons of the native race who would be fit to fill the situation of magistrate?—I do not know a native at present who I think would be quite competent to fill the magistrate's office, though he might occupy all the subordinate offices up to that of a magistrate. When I speak of Europeans I do not refer to those born in Europe; there are some who have been brought up in the colony who have occupied stations of importance there; such as Sir Andreis Stockenstrom.

125. Do you believe, if it were possible to find a person of the native race possessing the requisite qualifications, the appointment of such a person would very much conciliate the feelings of the settlers?—No; I think at present they would pay more respect to a European; I do not mean by that, one born in Europe.

126. One of European extraction?—Yes; as I believe Mr. Wienand is, who I think has succeeded Mr. Bowker.

127. You think that there is a confidence on the part of the native population in the general superiority and qualifications of the white man which would, at present at least, induce them to put more confidence in him than in one of their own race?—I think so.

128. Colonel *Thompson*.] Are there no half castes in the colony?—Yes.

129. Would they be respected, in your opinion?—Yes, if they were known to be men of character and intelligence.

130. Might they not form a kind of bond of amity between the two races?—I think they would; but I think they are few in number.

131. *Chairman*.] Are the half castes increasing as the result of marriages between respectable white men and colonial females?—Yes. The Hottentot race will become extinct before many years, I think, from that circumstance. In the Kat River Settlement, Mr. Read mentioned to me as a fact, that 17 young Englishmen had married Hottentot young women within the last few years.

132. Colonel *Dunne*.] How are the headmen chosen?—I think by election among the people themselves. The people of the village would meet, and if the senior man among them were

were a respectable man having their confidence, he would be chosen by a kind of acclamation.

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133. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You say it would be desirable to have Hottentot settlements in certain situations; how are those settlements to be encouraged?—The only other settlements of the Hottentots beside this of the Kat River, are the missionary institutions.

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134. Where the people have congregated round the missionaries?—Yes; a portion of land, say 5,000 acres, is perhaps allotted by the Government as the location of the Hottentots, where a missionary resides, and a schoolhouse is built, and a church or a chapel, as the case may be.

135. The act of the Government is simply to allot a certain portion of ground, which they say shall be for the Hottentots?—Yes.

136. And that is occupied as chance may direct?—Yes.

137. The missionaries go into the country, and take up their positions in certain localities?—Yes, appointed from the societies at home.

138. When the Hottentots come into the country and assemble in sufficient numbers, they choose their headmen after their own fashion?—Yes; those headmen are not recognised by the Government as possessing any official station; it is a simple arrangement among the people themselves.

139. They are acknowledged and obeyed by the people, are they not?—Yes; they have a moral influence rather than any other.

140. The only official is the magistrate?—Yes, the nearest magistrate.

141. Colonel *Thompson*.] Has any institution like that of juries made any progress in the settlement?—No, I think not among the natives themselves. Lately the Hottentots in the Kat River Settlement have become competent to serve on juries, and have been summoned accordingly.

142. To serve where?—At Fort Beaufort: Fort Beaufort is the town most contiguous. Whether they have served I do not know, but they have been summoned.

143. There has been no attempt to settle disputes among the Hottentots themselves by any tribunal resembling that of a jury?—No, I think not.

144. You stated your opinion to be, that the occupying what you called the neutral ground was, in the sense in which you used the terms, wise and judicious?—Yes.

145. Was it just and according to treaty as regarded the Kafirs?—Assuming that they had ceded that territory to us,

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then we had a right, I presume, to occupy it. My own impression, however, is, upon the whole, that that is a previous question, and it is one which remains to this day a bone of contention with the Kafirs; but it was ceded by them as neutral ground first of all, certainly. It has been subsequently affirmed that Gaika ceded it altogether to us, and we, assuming our right to the occupation of it, planted the Hottentots there.

146. It is not at this moment acknowledged by the Kafirs that it was ceded to us entirely, you say?—No, I think you would not find a single Kafir who would say that Gaika ever did really cede that territory to us.

147. Do you conceive that that has been one cause of the feeling which has led to the wars and the expenditure which have since occurred?—I think, judging from the answers given by the chiefs to Sir Harry Smith, as published in the Blue Books from time to time, it is so; that their loss of land has been throughout to them a source of dissatisfaction.

148. Do you think that the knowledge that that is the case ought to constitute a set-off against its being considered upon the whole as wise and judicious to have so occupied the land?—I think it should clearly have gone so far as this; to constrain us while taking and occupying the land, to adopt the kindest and wisest measures that we could towards those whom we excluded from it.

149. Do you think it is just and politic to exclude a man from his land in opposition to a treaty, on condition that you shall be kind to him afterwards?—No, I do not, certainly.

150. Marquis of *Granby*.] What is the number of magistrates in the Kat River settlement?—I think there is only one for the Kat River settlement; Mr. Wienand is at present the magistrate.

151. Mr. Bowker was alone there, was he?—Yes; he succeeded Mr. Biddulph.

152. Is there a strong desire for independence among the Hottentots?—Not to be independent of our Government, certainly.

153. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You speak of there being but one magistrate in the Kat River settlement; over what extent of country does his district extend?—It is the whole of the Kat River settlement; say 25 miles by about 20; that is the extent of it.

154. Are all questions brought to him, or does he remove from place to place?—They are all brought to him.

155. Does

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155. Does great inconvenience arise from that?—No; I think the people there do not mind going a few miles.

156. When you speak of the Hottentots being well satisfied with the European magistrates, or those which have hitherto been appointed, with one exception, do you think that that arises in any degree from the want of capacity among themselves for such appointments?—At the Kat River they have had but two magistrates hitherto in the settlement, Mr. Bidulph and Mr. Bowker. In those two cases I think the appointments have been rather unfortunate, and it has given the people a bad impression, but I believe with their present magistrate, who is the third who has been appointed, they are satisfied; I have heard nothing to the contrary.

157. Do you suppose that the natives themselves are capable of taking those offices, if they were encouraged to do so?—I think I have met with some three or four men whose intelligence and energy of mind was such that I should have as full confidence in referring any case of my own to them, as I should between white man and white man.

158. There is no general want of capacity among the natives?—Far from it.

159. They are a quick, intelligent race, are they?—Yes. They have not advanced very far; I have met with a few who have advanced to a respectable degree of general knowledge, though not in any one specific branch of attainments; but for all the ordinary purposes of life and of society they are perfectly competent.

160. Would the existing evils arise, in your opinion, if they had the appointment of their own magistrates?—No; I think if they had in some large degree, I would not say the final appointment, but if they had the power of making a strong recommendation, perhaps of a veto to a certain extent, still leaving the appointment finally with the Government, it would give them great satisfaction.

161. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Is the Kafir boundary very accurately defined?—I think so; as far as the course of the river is concerned it is.

162. That is the present boundary?—Yes.

163. What was the former boundary?—There was the Keiskamma, and before that the Fish River. There have been boundaries by rivers generally.

164. Were they sufficiently understood, so that a Kafir chief, in making a treaty, might certainly know that what he proposed to give actually belonged to him?—Yes, they have a ready capacity for making boundary lines; trees, nooks,  
juttings,





the individual himself, but which should secure the occupation of the land to his race. If the Hottentot will sell his land, let him, but it should be to a Hottentot, as long as the settlement is reserved for the Hottentots by the Government.

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175. The sale, or parting with the grants, did interpose a difficulty, did not it, in continuing to make grants to the Hottentots clear?—So I have understood; I think Mr. Montague once referred to it in conversation with me.

176. The old boundary of the colony was the Fish River, was not it?—Yes.

177. That was the boundary in Lord Charles Somerset's time?—It was.

178. The Kafirs at that time occupied what is now called the neutral or ceded territory?—Yes; it is now called Victoria.

179. At that time there were constant depredations and constant disturbances upon the boundary, were not there?—I should say there were frequently, and that on both sides. I question if their own servants, I mean the servants of the colonists, were not sometimes guilty of trespassing upon the lands of the Kafirs.

180. Were not those depredations at that time repressed by the commando system which had prevailed under the Dutch Government?—Yes.

181. Did that lead to very great abuses, in your opinion?—I think it led to very great abuses and involved constant wrongs; I have seen it in operation, and the impression left upon my mind was, that whether it were the custom of the Kafirs or not, as I am told it was, still it was sure to involve the punishment of the innocent together with the guilty.

182. Was not the establishment of a neutral territory made with a view to put an end to that commando system, and to prevent an immediate contact between the barbarian on the one side, and the settlers on the other?—Yes, so I have understood.

183. You have said that it is a disputed point whether or not this territory was ceded. It is admitted that there is no written treaty?—Yes.

184. Was not there an interview between the authorities at the Cape and the chiefs?—Yes; Lord Charles Somerset had an interview with Gaika.

185. As far as the local authorities are concerned, they have always maintained that the result of that interview was the cession of that territory to be held as neutral ground, with

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a view to put an end to the disturbances, and as the means of repressing those disturbances to which I have referred?—Yes; it would be painful to say that Lord Charles Somerset had at all misrepresented the interview; one could not do that in the case of an English nobleman. But while Lord Charles Somerset would say it was ceded, I am sure Gaika and his party would say it never was.

186. After that period did not the Kafirs occupy the territory again?—Maquomo came in there.

187. Previously to that period did not they do so?—This would be prior to 1834.

188. Did not they occupy the territory and graze cattle in the district?—Yes; it was permitted more especially to Maquomo to come in, inasmuch as it had been his patrimony and ancestral land.

189. Were not the depredations and disturbances again revived, and did not that lead to the driving of Maquomo from the territory?—So it was affirmed; it is difficult to ascertain the exact truth between some unprincipled Kafirs who would take every advantage they could, and perhaps some white men not really having much principle, but wishing to get possession of the land and its advantages.

190. In point of fact, depredations and disturbances did arise subsequently to the re occupation of the neutral territory?—Yes, there were complaints.

191. And those led to violence, whether on the part of the settlers on the one hand to defend their property, or on the part of the Kafirs on the other to steal cattle?—Yes. One great evil was the adoption of the spoor, that is, the footmark of the animal, and making that the means of detecting the theft. That is always an evil. And another was accepting simply complaints on the part of European or colonial farmers, who having lost their cattle were able to trace the spoors or footmarks perhaps to the next adjoining kraal, and by the commando system making them refund whatever the farmer alleged he had lost.

192. Colonel *Dunne*.] How are they to find the cattle without following the track?—That may be the case, but still the system involves great injustice.

193. Is there any other means of finding out where the cattle go to except by following the spoor?—I do not know whether there are other modes than those which we should adopt here; but the evil of it has been that you do not simply trace the cattle up to the village where you have evidence they must be, but up to a certain point near that village:

for example, in travelling one day along the road, I saw some 20 or 30 people stooping down and examining most carefully the road; I inquired, "What is the matter?" They said, "There are cattle lost here." The spoor was traced up to that spot, and then it was lost; because cattle from the neighbouring village had come down to that spot also to be driven on upon that road to watering, and the spoor of the lost cattle mingling with the spoor of the village cattle, was lost. Yet that village was condemned to pay for the cattle that had been lost, though where they were driven to no one could ascertain.

194. Colonel *Thompson*.] Did the Kafirs ever make comandos upon the British territory?—No.

195. Mr. *Hawes*.] But they made irruptions into it, did not they, for the purpose of stealing cattle?—The Kafirs have made war upon us occasionally, but the thefts have usually been by one or two men stealing, just the same as in our own country, by individuals, not by a defined and organized plan.

196. Marquis of *Granby*.] Were you in the country when the commando system was in operation?—No, I never was in Kafirland at that time.

197. Can you say whether there has been any greater loss of life and property since the commando system was put an end to than there was before?—No, my source of information upon that subject would be only the magistrates' reports appearing in the public press of the colony. My judgment, formed from all I could read and from personal observation, has been, that the commando system was far less effective and just than the system subsequently adopted.

198. *Chairman*.] You are aware of the objects for which this Committee is constituted?—To inquire into the relations subsisting between the border tribes and the colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

199. Are there any other observations with regard to those objects which you desire to make to the Committee?—I think I should like to be allowed to offer a few observations, when I have stated certain facts touching the case of the Griquas and the Bassutoes. They are people with whom we have relations.

200. Have the goodness to make any statement that occurs to you upon those subjects?—I should say, first, with regard to the Griquas: they complain of being deprived by Sir Harry Smith of a portion of their territory seemingly under treaty.

201. The Griquas are a tribe of Kafirs, are not they?—

They

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They are commonly called Bastards; they are chiefly descendants of Hottentot women by Dutch farmers; they are not black, but light coloured; the Hottentot is very light, and of course their progeny by Dutchmen would be light. The point complained of at present is, that although Sir Peregrine Maitland made a treaty with them, recognising a division of their territory into alienable and inalienable land, Sir Harry Smith has deprived them, by his last treaty with them of the date of February 1848, of the whole of that portion which is called alienable land. I would say that I attach some little importance to the interpretation given to the word used; their Dutch word would be *huurbaar*; that is, hireable or leaseable land; and *onhuurbaar*, which would mean inalienable or unleaseable. Those we have in our English translation of the treaties, and in all proclamations, called alienable and inalienable, being a step in advance evidently of leaseable and unleaseable; Sir Peregrine Maitland's idea being that of the people being allowed to let their land upon leases, but not involving the idea of final alienation. The people complain that by Sir Harry Smith's measure they are deprived of a personal interest in a very large number of their farms in the alienable territory. I took the liberty of writing to my Lord Grey upon that subject, and my two letters are in this Blue Book recently published, to which Sir Harry Smith has given a reply, which is also here; but which is, speaking respectfully of the Governor, to my mind most unsatisfactory and delusive, and such as I think he should not have written as Governor, nor would Lord Grey very readily receive, I think, if he went into the detail of the case. Will the Committee allow me to suppose that this is the Griqua territory, consisting of two divisions, alienable and inalienable. A number of Dutch Boers, in giving up their allegiance to the British Government, crossed the Orange River, then the boundary of the colony, and obtained permission from the Griquas to settle down in that country, and take leases of them. They were then beyond the British jurisdiction, and yet were unwilling to come under the native jurisdiction. That led Sir Peregrine Maitland very properly to propose the leasing for 40 years of a part of the land on which those Boers were allowed to settle, which should be brought under British jurisdiction, while, to secure the interests of the natives finally, a portion of the land should be called inalienable, and no leases recognised as valid which the Boers might take upon that land. That was the treaty made by Sir Peregrine Maitland, and confirmed at

home by Her Majesty. That treaty was made, I think, in 1846. After the disturbances with the Dutch Boers in 1847, Sir Harry Smith compelled those Griquas to relinquish to the British Government the whole of that portion of the land which was called alienable. Upon that land there were about 300 farms held distinctly by individual Griqua natives. Out of that number about 150 were let on lease to Dutch farmers, say for 40 years, and of the other 150 farms some were not let at all; others were let for short periods, 7, 14, and 20 years, and so on. Sir Harry Smith takes the whole of this land from them, and gives them a consideration for it, calling the whole of it a 40 years' leased property. The people then say, "We who have our lands for less than 40 years are entitled to the difference between the short lease and the 40 years' lease, and we who have not let our lands at all are entitled to the benefit of letting those lands for 40 years; we do not say we object to give up the whole of this section of our country ultimately, only let us have a fair consideration for it; let us let those farms which we have not let at all, and let us relet those which were let only for short periods, for the balance of the period up to 40 years." Sir Harry Smith said, "No, I call the whole of that land 40 years' leased land." His treaty had not so called it. Only a portion of it was let for that time, and when they appealed again to his Excellency to allow them not to take back this land from the British Government, but to have the benefit of the lands not let at all, or let for a short period, his Excellency says the point is finally settled. The Griquas then requested me to place the matter before the British Government, which led me to communicate with Lord Grey. In reply to that communication his Excellency, not wilfully of course, deludes Lord Grey. He makes a complete blunder in the matter, for want of entering patiently into the matter, as I presume to think, and he begins to talk about the inalienable property. There is no reply in Sir Harry Smith's letter to Lord Grey, touching the alienable land, but only touching the inalienable. He says, properly enough, that the Chieftain, Adam Kok, consented to the payment of the Dutch Boers, for their improvement upon that land, at the expiration of their leases. The Committee will understand there are Dutch farmers upon both divisions of that property. Upon the one, the alienable division, the Dutch are to remain in perpetuity, paying a quit-rent to the Government; but upon the inalienable portion, all those colonial settlers are to go away at the expiration of their leases, upon the Griquas paying the valuation

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- ation of the property, as improved by the farmers. In reply to that which I put before Lord Grey, at the request of the Griquas, Sir Harry Smith's statement affects only the inalienable land, and not at all the question of those short leases, nor the unleased lands. Sir Harry Smith is pleased to say that the Griquas are mere squatters. Now I must be allowed to remark upon that, that it is not fair to say so, when Sir Peregrine Maitland had, in the treaty of 1846, most distinctly recognized the indefeasible right of the Griquas to the whole of that territory. That was the basis of the treaty. It is printed and proclaimed that the Griquas are indefeasibly entitled to that portion of the land, and that treaty of Sir Peregrine Maitland is confirmed by Her Majesty at home. Then in the face of that it is hardly fair, I think, of a subsequent Governor to come in and say they are mere squatters, inasmuch as we have recognized their right and made a treaty with them. It may be said that the Griquas have not been there, perhaps, above 40 years, and that they are interlopers and have driven out other tribes. But we have come in upon other portions of the colony later even than that, and I do not know that we have a higher right to come in upon our land than the Griquas have to come in upon theirs.

202. Mr. Hawes.] Who was the chief with whom the treaty was made?—Adam Kok.

203. The treaty which Sir Harry Smith made, was made with him, was not it?—Yes.

204. With his full and free consent, as far as you know?—No.

205. Will you explain that answer to the Committee?—That is one of the points on which I feel it needful to allude again to my previous request that nothing I say should be taken as impugning directly Sir Harry Smith, the Governor. The late treaty was obtained from the Griquas by intimidation, most certainly. The Griqua chief and his councillors, called his Raad, had met at Bloem Fontein by Sir Harry Smith's desire. Sir Harry Smith, perhaps for sufficient reasons to his own mind, thought it requisite to obtain the final settlement of the land I now speak of, and to obtain for the British Government, as part and parcel of the colony, the alienable division of the Griqua territory. Adam Kok and his people objected to that; that is, they objected to the final alienation of the land which they were letting for periods of 40 years under Sir Peregrine Maitland's treaty. After a good deal of disputation in the matter, the Governor, certainly in a passion, told them that unless they signed that treaty by five o'clock in

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the afternoon, he would "hang them at that beam." I have reason to believe that he said so, but he said it in a moment of passion. I asked the men if they sincerely believed that Sir Harry Smith intended to do it; I thought that they could not as honest and reasonable men suppose it; and their reply was very simple and just: "We took Sir Harry Smith for a sort of madman, and we believed he would do it, though we knew he had no right to do it." I said, "Did you sign that treaty under that intimidation?" "We certainly did," said they; "we did not know what he might do, and we felt compelled to do it."

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206. The treaty was made you say, with Adam Kok, under compulsion?—Yes.

207. Were not there great disputes existing in the district at the time between the Griquas and the Boers?—No, not as to that particular point; because those Dutch farmers who had obtained their land of the Griquas were satisfied with the title given them to their farms, as coming under the signature of Adam Kok, and countersigned by his secretary Hendrik Hendriks. The validity of such title is shown to this day, since that property has been treated as British property. The court records are kept at Bloem Fontein. Those documents received by the farmers from Adam Kok form the basis of all the claims to the farms recognized by the British authorities at Bloem Fontein. The farmers had no doubt but that the Griquas were the real proprietors and had a right to dispose of the lands, and they made individually their agreements with the Griquas as the proprietors of all those lands accordingly.

208. The Griquas had granted land upon those 40 years' leases to the Boers?—Yes, and for shorter periods.

209. What was the arrangement made for converting the 40 years' lease into a holding in perpetuity?—Sir Harry Smith promises 300*l.* a year on the part of the British Government in lieu of the Griquas receiving quit-rents from the Boers, or in lieu of a division of the quit-rent. The quit-rent was to be paid, and half the amount was to be paid over to the Government as a means of sustaining the expenses of that district, and the half to go among the landholders.

210. Do you know from your own knowledge what passed between Sir Harry Smith and Adam Kok upon that occasion?—I had it from Adam Kok himself, and from his councillors. I have not of course asked Sir Harry Smith to relate the details to me; I could not presume to do that.

211. As you have referred to your own letter in the Blue Book,



Rev. J. J. Book, have you also referred to the dispatch of Sir Harry  
 Freeman. Smith of the 20th of January 1851?—Yes, I have read that  
 6 June 1851. carefully.

212. Does the account the Governor there gives of what passed between himself and Adam Kok correspond at all with your own account; and if it does not, can you throw any light upon the discrepancy?—I think the Governor is under some mistake regarding the terms “alienable” and “inalienable.” I think the explanation he gives refers to the inalienable portion, as to which he says Adam Kok himself proposed a payment for the buildings which should be found upon it.

213. I wish to refer you to a passage in the middle of paragraph 5: “The chief himself suggested that after the expiration of the 40 years’ leases in his ‘inalienable’ territory, the Boers might purchase from his people a future right, upon the conditions set forth in my additional treaty transmitted to your Lordship. This was Adam Kok’s own proposal, and it met the wishes of the Boers”?—Precisely so; but the honourable Member will observe that that is inalienable property; my reference is to the alienable property upon which leases have been let.

214. Did not the system of leasing under that treaty apply to the whole territory?—No, not the same system; upon the land which is called alienable, the Dutch Boers were allowed to take leases, though only for 40 years; but the inalienable, although they had buildings upon it, they were to be compelled to leave, on certain repayments, at the expiration of whatever leases they had got. The inalienable territory was to be secured for ever to the Griquas: the Griquas might grant no more leases on it.

215. There was a conversion of those leases into a perpetuity?—Not by the treaty of Sir Peregrine Maitland; the object of Sir Peregrine Maitland was to throw a difficulty in the way of this land becoming part of the British territory.

216. What is the precise nature of the injustice of those treaties as regards the Griquas?—I will suppose I am a Griqua, and that I possess in this alienable territory a farm, or two farms. One farm I have not let at all, it is mine; another farm I have let for 10 years, as by Sir Peregrine Maitland’s treaty I may do. By Sir Harry Smith’s treaty I am deprived of that farm which I have not let at all; and I am deprived of 30 years’ interest in the other, which I have let for 10 years only, because Sir Harry Smith calls it all  
 40 years,

40 years' leased territory, and then demands the quit-rent for the Government in perpetuity.

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217. Does that apply to the whole of the 40 years' leasehold property, or are you describing only an exceptional case?—I am describing the whole. Upon this alienable territory there were 300 farms belonging to individual Griquas; they have in the course of time let half that number of the farms to Dutch Boers upon 40 years' leases; but the other half, namely 150 farms, were either not let at all or were let only for short periods. Sir Harry Smith says, "I take the whole, and call it 40 years' lease property." The expression which was first used led the Griquas who had not let their farms for 40 years to believe that they were still secured in their right over the remainder of the term, between 7 or 10 years and 40 years, and entirely so over the farms which were not let at all. But upon applying to Sir Harry Smith he says, "No, I sweep off the whole of that piece, let or not let, or let for long periods or short periods; I call it all a 40 years' lease territory, and give you 300*l.* annually as a consideration in lieu of it all." The chief was to have 200*l.* and the people 100*l.* among them.

218. At that time, and for some time afterwards, was there any dissatisfaction expressed with that arrangement?—I have reason to believe that there was from the beginning, because I have seen letters written by Adam Kok, the chieftain, to Sir Harry Smith, complaining of this immediately after it occurred.

219. *Chairman.*] Do you mean that 300*l.* a year was to be given to them?—Yes; that would be in lieu of the 300 farms.

220. *Mr. Hawes.*] What was the object which Sir Harry Smith had in view in making that arrangement?—I conceive it was partly to carry out the principle with which he set out on the frontier, that where he found black men, there they should be; and where he found white men, there they should be. He states that he assumed that as a general principle of policy with the people as a whole. I am not here to complain of it, provided you will do individuals justice where there are individual rights concerned. I am not now complaining of his taking the whole of this territory in which so many Dutch farmers were settled. I think it is better that they should be under our Government rather than under that of the Griquas, but I would do justice to the individual native proprietors. They do not at this moment object to the land being taken from them for ever, but they ask you to pay

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them for the farms they have not let, and to give them the balance of the term for the farms which are let for short periods.

221. Are there many individual cases of the kind?—Yes; I have conversed with several of the men; I did not go over the whole 150 farms, but they assured me that half the whole number of the farms were in that predicament.

222. He did not interfere with their actual holding at the time, but it involved the loss of the land to them when the lease expired?—And the whole of that land upon which they had let no leases at all.

223. That land was in the hands of the chief, was not it?—No.

224. Was it in the hands of individual Griquas?—Yes; and their right was recognised by the farmers in their purchases.

225. Are the Committee to understand that any Griquas were deprived of land which they held, and which they had not let?—Entirely so, in the alienable territory.

226. Were they removed?—No; they might not be living upon the spot, but it had been distinctly recognized as theirs, as much as in the case of any English gentleman here having three or four estates, and not living upon the whole of them. The land was marked out; each Griqua was recognized as having a right to his particular farm. There he may take his cattle in the dry season if there is a fountain there, or he may reside there himself.

227. What was the immediate effect of Sir Harry Smith's measure?—To prevent a Griqua from ever letting his farm.

228. Was he removed and deprived of the use of the land or the water?—Of both. The Griqua may have been living 20 miles from it, but the fountain has been recognised as his. He goes there occasionally; in the rainy season he may send his cattle there to obtain fresh grass, and so on.

229. He was deprived of the right of using the water, and of the right of occupying the land?—Yes, and of the right of letting it.

230. To whom did the land go then?—The British Government has taken it, and now lets it and receives a quit-rent over the whole of those 300 farms.

231. Could those Griquas, under that arrangement, again take possession of that land, subject to a quit-rent?—Not under the present treaty, without becoming British subjects by so doing.

232. Could the British Government give them occupation

of the land and the use of the water under new conditions, namely, upon the payment of a quit-rent?—I think they would not take it. They would prefer, I think, to be away from the Boers, and to allow the territory which is alienable to be alienated, but they would desire to receive a fair compensation or valuation for the farms, which, if Sir Harry Smith had not interfered, they would have let under Sir Peregrine Maitland's treaty.

233. Is not it the fact that there were great disputes between the Boers and the Griquas, and was not it the object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the Boers on the land to which they had a perfectly clear right, and to remove the Griquas from close contact with the Dutch farmers?—Yes, I think that was the purpose; but then it need not have been carried out at the expence of the Griqua, in depriving him of his farm without compensation.

234. I understand your point to be this; you think the arrangement ought to have comprehended some compensation to the Griqua occupiers who were removed?—Yes, I think so; to those who lost their interest in their lands, which had been distinctly recognized as theirs as much as those who had let the land for 40 years.

235. Are you prepared to give the Committee any information upon the subject of the compensation, as to what would be the nature or the result of it in any way: could it be accomplished by giving land in any other district, or do you contemplate a money payment, and if so, how would you estimate the money payment?—I think a money payment would be most acceptable, and that the fair mode of estimating it would be by taking the value of the other farms that they have let. If a farm of the same extent remains to be let, for example, which has a volume of water on an average equal to a spring on another farm adjoining, which other farm has let for so much, say 100 rixdollars, or 500 rixdollars, or whatever the amount might be, that would be a fair consideration to the owner for the interest which he has in it. I do not know what the total would be, but certainly nothing very large, quite within the means of the British Government, and enough to secure the good will and confidence of the people; for they do not quarrel over the broad question of our having their land, for the Dutch farmers came in with their own consent to occupy the land; but they ask, as individual proprietors, compensation for the lands they give up.

236. Is that question still agitated on the part of the Griquas?—

Rev. J. J. Griquas?—I think it is; it was a sore point when I left. It was the last thing which they spoke to me about.

June 1851. 237. Do you know whether they have made any recent representations on the subject?—No; what has occurred since I left last June I do not know.

238. Did you know the secretary of Adam Kok?—Yes, I have met him several times.

239. Is he a clever intelligent man?—A shrewd man, but weak in principle; he is given to intoxication, that is his great vice. He is a well-meaning man, a long-headed man, something like Stoffles, who was over here and examined by the Committee respecting the Aborigines, some 12 years ago. I think Hendriks would put himself in the power of a Dutch farmer who would give him a bottle of brandy, and keep him for a day or two.

240. Are you not aware that he was represented to be favourable to the agreement in the first instance?—Yes, and I think he was. I think he was the means of letting many of those farms for the Griquas to the Boers; and he has been deprived of the office, not for being favourable, but for being so habitually intoxicated as to be unfit for business.

241. Should you describe him as a shrewd far-seeing man?—Yes, quite so.

242. And you state from your own knowledge that he was in the first instance favourable to this arrangement which Sir Harry Smith entered into?—Yes; and I think that the leading Griquas are now favourable to the occupation of this alienable territory by the Dutch Boers.

243. Colonel *Dunne*.] You think it is a mere question of compensation?—Yes, founded upon just claims; I think they were just claims.

244. In what state of civilization are the Griquas?—They are not quite so far advanced as those living within the colony; I mean those of the coloured races living within the colony. But some of them individually are far advanced; there are men who have got good houses, and dress in European clothing very comfortably; a few of them unite to pay for a schoolmaster at their own farms for the education of their children; they possess immense flocks of cattle, and their houses are furnished in capital style.

245. Are they Christians?—A great many of them decidedly are Christians; some were brought up from infancy with Dutch families, and many of them are good men.

246. Mr. *Hawes*.] In your letter to Lord Grey, your recommendation

commendation is that there should be some inquiry on the spot?—I think there should, to ascertain from those men the whole statement of the case; what farms they claim and why, and how their claims are to be established, and what would be the value of them. I think, in order to secure satisfaction to the people themselves, to hear them state their own case would be the safest and best course.

247. Are you aware that Commissioners are proceeding to the Cape with a view to assist Sir Harry Smith in the settlement of questions of that kind?—I thought they were going on the Kafir affair chiefly.

248. *Chairman.*] Are there any other points which you wish to represent to the Committee?—There is one other point regarding the inalienable territory. On the inalienable territory the Dutch have been permitted by the Griquas to come in, but they are not to remain. Sir Harry Smith confirms that part of Sir Peregrine Maitland's arrangement, but the Griquas must pay for the property as improved. Now I feel that although their chieftain admitted the propriety of it and almost proposed it, yet in the working of it it will be found extremely difficult; and one would just suggest that there should be the kindest consideration of them in the matter, even though at the expense in some measure of the colonial or British Government. Because the Dutch coming in have gone upon this plan: "We will improve and build so much that these Griquas will not be able to out-buy us in the end, and so we shall have final possession of the land." There was to have been a valuation of the property taken at the time the treaty was made; it is so distinctly stated; but that valuation was not made, and the parties have gone on improving the property so as to place it beyond the reach of the Griquas ever to pay for it. Therefore they will be allowed to remain and occupy the land, and of course the Griquas feel that the thing has gone from them. I think if the Griqua nation be at all worth preserving as a coloured race upon our boundary, the case of these occupied lands, which they will not be able to recover through not being able to pay for the improvements, should meet with some consideration on the part of the Governor.

249. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] You said that 300*l.* was agreed to be given by Sir Harry Smith as compensation; with whom was that agreement made?—It was made with the chieftain Adam Kok.

250. You have said that 200*l.* went to the chieftain?—  
Yes,

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Rev. J. J. Freeman. 251. One hundred pounds went as a compensation to the farmers?—Yes, but they do not accept it; they deem it so far below the value of their property that they scorn to touch it.

252. They have not taken it?—They have not.

253. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Do you think the Government ought to make compensation with regard to the inalienable property?—I think it ought.

254. And you also think that they ought to make compensation in respect of the farms included in the alienable property?—Yes.

255. So that the Government ought to make compensation in both cases?—I think the Griqua is entitled to compensation for the alienable land above all. I could not press that as to the inalienable land so much, but still for the sake of securing their affection, and confidence, and allegiance, I think their case is worth looking into.

256. *Chairman*.] What is the number of the Griqua population?—I think from 10,000 to 15,000.

257. Have you any observations to make with respect to the Bassuto tribe?—Yes; their territory is across the Orange River, just above Caledon, to the north-east. Moshesh is the chieftain there, with whom we have been in treaty for a long time past. His complaint would be this, that a large piece of the territory has been taken from him without his consent, and without compensation being made to him. A boundary line was drawn out for him some years ago by the Colonial Government, which he recognised. Sir Peregrine Maitland wished him to give up a small piece of his territory, which the British Government recognised as his. We therefore had passed by the previous question of how he got it, and so on. The British Government did recognise his right to that territory. Sir Peregrine Maitland, for very proper reasons, no doubt, wishing a small piece of his territory to be added to the colony, Moshesh gave it up; but since then another boundary line has been drawn by Sir Harry Smith, very likely for the purposes of convenience to the colony, and Moshesh has been required to sign a treaty which gives over a very large section of his land and makes it now a part of the colony. Sir Harry Smith says, "I have not taken that land from him; I have not driven him out." That is true to some extent, but the fact is this: There were 80 villages; there were 4,000 or 5,000 natives settled there, and there were also some farmers allowed by Moshesh to come

into that territory, with the distinct understanding that they had no right in the soil; that they were there only by permission. Moshesh had a notice printed of that in the Dutch language, which I have seen. It was given to these Dutch farmers that they might be aware that if they built upon that property it was still the property of Moshesh, and that he claimed the whole. Sir Harry Smith, with the same view I mentioned just now, that of placing the coloured man where he found him, and the black man where he found him, has now taken that portion into the colony in which are those 80 villages and 4,000 or 5,000 people of the Bassutos. They must either leave that territory and go back to Moshesh, or become *bonâ fide* British subjects, especially after the letter which Lord Grey has sent out, stating, that wherever sovereignty has been proclaimed, the people become British subjects. That will be a new bone of contention by-and-bye.

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258. Was the treaty signed by which Moshesh ceded this territory to the British Government?—Yes, but by the same kind of intimidation as in the case of the Griquas; that is to say, there was a dispute between Sikonyella and Moshesh. The Corrannas were called in by Sikonyella's party, and there was a probability of a fierce war ensuing between those petty tribes. Sir Harry Smith, in a very kind and judicious manner, had insisted upon the native chiefs not settling their own disputes by the sword, but appealing to him as a common father, and telling them that he would settle the whole matter for them. Moshesh, who was one of the principal men among them all, said, "I yield to that, and I will not fight this battle myself;" but he sends to Major Warden, who was acting immediately under Sir Harry Smith, at his residence at Bloem Fontein, and points out to him that attacks are being made upon his territory, and he appeals to Major Warden to carry out the provisions of the treaty, and to defend him against Sikonyella. Major Warden writes down, "Then sign that treaty which makes over this portion of the land to the colony, and I will settle the matter about the attack upon your country." Moshesh said to me, "To preserve my people from being destroyed, to save blood, and to save my property, I signed it, but with great reluctance:" and he used this figure, "Just as you drag a dog by a cord out of a room, and then say he goes out willingly. I signed the treaty," he said, "just with that feeling, to save my people." And it was so; I was on the spot and saw the burnt villages and the destruction there. He did sign the treaty, but he did it



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with reluctance and under a kind of protest, and he has been greatly aggrieved about it; so much aggrieved, that I have my fears at this moment that if the Kafirs are succeeding at present in their war, the Bassutos may join them, which will augment our difficulties very much. There is no fear but we can put them all down by-and-bye, but we may augment our difficulties unnecessarily and unjustly.

259. Colonel *Thompson*.] Is not there a distinction between the last transaction that you have mentioned and the previous one, where mention was made of hanging at the beam: does not it appear to you that this native chieftain received something like a *quid pro quo* in the case you have last referred to?—No, I think he did not.

260. Was not it to save his people that he signed the treaty?—He could have defended himself; but he had signed a previous treaty, in which he said, “In the event of disputes with my neighbours, I yield to Sir Harry Smith’s arrangement, and I will not fight my own battle. Sir Harry Smith says I must not do it, and for that reason I will apply to the British Government for protection.” That was evidently not for his own sake; he had men enough to fight; it was with difficulty he could restrain his men from fighting. He has the greatest amount of intelligence of all the natives that I have met with there, and I believe him to be a man of peace.

261. Mr. *Hawes*.] He is not a Christian, is he?—He is not.

*Jovis, 12<sup>a</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Estcourt.  
Sir Joshua Walmsley.  
Viscount Mandeville.  
Colonel Thompson.  
Mr. Stanley.  
Mr. Fitzpatrick.

Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Marquis of Granby.  
Mr. Cardwell.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE,  
IN THE CHAIR.

*Andrew Smith, M.D., called in; and Examined.*

262. *Chairman.*] WHAT has been the nature of your connexion with the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—I was stationed at the Cape of Good Hope for 16 years on the medical staff of the army, and during part of that time I was employed confidentially by different Governors, in reference to the frontier tribes, the Kafirs and Bushmen.

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263. What was the nature of your communications with those frontier tribes?—To obtain information in reference to their views, and in reference to what was going on among them with regard to the Bushmen; to ascertain whether the colonial policy was correctly understood by them, in order to suggest any alterations in the policy, if I discovered from my own observation that the Bushmen did not take a correct view of the intentions of the Government.

264. Are you acquainted with any of the native languages?—Not sufficiently so to speak them; I knew enough of Kafir to be able to understand when my interpreter attempted to mislead me.

265. You are aware of the purpose for which this Committee has been appointed?—Yes, I understand it to be with reference to the tribes beyond the boundary of the colony.

266. Are there any opinions which you are desirous of stating to the Committee with reference to these questions?—I cannot say that I have any special opinions to offer; I merely appear here as being summoned to give my evidence; I have

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no special interest in the subject; I do not come forward in any particular capacity to state any opinion.

267. Mr. Hawes.] You state that you were employed with the object of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the local Government?—Yes.

268. And to ascertain whether they were contented or discontented with that policy?—Yes, at least as far as the Bushmen were concerned.

269. In what part of the colony?—To the north of it.

270. Do you mean towards Kat River settlement?—No; towards the Orange River.

271. Will you state to the Committee what passed between you and the natives?—On that occasion the principal remarks which passed had reference to the law in the colony, that when commandos went out they were prohibited from firing upon the Bushmen, but were required to take them prisoners. A good deal of doubt had arisen whether that was practicable, or whether, if the law were continued, it would not lead to such constant robberies as eventually to remove the whole of the colonists from the northern frontier; I was sent to see how the Bushmen regarded that law.

272. Was the law which you refer to, the law which for a short time was in force reviving the old commando system?—It was previous to that; it was when that was suspended.

273. Of what year are you speaking?—I think it must have been the year 1828.

274. How long is it since you left the Cape?—I left the Cape in 1837.

275. And you have not been there since?—No.

276. You explained to them, as I understand you, that this commando system was about to be abandoned?—The old commando system had been abandoned, and the belief was, both on the part of the authorities of Cape Town and also throughout the colony, that by abandoning this system the robberies had greatly increased; my object was to ascertain the cause of the increase of those robberies. I was desired to go among them and talk to them in regard to the then existing policy, and to see whether they appreciated the policy or not. When I went I found that they did appreciate it; they knew that they could not be fired on; they were aware that the farmers might retake their cattle, and take them prisoners, but they said they would take good care that they should not be taken prisoners, because, as the farmers could not fire, they had the superiority; before the farmers

farmers could come and lay their hands upon them, they would take care to shoot the farmers.

277. Did you make any report to the Government of the result of your inquiries?—Yes.

278. Will you state the nature of it as far as you can recollect it?—The report was to the effect that the Bushmen did not correctly appreciate the policy, and I thought that if it were continued it must produce the effect I have stated, namely, that it would increase the number of robberies very materially, by rendering it impossible to take any of the Bushmen.

279. Did you suggest any alteration of the policy?—I suggested that every endeavour should be made to take them prisoners, but in the event of that being impossible, and that they still persisted in keeping the cattle on the tops of the hills as they did, that they should be fired on. I recommended that after certain efforts had been made to induce them to give up the cattle, if they still persisted in not doing so, the farmers then, if a single arrow were shot at them, should be allowed to fire. To a certain extent that plan was adopted, and was followed immediately with some advantage, though not perhaps with the amount of advantage one would have expected.

280. Were you for investing the frontier emigrants with a kind of summary power of redress in the event of depredations upon their cattle?—I was; there was no mode of getting redress but by investing the farmers with that power.

281. Was there any locally organized force when you were there?—No.

282. Was there any disposition to form one, or the contrary?—I do not think the subject had been considered on the northern boundary. There never had been any proposition of the kind made either by the colonists or by the Government to form a force there; both had hitherto depended, and even then depended, upon the field cornets collecting their people.

283. Did they answer to the summons of the field cornets with alacrity?—Sometimes they did, and sometimes they did not.

284. Was there a general inclination or not to form a local military force, to protect the frontier and their own property?—Decidedly not.

285. From what did that arise?—In the first place, they have a great horror of being soldiers; they think it is the next thing to being slaves. In the next place, they do not like to leave their families for any length of time.

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286. Are the Committee to understand that the general prevailing opinion was, that reliance should be placed upon the British force, and the British force alone, in the protection of the frontier?—Not exactly upon the British force, because they were prepared to protect themselves in the way they had hitherto done, but they had no idea of organizing a regular Burgher force, to be kept up continuously.

287. They were willing, individually, to defend their properties, but they were not willing to enter into any general plan for defending any general part of the frontier in which they were not particularly interested?—That was pretty nearly the case; the frontier districts consisted of a certain number of field cornetcies; each field cornet had a certain petty government over a certain portion of country, and when anything happened within that district, he summoned the farmers of his own field cornetcy, and also applied to the field cornet of the adjoining district to summon his, if necessary.

288. When they were summoned into the field did they come with willingness and alacrity to defend the frontier from the attack of the natives?—Yes, I should say so, generally; it was their interest to do so, and, generally speaking, they did. There might be some occasions on which some would find an excuse or invent an excuse, but that was not common.

289. Then they were not unwilling to join together to defend their properties on the frontier?—No, they were not.

290. They were not unwilling to take the field and resist the inroads of the Kafirs?—Not at all. I did not quite understand the former question. I thought the object was to ascertain whether the farmers were prepared to form a permanent militia. That certainly they were not prepared to do, and would have resisted to the last; and, no doubt, the fear of having to do that was in some measure the cause of the late emigration of the farmers in 1835 and 1836. That fear caused many farmers to emigrate who had no idea of emigrating. When I came back from the interior in 1836 I found the farmers all violent, from having the idea that a regular trained militia was about to be established.

291. Do you think the frontier can be maintained in peace by the present system of field cornetcies as contradistinguished from some regular militia force?—I do not think the frontier can be maintained in peace by any force, as long as we have people in an uncivilized state who believe it is their right to steal when they can steal. I think it is impossible to maintain the frontier in peace with a military force, or any other, under such circumstances.

292. You

292. You think that no local organization would be sufficient?—None; it might diminish the amount of the depredations, but there would still be a certain class of men who would continue to commit depredations, because the chiefs have little power over them.

293. Did you ever come into contact with any of the chiefs?—I had seen every chief in my time in Kafirland. I do not believe there was a chief of any note with whom I had not had personal intercourse.

294. Did they make any special complaints to you?—Many.

295. State what they were?—They were principally in reference to the transactions between themselves and the Government; that is to say, they were always complaining of the Government holding them responsible for the thieving which went on among their tribes, notwithstanding that they had not the power of restraining it. They have no organized government. The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect for the chief, but nothing beyond that. If he exacts anything from his subjects which is not agreeable to the whole body, he has no certain means of enforcing it.

296. Was there any other complaint which they made?—No; I think what I have stated was the constant and lasting complaint. It was the great complaint of Gaika when he was appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium of communication between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound to restore all stolen cattle, and so on. Gaika engaged to do so; yet at the same time that he engaged to do so he was perfectly sensible he could not do it, and he was not backward in saying he could not, still he was afraid of offending the white king, as he called him, by refusing.

297. That was the Governor?—Yes; he agreed to the plan, and as soon as cattle were stolen from any part of the frontier he was required to restore them, though they had been stolen by the Kafirs of some other chief. Gaika, in that case, sent to the chief and informed him that his people had stolen the cattle, and that he must send them to him that he might restore them to the Government; the chief frequently refused. Perhaps a second message was sent to him without success; Gaika frightened, thought it necessary to comply with the request of the colonial Government. The consequence was, he was very often forced to take from his own people, who had not plundered in any way, cattle to the amount which had been lost, and send them to the Government.

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298. *Chairman.*] Have you known that to be frequently done?—Yes.

299. Of your own knowledge?—So far of my own knowledge, that I have been told it by the Kafirs, and I know that was the general impression. I know every Kafir in Kafirland complained; that Gaika, and also other chiefs, were compelled to take cattle away from their own people to repay the colony, because they could not find out the robbers.

300. You are as well acquainted with the Kafir tribes on the eastern boundary of the colony as on the northern boundary?—I know every tribe in South Africa as far as the tropic.

301. *Mr. Hawes.*] May the Committee infer it to be your opinion that it is useless to attempt to enter into treaties with the chiefs?—I do not know that it is useless; but you must form a treaty which would organize a government for them.

302. Who must form such a treaty?—The contracting parties; if we form a treaty it must be such as will require such an organization among the native chiefs as would establish for them a government.

303. Without that you think it is useless?—Yes.

304. *Chairman.*] Are you able to state to the Committee what you think would be the proper policy to pursue in regard to those frontier tribes?—One of two courses must be pursued. In the first place, the question must be taken into consideration in suggesting any course of policy, whether we are merely to look to the tribes that are on the immediate frontier, or whether we are to look to the whole body of Kafirs. If we look at the map we will find the Amakosa Kafirs; they extend as far as the boundary; then when we get up on the Kei you come to the Amatembus; that is another race of Kafirs, who are now also at war with us; and then we come to the Amapondas; so that if we were to extend the policy to the whole of the Kafirs, it would be different in some respects from the policy which would be required to be extended merely to those on the immediate frontier.

305. Taking all those questions together, are you prepared to state to the Committee any opinion of what you think, from your observation, would be the most expedient and practicable policy for the British Government to pursue in reference to those frontier tribes?—There might be one of two courses adopted; either to let them entirely alone, and allow them to manage their own affairs, as was the case when I first went to the colony, or take them under the British jurisdiction altogether. If the latter plan were to be adopted, every great chief must immediately be removed from the country. We will

will never manage the Kafirs, keeping their own chiefs. The chiefs would naturally feel in an irksome and degraded position, and would never be friendly to the colony as long as they feel themselves to be so. I had not a doubt that when the treaty was made, by which we constituted the chiefs magistrates, that it would only last as long as it was necessary for them to submit to it.

306. Suppose the policy were adopted of not interfering with their internal concerns, in what way do you think the frontier could be protected against the incursions and robberies committed by those people?—In that case it would require a line of military posts along the immediate frontier. My opinion has always been, and is still, that it would be necessary to have a special Commissioner in Kafirland, who would be, to a certain extent, the adviser of every tribe of Kafirs, and who would appear to the Kafirs to have an interest in them, and them only. They do not consider the Governor to have an interest in them; they fancy that as the Governor is white and the colonists are white, that therefore the Governor must have a special affection for white people, and must feel disposed to make the interest of the Kafirs subordinate to theirs. The Commissioner ought not to be connected with the colony, nor to receive orders from the Government. The Governor should have no power to control him; he ought to be separate and independent, and communicate with the Colonial Office at home. The only power he would have would be in case of an outbreak, which might happen among them even under any circumstances, to call upon the Governor for assistance; but in no way should he interfere otherwise. The object should be to make the Kafir feel that the white man residing with him was his friend, which they do not feel now with respect to any white man. They themselves would not befriend the white man in preference to the black man; they would make the white man's interest always subordinate to the black man's; and the black man supposes that the white man would do the same.

307. When you talk of a chain of posts along the line of the frontier, have you considered the immense length of the frontier of the colony?—Yes; there was originally a chain of posts when I first went to the colony, and the posts were at no very great distance from each other; I do not think very much protection would arise from military posts; the great protection would arise to the colony from the presence of the Commissioner, or whatever he may be called, who would be resi-

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dent in Kafirland ; all communications as to stolen cattle would require to be made to him, and he would have to take steps among the chiefs with a view to recover them.

308. Do you think such a system would work satisfactorily, this Commissioner having no communications with the British authorities, his sole communication being with the Colonial Office in London?—I think it would work better than the present system. I must explain ; I never intended it to be understood that he should not have communication with the Colonial Government, in reference to matters affecting the colonists and the Kafirs ; I simply intended he should hold his appointment from the Home Government, receive his instructions from the Home Government, and correspond directly with the Home Government on all points he might think necessary.

309. Supposing a question arose as to the restitution of cattle which had been stolen, would not it be rather a circuitous mode of correspondence on such a question that it should go round by London?—It would be for the Commissioner himself to take care and arrange that ; he should have sufficient power, I think, to do it.

310. From whence would his power arise if he were a single Commissioner in that country, without the power of calling in any force or assistance from the British colony?—It would be merely a moral power, which would, generally speaking, be enough ; moral power, if employed with tact, is better than physical power against the Kafirs.

311. Do you think it likely that a single white man, residing among the Kafir tribes, who was known to possess no means of enforcing any opinions he might form, would obtain such a moral power as you describe among all the Kafir chiefs?—Yes, I think so, provided there was an understanding in the first instance as to what was to be his position. He would not go there as a private individual, but accredited ; he would go there with a certain understanding, which of course would be explained to the whole of the chiefs.

312. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You said not long ago that the Kafirs would not obey their chiefs in some cases?—Neither do they.

313. Do you think that this Commissioner appointed by the British Government and sent into that country will have more influence and more power to enforce obedience than the individual chiefs they now have, who are elected by themselves?—I contemplate that this Commissioner will be a man who will succeed in organizing a government for each separate tribe, and will enable the chief to have an executive, which

which he has not now. If a chief wants now to punish a kraal of Kafirs, he perhaps orders the next kraal to himself to go and do it; that kraal perhaps objects; then if another kraal will not do it the chief has no power to enforce his orders. But if you organize a government for them, and create an executive, the chief would have the command over the whole of that executive, and he would make that executive the instrument of carrying out his orders, and not make his subjects indiscriminately the instrument.

314. The object of such a government as that would be in some measure to control the Kafirs?—Yes; that is what is wanted.

315. If the Kafirs are now so reluctant to yield any obedience under some circumstances to their present chiefs, would they be willing to submit to the control of a government so organized as you have mentioned?—I do not know that they would be willing instantly to do it; it must be brought about by a gradual process among them.

316. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] How would you form the executive; if the kraals of Kafirs to whom he appealed would not obey the chief, how could he get an executive to obey him?—It must be effected principally by the exertions of the Commissioner; certain advantages must be granted to those who were employed as an executive. The chief can get no executive now, because there is no payment to the executive,—the executive must be made to feel the benefit of being agents in the Government.

317. How could the Commissioner enable the chief to pay his executive; or supposing it were possible, would not the chief, for his own sake, do it now without the Commissioner?—It appears to me that their minds have not attained to that extent of operation as to suggest that. In the case of the Griquas in 1836 when I went into the interior the Griqua chief, Adam Kok, was constantly speaking to me about how the white people managed their affairs and their government; he said I have no means of managing my people; any expense which must be incurred in redressing injuries, or compelling the law to be observed, must fall upon me, and I have no means of paying it; I said there was a very easy way of doing it, and I told him in a few words how a civilized government managed; then he asked me if I would have any objection to be present at one of his councils, and to suggest those things; I said not the slightest; I was present accordingly and I suggested a kind of tax, namely, that each inhabitant of the Griqua country should pay yearly to the chief a

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sheep, which was to be sold and the money appropriated to such purposes. They immediately took up the idea and passed a resolution to that effect at the council. Though they were much farther advanced in civilization than the Kafirs they had never thought about that before, but the instant it was proposed they saw it, I think the Kafirs might be got to do the same thing.

318. It was formerly proposed in South Australia that there should be a protector of aborigines, who was to be a man speaking the language of the natives and to take their part, but it was never thought that that protector of aborigines could by any means obtain any powerful influence over the natives, except by taking their part and knowing their language?—My experience in South Africa is rather different from that; I know, in 1824 and 1825, I had such an influence over the frontier Kafirs that I could have almost raised them against the whole of their chiefs.

319. *Chairman.*] Over what extent of country would you propose that the jurisdiction of this Commissioner should extend?—It would not do to extend it over the whole of Kafirland, but over the immediate frontier it might be extended; over the Kafirs who are more directly in communication with the colony; the Gaika Kafirs.

320. From your observation, are you of opinion that the influence of the missionaries is very great among the Kafir tribes?—Among a certain portion of them it is great; it is not great among the chiefs, the chiefs rather dislike them: they find that those persons who attach themselves to the missionary station get an idea of liberty, and various other notions which are not exactly in conformity with their wishes, and on very many occasions the chiefs, in the first instance, have endeavoured to get rid of the missionaries, finding the people were not so manageable by their tyrannical government as they were previously to the missionaries arriving there. With respect to the poor of the country, the missionaries' influence is great, because they look to them in some degree as their protectors.

321. *Mr. Hawes.*] As against their chiefs?—As against their chiefs; at least, not protectors exactly, but men who will always remonstrate with the chiefs, and point out to them that those people are ill-used, and that they ought, for their own sakes, to adopt a better system towards them.

322. The Committee understand you to say, that you are of opinion that there are only two modes of maintaining peace in the colony of the Cape. One is to allow the Kafirs to manage their own affairs, and the other is to assert the British authority

authority over the various barbarous tribes beyond the frontier?  
—Yes; and removing their chiefs.

323. With regard to the first plan, was it not in force when you were there, and had not there been frequent wars, and many disturbances?—Yes; but I do not think that those were wars which arose from any inclination to go to war on the part of the nation; they were wars which I do not think any effort will prevent occasionally breaking out. The Government regulations were stringent and good in reference to the treatment of the natives; but there were individuals who would break through those regulations; they broke through them, and the Kafir being an excitable person, and not reflecting much, he fancied it was the act of the Government, and not of an individual. In that way gradually, those things happening from time to time, brought about a state of feeling that they were ready for anything.

324. When Sir Benjamin D'Urban was Governor, which I presume was about the time you were in the colony, there was a serious war, was not there?—I was in the interior, beyond the Kafirs, during the whole of that time; I do not know personally anything about that war; we heard rumours that there was something going on between the colonists and the frontier Kafirs, but nothing so distinct as to know what it was till I returned.

325. When you returned, you became aware of the general policy which Sir Benjamin D'Urban recommended?—Yes.

326. As to the extension of the British authority at the Kei?—Yes.

327. What was your opinion of that system?—I did not think it would answer.

328. Colonel *Thompson*.] With respect to those two alternatives which you propose, did you mean them to apply to the tribes which have acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, or to the tribes which have not acknowledged it, or to both?—I do not see, myself, that their having acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government means anything as far as regards them individually; they did it because it answered their purpose at the time; no doubt they calculated to have an opportunity at some future period of throwing it off.

329. There are some who have professed to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, and others who have not professed to do so?—Yes, the latter are behind.

330. Then possibly you do not mean those alternatives to apply to those you state to be behind?—There is a difficulty as regards that; there does not appear to me to be

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any advantage in taking the tribes of Kafirs which adjoin the frontier; if you take them you simply advance the frontier in order to come in contact with people who are exactly like the Gaikas, and so have the battle to fight over again; then, if you take a second step you come in contact with another belt, and so you will have to conquer from time to time a succession of belts; you must either do the thing entirely, or there is no use in doing it at all.

331. Have you, in your own mind, any opinion as to the possibility of doing it with respect to those tribes who have never acknowledged anything like the supremacy of the British Government? Could you go to those different tribes and say, Now, give us up your chiefs, because we desire it?—No; none of the tribes will give up their chiefs; you must capture them.

332. You meant, then, to confine it to those on whom there is some kind of hold on the part of the British Government?—Yes; it may be done in that way, or in a general way.

333. Do you think an officer, in the nature of what in India is called a Resident, appointed by the British Government at home, but with directions to communicate with the Government at the Cape, would act favourably for the purpose for which you propose a Commissioner to be appointed?—Yes; my only object in proposing a Commissioner was, it should be understood among the Kafirs, that the Resident or Commissioner, or whatever he might be termed, was a man specially there to protect the interests of the natives, not to have any jurisdiction or authority in the colony, and that he was separate and apart from it altogether. I do not care as to his having friendly communications with the Governor; what I would like to see is, that an effect be produced upon the minds of the Kafirs which would lead them to know that a man was with them whose sole duty it was to protect them, and not do anything beyond them, among the white people.

334. The difficulty appears to be in having two commands; do you think that such a plan as here suggested would get over the difficulty?—I think it might.

335. Mr. Haves.] Should you propose to support such a Resident by any military force?—Yes; we must maintain his importance; we must make them respect him. Independently of there being a mere moral respect, there must be a certain station in Kafirland where he should have a party of troops under his command. What appeared to me to have done great mischief was, that persons residing among them were always writing letters backwards and forwards to the colony, hence the Kafirs came to the conclusion that those communications

communications were against them. There should be no constant references to the colony, things should be managed and done in Kafirland, and Kafirland only.

336. You would make that Commissioner a sort of military man, supported by an adequate force?—Yes.

337. Where would you place him in Kafirland; in King William's Town, for instance?—I should not like to say much about that; I have not considered that point.

338. *Chairman.*] Do you think it would be possible to preclude a Commissioner so circumstanced from having some relation with the Government of the neighbouring colony?—I cannot see what relations would be required; he would, of course, have to receive reports of aggressions chargeable on the Kafirs.

339. He would be somewhat in the situation of the head of the executive of Kafirland, would not he?—No, I should not propose him to be the head of the executive of Kafirland; I would only propose that he should have a moral influence. Suppose anything, for instance, broke out in the Sandilli tribes, he should send for Sandilli. In reference to chiefs, however, they have, in their own country, a great idea of their own importance, and they do not like to be sent for by the Government agents; they will come, but they will feel it to be degrading.

340. You propose to give the Commissioner a certain amount of European force with him?—Yes; that is to be at his own residence.

341. That surely would be for the purpose of giving him, besides a moral influence, the influence of an executive Government?—It would be for his own defence, not to use that force against the natives.

342. If your plan succeeds the effect will be, will not it, to place this Commissioner in the situation of Chief Governor of Kafirland in many respects?—As far as regards appearance; but if he does not exercise the power, I do not see how you would make him Chief Governor; my intention is that he should not interfere with the natives, except through the chiefs; there should be a constant communication between him and the chiefs; he should be merely protected in the way I have stated.

343. You mean those European soldiers to be there as his own personal guard, and not with a view of carrying into effect any policy or view which he may have in regard to the chiefs?—Decidedly so; I do not think he ought to have any power in

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his hands to carry out any operation among the chiefs except moral influence.

344. Colonel *Thompson*.] You mean that the troops should be merely an escort?—I can hardly say that I mean that; they should be an evidence of his importance. The Kafir chiefs themselves have a great number of persons of the tribe constantly about them, which indicates their position and standing in the tribe. If you sent a man into Kafirland as a mere individual, without any show or appearance of support, he would not be regarded with the same respect as if he had a certain number of soldiers attached to him.

345. *Chairman*.] Suppose he had a very few troops with him, which were to be altogether unsupported by the military force within the colony, in the case of a hostile feeling arising against him, would not he be more exposed to danger than if you left him altogether dependent upon the protection of the Kafirs themselves?—No. Any man who knows much of the Kafirs would scarcely be taken unawares in that way; he must see when a combination is taking place; he must see it by the movements of the Kafirs; there are certain things which always indicated the intentions of the Kafirs in all their outbreaks; there were plenty of people in the case of the last outbreak, who saw long before it took place that it was going to happen.

346. Supposing the Commissioner saw those appearances of a movement against him, would you allow him to resort to the neighbouring colony for assistance?—Yes; I stated that he should have nothing to do with the colony, except that in case of necessity he should be able to call upon the Governor for assistance.

347. Colonel *Thompson*.] You mean that he should be dependent upon the Governor for assistance if he required it?—Yes.

348. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Suppose there are some cattle stolen from our frontier, we call upon the resident to give us restitution, and the resident calls upon the native chiefs to give up the cattle; the native chiefs are not obeyed, and they tell the resident they can do nothing; what is the resident then to do?—He must still persist; they will at length be persuaded to do something; they are not a very unmanageable people.

349. You said, at the beginning of your evidence, that frequently the Kafirs will not obey their native chiefs now, and that in cases where cattle are stolen the chiefs themselves are not able to make restitution through not being obeyed by their own people; suppose they told the resident that, what is he

to do?—I am afraid I have been misunderstood; I was speaking then about Gaika; I said it frequently happened that under the system by which we make one large tribe responsible for all the small tribes, the large tribe sent to a small tribe to say, cattle had been stolen by their people, and they were required to give up the cattle that they may be sent in; the small tribe, in such a case, sometimes resists; but in the case of subjects being ordered by their chief himself, they would yield to him. He may have to enforce his command sometimes, and if it is to be enforced, and it is an unpopular thing, under the present organization in Kafirland, he sometimes will not get persons to enforce it.

350. What organization would you recommend in order to vest that power in the chiefs which they have not now?—I am not quite prepared to suggest what would be required; I think every tribe might be divided into a certain number of districts, perhaps each district having 100 or 150 families; there should be a minor chief appointed in charge of those; he should receive a salary in some way or other, so as to make him wish to continue in the position, and he should have a fixed police of four, or five, or six of his own people, and should make use of that police, that police being paid.

351. Colonel *Dunne*.] You said you recommended the Gaikas to levy a tax, which recommendation they adopted; can you tell the Committee how long they continued that practice, or whether they continue it to this day?—I said the Griquas.

352. Did they continue it for any time?—They adopted it at once; I mean the Griquas.

353. Did they carry it out?—Yes, for a time; whether they continue it now I do not know, but I think it is very probable they do, because they saw the advantage of it.

354. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You think they continue to pay a sheep each?—Yes; one sheep was given by each householder, and the persons thrown into gaol were maintained out of this fund, whereas previously they were only maintained out of the funds of the chief, and, as he could not afford to do it, the consequence was that crimes often passed unpunished.

355. Colonel *Dunne*.] Your recommendation would be, that some officer should be appointed to try and organize a species of government in each tribe?—Yes.

356. What is the number of the Gaika tribe?—Since Gaika died his tribe has been broken up into numerous smaller tribes. Sandili is recognised as the great chief of the tribe; but that is merely nominal; he has other brothers, Maquino,

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&c., who have each a subordinate tribe under him; that was not the case in the time of Gaika; he commanded the whole of those tribes which are now minor tribes.

357. Have you any idea of the number of them at that time?—I should think they could have brought into the field from 6,000 to 8,000 fighting men; the population might be about 44,000.

358. Mr. Stanley.] What do you reckon to be the proportion between the fighting men of a tribe and the whole population?—Perhaps the fighting men are one-sixth of the whole.

359. Chairman.] Is the love of marauding and cattle stealing a strong passion among the young men of the Kafirs, or do you think, if they easily found subsistence by other means, they would be diverted from such pursuits?—If you could once get them to think that it was as honourable to find subsistence by other means as by the means their forefathers adopted, there would be a great change wrought. There are, however, certain practices which must be changed before that; one of them is the purchasing of their wives by cattle: when a man has not cattle enough himself, and feels disposed to get a wife, he must go and steal in order to purchase the wife. As long as that practice exists, it will be an inducement to stealing. Then there is another thing in Kafirland; a good thief, especially if he can avoid being detected, is held up by the Kafirs as a person to be imitated; when they have large meetings and dances, their poets relate the deeds of their forefathers, and they always hold out for imitation a person who has been celebrated for carrying off many black cows or many red cows.

360. It is one chief means of acquiring personal distinction?—Yes; that and war and hunting are the only means.

361. Is the passion for war strong among the young men?—No; I think the passion for plunder is stronger, and war generally arises from that.

362. Mr. Stanley.] Do they attack other native tribes in the same way that they attack the colonists?—In the same way.

363. Then their attacks upon us have arisen not so much from any jealousy of race as from their general love of plunder?—There is a great deal of jealousy too; they are perfectly aware of the whole history of the Cape colony; they are aware that the Cape colony was but a few miles round Cape Town at one time, and that gradually the white people

have extended themselves, taking the land of the natives; knowing that, they say it will be our fate next.

364. There is a greater feeling of hostility against the white men than against any of the neighbouring tribes?—There is a feeling of fear; I do not know about hostility; they fear that eventually they will be sacrificed by the white men. The first intercourse we had with the Kafirs was an intercourse of that kind, and it showed even at that time how well they were aware of the system which had been adopted. In 1702 the colonists first became acquainted with Kafirs; a predatory party left the vicinity of Cape Town, and having gone 600 or 700 miles to see the Kafirs, the Hottentots fled before the colonists as they advanced, and informed the Kafirs what had been going on; the Kafirs advanced three days in front, because they felt, it is better to do that than allow them to come into their country. An attack took place, in which the Kafirs were worsted. That was the first knowledge which the Kafirs obtained of the white men.

365. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] The British had not possession of the colony in 1702?—No, the Dutch had it; since then there has been a constant succession of attacks: they have happened from time to time to the present day.

366. *Mr. Stanley.*] Have the Kafirs shown a disposition at any time to unite with other native tribes and make a combined attack upon the white men?—On several occasions there has been a combination between them and the Hottentots. In 1797 there was a combination between them, and there is always more or less of a disposition to that; the Hottentot feels that he has been deprived of his land, and that the white man is occupying it; under those circumstances some are ready to take advantage of any events which may arise.

367. There has been no union between the Kafirs and the Zoolas?—No, there is no opportunity for that, they are not likely to unite; they are hostile to each other.

368. *Colonel Dunne.*] What is the extent of frontier which we have to defend now?—I am scarcely able to answer that question; it may be 120 miles.

369. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] The British power does not extend to the tropic, does it?—The British power, to a limited extent, extends, according to the Act of Parliament, as far as 25 degrees south latitude.

370. Has not it advanced since that?—Not that I am aware of.

371. *Mr. Hawes.*] You do not mean to say that the British power, in the ordinary sense of the word, extends to the 25th degree

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degree south latitude, do you?—If I understand the Act of Parliament, and the proclamation, the Government at the Cape has the right to interfere with any British subject who may commit a crime to the south of that latitude.

372. They have the power of punishing any British subject who may be guilty of any crime?—Yes.

373. Colonel *Dunne*.] You were in the colony while the commando system was practised, were not you?—When it was practised on a modified scale.

374. You have been there since, also?—Yes.

375. Could you form any estimate as to whether the loss of life and property was greater since or before that system was totally abolished?—I should think before; the farmers are much more effective, if their object is to destroy life, than the white troops; the white troops may go out a thousand times and hardly destroy a Kafir, but the Commando of boers rarely go without doing so. The white troops fight the Kafirs as if the Kafirs were civilized people; the boers do not do so, they fight them in their own way.

376. Is the defence of the frontier more effectual under the commando system than under the system of protection by regular troops?—I should question if there is much difference.

377. But you think the defence by the boers is a more effective system than the operation of regular troops?—Much more; in the case of a boer pursuing stolen cattle, he will pursue completely out of sight; he will pursue principally during the night, when the Kafir does not know that he is in pursuit. The English troops pursue during the day, when they are seen; and in that way the boer is a much more efficient agent in retaking cattle than any English troops ever have been or can be.

378. The boer does not carry a pack of 64 lbs. upon his back?—No; he carries a much larger gun than a soldier carries.

379. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Are the boers able to protect their own property; are not their numbers few as compared to the Kafirs?—If the colony were left to them without any British Government at all, the boers would maintain it, and could very soon exterminate the whole of the Kafirs.

380. They are settled along the frontier; are they able to take care of their property without any assistance?—They would revert back to the old commando system, and under the old commando system they could do it; I should be very sorry, however, to see that system re-established, it was so fatal to the natives.

381. Colonel

381. Colonel *Dunne*.] But it was effective as far as defence goes?—Yes.

382. *Chairman*.] But it would lead to a system of massacre, you think?—Quite a system of massacre.

383. Colonel *Dunne*.] Would there be any difficulty in reviving it under a modified system, establishing, at the same time, a militia of the colonists?—I do not think you would get a militia of colonists; the boers would not serve; I do not think you would get 200 men to serve throughout the whole colony; they look upon a soldier as a very degraded being; they would not serve as soldiers.

384. They would serve when called out in commandoes, you think?—Yes; that is, temporarily, in the immediate defence of their property; but they will not serve continuously.

385. Mr. *Hawes*.] When they turned out under the old commando system, they acquired considerable property in cattle, did not they, without much scruple?—They took all they could get; they made a regular foray, and took whatever they could lay their hands on; they took any cattle which came in their way; they argued, The Kafir had stolen from them, and they must take from the Kafirs. They did not take the cattle only of the guilty. So the Kafirs reason if the white troops injure the Kafirs; they do not say, We will only injure the troops in return, but we will injure any white men we meet.

386. Your opinion is, that the only government which would be successful would be the establishment of a Resident or Commissioner, with an ample military force, in the heart of Kafirland?—Yes, if you did not choose to adopt the other course, of depriving them of every chief who is at all recognized as a chief, and appoint new magistrates or new managers among them, taking the whole expense of doing so upon the British Government.

387. Mr. *Cardwell*.] By the first plan you propose, you would sever all connexion between the British colonial Government and the Kafirland country?—Yes, if the Kafirs are to be independent.

388. You would have a resident in the nature of an ambassador residing at the head quarters of the native Kafirland Government?—Yes.

389. With whom you would station a small military force?—Yes.

390. Which would be rather in the nature of a body-guard than of a force to carry into effect any system of policy in Kafirland?—Yes; disclaiming all idea of establishing a power in the Commissioner to carry out anything by force, the soldiers

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soldiers should be only as a body-guard to give importance to the man.

391. In the case of any outrage being committed, or alleged to be committed, by the Kafirs upon the British colony, that would form a subject of negotiation between the colonial government and the resident?—Yes.

392. The resident being the agent of the British Government to negotiate with the Kafrarian Government?—Yes.

393. If restitution were refused, that would be a *casus belli* in every instance?—Yes.

394. Mr. *Havoes.*] An additional military force in that case being afforded from the colony?—Yes, if it became necessary.

395. *Chairman.*] In the event of a war between Kafrania and the colony, the Commissioner would withdraw, would not he?—Yes; it would not do to leave him there, unless he had a very strong force, if a war broke out.

396. Do you believe that the Kafirs themselves would be disposed to receive a Commissioner such as you have described?—I think so, from all I have seen of them. I think they are generally a manageable people. I have always found them manageable and tractable.

397. Mr. *Mackinnon.*] Would not the chiefs be jealous of their power or influence?—No; my notion is that no direct power ought to be exercised over any of the tribes by the Commissioner; the Commissioner, if he chose to give a man a present, he might do so, but he would have no political power or influence with the tribes except through the chiefs.

398. *Chairman.*] You would not propose that he should exercise any judicial functions?—No; whatever was done should be done openly by the chief, before all the Kafirs. For example, in case of a resident, or a commissioner, or whatever he might be, being placed there, there should be a certain meeting place in each subordinate tribe, and when any crime was committed by the subjects of one of those subordinate tribes, or cattle had been stolen from the colony by them, he should communicate directly with the chief of the tribe who should investigate the matter openly. There should be a building for the purpose, where the Commissioner himself and the chief would preside. They would hear what the accusation was, and go on to investigate it. If sufficient evidence could not be procured at the time, they must meet again. Let the people see everything done openly and in a systematic way, and it would suggest the idea among the Kafirs of new modes of doing things which at present do not enter their heads; continue the inquiry in the same way, and other information

mation would be obtained which would enable the chief and the Commissioner to come to a decision as to who was guilty and what redress was to be offered.

399. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Supposing they came to that decision, what power would there be, according to your notion, to enforce it?—Along with the appointment of this resident you must take other steps, and incur a certain amount of expenditure to pay those chiefs as subordinate magistrates, and to pay police among their own people to carry out the system, and thus gradually organize a civil force in the country which does not now exist.

400. *Chairman*.] You believe that a certain amount of expense ought to be incurred by this country for a certain time in order to introduce this system?—Yes; you would not otherwise attach those subordinate chiefs to the system; the money, though very trifling in amount, would be a great object to them.

401. Will you describe more particularly the tract of country which you propose to organize in this manner?—British Kafria and Victoria; it should only extend over that country at present.

402. Where would you commence to the west?—At the Keiskamma.

403. And extend how far?—To the Kei River; there you would come into contact with tribes who do not in any way acknowledge our influence.

404. Taking the Keiskamma as the western boundary, would not that include some settlements of Europeans?—Yes; the settlements of Europeans extend as far as Buffalo River; some of the best parts of Kafirland are now settled by Europeans.

405. How would you propose to deal with those settlements?—I do not know.

406. Viscount *Mandeville*.] You are giving to the Committee your experience of the colony 12 or 15 years ago?—Yes.

407. The circumstances of Kafirland may have changed a good deal since that?—I have no reason to fancy that they have changed; the Kafir customs do not change very rapidly.

408. *Chairman*.] King William's Town would be within the district you speak of?—Yes.

409. Marquis of *Granby*.] You said that the Commissioner was to have no judicial power whatever?—No.

410. Supposing that a robbery takes place, and the negotiation between him and the chief were to fail, what would be

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the next step towards obtaining redress?—That might happen, but I do not think it is very likely to happen; I am not prepared to say what would be the next step. If the person appointed were competent to deal with the chiefs, I do not think it would happen that he would fail.

411. You do not suppose that upon all occasions they would agree to his suggestions, do you?—If the robbery had been committed by their own immediate people it would not fail; the only thing is, you must always take into consideration that the Kafir community consists of two classes; viz. of a settled or wealthy class and a pauper class. That pauper class lives on the outskirts of the tribe, and depends entirely upon plunder; if a crime were committed by them, it would have been committed either for the purpose of slaughtering oxen and eating them, or for the purpose of purchasing a wife. If redress were demanded from them, they would have nothing wherewith to pay; the chief would say directly, "Those men are not under me; I cannot control them." If the next day there was an adjoining tribe going on a warlike expedition, these paupers would immediately join the other chief, and say they belonged to him; then afterwards when they came back they would return and say, "We are now again under our own chief." When Gaika was the great chief of Kafirland, and supposed to be very friendly to the colony, and the colony to him, if you met the greatest rogue in the world, and asked him to whom he belonged, he said he belonged to Gaika. It is the Kafirs located round the settled tribes who chiefly commit the robberies; that is why I think it is so absolutely necessary to organize governments for them. Till you have governments organized you cannot have any restraint over those persons.

412. Colonel Dunne.] How were the Kafirs armed at the time you were there; were they armed with muskets?—A few of them.

413. Do you understand that they are armed in a much more effective way now?—Yes, I should say that the difference between the Kafirs in 1821, when I first saw them, and the last time I saw them, in 1836, was very great; and I have reason to believe they have made great advances in knowledge and everything else since the latter date.

414. They are become a much more formidable enemy?—Undoubtedly they are.

415. Chairman.] Would you propose to found this new system, which you recommend should be introduced into the government of Kafirland, upon some convention to be entered

into

into between the British Government and the Kafirs?—Yes. It would only be effectual in that way. If the convention be not properly understood before the Commissioner takes up his position in Kafirland, little good comparatively will be accomplished.

416. In that convention you would probably define the rights and duties of the Commissioner?—Yes, and on what terms the Kafirs and the colonists were to continue.

417. Would you propose to consider the Kafirs as British subjects or not?—No.

418. Colonel *Dunne*.] With whom would you make the convention?—With each chief, or with the chiefs assembled.

419. I understood you to say that you could not rely upon any convention with the chiefs?—I was speaking with reference to Kafirland, without an improved organization. At present you cannot rely upon it, but if you had this organization, and had got the chiefs all together to consent to a certain understanding, and that were to be carried out by means of a resident in the country, you might rely upon it, I think.

420. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Supposing they were not willing to receive a resident, what are you then to do?—I think, from what I know of the Kafirs, they would not object. They have been so long accustomed to fancy that they will be compelled to comply, that they think it is better to assent than to object.

421. *Chairman*.] Have you no apprehension that such an arrangement as you propose would wound the national feelings or the pride of the chiefs; very much?—None; I think they would rather like it. The chiefs very often, in conversation with me, expressed a wish that the Government would assist them more in suppressing plunderers; however, it is very questionable whether they were always sincere; they have a great deal of duplicity about them. There was an arrangement made in 1807 to shoot Kafirs who were discovered carrying off booty. On that occasion Slamby, who is since dead, expressed his high approval of it, and his reply, when informed of it, was, "Now I am glad the White King has approved of a Kafir being shot when he is discovered carrying off booty, because you have been accusing me and my people so often of having committed these crimes when I know we have not committed them: now that men are to be shot, we will have the opportunity of ascertaining to what tribe they belong."

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Mr. John Fairbairn, called in; and Examined.

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422. *Chairman.*] IN what way have you been connected with the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—I have resided there for the last 26 or 27 years.

423. At Cape Town?—Yes.

424. In what capacity?—I was proprietor and editor of a newspaper there.

425. Had you any other trade or profession?—No other.

426. You are not engaged in commerce in any way?—No.

427. Have you been concerned in editing this newspaper the whole of that time?—I have.

428. Have you been chiefly or altogether resident at Cape Town during that period, or have you been much in the interior?—I have been resident in Cape Town the whole of that time, and have only come here in consequence of the summons I received; I have no personal knowledge of the tribes beyond the frontier; I only know them through the despatches of Government, and the other papers which have been published.

429. Have you been at all among the Kafir tribes?—I have been in Kafirland 20 years ago, but on a visit only.

430. Have you, since that time, been in any distant part of the colony?—I have been in the Zwellendam district, and other districts of the colony.

431. Have you been at Graham's Town?—I have not been at Graham's Town since then; I was at Graham's Town then, but not since.

432. Have you been led to form an opinion upon the policy which has been pursued by this country in regard to the frontier tribes?—I have considered the question for the last quarter of a century, and have formed opinions upon it, but recent events have so altered the circumstances of both parties, both the Kafirs and the colony generally, that I cannot say what ought to be done.

433. Should you say that events have very much disappointed the expectations of the most judicious and experienced persons in the colony with regard to the policy to be pursued in this respect?—They disappointed me, but they did not disappoint many of the old inhabitants on the frontier; I did think that the present Governor was going to be successful; for two or three years, the accounts from Kafirland were highly satisfactory, but the sudden outbreak has shown that there was some deception or mistake somewhere.

434. In what way do you apprehend that the policy of the present Governor differed from that of his predecessors in dealing with those frontier tribes?—He took possession of the country, and he established military forts within the country itself.

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435. Mr. Hawes.] Within British Kafraria?—Military forts were established along the Buffalo River, which is in British Kafraria, and in the mountains towards Amatola on that side, and at the mouth of the Buffalo River, where there is the means of landing goods and stores, so that he had military possession of the country, and governed it by a Chief Commissioner, he himself being High Commissioner; he appointed Colonel Mackinnon to take charge of that country, independently of the Cape Government.

436. Chairman.] Have not the natives been recently more employed in the British service as police, with a view to check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs, than they were in former periods?—Much more.

437. And for some time, that policy seemed to be very successful, did not it?—It seemed to be very successful for two years.

438. Has it been the case, that recent events have shown that those native allies were not so trustworthy as had been supposed?—The native Kafir police were perfectly trustworthy when pursuing thieves, the common enemies of all men; but when Sir Harry Smith employed them against their own chiefs, he mistook the Kafir character I think; those men had been born and educated, and brought up under their present chiefs; they were a new regiment, without the spirit of organization which men have in this country; they were just brought there as it were to act in the nature of a police against thieves and such persons, and they were active and would even go into the kraals of their own chiefs to seize the cattle; but when they were employed to seize the persons of their own chiefs, they failed.

439. You think they were trustworthy so long as their duties were confined to the ordinary functions of policemen, but when they were brought forward as parties in what might be considered a national quarrel, their feelings led them to join their old chiefs against the British Government?—It has so turned out.

440. Mr. Hawes.] Not universally so, has it?—I believe the Kafir police which were employed in Colonel Mackinnon's force all deserted, or nearly all, and the rest he could not

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trust. I do not think they will again venture to employ them in the same kind of service, that is, in political service.

441. *Chairman.*] Do there exist the same reasons for accounting for the conduct of the Kat River settlers, for instance, in leaving the British Government, and siding in considerable numbers with the Kafirs?—No; the Kat River settlers are a mixed race on one side. There was a Kafir chief down in the Kat River of the name of Hermanus, who was a Kafir and not a Hottentot; he and a number of other Kafirs were located there in return for certain services performed by Hermanus against the Kafirs in the last Kafir war; that man continued pretty steady up to the last war, when he fairly broke out in rebellion, unexpectedly by everybody; but he and other settlers in the Kat River settlement complained of a number of things done to them by the Government; how far they were true or otherwise I have no personal knowledge. I heard much of it, and the Government appointed a Commission to inquire into it, but the report of that Commission has not been published.

442. Does the Cape Mounted Police consist principally of Kafirs or Hottentots?—They are nearly all Kafirs.

443. With regard to the Cape Mounted Rifles, do they consist of Hottentots or Kafirs?—Nearly entirely of Hottentots.

444. How have they behaved?—They always behaved well up to the present war; now a number of them have deserted, and suspicion has fallen upon the whole body.

445. Are you able to account for their conduct?—Not in the slightest degree. It was since I left the colony. I had heard nothing of it, nor was there the least suspicion thrown upon them in the public papers or elsewhere till the thing broke out.

446. Is not it a fact which is undeniable, that the disaffection among the native troops is much greater than was anticipated, even by those who best knew them?—There are several people on the frontier who have been for years declaring that the tribes were hostile to us; and that the Government and a great portion of the people in the colony were deceiving themselves in supposing that they were in a state of security. Those persons, both publicly in writing through the newspapers, and in addresses to the Government, expressed their fears that something mischievous was about to take place.

447. Taking the general feeling at Cape Town, do you believe there was that distrust of the native population which

events have shown, to a great extent at least, to have been justifiable?—Not in Cape Town; we had not that suspicion there.

448. You have no means at Cape Town, except by rumour, of obtaining much information as to the frontier tribes, have you?—My opinion was formed almost entirely upon the Governor's despatches, printed every month; upon the despatches from Colonel Mackinnon, the returns of cattle stolen, and the general state of the country expressed monthly or oftener in the Government Gazette; upon those accounts we relied up to the very last.

449. Do you think there is some inconvenience in the distance of the seat of Government at Cape Town from those frontier tribes?—It would depend upon what is meant by Government; if it means legislation there would be no inconvenience, but if it means executive I think there should be an officer of high rank constantly on the frontier.

450. Mr. *Hawes*.] Do you mean Graham's Town, in speaking of the frontier?—No; the frontier is much beyond Graham's Town.

451. What do you contemplate that the rank of that officer should be?—In my opinion, which is not of much value however, he should not be of lower rank than major-general, and he should have a strong force constantly in hand on the immediate frontier.

452. *Chairman*.] In your opinion, would it be desirable to separate the present Cape colony into two distinct colonies, and to fix the seat of Government of one of them on some spot more to the westward, such as Graham's Town?—I think it would weaken both very much to separate them at present; it would make the frontier Government very weak to separate it from the western division. The safety of the frontier, I think, is better provided for by one strong Government, wherever its seat may be, if the colony is to pay its own expenses, and have the management of the frontier policy.

453. What would be the effect of transferring the seat of Government from Cape Town to Graham's Town?—I do not think that it would succeed; I do not think the great body of the colony would have confidence in any Legislature which could be assembled at Graham's Town. The great mass of the population and the property and commerce of the country is in the western division and along the sea coast there; they have the greatest amount of education and general knowledge, and connexion with the world.

454. With reference to the frontier tribes, are not the inte-

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rests of Cape Town and the district about it affected only in a very indirect manner by what goes on on the frontier?—We are very much interested in it. A large proportion of the money in Cape Town is derived from mortgages on frontier farms and frontier estates; a large portion of the trade of Table Bay is connected with the frontier, and a great many people in Cape Town have an interest in estates in the eastern province. I do not think there is any separation desirable between the two portions of the colony.

455. In the event of the colony not being divided, and the representative system being brought into operation throughout that colony, the Legislature meeting at Cape Town, do you think there would be any indisposition on the part of that Legislature to take adequate measures for the protection of the frontier?—None whatever.

456. You do not think that the distance of Cape Town from the eastern frontier would cause the Legislature to be indifferent to what went on there?—No.

457. You do not think that on that account only it would be desirable either to separate the colony into two parts, or to remove the seat of Government nearer to the frontier?—No.

458. Are you of opinion that there would be any inconvenience from the chief British officer residing at Cape Town, rather than residing at some point nearer the frontier?—I think there must be an officer of high rank always on the immediate frontier as the Executive, and that officer should have very great powers.

459. But still be subordinate to the Government of the colony residing at Cape Town?—The Governor of the colony need not always reside at Cape Town.

460. Still, if the Legislature is at Cape Town, probably it would be necessary for the Governor to be a good deal there?—The communication between the different parts of the colony is constant by steam and by excellent roads; we have capital roads now from one end of the colony to the other; the steam communication is constant; in 48 or 52 hours, you go from Cape Town to Algoa Bay.

461. You have stated that if a representative system were brought into operation in this colony, in your opinion the Legislature at Cape Town would be disposed adequately to provide for the defence of the frontier?—I think so.

462. Have you any idea as to what would be the necessary expense of doing so?—Not till I know what the policy is to be.

463. Are you able to state to the Committee any opinion  
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of your own as to what that policy ought to be, looking forward to the future?—None. If I had been asked that question some years ago, I should have been very positive, like other people.

464. What is the answer which you would have given, if you had been asked that question a year ago?—The plan I proposed many years ago, which was in part adopted, was that the Kafirs should be considered foreigners, and independent people; that we should deal in a friendly manner with the chiefs, treating them with respect, and receiving them into the houses of the chief officers, just as you would treat any man of respectability and standing; that those chiefs should, in consideration of certain services to be performed to the colony, receive small salaries; those services should be the discovery of cattle stolen, and of bad characters who have committed offences within the colony, just as you would apply to the French Government to assist you in taking up persons who had done mischief to this country. I would propose that those salaries should be paid quarterly, and always be left till matters were settled between us and those chiefs. That was a portion of the plan proposed at that time, which it was supposed would be successful. The colony and the Government were discussing it in 1834, when the war broke out. That war upset many of our notions about the Kafirs, and led to the trial of two or three new systems from time to time, which were popular for a while, and then, not succeeding in protecting the frontier as was expected, they became unpopular again. New wars broke out, and new systems were introduced, till this last system was adopted, which we all hoped would be a permanent one, because it seemed based on power and on popularity, as we were led to suppose, believing that the Governor, Sir Harry Smith, was not only popular in the colony, as he was to a great extent, but that the Kafirs both respected and liked him. We had hoped that this would continue, and we were under the impression, that if peace could be preserved for 20 years, or for a generation, we should have gained our point. The Kafirs by that time would have become an agricultural people, and have been a fixed people, and we should have had a hold upon them, but we have been all disappointed.

465. Mr. Cardwell.] When you spoke of the Legislature undertaking to pay for the defence of the frontier, did you mean that they would be willing to undertake it out of the colonial funds to be raised by colonial taxes?—I think, if a Legislative Assembly, representing the whole colony, were

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established at the Cape, the British Government and that Assembly could then talk over the matter, and come to a reasonable compromise. At present the Cape, as a community, does not exist; we are merely a number of individuals; one man thinks one thing, and another another; no man can pledge the colony to anything.

466. You said that you thought a Legislature fairly chosen from among the people of the colony would undertake for the defence of the frontier?—As far as was reasonable. The British Government have taken in new territories unconnected with the colony, and beyond the colony. For the defence of this part of her territories Great Britain must be responsible. For the immediate defence of the frontier the colony would be ready, I have no doubt, to pay its due proportion; but we always believe that our frontier is a British frontier, and that the enemy who attacks you, by coming across a river, is as much an enemy of the empire as if he came by sea; so that the British Government should defend us against the men who come by land as well as against those who come by sea.

467. Then the major-general, who is to reside upon the frontier with a large force, is to be paid in some part, at least, from Imperial resources?—I should think so.

468. Are you prepared at all to state your own view of what proportion the empire should pay and what proportion the colony should pay?—I am not prepared to answer that question till I know something of the policy which is to be adopted, and to what extent the colony is to have a voice in that policy. It would be possible for an injudicious system to be formed there under the British authority which would lead to continual wars.

469. Under the supposition that the Colonial Legislature had the entire control of the policy, would they be prepared to defray the entire expense?—I suspect that if a Colonial Parliament were asked the question they would say, "Do you mean us to separate from Great Britain?" If the entire defence of the frontier, which is the whole of our foreign relationship is to come upon us, and the whole control of the policy is to come upon us, that is equivalent to a separation from Great Britain, which we deprecate.

470. You advocate independent institutions, but you deprecate that degree of separation which would throw the whole of the expenditure upon yourselves?—Not the whole of the expenditure, as if we were dealing as an independent people; but if our policy is still to be interfered with by another

power, that other power must be responsible in some degree for the consequences.

471. Colonel *Dunne*.] Would the Cape of Good Hope from its own resources be able to support a war carried on at the expense of the last war, which cost 2,000,000 *l.*?—It would never have cost that under their own management.

472. If the Colonial Government had the management of the war, would not they manage it by the commando system more than by sending large bodies of regular troops along the frontier?—They would establish a regular force on the frontier, and then when any mischief occurred the people would turn out, as they have done formerly.

473. Could not that system be carried on in such a manner as would not be revolting to humanity, and yet would be perfectly effectual for the defence of the frontier?—War is extermination; war is killing; you kill on till the people submit.

474. *Chairman*.] Supposing the settlers in the frontier were allowed, without much interference on the part of the Government, to carry on a war against the natives, what do you think would be the result; would not it have a strong tendency to lead to a system of extermination and constant bloodshed on the frontier, which would finally end in the extermination of the natives?—The present situation of things there has been produced by a policy in which the colonists have had no concern; it is a very formidable situation; the Kafirs have been repeatedly at war with the British power; they have ceased to respect and dread the British power as they formerly did; they have measured their strength and stood for 12 months against all the force of the British Government upon the frontier and against the colonists too, so that now they are a very formidable people; they have horses, and guns, and gunpowder. I think it would not be fair to turn them over on any consideration suddenly upon the colony, and to say, in the present situation into which we have brought you, you must fight it out in the best way you can; but after peace is secured and a better system adopted, I have no doubt the colony would take the greater part of the expense of management upon itself, and to a certain extent co-operate with the British Government in a reasonable and humane policy towards the natives.

475. *Mr. Hawes*.] Suppose the Legislature to have an entire control over the frontier policy, and to be sitting in Cape Town, you contemplate of course the inhabitants of the eastern districts being fully represented?—Yes.

476. Would not they wish for the most speedy and the most economical mode of terminating the war in the event of

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its breaking out?—Undoubtedly they would; but the question would be, which was the most speedy and economical.

477. Are you of opinion that the old commando system would be the cheapest and most speedy?—I am not sure that I understand what is meant by the old commando system as distinguished from the system of calling out the Boers with guns to shoot the Kafirs.

478. Supposing it to consist in the field-cornets or the authorities within certain districts meeting to consider the depredations of the Kafirs, and then agreeing to arm themselves as well as they could to retaliate upon the Kafirs, taking cattle, and destroying life to the extent they thought necessary to prevent future depredations?—I do not think that was the system.

479. Will you describe what you think it was?—There were divisions of the colony into certain districts called field-cornetries, the field-cornet being some respectable farmer, who had authority to call out a certain number of the neighbouring farmers within the district, with guns and horses, to receive orders. Then above those field-cornets there was a man called a field-commandant, who, with three or four field-cornets, turned out and took the command. They received from the Government orders what to do, and were exactly like an army. Suppose a certain number of cattle had been stolen, or a certain inroad had been made upon the colony from any part of Kafirland, those men were ordered by the Government to proceed there and retake the cattle, and those cattle were distributed among the losers by the public authorities.

480. Supposing that to be the system, do not you think it the most effective which could be adopted?—It is as good as any which could be adopted; it is the system now, as far as I understand it.

481. There is no commando system now existing?—It is not called so, but a patrol or body of mounted burghers are, in fact, a commando.

482. Are there bodies of that kind who are now ordered by the Government to pursue cattle and destroy the Kafirs?—Whenever it is necessary, the Boers are ordered out to go anywhere and to retake cattle which have been stolen.

483. Will you give the Committee an instance within your recollection of such orders proceeding from the Government since the period when the commando system was abolished, in fact, since 1835?—I consider that the calling out all the burghers in the years 1834 and 1846, and in the present war, is just the same as the old commando system.

484. You think the commando system consisted chiefly in this, that particular districts assembled their whole force for the special purpose of retaliating injuries which those particular districts had received?—No; I do not understand that it was for retaliating injuries, but for recapturing cattle that was the chief object, and also seizing evil doers.

485. And shooting the Kafirs?—If they resisted and attempted to shoot them.

486. Was not that system interfered with in consequence of the great abuse to which it led, and the loss of life, and the constant irritation it kept up on the frontier between the Kafirs and the settlers?—I heard a good deal of Dr. Smith's evidence, but not the whole of it, upon that point, and I do not quite understand the difference; there may be a different name for it. The body of men now sent out are not allowed to go out without military officers, and some degree of authority, but that is all the difference I can see between calling out a number of men to follow up the spoor of cattle and retake them, and the system of the field-cornet calling them out; they are now called out under the field-cornets.

487. They are now called out because a general war exists. Is not that quite distinct from the case of special injuries received by individual farmers, to which the old commando system applied?—In the one case you call them out to act as a general body to put down the Kafirs. In the other you call out a certain number of farmers to go into Kafirland to retake the cattle by force; the one is a small body, the other a large one.

488. Colonel *Dunne*.] Is not it done in the one case by the executive government, and in the other by the parties themselves on the spot?—It was never done by the will of the parties, but always by officers duly authorised for the purpose.

489. Colonel *Estcourt*.] The people never went out of their own accord?—If they did so it was an abuse, or on an emergency. The Boers were bound to obey the field-cornet whenever duly summoned, and if they did not they were liable to fines and punishment.

490. Colonel *Dunne*.] Does not it appear to you that that system would afford the cheapest means of defending the frontier?—"Frontier" is an extensive word. One part of the frontier is very different from another; the Kafir frontier is the boundary between us and a highly organized and formidable people.

491. What is the extent of that frontier?—They generally say that there is about 120 or 130 miles of the Kafir frontier

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from the mouth of the Keiskamma up to the upper part of the Amatola Mountains. It bends out and in a good deal, so that there is a large frontier to defend.

492. Mr. Hawes.] Do you remember the proclamation of Lord Macartney in reference to commandos?—I do not remember it.

493. You know nothing of that proclamation?—I have read it long ago, but I forget the terms of it. I have always understood that a commando is a number of men called out to recover cattle by the constituted authorities.

494. The constituted authorities being the local authorities on the spot?—Yes.

495. And subsequently they obtained the sanction of the Government to what they had done?—They were ordered to do whatever was necessary in certain circumstances, and when those arose they acted.

496. By the local authorities?—The local authorities were bound, under certain circumstances, to perform certain acts. That was their duty; if they failed, they would come under the animadversion of the Government.

497. That proclamation authorised the inhabitants to arm whenever they thought fit to attack the native tribes?—Yes.

498. Did not that lead to great bloodshed?—They would be responsible the same as any other public officer with arms in his hands would be responsible for the peace around him. If they acted against the natives without provocation, they would be liable to animadversion.

499. Was not the system liable to very great abuses, in your opinion?—I have no personal knowledge on the subject.

500. Have you no acquaintance with the past history of the colony in reference to the commando system?—I have read a great deal about it. I have no doubt a great deal of bloodshed arose under that system, but not so much as under the new system; so that, without blaming the people of those barbarous times very much, I would say there was not much difference between them.

501. From your knowledge of the history of the Cape affairs, are not you prepared to say decidedly whether or not that system was attended with so much bloodshed and injustice as to be put an end to both by the public feeling in the colony and public opinion at home?—The public feeling in the colony has undergone a great change on that subject; but that may have arisen from the altered circumstances of the colony. The people are not now so much exposed to the injuries or the attacks of the native tribes, and they have ceased over a large

portion

portion of the colony to have that angry resentment towards them which they formerly, of necessity, had from their position.

502. Do you think it would be acceptable to the general body of the colonists to revive the old commando system?—No; they do not like to be called suddenly out; they would much prefer to have a regular fixed paid force always maintained for the protection of the colony.

503. A regular military body, not of the nature of a volunteer force?—Yes.

504. Do you think that that force should be considerable, and maintained constantly on the frontier?—There must be a considerable force maintained constantly on the Kafir frontier.

505. Have you formed any notion of the cost of such a force to the colony, supposing it took upon itself the defence of the frontier?—Sir Harry Smith had 1,500 men in Kafirland, and they turned out to be altogether insufficient when the Kafirs rose. We must therefore suppose that it must be a much larger force than that, probably not less than 3,000 men. They must be constantly employed. I do not know what the expense of that would be, but it must be considerable.

506. *Chairman.*] They must be regular soldiers?—Either regular soldiers or persons in the nature of mounted police, always ready for service.

507. *Mr. Hawes.*] What is the revenue of the Cape at present?—It is about 200,000 *l.*

508. What is the present expenditure of the Government?—It was rather more than 200,000 *l.* last year.

509. *Mr. Cardwell.*] Are the Committee to understand that you would call upon those persons whose property lies near the frontier, and who therefore are specially interested in its preservation, for no special exertions in the time of danger; but that you would protect the frontier entirely by a regular force constantly maintained?—I would have a regular force constantly maintained, but I would have the old system continued of making it necessary for the inhabitants when called on by the proper authorities to turn out with their arms and assist in repelling their enemies, the same as if this country were invaded by a foreign force you would call upon every one to resist it.

510. *Sir J. Walmesley.*] You have spoken of the frontier; will you have the goodness to describe what you mean by the frontier?—The present frontier of the colony is the Keiskamma River and the Buffalo River. There is a chain of forts

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upon those two rivers all the way up to the mountains from the sea ; that is the Kafir frontier.

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511. You would maintain that force and those forts upon that frontier?—Yes, wherever military men thought it would be most efficient that they should be placed upon the frontier.

512. Have you any knowledge of the tribes to the east of that frontier?—I know a great deal of them from documents which have been published and by conversation, but I have no personal knowledge of them.

513. Have you any idea of their numbers?—When the census was taken, at the end of last year, the Gaika Kafirs were estimated at 46,000 ; it was supposed, however, that a great number were absent. The tribes who are upon this frontier which we are speaking of, consist of two, the Gaikas and the T'Slambie tribes. The T'Slambies are on the sea side, and the Gaikas up towards the mountains ; I understood that the Gaikas were about 45,000 or 46,000 ; I gather that from the papers published in the Blue Books. The parties said that they believed a great number were absent. The number of the T'Slambie tribe was about the same, but rather less. All together there must be, I should suppose, about 80,000 or 90,000 of Amakosa Kafirs, with whom we are now in immediate hostility.

514. Will you go on to describe the various tribes in that part of the country, till you come to the Zoolas?—Immediately behind these Amakosa Kafirs, across the Kei River, you have a powerful chief called Kreli, who is the paramount chief of all the tribes on both sides of that river ; he is the son of Hintza. He has been always considered, and I know it to be the fact, that he is regarded as the great chief of Kafirland ; I believe his people are about the same number as the Gaikas.

515. Mr. Hawes.] There never has been a census of those people taken, has there?—Never. Then of the tribes behind them I know very little. There is a chief of the name of Faku, who has a powerful tribe there. Whether it is more or less powerful than any of those which have been mentioned, I do not know ; I should think it was not so powerful. Then, immediately behind those are the Zoolas, who are an exceedingly powerful tribe, and highly organized.

516. The colony of Natal is interposed between the two tribes you have last spoken of, is not it?—They are around the colony of Natal ; the Zoolas begin on the west ; their main body is on the north of that colony ; the organization of that tribe was very complete, and the executive exceedingly powerful, so much so, that when a regiment was called out on any  
perilous

perilous service, if they returned unsuccessful, the chief put every man of them to death; he was able to put whole villages to death; this man was killed, and succeeded by a person named Panda; his power is evidently very great. The grounds on which I have mentioned the numbers are these; I had no idea of the course the present examination would take; I thought I should be immediately dismissed on my saying that I had no personal knowledge of the Kafirs; I am only speaking from memory and what I have read in the Blue Books.

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517. Sir J. Walmsley.] You have now mentioned all the tribes from the seat of war to the eastern country of the Zoolas, and to the best of your knowledge, the number of those tribes?—Yes.

518. And you make them about 208,000?—As I have been accustomed to believe from my reading and hearing the subject talked of, I consider the Amakosa Kafirs between the Kei and the Keiskamma Rivers, to amount to about 80,000 or 90,000; I believe the number of Kreli's people which are immediately behind the Kei River, to be about 30,000 or 40,000; then there are Faku's people, which I believe to be fewer than any of those tribes; and then the Zoolas, much more powerful than either of them.

519. Mr. Hawes.] I understand you to say, that you estimate the Kafir population between the Kei and the Keiskamma, including what is generally called British Kafraria, to amount to 80,000 or 90,000?—That is my impression.

520. With regard to the other tribes, you are not able to state the population of either of them?—No; only from the reports of traders and the general estimate which may be made.

521. Are you aware that a census was taken, in the year 1849, of the Gaika and T'Slambie tribes?—No; I have not seen that census.

522. Colonel Dunne.] You say the frontier is the Keiskamma; all the forts which seem to be the base of Sir Harry Smith's operations are beyond the Keiskamma, some of them 20 miles distant; there are a great many places with English names beyond those forts, and therefore, of course, beyond the frontier?—We consider the whole of Kafraria now as British; the frontier of the British possessions is the great Kei.

523. That is 100 miles beyond the Keiskamma?—I think about 90 or 100 miles.

524. The Keiskamma, therefore, is not really the frontier?—It is the frontier of the colony.

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525. There is a distinction between the colony and the British possessions?—Quite so.

526. In speaking of the defence which you would wish for the frontier, you speak of the Keiskamma, not the British frontier?—Yes.

527. The colonial frontier, as contradistinguished from the British frontier?—Yes.

528. *Chairman.*] With regard to the frontier, more to the north-east towards Orange River, is it not necessary to defend the colony from inroads upon that side also?—That comes upon the Tambookie frontier; that has hitherto been a very peaceful frontier, but it is now disturbed, and I see that the Tambookies are at open war with the Colonial Government. A greater force will be required hereafter on that frontier.

529. Therefore the extent of frontier of the colony which will require to be defended is very much larger than the 120 miles which you speak of?—Yes.

530. What do you apprehend to be the state of things upon the frontier more to the north-west, in the direction of the Orange River?—On the Tambookie frontier there is war; further to the west there is a powerful chief called Moshesh, who has hitherto been very friendly, but it is now very doubtful if he has not declared against British authority.

531. *Colonel Estcourt.*] In what part does he reside?—In the Bassuto country, next to the Tambookies, before you come to Bloem Fontein.

532. *Chairman.*] Emigrant boers have established themselves in this country, have they not?—A number of boers have established themselves in the country of the Griquas, who border on the Orange River; the present Governor has established the sovereignty there, taking in all the boers on this side of the Vaal River, and has formed them into a community with a regular government. They have a Legislative Assembly or Council, and make laws and have courts of justice; they fine and imprison, and, I believe, hang people; and they have a British resident there. Those boers now are considered a community under the British authority, the supreme power being vested in the Governor of the colony, who appoints a resident there to administer the government. They have their titles to land from the British Governor as High Commissioner for the settlement of affairs beyond the boundaries of the colony; behind them you have a body of boers who have cast off their allegiance altogether, and established themselves in a republic or independent government.

533. Are the boers you have last mentioned numerous?—

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It is difficult to say what the numbers are ; they cannot be under 10,000 or 12,000.

534. What do you conceive ought to be the policy of the Government with regard to those boers who are desirous of pushing themselves beyond the limits of the colony ?—Some things would be very desirable which are impossible ; it is absolutely impossible to follow them. To recover their affections, so as to control their actions to a great extent, I think is possible, and that can only be done by establishing a good government within the colony, where we are supreme, and where we can establish a good government, and by obtaining the opinions and views and knowledge of all the colonists. Through a representative assembly constantly in action you would be able to discover the truth respecting South Africa, and come by degrees to a sound system of policy, but till that is done you can have no accurate knowledge of what is passing in South Africa. No one man knows it ; it is too wide a field for any one man to obtain all the information which is requisite. Perhaps those who have the knowledge conceal it, and there may be many people interested in withholding facts and inventing stories, so that altogether at present no man living knows the real state of Southern Africa, and I think that there is no mode of getting at it except partially by a Commission of Inquiry from this country ; but there is no method of getting at it completely without an open government at the Cape, where all parties can be heard always, as in this country, and where every statement would be published and met on the spot by persons competent to give evidence upon it. Till that is done I think the whole will be a scene of darkness and confusion ; so that I consider the Kafir question as involving the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, or an open government of some sort at the Cape of Good Hope ; you would then have the means of acquiring information as to the course to be taken, and you would have the colonists reconciled, self-government creating self-respect, and combining the different classes together.

535. What are the reasons alleged by the boers for emigrating beyond the limits of the colony ?—In the first place they supposed that justice was not done to them at the end of the Kafir war—that a sufficient system of protection was not established by Sir Benjamin D'Urban at the conclusion of the war.

536. Do you mean protection against the inroads of the Kafirs ?—Yes ; they said the peace was patched up, and they had no security whatever. They said also they had not got  
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any redress for the great losses which they had sustained, and they gave it as their opinion that the British Government was not qualified to deal with the Kafirs.

537. They were very much dissatisfied with the enfranchisement of their slaves, were not they?—I do not think there were many slaves in that part of the country; and I do not believe that that was the real cause of their moving away.

538. Viscount *Mandeville*.] They took slaves when they went beyond the frontier, did not they?—It was often said, and we suppose it to be true, but I never saw any clear evidence of it.

539. Was not that the reason of the Act of the 6th and 7th of William the 4th being passed?—No, it was to protect the aborigines more than the slaves, I think.

540. They took the aborigines as slaves, did not they?—They might take them into their service, and buy and sell between themselves.

541. *Chairman*.] Are you aware upon what terms the emigrant boers, who have gone beyond the frontier, live with the natives?—We have heard of several attacks being made by the boers upon the natives lately. When they first went there they had several fierce wars, in which both parties suffered severely, but lately we have not heard much of any war between those on the Vaal River and the natives around. The natives fear the Dutch people more than they do the English, and they understand them better. The natives, who are at all civilized, speak the Dutch language, and that is a great means of communication between them and the stranger. They know the boer; they know his power; and they know he is always awake, and not like the English, who only go to war now and then, and come with great form and state to accomplish a war.

542. Is that fear of the boer merely founded upon the readiness of the boer to take the punishment into his own hands of any native who attacks his property?—I think they understand one another.

543. Is not it the case that the boer adopts a very summary way in dealing with a native who attacks his property?—Yes, if he can get hold of him; but an Englishman would do exactly the same.

544. Colonel *Dunne*.] It is an individual contest?—If any native, or any person whatever, attacks a man's property he will shoot him, and that would be so anywhere.

545. *Chairman*.] Within the limits of the colony would a settler, either Dutch or English, feel justified in shooting a native

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native for committing, it may be a petty theft, upon his property?—If the man would not stand, he would do the same as you would do in this country; he would attempt to seize him, and if he would not yield, he would use force to the utmost.

546. *Mr. Cardwell.*] Do you mean that that greater fear of the Dutch arises from the impression that they are more cruel?—No. I think the natives consider the Dutch as natives like themselves, and they consider the English as intruders, who have come to take their own country from them.

547. *Chairman.*] You think they believe the English to be a more encroaching race?—Yes; I have been told from good authority that the boers have spread this among the native tribes, that the English have taken the land from the boers, and will finally take it from the natives. I have been told by parties who have been in the country that those stories have been spread abroad, and a feeling of hatred and fear of the English was created in consequence.

548. Is there a feeling of alienation and estrangement between the Dutch and English races in the Cape colony?—Not that I am aware of; I think it is quite gone.

549. Do they intermarry?—Yes.

550. Very commonly?—Yes; they are partners in business of all kinds; about Cape Town I do not know the difference.

551. In the event of a Representative Assembly sitting at Cape Town, would the Dutch or English element predominate, in your opinion?—The great majority of the colonists are of Dutch extraction, as we say; we call them Dutch, but in reality they are made up of all nations. The Dutch East India Company disliked the Dutch burghers because they had rights, and if they were oppressed, they went back to Holland and preferred complaints against the Government. Others would be Prussians, Italians, Danes, and so on, and those are the real fathers of the Cape colony; there are a great many of German descent and of Danish descent throughout the colony; the Dutch language however is general, and those persons who are called Dutch are the majority throughout the colony, but they generally prefer electing Englishmen to situations where activity and business habits and the power of speaking may be required; so that in the municipalities we find the English generally selected for holding public offices of trust by the Dutch people. Latterly, when there was a general election in the colony, several Dutchmen who would have been elected unquestionably, if they had been so disposed, came forward, and declared that they would not accept seats in the Council,

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on the ground that they could not speak, with comfort to themselves, in the English language.

552. Mr. Caldwell.] You spoke of the establishment of representative institutions at Cape Town as a means of drawing back those boers who have penetrated beyond the frontier into Kafraria; do you think that the Dutch, or the foreigners who live at a distance, would go to reside at Cape Town in order to take part in a representative council; would not they be more likely to elect as their representative some agent who happened to be living at Cape Town?—Those on the Vaal River could have no connexion with any representative government at the Cape.

553. How do you expect then that the establishment of representative institutions at Cape Town would re-establish a hold upon the affections of those people, and bring them back within the colony?—It would not bring them back within the colony; a reference to the map will show that. They are, however, the sons, and brothers, and relatives of the colonists, and if the colonists were thoroughly reconciled to the British Government that feeling would extend itself to them. At present there is a feeling against the British Government, or at least there is not a strong feeling in favour of it, on account of certain petitions for political rights being so long disregarded, and from the fear also that they are about to be deprived of them altogether. Those feelings may be unreasonable, but they exist.

554. Those boers you think would still continue an independent and separate government, but they would become less unfriendly to the British Government?—I am not sure that they would not insist upon being entirely separate. If the sovereignty continues I think they might coalesce with the British sovereignty again. They were all united at one time. Those are parties who left the colony, and who left Natal when the British sovereignty was firmly established there. If they obtained political rights and a share in the management of their own affairs, I think it is likely that the common feeling of relationship would be revived, and the European race would act more like itself throughout the whole of Africa than it does at present.

555. Do you mean that though remaining beyond the limits of the colony altogether they would become amenable to the jurisdiction of the Government at Cape Town?—In the sovereignty which we have established the government there would not be amenable to the government of Cape Town; the Governor of the colony is the High Commissioner,

missioner, through his representative, the local Governor. Something of the same kind would be done probably with the boers beyond that river, unless they joined with the boers in the sovereignty formed under the government.

556. The government being established at Cape Town, there would be a sort of independent government in some way or other attached to it, but lying entirely beyond the British frontier, within the limits of what would be Kafra-ria?—The whole country up to Vaal River is called British now.

557. Were you not speaking of a number of boers, who, after the Kafir war, from a sense of injustice, had left the British limits altogether, and penetrated within the Kafrarian limits?—Not the Kafrarian limits; it is away from Kafir-land.

558. Within the limits of the native tribes, where no race of British possession at present extends?—It exists now; it is all British now.

559. Colonel *Dunne*.] Is not there a large number of boers beyond the Vaal who repudiate the Government of Great Britain, and have a government under Petrorius, who signs himself commandant?—That is beyond the Vaal River.

560. Mr. *Cardwell*.] You said a reference to the map would show that those people are too far removed to be brought within the limits of the colony?—They would not come back within the colony; between the Orange River and the Vaal River you have a large tract of country which has been made British territory by a recent proclamation; beyond them, again, is the independent boer.

561. How do you explain your proposition that a representative government at Cape Town would re-establish the connexion between those distant boers and the British Government?—A representative government for Cape Town means a representative government for the whole colony up to the Orange River. The colonists there would be able to tell their friends beyond the river that they were as free as they were; that they could now take care of themselves, and manage their own-affairs according to their own judgment. In that way a reconciliation might take place between them and those who are living under the British Government. At present they reproach the colonists with being slaves, and being under the control of men who have no responsibility to the public, while they themselves have established independent republics of their own.

562. You look to their remaining independent republics,

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but you think the fact of a representative government being established in Cape Town would give them a friendly disposition towards the British?—I think it is just possible that when the colonists have a representative government established, and are made a people, a free community, they may reconcile those men so far as to lead them to join together, the boers in the sovereignty and the boers beyond forming a government under the British Government, the same as Natal is.

563. Those independent boers beyond the frontier would then become British subjects?—Yes.

564. And take their share in those representative institutions?—Not at the Cape; they would be separate colonies altogether, as much as New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land are. But those are widely distant things; there is something to be done immediately if possible, and then when you get light at one point you will be able to enter more satisfactorily into those distant questions.

565. Colonel *Dunne*.] Is not there a formidable question respecting these republican boers; have not they assumed an independent authority, and taken British subjects, and tried them by their own tribunals?—Yes, they have done all that.

566. Are not they said to be preparing to go more to the north, to some lake which has been discovered?—It appears that they wish to prevent any Englishman from penetrating to the lake, and forming anything like an establishment beyond them so as to check them. When the last Blue Book but one goes out there, they will see that it has been recommended by the Governor, and agreed to by Lord Grey here, that some British influence should be established at the lake for the purpose of forming a confederation of chiefs to resist the boers. I know how they will take it; they will take it as an attempt to raise the savages to cut their throats. The consequence will be that they will seize every Englishman; and if they catch the agent, whoever he may be, they will kill him. That influence may come in the course of time, but it is too great a step at present.

567. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] From what you know of the character of the Kafirs, do you suppose that any form of government whatever will be sufficient to prevent occasional collisions taking place between the settlers and the Kafirs?—I think it is possible; at all events, we are front to front, and must do the best we can.

568. What occasioned the war in 1834?—That war broke out upon the expulsion of the Kafir chief, Maquomo, from a portion of the territory between the Keiskamma and the Fish River;

River ; he was suddenly ordered off in a very dry season. The people were driven into a part of the country which was dry, without a bit of grass upon it, so that many people were in the utmost distress. He considered this as equivalent to a declaration of war on the part of the Colonial Government, he having been dispossessed of a large portion of territory on the Kat River about six or seven years before that. That was the exciting cause of that outbreak apparently, but the discontent had been growing for several years.

569. What was the cause of the break-out in 1846?—In 1846 the Kafirs had got an opinion that we were going to encroach upon their country. The Government had given orders for the survey of a piece of ground on which to build a fort. Unfortunately the surveyors went beyond the river into Kafirland, and began to survey a piece of ground for a fort there. The Kafirs then interfered, Sandilli among the rest, and stopped it by violence. There was then a consultation, and Colonel Hare, who was the Lieutenant-governor at the time, saw the chiefs, and they used very strong and bad language to him, and incensed him, and showed that they had ceased to respect the British Government. Much collision took place by little petty depredations on the side of the Kafirs for a good while, and last of all a theft was committed by a Kafir in a town called Fort Beaufort, on the immediate frontier. He stole an axe of trifling value, and was detected. He was carried before a magistrate, the magistrate put him in gaol, but determined to send him to Graham's Town to be tried. The chief to whom he belonged said that was contrary to the treaty ; that all such offences were to be tried at Fort Beaufort, in the immediate vicinity of the frontier, where both the parties could have their witnesses, and the thing might be properly investigated, but if he was carried into the interior it was a breach of the treaty. The magistrate resisted, and with the slight escort of two or three policemen he sent this man from Fort Beaufort across the Kafir frontier, unluckily within sight of this very man's kraal, his brother being the head of the kraal. As they were passing by, a number of young men rushed from the kraal, defeated the escort, and rescued the prisoner, killing one or two persons. The Government then demanded immediately that the offenders should be given up. The Kafir chiefs said they would do so, and they would inquire, but they required time, and they requested the Government not to be in a hurry. The people throughout the whole colony were very much incensed at their open defiance of the British power, and very strong language was used throughout

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the whole colony as to the method of treating the Kafirs; that it was too lenient, and that the Government ought to strike a blow to intimidate them as they were become so bold as to interfere with the course of justice and rescue a prisoner. Colonel Hare raised a force and entered Kafirland. They marched three days before they met the Kafirs, the Kafirs declaring at the time that they were not prepared for war, and did not wish it. But in the neighbourhood of the mountains they met the Kafirs and the war broke out.

570. Connecting those two instances which you have mentioned with the last outbreak, do you consider that any change which might be made in the legislation of the colony would prevent similar outbreaks from taking place in future?—One would hope that experience will lead to more caution in dealing with the Kafirs. I think the war of 1846 need not have broken out at that time if the Governor had waited a little to give the Kafirs time to deliver up the men, for they declared they were ready to do it.

571. Is not it likely that collisions must take place when the progress of the colonists is gradually encroaching upon the Kafirs, who perhaps have no means of retreating, except upon a hostile tribe behind them?—It is an indispensable condition of any future policy that there shall be no further encroachment upon the Kafirs upon our side. It is a great question whether we ought not to give up certain lands which we have taken from them. That is a question which can scarcely be discussed at present, because so much local information is required on the subject.

572. Assuming a sort of neutral ground were established by the consent of both parties, between the advancing colonists on the one side, and the retreating Kafirs upon the other, would not such an arrangement prevent the possibility of future outbreaks?—It has not prevented it; the neutral ground became the resort of bad characters from all quarters, who were constantly committing depredations. The Kafir chiefs said it was worse than if we were on the immediate frontier, because we made them responsible for the actions of men whom they knew nothing about.

573. Your idea of the means of preventing the possibility of future outbreaks would be, that the British power should not make any further advances, but should rather recede?—If it were possible to do it.

574. Would not that retreat give an idea to the Kafirs that they were getting the best of it?—That has often been said, but I think it is rather fanciful; I think if it were clearly thought

thought to be just, and that the Kafirs had a rightful claim to the country between the Keiskamma and the Fish River, we ought to give it to them; I think we have looked too much to expediency and overlooked justice, as the foundation of our policy.

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575. If that were done at the conclusion of a war, would not it bear the appearance, in the eyes of those tribes, of a defeat on our part?—At the conclusion of the war of 1836 we gave them back the territory between the Keiskamma and the Fish River, upon the express understanding that it was a mistake to have taken it, but that now we were quits for everything, and if they again attacked us, they must stand by any consequences which might be the result of their being defeated. That system, it was believed by many people, had it been well worked, would have been successful, but it was worked by parties supposed to be under the influence of men entirely hostile to it, although it continued for, I think, nearly eight years, with various changes.

576. Marquis of *Granby*.] Have you any knowledge of the number of fighting men which the Kafirs can bring into the field?—I have not; except from merely calculating what number of male adults there may be in proportion to the whole population.

577. There are many Kafirs fighting on our side, are not there?—There is a tribe which continues friendly, between King William's Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River, but it is a very small tribe.

578. You have spoken of the disaffection of the Cape Mounted Rifles; at what time did that disaffection show itself?—I think it was in February last.

579. It was before the war broke out, was not it?—No; the war broke out in December.

580. Whenever they had been engaged before, had not they fought very bravely?—Much reliance was placed upon them. Their commander, Colonel Somerset, always had much confidence in them, and he has acted with them for the last 30 years.

581. Mr. *Cardwell*.] Will you name the newspaper of which you are the editor?—The "South African Commercial Advertiser."

582. Colonel *Estcourt*.] The system you propose with regard to the maintenance of the frontier is a mixed system, partly depending upon the settlers, and partly upon a fixed corps; you said that the colony would be disposed to pay part of the expense of such a system, provided the imperial go-



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vernment and the colony agreed upon the policy to be pursued. Supposing the imperial government wished to adopt a system which did not correspond with the views of the colonial government, in what way would such a difference be arranged?—I think the difficulty would be met by the colony being responsible for a certain amount of force at all times, and the payment of a fixed sum; that they should pay either the whole or a due proportion of the expense of the persons who might be called out from their farms to act with the regular forces.

583. *Chairman.*] If the general Government were responsible for a portion of the expense of maintaining the frontier, do not you think it reasonable that the general government should have a voice in the policy to be pursued towards the frontier tribes, with a view to prevent the recurrence of wars for which this country would become chargeable to a certain extent?—We propose that its voice shall be supreme; that the Governor's assent shall be required for every measure which passes through the local parliament, just the same as here, the consent of all three parties, King, Lords and Commons, is required to sanction any Bill.

584. *Mr. Hawes.*] Then practically the frontier policy would be in the same hands as it now rests in?—No, I do not think so.

585. Have you formed any idea of the amount of contribution which the Cape would be required to pay?—They would be ready to pay all that the case required; there would be no specific limit to it; they would pay whatever might be necessary.

586. Would they be prepared to pay 80,000 *l.* or 100,000 *l.* a year?—Whatever was required they would be ready to give.

587. That you speak confidently, from your knowledge of the colony, do you? The Committee understand you to say that the colony would be prepared either to pay a certain sum, or to maintain a certain fixed military force?—Till I knew what the policy was, it would be impossible for me to say what amount would be required.

588. Supposing the policy to be that which you represent it would be upon a colonial legislature being established, and that the colony had a considerable share in directing it, have you formed any opinion what would be the force which the colony would be willing to maintain, or the sum they would be willing to pay?—I can only speak for myself, and not in the slightest degree as leading the Committee to believe that

I speak the opinions of the colonists, or that they would stand by what I say to the slightest extent ; I should say one-third or one-fourth of the whole amount.

589. *Chairman.*] Are not there large classes of persons in the colony interested in promoting, or in the continuance of these frontier wars, and in the great expenditure which is occasioned by them?—A very small number indeed ; a small number of British merchants and their agents may be so, but there is not a single resident colonist who is so.

590. Do not you believe that their influence would be appreciable in its effect upon the legislature of the colony?—No.

591. *Mr. Cardwell.*] What did you mean when you said that the great expenditure of two millions would never have been incurred if the colony had had the control of the war?—The boers and Hottentots, to the amount of about 1,500, went to the Amatola Mountains at once and expelled the Kafirs, and compelled them to come to a conference and adopt terms of peace. This was all done in a very few months. The regular forces had been lying down there for a great many months in Lower Kafir land, and had not attempted to enter the Amatola Mountains ; I believe, therefore, if the colonial force had acted at once upon the Kafirs, they would have put an end to the war in perhaps one-fourth of the time ; I give that as an opinion which I have heard from a great many people who served in the war, both military and burghers.

592. In a former part of your examination, did not you state that you proposed to defend the frontier entirely by a regular force, and not by a voluntary force?—The regular force, I think, should always be the base of an irregular force.

593. *Mr. Hawes.*] You would have a voluntary force besides, then?—I would have the force which we have now ; every man may be called out by the Government to turn out with arms for the defence of the colony when attacked ; that is what I understand to be the present system.

594. You would vest that power in the supreme authority of the colony, would you?—Yes, at all times.

595. *Colonel Dunne.*] Was not that expense of 2,000,000 £ chiefly caused by marching the regular troops into a country in which they were neither armed nor equipped to carry on the war?—A large portion of it was spent in waggon hire ; the country was burnt up, and they had to derive their supplies from a great distance ; therefore every supply of provisions cost them an enormous sum for waggon hire, and by the time they

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they got the additional supply their former supply was exhausted, so that the troops could not move at all. It is not yet known, I believe, where all the money went.

596. Mr. *Hawes*.] That great expenditure being occasioned, as you say, by drought, might occur again under the same circumstances, of course?—If the troops had to derive their resources from the sea, and through a regular commissariat; but I believe the burghers found a sufficient supply; they were able to supply the troops frequently from their stores, which they themselves had collected.

597. Mr. *Cardwell*.] In one of your answers, you stated that there are no residents in the colony who were interested in a warlike expenditure; in another, you have said that nobody knows where a great part of the money went; do you consider those two answers perfectly consistent with each other?—I think so; it must have gone through the contractors, and those contractors were English merchants and persons of that description, and not the regular Dutch or agricultural inhabitants of the colony.

598. Would those contractors be entitled to vote under the representative system which you propose to establish?—Undoubtedly, if they were proprietors of lands.

599. Then there would be in the representative government you propose to establish, interested parties, whose personal advantage would be promoted by wars on the frontier?—So small in number, as to be altogether inappreciable in the general legislation of the country; their number may not be above 20 or 50, or 100 at the very outside. If you established an extensive franchise their interest would be neutralized.

600. *Chairman*.] Is not the general expenditure of the colony promoted by troops coming from England, and by the whole stir which is made in consequence of a war upon the frontier?—I have no doubt the whole of the mercantile part of the colony gains by it, directly or indirectly, but the general body of the people suffers enormously. In the first place, all the people on the frontier suffer; their farms are over-run, their cattle are destroyed, their horses stolen, and many of their friends killed, and their houses burnt. The people in the middle districts suffer from being called away, either themselves personally or their servants, in time of harvest.

601. Their sufferings must depend upon the amount of compensation they receive, must not it?—They get nothing at all; their servants are paid; but when the boers have been out themselves they have received almost nothing. The men may be called away from their farms when there is the greatest necessity

necessity for labourers to be employed. A farmer requires perhaps 30 or 40 labourers to be employed upon his crop, and if they are taken away at ploughing time he suffers loss for the whole of the next year. Then, in the western district, when they are called away, either themselves or their servants, they suffer in their vintage; the whole of their vintage might have been destroyed, and a great portion of it was lost for want of labour; so that the great body of the colonists are clearly and indisputably injured by every war. The parties who gain are the military, who get promotion and field-pay, and the contractors, who also make abundance of money. Sir Harry Smith has distinctly stated in one of his despatches, and he is a much better authority than I am, that no doubt there are some persons who make large sums of money.

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602. Take the case of Cape Town generally, do not the shopkeepers and traders of that town make a good deal of money by warlike operations being active upon the border?—Not Cape Town; Graham's Town may do so; it makes very little difference in Cape Town; the places where the prices are so much raised are in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier, Graham's Town, and Port Elizabeth, and Fort Beaufort, and some of those frontier towns.

603. Mr. Hawes.] All those persons would have a voice in the election of representatives, would not they?—Yes.

604. Viscount Mandeville.] But they are the minority, you say?—A very small minority, not one in 100; and even those parties would be far from inducing a war because they profited by it. I suppose many parties in this country gained by the French war, but they would not have caused a French war on account of that gain.

605. Colonel Dunne.] Were not there an immense number of cattle taken by our troops?—Yes.

606. Were they kept for the support of the troops?—During the last war I think they were sold; an attempt was made to remunerate certain losers out of the price, but they complained very much of that.

607. Was not there a complaint among the Hottentots that while the men were serving on the frontier, during the war, their families were left almost to starve?—There were some complaints of that kind during the last war, and they were true, but they were remedied afterwards.

608. That caused an indisposition to serve in the present war, did not it?—The Hottentots have turned out from the western province during the present war upon a public promise being

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being made by the Government that their families should receive food during their absence.

609. That promise has now been given?—Yes, and it has been kept.

610. Viscount *Mandeville*.] The Kat River Hottentots made a good deal of money in the first war by carriage and waggon hire, did not they?—Some of them might do so, but the general body of the Kat River settlers lost enormously; they were ordered to leave their houses and to assemble under the command of the military. The consequence was that their gardens and fields were wasted, their cattle lost, and they themselves reduced to great poverty and distress. That was the state of the Kat River during the last war. The consequence was that in this war they at first said they would not leave their places, but defend them; but I believe a great number of them, instead of defending them, have joined the Kafirs.

611. Mr. *Hawes*.] Is it not the fact that the frontier on the eastern part of the colony has far more interest than the western in preventing a war; it is there the first sufferings caused by a war begin?—But we must have a frontier, and that is our frontier as well as theirs, so that we are as much concerned in defending the Fish River frontier as any other.

612. It is the fact, is not it, that property in that district suffers first in the event of an irruption of the Kafirs?—Yes, they are upon the immediate frontier.

613. Do you think the western district would be quite ready at all times to come forward with its full quota, especially having to pay a larger quota, in consequence of its possessing larger property, to defend property in which the eastern district was so much more interested than the western?—Yes, I have never heard a single whisper of any distinction being likely to be made.

614. That you state generally as being the opinion of the people?—Yes, and I think I know what their opinions are upon the subject.

615. But the eastern district have put forward a claim to have a separate government, have not they?—A considerable part of them are very anxious on the subject, I think, from confounding the future government with the past. We hope that the future government will be a better one than the past has been. They always speak of the Table Mountain government being ignorant of the frontier. That may be very true, because the Table Mountain government was merely the Governor; but we propose that the legislature shall be filled up

up by representatives from the eastern province, and shall no longer be a local government.

616. *Chairman.*] Have you any apprehension of the colony being inconveniently large in point of extent for the purpose of legislation?—I think not; now that we have good roads, and steam along the coast, there will be no inconvenience, I think, in people coming to the Legislative Assembly.

617. *Viscount Mandeville.*] There is a mail coach from Graham's Town, is not there?—There is a mail twice a week regularly.

618. *Colonel Dunne.*] What is the distance?—It is about 600 miles.

619. *Chairman.*] How long does it take to travel that distance?—I think 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  days.

620. Travelling night and day?—Yes.

621. *Colonel Dunne.*] How far is Graham's Town from the frontier?—About 30 or 40 miles from the immediate frontier.

622. *Mr. Hawes.*] Do you think that the inhabitants of the eastern district are likely to agree in opinion with the inhabitants of the western, as to the policy to be pursued on the frontier?—I think they would; I think that people in the west would pay great deference to the opinions of the people on the immediate frontier.

623. Do not the people round the immediate frontier now complain of the want of information and knowledge on the part of the Cape Town government?—On the part of the Governor, who is the government; the people have nothing to do with it.

624. They do complain, do not they?—We complain; at least, if we may judge from the newspapers and public meetings, the people of Cape Town have been loudest in their complaints of being deceived as to the state of Kafirland, and it is clear that the Governor was completely in the dark up to the last moment. Colonel Mackinnon was in Kafirland, Sir Harry Smith was also there frequently, yet up to the last moment they declared that all was tranquil. The colonists were very much alarmed, and the Governor wrote several proclamations, accusing them of doing mischief by their alarm, so that the people were informed, but the Governor was not.

625. Were not there, previously to the outbreak of former wars, similar reports of tranquillity?—No, not in 1846, I think. There was a considerable outcry for more than a year that there was a war impending, arising from several circumstances; one was the immense supply of gunpowder and fire-

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arms which was known to have gone into Kafirland, and by the audacious tone of the chiefs, especially Sandilli, towards the Lieutenant-governor.

626. You now speak of the war which broke out in 1846?—Yes.

627. Do you at all remember the accounts which preceded the outbreak of 1835; were not there statements then made as to the tranquillity of the frontier; in point of fact, have not the Kafir chiefs been remarkably secret in their preparations for war?—This last time they have been very secret, but in the two former wars there was a good deal of discontent manifested by them previously to the war.

628. You are not aware of its being officially stated that the apprehensions of a war were not great at the time the war broke out in 1835?—Some parties then were pretty confident that the Government measures would prevent war, but on the frontier a great many persons maintained that nothing could prevent a war. It was supposed that if the Governor had gone up when he first arrived he would have prevented the war.

629. That was a matter of opinion?—Yes; the Kafirs expected him; and said they would remain peaceable and quiet till he came; they had heard that he was a man who would do them justice.

630. You would admit that there would always be great differences of opinion upon matters of that kind?—Where there is no means of coming at the truth positively there will always be differences of opinion; but I think if there were a representative government, including representatives from all parts of the country, they could meet and communicate accurate information as to what was taking place in their respective districts.

631. You do not think the Governor at present has full means of getting correct information?—I do not think he has.

632. And you think he has not got correct information?—I am certain he had not got correct information with reference to the last war.

633. How can you account for that at all?—Colonel Mackinnon seems not to have got correct information from those under him, for he also, though not so confident as the Governor, did not expect an outbreak.

634. Colonel Mackinnon is an officer of some experience at the Cape, is not he?—One or two people on the frontier seem to have obtained better information, for they addressed the  
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Governor on the subject, and said that war was coming; they observed the Kafir servants leaving, and they judged also from a certain instinct which a man acquires who has been all his life upon the frontier.

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635. Colonel Mackinnon is an officer of experience in that district, is not he?—He has been there since 1848.

636. Do you know any of the civil commission who are under him by name?—I know them by name.

637. Are they able and energetic men?—They all bear a very high character.

638. And they are constantly moving among the Kafir population?—They are constantly moving among the Kafir population.

639. Do you not think they were likely to get as good information as could be obtained?—I am not certain that they were not well informed, or that they did not represent the matter to the Governor.

640. Am I to understand you to doubt whether they represented accurately what they knew to the Governor?—I do not doubt it, but probably not in the despatches which have been published.

641. Do you think that there are despatches communicating information of the kind which have not been published?—I do not know the fact; I think there are two sets of correspondence, one private, and the other public; that I have no doubt of whatever.

642. Upon what does that opinion rest?—I know it to be the fact.

643. Mr. Cardwell.] Is that hypothesis consistent with what you said just now, that you thought the Governor himself was misinformed on the subject?—Yes, I think it is quite so; he did not know all.

644. You now say that you believe that certain official despatches were written which were intended to be published, but that these intelligent men on the frontier wrote private letters to the Governor, acquainting him with the truth. In your former answer you said that you believed neither the Governor nor Colonel Mackinnon had any accurate information of what was going on?—I did not say that they had no accurate information; I said that the Governor was not fully informed; we must believe that, because he distinctly states that there was no danger, when he was in the very jaws of danger.

645. Do you mean to suggest that when he was distinctly stating that there was no danger, he was writing confidential



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letters to the effect that there was danger?—I think I can answer that question by referring to the Blue Book. There are despatches there published in the colony, and there is other correspondence which was not exactly confidential, and which contains a good deal more than appears in the published despatches.

646. Do you mean to say, or do you not, that Colonel Mackinnon and the Governor were accurately informed?—No, I do not think they were accurately informed of the whole of what took place, but they did not draw proper inferences from certain facts.

647. Do you mean to state to the Committee that drawing themselves accurate inferences they published to the colony inferences which were inaccurate, or do you mean to state that their own inference was an inaccurate one?—I would not charge the Governor with anything so strong as actual misrepresentation, but his despatches and his letters did not convey to the colony the real state of Kafirland, with which, I think, he was better acquainted than one would have inferred from the published despatches.

648. Do you withdraw your former answer, in which you said that the Governor and Colonel Mackinnon were not accurately informed?—No; I think “fully informed” was the expression which I used. My meaning, I think, is pretty clear, that they were not sufficiently informed to be convinced that to attempt to seize Sandilli would certainly produce a war, otherwise they would not probably have done it.

649. You have made two statements, which I cannot reconcile with each other; one, that the Governor and Colonel Mackinnon were not themselves informed; the other, that they had private information, but had published to the colony official information of a different tenor?—Not of a different tenor. There is an understanding among men who are carrying on business in a country like Kafirland; they are daily informed about different events, and then despatches are generally written about them. I know that there is private correspondence going on between men in such circumstances, and that every little event which they consider trifling is not immediately published; I speak chiefly from the Blue Book, which is open to the Committee, from which a correct inference may be drawn if I have drawn a wrong one.

650. Mr. Hawes.] Will you refer to the part of the Blue Book to which you refer, to support your statement?—I refer

to the whole correspondence respecting the withdrawal of the servants, and the letters to the Graham's Town people about the state of Kafirland. It appears to me that those would have induced the colonists to believe that there was no danger, whereas Colonel Mackinnon was very much alarmed, and the Governor was also very much alarmed.

651. Does that appear?—I believe so.

652. Are the Committee to understand you to say this, that there are two sets of communications made to the Governor, and two sets of communications made by the Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies?—No; I did not say that.

653. And that one is published, while the other, containing different information, is suppressed?—I made no reference whatever to the Secretary of State; I was speaking of different commissioners and persons conducting the government at the frontier.

654. Do you think they obtain accurate information, which they communicate privately, and at the same time write letters of a different tenor, which they mean to be published?—I have formed opinions upon the subject, but I would rather not at this moment put them into words till I have looked again into the Blue Books. I think I have seen something like it in them, and I have also had occasion to hear it said, and to believe it, that frequently the despatches have not contained all that was known respecting the general administration of the government in Kafirland.

655. Colonel *Dunne*.] May not there be circumstances in which it is not judicious to publish all the information which has been received?—Quite so.

656. To do so would be the means of exciting unnecessary alarm?—Yes. If I have said anything which would bear the meaning that I charge the authorities with misrepresentation, I did not intend it at all.

657. Mr. *Cardwell*.] You think that they themselves were not fully informed?—That no one of them was fully informed as to the real state of the colony, but that they knew sufficient to make them very uneasy.

658. And that uneasiness, for some reason or other, they kept to themselves?—They kept it to themselves; that is my impression; but it is an inference.

659. Colonel *Dunne*.] That might have been done judiciously, you think?—If everything had been let out the colonists would have been ready to spring to arms when the danger

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came, but they were scolded for saying they were in danger; and then were suddenly called out. I think it would have been better if the whole truth had been laid before them, and openly discussed.

*Lunæ, 16<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Dunne.	Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Mr. Hawes.	Colonel Thompson.
Marquis of Granby.	Sir Edward Buxton.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Hindley.	Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Stanley.	Mr. Bonham Carter.
Mr. Booker.	Colonel Estcourt.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE,  
IN THE CHAIR.

The Rev. *James Adamson*, D. D., called in; and Examined.

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J. Adamson,  
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660. *Chairman.*] HOW long have you resided in the colony of the Cape?—About 23 years, with a short interval.

661. In what capacity have you resided there?—I have had charge of religious concerns chiefly, and latterly almost the sole direction of the college for about 12 years.

662. You are a clergyman?—I am.

663. Do you know anything of the missionary stations in the colony?—I have not visited them extensively, as I have been chiefly confined to Cape Town; I have corresponded with missionaries, and have had access to people who have been engaged in travelling in the country.

664. Do you know what the number and localities of the stations are?—I am not quite sure that I can state the number accurately.

665. Have you been able to form any opinion of the general conduct of the missionaries in the colony?—It has been upon the whole highly advantageous; and our colony, I think, is peculiarly distinguished by the fact, which is very honourable to British institutions, that representatives of almost every great missionary

missionary institution in the world are now found in the colony, or in the territories adjoining it, both Germans and French, and latterly also from the Established Church in Norway.

666. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] Of different denominations?—Yes.

667. *Chairman.*] What, in your opinion, may be said to be the general result of missionary labours in the colony?—As far as I myself have been connected with them, it has been in the highest degree beneficial; I allude, in particular, to the late apprentices, who have come more especially under my own charge. As to the effect upon the natives, it has saved a great number of those who otherwise would, I suspect, have been expelled from their territory, and it has advanced them considerably in moral qualifications and in civilization.

668. Do you believe the influence the missionaries have acquired to have been considerable, and to have produced important results upon the conduct and feelings of the people?—I have no doubt, as to most of the stations which have been occupied, that that has been the case.

669. Have the missionaries and traders interfered with one another much?—There is somewhat of an opposition of interests between the two parties, which has generally led to something approaching to a hostile feeling. The traders very often deal in articles which the missionaries do not wish to see distributed over the regions in which they are placed; and upon the whole the missionaries are rather disinclined that the traders should visit their stations, from the effects which they apprehend from the visits of those persons.

670. Are the articles to which you allude brandy and gunpowder?—Yes; it is reported that those are two articles which the traders sometimes carry to those stations.

671. In what you have said, are you referring to the missionary stations among the Kafirs?—Beyond the colony generally.

672. *Viscount Mandeville.*] Is not gunpowder prohibited from being exported?—I believe it is, but it is so much an article in demand, that it may be considered as a kind of circulating medium in the interior; at least, it is the most acceptable of all gifts which can be given to the natives.

673. *Chairman.*] Have you had any opportunity of forming an opinion of the cause of the late outbreak among the Kafirs?—I cannot say decisively. I visited Scotland lately for the purpose of making inquiries among those who were concerned in the missions in Kafirland, but I was not able to procure any decisive information as to the cause of the outbreak.

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674. When did you leave the colony?—I left on the 28th of October. I have with me a printed document which refers to that subject. The Committee are perhaps aware that there are two Scottish bodies engaged in missionary operations there, the Free Church of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church, or the Old Seceders. The document I have in my hand contains a letter from one of the missionaries of the United Presbyterian Church, who was stationed in the very middle of the country where the disturbance appears to have commenced; he had formed a station in advance of the others, called Union Dale, in the centre of the Amatola Mountains; he makes allusions to the commencement of the outbreak.

675. Have you formed any opinion of the political system which is now pursued by the British Government towards the native tribes?—I think it is defective in two points, inasmuch as there has been a great tendency to take the lands of the natives, which has the effect of driving them before our advance, and cooping them up in places not quite suitable to afford them the means of support, and of course keeping them in a somewhat dissatisfied and discontented state.

676. Do you mean there has been a tendency in the settlers to establish themselves in the country which had been theretofore occupied by those savage tribes, and that that has produced a feeling of irritation among them?—Not exactly so; it had been the practice at an early date, that the farmers of the colony should cross the great rivers for the purpose of procuring pasturage for their cattle when the season was dry in the colony; but they seem to have done that generally on amicable terms with the natives, either getting leave or making some sort of bargain with them, by which they were to pay some compensation for the advantage they gained. What I alluded to was the fact of taking possession of countries occupied by savage men. In consequence of its being the right of the Crown to become the absolute proprietor of the lands, in that case they became grantable, and they appear to have been granted away in great quantities, so as to injure the interests of the natives, and unavoidably to give rise to a considerable degree of irritation among them.

677. Are not the circumstances of the colony such as to induce the settlers to spread themselves over a large extent of country, rather than occupy very densely any particular portion of the territory?—Yes; that has been the case, undoubtedly, inasmuch as the frontier population all round the colony are pastoral people, who require a great extent of ground for the support of their flocks and herds; but that extension is mainly

owing to the incidental circumstance I mentioned, of seasons of great drought occurring, obliging them to look out for water.

678. Probably that renders it more difficult for the European population to defend themselves against the sudden inroads of their more barbarous neighbours?—Undoubtedly it does.

679. You are probably aware of the objects for which this Committee has been appointed?—Yes, I am.

680. Are there any observations, with regard to those objects, which you would desire to address to the Committee?—Yes; if the Committee will allow me, I should like to present some details to them, which may require a few sentences. If you look round the boundary of our colony, you will find, upon the north, it appears to be bounded by the Orange River, but the real frontier, in fact, is the desert tract which borders the Orange River on the south, in which civilization and the means of support can scarcely be found; that is the proper region of the Bushmen; that district, appearing to be occupied by them, is in fact almost uninhabitable, from the want of permanent streams, and from the character of the climate being such as that rains very seldom fall there. These Hushmen appear to have been extending their frontier, at the expense of the Hottentot races, to the south; that race of men is now almost extinct; they were the enemies of all the other tribes, and were looked upon by the others as being their enemies; they were in a state of constant warfare with every one around them. The colonists may be considered as inheriting that warfare at their hands, because their neighbourhood is extremely dangerous to life and to property; that accounts for the hostility ascribed to the colonists in respect to those people. On the north side we come to the proper Hottentot races; the country is upon the whole barren and desert, but in various spots affords a good deal of pasturage, so that they can support herds of cattle, and missionary stations are now established among them. There is one circumstance to be remarked, of great importance there, that though the frontier appears upon the whole to be perfectly safe, yet there are causes of danger in the advances the natives are making in the attainment of European power, such as their getting possession of fire-arms; the immediate effect is, that they have a preponderating power in respect of the natives beyond them, and when not under the authority of moral principle, they perpetrate acts of depredation which tend to harass greatly the native tribes in their neighbourhood. That advance which I have spoken of will almost necessarily result from their intercourse with European people. A more important circumstance is their

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getting possession of the horse; and though it happens that the country, upon the whole, is not very favourable to the nurture of that animal, yet if it be treated in a domestic manner, as in Arabia, the animal might be reared, and the population might then resolve itself into hordes of mounted depredators. I do not know that any remedy can be found for those dangers, except in the extension of missionary influence among them, and the preponderating power which it is probable the colonial authority will ultimately assume. As you proceed onwards, you get out of the Hottentot tribes of people, and among those who may be called the Chuana races, the Bechuanas, and others who are advanced further in civilization than either of the two I have mentioned; and then you get to a part of the country called the Northern Sovereignty. There are small detachments of Bushmen still ranging about the frontier divisions of it. They appear to occupy a great valley north of the Quathlamba Mountains, where it appears no European has hitherto gone, and where the only traces of habitation appear to be the smokes which are seen, and which it is presumed arise from small tribes of Bushmen. They are an annoyance to all the tribes around them, and of course there is something approaching to a state of warfare constantly existing between them and the other people. Missionary stations are pretty numerous in the Northern Sovereignty, being partly Wesleyan, and partly belonging to the London Missionary Society. The London Missionary Society has extended itself further to the north, and occupies the extreme stations which are marked upon the map. As the country slopes up towards the mountains we get to the out-cropping of a great coal field, which may ultimately become of great economic value. I have had specimens sent to me from a small branch of the Caledon River, which indicate the existence of coal fields, but these have not any great economic value, because the beds are very thin; but in consequence of being the out-cropping of great horizontal beds, that country is greatly broken, and abounds with precipitous summits, which are occupied by the natives as fortresses, of a character so strong that it would be very difficult for any European power to drive the natives from one of them if they chose to resist. That I think is a very important circumstance in regard to the after experience of the countries which are connected with this Northern Sovereignty; one of them is held by Moshesh, who is perhaps the most important and the most intelligent of the native chiefs who are settled there; he wants greatly to extend the civilization

tion of his people, and favours the missionary stations in his neighbourhood, and about four or five years ago he sent down four of his relations, two sons and others, to Cape Town, to be instructed in the English language, that he might the better keep up his communications with the British authorities. This is considered as under the jurisdiction and superintendence of the resident in the sovereignty, whose office it is particularly to see that they do not fall into a state of hostility; he has had occasion to interfere lately between the tribes occupying such stations, for the purpose of putting an end to or preventing their hostilities; as long, therefore, as the Northern Sovereignty retains its present character, the frontier of the colony proper may be considered as absolutely secure. If dissension, however, occurs among those tribes, the frontier will be liable to invasion; and if it should appear, which I should very much regret, that Moshesh has actually consented to take a share in the hostilities, it is not very easy to say what may be the extent of the difficulty which may arise. It should be recollected that this country was invaded, and the invaders were driven out of it only by the Governor calling out the British troops and engaging in skirmishes there; that the safety of the natives depended upon that interference of the British Government, and all they have is due to that interference. Then we come immediately to the Kafir country, which, by looking at the map, it will be seen is almost bounded by our colonial territories; therefore, if any mere frontier system were erected for the purpose of restraining the Kafirs, it would necessarily require to extend round the whole of the three sides, which constitute the supposed boundary of that small territory. In regard to the general policy, one of the principles which ought to be adopted in all the transactions with the natives would be to give them absolute security that in no cases should the possession of their land be interfered with. Even in cases of warfare, I think the effects of the warfare should be considered as having an influence on the station of the chiefs alone, and not of the chiefs' families, or the people who have been under their direction. It would be very much preferable that the lands should be preserved absolutely for the support of the natives; and it appears to me also, that it would be almost necessary for the advance of civilization, that the native authorities should be got rid of, or reduced as quickly as possible.

681. Do you mean the chiefs?—Yes.

682. Mr. Monsell.] What do you mean by the native authorities being got rid of?—That some other authorities of better character should be substituted in their place.

683. Chairman.]

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683. *Chairman.*] What description of authority do you mean?—It must be the authority of a government; at present there is really no government which you can trust to in carrying on any operation in that country.

684. Do you mean a native Government?—No; I think it must be the British Government.

685. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] By the appointment of magistrates, or something of that sort?—Yes, these being operations which can only be carried on gradually; and it should always be kept in view, that it is just, and must be found expedient, to compensate the chiefs in all cases where they are left residents in the country. I think that the Governor has seen that though it was too late, when he says that he had thought of compensating the chiefs for the diminution of their authority, which brings with it also the destruction of their means of support, because what they receive for their present support is almost entirely dependent upon the exercise of their authority.

686. *Chairman.*] If you deprive the chiefs of their authority, would you think it just to hold them responsible for the conduct of their people?—No; I do not think they can be held responsible for the conduct of their people. It has been established that there is a considerable proportion of the people of Kafirland who are not under the influence of the chiefs; any influence to be exerted upon them must be from a foreign source.

687. If you relieved the chiefs from all responsibility, and said that even in case of war the native tribes should be secure of not having their property disturbed, what hold would you have upon them to induce them to keep their treaties with this country, and prevent their constantly taking up arms and resorting to plunder?—I think that the error has been the formation of treaties at all; I do not think treaties are at all advisable in respect to a people situated as the Kafirs are, from the circumstance that the chiefs cannot be responsible to any very great extent.

688. What means would you substitute for treaties, and for an attempt to get an influence over the chiefs, in order to keep the frontier safe against the incursions of the natives?—I see no mode in which it can be effectually accomplished, but that of rendering them all, as rapidly as possible, British subjects, by including the whole of that rectangle in our dominion, or controlling its authorities.

689. How far would that push the British frontier?—As I said before, this territory is bounded in a peculiar manner; on

three sides of it there are already the British territories; and it appears to me very undesirable to draw any frontier round those three sides, which in that case you would allow to remain in a state of irritation, provided you exercise no control over the people who are included within those boundaries.

690. Colonel *Estcourt*.] How would you proceed to get rid of the chiefs?—I should not think of interfering with them while they remained at peace; as long as the chiefs remain at peace I would allow them to retain their authority over their tribes, and encourage them to act right, and to extend their authority as much as possible, converting them as much as possible into magistrates: in those cases in which they have compelled you to engage in war, I should hold that the right of the chief to his authority was forfeited; you might say that the right to his property is forfeited also, but I would not go so far as that; as soon as possible I would ascertain and put on record the rights of all parties, in order to bring them as much as possible under the jurisdiction of our courts, so that there should be real property rights.

691. Do you speak of the rights of the chiefs?—The rights of the chiefs and the rights of the people.

692. In respect of what?—In respect to land, or the produce of the land particularly.

693. If the land belongs to them, we know the boundaries of it, do not we?—That can be ascertained.

694. Suppose, instead of chiefs, there were so many magistrates appointed by the Colonial Government in the colony, how would they be able, in that remote part of the country, to influence or control the people?—I think they might be established in villages or small communities, each under the direction of a magistrate, and that by his influence he might prevent any dangerous crimes occurring; it might happen, of course, in that transition state, that you would be compelled to overlook a good many occurrences which otherwise you would take notice of.

695. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You are now speaking of tribes within the limit of the colony, are not you?—In Kafraria particularly; it is a country which is so bounded by our territory, that it appears to me you cannot possibly let it go; it might become a nest of savage life if you lose it, and it would be a very dangerous one; it would become a source of great annoyance to the colonial population, and would lead eventually to a war of extermination.

696. Colonel *Dunne*.] Could you transfer the authority from the chiefs to the magistrates without the presence of a

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strong military force?—It could only occur as the result of conquest; if a chief is living in peace, and managing his people well, I should not interfere with him.

697. It would amount to a complete conquest?—Yes; I do not see how you are to avoid it.

698. Mr. *Booker*.] What is the state of feeling of the chiefs in relation to each other, as to their own territories and tribes; do they live in concord, or are they jealous of each other?—I presume that if there were no authority near them, of which they had as much fear as they have of the white men, they would be living constantly in a state of internal dissension; that is the condition of all the tribes to the north-east which we are acquainted with.

699. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Can you inform the Committee what are the numbers of the missionaries?—I remember making a rough sum of them lately; I think they amount altogether to 63.

700. Distributed over the various boundaries?—This was within the colony; it was in reference to something relating to the master and servants ordinance. I had occasion to consult the blue book upon the subject.

701. What are their denominations?—The oldest are the Moravians, who have several influential stations in the colony; they have preserved, to a great extent, the original Hottentot population, so that we are entitled to say that, as compared with other tracts of the world, the native population in that colony has been preserved and improved to a greater extent than has occurred anywhere else. A considerable portion of the peasantry population is of the Hottentot race, among whom you can see distinct traces of Hottentot origin. Next to the Moravians there is the London Missionary Society, who have several stations within the colony, and also considerable stations beyond its present boundary, or in the Northern Sovereignty. Then there is the Wesleyan body, who have stations in almost every village; they do not distinguish between their churches and their missionary stations as the others do, though they have various stations, particularly in the Northern Sovereignty also, which are occupied entirely by natives; there is more intermixture of the white class with the coloured people in their establishments than anywhere else, excluding those entirely within the colony with which I am connected, which are for the benefit of all parties. Then there is the French mission in Moshesh's country; they have some very successful institutions indeed.

702. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Is that a French Protestant mission?

sign?—Yes. Then there is the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions, occupying the Natal country. They are the leading missionary interest in the country of Natal. Along with them there are a few Wesleyan stations also in the same country; and there is one established, I presume, now, though it was a long time in doubt, by the representatives of the Established Church of Norway. Then there are colonial missions of all classes; those are entirely in the interior of the colony.

703. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Are the missionaries looked on favourably by the natives, and received with kindness?—By the coloured natives they are, and their influence extends very far beyond the stations which they occupy. The natives have been known to come down from a distance equal to perhaps from 400 to 500 miles to visit a station, residing there for a time, getting a little instruction, and then going away to their own people.

704. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Are they disliked by the chiefs?—I am not aware of that being suspected, except in Kafirland proper. In other cases the chiefs have been the parties who have applied for missionaries, and have sent long distances and made great efforts for the purpose of getting missionaries to reside at their stations.

705. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Have you reason to be satisfied with the progress of missionary labour in South Africa?—Yes, completely so.

706. Have you any knowledge of the number in communion with the various missionary societies?—I cannot speak to that point at present. There is one source of information which can be got at very readily, which is the Cape Almanack, where there may be details of that kind. In the blue book there are details satisfactory enough as to the number of the missions in the interior of the colony; the Committee will find there the name of every individual attached to the missionary stations, the particulars of his employment, and the amount he gains annually.

707. And the number of schools?—Yes.

708. How many years have the missionaries been employed in South Africa?—All those things are on record in former inquiries of the House of Commons. I think the Moravians made an attempt some time after the middle of last century, about 1772 or 1776, and others have followed them at various intervals, chiefly however, in more modern times, since 1815.

709. When you were speaking a short time ago of governing

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ing the tribes by means of magistrates and others, had you any view as to the missionaries taking any part or interest in the matter?—Not the slightest; I think missionary influence must be kept perfectly distinct from Government and magistrate influence.

710. Do not you think that that would be a better course to pursue than the plan of going to war with the tribes and almost exterminating them before you attempt to put civil officers over them?—I presume that you should never go to war with a tribe unless they commence a war with you first.

711. Under present circumstances, did not you say you saw no alternative?—As to Kafirland proper. With regard to the Northern Sovereignty, I think the rights of the chiefs should be ascertained as soon as possible, and as soon as possible put on record.

712. Are you not of opinion that the missionaries might themselves be made more useful in that way than any other parties?—I do not think so; I think it would interfere very greatly with their proceedings.

713. You think it would probably interfere with their usefulness in other ways?—I think it would.

714. You stated, in the early part of your evidence, that the traders and the missionaries had different interests; you said that the traders introduced gunpowder; perhaps there are other things which they trade in, which you will be good enough to explain?—I only stated that from report.

715. Have you no knowledge of that yourself?—None; I only know they have been accused of it.

716. I understood you to say that gunpowder had become almost an article of currency among the natives?—Yes, to a certain extent it has taken the place of beads and such things.

717. That you think is introduced by the traders?—I presume it is.

718. Against the wishes of the missionaries?—Yes, I have always understood so. It does happen in the colony frequently, and in some stations in Kafirland, that to prevent the intrusion of the traders the missionary has a trading establishment in his own station; he has procured some establishment there in connexion with some respectable house whom he can trust.

719. Then the missionary became the distributor of the powder in that case, did not he?—No, he has no direct interest in the trading establishment; he places it there for the purpose of preventing the introduction of such articles; he gets established in his station a commercial establishment for the

the purpose of furnishing the natives with goods, articles of clothing and tools, and such things, and I presume with the intention of excluding the interference of the traders.

720. Viscount *Mandeville*.] The object being to exclude the travelling trader?—Yes.

721. Sir *E. Buxton*.] The missionary would take care that no gunpowder was sold at the store?—That, I understand, is his object; there are instances in which some missionaries appear to have been accused of selling gunpowder.

722. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Has anything reached your ears of that kind?—I have seen it stated in the colonial papers; I presume that establishes the fact that there was such an establishment in the station, and I believe that the purpose was to exclude those articles which might be dangerous.

723. Do you know whether the missionaries have in any instances dealt in powder and fire-arms?—I do not know the fact with respect to those stations; I know that in the colony they deal in no such things.

724. Have you visited any of those stations yourself?—No, I have not.

725. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think that any exertion of the missionaries would now prevent the natives getting the gunpowder, which seems to be so necessary to them?—I do not think any exertion of the missionaries would have the slightest effect.

726. Has not it become almost necessary to their existence; they having adopted fire-arms to such an extent, will they not buy it in some way or other, and will they not always find people to bring it to them?—I presume that that is the case; and perhaps if arms of that character were universally distributed over the interior of Africa, the detrimental effect of their possession by particular tribes might be counteracted.

727. They live by hunting a good deal, as well as by the keeping of flocks, do not they?—Yes.

728. And those fire-arms are used in hunting?—Yes; they hunt for ivory a good deal.

729. Mr. *Monseil*.] You spoke of the success of missions, and particularly of the success of the Moravians, among the Hottentots; do you consider that the missions in Kafirland have been successful?—They have had attached to them a great number of Kafir people, who have generally accompanied the missions in case of warfare.

730. Do you think that the missionaries have made much progress among the Kafirs in Kafirland?—They have only made progress among the people who have been attached to them;

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them; I do not think the progress among the Kafirs, as a whole, has been great.

731. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Can you give the Committee any information as to the localities and numbers of the various tribes?—I am not very particularly acquainted with them. I remember obtaining a return from a very intelligent man, as to the number and distribution of the tribes, which was printed in one of our journals, but it is so long ago that I do not remember much of the particulars; perhaps circumstances may have changed so greatly, that that return would not be worth much now.

Major *John Jarvis Bissett*, called in; and Examined.

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732. *Chairman*.] HOW long have you resided at the Cape?—All my life; when I say all my life, I was a year old when I went there.

733. In what capacity have you lived there?—For the last 15 years as an officer in the service; previously to that, my father was a half-pay officer of the navy, and went out there with the British settlers in 1820.

734. Have you been there without intermission, during the whole of that time?—Yes.

735. To what regiment do you belong?—The Cape Mounted Rifles.

736. Will you have the goodness to state to the Committee what service you have seen during your residence there?—I have served there during three wars; the war of 1834–5, that of 1845–6, and the commencement of the present war.

737. When did you leave the colony?—I left on the 1st of April last, having received a wound at the beginning of this affair.

738. Are you aware of the purpose for which this Committee is constituted?—I imagine it is to enquire into the Cape affair, but I am not aware of it very perfectly.

739. The principal object of the appointment of this Committee is to inquire into our relations with the frontier tribes, and the policy which it would be expedient for this country to pursue in reference to those tribes, and for the defence of the settlers against the incursions which have taken place; are there any observations which you are desirous of addressing to the Committee on those subjects?—It is such a complicated question, that I cannot bring my ideas all at once to a matter so important as that; any question which the Committee would like to put I will answer to the best of my ability.

740. Have

740. Have you any information as to the immediate cause of the recent outbreak?—The last three years I have been brigade-major in British Kafiraria, under Colonel Mackinnon, therefore I have had a good insight into the working of the late system. I conceive the chiefs made this outbreak with a view of regaining their power, which they were gradually losing; and of course, not having troops enough there, they commenced the war with impunity, knowing that we were not able to cope with them.

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741. Do you think it unfortunate that the military power had been reduced to the degree it had been?—Very much so; had the system worked another three years, had there been troops sufficient to coerce them for that time, I believe their power would have been annihilated.

742. For three years the system has appeared to be working extremely well?—Perfectly.

743. You are of opinion, that the reason why the successful operation of that system was disturbed by the recent outbreak was, because there was not sufficient military power to keep the Kafirs in awe?—Just so.

744. Mr. *Booker*.] Was that power exerted humanely as well as vigorously?—Entirely so.

745. There was no undue stretch of authority?—None at all; no even-handed justice could have been administered with greater propriety in any way.

746. *Chairman*.] The conduct of the Kat River settlers mainly contributed to the recent outbreak, did not it?—I am confident that the Gaika Kafirs would not have entered upon this war, had not they been sure of the co-operation of the Kat River Hottentots. There has been so much confidence placed in them by the British in former wars, that they have imagined that without their assistance the white men would have gone to the wall.

747. What in your opinion was the cause of the defection of the Kat River settlers?—Their proximity to the Kafirs; their intermarriages with them, and the settlement being such a loose establishment; it is a collection of all the bad coloured people in the whole of the provinces; they are easily led, and being an excitable people, they have been induced to join the Kafirs; the Hottentots are very easily led; they are most excitable.

748. You think the policy recently introduced has failed to preserve tranquillity, not so much from any defect in the principles upon which that policy rested, as from the want of a sufficient



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sufficient force to keep the Kafirs in awe while it was established?—I do, entirely.

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749. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You said that it was the loss of the authority of the chiefs, which had begun to dwindle under the system recently pursued, to which you attribute their hostility?—Certainly; the chiefs finding their authority gradually leaving them, they have made an effort to regain that authority.

750. *Chairman*.] We are now engaged in a very arduous contest with these Kafirs?—Very much so.

751. Supposing that contest is brought, as it is to be hoped it will be at no distant period, to a successful termination, and the whole of that country, up to the Amatola Mountains, is reduced to submission, what do you think ought to be the future policy of this country with regard to those tribes?—I think there never will be peace for the colony as long as the Kafirs are allowed to occupy the Amatolas; it is such a strong hold, that they can any day, with impunity, overrun the whole country, it is so near the immediate border.

752. When you say they ought not to be allowed to occupy the Amatolas, do you mean they ought not to occupy it exclusively, or ought they to be expelled from it?—I think they ought to be expelled altogether.

753. Mr. *Monsell*.] There is not much grazing ground in the Amatolas, is there?—It is a splendid water country, and more suited to agricultural than pastoral purposes.

754. *Chairman*.] Do you think there would be any difficulty in expelling the Kafirs from the Amatola district, yet allowing them to occupy the country in the plains which they now possess?—Yes, I do, so far as the Gaika tribe is concerned; and as long as they do that, there will be constant intercourse, and they can always stir up disaffection.

755. Mr. *Booker*.] To whom does that Amatola country of right belong?—To the Gaikas, Sandili's people.

756. *Chairman*.] You think the Kafirs should be totally expelled from the country which they now occupy?—I do; that is, those at war with the Government.

757. How far back would you push them?—I would push them over the Kei.

758. Do you mean that you would allow no native at all to reside there?—None, except those who had been faithful to the Government.

759. Which is a comparatively small portion, is not it?—No, it is half.

760. Is it, in point of numbers, half?—There was a census taken

taken at the beginning of 1848; the Tslambies, which are faithful to the Government, were then 35,000, and the Gaikas 27,000; therefore the greater proportion is on the side of the friendly tribes.

761. Have not many of those, who at that time were friendly, since gone over against us?—Yes, Seyolo has gone over against us.

762. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] The Committee understand you to say, that you would expel the Gaikas from their own country?—Yes.

763. How long have they been in possession of that country?—I cannot say exactly; it is beyond my memory.

764. They have had undisputed possession of that territory for a very long series of years, have not they?—Yes, they have; or rather they were placed under Government rule and martial law during Sir B. D'Urban's policy; it was taken from them in 1835, and restored to them.

765. You think it right that they should be expelled from that country?—I do.

766. Do you think the reason of the Gaika tribes rising has been the fear of expulsion from their territory?—No.

767. What has been the cause of their rising?—To regain the power they (the chiefs) were losing generally.

768. And to prevent the loss of their country?—They were not losing their country; a white man is not allowed to locate in it, except at military posts, and missionaries on their stations.

769. You say you would drive them entirely from it?—Now I would.

770. Has not it been the fear of your driving them from its which has caused them to rise?—No, not at all.

771. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] You speak of the chiefs?—Yes.

772. *Chairman*.] Do you rate the influence of the chiefs as very high among them?—For bad purposes very much so; they are a superstitious people, and are easily led by their chiefs for any bad purpose. But their referring cases to the commissioners during the last three years shows that they do not dread their chiefs so much as was contemplated, otherwise they would have gone to their chiefs instead of to the commissioners.

773. The influence of superstition is very great among them?—Yes.

774. Which is used for political purposes?—Yes.

775. Supposing this territory cleared from the native inhabitants who now occupy it, what means would you then propose to adopt with regard to it?—There is the difficulty; you

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want population upon the borders ; it is now a scattered population ; the farms are of large extent, and they have not sufficient numbers to cope with an enemy ; if you could introduce a population of any class there, which you could rely on, it would be a great thing.

776. Are not the circumstances of the colony very unfavourable to the concentration of population in any particular place?—Some parts are sterile, and only fit for grazing stock, but the most part would support a large population.

777. Is not that in consequence of the nature of the soil and the climate?—It has been so in part of the colony, but as you advance to Kafirland the country becomes a garden ; when I left it, it was a perfect garden ; people for agricultural purposes might be located there to any extent.

778. You think it would be of advantage to bring about a more dense settlement of people there?—Yes.

779. Is the Amatola ridge easily susceptible of military defence?—You may put a post upon it ; I should say it is not capable of military defence except by having an open country to the east of it.

780. Sir J. Walmsley.] You speak of driving the Gaika tribes out of their present territory ; where would you drive them?—Over the Kei.

781. Upon another tribe?—They are of the same nation ; they are all Kafirs ; Kreli is the head of the Kafirs.

782. What would be the result of driving the present tribes into the territory of another tribe?—They would then occupy the open country, where they could not form themselves in strongholds, as they do now, and you could keep them in better subjection.

783. Would not that force them to take a part of the territory of another tribe, and thus produce war between those two tribes?—No ; those two tribes are now in open hostility against us ; they are one tribe, in fact. It is only the country to the Kei which has been taken possession of by our Government ; beyond that they have an unlimited country.

784. Sir E. Buxton.] Those beyond the Kei are what?—Krelis, or Umagalikas.

785. Chairman.] Is the country there free from bush?—Yes.

786. Sir E. Buxton.] Has not the effect been, when one tribe has been driven back upon another tribe, or another part of a tribe, that those upon whom they have been driven have resisted, and attempted to drive them out again?—Never ; it has never occurred at the Cape.

787. Has

787. Has not it been the case that our colony has gradually extended?—Not in my day; it has not extended much in my day.

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788. Mr. Mackinnon.] Assuming they were driven over the river, would there be sufficient means of support for them selves and for the tribe which is there now?—Yes; there is 150 miles of unoccupied country immediately in the rear of Kreli.

789. Sir E. Buxton.] Is not it occupied by flocks?—Not by any tribe.

790. Nor by their flocks?—No; it is a most beautiful country, but abandoned.

791. Chairman.] Have you been there yourself?—I have.

792. Sir J. Walmsley.] Is that adjoining to the Gaika territory?—It is adjoining Kreli's country; Kreli occupies from the Kei to the Bashee, which is an extent of 80 miles eastward, bounded by the coast upon one side, and I suppose 150 miles north from the coast. From the Bashee to the Umgazi River is unoccupied; the Umgazi is close to St. John's River.

793. Sir E. Buxton.] Was not there a famine during last year on the eastern frontier?—Not a famine; they were suffering a good deal from drought.

794. Was not the effect of that drought that the Kafirs were unable to drive their cattle to the pastures now occupied by the British settlers, which they had formerly been in the habit of occupying in the time of drought?—No, decidedly not.

795. Sir J. Walmsley.] If you were to succeed in driving the Gaika tribes, as you propose, over the Kei, what advantage would you have by so driving them upon another tribe, and what security would you have against the tribes beyond them combining and coming down upon you?—There is an unoccupied space between Kreli's country and that of any other tribe, and they would be in a country where, in case of war, cavalry could act against them.

796. There is a large space of ground between the Gaika tribe and the next, is there?—Not the Gaikas; they join Kreli's; but they are in fact the same people—they are the Amakosa nation; but the Gaikas have been under the British rule for the last three years; Kreli's people have not; between Kreli's people and the Amapondas there is a large space of country unoccupied.

797. Are Kreli's people now opposed to us?—Yes, they are.

798. What security would you have against Kreli's people

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and the Gaika tribe uniting against the British?—You have none, except that they would be in a more open country, where you can more easily cope with them.

799. *Chairman.*] The great difficulty in Kafir warfare is the bush and the mountains?—Yes; and that is the space now occupied by the Gaikas, called the Amatola Mountains.

800. *Marquis of Granby.*] Do you think, if you drove them beyond the Kei, the present amount of force would be sufficiently large to hold them in check?—No.

801. *Chairman.*] You think that a considerable force must be kept there?—Yes; or in another war the Kafirs will become so formidable an enemy that they will quite equal our troops.

802. *Mr. Booker.*] How do the chiefs acquire their position as chiefs; is it an hereditary office?—With most of them it is; in the case of Pato it is not so; and in the case of Umhala it is not so.

803. *Chairman.*] You have had experience in several wars, you say?—Yes.

804. Did you find the Kafirs much more formidable enemies in the last war than before?—Decidedly; they were nothing in former wars compared with the last.

805. They have now become formidable enemies, even against British troops?—Yes; so much so that the native levies have not been able to stand their ground against them.

806. Adopt what policy you will as to the frontier, do you think it will be possible, for some years to come at least, to do without the presence of a considerable regular force upon the frontier?—I do not think it will.

807. You think it would be impossible to trust altogether, or mainly, to the settlers for the defence of the frontier?—Yes.

808. Do you believe that if there is a respectable regular force maintained upon the frontier, there will be any indisposition on the part of the settlers to co-operate with that regular force in defending their own country?—No.

809. Have you formed any opinion as to what would be the best and most efficient manner in which the colonists could co-operate with the military in defending the frontier?—It is a most difficult thing to say; the Dutch people there have a dread of being made soldiers in any way; there is a difficulty in raising a militia from them; there would be no difficulty with the English community, but the Dutchman thoroughly dreads being a soldier, and he looks upon a militia-man, who has to attend muster and parade, as a soldier.

810. Have not they, on several occasions, evinced no indisposition to turn out and fight in defence of their own property?

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perty?—Not in time of war; they have always been most willing to do so, more so in former wars than the present.

811. They have evinced a great indisposition to enrol themselves in any corps or militia?—Yes, there was a great outcry against it when it was proposed a short time ago in the Cape.

812. Has not there been an attempt lately to employ the Kafirs themselves as police?—Yes.

813. Do you think that that has succeeded?—They did admirably during peace, but they went over to the enemy on the very first attack.

814. In the character of policemen the experiment answered very well?—Yes.

815. But it failed when this country was engaged in a war against that nation?—Yes.

816. Mr. *Hindley*.] In what respect are the Kafirs more formidable now than they used to be?—In point of bravery. You may say in point of numbers also, but particularly in bravery, and their possession of fire-arms.

817. Colonel *Dunne*.] Are they mounted?—Great numbers of them are.

818. Have you ever been at the Kat River Settlement?—Yes.

819. You have stated that you consider that a collection of bad characters; do not you think that Colonel Somerset, in breaking up that settlement, would do a politic and wise thing?—Yes.

820. Do you know a missionary of the name of Read who was there?—Yes, a missionary of that name was there for a long time.

821. Was not that a Hottentot community?—Yes.

822. Are you aware, that in the case of the desertion of some of the Cape Corps under Colonel Napier lately, the men, when they were taken, said they deserted from the preaching of one of the missionaries?—Yes, a local preacher, not the missionary; he used to preach to our men every night.

823. Was he connected with the Kat River Settlement?—He was.

824. Is there any reason to suppose that the desertion of those men from the Cape Corps was connected with this settlement?—I think so. I had a letter from some of my brother officers in the corps, which stated that his name was Lavilot; he has been stationed at King William's Town for some time; he led those fellows off.

825. He was connected with the Kat River Settlement?—Yes.

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826. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Did he go with them?—He did.

827. Colonel *Dunne*.] Several of them were killed in a subsequent action, were not they?—That is since I left; I see it reported.

828. Do you think that the Hottentots now can be as much depended on, as troops in our service, as they were formerly?—No, I do not.

829. Do not you think it would be more advisable to send out troops from this country?—I do, decidedly.

830. Mr. *Booker*.] Do you know anything of the civil appointments in the colony or on the frontier, whether they have been proper or improper?—I think proper men have been appointed; I do not know of any instance where it has not been so.

831. Do you think any irritation has been occasioned by the conduct of any of the magistrates?—None.

832. Have you had occasion to assist the civil power in your military capacity?—No; we have never had a single case in Kafaria in which it has been necessary to call the military to the assistance of the civil power.

833. Colonel *Dunne*.] You are decidedly of opinion that instead of recruiting the Cape Corps with recruits from the Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this country who would serve in the colony, and become colonists?—Yes.

834. Would not it be possible to place military colonies along the frontier, if you allowed the men to take their wives and to settle along that frontier?—Not unless they were under a regular code of discipline, because there has been a perfect failure in the military villages established on the border.

835. Is not that failure attributable to the manner in which the colonies were formed, and not to the system itself?—Yes; it was because there was no restraint upon them; the men had their free discharge, and were allowed to roam and to go where they could better themselves.

836. Were not those men, in general, unmarried men?—Yes, and many of them bad characters.

837. Do not you think men would be more likely to stay in those colonies if they were encouraged to settle there with their families?—Yes, if they were pensioners, or people whom you had a control over.

838. Would not pensioners be too old, generally speaking?—It would depend upon circumstances; they are always available for defending garrisons.

839. Do

839. Do you think that we can have any security, in case of any future outbreak, without clearing the Amatolas?—No.

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840. Do you think, if they were cleared, the frontier would be more easily defended?—Yes, with a certain number of troops.

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841. *Sir E. Burton.*] What number would you think sufficient?—You should have 3,000 troops on the border, independently of the colonial corps.

842. *Colonel Dunne.*] Would it be possible to have a chain of posts along the Amatolas, supported by regular troops?—It is difficult to answer that question; the ridge of the Amatolas forms a half-moon; it is an oblong; it is the shape of a half-moon.

843. Running in what direction?—Running east and west; to the north of it is open country; therefore a chain of posts could be placed east of it to communicate with the north country, which is open and defensible; and from there to the sea it is entirely an open and defensible country.

844. Are the Amatolas to be passed at every point, or are there certain passes only?—There are three great passes by which they can be entered.

845. By taking possession, and putting a force upon those passes, would not you be able to defend the chain of the Amatolas?—No, a Kafir can pass anywhere.

846. *Chairman.*] What is the height of the Amatolas?—I cannot exactly say.

847. *Colonel Dunne.*] They are not any great height, are they?—They are not so high as the Great Winterberg. I cannot exactly remember the height; I should say they were about 3,000 feet above the level of the sea.

848. You say that the Kafirs are now supplied with arms and ammunition, and are much more formidable than they were in preceding wars?—Yes, very much so.

849. Are you aware how those arms and ammunition have been supplied to them?—No; I could make a guess; the only mode I can see in which they might procure them would be from their proximity to a number of Kafirs living in the Kat River Settlement; there would be an opening there which we have not hitherto been able to guard. The line from the Kat River downwards has been always defended, so that nothing could pass in and out, and no trader comes into Kafirland without taking out a license, and then only allowed to trade at a military post or missionary station.

850. Are the traders forbidden to carry arms and powder for sale?—Yes.

851. Would



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851. Would there be any means, by taking possession of the Kat River, of preventing the introduction of arms and ammunition?—I doubt it; they would procure them in other ways.

852. Are they supplied by the traders, do you think?—No, except in the case of smuggling.

853. Have you ever heard that the missionaries have introduced gunpowder?—No, not into Kafirland.

854. Therefore it is done in some way which as yet we are not aware of?—Yes.

855. But it must be introduced in considerable quantities?—Yes, it is so; there has been no end to it.

856. *Chairman.*] What has been the effect of the influence of the missionaries upon the people; has it had a tendency to civilize them?—I do not think it has in a single instance; Mr. Bonats left Shiloh the other day without a single person adhering to him.

857. Was not Hermanoz brought up at a missionary station?—I do not think he was.

858. *Mr. Hawes.*] Mr. Bonats was a very old missionary, was not he?—Yes, he had been 19 years at Shiloh.

859. *Mr. B. Carter.*] You stated that the Boers have been less willing to turn out in the last war than at previous periods; to what do you attribute that?—There has been an anti-government feeling on the part of the Boers.

860. Arising from what?—From the late convict question in a great degree.

861. *Chairman.*] With reference to the present state of the frontier, do you think it would be expedient to provide for the seat of government being nearer to it than Cape Town is, either by dividing the colony into two, or by transferring the seat of government to some place more to the east?—I think it would be advisable to transfer the seat of government.

862. Do you think much practical inconvenience arises from the distance at which Cape Town is from the eastern frontier?—Yes, I do.

863. In what way does that inconvenience show itself?—In the length of time you are in getting up your forces to the east, and the delay caused in waiting for orders before you can act.

864. Is not that inconvenience much diminished by a communication by sea being established?—Yes; had it not been for the circumstance of those two steamers being there, we should have had to abandon the province of Kafria.

865. *Colonel Dunne.*] Notwithstanding the convenience, is not it a long march from Cape Town to the frontier, too long for

for any emergency?—You could not march it, you must go by sea.

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866. Would not it be sufficient that there should be an officer, with very extensive powers, upon the frontier, who should make reports to the central Government?—Yes; but if he is to wait for the authority of the central Government before he can act, it must tend to weaken his power greatly.

867. If he had the power of acting for himself, and in fact the whole line of frontier was under his command, would not that answer all the purposes which could be desired?—Yes, if he had unrestricted power, it would do.

868. Do you think the same system of government can be carried on at the frontier as that which is maintained about Cape Town?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the Government measures to answer the question.

869. *Chairman.*] Is there an identity of feeling and of interest between the inhabitants of the eastern portion of the colony and those who reside at Cape Town and its vicinity?—There is a great extent of Dutch feeling at Cape Town.

870. There are a considerable number of Dutch settlers in the eastern provinces, are not there?—No; they are becoming more English there; a great many of the Dutch settlers have migrated.

871. *Colonel Dunne.*] Is not there a large colony of Dutch who have crossed the Vaal?—Yes; that is a long way to the north.

872. They are totally independent of our sovereignty?—Yes.

873. They are moving northward from the British power, are not they?—Yes.

874. Do you think there would be any possibility of stopping them, and making them defend the frontier?—None whatever.

875. *Marquis of Granby.*] Those Kafirs who are not armed with guns, use a kind of spear, do not they?—They use the assagais.

876. Which is a very formidable weapon?—Yes, they carry seven.

877. Do they manufacture that weapon themselves?—Yes, they do.

878. *Colonel Dunne.*] Is there any possibility of the Kafirs manufacturing powder, if we could stop its exportation to them?—None.

879. Then we should put a stop to further war, if we could put a stop to the introduction of powder?—Yes.

880. *Colonel*

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880. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Could we stop the introduction of powder into that country?—Not unless you extended the operations to Natal.

881. Would not that be too great an extent of country to undertake operations over?—There would always be smuggling; there are so many little bays, and means of landing anything on the coast of Kafirland.

882. The temptation of course is very great?—It is.

883. Mr. *B. Carter*.] You apprehend a good deal of powder comes from Natal?—I do not say it is so in the present instance.

884. Mr. *Hawes*.] Did you ever hear of its being imported into the Portuguese settlements?—No.

885. With regard to the late outbreak, you having long resided in the colony, and served a good deal on the frontier, have any acts of injustice come under your knowledge on the part of the settlers towards the Kafirs?—Not in a single instance.

886. Can you state to the Committee whether you believe the Kafir population generally has been contented with the policy pursued towards them?—Perfectly so.

887. May the Committee infer that the discontent is chiefly on the part of the chiefs of tribes, who feel their power declining?—Yes.

888. Declining, in a great degree, from the advance of civilization and the restraints of law?—Yes.

889. When you say that you would remove those chiefs especially from the Amatola district, the Gaika tribe more particularly, and drive them over the Kei, do you contemplate making any arrangements with regard to their location beyond the Kei, or would you leave that to chance, or the charity of the chiefs into whose tribes they may be driven?—There is an immense extent of country beyond the Kei; there would be no difficulty in respect to that; it is a thinly populated country.

890. Would they find ample land for pastoral purposes?—Ample land; they existed there for three years during the last war; they were then all over the Kei, the Gaikas and the Tslambies, and there was no want of territory then.

891. Would it be necessary to do more than to remove the principal chiefs, who have been the cause of the present discontent?—I think it would be advisable to place commissioners to see them located.

892. Do you think, if the chiefs were removed, and the people remained, friendly relations could be established between them and the British authorities in British Kafiraria?—

They

They would always be open to revolt ; there would be always bad characters springing up as adherents of those chiefs.

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893. Is that consistent with the opinion you have expressed that the people generally are satisfied with the exercise of British authority ?—Yes ; because I believe that one bad man could influence 10 good men ; they are more easily led for bad than they are for good purposes. They are a very superstitious people ; the belief in this prophet has a great tendency to draw aside those who found themselves bettered by the present system, and induce them to join the chiefs.

894. I believe, speaking generally, the Kafirs are altogether a people without any religion ?—They have none whatever.

895. They are not believers in a future state ?—They are not.

896. They are susceptible of being influenced through a class of people called prophets, as well as by means of their attachment to their chiefs ?—Yes ; this is a rare instance of a prophet arising among them ; they say that we have our prophets ; we speak of our prophets, and the missionaries tell them of our prophets, and now they have their prophet. There have been only two instances of such prophets. There was a man of the name of Linx, who led the Kafirs in former times to attack Graham's Town, telling them that the Englishman's bullets would turn to rain. This is the second one who has arisen.

897. Do you think the present prophet has with him the cordial sympathy of the people, or that he is the mere tool of the chiefs ?—The mere tool of the chiefs.

898. And that he is not acting in conformity with the feelings and wishes of the people ?—I cannot altogether account for their superstitious feeling, but they have been led to believe him, and to put great faith in him.

899. Do the Kafirs cultivate land to any great extent ?—Yes, the women do ; the men never work.

900. What are the chief products they raise ?—Kafir corn and millet ; but chiefly millet.

901. They simply cultivate the land for their own support, but not for any purposes of trade ?—That is all ; they are an improvident people ; they will sell a great deal in a time of abundance to traders, and thereby cause a sort of famine before the next crop comes in.

902. Do they supply traders with wool and hides ?—They have no sheep in Kafirland ; they supply them with hides.

903. Colonel *Dume.*] What is given in return ?—Spades and hoes, and blankets ; particularly blankets ; handkerchiefs and beads.

904. And

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904. And gunpowder?—We have never been able to trace the sale of gunpowder to any of them.

905. Sir E. Buxton.] No smuggling of gunpowder has ever been discovered?—No.

906. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you lived among the Kafir tribes, so as to know their habits?—I know them to a great extent; I have been stationed during Sir Benjamin D'Urban's time in Kafaria, and I have been there now.

907. You have had frequent opportunities of ascertaining the feelings and wishes of the people?—Yes.

908. You speak from your own knowledge when you say they are a perfectly contented people?—Yes.

909. Chairman.] Do you understand the Kafir language at all?—Yes, I do, partially.

910. Colonel Estcourt.] You have been in personal communication with persons of importance among the Kafirs?—Yes, I may say I have.

911. Viscount Mandeville.] The Kafirs, although they may be perfectly contented with our rule, would be always ready to be excited by the hope of plunder, would not they?—Yes.

912. That would be sufficient to excite them to go to war, would not it?—Unless they had a wholesome dread of us, in consequence of there being sufficient troops to keep them in subjection.

913. Mr. Hindley.] You said Mr. Bonats left Shiloh without a single Kafir following him?—Yes; it was not altogether a Kafir missionary station; it was a Hottentot station.

914. Without any followers he left?—Yes; some Fingoes followed him, but no Hottentots.

915. Before the destruction of Shiloh, did he take the submission of the people to the commander, Captain Tilden, who said it was too late?—I cannot answer that question exactly.

916. Do you know that the chapel was actually offered to be used as a fort by the military?—No, I do not; Shiloh is not in Kafaria.

917. Sir J. Walmsley.] You have stated, in reply to an honourable Member, that the people are perfectly contented; you have also stated, that you would not only remove the chiefs, but that you would drive the whole people out of that country?—The whole of the people who have now made war against our Government.

918. Do not you think it would be much more desirable to drive out those who are instigating the people to war, rather than drive the whole of the people out of that country?—You

cannot

cannot discriminate where the people have been all in arms against you.

919. Then they are not perfectly contented?—I am speaking of the Kafir tribes themselves; previously to the war the lower orders were contented.

920. They were contented previously to the war, but they are not contented now?—The lower orders were, but the chiefs, and those who were influenced by the chiefs, were of course against the Government.

921. Colonel *Dunne*.] I understand you to say that you would only drive out those who had taken up arms; but that would leave a considerable number who are well affected, would not it?—None of the Gaikas are well affected.

922. But there are other tribes who are well affected whom you do not propose to remove?—Yes, the Tslambies; you could not remove them.

923. Viscount *Mandeville*.] The Tslambies are well affected, are not they?—Except one tribe of them.

924. Colonel *Dunne*.] The difficulty you apprehend would be in supplying that country with a sufficient population for defence?—Yes.

925. Do you think it would be possible to meet that difficulty by encouraging emigration, or is the nature of the country such as to encourage emigrants to remove there?—From this country I think emigration would be advantageous, but I do not think there is population enough in the colony to fill it up.

926. Sir *E. Burton*.] You propose to people that country with English colonists?—Yes.

927. Is it your opinion that if the English colonists were located in the country, up to the River Kei, they would be contented with that country; as their flocks increased would not they be likely to pass over to the other side of the Kei?—No; I would make it an agricultural country, and fill it up with that class of persons; I would not place there extensive farmers who might keep large flocks of sheep, which will always induce the Kafirs to plunder.

928. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think if the convicts, who were sent to the Cape, had been sent to the frontier, there would have been any ill feeling there?—Yes, just the same, but not the same radical measures resorted to.

929. Sir *E. Burton*.] Does the land in Kafirland belong to the chiefs, or is it the property of private individuals?—It belongs to the chiefs and their people generally; there is no defining each man's land.

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930. Mr. *B. Carter.*] Is there any actual property recognised at all?—They do not care anything about property; they move from one place to another, as it suits their convenience.

931. Sir *E. Buxton.*] Would those Gaika tribes be willing that their land should be taken away from them?—Decidedly not.

932. Would not it reduce them to abject poverty?—No, not at all.

933. Mr. *Mackinnon.*] You state that if they were driven on the other side of the river there would be plenty of support for them, notwithstanding the country is already occupied by other parts of the same tribe?—Yes.

934. Mr. *B. Carter.*] You say that one-half of the natives who now occupy British Kafaria are friendly to us?—Yes.

935. You would leave them where they are?—Yes; it would be a breach of faith to remove them.

936. In fact, then, they would have the sole occupation of the territory at first?—Yes.

937. *Chairman.*] The territory they occupy is chiefly towards the Kei, is not it?—Yes.

938. Sir *E. Buxton.*] Of that part of the tribe which you call friendly, large sections have gone over to the enemy, have not they?—Not large sections; there are two chiefs from those tribes who have gone over to the enemy.

939. With how many men?—One has 2,000 men; the other is a petty chief, and I do not think he is classed as a chief.

940. Were you present at the Kat River when the outbreak took place there?—No.

941. Have you been there since?—No.

942. Your knowledge, then, of the causes which led to that outbreak is not derived from personal acquaintance with the facts?—Yes, I have been stationed in the Kat River for years, but it is a long time ago; I know the settlement has been increasing in the collection of those people ever since; it is some years since I was stationed there.

943. Should you have given to the Kat River settlers the character you have given them now, some years ago?—Yes, with respect to their collecting idle people about them, I should.

944. Colonel *Dunne.*] Many people came from the colony who are unwilling to work there?—Men from all parts of the colony are collected there.

945. But,

945. But, generally, they are people of idle and bad character?—Yes.

946. Sir *E. Burton*.] Were the Kat River settlers themselves, the Hottentots, people of bad character?—They are chiefly Hottentots; there are a great many Gonahs, a race of people between the Hottentots and the Kafirs.

947. Is it your opinion that the Kat River settlers generally were worthless characters?—Yes, decidedly; I think there are some good men among them, but they are overpowered by the other idle people.

948. Have the Kat River settlers any reason to complain of the conduct of the Government or of particular magistrates?—Not that I am aware of. There has been a talk recently of their complaining about some idle squatters having been removed from there, I think, about July last.

949. Colonel *Dunne*.] Were you there at the time of the removal of those squatters?—I was at King William's Town.

950. At what time of the war were you wounded?—At the very first outbreak.

951. Sir *E. Burton*.] Are you of opinion that the political excitement which has been going on among the white people in the colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives?—Yes, I think so.

952. Has it affected them to any great extent?—I think it has. I do not think it has extended so much to the Kafirs, but with respect to the others, I think it has.

953. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You say that the military occupation of the country has been insufficient up to this time?—Yes.

954. Will you tell the Committee what was the character of that occupation?—We occupied a number of forts in British Kafraria.

955. Detached forts?—Yes; King William's Town was the head-quarters; and there were seven other posts.

956. Is that a good system, in your opinion?—Had they been occupied in sufficient numbers to act in case of any hostility, it is shown that they would have been of great service; but there were only enough there to defend themselves.

957. In regard to the future, would you rely upon the settlers as a means of defence, or would you depend entirely upon the regulars?—You must depend upon the regulars, I think.

958. The settlers are too far apart to be depended on?—It is a great inconvenience for them to meet for the purpose of drill, or anything of that kind.



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959. Could you depend upon them as irregulars?—Yes, I think you could depend upon the white population, decidedly.

960. Mr. B. Carter.] Do you find that the settlers gather round the forts more freely than in other quarters?—No; the forts have only been in Kafirland, and there were no white people there, except in King William's Town.

961. Chairman.] With respect to Kafirland, you must depend entirely upon the regulars, you think?—Yes.

962. Mr. Mackinnon.] Your opinion is, that a force of 3,000 British troops, and also the driving of those persons the other side of the river, would be necessary to secure the British power?—Yes, I am of opinion that they must be subjugated first; you must conquer them; they have never been conquered in fact.

963. Colonel Dunne.] You believe, in fact, that the last war was never completely finished; the people were never completely put down?—They were not.

964. Had they been conquered during the last war, probably the present war would not have occurred?—Decidedly not.

965. And you propose that the present war should be completely finished, and that then a proper system of defence should be put up?—Yes.

966. Would you propose to encourage the white population to go into Kafirland, when the natives were driven out?—If you do so, you must throw in a large population, so that they might rally, and form a defence for themselves.

967. Are you aware that the commando system was a more effective system of defence, whatever other faults it might have had, than any which we have adopted since?—In those days the Kafirs were not armed; they could not cope with any great force which might be brought against them.

968. Do you think they could cope with the Boers at the present time?—Yes.

969. When those Boers have formed a settlement of their own, will they be able, without support, to defend that settlement against the Kafirs?—No.

970. Are we likely to give them any support?—Yes, by means of forts.

971. I speak of those who have left the colony?—It is all open country to the north.

972. They could defend themselves, you think?—Yes.

973. Viscount Mandeville.] Did you hear the Kafirs make any

any remarks when the battalion of the Rifle Brigade left?—Yes, I have heard them express surprise at their shooting.

974. Have you ever heard them make any remarks as to what the effect would be upon them?—No.

975. You said the missionaries have not been useful in a single instance; did you confine that remark to their exertions upon the frontier, or do you speak of South Africa generally?—I do not speak of South Africa generally; I speak more of Kafirland.

976. *Chairman.*] Even in the case of regular troops, it requires some practice in the mode of warfare to be efficient against the Kafirs, does not it?—Yes, you are some time before you get into it.

977. *Colonel Dunne.*] Can regular troops, equipped as they are for ordinary warfare, become efficient; must not they alter their equipments?—Yes; at present the troops are dressed as burghers.

978. The ordinary dress of soldiers is quite unfit for Kafir warfare?—Yes, you cannot stoop and get through the bush.

979. *Chairman.*] The great difficulty you say consists in the nature of the country?—Yes.

980. The same difficulty would not exist in the open country?—No.

981. *Mr. Stanley.*] You consider that if the Amatola country were once clear there would be no great danger of future wars?—Not if you keep a sufficient number of troops there; but you must always have a large number of troops there.

982. *Chairman.*] When you speak of 3,000 men, have you contemplated the possibility of difficulty arising to the north-west, in the Orange River territory?—When I speak of 3,000 men, I mean them exclusively for the defence of Kafria.

983. Do you think it would be necessary to provide, by the presence of regular troops, against inroads on the north-western side?—You are not likely to have inroads into the colony from that direction.

984. *Colonel Dunne.*] What is the extent of frontier which you contemplate to defend?—It is about 100 miles.

985. Those regular troops, with the colonial corps, must be moved in columns?—Yes, you must have a force available, which you may move in three columns upon any given point, and it is not safe to move a less number of troops than 1,000 men.

986. *Chairman.*] What number of troops were maintained previously to this war upon the frontier?—In Kafria we had 1,100.

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987. Mr. *Hawes*.] Were you serving under Sir Harry Smith at the conclusion of the last war?—Yes.

988. Looking to the policy he has since adopted, of extending British military authority to the degree he has done in British Kafiraria, do you think that that has been the means of saving the colony from much loss and devastation?—Decidedly; there have been comparatively very few devastations committed upon the colony since that system has been established. Very rarely cattle have been carried into Kafirland without being traced and restored.

989. Looking at the state of the colony under the former system, and comparing it with its present state, are you of opinion that the policy now adopted has been very beneficial, and has afforded great protection to the farmer and settler within the old boundary?—Decidedly, up to the time of this outbreak.

990. Marquis of *Granby*.] There have been some dreadful murders committed by the Kafirs since the breaking out of the war, have not there?—Yes, they never show mercy if you fall into their hands; they never take a prisoner. The men in the rear, on a late occasion, having discharged their arms, were taken behind the rocks and their throats cut before they could reload. It was in an intricate pass.

991. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You are for clearing Kafiraria of the Kafirs?—That part of it occupied by the Gaikas.

992. You would require no more troops in Kafiraria, would you?—Yes, on the border you would.

993. The border would then be on the Kei, would not it?—I would not extend the border quite to the Kei; I would have an unoccupied territory between Amatola and the Kei.

994. Could you maintain that unoccupied territory?—I would have a chain of posts there.

995. On the unoccupied territory?—Yes.

996. Viscount *Mandeville*.] The Kei is a much more defensible frontier than any we have yet occupied, is it not?—Yes, much more so.

997. Colonel *Dunne*.] Is the Kei navigable for any distance up?—There was an instance the other day of a small vessel being brought in there, but that is the only instance.

998. Is it fordable at all points?—No, the fords are at some distance apart, but still in dry seasons you would cross at many more places than at other times.

999. Are those places too numerous for us to hope to block them up?—Yes, and besides that, the Kafirs can always swim any river.

1000. The most defensible boundary, you think, is an open space in which you can act with cavalry?—Yes.

1001. The chief use of horses now is for the purpose of conveying mounted infantry from one spot to another?—Yes.

1002. Mr. *Stanley*.] Are any large number of the Kafirs mounted?—Yes, I dare say they have a couple of thousand cavalry.

1003. You spoke of many of them having fire-arms; have you any idea of the proportion, as far as you could judge from what you saw of them?—Probably one-fourth or one-fifth of the whole may possess fire-arms.

1004. And those arms are serviceable?—Yes.

1005. Colonel *Estcourt*.] How do the Kafirs cross a river in any numbers?—They swim; they get a block of wood and drive a stake in it, and tie a handkerchief containing their powder to it, and then paddle themselves over.

1006. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think if the war continues, they will be able to keep up the supply of powder which is necessary?—No, I do not think they have any means of obtaining powder, except what they capture, or the rebels take to them.

1007. That would not be sufficient to carry on the war for any length of time?—I think nothing but hunger and famine would tend to bring the war to a close.

1008. Mr. *Booker*.] Are the arms which they have of European manufacture?—All of them, I think.

1009. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] English?—Yes, I think so; they are common muskets chiefly.

1010. Mr. *B. Carter*.] How was it that the late outbreak was so unexpected, occurring as it did immediately after the intimations that everything appeared to be quiet?—Sir Harry Smith made a demonstration; there were certain demands made upon the Gaika chiefs, as restitution for depredations, which not being complied with, he marched his troops for the purpose of a demonstration into Amatola, and they (the Kafirs) fired upon them; that led to the war; meeting a reverse at first, numbers went into it who would not otherwise perhaps have joined it.

The Reverend *James Adamson*, D. D., called in;  
and further Examined.

1011. Mr. *Hawes*.] WHAT is the nature of the duties imposed upon a missionary at any particular station?—That depends a good deal upon the character of the station itself,  
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whether it be a new one or one which has been some time established; in case of its being a station established for some time, his duties are very much like those of an ordinary clergyman in a village; he superintends the whole religious instruction of the people, officiates as their minister on the Lord's day, and conducts every religious operation necessary in regard to those who are converted, and takes charge of the means of education; he may teach himself, or have a body of teachers under him.

1012. Are specific instructions issued, by the bodies sending out missionaries, to their missionaries?—I am not aware of any specific instructions, further than that I think all the regulations contain a stipulation that the missionaries shall not interfere with political movements in any respect. As to a station newly formed, of course the missionary has a great many other affairs to transact; for instance, having fixed upon a station, he must erect buildings, in which he very often has to labour with his own hands; he must prepare cultivated grounds; all which require a great deal of personal trouble, and stand in the way of his proceeding to his proper business for a considerable time.

1013. Is he or not instructed to instruct the people in agriculture, or in any useful arts, as well as to discharge spiritual duties?—Undoubtedly; that is made a more prominent object of attention by certain classes of missionaries than others; it has been more especially the object of the Moravians to instruct them in agriculture and in other arts, than of other denominations of missionaries; but all of them necessarily engage in cultivation to a considerable extent, and endeavour to set an example to the natives of the way in which produce can be derived from the soil, such as introducing the use of ploughs or spades, or digging canals for irrigation.

1014. It is part of the practice of the Moravian missions, is not it, to instruct the people in agriculture?—It is.

1015. Are there any other missions in which it is made especially a part of the duty of the missionary to do that, besides the Moravians?—I have understood always that it was the case with all of them; the greatest operation of that kind which has been conducted in the colony was the digging a tunnel through the spur of a mountain to supply water to a missionary station, which was conducted by the missionary and the people under his charge.

1016. Of what denomination was he?—Of the London Missionary Society; he was the son of Dr. Phillip.

1017. Is there any difference in the respect shown to particular missionaries as compared with others; are the Moravians more liked by the people than the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, or the Scottish Missionary Societies?—I do not know that there is any difference as to the natives; sectarian differences are of very slight account in our country; the members of the different missions appear to hold very cordial intercourse, and sometimes the members of one mission may be transferred very readily to another. As to the opinions of the colonists generally, I think they have been rather in favour of the Moravians, in preference to the others; next, perhaps, are the Wesleyans. Then I may remark, as a very interesting circumstance, that when the French mission, in consequence of the late revolution in France, was apparently likely to be suspended or abolished altogether, the colony felt the value of operations of that kind in general, and of that one in particular, so greatly, that they came forward almost universally to offer their support, and collected a sum of money amounting to 1,200 *l.*, for the purpose of preserving that missionary station from being abolished. Nearly the same thing happened in respect to the American mission at Natal, in a season of great commercial depression in America, when orders had been given to withdraw their missionaries from that country by the Board of Missions of the United States; the people then professed their readiness to help, and the Government also came forward in that case and proposed to give pecuniary aid for the purpose of sustaining that mission; however, it turned out that it was not required. The missionaries of the London Missionary Society are, perhaps, upon the whole, less generally esteemed than the others.

1018. Has cultivation extended around those missionary stations, and has the example thus set induced any large body of the natives to follow agricultural, instead of their own pastoral and wild pursuits?—That is a question which of course can refer only to regions beyond the colony itself. I think the circumstances of the natives generally are of such a character, that in some districts that could scarcely be expected; there would scarcely be any means of agricultural operations afforded, from the barrenness of the soil and the want of water. In some regions, particularly along the whole north of the Orange River, and in a great part of the Northern Sovereignty, agriculture cannot be very greatly extended. I am not aware that the natives there have very generally emulated the example set by the missionaries, with the exception of the Griqua stations and the Kuruman station; there, I understand,

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a great deal has been done, and much more has been attempted, but defeated by the physical character of the country.

1019. Speaking of the missions within the colony, are there any natives who are farmers to any extent; take the Hottentots or the Gonabs, are any of them farmers to any extent?—They raise a great deal of produce in some of the stations; for instance, at Camisberg, under the Wesleyan body, there is a great deal of cultivation in the neighbourhood of that station.

1020. Do they raise it for food, or for the purposes of trade?—They trade with it.

1021. Are there any native farms of any extent?—There are farms held by coloured men, but not the property of the Hottentot race, but of intermingled races; I think they occur everywhere throughout the colony.

1022. The Committee rather gather from what you say, that the missionaries have not induced the people to resort to industrial occupations generally?—They have in the stations inside the colony; but I do not think that the character of the country beyond has permitted that, generally speaking, hitherto.

1023. Speaking of the stations within the colony, to which would you point as a proof that the Hottentots have been induced to become farmers or traders to any extent?—There is a great Moravian station at Genadendal, where a good deal of manufacture has been carried out, such as sewing muslins; at Riet Fontein, I think, a great deal of agricultural produce is raised. The stations within the colony are very generally attached to villages where the members of the mission churches are commonly working people, daily labourers; in some cases grounds have been purchased and divided into small properties, which have been put in possession of the natives, and those are cultivated as gardens; so that during certain seasons, such as the ploughing season or the reaping season, the native members of those stations can proceed to a distance where agriculture is carried on, for the purpose of giving their help at those peculiar seasons, or during the season of vintage, and then they return to their own small properties at other times, when they labour in their gardens to contribute to their support; that is the common mode of operating inside the colony.

1024. Do you think that the missionary influence has been generally extensively successful in the colony in inducing the native population to resort to agriculture or industrial pursuits?—I think it has.

1025. Speaking of the stations without the colony, take those,

for instance, in the Orange River Sovereignty, or in the Gaika country, have they been equally successful there?—The circumstances of the country do not admit of anything like the same success there.

1026. The country is not equally fertile?—By no means; the climate is very uncertain. We have two climates in our colony, bounded by the ridge which stretches diagonally across the country from the north-west to the south-east, and which divides it into two districts; in them the character of the climate is very different. One is an oceanic climate, where we receive all the rains from the ocean; the other is a climate where the rains occur only in the summer season, attended by thunderstorms generally.

1027. As regards the climate, the great difficulty you have to contend with is drought, is not it?—Particularly in the interior; there is not much fear of drought in the other region.

1028. Are there efforts made to form tanks to collect and preserve the water of the streams which dry up in seasons of drought?—There are few streams in the colony which are not led out by small canals for irrigation. The practice of forming tanks upon the farms has now become very common.

1029. Do the missionaries take an active part in promoting such works?—They do; in Kafirland the missionary stations have cultivated land, which contributes to their support. I think in the Kat River Settlement there is a great extent of canal digging for irrigation; I have heard it estimated as amounting in length to five miles.

1030. Have you ever visited the Kat River Settlement?—No.

1031. Have you ever read any reports which have been published in the colony respecting it; Mr. Biddulph's report, for instance?—I did not read that report; I have read the missionary reports, which alluded occasionally to its condition and its progress.

1032. Did you ever hear reports which were very unfavourable as to the industry and character of the people there?—Yes, I have heard that there were such reports.

1033. It was largely supported, was not it, by Government aid?—It occurred in this way; the Government intended to establish the Hottentot race in that country as a sort of refuge for them. They appointed a resident clergyman, with the understanding that the whole establishment was likely to be under his charge; but in consequence of the more respectable members of other missionary stations in the colony resorting there when lands were offered to them, a movement occurred

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among themselves to request the missionary under whom they had been to accompany them to that station.

1034. Colonel *Dunne*.] Who was he?—Mr. Read.

1035. Was that the father or the son?—The father.

1036. Is he a man highly spoken of by the missionaries?—I think he is; he seems a very zealous and devoted man.

1037. Mr. *Hawes*.] It is the fact, is not it, that there was considerable Government aid given to that settlement in the shape of rations and clothes?—Mr. Thompson was supported upon the Government establishment; I think privileges were conferred upon the residents there in the way of a preference being given to them in the purchase of forage.

1038. Are you of opinion that the system of giving direct Government aid in any shape to those stations is a desirable one to be pursued?—I think, at present, it can scarcely be dispensed with. Our Government has acted upon the principle of giving aid to all parties who would receive it, provided they could show that they were engaged in the public service. In respect to the missions to the late apprentices, we have had no scruple in requesting aid from the Government, and have received it; I do not think at present we can very well do without it.

1039. How is that applied?—What they give to us is a salary for my colleague in Cape Town, who officiates as the regular minister of a large coloured church there; and grants for the school.

1040. The question referred more particularly to the aid given to the Kat River Settlement in the shape of rations?—I should doubt very much the propriety of that system; I think that establishment led to a good deal of jealousy among the cultivators of that region.

1041. You do not happen to have read Mr. Biddulph's report upon the Kat River Settlement?—No, I have not read it.

1042. Did the missionary reports which you have read give a favourable account of the Kat River Settlement?—They have always done so.

1043. In what respect?—In respect chiefly to the spiritual condition of the people, with occasional notices of the operations they were carrying on with respect to agriculture.

1044. How is that progress in religious instruction consistent with the part which a portion of them have recently taken?—I do not know; the circumstances at present are exceedingly obscure; I cannot make out any consistent account of what has happened.

1045. You have no knowledge of the circumstances yourself?  
—I have not.

1046. With respect to the general climate and soil of Kafiraria, are they good, and is the land fertile?—It has always been represented as exceedingly fertile. It is a beautiful picturesque country; the streams from the mountains are the chief source of the fertility there.

1047. Is that country more fertile than any portion of the Cape colony proper?—Much more so, I believe, than the western division. The eastern division approaches the same character, but it has always been reckoned inferior. The country improves as you go eastward.

1048. May that explain the gradual tendency of the settlers to advance cultivation, and to encroach upon that district?—It explains its direction, inasmuch as towards the north you can scarcely make any progress at all, the climate is so irregular, and the country so bad.

1049. The Kafirs are not cultivators to any extent, are they, beyond the amount which is necessary to raise the food they want?—That is all; they cultivate rather by what may be termed garden culture; they raise millet, which is the grain of Africa, and pumpkins, the abundance of which is a peculiar characteristic of the climate also; lately they have introduced maize to a considerable extent.

1050. The Committee has been told that the Kafirs are generally without any belief in a future state; is that your opinion of them?—Yes, I think that is the case; the only word which occurs in the Kafir language indicating a Divinity is a Hottentot word.

1051. As regards the Kafirs, have the missionaries been at all successful in inducing them to embrace Christianity?—Not in point of numbers; I think the number is small; I am not aware myself what it may be.

1052. They have been more successful among the Hottentot race than among the Kafirs?—Yes; the Hottentot race, and the related race of the Griquas; and also with the Northern Sovereignty people they have been successful, I think.

1053. Colonel *Dunne*.] Into what districts is the colony divided?—There are about 22 or 23 different districts.

1054. What is the number of inhabitants in those districts?—The whole population of the country is estimated at about 200,000.

1055. Have you any idea of the population in the more distant districts?—No.

1056. When you speak of the population of the colony;  
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what tract of country do you include; is it the part which is coloured red on the map before you?—I should say the whole which is coloured red upon this map; the whole of the colonial territory.

1057. With the recent additions?—Not including British Kafaria.

1058. Excluding British Kafaria, it would be about 200,000?—Yes.

1059. Are they generally scattered over the surface, or are they congregated more in the neighbourhood of Cape Town?—The population is much more dense in the neighbourhood of Cape Town and in Albany than anywhere else.

1060. Can you state the proportions of those who are in the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Town, and in the more distant part of the province?—In Cape Town there are 23,000. In the Cape Town Almanack, which is published every year, the exact numbers are given for every district of the colony: the proportion of coloured people to the whites appears to me to be about as 78 to 72, the coloured people being somewhat more numerous. Out of the 200,000, there are perhaps 15,000 or 20,000 who are looked upon as a kind of wanderers; what are called native foreigners.

1061. Mr. Hawes.] In the former part of your evidence you stated that there was a considerable portion of the population in Kafirland who are not under any chief?—Yes.

1062. Are they Kafirs, strictly speaking?—Yes; I do not mean exactly that they are not under a chief, but I mean that the chief can exercise no authority over them.

1063. Is it known what proportion they bear to the whole population in Kafirland?—I do not know.

1064. Would they be accessible to the direct influence of British authority much more readily than those who are under chiefs acknowledge the authority of those chiefs?—I do not know, unless you had possession of the territory, how you could exercise any authority at all; any authority exercised hitherto in Kafirland<sup>1</sup> has been through the chiefs, till the country was taken possession of and made British territory.

1065. The proportion that this unappropriated population bears to the whole you cannot inform the Committee?—No; it can scarcely be called an unappropriated population, for sometimes the people will attach themselves to one chief and sometimes to another; very often, I suspect, according to the reputation he has of being an active, energetic man; if he acts in accordance with their general sentiments, which go so much to encourage depredation, his authority will extend over them.

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1066. With a view to maintain a friendly understanding with the Kafir population in British Kafaria, are you of opinion that any large proportion of the population should be actually removed beyond the Kei?—I do not think any should be removed.

1067. Would you remove any of the chiefs who have taken an active part in the hostilities?—Undoubtedly; I think it would be advisable that they should be removed entirely.

1068. What authority would you substitute for the authority of the chiefs; that of the British authority, directly?—Yes; I think you can trust to nothing else.

1069. Colonel *Dunne*.] If the chiefs were removed, do not you think the people would follow them?—If they were sent to any other native territory.

1070. Did you hear Major Bissett's evidence, which was given in a military sense, and have you any reason to doubt that it is a prudent way of defending our frontier, to remove those tribes which have been actually at war with us?—It appears to me you would have the same kind of frontier difficulties occurring; and moreover, if the Amatola range were freed from the Kafir population at present, they would be very likely to concentrate in the Quathlamba range, which is immediately beyond it. That separates the streams of the Orange River from Natal, and, I am told, is as difficult a ground for military operations as the Amatolas.

1071. What is the distance of this other mountain range from the Amatolas?—There can be said to be no distance between them; they are connected by a very narrow ridge or neck of mountain.

1072. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Is not there a dread on the part of the Kafirs generally, that the white men will dispossess them of their territories?—I have understood that that dread is general over the whole region.

1073. Should you trace the war in any respect to that feeling?—I presume it is never absent from the remembrance of the Kafir, that the white man has intruded upon the native population. That, unquestionably, is the active motive with them for watchfulness and caution, and for what we may call preparation for war, because they are constantly in the habit of preparing for war; all their conversation is about it, and all their common employments are sharpening their assegais or looking to their arms; and though there should be nothing in the shape of treachery, nor a preconcerted scheme to engage in war at any time, the whole character of their lives is in fact a preparation for war.

1074. *Chairman*.]

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1074. *Chairman.*] They are a warlike population?—Yes.

1075. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Dispossessing the Gaika tribes of their territory would tend greatly to increase this dread of the whites, would not it?—I think it would.

1076. I understand you to say, if these Gaika tribes were driven backwards, they would only be driven upon other tribes, who would in their turn endeavour to dispossess them?—They would certainly be driven upon other tribes, at least upon the territory occupied by other tribes; what may be the extent of that territory which those people do not really use I cannot say; when one tribe is driven in to another, they always sink into a subordinate position, and become a kind of slaves to those among whom they have been driven; that was the case with the Fingoes.

1077. *Colonel Dunne.*] The Gaikas would be driven back upon another part of their own tribe?—Yes, it would be a tribe closely related to them.

1078. Major Bissett stated that there is a space of 150 miles of unoccupied country between them; how then could they suffer?—They could not suffer if there were room enough, except by the loss of their cattle.

1079. Would it be necessary to take their cattle when you drove them back?—It appears to me that in conducting a warfare among Kafirs, the victory must be gained by the extent of your military means, and the sacrifice of the cattle is a necessary part of the operation.

1080. Suppose you drive them over the Kei, they may take their cattle with them, may not they?—The cattle would be either captured or killed in all probability.

1081. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] Supposing you drove them quietly, and let them take their cattle with them?—Then they might establish themselves in the country.

1082. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Are the Committee to understand you to say, that if the Gaika tribe was driven back upon the tribe next to them, they would be made the slaves of that tribe?—If they were of a different race; not perhaps in this case; they would become not exactly slaves, but as they have no property of their own, they are always held as inferiors. In the case of the natives beyond the Orange River towards the desert, they are stationed in the outskirts of the native population as a kind of defence against intrusion and attack, and they rank as herdsmen.

1083. *Chairman.*] Are you able to say how far that ordinary state of things might be modified by the close connexion subsisting between the Gaika tribes and those which they would

would find on the other side of the Kei River?—I do not know. You might perhaps make arrangements by which they might be favourably received.

1084. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] The Committee understand you to deprecate any system which would drive the Gaikas back upon other tribes?—Yes. I think, unless you adopted effectual measures for restraining the whole of the country which is bounded by our territories, anything you do of that kind would only remove the evil for a short time.

1085. *Chairman.*] Suppose the war to have been brought to a successful termination, and those persons to be altogether in our power, and it became a question what measures should be taken with a view to promote the defence of the colony, and what policy should be pursued towards that tribe, what course are you prepared to recommend?—I think, as I have said already, jurisdiction must be assumed over the whole territory, and civilization introduced as rapidly as possible.

1086. You think the whole of that country must be subjected to British rule, and to the immediate operation of the British Government?—I think so; and the sooner that is effected the better, because if it remains in any state approaching to what it now is, it will be a source of conflict at all times, not only with our colony alone, but with all the regions round.

1087. *Mr. B. Carter.*] You would effect that, would not you, rather by good treatment, and by sending British officers among them, than by driving them out of their own country?—Yes; I think to drive them out of their country would not tend to bring about the desired result.

1088. *Mr. Booker.*] Did not you say that there were extensive coal-fields in one of the border districts?—Yes; I had some specimens sent to me by the late Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, from a small stream which falls into the Caledon River, now in the Northern Sovereignty.

1089. Has there been any attempt made by the missionaries to introduce arts and manufactures among the tribes?—Not in those regions, except agricultural improvements. There has been a kind of art carried on in the country, in smelting metals and making brass ornaments, in the mountain region which borders upon the coal-fields. The natives fell into confusion and conflict some years ago, and the establishment has been given up.

1090. Do they weave their own clothing?—They do not weave; they make their own clothing of skin.

1091. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Could you now, or within a few days, give the Committee any information as to the number

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and localities of the various tribes on the eastern frontier?— I think that that could be procured through Dr. Smith, who was examined by the Committee before; he has spent a long time in studying everything relating to the native tribes of our colony, and has prepared an abstract of everything in the Colonial Registers in respect to the interference of the Europeans with the coloured population.

1092. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Are the Gaikas included among the Kafirs?—Yes.

1093. Their cattle are already taken, are not they?—They have been captured to a considerable extent, but there may be a considerable number hidden in the Amatola range.

1094. There is a report that their cattle have been taken across the Kei; do you know anything upon that subject?—No; it has been asserted at all times that they have been in the habit of driving them across the Kei when they are threatened with danger.

1095. Therefore they are in a measure prepared themselves to go?—Yes, I should presume so.

1096. There would not be much difficulty in removing them from the country, would there?—There would be no difficulty, if you are determined to do it.

1097. Would there be any difficulty with respect to the other portion of the people?—That would depend upon the disposition of the others to receive them.

1098. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Do you mean to say that they would not resist being expelled?—They would resist, no doubt.

1099. And there might be great loss of life in consequence?—Yes.

1100. Colonel *Estcourt*.] What do they now do for food?—They have their cattle with them, and it is presumed that they make small deposits of grain in places which they are acquainted with; I doubt if that can be carried on to any great extent.

1101. Mr. *Hawes*.] They do not use their cattle for food, generally, do they; the Kafir prides himself upon having a large herd as a proof of his wealth, rather than keeps it for the purpose of food?—They are very fond of animal food, but they live chiefly upon the milk of their herds.

1102. Colonel *Estcourt*.] For what purpose do they keep those cattle?—They kill them occasionally in times of feasting, and they are reckoned to be their wealth.

1103. Mr. *B. Carter*.] Do the members of a tribe pay any tribute to the chief, which enables him to be in possession of greater

greater riches than others?—Yes; I understand there are certain dues which he receives from many of them; one man may supply him with milk, another may give him a calf now and then; I think their emolument arises a great deal from their legal proceedings.

1104. Mr. *Hawes*.] They do not rear cattle as we do in England, for the ordinary food of their population, do they?—Not the ordinary food; it is used as a species of luxury; their common food is milk and grain Kafir millet, or pumpkins.

1105. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Is the chief generally the richest man in the tribe?—Among some tribes that is the case; it is the case with Moshesh; he claims the whole cattle of his district as his own; he does not, as far as I know, assert any title to the land as his own property. In consequence of an incursion driving the population of the country all away, and he alone being enabled to take refuge with his cattle on the top of the mountains, he claims, as his right, the whole of the cattle of his tribe, as being descended from his.

1106. They rather claim the right of ranging with their cattle over the country, than any actual property in the country itself?—Yes, they cultivate where they choose. The person who finds an unoccupied plot of ground cultivates it as long as he pleases.

1107. The idea of actual property in the land does not generally exist among them?—Not as the property of the individual; the property is in the tribe.

1108. Colonel *Estcourt*.] They choose certain localities for pasturage?—Yes.

1109. As the grass grows from year to year, do they go back to the same neighbourhood?—They keep a few permanent stations either for habitation or defence: if a severe drought falls upon the land they must move to some other.

1110. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] They migrate like pastoral tribes, do not they?—They do not migrate; I do not think migration occurs except in consequence of war within their own country; they move from one place to another, but it generally happens that the tribe is distributed in smaller settlements round the main one.

1111. You say they have no individual property in the land. The tribe itself has a certain amount of land as the property of the tribe, has not it?—Yes.

1112. Then the hardship would not appear to be great in their being directed to cross the river, where there appears to be plenty of land for them?—They would lose the garden pos-



sessions which they have, and there may be a doubt whether the other tribe would be disposed to receive them.

1113. Mr. *Booker*.] Would they willingly change cultivated for uncultivated land?—They are strongly attached to the places of their birth.

Rev.  
J. *Adams*,  
D. D.  
16 June  
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*Jovis, 19<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. *Hawes*.  
Mr. *Booker*.  
Sir *Edward Buxton*.  
Mr. *Hindley*.  
Viscount *Mandeville*.  
Mr. *Stanley*.  
Mr. *Mackinnon*.

Colonel *Estcourt*.  
Mr. *Bonham Carter*.  
Mr. *Fitzpatrick*.  
Colonel *Dunne*.  
Marquis of *Granby*.  
Sir *Joshua Walmsley*.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel *C. Ovens*, called in; and Examined.

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1114. Mr. *Hawes*.] ARE you in the East India Company's service?—I am; I am a Colonel in the Bombay Army.

1115. Will you state the length of your service in India?—I have served in India thirty-two years. I was first employed in the revenue survey department, after which I was sent as Bheel agent to Khandesh. During the last ten years of my service in India, I was quarter-master-general of the Bombay army and resident at Sattara.

1116. Had not the wild tribes in that district been troublesome, both to the people and to the government?—They had.

1117. Will you describe generally the state of the Khandesh territory, when it first fell into our hands?—In 1817 and 1818, when the British Government first took possession of Khandesh, it was in a complete state of anarchy, overrun by mercenary bands of Arabs, Pindarees, and Bheels, so that the roads were nearly impassable, and neither life nor property was secure.

1118. What

1118. What means generally were adopted by the Indian government to restore order in that district?—The Arab mercenaries and the Pindarees were very speedily put down, but the great difficulty which was experienced was in dealing with the Bheels. In 1819 I think it was, the then political agent reported to the government that the distress and terror of the inhabitants in consequence of the depredations of the Bheels was extreme, and that no improvement could be expected to take place in the state of the country till settlements were made with those wild tribes.

1119. Was the local government instructed to bring about that settlement, and if so, what was the nature of the instructions?—In consequence of that report coercive measures were undertaken, and strong detachments of troops were employed in different parts of the province against the Bheels, but they proved only temporarily successful, inasmuch as, as soon as the troops were withdrawn, they reassembled for the purpose of plunder, and carried devastation through the whole country.

1120. In the first instance military measures were resorted to to restore peace and order?—Yes.

1121. Will you state what was the result of those military operations; were the people subdued?—No; I mentioned that as soon as the detachments were withdrawn, which were employed against the Bheels, those bands again assembled and carried on their depredations, and devastated the country just as before.

1122. So that the military and coercive means to which you have alluded failed?—They permanently failed; they had only a temporary effect.

1123. Will you state to the Committee the civil means which were employed?—In 1824 and 1825, in consequence of orders from England to endeavour to introduce a different and conciliatory system, European officers were then appointed as Bheel agents; the province was divided into districts, and a Bheel agent appointed to each district, with full powers and instructions to settle all the Bheels within his own limits.

1124. Were those agents armed with magisterial powers?—They had very ample powers in every way; they had full magisterial powers.

1125. *Chairman.*] What was the extent of the districts over which they presided?—The district of which I had charge was about 100 miles in length, by 30 or 40 in breadth.

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1126. What was the amount of the population within that district?—It was not large; they were the very wildest Bheels in Khandesh; it bordered on the Nizam's territory; both above and below the hills, I should say, there was a population of 90,000 or 100,000 souls, of whom 10,000 or 12,000 were Bheels.

1127. Within the district of which you had charge?—Yes; in the whole of Khandesh I think the population might have been at that time 374,000, of which about one-eighth was estimated to be composed of the predatory tribes.

1128. Mr. *Hawes*.] Will you proceed to describe the nature of the conciliatory policy adopted by those several magistrates?—I stated that the Bheel agents were empowered to act as magistrates; they had powers to offer an amnesty to all who would submit, except to a few of the most notorious offenders, who were named, and to give a free pardon to all who would submit; they were empowered to grant protection also to all who came in.

1129. That is, personal protection?—Yes, they were empowered to grant lands, and make advances of money to those who would cultivate; to inquire into all their rights of which they had been deprived, and to restore those to which they were found to be entitled; to re-establish and reorganize the police of the country; and to raise a regiment composed of Bheels.

1130. In accomplishing this policy, did the agents come into personal communication with these chiefs?—They did; I think I may say I communicated personally with almost every Bheel in my district.

1131. Speaking his own language, of course?—Yes.

1132. Was the result of those arrangements and policy successful?—I may say perfectly successful; for in a report which I made to Sir John Malcolm in 1830, I stated that although all means had formerly failed to produce order, a conciliatory policy had been successful, inasmuch as Khandesh, which had formerly been in such a state of anarchy, was now as quiet as any district under the Bombay presidency.

1133. You stated that part of the measures adopted consisted in the grant of land, and also advances of money; was land granted and money advanced on any conditions such as the cultivating of ground or paying any revenue?—On condition of cultivating the ground and of holding it for a certain term of years, and repaying those advances within that term of years.

1134. Did they pay any taxes in any shape?—In the first instance, it was given them free for three years; they were then

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then bound to commence paying according to their ability, till the whole was discharged; and then I proposed that a small tax upon each plough, which was considered to be the fairest mode of assessment there, should be levied; indeed, before I left, they had begun to pay in small sums the money advanced.

1135. And generally those arrangements and this policy were successful both in restoring order and in bringing those wild tribes under the government of the company?—Certainly. I mentioned having made a report to Sir John Malcolm. I of course, entered into considerable detail in that report, and it shews the success of the arrangements made, and of the policy pursued.

1136. Could you consistently with your duty furnish the Committee with a copy of that report?—I have brought a copy with me, which I respectfully submit to the Committee, if it will be of any service to them.

1137. Did those magistrates reside constantly within their districts, and constantly superintend the arrangements, and see that the conditions were fulfilled?—They constantly resided within the district, and moved about from village to village hearing the complaints of the Bheels, and redressing their grievances, and personally superintending the whole of the operations.

1138. Was the magistrate in doing that supported by a military force?—There were small detachments of military which were placed in small parties in commanding positions. Their orders were to prevent any assemblage of Bheels for hostile purposes, and generally to maintain the peace of the country.

1139. Can you at all state the amount of the Indian force that is, European and native, employed by the Company?—We had no Europeans employed; they were all Sepoy troops. In that part of Khandesh of which I had charge, I think there might have been 200 or 250 regulars of Bombay Native Infantry, and about 600 irregular horse and malseebundeas (district police).

1140. That was in your own particular district?—Yes.

1141. The force generally within the province was no doubt larger?—Yes; there was a large military station at Malleigam, consisting of two native regiments and a large body of irregular cavalry at Dhoolia.

1142. Was that intended for the protection of that province, or was it part of the general military arrangements of India?—It formed one of the chain of posts; still it was for the protection of that province particularly, yet forming one of

the chain of posts connecting the Bombay territory with that of Bengal.

1143. You state that a corps consisting of those native tribes was formed; has that been successful from that time to this?—Perfectly successful.

1144. Has their fidelity been found uninterrupted?—So successful has it been, that it has taken, for some years, the whole of the escort duties of that province, guarding treasure and prisoners.

1145. Is it commanded by European officers?—Lieutenant Outram, now Colonel Outram, was the Bheel agent who had the raising of that regiment. He was then adjutant of the 23d Regiment of Native Infantry, and very much beloved by the men. He took certain non-commissioned officers and privates with him, and by that means, it may be easily supposed, he more readily succeeded in inducing the Bheels to submit to discipline. Those men speaking their language and understanding their customs, they submitted to discipline more readily, and became in this manner completely reformed.

1146. And they formed a corps which was to be relied on?—They are as good now as any irregular corps in the service.

1147. Having stated that you made a report to Sir John Malcolm, which you have put in; did Sir John Malcolm make any reply to that, expressing any concurrence of opinion with it?—He stated that it was just the thing that would do good. The report was ordered to be lithographed, and circulated throughout the presidency.

1148. Thereby giving his authority to it, and circulating it for general instruction?—As a sort of guide to others who might be employed in the same manner. He, also, in his work on the Government of India, speaks in terms of commendation of this settlement, and the good effects which have been brought about by it.

1149. Did the Home Government also concur in it?—Yes. In a despatch dated the 1st April 1835, it is stated, “This signal instance of (what we have so often impressed upon you) the superior efficacy of conciliatory means in reducing uncivilized and predatory tribes to order and obedience, is one of the most gratifying events in the recent history of British India; and we trust the success of your measures will impress upon our Indian government the policy, as well as humanity, of pursuing the same course in all similar cases.”

1150. You have probably acquainted yourself with a good deal of the contents of the Parliamentary Papers which have been

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been published in regard to the state and condition of Southern Africa?—I have read the Parliamentary Papers.

1151. Speaking from your experience in India, and from your knowledge of the contents of those papers, do you think the policy which was pursued in Khandesh is at all applicable to the wild tribes in Southern Africa, the Kafirs especially?—I must premise by stating that I have never been in South Africa; but it appears to me that the habits and feelings of all those wild tribes are so similar in many points, that it is probable the same principles might be applied, and with equal success, in settling those tribes also.

1152. Have you any other and more especial reasons for applying a similar policy to the tribes in South Africa?—Yes. I observe in the Parliamentary Papers to which I have alluded, particularly those laid before Parliament in August 1850, respecting the Settlement of Natal, that a similar policy has been followed by Mr. Shepstone, who is stated to be the diplomatic agent among the Zoolas there; and from his own account of it, contained in his Reports to the Natal government, pages 42 to 47, the principle of that system appears to me to resemble so much the system followed in Khandesh, that I think the presumption is, that if it has succeeded in Natal so well, it might also succeed elsewhere.

1153. Have you any opinions to offer to the Committee as to the measures which you think should be taken in Southern Africa to apply the Indian policy to the settlement of the differences which exist between the local government and those tribes?—I think that, as Sir John Malcolm observes, and reiterates in many of his reports, the great object is to have men fitted for the work; men speaking the language of the people, acquainted with their habits and customs, and disposed to make allowances for their prejudices and feelings; and, above all, I think that it is necessary to use the authority of the chiefs, to govern the people, in short, as much as possible through the medium of their own chiefs, and to avoid all sudden and premature innovations. The subsidiary measures must of course depend upon the state of the country; but still, as I before observed, as these principles have been applied in one part of South Africa, that is at Natal, by the diplomatic agent there, and as they are reported to have succeeded there in the same manner as they have done in India, it appears to me that they might be generally applied to other wild tribes with the same good effect.

1154. *Chairman.*] What is the amount of the salary given to

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to a Bheel agent?—I received 400 rupees a month, that was independent of my military pay and allowances.

1155. Were they chiefly officers in the army who were employed in that capacity?—They were all officers in the army.

1156. Do you think there was an advantage in employing military men in that capacity?—I think there was; by employing civil servants the salary would have been larger; and from the former being accustomed to deal with troops, and the military and civil power being united in the same person, a considerable advantage was gained.

1157. Do you think there was a disposition on the part of the natives to look up with greater respect to military men?—No, I do not know that I can say that.

1158. Mr. *Hawes.*] Had these Bheels any religion; were they Hindoos or Mahometans?—A portion of them call themselves Hindoos, and a portion call themselves Mahometans, but still they held very loosely to either faith.

1159. Were they a very superstitious race?—Very like all wild tribes, apt to take alarm at the slightest evil omen: they would change their encampments on the death of any person, or on the death of any cow or other animal; indeed the great difficulty was to induce them to come in and submit.

1160. Were they addicted to witchcraft?—They had what were called jadooqurs (sorcerers), who, I believe, a good deal resemble the prophets in Africa.

1161. Had they considerable influence over the people?—Very great.

1162. Do the chiefs make use of their influence for the purpose of acquiring power over the people?—Over their own immediate followers, certainly; among many tribes in India they were supposed to possess the power of taking away life by their incantations.

1163. Did the resident magistrates attempt to deal with those local superstitions in any way?—Only when they were brought before them in the shape of positive crimes; but not from any mere presumption of those persons being possessed of the power of witchcraft.

1164. Did the magistrates venture to arrest and punish those sorcerers?—Not unless they were accused of any positive crime; in that case they were dealt with just in the same manner as any other persons.

1165. Was that readily submitted to by the native population?—I found no difficulty in it, though I do not recollect any

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any particular case at this moment; I presume there would have been no difficulty in dealing with those men.

1166. Were their peculiar laws and customs, and local superstitions, respected by those resident magistrates, or did they attempt to interfere with them in any way?—They did not interfere at all; they were entirely respected, provided there was no criminality.

1167. They were brought alone within the British jurisdiction by the commission of crime?—Crime was always dealt with without reference to person or superstition; in other respects we never interfered with any mere superstition because it was a superstition.

1168. Did the magistrates exercise any civil jurisdiction; did they settle disputes regarding land or the payment of debts?—Not except with regard to the Bheels; they had full power over the Bheels, civil and criminal; they had only criminal powers over the rest of the inhabitants. The civil disputes of the rest of the inhabitants were carried to the Adawluts.

1169. Did the Bheels readily submit to the civil jurisdiction?—They did; because we made use of the chiefs in settling disputed points, and they generally followed the customs of the country in employing punchyats, which are juries.

1170. A kind of jury system exists there?—This punchyat is a jury system, composed of five, and the word meaning "five." This was the ancient system of India formerly; the civil government was chiefly carried on by that means.

1171. The chiefs lent their authority to the resident magistrates, and co-operated cordially with them?—Yes.

1172. Did the chiefs receive any pay or pension from the Company?—They had certain rights over certain districts, in consequence of being the hereditary guardians of those districts. They had also certain payments and lands from every village in their own districts. The lands were continued to them, but the payments in kind were commuted into a money payment, which we made monthly.

1173. Can you state to the Committee the average amount of payment to each chief in British money?—They varied so very much that I could not exactly state.

1174. Can you state the two extremes, the smallest and the largest payment?—I think the largest payment in my agency was about 150 *l.* a year, 1,500 rupees; the lowest might have been about 25 rupees.

1175. Did the revenue of the province compensate the Company for the expense of their establishment upon the restoration



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restoration of order and tranquillity?—When I took charge of my agency, which is situated both above and below a range of hills, called the Satmalla Hills, the villages in the immediate vicinity of the hills were almost all depopulated, and in a deplorable state. As those settlements obtained confidence among the people, the people returned to their villages, and I think I reported that 113 deserted villages had been re-established in the course of a few years, and the people had returned to the others also, so that the increase of revenue must be supposed to have been very considerable.

1176. You did not resort, with a view to the settlement of that district, to the formation of treaties with the chiefs?—Not at all. Cows, or papers of protection, were given to them; these were drawn up in a particular manner, stating, that as long as they behaved well and protected the country, and were present with the sirkar, their rights would be respected; but then those papers were given by the Government. They were not in the shape of a treaty; they were papers given to them as a sort of deed to give them confidence, and which they could always keep in their possession to show that their rights had been restored to them.

1177. It was in the nature of a personal protection, acknowledging the position or rank of the chief?—Yes, and guaranteeing those rights to him as long as he remained peaceable and performed the duties laid down in the paper.

1178. You ascertained in the first instance the rights of those chiefs, and then guaranteed them in this instrument of which you have spoken?—I myself personally examined into the rights, not only of the chiefs, but of all the Bheels within my agency. I ascertained what those rights were, confirmed those to which they were entitled, and settled them either at the plough or as jagleas (village watchmen).

1179. So long as they committed no crime which brought them within the British jurisdiction, you left them to govern themselves and manage their own affairs?—Yes.

1180. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You assumed first of all that you had possession of the country?—Yes.

1181. Was that disputed by those people?—No, they did not claim the country; they were driven into the hills, as I state in my report; the country had become depopulated in consequence of those marauding parties, and in consequence of the famine; they themselves took to the hills and plundered, but they simply claimed those rights which they had on the villages.

1182. In giving them letters of protection you did not say that

that the country was theirs?—No, there was no claim whatever to the country in that part of Khandesh, of which I had charge.

1183. In fact you took possession of the country as a conquered country?—It was taken from the Peishwa in the war of 1817 and 1818. When the war broke out between the Peishwa and the British Government it was conquered from him, that being then a portion of the Peishwa's dominions.

1184. Inhabited by the Bheels?—Inhabited by the same race which I speak of, and also by other castes; the Bheels do not form a very large portion of the population; the Bheels are a predatory tribe.

1185. Were they anxious to obtain these letters of protection?—They were extremely anxious at that time to be settled.

1186. Supposing quarrels had occurred between those tribes, in what way would the Government have enforced their authority?—By military means.

1187. Would the force in the country at the disposal of the officers who had the charge of those districts, have been sufficient to maintain the authority of the government in such cases?—If the detachment which I had under my orders had not been sufficient, I should have made a requisition to Mal-leigam, and a reinforcement would have been sent; but I had no occasion to do so, because as the settlement proceeded I dispensed with the assistance of the military altogether, except a very small body.

1188. There was a regiment raised in the country, was there not?—Yes, a Bheel regiment; a regiment raised from these predatory tribes.

1189. By whom was that regiment officered?—Colonel Outram raised the regiment, and there was another officer under him; there were but two European officers; native officers were brought from one of the native regiments.

1190. Those people had the advantage of being able to speak the language of the country?—Yes, they spoke the language of the Bheels themselves; they were acquainted with our discipline, and those Bheels looked up to them as being men of a higher caste; therefore that made them more disposed to submit to discipline. It was supposed they would not submit to discipline, but they did so, and it was found that this discipline brought about a more complete change in their habits than anything else. It was by enforcing discipline that they turned out so well.

1191. With regard to the disputes among themselves, who settled

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settled them ; had you anything to do with the disputes of the people ?—I had a complete control over those Bheels, both civil and magisterial.

1192. When there were disputes in the country among the people themselves, did they bring their disputes to you for settlement ?—Yes.

1193. In all cases ?—Yes, they were bound to do so.

1194. Did they refer them first of all to their own chiefs ?—The chief, for instance, generally settled disputes among his own Bheels, but provided he could not succeed in so doing they were referred to the agent.

1195. What is the character of the country ?—That part of the country of which I had charge was in fact a range of hills, extending about 100 miles east and west, and perhaps about 30 in breadth.

1196. It is a hilly country ?—Yes, and broken into very deep rugged ravines ; it was a very difficult country.

1197. Covered with jungle ?—Yes.

1198. You had cavalry, you say ?—Irregular cavalry.

1199. Were they to be used principally as messengers in keeping up the communications ?—No, as troops.

1200. Was the country fitted for cavalry ?—They were employed in the plains ; those hills were bounded towards the Deccan by tableland, and also below.

1201. There was a mixture of land ; sometimes a portion being mountainous, and sometimes a portion being level ?—Yes, the hills rise very perpendicular from the plain.

1202. Viscount *Mandeville*.] With respect to the annual payment to the chiefs, was that regulated by the amount of their former income ?—Their rights were inquired into, and commuted into a money payment, the amount of which of course depended on the amount of their former rights.

1203. The Kafir chiefs seem to have no regular income ; in what manner would you deal with them or regulate the payment to be made to them ?—Not having been in Africa, I could not presume to say. My opinion is chiefly formed from reading the account of the settlements which have been made in Natal by Mr. Shepstone ; he seems to have made use of the authority of the chiefs, and to govern those people through their means, very much in the same manner as we have done in Khandesh. They seem there also to be settled in localities ; he even states that they have paid a tax, amounting to between 3,000 *l.* and 4,000 *l.* ; he said he had visited 41 of those chiefs, and he had received between 3,000 *l.* and 4,000 *l.* as a tax, and he supposed the whole amount would

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be 10,500 *l.* per annum. I give this from the Parliamentary Papers of the 14th of August, 1850, regarding the "Settlement of Natal," pages 65 and 165.

1204. *Mr. Booker.*] Was all the military force withdrawn from Khandesh before these conciliatory measures were taken, or were the Company's officers backed by a large military force in carrying them out?—In the agency of which I had charge I think there were about 300 regular troops when I took charge of it, and perhaps there might have been 400 or 500 irregular cavalry, and malseebundeas (district police).

1205. Were the employments of the Bheels in that district pastoral, or what were their ordinary pursuits?—They had no fixed habitations when in the hills, and no cattle; in fact, no property: that was the great difficulty we found in dealing with men who had no property and no local habitation.

1206. You stated that you had paid attention to the Parliamentary Reports, as to the system of policy which of late has been pursued towards the South African tribes?—I have read them.

1207. Do you think there have been any mistakes made either by this Government or by the local Government?—Not having been in the colony, I could not presume to speak upon that point.

1208. *Mr. Hindley.*] By what means did those Bheels subsist if they had no property?—As regards their local habitations, perhaps, I ought to explain, that, although when those chiefs and Bheels were in the hills they had none, yet still they did belong originally to villages in the plains; they were hereditary watchmen of the villages of the plains. In those disturbed times they gathered in the hills, and instead of protecting the country, they plundered it. This being the case, of course it gave us a great advantage in reorganizing the police of the country, because, as they came in and submitted, we settled the hereditary watchmen in their own hereditary villages, and thus re-established the ancient police of the country, so that the jagleea became responsible for the police of his village, and the chief became responsible for the police of his district.

1209. Do not you think that that constitutes a great difference between the situation of the country you have been speaking of, and that of Kafrraria?—No doubt, that is a difference.

1210. *Mr. Booker.*] What was the nature of the frontier between the East India Company's possessions and the country you have spoken of; was it mountainous?—It was bounded by

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by those high mountains which are of a very difficult nature, rising almost perpendicularly from the plain of Khandesh, with the tableland of the Deccan above; that tableland forming the dominions of his Highness the Nizam; consequently that rendered the settlement more difficult, the Nizam's being a different country.

1211. Mr. Stanley.] What was the mode of life of the Bheels when resident in the hills; did they live entirely by plunder?—Entirely by plunder.

1212. The Committee understand you to say that the government have acted on the plan of governing through chiefs; was their authority over their subjects despotic?—I think that all cases of importance were submitted to the agent, but all smaller cases were generally settled by arbitration among themselves, which is the custom of the country, and by those punchyats or juries.

1213. Did you find it necessary to diminish the authority of the chiefs, in order to protect the people from them?—No, I do not recollect any instances of oppression on their part, inasmuch as in the case of any heinous offences they were brought before the magistrates.

1214. You say that you did not interfere in any manner with the customs or habits or laws prevailing among themselves; in that case, what law did you administer as a magistrate?—The police regulations of the Company's government, in all magisterial cases.

1215. In point of fact, they had no civilized system of law among themselves?—No, except the law of custom. In all cases coming under the head of magisterial cases the magistrate interfered, but they were left to themselves in everything regarding their local prejudices and feelings and customs.

1216. You did not meet with any jealousy on the part of the chiefs, from the fear of their authority being diminished?—I did not; I found no impediment from that cause at all.

1217. You were understood to say that waste lands were allotted to these tribes, and that colonies and villages were formed?—Waste lands were granted for a certain term of years; advances of money were made to enable them to purchase implements of industry and cattle; and the chiefs were placed in the colonies with their followers. There were also other Bheels placed in different villages of the agency separately. I think in my agency there were 25 of those colonies established when I was there.

1218. About what length of time did it take to transform those wandering tribes into peaceful colonists?—I took charge

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of the agency in 1825, and I was there about six years. The system was gradually progressing the whole of that time; but there has been no relapse, so that we may now consider the reform to be permanent.

1219. Was there any serious outbreak during the time you were there?—I think there was only one of any consequence; some of the colonists took to the hills, but they were almost immediately brought in again by their own chiefs, and punished. I think that was the only case of any consequence.

1220. From first to last you had the chiefs entirely with you?—Yes.

1221. Willing to co-operate in the work?—Yes.

1222. Was anything done in the way of opening the country by road communication?—The roads were improved; money was given to make wells in those colonies which I speak of, and their villages were improved as much as circumstances permitted.

1223. You stated that you considered the Bheels to be very susceptible of being worked on by kind treatment?—Exactly so.

1224. You have also stated that there is a very general resemblance, in your opinion, in the habits of all wild tribes; should you say that that is a characteristic of all savage tribes?—As far as my experience goes.

1225. *Chairman.*] In the report which you have given in, you describe these people as a wild race in the midst of civilization; what do you mean by that expression?—It ought to be understood comparatively, of course, because the cultivating classes and the other castes of the country, the Brahmins, the Rajputs, the Coombees, and the Mahometans, may be considered as civilized races compared to the Bheels.

1226. Those races lived intermingled, did they?—They were in the country; but the Bheels did not intermarry, or communicate with the others.

1227. Did they live in a completely different district, or were they all mixed up together?—They were all mixed up together.

1228. Did your functions as magistrate extend over all the inhabitants, or merely over the Bheels?—Over all. The Bheels were subject to me in every way; I had full power, both civil and police, over them; but over the rest of the inhabitants I had only magisterial power.

1229. How were they governed?—The rest of the inhabitants were under the collector of the district,

1230. *Mr. Hawes.*] Was there any attempt made to introduce

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duce schools for the instruction of the children of those tribes?—Not during my time; but the officer who succeeded me, succeeded in establishing a few schools.

1231. *Chairman.*] Were the religious opinions of the Bheels at all interfered with by missionaries or others?—In no manner whatever; there were no missionaries in the country; there were no Europeans, except ourselves.

1232. *Mr. Stanley.*] Was it a part of your policy to employ as police or as troops for the preservation of order, those who would otherwise have taken to a life of plunder?—Precisely so; those very Bheels, who were in point of fact the watchmen of the villages, had taken to plunder, because they were in the hills with their chiefs; when brought down again and placed in their villages, they became the police of the country, and, in fact, guarded that country which they had plundered before.

1233. The villages you speak of were formed of the more peaceful part of the population?—The villages were entirely composed of cultivators.

1234. *The Marquis of Granby.*] The feelings and dispositions of the Hindoos and Mussulmans are quite different, are they not?—Yes.

1235. Was the effect of the conciliatory measures equally beneficial towards both classes?—Yes, the system was applied to both without the slightest difference; in India we make no difference as to religion or caste; the effect was precisely the same in both cases.

1236. *Mr. B. Carter.*] You stated that these people were a savage tribe, living in the midst of civilization?—I spoke comparatively, inasmuch as the other castes, the Brahmins, and Coombees, and Rajputs, may be considered as a civilized race compared to the Bheels.

1237. They formed about one-eighth of the population, and were mixed up with other inhabitants, who were more civilized than themselves?—If there were a certain number of Bheels in a village, they would live in a distinct part of that village; they would not live mixed up with the Brahmins and the cultivating classes.

1238. In the district in which they lived would it have been possible for them to retire before the Europeans into any country which was not under the authority of Europeans?—They might have retired into the Nizam's country.

1239. There was a frontier bordering on the Nizam's country?—Yes; our country there is bordered by the Nizam's country.

1240. They

1240. They would in that case have had to contend with the subjects of another government probably hostile to them?—They might have retired into the Nizam's territory, but still they would have been met by the Nizam's troops, commanded by British officers.

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1241. They were not in the position of having any supposed rights of their own which were interfered with by the encroachments of Europeans?—No, they were not in that position; their rights consisted, as I say, of these dues from the villages, and they had been interfered with during those troublesome times by the native governments. That was partly the cause of their having been driven into these acts of rebellion and plunder.

1242. It was, in fact, a quarrel with other native tribes which led to the acts of rebellion?—There were no other native tribes there similarly situated to them; they had been deprived of their rights by the native governments.

1243. The Kafirs range over a large district of country, and possess cattle; is there any analogy between the condition of the Bheels in that respect and the Kafirs?—The Bheels had no cattle; in fact, the difficulty with the Bheels was, that there was nothing tangible; they had no property; our great object was to give them property.

1244. Your experience, in fact, is confined to an effective mode of dealing with native tribes in combat with Europeans; you do not speak of the position of the Bheels as being similar to that which the Kafirs now hold?—I cannot speak of the Kafirs from any personal acquaintance with them; my opinion as to the conciliatory system being applicable to other wild tribes is chiefly formed from the success it has met with at Natal.

1245. Mr. Hawes.] Are you of opinion that the possession of cattle on the part of the Kafirs, and their pastoral habits, render it more difficult to adopt the Indian policy than if they had no property and no cattle, and were merely a predatory tribe living upon plunder?—I should certainly think that if a tribe possesses property of any description it gives you a hold upon them, and gives you so far an advantage in settling them: That is our opinion in India with regard to those tribes. We have not any of those pastoral tribes there, and of course the country which I speak of is of a much more limited extent.

1246. Marquis of Granby.] One of the great difficulties you had to deal with was the lawlessness of the Bheels, and their savage mode of life, was not it?—Yes.



Sir *Andries Stockenstrom*, called in; and Examined.

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1247. *Chairman.*] ARE you a native of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—I am.

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1248. You have passed almost your whole life there?—I have lived there all my life, except that this is my third trip to Europe.

1249. In what part of the colony have you resided during that period?—In my earlier life I resided in Cape Town, but I have been principally in public employment in the eastern parts, except since the year 1839, when I have been upon a pension. I was for a short time upon a pension previously to that, when I lived in the north of Europe, in Stockholm.

1250. In what part of the colony do you now reside?—I now reside within 25 miles of Kafirland, at a place called Maestroom, in the district of Somerset.

1251. Have you landed property there?—Considerable.

1252. You yourself exercise the pursuits of agriculture there, do you not?—I am a farmer there.

1253. You have been connected with the government of the country?—Very much.

1254. Will you have the goodness to state for what period, and in what capacities?—I began public life in 1808, as a clerk; I was then a boy. In 1811 I entered the military service. In 1812 I was appointed a magistrate of Cradock district. In 1815 I became llandrost of the district of Graaf Reinet. On the 1st of January 1828 I became commissioner-general of the frontier of the eastern division, an office substituted for the lieutenant-governor at that time. In 1833 I came to this country and resigned my office, and retired to Stockholm, the land of my forefathers. At the end of 1835 I was called away from Stockholm by Lord Glenelg; and in the beginning of 1836 I was sent as lieutenant-governor to the Eastern Province. About the close of 1838, I think it was, I returned to this country. In 1839 I was removed from the office of lieutenant-governor. I then returned to the colony, and have been living in retirement ever since, except when, occasionally, the public service has called me forward.

1255. You have had abundant opportunities of forming an opinion upon the subject of the policy pursued by this country with respect to the border tribes upon the frontier of the colony?—In order to be very particular, I have put in writing my answer to that question. Having given that answer, it will

will be for the Committee to decide whether they think it worth while to ask me any further questions. Having yesterday received a summons to appear before this Committee, I have deemed it my duty, with the utmost deference, to comply therewith. At the same time I consider it right respectfully to inform the Committee that I gave my views with reference to the affairs of the Cape frontier most fully before the Aborigines Committee of the House of Commons, in the years 1835 and 1836, and have, within the last five or six years, had occasion to make some communications on the same affairs to the Colonial Department, in Downing-street. I humbly submit, that it may save much of the valuable time of the Committee, if I be allowed to refer to my said evidence and communications, and to add, that I fully adhere to the opinions, as well as the facts, therein stated by me, and that subsequent events have unfortunately too much confirmed my views in general. For the facts stated by me I am of course responsible; but I take the liberty to submit to the consideration of the Committee how utterly hopeless it is to get at the truth on any disputed point without the most full investigation on the spot, where the witnesses on all sides may be heard and confronted; and I cannot better prove this assumption than by the following circumstance, which is within the immediate reach of the Committee. In the Parliamentary Blue Book, on the "State of the Kafir Tribes," dated 20th March 1851, there appears at page 10 a letter, which I addressed to the Cape government on the 1st July 1850; and in page 108 of the Parliamentary Blue Book, on "a Representative Assembly at the Cape," dated 19th May 1851, there appears another letter of mine to the same government, dated 11 July 1850. In a despatch, dated February 18th, 1851, published in the last-named Blue Book, at page 202, Lord Grey writes to the Governor of the Cape, "I am glad that the civil commissioner of Victoria has been able to furnish you with satisfactory answers to the statements made by Sir A. Stockenström and Mr. Hart, relative to the treatment of the natives in that quarter." Now I have carefully examined every report or statement which has been published in any of the Parliamentary Blue Books, as received from the said civil commissioner of Victoria, and I cannot find that they contain one syllable referring to either of my said letters; and so far from any "satisfactory answer" to, the said civil commissioner in a great measure confirms the main point of my said letter of the 1st July 1850, without referring to it, where he says, in his letter of the 4th October 1850, to be found in page 35 of the

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the said Blue Book, of the 20th March 1851: "The Tambookies say, and with truth, that a large piece of fine country has been taken from them, and given to the farmers along the Stormbergen. They agreed to this, in the full confidence that Kralee would be ordered out of the Ballotta," &c. My statement is, that the field cornet, Z. Pretorius, "resorted to me for advice and assistance in obtaining from the Governor the execution of his own promise, whereby he had given the said Tambookie territory to the farmers." I leave to the Committee to judge in how far the former passage is a "satisfactory answer" to the latter. The same field cornet had also, as I stated in my said letter, "produced a copy of a memorial which the said farmers had presented to the Governor, the details of which I cannot now give, but which in substance prayed for the annexation of the said territory to the colony; and the reply to which, written and signed by the Governor's own hand, which Pretorius likewise produced, granted the prayer, subject only to this exception, viz., that the Kafir chief, Rama, and his followers were not to be expelled, because the former was a Christian, and the latter would make good servants for the farmers." I have just seen a Parliamentary Blue Book, containing a letter, in which the Governor writes that the document above stated to have been written and signed by his own hand, if it exist, must be a forgery. The Committee will judge whether a forgery connected with so vital a question ought not to have at once become matter of investigation on the part of the Attorney-general, in July 1850, when the Governor received notice of its existence. In the meantime, the field cornet has been dismissed for trying to enforce that "forged" document, without the slightest inquiry as to this document itself; and the Tambookies, from whom, as the civil commissioner says, "a large piece of fine country has been taken," have joined in the war against us. It strikes me that the merits of this question cannot be decided without the most minute examination and confronting of the field cornet and several other witnesses. To my other letter also, as above named, the civil commissioner, so far from affording "satisfactory answer," does not make the slightest allusion, that I can trace. The fact is, that the complaints of the Kat River Hottentots, as therein contained, were fully substantiated, as the Committee and the public would have found, if the Blue Book had contained the proceedings of a court of inquiry, in consequence of which the magistrate complained of received a hint that he ought to resign, without, however, any satisfaction or compensation

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being made to the aggrieved parties, some of whom are or have been, I believe, in open rebellion. There are, consequently, in the Blue Book, no "satisfactory answers" to the statements made by me; and I am bound, with every possible deference, but firmly, to maintain that without a commission deputed to the Cape, composed of men of the highest character and independence, totally unconnected with the colony or any party therein, to examine the numbers of witnesses of opposite opinions and interests, whom it is almost impossible to bring over to this country, the British Government and Legislature will never be able to ascertain the true causes of the disaffections, disturbances, and wars, which are at present raging at the Cape; and to do justice, unless a free constitutional government be granted to that colony, whose local knowledge and public scrutiny would render all mystifications very difficult at least. After this preamble, I shall feel great satisfaction in affording the Committee every information in my power.

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1256. Without entering into particular cases, such as that to which you have alluded, will you have the goodness to state to the Committee generally what you believe to have been the cause of the late outbreak?—I think our vacillation in systems, in making treaties and breaking them, and the nature of the people we have to deal with. One party will tell you they are all harmless inoffensive people; another, that they are irreclaimable savages. They are both equally remote from the fact; they are just barbarians who will plunder, and require to be kept tight. At the same time strict justice and humanity are the only means by which you can rule that or any other nation, I believe.

1257. Supposing this war to be brought to a successful termination, what is the course which you would suggest as desirable to be pursued upon the frontier of the Cape colony?—Allow me, with every deference, to say that I believe there is not a man in this country, or at the Cape, who can tell you what must be done at the close of the war; everything depends upon its termination. I ought to know a great deal of our colonial natives, but I cannot tell you what ought to be done. What we are to do now is, not to rest till we have those people down. They believe themselves our masters now, and unless they are put down they will drive us out of the colony. But then, on the other hand, when the question is put to me, what ought to be done? I can only say that justice and truth are the only means which we have to rule the colony.

1258. Are you able to suggest to the Committee any practical

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tical measures, which, in your opinion, and from your experience, you think the Government of this country ought to adopt in reference to these tribes, in the event of the British authority being completely re-established over them?—I could have done that 20 years ago, and I did so; it is a very difficult question now; we have now called in the Zoolas and the Amapondas, to attack those people in the rear. That involves the question in a new difficulty; it is the greatest misfortune which could ever happen to lead the blacks into the idea that we want their assistance; if we could not do it ourselves, it would be better to give it up; I believe we were perfectly competent to do it ourselves.

1259. Do you mean that, supposing Kafraria to be subdued, you anticipate further difficulties with the Zoolas?—With all the tribes which we call into our assistance now; I believe it is an ascertained fact that the moment the request came to Port Natal for the Zoolas, they at once assumed an arrogant tone towards the whites. They said they never could have expected the white men would have required the assistance of the blacks.

1260. Do you think that there would be any advantage in pushing the frontier as far as the great Kei River?—I thought so in 1846, provided you had adopted a certain humane policy, and would acknowledge Kreli, the son of Hintza, as the paramount chief, and entered into negotiations with him; it would have been a complicated matter even then; I do not see now how it is to be done.

1261. Do you still think that in connexion with new measures of another description, it would be advantageous that the Kei River should be the future boundary of the British colony?—You might enter into a certain system, but I think it has become very difficult to rule those natives; I believe there is not a more able officer anywhere than the officer we have had there for two or three years carrying on this system, the officer who acts immediately under Sir Harry Smith.

1262. Whom do you mean?—Colonel Mackinnon. I do not know him personally, but I have heard from all quarters that he is a man of the strictest integrity, and wishing to do justice, but under the present system he cannot do it.

1263. Under what system?—The system he has carried out; the patrol system. And if you look to the Government Gazettes, you will find that if a man has committed a crime in the colony which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the colonial courts, in which he may be tried according to the laws of the colony, convicted and punished, he is brought over,

over, and if it is supposed that there is not sufficient proof before those courts, he is tied up and flogged. No nation on earth can submit to that. I quote the Government Gazette.

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1264. Do not you think that it would be possible to devise some improved system of managing the internal affairs of Kafria, being of opinion, as you are, that the existing system is liable to so much objection?—It entirely depends upon the termination of the war; I should revert to my original opinion, which is on record. I should leave those people independent, and rule them through the chiefs. I would gain an influence over the chiefs.

1265. You would not attempt to rule them through the means of Englishmen?—I do not think you can gain anything by doing that; but it comes back to the same question. We have got ourselves into such a labyrinth that it is impossible to say what you will have to do at the close of the war.

1266. You are not prepared to suggest any very distinct policy which, in your opinion, ought to be pursued in reference to these tribes at the close of the war?—I should refer to what I stated before the Committee in 1835-6, which it is impossible for me to recollect. I should be disposed to refer with confidence to that; modifications may suggest themselves at the close of the war, and we may see how matters may then stand. I dare not commit myself now by suggesting anything.

1267. Do you think that the outbreak which has recently taken place is attributable to the absence of a military force of sufficient amount upon the frontier?—Decidedly; under the present system they could not do with the present force. I do not think 5,000 men would carry out that system permanently.

1268. You consider the system itself radically impolitic and unjust?—Radically bad and impolitic; I have stated so repeatedly. The Kafirs have been in a state of agitation ever since that system was adopted. They have been constantly plotting against the colony ever since that system has been in force. Since the last war there has never been one moment's permanent peace upon the frontier.

1269. What is the radical vice of that system which has produced those effects?—Those men do not like to be deprived of their land and to be domineered over by us. It is not natural that they should.

1270. Do you think that no system of interference is necessary

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sary for the protection of the British colonists against the inroads of these barbarous tribes?—For a long time Kafirland was ruled by a species of prestige; the black man had a fearful idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white; he has lost that; the prestige has gone.

1271. Has not that been the result in a great measure of his having become acquainted with the use of fire-arms, and very much better able to cope with the white man than he was in former times?—That contributes at present to his showing that strength; they never thought of meeting us in the open field till 1846, when they defeated us, and burnt all our waggons.

1272. They have now become a most formidable foe?—A very formidable foe, I assure you; they are now united; heretofore we have had to do with Kafirs only, and only with tribes of Kafirs occasionally; so that sometimes you could keep all the others quiet while you were dealing with one tribe. We had the Tambookies in our favour; they are now against us.

1273. Do you think that under any policy which can be suggested or pursued, it will be possible to live on the frontier, for some time at least, without the defence of a considerable military force?—For some years to come it will be impossible; affairs have got into that state that you must expect to keep up a considerable force.

1274. Do you think that the colonists would be either able or willing to defend the frontier against the inroads of those savage tribes, without the assistance of the Queen's troops?—Not without the assistance of the Queen's troops, but they have invariably borne the brunt of the business; whenever there was a war they turned out by hundreds. In 1846 I was called on by the Governor, in consequence of the burgher forces requesting that I should lead them. The burghers came from every part of the colony. I dare say the Governor had 6,000 or 8,000 colonial troops upon the frontier in a very short time, as soon as they could reach it.

1275. Is not it the fact, that the manner in which the Kafirs have improved in the means of carrying on wars successfully against the whites has made it much more necessary that there should be regular troops to oppose them than in former times?—For some time to come, decidedly.

1276. At present the colonists would naturally and properly shrink from coping, unassisted by the regular troops, with these barbarians?—They cannot be permanently upon the frontier, therefore they expect to have troops there; they are perfectly

perfectly strong enough, as long as they are in the field, to cope with the Kafirs.

1277. It would be a great inconvenience to the colonists to be on constant service?—It is impossible.

1278. Do you think the colony would be disposed, in the event of their having representative institutions which were satisfactory to them, to bear the whole or a considerable portion of the pecuniary burden of maintaining a military force upon the colony?—That brings me back to my former answer. It all depends upon the manner in which the war is ultimately settled and the state in which the frontier is delivered over to them. It is quite impossible to decide what the colonists would do, or what they ought to do, before you know how the war terminates, and in what state the frontier will be delivered over to them. It is impossible for any man to say, or to pledge the future Parliament as to what they would do, or what the colony would do generally. The colony is entitled to a constitutional government; accepts it, of course, with all its legitimate responsibilities: beyond that I would not take upon myself to go. That is what they have themselves said. In various petitions which they have sent home they have repeatedly stated that that is what they wish.

1279. In reference to the defence of the colony, do you think it would be important either that the seat of government should be transferred from Cape Town to some point further in the east, or that the colony should be divided?—I do not think either step to be necessary; I think an executive officer with full powers would be necessary upon the frontier.

1280. You think there can be such an executive officer who is not the governor of the colony?—A lieutenant-governor, decidedly; I do not see any objection to that.

1281. Are the interests and feelings of the eastern part of the colony, and that of the western part of the colony, absolutely the same in respect to those subjects?—No; a very small fraction in the eastern part of the colony are for separation. It may be necessary here to observe that the people of the west have no objection to separation; but the majority object to separation, except through the Parliament; the majority would have no separation, except as the act of their own parliament.

1282. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Great objections are entertained by you to the present system?—Yes.

1283. What are the precise objections which you entertain to the present system?—I object to our having, for instance, the right of sending patrols among those people as one of the greatest

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greatest misfortunes, and which has brought on several successive wars. I object to the flogging system, which is, that when a man's case cannot be sufficiently proved, he shall by the mere *ipse dixit* of an individual be tied up and flogged, when the proofs are not supposed to be sufficient to bring him before a competent court. In the long run no people on earth can submit to that; it has been carried on by one of the ablest and most upright officers, though I have not the honour of knowing that gentleman; he has done his best, but it has failed under him, and the Kafirs have had the cunning to make him and others believe that they were satisfied; and while they were kissing hands and receiving presents, they were brooding over their misfortunes, and they have been caballing and plotting for war ever since the moment that system was set on foot for the second time; it is not a new system; it is the second time it has been tried.

1284. Under what authority was the patrol system established?—The patrol system had its origin in 1817, under Lord Charles Somerset; it has been going on from that time to this.

1285. Is the patrol system different from the commando system?—Yes, the patrol system is distinguished from the commando system.

1286. The commando system is an old system?—Yes; but it has been mistaken. I have met with some men ignorant enough to suppose the commando system meant a parcel of people going and shooting anybody whom they came across. In cases of emergency, a field cornet had a right to call out people on the frontier; in some cases the magistrate might do so; but, generally speaking, and in cases of general war, the Governor only had the right to call out a commando. That was the old system, from time immemorial; but the patrol system was established in 1817, by which, if you lose your cow, and can show the spoor, you follow it with the patrol, and the first kraal you come to you demand satisfaction; if the kraal do not pay you, you seize their cattle.

1287. What does that patrol consist of?—It often consisted of a field cornet and some burghers, who were collected together; lately, generally, it has consisted of military men, a military officer being at its head.

1288. Under the old commando system, did not they follow the spoor of the cattle under the field cornet?—A commando very seldom collected, except where it had been ascertained that there were a gang of robbers to be dealt with; on ordinary occasions the field cornets and the landrosts had a right

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to order out the commando in case of emergency; then, of course, they went upon the spoor.

1289. Did they deal with the natives in the same way as the patrols did?—They brought their own property back; it was not then permitted them to demand compensation, except when the Government went to war. If they found their own property they brought it back, but they could take nothing from the natives.

1290. The patrol system has been adopted ever since 1817?—Ever since 1817, with a short intermission; I believe from 1836 up to 1844; during that time there was no patrol system.

1291. Then the principal difficulties have arisen since that?—I know that under my administration, as lieutenant-governor, and as long as Sir George Napier was governor of the colony, and up to 1844, there was no patrol system.

1292. What makes the question so complicated since the last war with the Kafirs; if the patrol system has been going on since 1817, what new state of things has now arisen?—It was most pernicious while it lasted; it brought all the misfortunes upon the colony. All those things will appear stated before the Committee on Aborigines, in 1835 and 1836.

1293. Mr. Hindley.] What was the effect of the suspension of the system between 1836 and 1844?—The effect is very difficult to state; it will be necessary to refer to Downing-street; I can only speak respecting it up to the end of 1838. I left the government of the Eastern Province at the end of 1838. Governor Sir George Napier's despatches may be found, and it will be better to refer to them. The Committee will see from them in what state the colony was then. Lord Normanby put into my hands a despatch from Sir George Napier, containing a report from Colonel Somerset; that despatch is dated 1st of February 1839; it will show the state in which the country was then, and the feeling of the Governor as to the system which was then going on; but having been out of office since that time, I know very little on the subject that can be considered authority.

1294. Sir E. Burton.] Did that despatch give a satisfactory account generally, or an unsatisfactory account?—A very satisfactory account, particularly the enclosure from Colonel Somerset. Generally, I beg to refer the Committee to Sir George Napier's statement up to the end of 1838 and the beginning of 1839; this despatch is dated the 1st of February 1839; there were others to the same effect.

1295. Mr. Hindley.] In fact, from 1836 to 1844 were there any

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any robberies of any consequence committed by the Kafirs?—There were robberies; on the frontier there have been robberies as long as I have known it, more or less; but I know of no instance of a breach of treaty.

1296. Mr. Booker.] Being a native of the colony, and resident within 25 miles of Kafirland, have you been in personal communication with the tribes and the chiefs?—Constantly.

1297. Up to the year 1836?—Up to the present time; that is to say, I live near the frontier, and those men had a kind of notion that I could be of assistance to them, and they have annoyed me so much that I have been obliged to be rude, and to keep them off.

1298. In what way was that prestige, which you spoke of, kept up; had they a high opinion of our military strength, or of our justice and humanity?—Both of our moral and physical superiority.

1299. What circumstances have led to the alteration of that opinion?—Various circumstances, which are stated in my evidence before the Committee on Aborigines, to repeat which would require me to enter into particulars which I should rather abstain from; we have come into contact with these people; we have done wrong, and they have done wrong.

1300. To maintain that opinion, was it necessary to use our physical force vigorously?—If we had strictly used our moral superiority over them, we might have avoided bringing into play that physical force, and teaching them their strength.

1301. Do you think it is possible to regain that opinion by any other means than by conquest?—You must conquer now; they must be put down; they have an idea now that we are the weaker party, and they would not let us rest; we must put an end to the war, and that cannot be done by fine words.

1302. Do you think it would be a very difficult matter to accomplish that, or that it would require a very great expenditure of blood or treasure?—I do not think so, if we could bring the colony to be as unanimous as they were in 1846. I believe there are gentlemen in the room who can say what force we had on the frontier in 1846; it was immense, and if those men could be brought to come forward as they did then, with the resources which have gone from this country, the war would be soon put a stop to. But allow me to say, that we have now got additional enemies to deal with; we have the Tambookies. The Galekas have also joined against us, that being a very powerful tribe.

1303. Do you, as an owner of property in the colony, think it would be safe to grant a representative government in the

the present state of things?—Decidedly; I think it would be quite safe to grant it, and absolutely necessary, in order to make the colony unanimous; I do not think you could accomplish the object without, unless an overwhelming force goes from this country, and we keep the Cape of Good Hope as the French keep Algiers.

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1304. Marquis of Granby.] You have said that you are of opinion that the Kafirs must be put down by force, and you have also said that in 1836 you thought it would be very desirable, in order to put them down, to make the Kei the boundary of the colony?—To make the Kei the boundary of the colony, and look upon Kreli as the paramount chief, entering into treaty with him as we did in reference to the territory upon this side. My correspondence with Sir P. Maitland contains my views on this point.

1305. You were of opinion, then, that you would make the River Kei the boundary of the colony?—Under certain modifications.

1306. Would you treat them as British subjects, supposing you were to make the Kei the boundary?—I doubt it; it would depend in a great measure upon the terms which you might come to in reference to them and their chiefs; I do not think you can do anything with those people except through their chiefs; I never found the possibility of doing anything with them except through the chiefs, keeping a sort of moral control over the chiefs. It is difficult now; at the same time you must keep up the idea that your power is very great; but I think by the chiefs alone you can control the Kafirs, unless you crush them altogether.

1307. Supposing it is necessary to carry the war to a successful termination, why is it not equally expedient now to push the boundary as far as it was taken in the year 1846?—I think the Kafirs are more exasperated against us; they are less disposed to enter into understandings and treaties with us. It will be a very difficult question, which can only be solved at the time when the war is put an end to; it depends upon how you end this war. Our frontier affairs are in a perfect state of chaos.

1308. You think that no measures of conciliation can have any good effect at the present moment?—I think they may, provided you get the upper hand of them completely; they will not give in; their feeling as to their own strength and our weakness is so great that they will not give in unless you do put them down. Whatever may have been the origin of the war,

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1309. Mr. B. Carter.] In reply to a former question, as to what were your objections to the present system, you mentioned two points; if you have other points of objection, will you continue them; the first you stated was the right to send a patrol; the second was the practice of flogging?—I refer to the Government Gazette with respect to both points.

1310. Do you consider that those are the chief objections, or are there any others which you wish to add?—There are details which led to our earlier disputes with the Kafirs, which are stated in my evidence in 1835-36.

1311. Sir E. Buxton.] Was the flogging system frequently adopted?—That I cannot answer for. The Government Gazette was shown me as proof of the system.

1312. Are you aware whether there have been many cases of persons being flogged?—I cannot answer; I saw the cases I have referred to published in the Government Gazette.

1313. The commando system, though it was legal, was open frequently, was it not, to very great abuses?—Very great.

1314. Did not it practically consist of a band of men who murdered whomsoever they pleased?—No; such instances were invariably punished if they could be traced.

1315. It did not go to that extent?—No. If a farmer lived upon the frontier and was attacked by the natives, he would gather together his neighbours, and they would defend themselves; but the commando system never authorised anything of that kind.

1316. Mr. Hindley.] Do any British subjects occupy land in British Kafria?—I believe not, except on sufferance by the Kafirs; I am not aware how that may be; what has taken place since 1838 I merely know from what I learn occasionally; I have not been in Kafirland since 1846.

1317. As far as your impression goes, you do not think that British subjects do occupy land in British Kafria?—It may be that they do with the permission of the chiefs. Colonel Mackinnon may have authority for allowing it, but that I cannot answer.

1318. It appears from the map that the country is divided into districts, which are named; what kind of jurisdiction do we exercise in those different districts?—I know nothing of them.

1319. What kind of influence and jurisdiction have the British settlers there. The land of that country, you say, is not occupied at all by British settlers, but it is left entirely to the

the Kafirs. You say they do not like to be domineered over and deprived of their land; have they been deprived of their land in British Kafraria?—I cannot say. The bone of contention now is the land between the Kat River and the Keiskamma.

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1320. Sir E. Buxton.] Supposing a boer were attacked and robbed, what did he do to recover his property under the commando system?—He rode after it as fast as he could to recover it, and if it was necessary in recovering his property, he would fire upon the thief. If he could not succeed individually he would collect his neighbours, which was always considered justifiable.

1321. The field cornets had authority to summon them?—In cases of emergency, when there would be danger arising from the delay of referring to a magistrate, who might be 300 or 400 miles distant.

1322. Supposing a legal assemblage of people were collected, and entered Kafraria to recover cattle; if the cattle of the Kafirs were taken away, would not the Kafirs also follow them, and thus a disturbance ensue?—The commando would go to the chief, and require satisfactory compensation from the chief. Under the patrol system, the party would go into Kafirland, upon the spoor, and if the man did not find his own property, he would seize the cattle of the first kraal the spoor should lead him to.

1323. Mr. Hawes.] I understood you to say that there were two great evils of which you complain, the patrol system, and what you describe as the flogging system?—Yes.

1324. I understood you to say that the patrol system originated about 1817?—Yes.

1325. Is the flogging system under the colonial law of long standing?—No, we never had anything to do with the Kafirs as to their domestic affairs.

1326. Is it confined to the Kafirs?—I am only speaking of what I have found in the Government Gazette.

1327. Will you state what you read in the Government Gazette?—I can refer you to the Gazette if I have time given me. It merely states that a man had been taken stealing in the colony, and it being considered that there was not sufficient proof to send him to the colonial court, he was flogged.

1328. Are the Committee to understand that it is a punishment exercised summarily by magistrates there for the offence of theft?—I do not know whether it is done by the magistrates;

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trates; it is done in King William's Town under martial law. I refer to the Government Gazette, which you have, of course.

1329. Is what you speak of quite recent?—I suppose it is about a year or eight months ago.

1330. You have described it as the flogging system?—The Government published this as an act which had taken place under their auspices. It must therefore be a system.

1331. Are the Committee to understand you to mean that it is a system adopted to punish the Kafirs for theft; and that being adopted as a mode of punishment, as such you object to it?—I object to any punishment which has not the sanction of the Kafir chiefs, and of the nation generally. I object to the system, to punishment upon insufficient proof.

1332. Do you think that in the event of a Kafir being caught in the act of stealing he should be remitted to punishment to the chiefs of his tribe, and should not be punished by the British authorities?—That depends upon the system which you adopt.

1333. Will you further explain that answer, and tell the Committee what you mean by the expression, "the system you adopt"?—I object to a system which gives any man a power in Kafirland of flogging a Kafir except with the consent of the chief of his tribe. I decidedly object to any man being punished in Kafirland at all who commits a crime in the colony.

1334. First of all, confining yourself to Kafirland, are the Committee to understand that you think all petty crimes committed by Kafirs should be punished alone by or with the consent of their chiefs?—Yes.

1335. Suppose those chiefs are in hostility to us?—Then there is a state of war.

1336. Assuming war to be the state of the colony?—I suppose that there will be martial law there, and you would deal with them just as you would do if you were carrying on war in France.

1337. Are the Committee to understand your objection to be to that mode of punishment as a punishment?—I am speaking of a time of peace exclusively.

1338. Assuming a time of peace, are the Committee to understand you to object to flogging as a punishment?—I object to the punishment altogether, except there be some sort of court in which the Kafir chiefs have a voice.

1339. You think that if a Kafir is caught committing some crime, he should not be punished, especially by flogging, unless his chief has some voice in the sentence passed upon him?—I would

would not interfere with their domestic affairs, except through their chiefs. I mean the Kafir courts.

1340. Supposing a Kafir commits a crime upon a British subject, and is caught in the act of doing so, do you think the consent of the chief should be obtained before he is punished?

—Yes.

1341. That is your opinion?—Yes.

1342. *Chairman.*] Do you consider that the authority of the chiefs in Kafirland is so complete over the Kafirs generally, that they can be justly held responsible to the English Government for the conduct, both public and private, of the Kafirs connected with them?—It was so, as much as in most countries. I do not know how it may be now, but it was so; the Kafir chiefs had considerable power over their people.

1343. Do you believe the authority of the chiefs over the natives in connexion with them to be very complete and absolute?—No, I do not think so; every chief has his council; they are not despotic at all; they have no despotic power; they have power as the executive officers of their council.

1344. Do you believe that the executive authority thus constituted is really such that it would be safe for the British Government to trust to that authority for maintaining police within Kafirland, even against British subjects; and also that it would be just to make the chiefs, assisted in this manner by their council, responsible for all acts of aggression committed by persons of their tribes against British subjects?—What they may be now I am not competent to say; I am perfectly confident that it was the case that you could hold the chief responsible about 15 or 20 years ago.

1345. Have you any reason to believe that the authority of the chiefs has diminished since that period?—There has been a great deal of disorganization in Kafirland in consequence of the wars.

1346. In case the chief should set himself to discourage the predatory habits of the Kafirs connected with him, do you think there would be no reason to fear that he would become unpopular, and that his authority would be greatly diminished and altogether subverted?—I do not think it would be more so among them than among any other people.

1347. Do you mean that it would not be more so with a Kafir chief than with the lord-lieutenant of an English county?—You are speaking of a country in a high state of civilization. I say, making allowance for the Kafir as a barbarian, the chief I think has sufficient control over his own people to maintain order.

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1348. Do you think he has sufficient control over his people to maintain order in those cases in which he might be running counter to the feelings and supposed interests of his people?—I do not think any chief upon earth can do that; he cannot run counter to the interests of his people, and retain his authority.

1349. Are not the general feelings of the young men, especially among the Kafir tribes, very much in favour of their present predatory habits, and their expeditions for the purpose of cattle stealing?—Yes, I think they are; not more so than might be controlled in time of peace, when a regular state of order is established; when a system of justice shall prevail.

1350. It has been stated to the Committee by witnesses well acquainted with the Kafir tribes, that among the young men personal distinction is often acquired by successfully making inroads upon their neighbours, and carrying away their cattle; suppose the chief were to set himself to work effectually to repress those habits, do you think there would be no fear that he would become unpopular, and that his authority would be subverted?—To a certain extent it might be so. To act against the feelings of the tribe is impossible; he is not despotic. If you have a good understanding with those men I do not doubt but they will see it their interest to maintain order.

1351. Do you mean to maintain order so far as effectually to check those predatory habits?—Effectually to check robbery and stealing is almost impossible in any community; thefts will be committed anywhere.

1352. Is there not a wide distinction between those habitual inroads upon the cattle of their neighbours, and the ordinary cases of offences against property which take place in all countries?—I can only say that these Kafirs are barbarians, and nothing more nor less; but if the European Government will maintain a proper moral influence over the minds of the Kafir chiefs, the chief has sufficient power over the majority of his people to maintain order.

1353. Sir J. Walmsley.] What power has the chief, in concurrence with his council, over his tribe?—I think it is very great.

1354. Will you state in what that power consists; does he possess the power of life and death?—Yes.

1355. Does he possess power over the property of any individual in his tribe?—No.

1356. Neither he nor his executive council?—I could not exactly

exactly say that; they can inflict punishment upon individuals, but they cannot seize their property, except for crimes, and sometimes the crimes are imaginary; such, for instance, as witchcraft. Their property is occasionally seized under the pretext of punishment for witchcraft.

1357. What would be the conduct of a chief in such a case, finding that any portion of his people had committed acts of robbery?—He would punish them by seizing their cattle; they never punished by corporal punishments till they came into contact with us, and I do not think that they have even yet adopted that plan.

1358. That is your reason for objecting to the flogging system, is it?—I object to it as an unjust principle that any man should be withdrawn from a competent court and flogged because there is not sufficient proof to bring him before that competent court.

1359. The chiefs, you say, have not hitherto inflicted corporal punishment?—It is not a Kafir punishment.

1360. The chief does possess the power of life and death, you say?—Death is often inflicted.

1361. Does he possess the power of banishment?—They never adopt it. It would be difficult to inflict it in a barbarous country.

1362. You say he would take the cattle of the individual?—Yes, he would fine him.

1363. Mr. B. Carter.] Your objection has been put in these words: that you disapprove of the "flogging system"?—Such as I have described it; such as the Government Gazette describes it.

1364. You instance one particular case in which a man has been flogged during a time of peace, and your objection in that particular case was, that he was flogged for want of there being sufficient evidence to convict him?—That is what the paper stated.

1365. Do you think that that individual case which you have mentioned is sufficient to establish what you call a system?—I suppose it to be a system, because otherwise it could not be carried out. This was published under the sanction of the Government.

1366. Have you any other grounds, beyond that particular case, to suppose that any system of punishing by flogging men not convicted was established?—This was brought to my particular notice; I do not know how many more cases there might be.

1367. Have you any knowledge of your own of other cases

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which could justify you in coming to the conclusion that this was not an isolated case?—I could not be positive; I cannot remember, at the present moment, any other case.

1368. You have accepted from a newspaper an assertion that there was a system of flogging in existence, of which you instance that one case?—This is one case which I have seen in the Government Gazette.

1369. The impression upon your mind is that that is a part of a system?—I believe it is. If it were not it could not thus figure under the sanction of Government.

1370. You cannot say from your own knowledge that any such system exists?—No. I only know this case; I have heard of others; but I know only this case.

1371. Mr. *Hawes*.] Is flogging sanctioned by the colonial law within the colony for any offences?—Yes, I believe so.

1372. Mr. *B. Carter*.] You say in this case the man was not legally convicted, but that he was flogged upon suspicion?—The words were used, "There not being sufficient proof to send him to the colonial court, he was therefore flogged."

1373. How long do you calculate that this system has existed which you so define?—I suppose it is part of the present system.

1374. Do you refer that to the same date as the other objection you have referred to, namely, the patrol system?—No.

1375. It is of later introduction than that?—Yes, I suppose so, as part of the present system.

1376. Are the Committee to understand that information, as to this which you have denominated the flogging system, has reached you through articles in the paper, but that it has not come to your knowledge from your own personal inquiry?—I saw this in the Government Gazette, which was exhibited to me as a specimen of the system, many more cases having taken place; but I cannot answer for that being the case.

1377. Colonel *Dunne*.] In the district where this flogging was stated to have taken place was there martial law proclaimed at that time?—I believe there is martial law there at the present time.

1378. Therefore it was done under martial law?—I believe so, but I believe the whole system is based upon martial law; martial law is there, and no other.

1379. Do you object to the proclamation of martial law, or to the exercise of martial law in a district which is in a state of warfare?—No; it was not in a state of warfare at the time

I speak

I speak of; the governor represented the country as in a perfect state of peace.

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1380. By the colonial law, does the civil law extend to any defined boundary?—The colonial law extends to the banks of the Orange River and to its mouth, and from the Orange River up to the Stormbergen, and down again to the Keiskamma, but not to Kafirland.

1381. Was this punishment inflicted in Kafirland?—Yes, decidedly.

1382. Therefore the punishment was inflicted as a punishment of military necessity, for which the officer who ordered it was responsible?—It was under the authority of the Government; so the Gazette states.

1383. Then it could hardly be considered as part of a system, could it; if that country is only governed by martial law, the man could not be sent legally before a colonial tribunal?—The crime was committed in the colony; it is so stated, and the man was amenable to the colonial courts. Punishing him in Kafirland was both unlawful and impolitic.

1384. You are not aware of any other instance of the kind?—No; I was asked whether I objected to martial law: the present system cannot exist without martial law, and that is one of my objections to it.

1385. In a letter published recently in the Blue Book, they speak of a system of governing "by the bayonet and the cat." In a country where martial law is prevalent the cat may be used, and the military commandant is responsible for its use; have you any objection to that when war is carried on?—I am not speaking of a state of war.

1386. This occurred before the war, did it?—Yes.

1387. Can you point out the difference between the patrol and the commando system?—Yes; the commando system was adopted under the authority of the Government in cases of inroads. In cases of emergency the field cornet had a right to act, and in a case of less emergency the magistrate had to be appealed to; but in a case of general war no one but the Governor could order out a commando.

1388. Comparing your former evidence with your evidence to-day, you appear to consider that under the commando system the actual perpetrators of a theft were taken up, and the cattle restored; but under the patrol system there is a general sweep of the cattle through the country, which may include the property of the innocent among that of the guilty?—The patrol system was this, as it was established in 1817. A man losing his cattle, followed the spoor, and the first kraal

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he came to he demanded satisfaction. If he did not get it, he took it; that led to constant collisions.

1389. Under the commando system they only took what they had lost?—Yes.

1390. The result of your opinion is, that the commando system was less unjust and less injurious than the patrol system?—Decidedly; a patrol coming to a kraal and demanding compensation, and not getting it, but taking it, would necessarily lead to a collision, particularly when the kraal knew itself innocent; and those collisions, constantly occurring, would bring on such a state of irritation that a war ensued.

1391. Is there not a greater objection among the Kafirs to the patrol system than to the commando system, because the commando system suited their ideas of justice better than the patrol system?—Undoubtedly the patrol system has been one of the main causes of our misfortunes, which may be proved by the evidence of several witnesses in 1835 and 1836.

1392. Have you not stated that the Kafirs have also said, "You may shoot any thief who is stealing your cattle, but we object to your interfering with the cattle of persons who have never done you any injury"?—They have repeatedly said, "We will thank you if you kill our wolves for us. The more you kill on the other side of the boundary the better, because it takes the trouble off our hands."

1393. Are you of opinion that the commando system, under proper regulations, would be better than the patrol system?—You cannot do without the commando system on a barbarous frontier.

1394. Do you think there would be any difficulty in restoring the commando system under proper regulations?—It depends in a great measure, as I before said, upon how the war terminates.

1395. If the war terminates successfully, will not the frontier be very much denuded of inhabitants?—I do not see why it should.

1396. Will not it be denuded of inhabitants of European descent?—I do not see that it will, unless the measures of the Government be such as to drive the people to emigration; there is a great deal of soreness.

1397. Are you acquainted with the localities in the neighbourhood of the Amatola mountains?—Yes.

1398. Do you consider that the Amatola mountains would afford a sufficient boundary?—They run into the colony; they do not form a boundary; they run at right angles through the old boundary and through the new boundary.

1399. You

1399. You consider the Keiskamma as the boundary at present?—Yes.

1400. Do you think, if we cleared the Amatola mountains of the Kafir inhabitants, we should put an end to the means which they have of renewing the war?—Where are we to drive them to? They must have a place to go to; and wherever they go to, if they have not got food, they must come down upon you; whether from the Amatolas or from beyond the Kei, it signifies nothing.

1401. If you drive the inhabitants over the Kei, are you aware of any district of country which would be sufficient for their support in the rear of another tribe?—Decidedly not; there is an open country and high snow mountains, where the cattle in winter could not exist; and even where there is open ground, there are other tribes who use it for hunting, and you would drive them upon the assagais of those people at once, and create wars which must re-act upon yourselves.

1402. Are not they people of the same tribe?—Originally they were, some five centuries ago or more; but they are now a different people, though they speak the same language.

1403. It is your opinion that there is no place to which we could drive that tribe, which would enable them to support themselves?—I am afraid not, without forcing them back upon you.

1404. In Kreli's country, is there any space of that kind which they might occupy?—I have not been much through Kreli's country. There is a vacant space towards the White Mountains, but those are some miserable mountains upon which no tribe could exist. Those are a pastoral people. Independently of a great deal of agriculture, they have great flocks; and those pasture lands they require to go to in particular seasons of drought, and for their hunting grounds. You cannot drive other people upon that land without bringing them into collision, and forcing them back upon you.

1405. Would not the result be to make them attend to agricultural more than to pastoral pursuits?—No, decidedly not: a nation becomes agricultural from the natural course of events, by the increase of population and the increase of commerce and civilization. You do not force them to it by compressing them together in a barbarous state; you only starve them, and render them desperate, until extermination is your only resource.

1406. You have not been much yourself through Kreli's country?—No. I have gone through Kreli's country during the

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the last war; and some 30 or 40 years ago I went to the Bashee. I know there is no more ground than they require for themselves.

1407. You would not recommend the policy of driving the natives from the Amatolas?—No.

1408. You stated that you considered the natives should be put down before the war terminates?—Yes.

1409. What do you mean by being put down?—If you were at war with France, you would certainly wish to gain the upper hand, and to be the stronger party, and to dictate terms; that is what I mean; that we must conquer the Kafirs.

1410. At the end of the last war, you have stated, in a letter to the Governor, that instead of having put them down, they laughed to scorn what we considered to be our conquest over them; that they set us at defiance; and that though the war was represented to have been finished successfully, really the Kafirs thought they got the best of it. How are we to know that they are really put down unless we drive them from their present country?—The same as you do with any other nation; they sue for peace, and you dictate terms.

1411. With whom could you make peace?—With the chiefs.

1412. Have the chiefs authority to make peace?—They had in 1835.

1413. Can that peace be relied on?—Yes.

1414. In the instance of the Gaikas, who gave up to us a certain territory, it has been represented that the Kafirs said that Gaika had not power to cede it?—They said so.

1415. Therefore how can we make treaties with men when their own people say afterwards that they had not the power of ceding the country?—I do not allow that the chiefs have any power without their councils.

1416. *Chairman.*] How is the council composed?—Of Ammapahati, as the Kafirs call them.

1417. Are they elected?—Yes, they are selected from the men of the greatest ability in peace, and prowess in war.

1418. *Colonel Dunne.*] You understand that we can make no treaties with the chiefs, except with the concurrence of their councils?—Yes.

1419. When we make peace at the end of a war, what assurance have we that they will keep that peace?—I have not found European and civilized nations more true to their treaties than the Kafirs. Up to this present moment we have never yet reduced the Kafirs.

1420. What would you consider to be a reduction of the Kafirs,

Kafirs, such as we could depend on for a permanent peace succeeding it?—Following them up through Kafirland till they sue for peace, and you dictate terms to them; show them you are the stronger party; make treaties, and honestly keep them.

1421. Have not they repeatedly sued for peace, and then broken out again?—Not that I know of. In 1846 they asked for peace; but there was no peace made with them. We refused to make peace, and the present policy was adopted.

1422. In 1835 did not we make peace with them?—We did.

1423. They made a cession of territory to us in 1835, did not they?—Yes, the thing is upon record; you have the treaty of peace there, and you can see the terms of the treaty. We said we had conquered the Adelaide district, and we then established the present system in the district.

1424. You say that we have pursued a system of injustice and oppression, and violation of treaties; and that we have half ruined ourselves, and completely ruined the nation. Will you explain what you mean by those terms?—I mean this: in 1844, for instance, we drew the pen through the treaties of Sir George Napier with the Gaikas without any sort of discussion with the opposite party, and from that moment the irritation has been such as led to the war of 1846. We sent engineers to mark out fortifications in Kafirland. This is one case.

1425. Upon land belonging to them?—Yes; that irritated them, and brought us into collision with them.

1426. You say that we have half ruined ourselves?—Yes; I am an instance of it.

1427. You have stated the instance of an opulent farmer, who once sat in the council, to whom you had been obliged almost to extend charity?—Yes, a Kafir; he was my menial servant at that time.

1428. He was in the Kafir council; not in your own council?—Yes, in the Kafir council.

1429. You state that you consider the farmers along the frontier to have been ruined by that policy?—Yes.

1430. What was the policy which caused their ruin?—Breaking the treaty without reference to the chiefs themselves, and dictating a new treaty to them.

1431. Of which the result was the war?—Yes. Not immediately; the Napier treaty lasted till 1844. The Gaika tribes were then told that that treaty was abolished, and that another treaty would be shortly laid before them for signature.

1432. Did not the Gaika tribes themselves repudiate the treaty?

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treaty?—They objected to it decidedly; I speak of the treaty which was forced upon them in 1844.

1433. Did that relate to a cession of territory?—No; it was only a new system that was introduced.

1434. Are you aware whether the Kafirs are better armed now than they were?—Yes.

1435. How did they obtain those arms?—From the colony; the Custom-house returns will show what import of ammunition and fire-arms there is.

1436. Is it forbidden?—The importation into the colony is quite legal; it is unlawful to send them into Kafirland.

1437. If we were to put a stop to the importation of fire-arms and gunpowder, would it not put an end to the war?—They would be smuggled into Kafirland in that case.

1438. Do you think in such quantities as would enable them to carry on the war?—Smugglers will find a market for their produce wherever they can, and I am afraid you cannot stop it.

1439. You do not think it could be stopped?—I am afraid not; I wish it could, but I am afraid it cannot.

1440. If there were a possibility of doing it, it would be an advantage, you think?—Yes, in the present state of things.

1441. You think that the trade in arms and in ammunition comes through our own colony?—The greatest part of it; some may come from Natal, and some from the petty ports on the coast; the import of fire-arms and ammunition in the Cape colony is fearful.

1442. If it were checked it would put some difficulty in the way of their obtaining arms, would not it?—I am afraid they would find an entrance in other places.

1443. What are the articles of exchange which they give for fire-arms?—Cattle and skins, and ivory; but they have no other articles of importance but cattle.

1444. Those are the only articles which they are able to give?—Yes.

1445. Natal is a colony totally under our influence?—Yes, it is a British colony.

1446. Could not we prevent arms and ammunition obtaining an entrance through that colony?—I think that would be very difficult.

1447. You have no hope of putting a stop to the war in that way?—Certainly not.

1448. You live in Somerset county?—In that district.

1449. Can you state the population of Somerset district?—No; there are returns of it.

1450. Are there returns of the extent and population of each part of the colony?—Yes, I believe so. I am a private individual, living in retirement, and those official documents never reach my eye, so that I should not like to commit myself by saying anything on the subject; there are returns which will show it.

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1451. *Sir E. Buxton.*] What, in your opinion, is the influence of the missionaries upon the native tribes?—Very good; I think the missionaries do a great deal of good; I think there have been a great many follies committed also; missionaries, like other men, are not perfect, and there has been a great deal of nonsense; but the cause of missions no man, I hope, will depreciate.

1452. *Chairman.*] Is there any jealousy on the part of the chiefs, or the people, of their interference?—No; of late there has been on the part of the Gaikas an idea that some of the missionaries have leaned to the Government side, and sacrificed their cause.

1453. Do the operations of the missionaries run counter to any religious feelings of the natives?—Not with the heathen; they are very fond of the missionaries, except where they suspect them, as I have just stated.

1454. *Sir E. Buxton.*] Are there many European settlers in British Kafiraria?—I cannot say.

1455. Is it your opinion that the land being taken from the natives has caused irritation among them?—Unquestionably; as much so as it would here.

1456. Has the land been taken from them in British Kafiraria?—From the Kat River to the Keiskamma, decidedly. We have lately sold part of Kafirland by public auction.

1457. What part of Kafirland?—It is to be found in the Government Gazette; it is a regular speculation.

1458. *Chairman.*] Do you think it advisable to put a check to the further extension of European settlements in that direction?—Decidedly; you must leave them the land; no tribe can do without land, barbarians less than civilized nations. The Kafirs are not manufacturers nor sailors; if they have no corn and pasture land, they must rob or starve.

1459. *Mr. Hindley.*] Beyond the province of Victoria has any land been sold by the Government?—The province of Victoria borders upon the Keiskamma; in that province we have sold land which is part of the land which the Kafirs are now fighting about; that land has been sold by public sale.

1460. That is not called British Kafiraria?—No, I believe not; it is a district which was Kafirland before the war of 1846.

1461. Then

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1461. Then the limits of the colony have increased?—Since the war of 1846 they have.

1462. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Had not they that district merely on condition of good behaviour?—Not that part; it was Kafirland.

1463. *Chairman*.] Is it the case that the land you are speaking of formed part of the ceded territory?—No, never; not this part which I say was sold by public auction by the Government lately.

1464. Mr. *Hawes*.] What were the boundaries of the ceded territory, east and west?—The Keiskamma on the east, and the Fish River on the west.

1465. Where is Victoria situated?—Victoria embraces part of it, but Victoria runs into what was Kafirland in 1846.

1466. Do you mean that it runs beyond the Keiskamma?—It runs to the north, beyond the ceded territory.

1467. What was the limit of the ceded territory to the north?—It took a line below Block Drift; from Block Drift it took a line connecting it with the Kat Berg; Block Drift was Kafirland when the war of 1846 broke out; Block Drift is the place where we had engineers measuring out fortifications in Kafirland, where the very unpleasant affair took place between our troops and the Kafirs.

1468. Mr. *Hindley*.] That part of Victoria in which Auckland appears to be situated was Kafirland?—Yes.

1469. That has been added to the province of Victoria?—Yes.

1470. When was that done?—Certainly since 1846; in 1846 it was Kafirland.

1471. By whose authority was it done?—I should not like to be positive. There were three successive governors in a very short time; Sir Peregrine Maitland, Sir Henry Pottinger, and Sir Harry Smith.

1472. *Chairman*.] What is the extent of the district of which you are now speaking, which in your opinion was improperly added to the ceded territory?—About 10 miles by six; the whole of the country beyond the mountains to the Kei has been added to the colony since.

1473. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Has there been an accession of European colonists on the eastern frontier of the colony during the last four or five years?—Individuals have come in, but not many; I could not say hundreds, much less thousands; individuals have come in in succession, but no masses.

1474. Was not there a severe drought on the eastern frontier of Kafiraria in the course of the last year?—About a year

ago,

ago, but these things are very common; every four or five years we calculate upon a very severe drought; for instance, the year of the war was a very dry year, and we had another very dry year the year before last.

1475. Is not the effect of drought upon all persons who have cattle, whether they be natives or British colonists, to induce them to spread their cattle over the country in search of pasture?—They must do so, or they perish.

1476. The natural consequence therefore is, that in times of drought the European settlers and the natives come in collision by their spreading their cattle over the country in search of grass?—Yes.

1477. Are you aware whether the drought of last year caused excitement among the Kafirs?—I could not tell; it always creates a great deal of suffering, but I cannot tell whether it caused any peculiar excitement.

1478. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Are you of opinion that one of the chief causes of offensive operations on the part of the Kafirs arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory?—Yes.

1479. And the general disposition on the part of the British to seize upon their territory?—It is not only there; wherever white men come in contact with barbarians, that is the result; it is the same in the back settlements of America.

1480. If they were well assured of the contrary, do you think the tribes would be much more contented?—If they had proof positive of it they would be.

1481. What means, in your opinion, would be the most likely to produce peace and contentment among the various tribes?—As a general rule, nothing will answer but strict justice. Where there is aggression, follow it up and insist upon redress; when you make a treaty, keep it most scrupulously, and insist upon its being kept most scrupulously; deal with them as a Christian nation, and honestly keep your own word with them; thereby prevent physical collision, and the exposure of your weakness.

1482. The Committee may gather from what you have now said, that it has been the absence of that conduct on the part of the British which has caused these incursions and fightings?—I have already stated that I disapprove of the measures of the Government, and to that I adhere.

1483. *Chairman*.] You are aware of the policy which has been pursued by the Government with regard to what you call the

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the emigrant boers; are there any observations you are desirous of offering to the Committee upon that subject?—They are at present very quiet, but they are in a very discontented and excited state; they feel themselves very much aggrieved, and they are very anxious to have the causes of their late collisions with the Government most minutely investigated. Emigration from the colony is just the same as emigration to the back settlements of America; it is a natural result of the nature of the country, and consequently the people go where they can find land. At very early periods individuals have gone; but in the years 1835 and 1836, in consequence of various causes, which they considered causes of dissatisfaction, and particularly the state of insecurity they were in when the Kafir war of 1835 took place, a number of people emigrated. The Governor of the colony obtained the opinion of the Attorney-general in reference to those men, and he gave it as his opinion that nothing could prevent their emigration; that they had as much right to emigrate as a British subject had to emigrate and become an American subject in the United States. They went in great masses; they came in collision with the natives, and afterwards Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was the Governor, had something to do with making a treaty between them and the native chiefs there. This state of things lasted till the present Governor arrived, and he went over and made modifications in those treaties between the emigrant boers and the native tribes. He informed them, that unless four out of five were willing to submit to British rule, he would have nothing to say to them; otherwise, he would legislate for them. Upon this, unfortunately, they acted; and the general voice of course was, that instead of four out of five being for us, 99 out of 100 were against us. This led to the unfortunate collision at Boom Plaats. After this conflict between the British troops and the boers, a boer was taken and tried by court-martial and shot. The boers are all extremely anxious to come to some understanding. They wish to have peace and quietness; but they wish to have matters properly understood. They are extremely anxious to have investigated the question as to the legality of the death of this man, who, they maintain, was either not a British subject and then a prisoner of war, or, if he was a British subject, that he ought to have been tried by a court which could have properly judged the case. All these matters these men are anxious to have investigated, and I believe that all those rebels, as we call them, may be brought to their senses, and something done with them, by a thorough investigation and an explanation of the matters which

which have occurred, justice being done where wrong has been done.

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1484. Irrespective of emigration, caused, as you seem to suppose it has been in this instance, by acts of impolicy or injustice, would not there be generally a tendency, under any system, for the colonists to go over the border, and establish themselves there?—It is proved to be so in this country and in every other country which is either uninhabited or thinly inhabited.

1485. What is the policy which in your opinion ought to be pursued with regard to the colonists going beyond the limits of the territory in that manner; to what degree should any control be exercised over them; or should they be left altogether to themselves or, in short, what is the policy which you would recommend as the right one to pursue in regard to a class of cases which are likely, under all circumstances, to occur?—I do not exactly know; they form themselves into a community, they must be allowed to have their own laws, and to unite under certain conditions, as has been done in America.

1486. Would you leave them entirely to themselves; would you not meddle in their affairs at all, but leave them to form such relations or pursue such a course in reference to the savage tribes around them as they may think fit?—We have tried another plan, and it invariably brought on the most fearful consequences; we have attained to nothing but collision and aggravated evil.

1487. Your recommendation is that we should not meddle with them at all, but that as long as they commit no injury or outrage upon the colony, we should not take any notice of what they did in other respects?—I am afraid that that is the wisest plan. Anything else has only aggravated the evil when we have tried it.

1488. Do you believe that practically there would be a prospect of very dreadful scenes taking place upon the collisions which would ensue between those colonists thus separated from all control on the part of the Government, and the native tribes with whom they might come into contact?—Not so bad as when we do interfere: the irritation then increases, and sympathy with those men is produced in the colony. The Boom Plaats affair has been a most unfortunate affair. It has created feelings in the colony which have been very pernicious. Persons have tried to trace the present feeling to a later date, but it has chiefly sprung from that.

1489. Suppose a colonist, beyond the limits of the colony,  
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exercises some act of barbarity, would you not provide in any manner for his trial and punishment for such an act?—If you could do so, it would be desirable; but I do not see that we have done any good by it; our interference has aggravated the evil.

1490. Upon the whole, your opinion is that it would be best to take no cognizance of what takes place beyond our own boundaries?—I would try to influence those people. In the Blue Book there is a letter of mine which I wrote from Stockholm in 1834, in which I laid down a certain theory of my own, which I thought would prevent a good many evils; but the country is in such a state now, that I do not know whether it would answer at all. We have done no good by interference hitherto.

1491. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you read a despatch from Lord Grey to Sir Harry Smith, dated Downing-street, the 12th November 1850?—I have not read the despatch. I know the law to which it refers.

1492. “The proposal of the Executive Council to extend the provisions of the Statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, to the equator, in order that the Boers emigrating to the newly discovered country may not be entirely beyond the reach of British law, had been already recommended on other grounds by the Committee of Privy Council, and I hope to be able in the next Session of Parliament to introduce a Bill for that purpose.” What would be the effect of that despatch upon the Boers; how would they view it?—It would be calamitous. It would bring on collision worse than ever. If we interfere at all that will be the effect. Our plan is to try and conciliate those Boers. They are not unreasonable beings.

1493. Colonel Dunne.] Do you think there is any means of conciliating them, and what would you suggest as the mean of doing so?—They are averse to our system of government; let them have their own.

1494. Do you think we should be able to govern them by the people who are now elected as their own chiefs?—Yes; you cannot do it in any other way, unless you bring an overwhelming force and put them down; to organise the blacks against them by means of British non-commissioned officers would be a decree for mutual extermination.

1495. Would they be valuable assistants in defending the colony if the Government dealt with them fairly and justly, according to their own ideas?—First inquire into what they consider their grievances. They consider themselves to have suffered great injustice, and particularly in consequence of what

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what has lately taken place; let that be inquired into, and if they are wrong, let the matter be explained; if they are right, let them get redress, and establish some kind of social order among them, so that they may be a benefit to the colony and to the natives, instead of the contrary.

1496. *Chairman.*] Your plan would be to treat them as an independent nation?—I do not see how to avoid it. I should be glad to see them reincorporated with the colony, which perhaps a system of justice may bring about.

1497. *Viscount Mandeville.*] What does Pretorius call himself?—He now calls himself the president; he is the commandant in a military point of view, but he is the president of their council. The man has gone wrong; but he is not an unreasonable man.

1498. *Colonel Dunne.*] What are the injuries which they complain of?—Particularly the last conflict which we had with them.

1499. Were not they in a state of hostility before the conflict, and was not the conflict the result of that hostility?—Yes; they possessed themselves of Natal, and thought it was wrong that the British should take possession of Natal.

1500. Is not the dispute between us and them this, that they are for moving further into the country and taking possession of the native lands, which we have attempted to prevent; is not that the original cause of the hostilities?—We have not prevented their doing so, but taken the land ourselves.

1501. Have not they fought against the Queen's troops; was not the man who was executed taken in arms, and executed for fighting against the Queen's troops?—I do not know the particulars.

1502. Is it not perfectly notorious that that was the case?—I do not know whether he was taken in arms; he is supposed to have been one of the band who fought against the Queen's troops. I am only stating their grievance. I am not giving my own opinion upon it; but I do say that they demand investigation, and that it is unjust to deny it.

1503. Do you deny the statement that he was in arms against the Queen's troops?—I have heard it denied; I cannot say that it is generally denied.

1504. The point to be inquired into is, whether he was guilty or not of the crime he suffered for?—No, the question is this; if he was a British subject, he ought to have been tried by a competent court; that is my opinion.

1505. Was not there a state of warfare then existing, and



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were not they in arms against our authority?—They were in arms against our authority, certainly.

1506. You have stated that you think in a state of war military law should obtain; war was at that time going on, and this man was taken prisoner and executed?—All they desire is that the thing shall be inquired into; if the man suffered justly, and that were explained to them, there would be an end of the case. The whole transaction demands the most thorough investigation.

1507. The inquiry would be whether he was guilty or not?—Whether he was tried before a competent court.

1508. Was he tried before a court martial?—I believe so.

1509. Which court martial found him guilty?—Yes.

1510. *Chairman.*] Was not he punished as a British subject emigrating to France or America, and afterwards engaging in hostility against the Queen's troops, would be punished?—I am not sufficient lawyer to know what the law would be in the case of the emigrant you speak of.

*Lunæ, 23<sup>o</sup> die Junii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Marquis of Granby.  
Mr. Booker.  
Sir Joshua Walmsley.  
Colonel Thompson.

Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. Stanley.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Viscount Mandeville.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. Monsell.  
Mr. Cardwell.

THE RIGHT HON. H. LABOUCHERE IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *George T. Napier*, K. C. B., called in; and Examined.

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1511. *Chairman.*] YOU have held the office of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, I was Governor there for between six and seven years.

1512. What were the dates of your assuming the government, and of your relinquishing it?—I assumed it at the beginning

beginning of January 1838, and I came away in April 1844.

1513. It is rather the object of this Committee to consider what ought to be future course of the British Government with regard to the Cape frontier than to go very minutely into past transactions. You have doubtless paid attention to what has happened at the Cape since you left it?—I have in general; but, to tell the Committee the truth, I have not paid so much attention as I should otherwise have done, because I have lived abroad continually. I have kept myself free from everything of the kind as much as possible. I have had correspondence with friends, and I have a son who commands the Cape corps, but I have always prohibited him from giving me political information; as being a military man, I considered his duty was entirely military. When the war under Sir Peregrine Maitland commenced I was in Scotland. I happened to come home, and the Duke of Wellington sent for me, and I had some hours conversation with his Grace. Sir Peregrine Maitland had applied for troops, and for a general officer to help him in the war. Hearing that, I thought it was my duty to write to the Horse Guards, to say I should waive all etiquette as to having been relieved by Sir Peregrine Maitland, and that if my services could be of any use I was quite willing to serve as major-general under Sir Peregrine Maitland, and give him the benefit of whatever experience I might have of the colony. The Duke of Wellington, however, said there was no general officer going out, and there the matter dropped. Not living in England, I seldom saw any of the papers laid before the House of Commons.

1514. Still you are, no doubt, generally aware of the circumstances under which the war which is now raging at the Cape has broken out?—Yes, I have heard a good deal of it, of course.

1515. Will you have the goodness to favour the Committee with any opinions which you may have formed with regard to the future policy which this country should pursue towards the Kafir tribes?—In the first place I am perfectly convinced of this, and I was exceedingly glad to hear Sir Andries Stockenstrom give the same answer as I shall give, that the Kafirs must be put down, and so completely put down as to call out for peace before anything can be done; that I am perfectly convinced of. If you let them off now, I am perfectly convinced that they would consider that they had got the better, and that we were afraid of them; therefore

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fore I am sure that it must be done, and it can only be done, in my opinion, by a strong military force being put at the complete disposal of Sir Harry Smith.

1516. You think the first step must be to put the Kafirs absolutely down and completely conquer them?—Completely, so as to force them to cry out for peace.

1517. Supposing that to be done, what is the general policy which you would then propose to adopt?—That is a very difficult question. I think, if you mean to keep the whole of Kafraria, you can only do it by means of a military occupation of the country: that is my opinion, clearly and distinctly. I do not see how it is to be done in any other way. The Kafirs certainly are not completely savages, but they are very much more of savages than of barbarians, I think.

1518. Which is the frontier which you think it would be most advantageous to maintain?—My opinion is, the Keiskamma; I may be wrong in that; but that was the frontier which Lord Charles Somerset took, and along which there were very excellent forts built. Then the Fish River was behind that again, and my opinion is, that Graham's Town, and Fort Beaufort, and all along there, might be kept as a *place d'armes* for stores and for some troops; but that the Keiskamma, and that line, should be maintained as it was under Lord Charles Somerset. I think he understood the Kafirs, and the management of that frontier, better than any Governor who was ever there, before or since.

1519. You would not propose to push the frontier to the Great Kei?—Not unless you mean to keep Kafraria; if you mean to keep Kafraria, it can only be kept by a military force, in my opinion.

1520. Do you think it would be the better policy for this country to keep Kafraria under British rule, or to endeavour to establish satisfactory relations with the Kafirs as independent tribes?—The ground they are now in is narrow and confined. In consequence of the drought, and of the different kinds of grass which grow, they must, with their herds, at certain times of the year quit the district they are on and occupy a further extent of territory to the right and the left; because, when the grass gets sour in one spot on that frontier, it is not so in another, and they must have that range. If you force them all into one spot they will starve.

1521. That is, supposing they retain their present habits?—Yes. As to civilizing them, my own opinion is that they never will be much better than they are; I may be wrong; I went off to the frontier immediately I arrived in the colony;

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I visited the missionary stations. The missionaries are most excellent people; they go out with a thorough idea and belief that they are doing good, but as to whether they are really doing so, that is a matter of great doubt, in my opinion. The Moravians have done good, but even at Shiloh the Hottentots have turned against their ministers, and against the Government. I do not mean to say that missions are all nonsense, or anything of that kind, but I do not conceive that the missionaries at the different stations there have done a great deal of good, or will do a great deal of good.

1522. You say you would adopt the Keiskamma frontier, and place a strong military force upon it; do you think it would be expedient in any way to interfere with the internal government of the Kafirs beyond that frontier, with the view of preventing their incursions into the British territory?—No, I should say not; I would have a few small isolated forts in different parts, but I think you should not interfere with their government, except just to prevent such practices as witchcraft, and the system of torturing which they employ. I think those should be interfered with, but otherwise I would leave them totally to themselves, telling them that if they committed any depredation in the colony we would punish them by military force.

1523. When you say you would punish them by military force, do you mean that you would punish individuals, or that you would make the chiefs responsible?—I would make the chiefs responsible; my opinion is that everything ought to be done through the chiefs.

1524. Do you believe the authority of the chiefs over the tribes to be of that nature that they can justly be held responsible for the acts of persons under them?—I do, certainly.

1525. You think they have the power, if they choose, of preventing depredations?—I think they have. I went twice to see them. I went on one occasion to alter a treaty, not to make new treaties, as was erroneously said the other day; but I altered certain treaties, because many of the articles of those treaties were most unjust towards the colonists: such as forcing them in different ways to track the spoor, which sometimes, after rain particularly, was impossible; I went to alter those treaties by permission of the Kafirs, as much as I could. I met them in three different places: 6,000 at one place, at another 3,000, and at another 5,000. I went with a small force of troops, and I then travelled into the country

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country with Lady Napier, two servants, and two orderlies; I went through the Gaikas country, and said to them, "I will send my troops round another way, and will try whether you are honest in what you say." I went through in three days and two nights, and never met with anything but the greatest kindness from them. That was in Eno's time; Eno was with me. Blockdrift was the place where I saw those men. That was in Kafirland, about 15 miles from Fort Beaufort.

1526. What was the date of those transactions?—The first visit was after some depredations had been committed. The next occasion was in 1841. I only went twice, and I am speaking of the second time; I met them in a friendly way. My instructions told me that I was not to attempt to do anything, or to break any of those treaties upon my own responsibility, without the perfect acquiescence of the native tribes and their chiefs; therefore when I saw them they were in a very good humour, and I did alter a good many of the details of the treaties.

1527. Do you believe that the undefended state of the frontier has been a great inducement to the Kafirs to make those incursions which have taken place?—It has been a very great inducement to the Kafirs to make those incursions. The inducement to the Kafir is, that it is his nature; every Kafir is told that the best thing he can do is to steal.

1528. *Mr. Hawes.*] What are the treaties to which you refer?—The treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom under Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in 1835 or 1836.

1529. Do you refer to treaties made, not by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, but during the time he was governor of the colony?—Yes, while he was governor of the colony; not by his direction. They were Sir Andries Stockenstrom's treaties.

1530. *Chairman.*] Can you give the Committee any idea of what, in your opinion, would be the amount of force which it will be necessary for some time to come to station upon this frontier, in order adequately to protect the colony against the incursions of the Kafirs?—Certainly not less than between 3,000 and 4,000 men. I should say 4,000 effective men.

1531. Regular troops?—Yes; I am sorry to see that my son's corps have proved disaffected. I cannot help thinking that there is some misunderstanding there, or something which the men have got hold of that they cannot understand. I found that corps with only three troops; I got it augmented

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to six troops. It has since been augmented again; and my son, I know, would have gone anywhere with those troops. He now seems to have lost a great deal of his confidence, except that he says Sir Harry Smith had re-armed 90 of them; and he (Lieut.-colonel Napier) had gone out with them, and given them an opportunity of retrieving their character, and they had behaved very well.

1532. Even with the amount of force you have mentioned, considering the constant disposition of the Kafirs, especially the young men among them, to engage in these predatory expeditions, would not it be very difficult to prevent depredations from constantly happening upon such a frontier?—I believe it would be very difficult, but you would prevent them to a certain extent. Depredations, in my opinion, will constantly take place. When I first went up there, Sir Andries Stockenstrom was with me, as Lieutenant-governor, and he spoke to the chiefs through an interpreter. I do believe that there was no man in the colony who had so much political and moral power over the Kafirs as Sir Andries Stockenstrom, and also over the Kat River Hottentots; he has more power than any other man among the Kafirs.

1533. Do you think it would be practicable or expedient to attempt to obtain in Kafirland some such influence as the British Government possess in certain parts of India over districts which are not immediately and absolutely under British authority?—I never was in India; I know a good deal from reading; but my own opinion is that you must do all things through the chiefs; I am convinced of it. I may be wrong in it, but my experience there leads me to believe that that is the case. I never did anything but through the chiefs; and I never fired a shot against the Kafirs, nor the Kafirs against me the whole time. I ordered monthly returns of the number of head of cattle or horses or any other property which was stolen by the Kafirs, and what means were taken, according to Sir Andries Stockenstrom's treaties, to recover those cattle. I was urged over and over again to go to war with them, but I resisted it. It struck me that it was great folly for a nation like England, who has conquered most nations in the world, to be provoked into such a war. During the first six weeks of the war I would defy any man to prevent the Kafirs darting into the colony, and committing enormous ravages, leading to great loss of life and property. Taking the greatest amount of property lost by their depredations to be 4,000*l.* per annum, I thought to myself, Is it

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worth while for such an amount of loss to encounter all the damage that will be done by going to war? I said, "If it were the French or a European nation, you would not let them injure you in this way;" but looking at the amount stolen, and at the nature of the people, I thought it was much better to try to get the colonists to submit to this loss rather than incur the bloodshed and the expense which would be caused by a war. With respect to the treaties, I will venture to say, that those treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom were never once infringed by the colonists, by the Government, by Dutchmen, or by Englishmen, the whole time I was there; but they were infringed by the Kafirs over and over again. The moment it occurs to a savage that it is his interest to do so and so, treaties may go to the wind. Sir Andries Stockenstrom told them that we had not infringed the treaties, and threatened them that he would give me advice, if they did not stop their depredations, to drive them to the Bashee.

1534. What may be called the open frontier of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, is not of very great extent, is it?—You run up the Fish River, which is very open; every mile or two in summer you can ford it; the Fish River runs up to the mountains a good way, and then again the Orange River is all pretty open; there was never sufficient force there to guard all the places which ought to have been guarded; I had an enormous number of detachments at the different forts, and at one time I had only 1,500 effective troops there.

1535. The course you have recommended supposes a great expense to this country for a great many years?—I should think so; I think it will be a very great expense to this country.

1536. Do you believe that the colony would be disposed, under any circumstances, to contribute any considerable part of that expense?—I think it would to a certain extent, but that would depend a great deal upon circumstances too. The Committee must be aware that there are a great many people in the colony who make a great deal of money by wars, and by the troops, whose constant cry was, "Have troops over;" that was the great reason why they wished to go to war. Contractors and such people make a great deal of money by a war, but I do not think that the country itself could pay any very large amount; I have heard people speak of giving them a constitution, but a constitution and keeping the Kafirs off are two very distinct questions; I do not think you could raise money in the colony to do it. It is with great difficulty that

that they have raised sufficient to pay the expenses of the colony. During the first two or three years I was there, we had always a deficit.

1537. Do you think the distance of Cape Town, as the seat of government, from the Kafir frontier, is a source of inconvenience in the event of a Kafir war?—Not now so much; when I was there it would have been very much so, and when Sir Benjamin D'Urban was there it was very much so; but now the roads are pretty good, and they have steamers which communicate with Algoa Bay. I understand that now you can send to Graham's Town and get an answer the same week. Formerly, when I was there, it took 14 days before you could get an answer to a letter. Sir Benjamin D'Urban I understand, though he did not tell me so, proposed to move to Uitenhage, thinking that a more central place. I think the expense, however, would be so great that I cannot say I am of the same opinion. I believe it is Sir Andries Stockenstrom's opinion that the seat of government should be moved more into the centre of the colony, and more towards Uitenhage; but I am not prepared to say that he told me so. I think it better that the seat of government should be at Cape Town.

1538. Mr. Mackinnon.] How far has the British boundary been extended from your time to the present?—Sir Benjamin D'Urban took in Kafraria, that is the same ground they have now; but when I went out there it had all been given up by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, and all the forts on the Keiskamma had been destroyed, and the Kafirs were in possession; he had given up that territory, and then the boundary was the Fish River.

1539. Then, in fact, we do not hold a greater extent of territory than we held some years back before Sir Andries Stockenstrom gave it up?—We hold now the same boundary as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had after the war which took place. Sir Andries Stockenstrom gave it away again.

1540. It has been since retaken?—It has been retaken; that is the boundary which Sir Harry Smith has now.

1541. Chairman.] Do you think there would be any advantage in making on the part of the British Government small allowances to the chiefs as long as they maintained good order among their people, and prevented depredations?—Very great. I have always been of that opinion, that as in former times black mail was raised in Scotland, something of that sort might be given now, under proper regulations.

1542. The system of black mail is supposed to have had a tendency

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a tendency to keep up the predatory habits of the Scotch, though in a somewhat regulated form?—I cannot help thinking that if the chiefs were told, "There is a certain quantity of money, or a certain number of heads of cattle which you shall have for yourselves; but, on the other hand, when anything is stolen from the colonists, that shall be taken out of your allowance, and you must pay also the value of what is taken over and above the allowance," that would have a good effect. But I may be perfectly wrong in that opinion; it is six or seven years since I was in the colony, and of course the state of things alters.

1543. Suppose the chiefs were seriously to set about repressing those marauding dispositions, after what you have said of the attractions they possess among the more active portion of the community, especially the young men, do not you think there is great reason to apprehend that those chiefs would lose their popularity and influence among their tribes, and would be in reality unable to accomplish those objects?—I cannot say whether they would or not. I cannot attempt to give a distinct opinion upon that subject. The Committee must be aware that, as the governor, I did not live among the Kafirs. I went up twice. The man who, I think, can answer that question better than any other man is Sir Andries Stockenstrom. Sir Andries Stockenstrom and I are not friends, therefore I am not saying it out of any compliment to him; but I do say that I look upon him as a man who knows more about the Kafir nation than any other man at the Cape of Good Hope.

1544. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] A former witness appeared to think that the chiefs have not much influence over their tribes. You appear to be of a different opinion?—I have a very different opinion; of course, however, the Committee will take into their consideration that I speak as the governor of the colony, having lived a long way from them, and only visited them twice, and from such matters as have come under my cognizance. A witness may have been before the Committee who has lived among them; such a witness, of course, would know the feelings of the Kafirs better than I do. Sir Harry Smith ought to know a good deal about them, but lately it appears to me he was mistaken in the influence he thought he had with them. I myself thought that he had very great influence with them; he lived for a long while himself in the same situation in which Colonel Mackinnon is now.

1545. *Chairman.*] Those Kafir chiefs have managed to deceive

deceive the British governor and the British authorities repeatedly, have not they?—Yes, they have; they are very cunning and very clever people, and they look, as most other people do, I suppose, to their own interest more than anything else.

1546. Viscount *Mandeville*.] You stated that you thought Sir Andries Stockenstrom had very great influence over the Kafirs?—Yes.

1547. Do you think he has exercised it at all to maintain peace?—That I cannot say with respect to the Kafirs; I am asked the question, and I shall certainly answer it. I do think that if Sir Andries Stockenstrom had gone down or written to the Governor, and said, "Things are going wrong at the Kat River, I will go there and answer for the loyalty of that settlement;" he could have made that settlement do whatever he liked. I am sure he would have kept them in loyalty if he had gone there; that settlement was made by himself, and was always a favourite settlement of his; and when I was up there I saw the influence which he had, and he ruled the whole of that part of it with great justice. I have no complaint to make of him when he was Lieutenant-governor there; he tried in every way to do his duty, but he was thwarted by everybody in every possible way that they could thwart him. He was then very unpopular for the evidence he had given in a Committee of this House, and everybody's hand was against him except my own; he, however, had great influence in that settlement, so much so, that I believe if he had gone to them and said, "You shall be loyal, and you shall do exactly as I tell you," everybody in the settlement would have done as he told them.

1548. When you travelled through Kafirland you said you were escorted by Eno?—Yes.

1549. Do not you think he was much more worthy of confidence than any other Kafir chief?—I think he was. There was a man of the name of Stock, named after Sir Andries Stockenstrom, in whom I should have had great confidence; and so I had in Pato and those people. In the last war Pato turned most violently against us. I never found Eno behave ill; but he had no influence. It was supposed Maquomo had great influence.

1550. Do you think that the fact of Eno having but little influence was owing to his discouraging the predatory incursions of the Kafirs?—No; he had grown an old man, and he was not of the first rank among them; they looked to other and younger men. I perceive, in looking back to events

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which have happened in the colony, that about every 10 years, when the young men of 12 or 14 have grown up into manhood, a war has broken out.

1551. Mr. *Cardwell*.] You spoke of giving a subsidy to the Kafir chiefs; do you intend the subsidy to be so large as to be divisible among all the members of a tribe, or only an *honorarium* to the chief himself?—To the chief himself.

1552. You think a very small sum would be sufficient?—Not a very large sum; just enough to buy him some cattle.

1553. Can you give the Committee an idea of the amount of charge upon the public revenues, which would be occasioned by subsidizing all the Kafir chiefs?—At the time I was there, I thought about 7,000*l.* a year would have done it.

1554. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You would not desire to subsidize all the Kafir chiefs, would you, but only those who are upon our immediate frontier?—Merely the Gika chiefs and the T'Slambies; there is a great line of them. Many chiefs have said to me, "You blame us when cattle are taken, because we live upon the frontier. It is very hard upon us when Kreli sends his people in, and they come through our property, and upon our lands, and go back to him, that you should come upon us for the cattle." My answer was, "I cannot help that; I cannot go beyond you; you are here, and you must pay. If you choose to live upon the frontier you must pay, in the same way that those Boers and settlers who live upon the frontier must expect to have their cattle stolen." I think, though I am not certain, that under Sir Lowry Cole, in the case of every settler who came up to the frontier, though he did not wish to give them lands along there, near the Kat River, yet he was persuaded to do so at last, and then on condition that they should have a certain number of armed herdsmen upon their estates, and that they should never be without them, in order to defend themselves. That went on pretty well at first, but by degrees they got tired and neglectful, and then the Kafirs took their cattle.

1555. Mr. *Booker*.] Are the combinations among the chiefs themselves very complete?—Yes. I am surprised at present at Pato. I see from some of these despatches, and from a letter I have received from Sir Harry Smith himself, that he says Pato is faithful to him. If he were not, it would be difficult to get supplies from the coast at all; he was very faithful when I was there, but in the war under Sir Peregrine Maitland and Sir Henry Pottinger, he was most violent against us. It puzzles me very much when I see him now again

again in alliance with us ; I feel sure it is his interest, or he would not be so a single day.

1556. Mr. *Hindley*.] Do you think it was just to avenge the depredations of Krelî upon the frontier tribes?—The stolen cattle went through their territory ; it was according to the different treaties that it was done.

1557. If the French were to go through Wurtemberg and Bavaria to Vienna, would it be right for the Austrians to avenge themselves upon Munich?—That analogy will not do ; I am speaking of savages, and you are speaking of civilized people.

1558. Are not the principles of justice the same every where?—No doubt they are ; but there is a word called expediency, which comes against justice very often.

1559. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Might not the Kafirs on the frontier have prevented the stolen cattle going through their country?—Of course they might, if they had chosen.

1560. Colonel *Estcourt*.] For that reason you think it quite just that you should expect from those living on the frontier that Krelî should not pass through their territory to commit incursions upon the colony?—Yes ; unless they had said, “ We will show you the spoor into Krelî’s country ; ” in some instances they have done that. I recollect one or two instances in which they traced the spoor, and the cattle were found in Krelî’s country, and they then gave them up.

1561. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Will you tell the Committee whether in your opinion it would be more advisable to send out European troops, or to raise native levies?—I have not the slightest doubt about the advantage of sending European troops.

1562. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think it would be better to send out troops, and form a corps of our people, instead of having Hottentots in the Cape Corps?—If it is clear that they are disaffected, and determined not to fight for the Government, then I have no hesitation in saying that it would be so ; but if not, they are a description of troops which are of the greatest consequence there ; they know the habits of the people, and how to trace the Kafirs, which the European cannot tell how to do, through the bush. These men are in that way very effective, but if you could meet the Kafirs in the field, which they take very good care that you shall not, I have no hesitation in saying it would be better to have Europeans. My son, in one of his letters, says, “ I have told the Governor that it would be much better to allow volunteers from regiments out there, and recruit from England.”

1563. Viscount

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1563. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Have you any hope of the Hottentots returning to their duty?—Yes; my son's letter was written when they were disarmed. He was then very much out of spirits about it; he has since written to me to say that Sir Harry Smith has re-armed 90 or 100 of these men, and that they have behaved uncommonly well. He said, in one of his first letters, that his own opinion was that those 48 men deserted, in consequence of some malicious persons out there instilling into the minds of the Cape Corps that General Somerset was going to the Kat River in order to set fire to the place, and hang and shoot their relatives. Almost all those deserters came from that settlement; and my own opinion is that they have gone there, and not to the Kafirs, except in one or two instances. They are gone, he thinks, to the Kat River, to see what has become of their friends.

1564. Colonel *Dunne*.] Could not a corps be formed partly of Europeans and partly of Hottentots, who might be used in the warfare for which they are peculiarly fitted?—I think so. I do not know whether that would do or not.; but I think you might have a certain number of Hottentots attached to each regiment. I should be inclined to try that, but I do not know whether Sir Harry Smith's opinion is to the same effect. Any military opinion I may suggest must be of far less value than that of the man who is commanding the troops out there, who is the proper person, and much more capable of forming an opinion than I can be in England. I agree with the Honourable Member, in thinking that that would be a very good thing if it could be done. If, however, the Hottentots are disaffected, they are of no use, of course. I shall be very sorry for it. I put my son into the corps, and did everything I could do to get them on. During the last war they behaved uncommonly well throughout.

1565. Do you approve of the Kat River settlement being so near the frontier?—If I had had to make that settlement I should never have placed it there; but it was made by a man who knew the place well, and who knew both the Kafirs and the Hottentots, and the country, namely, Sir Andries Stockenstrom. It was agreed to at the time by Sir Lowry Cole. At first, I believe, Sir Lowry Cole, and General Bell, who was then secretary, were against it. When I visited the settlement, in 1838, they certainly were in a very good state of civilization. The houses were generally built of unburnt bricks.

1566. Looking at the position of that colony, and at the disaffection

disaffection it has shown, and the danger to our military operations caused by that disaffection, should you approve of breaking up that settlement and placing those Hottentots more within the frontier of the colony?—I think it would be a very proper thing; I think they might be better placed. Another reason is, that everybody has got the idea that it is a nest of iniquity; they will never recover their character. It is seldom that a regiment recovers a good name if it gets a bad one; therefore they will always be suspected, and they will always think that people are suspecting them, and they will go wrong. But Sir Harry Smith, I think, on that subject also, is a better judge than I am.

1567. Would you propose to supply their place with English settlers, who would be subject to be called out as militia or commandos along the frontier?—I am one of those who think that if you had a body of Englishmen in Kafraria, along the whole line of that country, it would be a very good thing.

1568. Could not that be accomplished by degrees, by encouraging soldiers to settle there, and allowing them to settle with their families?—That was my opinion, and I have heard no reason to alter that opinion. In the case of every regiment, when it was relieved from the Cape of Good Hope, while I was there, I invariably gave every man permission to receive his discharge according to the regulations, paying for it; and I discharged as many men, and left them at the Cape, as I could get to remain as settlers.

1569. Did they settle on the frontier?—Yes, almost all of them.

1570. Had they their families with them?—Some had and some had not; I think the greater part had not. Young and able men got work very easily there. A great number of the 75th settled there.

1571. Was not it a disadvantage to those settlements that the men left the frontier, and went into the colony, where they were able to get work. If their families were settled with them, would they not be likely to remain upon the frontier?—I think they would stay upon the frontier.

1572. You would recommend that system to be tried?—Yes, I do not know what those military villages have done; but I do not understand how they came to be so suddenly broken in on, and treated as they have recently been.

1573. Could not they be so placed as to be able to defend themselves till relief came?—Yes, I think so; the men having been subjected to military discipline, they would believe

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what the officers and people in authority told them. I tried it with the Dutch farmers and English settlers. I proposed to numbers of them to build a wall with loop-holes in it, in order that they might defend themselves till the military came to their support. One or two did it; but it was found to be a trouble, and it was neglected.

1574. Could not they be placed at such distances that by a system of signals they might support one another?—I think they might. Colonel Selwyn was the engineer out there when I came away: two or three posts were established, and I had an idea of establishing signals all along the colony, so that the moment there was a depredation committed the whole of the force, both military and civil, should know it in the course of a short time; but it fell to the ground, I believe.

575. With such a defence as that, would not a much smaller military force be required than if we undertook the whole defence of the frontier by a purely military force?—Certainly.

1576. If you had a line of regular troops to support those settlers, you think they would form an efficient defence?—After you once got them well settled; but it would take some years before they were well settled and established there.

1577. Do you think the system would be worth trying even now?—I think it would, if you give them plenty of men. You must not leave them too isolated.

1578. Do you think it would be necessary to place the whole of the frontier under a military chief, with summary powers to act for himself in his treaties with the Kafirs?—If he is merely a military chief, to be ready in case of invasion, I agree with that suggestion. If there is to be a lieutenant-governor, then, I think, and I myself found it so, that, looking to the constant correspondence and the delay experienced in getting an answer, the circumstance of the lieutenant-governor being obliged to send to me for the approval of everything caused a great deal of delay. It was proposed by Sir Andries Stockenstrom that he should be independent of the governor, and correspond directly with the Colonial Secretary at home. I objected to that. I said I would much rather let him be the lieutenant-governor completely distinct from me, but I could not consent that he should correspond with the Secretary of State at home without the correspondence passing through me; but if you had a military man to act as General Somerset once did, as commandant of that line, I think that would do very well.

1579. You

1579. You would fix some boundary over which his powers should extend?—Yes. I believe Colonel Mackinnon is now in that position.

1580. Should the law which should prevail be purely military law, or would you be able in such a state of things to put the ordinary laws of the colony in force?—Military law should prevail, I think.

1581. Mr. *Hawes*.] What was the date of your arrival in the colony?—I arrived there about the middle of January 1838.

1582. How long did you remain governor?—I remained till 1844, just six years and three months.

1583. What were the principal treaties then in force which regulated the relations between the British authorities and the Kafir chiefs?—Those denominated Sir Andries Stockenstrom's treaties. They were treaties signed by Sir Benjamin D'Urban; but he disagreed with them, though he signed them as the governor. They were in full force when I went up to the colony. Sir Andries Stockenstrom met me as soon as I entered his districts. He managed the treaties, and had done so.

1584. Was one of them a treaty dated the 1st of June 1837?—No, I think the treaties were dated immediately after the Kafir war which Sir Benjamin D'Urban put an end to; I think that was in 1836. They were the treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom.

1585. When you say the treaties, do you refer to one principal treaty, or were there others which were then in force?—There were treaties with the Gaika tribes and the T'Slam-bies. They were all in force, and were all made together.

1586. It was the same treaty made with various chiefs, was it not?—Yes.

1587. The Committee "understood" you to say that that treaty had not been violated, either by the colonists or by any British authorities?—I cannot recollect an instance of it. When Colonel Hare was Lieutenant-governor a war had nearly broken out, but not from any violation of the treaties, that I know of.

1588. During your governorship no violation of a treaty was brought under your notice, either on the part of any British authority or of the colonists?—None.

1589. Were many complaints made to you that the treaties had been violated by the Kafir chiefs?—Yes, many.

1590. You have stated in the course of your evidence that the chiefs have the power to enforce the observance of treaties

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upon their followers, if they are so disposed?—Yes, in my opinion clearly so.

1591. How then do you account for the violations of those treaties by the Kafir chiefs or their followers, if they have power to enforce the obligations of a treaty upon their people?—I think the Kafir chiefs connived at it.

1592. You think that they have the power to enforce those treaties, but that they are disposed to connive at the violation of them when it suits their interests?—Exactly so.

1593. Do you attach much value to entering into those treaties with the chiefs?—No.

1594. You would not be disposed to recommend it as any part of the British policy to make such treaties in future with the Kafir chiefs?—No, I should not; the more I thought of it and the more experience I had, the more I was convinced that any treaties you might make with savages or barbarians, would only be observed by them as long as it suited their interests, therefore I think it is as well not to make them.

1595. Was not the boundary of the colony, when you were governor, strictly speaking the Fish River?—Yes.

1596. Beyond that again, there was what was first called the ceded territory, subsequently called the neutral territory, which was bounded by the Keiskamma?—Yes.

1597. Keeping in mind those violations of treaties which have been entered into, how should you propose, supposing the boundary of the colony to be that which you prefer, namely, the Keiskamma, to maintain peace on that frontier?—I should have all the forts which were there before; I should maintain it by a military force, having military posts the whole way; I do not see any other way of maintaining it. I have heard people say, though I am not inclined to think so myself, that if you take away the military and let the settlers and Boers protect themselves they will do it; I do not think they can.

1598. You are of opinion, from your experience, that even that boundary which is a better boundary, as I understand, than the Fish River, could only be maintained by a large military force?—That is my opinion.

1599. Are you at all prepared to state to the Committee what you think would be the numerical amount of force which would be required?—I should say 4,000 effective troops. I do not mean 4,000 troops upon paper, I mean 4,000 troops able to take the field.

1600. Are you or not disposed to think, that taking a certain military possession of Kafirland beyond the boundary of the

the Keiskamma; that is to say, establishing military posts there, as has been done by Sir Harry Smith, with the concurrence both of Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir Peregrine Maitland, has been so far successful that it has prevented an irruption of the Kafirs into the colony proper?—I think certainly it has. I went out, if I had any prejudice at all, with a prejudice against the colonists, and against that former occupation of the ground by Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Sir Harry Smith, and thinking that it was better not to have it. My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes there, convinced me that I was wrong, and that Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them. No doubt it must be so, and if all those forts were well garrisoned and provisioned, it would answer very well. I think the system has prevented a very sudden irruption into the colony; but owing to the nature of the bush, in spite of anything which can be done, the first irruption of the Kafirs must be a source of great detriment to the colony.

1601. May the Committee infer it to be your opinion that, simply as regards the protection of the colony, the establishment of military posts in British Kafraria, is the best means of securing the peace and tranquillity of the colony itself against the depredations of the Kafirs?—Certainly.

1602. Supposing such a policy to be pursued, and military posts to be established in Kafraria, Kafraria being therefore under a kind of military possession, what would you be disposed to recommend as the policy to be pursued towards the chiefs within that territory?—I should certainly uphold their authority in every possible way I could, and then let them govern their people according to their laws with their councils, and pursue their own course; putting down witchcraft and torture, and such things, but otherwise interfering with them as little as possible. There was a very clever young man, who was interpreter to Sir Andries Stockenstrom, of whom he gave me a very high character, I mean Mr. Shepstone; he has been placed by Sir Harry Smith over the Zoolas at Natal, which was first taken possession of by me; he has managed the people exceedingly well. I saw a letter giving an account of his management there, and giving a most excellent account of it; I think it was as good as anything I ever saw.

1603. The Committee understand you to say, that suppose ing this military possession of British Kafraria to be  
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conceded to be the best policy, you would leave the chiefs in possession of their authority over their followers, and retain them in their respective districts, that is to say, you would leave them possessed of the lands they now have?—Certainly.

1604. Would you govern them directly by military authorities, or by means of diplomatic or resident agents, or magistrates?—It may be supposed to be prejudice, but I say it should be by military authorities; there were diplomatic agents before, and I found that many of them did not act as I thought right. There was a man at Block Drift who did not do so; I believe afterwards Sir Peregrine Maitland or Sir Henry Pottinger dismissed him. My opinion is, that it would be better they should be governed by military authorities.

1605. Sir Benjamin D'Urban extended the boundary of the colony to the River Kei, did not he?—Yes.

1606. Public opinion in the colony was very much in favour of that extension, was not it?—Yes; some people were not so, but the majority were clearly in favour of it.

1607. They thought it the best policy as regards the interests of the Cape of Good Hope?—All those persons whom I ever conversed with did. When I arrived there, certainly a very great majority wished for it.

1608. Were not some of the most enlightened among the missionaries also very much in favour of it?—Yes, the Wesleyans particularly; but I do not believe that the missionaries of the London Missionary Society were in favour of it.

1609. Do you know Dr. Philip?—Yes.

1610. Is not he connected with the London Missionary Society?—Yes. With respect to Dr. Philip, I may say that he and I had not a great deal of political conversation. I met him in London before I went out, and he said a great deal to me as to his being forced into politics by what was taking place in the colony. I told him this: "When you go out to the colony, as you are going out at the same time I am, if you will keep to your avocation, which is preaching the Gospel, and not interfere with mine, we may go on very well; but if you attempt politically to interfere with me, I will see who goes to the wall." I must in justice to Dr. Philip say, that from the moment he arrived in the colony, while I was there, till I went away, he never gave me the slightest difficulty or embarrassment of any kind or sort.

1611. Did you know Mr. Shaw?—Yes, he was a Wesleyan missionary; he was a very respectable, excellent man.

1612. Did

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1612. Did his plan for the government of British Kafraria ever come under your notice?—Never.

1613. Did the missionaries generally aid the Government in their attempts to preserve peace with the Kafirs?—I think they wished it, certainly; but I tell the Committee very fairly that I did not much trouble them with questions upon the subject.

1614. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do not you think it a very unadvisable thing to have any political communication with the missionaries?—That is clearly and distinctly my opinion.

1615. *Chairman*.] You stated that you were struck with the success of the policy pursued by the Government towards the Zoolas, will you have the goodness to inform the Committee what that policy consisted of?—I saw it alluded to the other day in a letter to the "Times" from an officer in India, recommending that the same policy should be pursued towards the Gaika tribes which had been pursued by Mr. Shepstone with the Zoolas in Natal.

1616. You have not yourself any special sources of information upon that subject?—No; but I know Mr. Shepstone to be a very clever young man in every way.

1617. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Do you find that the traders are troublesome among the Kafirs?—Yes, they introduce gunpowder and arms and brandy, and everything which is bad, in my opinion; they smuggle very much.

1618. Do you think that ought to be put a stop to?—Yes; I think it was better under the system established by Lord Charles Somerset; there were fairs held, and the Kafirs met them at those fairs and bought what they wanted. That seemed to work very well, from what I have read. They now take gunpowder and arms into Kafirland; the merchants at Cape Town and Graham's Town purchase large quantities of arms from England. The muskets cost, I believe, about 7 s. or 8 s. a piece at Birmingham, but they get 2 l. or 3 l. for them in selling them to the Kafirs. I tried to stop the gunpowder from going in, but I found it impossible; the settlers and the Boers said, "If you take the gunpowder from us what is to become of us in winter, or in the dry season, when the antelopes in millions, and the beasts of prey, come down upon us? We must have gunpowder and arms."

1619. You think that the only means of preventing the introduction of firearms and gunpowder is to put some check upon the traders?—Do not let them go into Kafirland, except as they did formerly.

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1620. You would put a stop to these itinerant traders?—  
Certainly.

1621. *Chairman.*] Do you believe it would be possible, by any means, to prevent gunpowder being introduced into Kafirland as long as the Kafirs desire to obtain it, and it is the interest of parties to introduce it?—I think they will always obtain it. I tried, in every way, but I could not see how it was to be avoided; they will get it somehow or other.

1622. *Colonel Thompson.*] Could not they obtain it by sea?—I have no doubt they could; they get it from the Mozambique coast, and from the settlements of the Portuguese; they would get it, I think, in spite of every precaution.

1623. *Colonel Dunne.*] Are those arms exported from Liverpool?—I believe so.

1624. All along the slave coast, are there great quantities of arms?—Yes, great quantities.

1625. *Viscount Mandeville.*] Do you think that Kafir servants coming into the colony are the means of stealing cattle in anyway?—I think some of them may be honest, but very few; they all look very much to the interests of their tribe, and they are afraid of the chief. They must give information, and they do give it.

1626. Would you prohibit Kafirs going as servants to the farmers?—The only thing against that is that when they want to cut their harvest they must have hands; but there are a great many Fingoes now who are the best servants, and a very excellent race.

1627. Do you think if the Kafirs who went as servants were obliged to bring their families and cattle with them to the farms, that would be beneficial?—I think that would be a very good thing; but then against that is to be placed this, that the farmer would not have the means of feeding those cattle upon his grounds.

1628. *Mr. Stanley.*] I understand you to propose to give up all interference with the internal affairs of Kafria, provided the Kafirs do not interfere with us?—Yes, having a military force there; I would have a military force, but I would not interfere with them. Let them be governed by their own laws; but if you withdraw the troops from the frontier, and take the troops out of Kafria, of course they will be the same as they were before.

1629. What rule would you enforce as to individual Kafirs entering the colony?—In his treaties, Sir Andries Stockenstrom had an article, that a Kafir coming into the colony to be a servant must have permission from his chief and  
from

from the political agent, upon which he was allowed a pass; therefore they were all known to the Lieutenant-governor. That plan seemed to act very well.

1630. With respect to the British colonists, would you enforce the same rule; would you allow no British subject to enter Kafraria without a pass?—Yes, I would; I do not see that they would do any harm.

1631. You would allow the colonists to enter Kafraria freely, but you would not allow the Kafirs to enter the colony?—Just so.

1632. *Chairman.*] In a military point of view, do you attach great importance to the possession of the Amatola district?—It ought to be in our possession if we wish to keep the country; on the same ground that I think you should keep Kafraria by military possession, you should have the Amatolas.

1633. Do you think it would be important to clear the Amatolas of the Kafir tribes?—It must be done now; the war will not be finished till the Amatolas have been cleared.

1634. Having been cleared, could they be kept clear?—It would require a larger force than I spoke of before, if you are to take possession of the Amatolas, and keep up the forts there and maintain roads for bringing up provisions and water.

1635. You do not contemplate our permanently clearing the Amatolas of the natives, and retaining the country in our hands?—No.

1636. You think that would be too expensive an undertaking?—I should say so.

1637. *Colonel Estcourt.*] You think the Keiskamma the better boundary?—Yes, I think so.

1638. Supposing the Keiskamma to be the better boundary, having cleared Kafraria, do you think that without the appearance of being defeated, and without losing your prestige, you could retire upon the Keiskamma?—I do not think the prestige of the British army is ever lost.

1639. You think you could take up the Keiskamma as the boundary?—Yes, I think so; I should not be afraid of doing so.

1640. *Mr. Stanley.*] You have stated that during your tenure of office, you were very reluctant to go to war in consequence of any trifling depredations?—Very reluctant.

1641. Was not the effect of that pacific policy to cause an increase in the number of those depredations?—I do not think it was. The number of depredations, I thought, decreased.

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Returns were kept, and when I looked over them on coming away, the numbers had decreased rather than increased. At the time when I altered the treaties so as to give the colonists more facility in tracing their cattle and their stolen property, for six months after there were hardly any cattle stolen.

1642. What means did you take of obtaining restitution from the chiefs if the colonists were unable to trace their own property?—I threatened them. I here and there got the property; but they evaded it in every way they could. They employed every kind of subterfuge in their power. I had no resource but to have gone in and taken the cattle of the first kraal I came across, and then a war would have taken place immediately.

1643. You say that there are in the colony many parties who profit by a war?—Yes, there are.

1644. Are not there also a great many who lose by a war?—The colonists on the frontier on whose estates the Kafirs make depredations, and whose houses are burnt, lose an immense deal. When I went out there I found in the office at Graham's Town claims by the colonists to the amount of between 200,000*l.* and 300,000*l.* during that war. It appears to me just that they should have been paid, but they were not.

1645. Setting those two interests one against the other, is not there a stronger interest in the colony against a war than in favour of one?—I believe so. I think it is only a few persons who make money by a war, and who wish for a war. The whole interior of the colony from Cape Town up to the frontier does not wish for a war. Graham's Town has profited by the contracts and the money which is spent by the troops.

1646. You said that public opinion was in favour of the last extension of the frontier; was there a strong feeling on that subject in Cape Town, and in the western parts of the colony?—That was in the time of Sir Benjamin D'Urban. There was then a very strong feeling in favour of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy in every part of the colony; stronger in Cape Town than anywhere else almost; but there was a very strong feeling from Cape Town up to the frontier.

1647. It was not merely approved of by those colonists who personally gained by the frontier being removed further from themselves, but there was a general feeling throughout the colony that the measures then taken conduced to the general safety?—Decidedly. I was rather prejudiced against that

that feeling, but common sense showed me that I was wrong.

1648. You spoke of establishing military villages along the frontier; by whom would you have those villages occupied; by retired soldiers, or by soldiers actually in service?—Soldiers who had received their discharge. There was a very able statement put into my hands by Colonel Lewis, in which he referred to the Russian villages; but there was no way of carrying it out then. I sent the plan home, and since then there have been military villages established; but I hear that the other day they were all destroyed, and the people all murdered.

1649. You propose also the establishment of a line of signals along the frontier?—I did when I was there. I should think a line of signals would be very advantageous, so that the whole line of frontier, from one end to the other, might receive intimation of an incursion of the Kafirs, particularly now that science has brought the means of doing it so easily within our reach. Sir Harry Smith was my adjutant-general at the time. I forget whether he agreed with me about it or not.

1650. Mr. B. Carter.] You said you thought the system of giving a pass to every Kafir on entering the colony was a proper system?—I think so.

1651. That was as a guarantee for his good behaviour?—Yes, certainly; the chief guaranteed that he was a well-behaved man.

1652. Do not you think it important also that you should have some sort of guarantee that a colonist when he goes into Kafirland should not involve you in disputes?—It might be so: perhaps I may correct myself, and say that I would have a pass for the colonists. It would do good, and it would look more like justice to do the same to our own people as we do to the Kafirs. No trader can go in without a pass.

1653. Disputes do arise from colonists going in an unauthorized manner into Kafirland, do not they?—Yes, several disputes have arisen in consequence of it.

1654. It would be desirable, in your opinion, to have some surveillance over the dealings of our colonists with the Kafirs?—Yes.

1655. Marquis of Granby.] You have said that the colony must be governed by military occupation; in fixing any boundary for the future, one of the most important considerations would be the nature of the country around the boundary

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boundary which you would fix, in a military point of view? — Yes.

1656. From your knowledge of the country, do you think the boundary you propose would be the most advantageous, in a military point of view?—I do, but then it must be observed I never went beyond that boundary. It was not the boundary when I was in the colony.

1657. You know nothing of the country beyond?—No.

1658. You think that we should govern the Kafirs through their chiefs?—Yes, I think so.

1659. Are you aware that one of the great causes of discontent among the chiefs has been, that we held them responsible for the cattle which were taken?—I know that they said so very often, and that they do say so; but I know that the chiefs will say whatever suits them best. I have every wish to do the black man good as well as the white, in every way; but still I must say that I saw and had many instances of deceit among the chiefs. I repeat, that during the time I was there I do not recollect an instance of any treaties being infringed by the colonists against the Kafirs. I have told the Kafirs so.

1660. Mr. Hawes.] Do you recollect the date of the establishment of the Kat River settlement?—It was at the time of Sir Lowry Cole, about the year 1830 or 1831.

1661. When did you visit it?—In 1838, immediately after I went out; I visited it also in 1841 or 1842. Mr. Read was the missionary there.

1662. I understand you to say that you doubt the policy of placing that settlement so near the frontier?—I do.

1663. When you visited the settlement was it in a prosperous state?—It was; when I went into it I was astonished to find myself met at the end of the village by four or five distinct columns of children and adults, with schoolmasters. Every one of those children could read and write, to a certain degree. The houses were built of unburnt brick, and some of brick, and they had gardens before them, with all kinds of tillage, and they had beasts in the different kraals. Dr. Philip showed me in the schools, boys and adults who were reading and writing, and they came up as regular as any school in any town of England would do, under their different teachers.

1664. You saw the gardens cultivated, and the land generally cultivated?—Yes, there was a large tract of land cultivated.

1665. Were the Hottentots themselves the labourers; did they

they cultivate the gardens and the land themselves?—Yes; they make the women work a great deal more than the men.

1666. Were not the Fingoes the chief labourers?—No; the Fingoes were not in that settlement.

1667. Were there no Gonahs?—After the war a few Kafirs had gone in among them, but generally they were Hottentots, and a great many of them old discharged soldiers from the Cape Corps.

1668. Were you led to believe that the Hottentots themselves were the actual cultivators of the gardens and fields, or did you ascertain the fact from your own personal knowledge?—I saw them myself cultivating the fields. I do not say I saw them at the plough, because they use the hoe.

1669. Have you heard or read any reports of the state of that settlement since?—I heard reports that they were not going on so well as they had done; but I cannot give those reports from any authority.

1670. Were not there considerable advances made on the part of the Government for the support of the people?—At times a good deal.

1671. They received food and clothing?—Yes; I do not think they ever required food while I was there.

1672. If those advances were made they were made subsequently to your time?—I think so; I do not remember advances being made while I was there.

1673. You are not at all acquainted with the reports made upon the state of that settlement by Mr. Biddulph, who was sent there by Sir Henry Pottinger?—I read a Blue Book of Sir Henry Pottinger two years back; Mr. Biddulph came out when I was there; I think he reported unfavourably. I remember reading a report, and saying at the time, "Mr. Biddulph does not report very favourably of this settlement." It was sent home to me by the secretary.

1674. Mr. Biddulph, in that report, makes the following statement:—"Whatever might be the avowed motives of the founders of the settlement, it is quite clear, by this statement, that it was never designed to be a self-supporting community, although there is no reason why it should not have been; for it might, after the lapse of a few years, just as well have produced 1,000 *l.* as 50 *l.* per annum, and the people would have been more prosperous and respectable. But the truth is, the whole affair, from beginning to end, has been nothing but the most transparent piece of humbug ever practised upon

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upon the public, to serve the purposes of unscrupulous, intriguing people"?—I cannot agree in that.

1675. This report is dated in October 1847; that is nearly 10 years after you visited the settlement?—Yes; when I saw the settlement on that occasion they were going on very well and very prosperously. It appeared to me they would have gone on very well, as I told Dr. Read, if he would have abstained from politics.

1676. They held their land upon very easy terms, did they not?—Yes.

1677. You do not recollect contributions being made to them from the Government?—No, I do not recollect it; it was not the case in my time.

1678. Would you think it a wise step to grant such allowances to a settlement of that kind?—When the settlement was first made, I think it might have been so; when I saw them there was no necessity for it. The settlement was very close upon the Kafirs, and at the time that I was there the Kafirs and these Hottentots disliked one another very much. I was very much surprised at it, but they did so.

1679. Did the Hottentots in that settlement show a readiness to take their share in the defence of the colony during your government?—I felt convinced at that time that I had nothing to do but to call them out, and they would have behaved well.

1680. Did you put that disposition to the test?—No, I had no occasion to do so.

1681. With respect to occasional depredations, did they show courage in resisting them?—The field cornet was always very ready to come to me if I wanted him. I always employed the troops if there was any occasion to threaten the Kafirs, or anything of that kind.

1682. What was the name of the cornet when you were there?—He was an old serjeant-major in the Cape Corps; Boeter was one field cornet, and there was another man who had been in the Cape Corps. The fact is, however, that Mr. Read, the clergyman, did exactly as he chose.

1683. Colonel *Dunne*.] Did he enter into politics?—Yes; he attempted it with me, but I would not allow it.

1684. Is not the situation of the Kat River settlement very important in a military point of view?—No, I do not think so. There was another settlement nearer to Fort Beaufort, the settlement of Hermanns; I see that he was killed in his attack on Fort Beaufort; he collected around him every depredator and every rogue he could collect together.

1685. Mr.

1685. *Mr. Hawes.*] If such settlements are to be encouraged, you would be of opinion that they should be entirely self-supporting?—I think so.

1686. And beyond what might be necessary first to establish them, you would contribute nothing from the Government funds?—No, certainly not.

1687. During your Government, that is from 1838 to 1844, no such contributions were made?—Not that I know of, to the Kat River settlement.

1688. *Mr. Cardwell.*] Your general view is that you would make the Keiskamma the frontier of the colony?—Yes.

1689. Do you think that that would be a good frontier, in a military point of view?—I think so.

1690. You would leave the whole of Kafraria to the government of the native chiefs?—Yes.

1691. You would keep on good terms with them by paying to them a small subsidy, the whole amount of which you think would not exceed 7,000 *l.* a year; you would maintain a military force upon the line of the Keiskamma, aided by a system of signals; and you would keep up a native population, who should act when occasion required in aid of the troops?—Yes; and I would have a few forts in Kafraria.

1692. You would maintain a military force within Kafraria, though you would limit yourself to preserve the frontier of the Keiskamma?—Yes.

1693. You would maintain a military force of about 4,000 men you say?—Yes, from 4,000 to 5,000, but not less than 4,000 certainly.

1694. Have you at all considered whether the expense of a permanent military protection of the nature which you have described, could fairly be thrown upon the colonial revenues if the colony had a representative government, and if to that government were entrusted the direction of the policy to be observed towards the Kafir tribes?—I do not think they could possibly defray it; I do not think it would be in their power to sustain so large an expense, but it must be borne by the mother country; that is my clear and distinct opinion.

1695. *Mr. Hindley.*] What do you consider the present boundary of the colony?—The Kei is the boundary.

1696. In what respect does the present policy differ from that which you suggest?—I do not believe from what I have heard that it differs at all.

1697. What was the boundary according to the treaty with

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with Kreli?—Kreli has his own boundary, which is beyond the Gaika and the T'Slambie tribes.

1698. What is the boundary of the colony by the treaty with Kreli?—After Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was given up, the Fish River was the boundary of the colony for the whole of those tribes.

1699. According to the treaty with Kreli, you consider the Fish River to have been the boundary?—There was a treaty made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom with those tribes, and then came the Fish River boundary; before that it was the Kei, under Sir Benjamin D'Urban; but when his whole system, and with it the province of Adelaide, was thrown over by the treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom, the Fish River became the boundary for the whole of the Kafir tribes.

1700. In the time of Sir Benjamin D'Urban a treaty was made with Kreli which gave us possession of the land up to the Kei, and also a small portion of land to the east of the Kei, containing the settlement of Butterworth?—Yes.

1701. By whose authority was the land given up?—It was under the government of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, but with a protest, I believe, upon his part; it was done by treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, who was appointed from home Lieutenant-governor, and had to mark out the line of boundary he thought proper.

1702. It was under the specific direction of the home Government that the land was given up?—Whether it was by the specific direction of the home Government that the land was given up, I cannot say. I went to take leave of Lord Glenelg, and he said to me, "I have just received a despatch from Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in which it appears that Captain Stockenstrom, as he was then, has delivered up the whole of the forts of the Keiskamma, and dismantled them, and has given up the whole of that territory, taking the Fish River as the boundary of the colony." I said, "Then there is a great deal of trouble taken off my hands."

1703. Up to the year 1844, the boundary of the colony was the Fish River?—Yes, up to the war which took place under Sir Peregrine Maitland. I objected to that boundary, and wrote home to that effect. Lord Glenelg asked me, before I went out, to give my opinion as to the boundary. I told him I could not give my military opinion of a country I had never seen; but that when I got out there I would do so, and I wrote him word that it was a very bad one. The most had been made of it by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the

the engineers, which could be made; but I was of opinion that it was a very bad boundary. The Keiskamma ought to be the boundary.

1704. During the period of the reversal of the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, you had no war with the Kafirs?—No, none.

1705. Mr. *Harves.*] Though you had no war with the Kafirs immediately upon, or for some time after the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy, the frontier was in a constant state of disturbance in consequence of the depredations of the Kafirs, was it not?—A great deal of depredation took place. I cannot deny that there was an immense deal of commotion, and many people may think that I ought to have gone to war two or three times, but I did not do it for the reasons I have stated.

1706. Does it fall within your knowledge that Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in his despatches, distinctly predicted that the frontier would continue to be disturbed, and that a future war would be the consequence of a reversal of his policy?—I will not say that I recollect that, but my impression is that he did think so, clearly and distinctly.

1707. Mr. *Hindley.*] After the reversal of his policy, for six years there was no war with the Kafirs?—There was not.

1708. The depredations committed by the Kafirs on an average, were not above 5,000 *l.* a year in value?—From recollection it is hard to say, but I should not think the value would amount to more than that.

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## MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Hawes.	Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Mackinnon.	Sir Edward Buxton.
Mr. Booker.	Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Bonham Carter.	The Marquis of Granby.
Mr. E. H. Stanley.	Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Thompson.	Colonel Dunne.
Colonel Estcourt.	Mr. Cardwell.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.	Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Labouchere.	

THE RIGHT HON. H. LABOUCHERE IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *Andries Stockenstrom*, called in ; and Examined.

Sir *A.*  
*Stockenstrom.*

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1709. Mr. *Hawes*.] I OBSERVE in the Evidence which you gave before the Committee in 1835, you stated that the Government could at the time "have laid down a system of preventive measures which would have effectually protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard their cattle, and could make stricter rules for said territory, than perhaps it would have been able to do on the western side of the old frontier." Will you have the goodness to state to the Committee what were the preventive measures which you contemplated in the answer you gave to the Committee at that time, and which I have read?—The measures were carried out subsequently by order of Lord Glenelg. If the Committee will allow me, I will quote an authority which may perhaps have some weight here; it is that of Sir Harry Smith.

1710. Do so, if you please?—It is confirmatory of that view. I thought it best to refer to old documents; I have done so, and I have found a paper of Sir Harry Smith's. This was sent to me by Sir B. D'Urban: "Extract copy from Colonel Smith's plan of the frontier police, and relations with the Kafir Tribes, upon giving up the new province of Adelaide." It is dated 12th July 1836. I take this from the supplement to the Cape Frontier Times of the 18th of July 1848.

1711. Mr. *Booker*.] Is that a despatch?—It is a memorandum

dum sent to me by Sir Benjamin D'Urban when he had repealed martial law, and ordered the territory to be given up; he sent me this as a suggestion from Sir Harry Smith, for me to adopt. As far as it was consistent with Lord Glenelg's instructions I adopted it; other parts which were inconsistent I did not adopt; but this passage bears upon it so strongly, that I should like to read it to the Committee. In the fourth paragraph it is said, "upon the farmer discovering he has been robbed, he is to follow up the spoor, to proceed to the nearest agent of police, make affidavit that he has lost ———; if during the day, that he was satisfied with the diligence of his herd; if at night, that his cattle were in the kraal; half the depredations are occasioned by the farmers themselves from allowing their cattle to wander about, without even counting them, for days; the next thing to be considered is, suppose the farmer is robbed to a serious extent, yet his cattle, or any traces of them, are not discovered, has he any claim on the Government? I say no, for if he attends to his herds it is totally impossible they can fly; the spoor must be discovered, and so must the cattle;" that is the passage I allude to, and this was so consistent with my view, and, in fact, with Lord Glenelg's views, that it was carried out.

1712. *Mr. Hawes.*] Then am I to understand that the measures you have spoken to of the general policy you thought desirable for the protection of the frontier was carried out in the treaty you made, and signed at King William's Town on the 5th of December 1836?—Yes.

1713. I understand that that treaty carried out generally those preventive measures which you have referred to in the answers you gave when giving evidence before the Committee in 1835?—Generally speaking, those views of mine, combined with the instructions which I received from Downing-street.

1714. Now did the treaty of 1836, which I have just referred to, work well and successfully for this object?—I hardly think that I am an unbiassed witness upon that point; I should rather like to refer you to others. Sir George Napier was as humane and upright a man as we have had there, and I should like to refer to his letters to Lord Glenelg up to the end of 1838 or the beginning of 1839, when I left the frontier; subsequent to that I can say very little, except from hearsay; but as long as I was there I considered it to work well, and Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approbation to me, but that is in private letters; but they will be officially found in Downing-street. In one particular letter I find this

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—(“ In a report made to Sir George Napier, and transmitted by this officer under cover of his despatch of the 1st of February 1839 to Lord Normanby, who placed it in my hands) Colonel Somerset felt himself bound to declare that he ‘ never observed such apparent quiet throughout the country, adding, ‘ that war can only have been contemplated by those who wish to keep up a feeling of excitement in the minds of the tribes, either against each other or against the colony, and thus disfigure and distort every subject, but in the minds of the Kafirs nothing of the kind was ever contemplated ; ’ ” but this is not the only one, there are several other documents that will be found, both private and official, addressed to Lord Glenelg, and the private ones were also in the office at that time ; I refer particularly to that of the 1st of February 1839, and my report thereon.

1715. Has it or not come within your own knowledge, that complaints were very frequently, not to say universally, made in the colony against those treaties, to the effect that the provisions were not such as to protect the frontier farmers?—Not generally or universally ; but certainly on the frontier there was a very strong party determined to upset those treaties ; there is no doubt about that ; but they were as hostile to the D’Urban system ; I hold in my hand documents to show that.

1716. Did not Sir George Napier feel it necessary to amend those treaties?—That was in 1840, I think, two years after I left the Government ; I allude to Sir George Napier’s view of the Glenelg treaties, and how they worked for two years and upwards.

1717. Allow me to call your attention to a statement made by Sir George Napier, with reference to those treaties ; he says in a despatch dated the 21st of September 1840, “ I have determined to proceed about the beginning of next month to Graham’s Town, in order to investigate afresh the grievances so deservedly complained of by the colonists, with reference to the plunder of their property, herds and flocks ; and also in reference to a new feature in Kafir depredations, namely, the frequent murders of the armed herdsmen belonging to the colonists, whom they are forced by the articles of the treaties to have so armed, in order to entitle them to demand compensation for their plundered cattle.” Now is not that a rather strong opinion, that the provisions of those treaties were not sufficient?—I am speaking of the despatches in the beginning of 1839 and the end of 1838, when I had for two years conducted the system.

1718. But

1718. But this, as you will observe, is dated in 1840, after another year's experience?—I had then left the frontier two years, and had been in this country two years, consequently I do not know anything about Sir George Napier; I have had no intercourse with him since I left the frontier.

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1719. I will ask you this general question then, whether you are or are not aware from your long residence and experience in that colony, that Sir George Napier from time to time spoke of the inadequacy of those treaties to maintain peace, and found it necessary to enter into fresh agreements with the Kafirs?—I know he made a fresh agreement with the Kafirs; that is a notorious fact. What he spoke I know not.

1720. I will just call your attention to one more despatch of Sir George Napier's, and ask your opinion upon the points, if you please; he says in the despatch of the 26th of August 1841, "After a full and impartial trial during four years of the treaties entered into in 1837," which should be 1836 I believe now, "between Lieutenant-governor Stockenström and the various tribes of frontier Kafirs, I find that these treaties were defective in some particulars, bearing hard and unjustly upon the colonists, and tending rather to encourage than to discourage stealing on the part of the Kafirs;" did anything justifying or bearing that opinion come within your personal knowledge?—He would not give that opinion without he was perfectly convinced it was so; but I disagree with him altogether. I refer to his opinion when he had been about a year in the colony, and the system had been in operation for upwards of two years.

1721. Now I gathered from your former evidence, and you will correct me if I am wrong, that you were of opinion that there had been a constant tendency to encroachment upon the land justly belonging to the Kafirs, and that that had led to collisions, ill feelings, and ultimately war between the Kafirs and the colonists?—I spoke of the encroachments of the white man from the Cape of Good Hope for the last 200 years, and the natural state of colonies by white men coming in contact with aboriginal tribes, and I believe that that is an established fact; it has always been my opinion, and is so now. We have before our eyes the Cape of Good Hope, when the Dutch took possession of it; they first built a little fort, and we have now got to the Orange river, upon that principle of gradual encroachment.

1722. And your opinion is, that that gradual encroachment has in fact led to bad feeling on the part of the Kafirs towards the colonists, as between the Kafirs and the settlers?

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—Yes, as a natural process in the new world as well as in the old.

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1723. And has brought our relations to their present unsatisfactory condition; that is your opinion?—Yes.

1724. Will you let me call your attention to the arrangements that you entered into with the chief Kreli in 1846, and I ask you simply with a view to explanation. In 1846, I find in the papers laid before Parliament in 1847, that you made a treaty with Kreli, and I will read you the last article of that treaty, with a view to ask you for some explanation: "Fourthly," Kreli is "to acknowledge the right of the British government to all the land west of the Great or White Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he, Kreli, or any other Kafir, chief or subject, may have possessed to any part of the said territory." Before you answer the question, in order to put you in full possession of the points I wish to direct your attention to, I will read the comment which you make in your letter dated 14th August 1846, addressed to Lieutenant-colonel Cloete. In that letter I find this passage: "His Excellency declines all negotiation with any other Kafir chief. He declares the territory west of the Kei, forfeited to the British Crown: he will dispose thereof as he shall see fit, and he will not allow any Kafir to reside therein except upon terms dictated by himself. It now rests with Kreli whether his territory, east of the Kei, shall share the fate of that on the west of that stream." Now will you allow me to ask you generally for an explanation of the arrangement which you entered into with Kreli, seeing that you generally object to encroachments upon the lands held by native tribes?—I have a memorandum as to that, which with permission I will read: "The Committee having pressed the question as to the best policy to be adopted when the present Kafir war shall be brought to an issue, I have given the subject my most anxious consideration. Besides considering myself in duty bound to afford the Committee every assistance in my power, I have every farthing that I possess at stake on the Kafir frontier; but I am bound to declare that I cannot see my way through the labyrinth in which we are entangled. As late as 1846, I still hoped, that by treating with Kreli as the paramount chief, and obtaining from him the cession of the land west of the Kei, we might thus obtain a title to the principal strougholds, and restore the remainder, holding him responsible as any other independent chief. But we broke the convention which was made with Kreli, by marching an army against him, which only exposed our weakness, shook more than ever the

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faith of the barbarian in our justice, and the result is, that Kreli has joined the war against us; this plan, therefore, I can no longer recommend." I drew up that because it struck me the Committee expected something from me. I have given it my most serious attention, and I have come to that conclusion. It is impossible for me to say what is to be done. I moreover wish to say this, the orders I received to carry that out generally coincided with my view.

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1725. Now, will you further explain to the Committee if this treaty, or this result of the conference as it is called, with Kreli, generally coincided with your view, wherein materially you differ from the view taken by Sir Benjamin D'Urban for the preservation of the peace of the frontier, by advancing into Kafirland, and holding a kind of military possession of it in connexion with the chiefs?—After that war of 1846, I should have had no objection to hold certain strongholds in Kafirland, provided it were the result of a treaty with Kreli, whom I expected the Governor would treat with as paramount chief. I knew that after seizing the land in the manner in which we did it, we could not hold it without an overwhelming force. All confidence was lost between us and the western chiefs, and I thought it best for the Governor to hold himself to Kreli. It would have been for Sir Peregrine Maitland and Kreli to enter into such further arrangements as they thought proper. I was merely commanding the burgher force at the time, and carried out the Governor's views in that convention. I only cleared the way to give the Governor *carte blanche* for entering into treaties with Kreli, which might have placed our frontier affairs upon a good footing.

1726. Which coincided with your own?—Yes.

1727. This treaty, or this result of the conference, never took effect?—It was broken immediately we marched a force against Kreli.

1728. Did not the Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, actually revoke it?—I believe he did.

1729. In point of fact it was never fulfilled?—Kreli rested upon the faith of that convention, and so did I.

1730. But the Governor refused to confirm the arrangement you had entered into?—Yes, but that arrangement was his own.

1731. Was not your object in making that treaty, and was not the policy you now state you generally adopted, that which you considered best for the defence of the frontier of the Cape, and the preservation of the peace in Kafirland?—Yes; I should at that time have thought so, and it was my object

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to give the Governor full play over the whole of that territory in any negotiations he might see fit to enter into with Krelî. They were his own views, not mine; but I perfectly agreed with him.

1732. Then, with a view to defend the frontier of the Cape, you consider this military possession of Kafirland essential, and beneficial to the interests of the Cape colony proper?—I should have thought so at that time decidedly, leaving at the same time the Governor the discretion of making any arrangement with Krelî he thought proper on the subject.

1733. Are you disposed in any degree to modify that opinion now?—No, not the least. On that occasion, when I was sent there, in fact, even before that, I gave the Governor my opinion that it would be the plan to hold Krelî responsible, and to deal with him to get his cession of the land, and make any arrangement afterwards which might be thought politic.

1734. Then may I infer from your evidence this, that suppose the war ends in the retention of Kafirland by these military posts, you would think that to be the best mode of maintaining a peaceful frontier?—I must again decline saying anything that is to be done when this war ends. At that time I suggested a plan which was adopted and afterwards repudiated. When I spoke to Sir Peregrine Maitland, I thought that was the best plan to get the cession of the land, and have a *carte blanche* to do what he pleased in any negotiations he might enter into with Krelî. The object was merely provisional, to give him complete power to deal with Krelî as he thought proper.

1735. Must I conclude that you are unwilling to state to the Committee whether or not a similar course of policy now pursued, assuming the war to be brought to a conclusion, would be as successful now as you thought it would be then?—I cannot say; the country is in too difficult a position to say what may be necessary hereafter.

1736. In what does the difference consist between the two periods, then and now, which prevents your forming an opinion whether the policy you then recommended is unsuited to the present state of affairs?—I should not like to give any opinion with reference to what ought to be done at the close of the war; I did then, and I found I had gone too far; I had acted *bond fide*, and I found that it would have been better if I had not done so; I think that we are in a very great difficulty with reference to that frontier, and I should not like to recommend the same policy just now; we may be obliged to adopt that, or  
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even perhaps a severer one ; I am not, however, prepared to say how that may be.

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1737. You stated one of the evils of the present system was the existence of what you call the patrol system ?—Yes.

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1738. Did that actually cease upon your treaties being entered into ?—Yes ; that could not be ; it was not allowed.

1739. I find it stated by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, on the 12th of August 1837, "That the practice of military patrols along our whole frontier line as it existed before the late war, and which, if I mistake not, your Lordship has strongly condemned, has been revived since the conclusion of the treaties (probably rendered indispensable by the incessant depredations which have taken place, and as a necessary aid to the maintenance of the present system), and now prevails so unremittingly, that I have observed in some recent duty states of the posts along the new border line as many as nine daily patrols sent out from the same post in 14 days;" were you aware of that ?—Those are military patrols scouring the country, but not patrols going after stolen cattle in Kafirland.

1740. They are totally different, I understand ?—Quite different.

1741. What was the duty of the patrols spoken of by Sir Benjamin D'Urban ?—If you look at some of the articles of the treaties, you will see that no patrol was allowed to cross the frontier after stolen cattle ; that whenever cattle were traced to the frontier, notice was given to the authorities ; but those were military patrols ; every officer sent out his patrol whenever he thought it necessary, to see if there were traces of cattle gone into the Kafirland. Patrols within the colony to see whether bodies of Kafirs had entered the colony, and other similar objects, are quite a different thing.

1742. Then I understand the patrol system was effectually put down by you ?—Yes. See the treaties.

1743. But did you succeed in stopping depredations by Kafirs ?—The depredations were never stopped completely ; that was never expected.

1744. Did they not continue extensively ?—No, I believe not ; but the official returns will show ; but they must be obtained up to the end of 1838, through the agent-general, who kept his returns on purpose. To those returns I refer, and it will be found not to be the case. Mr. Hudson was agent-general. No other return can be correct.

1745. Are you able to give the Committee any information upon this point as to the extent to which the Cape is willing to contribute towards the defence of the frontier, in the event

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of their obtaining the constitution they desire?—The constitution is a distinct point from the Kafir war. The colonists had nothing to do with the Kafir war, which is entirely the result of Government measures. Her Majesty has sanctioned and granted a constitution to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. The colony is entitled to it, and expects it, and I do not think you can connect the two points. But I give my own opinion that they accept that constitution, and accept it with all its legitimate responsibility; but it will not be in the power of that colony, for a considerable time, to pay the expenses of this war, because it will take a vast number of troops yet before this war is at an end, and the consequences of the war it would be cruel to load upon the colonists. I think the questions are two distinct ones, and I am not authorized to pledge myself for the colony; and I do not believe the colony can, for a considerable time, pay the expenses; that will be the result of the present war, which they had nothing to do with. But if they take the constitution, they accept it with all its legitimate responsibilities.

1746. Do I understand you to say the policy pursued is generally unacceptable to the people of the Cape; I mean in entering upon this war to punish the Kafirs for their depredations?—The war has been not unpopular. The people see it must be done. If the war be not carried on, it will be a most awful affair. The Kafirs fancy themselves our masters.

1747. In what respect do I understand you to say that this war is a war of Her Majesty's Government as distinguished from the interests of the colony?—It is the result of the measures of the Government, in which the colonists generally have no concern; they have no control over the acts of the Government.

1748. They have an interest though they have not a control?—Much more interest than the Government have.

1749. And they have a deep interest in the settlement of the frontier question, by a policy, somewhat similar to that recommended by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and of which you have stated generally to the Committee you approved in 1846?—I never approved of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system at all; I disapproved of it from first to last.

1750. What is the difference between Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system in the main, and that arrangement you entered into with Kreli in 1846?—That was a provisional agreement; a convention to enable Sir Peregrine Maitland to do what he thought proper with Kreli afterwards; but Sir

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Benjamin D'Urban's system was, taking Kafirland under his own control, and ruling by martial law.

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1751. How is that consistent with the maintenance of the treaties; that the right of the British Government should be acknowledged "to all the land west of the Great or White Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he Kreli, or any other Kafir chief or subject, may have possessed to any part of the said territory"?—That was made in order to enable the Governor to have a *carte blanche*, to put the frontier in such a state as he thought politic. I was acting in a military capacity rather than a diplomatic capacity. I wish to say, there has been a great mistake on the D'Urban system. It was stated, and I think generally believed, that the D'Urban system was superseded by Lord Glenelg, which is not the case. The D'Urban system cannot exist without martial law. Sir Harry Smith has proved that. He has carried it on for four years, now for the second time, and has failed, and I was expected to do it without martial law, as if that were possible, for before I reached that frontier with my instructions Sir Benjamin D'Urban repealed martial law. His system therefore was at an end, and the Kafirland he had attached to the colony was thrown upon my hands without martial law. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and civil law was extended over it. To carry this out was declared impossible by Sir H. Smith himself and his friends. I have here a document to show that the D'Urban system was not superseded by order of Lord Glenelg. I had my positive orders to carry on Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system till I should receive further instructions from this country, which were never received, because Sir Benjamin D'Urban upset his own system. I can refer to the official document to prove that, if necessary.

1752. Will you have the goodness to explain a little more fully what you mean by Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system as contra-distinguished from Lord Glenelg's system?—I refer you, rather than trust to my memory, to Lord Glenelg's despatch of December 1835, in which he enters fully into that, and explains his system in contra-distinction to the measures Sir Benjamin D'Urban had adopted.

1753. Am I right in describing Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system to be this, that of taking military possession of the territory west of the Kei, maintaining the colonial frontier, within which colonial law prevailed, and holding it by a kind of military possession; and Lord Glenelg's system to be this, that of withdrawing all authority and all military force from British Kafiraria, and leaving the Kafir Chiefs to govern themselves,



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themselves, and maintaining the frontier of the Keiskamma; is that so?—Yes, I believe Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system to have been exactly what Sir Harry Smith's system is now, and Lord Glenelg's system can be found in his own despatch, and the treaties made in consequence of that.

1754. Lord Glenelg's system consisted practically in withdrawing all authority whatsoever from what is called British Kafiraria?—Yes.

1755. Leaving the chiefs as they were before, perfectly independent; was not that so?—Yes.

1756. Now I understand you to say that Sir Benjamin D'Urban himself upset his own system?—Yes.

1757. In what respect, and what proof have you of that?—I have the proof here, the whole of it; I think I had better read Lord Glenelg's instructions to me: "Although I have thus adverted to the main object of your future care, as if it were immediately within your reach, you will yet understand, that until you shall have received further instructions, you are not to proceed to treat with the Kafir chiefs, or to frame the laws to which I have adverted; those instructions will be conveyed to you so soon as I shall have received from Sir Benjamin D'Urban the final report, for which I have applied to him in my despatch of the 26th December; your duty in the meantime will be to administer the law as it actually stands;" this is the passage I allude to in that despatch, and there are my orders. When I arrived at the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban seemed rather disposed to at once abandon his system, and referred the question to me, which I answered thus: "Cape Town, August 5th, 1836. To his Excellency the Governor. Sir, Having attentively perused the several documents which your Excellency did me the honour to transmit under cover of your letter of the 1st instant, No. 1, I take the liberty, for our mutual satisfaction, hereby to record officially the sentiments which I expressed at the interview with which you favoured me this morning, and to repeat that I shall feel great pleasure in cordially carrying into effect the system established by your Excellency on the frontier, as now in operation, in strict accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, contained in his despatch addressed to me on the 5th February 1836, No. 2, and more particularly in the passage running thus," which I have just read. "In thus expressing myself, I am not losing sight of the passages from Lord Glenelg's despatches to your Excellency, of the 17th February and 28th March last, as inserted in your Excellency's said letter of the 1st instant, but as

as on the 19th of April, when I had the honour of an audience of leave with his Lordship, I was pointedly referred to the instructions which I had received, without any allusion to any communication to your Excellency, it does appear to me, that though the supercession of your Excellency's plan was evidently contemplated as the ultimate result of the instructions which I had received, and of my arrival here, it would nevertheless be premature in me to proceed to such supercession without those further instructions for which I was so positively instructed to wait, and which were to be framed after the receipt by his Lordship of your Excellency's reply to his despatch of the 26th December last, unless indeed it were your Excellency's desire that I should do so at once. But as your Excellency, after a test of nine months practical experience of the working of said plan, is enabled to anticipate such desirable and important results, from a perseverance in the same, we must admit the possibility that those further instructions which must follow within a moderate period, may contain the sanction of your Excellency's views; in which case the re-establishment of the present state of affairs would be attended with much greater difficulties than its reversal, as soon as you shall have received the final instructions alluded to. At any rate, as I nowhere find the door entirely closed against such possibility, I should humbly propose that I proceed to the eastern frontier (which, with your Excellency's permission, I shall do immediately, having, in order to avoid delay, made up my mind to leave my family to follow at leisure), and after a personal inspection and examination of the affairs of the borders, communicate to your Excellency the conclusions which I may have come to, by which time the Minister's decision may, perhaps, have left no further doubt on our minds, nor will by such a proceeding any material time be lost, as the undoing of what has been done will require a degree of caution, towards which an exact knowledge of various circumstances will be indispensable on my part." That is signed by myself in consequence of the Governor showing a disposition, and in fact, there is a letter which I have not got, in which he proposed to give up the system.

1758. Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was not confirmed by Lord Glenelg?—No; those are the words I have read; stating that further instructions would come from Lord Glenelg after he should receive from Sir B. D'Urban the final report above referred to.

1759. Whilst Sir Benjamin D'Urban remained Governor of

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the colony he gave you assistance, and acquiesced so far in the then policy that had been prescribed by the Secretary of State?—My answer is above.

1760. My question referred to Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—I wish to make my answer clear; I proceeded to the frontier expecting in consequence Lord Glenelg's orders to carry out strictly the D'Urban system.

1761. Your orders were, upon your proceeding to the Cape, to carry out the system introduced by Sir Benjamin D'Urban until further instructions proceeded from the Secretary of State?—Yes; I have just read it.

1762. Were you not aware, and was not Sir Benjamin D'Urban aware, that those instructions would in all probability put an end to that system, and altogether reverse it?—Lord Glenelg did not lead him to expect that, because he said in his despatch, if you give me sufficient explanation, I may change my mind.

1763. In fact, was not the whole policy reversed?—Ultimately; but who reversed it? The whole policy rested upon martial law. I left the Cape with the determination, of course, to follow up Lord Glenelg's orders, and to carry out the system exactly as Colonel Smith had carried it out; but I was not away a day from Cape Town, when a proclamation issued without my knowledge, whereby martial law was repealed. The jurisdiction of the judges was at once extended into Kafirland, and there was at once an end to the D'Urban system. That Lord Glenelg had nothing to do with whatever; his order was, "*Administer the law as it actually stands.*"

1764. You entirely concurred in the reversal of that system yourself?—Yes, decidedly. Sir Harry Smith himself and his own friends had declared the thing impossible after the repeal of martial law.

1765. And Sir Benjamin D'Urban, I believe, protested strongly against the policy which he was instructed to adopt?—This correspondence with Lord Glenelg is on record, and is of a very voluminous nature; I would rather leave it to the Committee to read.

1766. But the effect of it was a strong protest, was not it, against the policy which was then introduced?—Which I was to introduce upon receiving final instructions from Lord Glenelg, *which I never received.*

1767. But it came within your knowledge that Sir Benjamin D'Urban altogether protested against the reversal of his policy?—I have read that.

1768. Did he ever predict that it would not put an end to the depredations on the frontier, or the chances of war?—He predicted much more awful consequences than that even, but it is many years ago; I have read it, and the Committee will find it upon record, which will be better than taking it from me.

1769. You are not aware of the observations which were made by Sir Benjamin D'Urban himself upon your treaties?—I believe he had a very great objection to them; he ratified them in Council, and there was a great deal of correspondence between him and me on the subject before they were ratified; they were ultimately ratified, and approved by the Secretary of State and his Majesty the King.

1770. Is not it notorious in the Cape that depredations continued, and that there were as constant collisions between the colonists and the Kafirs subsequent to those treaties as before?—As I said before, I should like to refer the Committee to the returns of the agent-general, Mr. Hudson.

1771. Living, as you do, near the frontier, does it not come within your knowledge?—Of late years, certainly.

1772. Since the conclusion of those treaties of 1836?—Yes, but not immediately; mark me, I speak only of the two years I conducted that treaty, and I refer to Sir George Napier for his opinion in confirmation of my own view; beyond that I can only state what rumour and the newspapers state.

1773. Can you refer to the opinion of Sir George Napier?—I speak of his opinion when I left the government of the eastern province, about the close of 1838, and the very strongly favourable character of Sir George Napier's testimony when I left.

1774. Did not Sir George Napier, very shortly after the conclusion of those treaties, repeatedly bring to the notice of the Secretary of State depredations that must have come within your knowledge, living near the frontier, beginning in the year 1838, and going on steadily during the whole course of his government?—I am not aware of that; I have not seen Sir G. Napier's despatches since 1839.

1775. I will read you a passage from the despatch of Sir George Napier, dated the 25th of May 1838, in which he states, "I cannot conclude this despatch without informing your Lordship that I am taking every means within my power, in strict accordance with the treaties, to prevent the constant and now much-extended depredations of the Kafirs;" Sir George Napier, also, in September 1838, states that he informed the chiefs of the Tambookie nation, that he "must insist on all the articles of the treaties being fulfilled on their

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parts, as they have been on ours, and to impress upon them, as I have constantly done upon the Gaika nation, that the consequences of their non-compliance with every article of these treaties will be war"—There is no statement in that passage that he did it in consequence of depredations; he would naturally, as a new Governor in the colony, make these statements, and tell the chiefs his determination.

1776. Is not it an evidence to show, on the part of Sir George Napier, that those treaties did not prevent extended depredations?—I can only speak of Sir George Napier's communications to me, and those to Lord Glenelg, and I would refer particularly to one; but I have not got the letter; I have only got an extract from Colonel Somerset's Enclosure; I refer to the one of the 1st of February 1839, containing Colonel Somerset's views on the then state of the frontier.

1777. I have it here; will you read the extract?—It is a most important letter, but I do not see it here. The enclosure is by Colonel Somerset; it begins something about disputes between diplomatic agents. Then he says, that he "never observed such apparent quiet throughout the country;" adding, "that war can only have been contemplated by those who wish to keep up a feeling of excitement in the minds of the tribes, either against each other or against the colony, and thus disfigure and distort every subject; but in the minds of the Kafirs nothing of the kind was ever contemplated." That was the letter enclosed, and was referred to me by Lord Normanby. Sir G. Napier's letter, as well as my report thereon, is of the utmost importance to this Committee.

1778. What was the date of that?—Sir George Napier's letter was dated the 1st February 1839. Here I accidentally see a letter from Sir George Napier to Lord Glenelg, dated Government-house, Cape Town, 20th of November 1838: "I am happy to say that Captain Stockenström's successor, Colonel Hare, is zealously and actively carrying into effect all the measures necessary for the tranquillity of those provinces, and firmly establishing that peace and amity with the Kafirs so vital to the welfare of this colony. The chiefs confess they have no cause of distrust or complaint of the Government; and that in any little unpleasant occurrence which may at times happen (and which often must be the case), Colonel Hare, following the footsteps of his predecessor, Captain Stockenström, instantly redresses it in person, according to my directions, which were given in consequence of the advice of Captain Stockenström to myself, and as he will tell you, I invariably treated all the chiefs as my equals, as I am convinced

vinced the more we hold them up in a respectable light, and as great men, which they are in their own nations, the greater will be their confidence in us, and the more power they will have of keeping their people quiet. I am aware that this is not the way in which they were formerly treated, and that every thing was done to lower them in the eyes of their tribes, and thereby undermine, as it was called, their power. In this policy I never can concur; I am convinced it is based on wrong principles, and certainly failed when pursued. I do most earnestly and respectfully entreat of you to confirm Colonel Hare as Lieutenant-governor and Commandant of the troops (in which I feel confident Captain Stockenström will join me), for he is calming the irritation of party, and doing justice to all, at the same time firmly supporting the enlightened policy of your Lordship, and in a conciliatory manner, which towards a community composed as that of Graham's Town, is of the greatest importance; he is, in my opinion, decidedly the best lieutenant-governor your Lordship can have, provided he is also made commandant of the troops on the frontier, uncontrolled by any one except the Commander-in-chief of the colony, in the same way as he is under the governor in his civil capacity; and as your Lordship is aware, that in our profession rank carries with it much weight, I trust you will press upon the General Commanding-in-chief the necessity of giving Colonel Hare the local rank of either major-general or brigadier, with an aide-de-camp, as the military duties on the frontier require the commanding officer of the troops to have an aide-de-camp. Should all this meet your approbation, and that Colonel Hare is nominated by your Lordship, I feel confident that ere long everything will go according to your wishes, as already property of all kinds, and particularly land, is rising steadily and at the same time rapidly, and even the most furious of our opponents, and the greatest alarmists, are forced to admit that public confidence is fast returning, and that the Kafirs are not going to eat up the colonists, but that everything indicates a continuance of our present peace and tranquillity; I have no fears myself as long as justice is fairly administered to the native tribes, but that they will be quiet, and not give any cause to expect an irruption into the colony; still I am bound to state to your Lordship, that I earnestly request that another British regiment should be sent out to reinforce this army, as I consider three regiments absolutely necessary for the duties and defence of the frontier; of course, if it cannot be done, and that your Lordship is of a different opinion, I shall exert myself and

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use every means in my power to do without a reinforcement." Then he says, "I cannot close this letter without expressing to your Lordship, privately, the very great advantage I have derived from my friend and medical adviser, Mr. Clarke, the surgeon of the 72d Highlanders; this gentleman has known this colony, and particularly the eastern frontier, for upwards of 20 years in his capacity of an officer, and being a man of great observation and sound, unprejudiced judgment, and well acquainted both with the Dutch boers and English settlers of 1819 (the worst importation that ever was imported into this colony), as well as with the Kafirs, his experience and knowledge was, and is of infinite service to me, particularly as he, 20 years back, always publicly said the system then pursued of commandoes, &c. &c. was bad, and until a more just and humane one, as regarded the native tribes, was adopted, it was useless to expect peace with or confidence in them; he served in most of the commandoes of former times, and therefore speaks from personal knowledge, and he tells me he feels full confidence in the working of your Lordship's system. I mention this for two reasons: first, I am sure it will give you pleasure to hear the opinion of a clever, sensible, scientific, well-educated professional man, whose liberal ideas and sentiments, as well as his position, have given him the power of impartially judging, from the experience he has had of the various systems pursued by the different governments towards the native tribes; secondly, it would be most uncandid in me not to acquaint you with one of the principal sources from whence I have derived the information which has enabled me to get on so well as I hope I have done in the arrangement of the affairs of the frontier; and I refer your Lordship to my friend Captain Stockenström for a full corroboration of the very high opinion I entertain for Mr. Clarke, and also to confirm, as I know he will, Mr. Clarke's usefulness to me in every way, as Captain Stockenström and Mr. Clarke have known each other for upwards of 20 years." This is as strong as I can wish it, confirmatory of what I said when I left the frontier; those were Sir George Napier's sentiments, and they are very strong, particularly when he says property is rising and confidence is re-establishing; stronger than that I do not wish to press anything.

1779. Is there anything in that letter to show depredations to a great extent were not continuing on the frontier?—They were diminished, but still I would not be positive; I must refer you not to newspaper reports, but to the official statement of the agent-general, Mr. Hudson, appointed by Sir Benjamin

Benjamin D'Urban, and a very great friend and supporter of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's.

1780. Let me call your attention to the despatch from Sir George Napier of the 7th of May 1839?—I do not know that; I appeal to this which I have read, and I could point to several others, but I refer particularly to this one, and the terms there expressed as to the working of the system, and as confirmatory of my views of the way in which the chiefs ought to be dealt with.

1781. In the early part of the year 1839, I think you were in the colony and on the frontier?—No, I was in this country in November 1838, and did not leave it until the middle of 1840, I believe.

1782. Sir *E. Burton*.] When did you leave; in what month of 1838?—August or September 1838 I left the Cape; I beg to say I have letters from Sir George Napier, of course private letters, speaking in the same tone exactly.

1783. Mr. *Hawes*.] Were you in that colony in September 1840?—Yes.

1784. Let me call your attention to the statement made on the 21st of September 1840 by Sir George Napier, in which he says, "I have determined to proceed about the beginning of next month to Graham's Town, in order to investigate afresh the grievances so deservedly complained of by the colonists with reference to the plunder of their property, herds and flocks, and also in reference to a new feature in Kafir depredations, namely, the frequent murders of the armed herdsmen." Were you not at all acquainted with the reports that were then existing on the frontier?—The frontier is full of clamour, and if Sir George Napier states that, it is perfectly correct.

1785. I understand you to admit, then, that this description by Sir George Napier in September 1840, as far as you know from your residence, is correct?—I could not contradict it; I know nothing of that of my own knowledge.

1786. Did not the frequency of the depredations, and the notoriety of those murders come to your knowledge?—But we are always having clamour about depredations and murders; it is possible that the thing may have come to my knowledge; I could not possibly say it had or had not; I know Sir George Napier does not write that without good authority; at the same time, of my own knowledge, I could not speak to it.

1787. Are you disposed to think now that those treaties of your own, or treaties upon such a basis, will or will not be

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successful in maintaining the peace of the frontier?—They were not mine; I wish they were; they were Lord Glenelg's; I was only an instrument in carrying them out.

1788. They are treaties you signed?—Yes.

1789. You think they lay down the best rules of frontier policy?—I would not say that now; I say again, that I wish to give the Committee my full sentiments; but I am afraid to say what ought to be done when this war ends; and I further say, that I am perfectly certain, if the treaties had been strictly and honestly adhered to, we should have had no more war.

1790. Is it your opinion, that the treaties have not been adhered to on the part of the local Government or the colonists?—I think there has been vacillation; I think Sir George Napier's amendments were injurious.

1791. Do you think the violations of the treaties referred to were on the part of the colonists or the Kafirs?—Not the colonists.

1792. Then on the part of the local Government?—Yes; the Government, decidedly.

1793. What was the year the violations were committed by the local Government, in respect of those treaties?—I speak of the year 1844, when the Gaika people were told that the treaties were at an end, without any discussion, and new treaties would be put before them. And if it can serve any purpose, I will state exactly my reasons for stating so.

1794. What was done by the local Government to which you object, then, in 1844?—I object to the breaking of the treaties, without any reference to the opposite party.

1795. Did not the original treaty you made, contemplate its being put an end to, in the event of the Kafirs ceasing to observe it; is not that one of the articles of the treaty?—I never knew of treaties being altered except by both parties discussing the matter, and coming to an understanding. War breaks treaties, but no party has the right to break a treaty.

1796. I will refer you to article 5 of the very treaty which you made, and in which you secure to the Kafirs their country, or Kaffraria we call it, "never to be reclaimed by or on behalf of his said Majesty, except in case of hostility committed, or a war provoked by the said chiefs or tribe, or in case of a breach of this treaty or any part thereof, and for which breach satisfaction or redress shall not be otherwise

given or obtained"?—I am not aware that there was any injury done for which satisfaction was refused.

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1797. You are not aware, then, whether the depredations on the part of the Kafirs were so extensive that the mere demands of the local Government were, from time to time, altogether ineffectual to obtain the restitution of stolen property or not?—I believe not; but I cannot say, being out of office at the time. Cattle stealing by individuals and breach of treaty by a nation are two different things.

1798. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you recollect the date of your treaty?—December 1836.

1799. Do you recollect whether there was any complaint of that treaty having been violated on the 2d of June, subsequently?—I am not aware, but I will refer to it particularly.

1800. In the despatch to Lord Glenelg, in August 1837, do you know whether he accuses them of having wantonly and flagrantly violated the treaty of the 5th of December?—I am not aware.

1801. That there was an attack made on "the Fingo settlements around Fort Peddie, on the Clusie, plundered them of all their cattle, and murdered 10 or 11 of the Fingo race, together with an English corporal then in the execution of his protecting duty;" are you aware of that fact?—I believe what is stated there to be correct, but you must take the text with the context.

1802. I am only asking you if you recollect that; are you aware of that fact?—Yes, but I should prefer to refer to the correspondence and record; it would be preferable to refer to the record rather than to trust to my memory.

1803. I refer to the statement published in the book in your hand; you will find it in page 15?—Yes; I see it.

1804. I think you proceeded to make inquiry, as Lieutenant-governor of the frontier, as to the circumstances of this attack on the Fingoes?—Yes, I think I did; it strikes me so; I can only say, whenever anything of importance took place I was on the spot immediately afterwards.

1805. At page 20, you will find a letter of yours, in which you make observations on this outbreak of the Kafirs; it is dated Graham's Town, 9th of August 1837?—Yes.

1806. Is it in that despatch you condemn the policy of allowing the Fingoes, who are the slaves of the Kafirs, to have property and being in close proximity to the Kafirs, and proposed taking them under your protection?—I do not know whether I said that, but I know that was the feeling; it was

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wrong to bring those people out of Kafirland, and put them in juxtaposition with those Kafirs; it was most injudicious, and we have paid dearly for it.

1807. If they remained in Kafirland, must they not have remained as slaves?—What we call slaves; it is a different sort of slavery.

1808. Was there not a strong difference of opinion between you and Sir Benjamin D'Urban on the very fact of your treatment of those Fingoes?—There was a difference of opinion upon almost every subject, and particularly on that. Recurring to the question of martial law, when I was to proceed to the frontier to carry out his system, based upon martial law, it was repealed before I was out of Cape Town 50 miles.

1809. Did not Sir Benjamin D'Urban think, and express the opinion he felt in the despatch of the 9th of October 1837, that, in consequence of the policy you adopted with respect to the Fingoes, order could not be maintained, because of a want of good faith, in "the abandonment and sacrifice of the Fingo race to the tender mercies of their inveterate enemies the Kafirs." In the despatch you find he expresses that in condemnation of the policy pursued towards that race?—I do not think that was so; the Fingoes got the territory at Fort Peddie.

1810. Was there not a difference of opinion upon that subject on the part of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, however erroneous he may have been, he believing that you had abandoned the Fingoes to the "tender mercies" of the Kafirs?—It could not be; there were treaties made with the Fingoes as well as the Kafirs.

1811. Did not he say that the conduct you pursued towards them was a breach of good faith?—I dare say he did say so; he approved of nothing that I did.

1812. With regard to the Amakosa Kafirs, did not Sir Benjamin D'Urban accuse them of violating the stipulations made in favour of the Fingoes?—In what respect?

1813. By attacking them, and plundering and murdering them?—There was a collision between those people constantly; but I would rather refer to the documents.

1814. In this particular instance, at page 33 (I refer now to the particular document), in the last page Sir Benjamin D'Urban states, that "The Fingoes were amply provided for without expense to the colony, industrious, thriving, and prosperous; now they are, some of them, dispersed and about to become destitute, the others expecting the same fate; that  
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portion of them whom I had located on the western bank of the Chumie have since been forcibly expelled from that country, which they had converted into a garden of cultivation; to give it to the Gaika Kafirs, who had ravaged the colony two years ago; and these Fingoes will, in all probability, the greater part of them starve;" I am reading that from the despatch?—I beg you to refer to my despatch, and Lord Glenelg's decision. I differ with Sir Benjamin D'Urban altogether.

1815. I will afterwards. Were not those the points in dispute between Sir Benjamin D'Urban and yourself as to the frontier policy adopted by you and condemned by him?—He says, the Fingoes have been driven out of the Chumie, and the Chumieland belonging to the Kafirs of the Gaika tribes had been given by Sir Benjamin D'Urban to the Fingoes.

1816. But in the first treaty here, I find that the frontier, that you laid down in your proclamation, and which is afterwards confirmed, is from the source of the Chumie?—Yes.

1817. Was not that the treaty by which those Fingoes were established there?—And which was ordered to be restored to the Kafirs by Lord Glenelg.

1818. Was not it subsequently to the violation of the treaty on the occasion that I allude to, namely, on the 1st of June 1837, that it was restored?—It was restored by the treaty of December 1836. I know of no violation.

1819. That was an engagement to drive out those Fingoes we had placed there by that treaty?—If you will refer to the treaty, you will find a special article in which the arrangements are made, that the Fingoes were to remain until they had collected all their crops.

1820. Was not this arrangement made a long time before they had collected their crops, and before they were driven out?—I believe not. Here are the documents before us, and we should appeal to them. I believe they contain what is correct, or at least, the different views of the different parties.

1821. Sir Benjamin D'Urban in this despatch took a different view to what you did of the provisions of those treaties?—He disapproved of them altogether.

1822. Does not he point out that this treaty of the Lieutenant-governor was violated, and that the Amakosa Kafirs were murdered and plundered with impunity, as he calls it, "an earnest, as it seems, of their ultimate and very speedy destruction." You are aware of that despatch?—Not to Lord Glenelg; I never saw his despatches to Lord Glenelg; I was directed to communicate with the Governor of the colony, and not directly with the Secretary of State; my despatches went

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to Sir Benjamin D'Urban; but his despatches to Lord Glenelg I never saw, unless they were specially referred to me.

1823. Was not it an accusation on the part of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, that the policy pursued by you; in fact, that this treaty was one of the causes of the retirement of the boers from the frontier?—I believe that was said, but I can prove the contrary. I have the documents in my hands.

1824. Was there not a certain Field-commandant, Retief, on the frontier?—Yes.

1825. Had you strong differences of opinion with him?—Not on that point.

1826. Was not he the man who led the emigration first of all?—My difference of opinion with him was, because he threatened to go away into Kafirland in defiance of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's treaties, and take from the Kafirs the cattle and other property which had been taken by the Kafirs. Sir Benjamin D'Urban had made peace with the Kafirs without taking back one iota of those things; the ultimate result was, that he was dismissed by me in consequence of his violence.

1827. Subsequent to his dismissal, did not he retire into Kafirland from the colony?—Yes; and he was prepared to do so long before I reached the colony. The boers were not without organization. The farmers had emigrated, and were prepared to emigrate long before they heard of Lord Glenelg.

1828. Do you mean in a body or individually?—Individually; for the last 30 years they have been emigrating in that direction. The emancipation of the slaves, or rather the amount and mode of compensation, gave great dissatisfaction, as also the state of insecurity consequent on the war of 1835, and the peace then made. Great numbers then went. They were gone and going before the Glenelg treaties.

1829. But I understand you, those were individual cases of emigration?—When I reached that colony they were going *en masse*.

1830. But more immediately so on Mr. Retief going?—Yes; while the Governor was still at war in Kafirland, a man went to Natal and returned and said, there was such a beautiful country, he would get all his relations to sell their farms; that was before there was anything heard of the Glenelg system at all.

1831. Do you consider the causes of that emigration were originally from the measure which took the slaves from under the colonists' power?—Not so much the emancipation as the manner in which compensation was given.

1832. Was

1832. Was that compensation paid fairly and promptly to the owners of the slaves?—I think not.

1833. Was the cause that the money was not fairly paid?—Not the cause of emigration, but of discontent.

1834. There were causes of discontent antecedent to the emigration that Mr. Retief conducted?—Yes.

1835. And organization?—Yes.

1836. What were the causes do you consider, of that discontent which induced the emigration?—They were various; one was the manner in which the emancipation affected many; the manner in which the compensation was given caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. I was in Sweden when all that took place.

1837. Was not the slave population chiefly about the Cape and not on the frontier?—Chiefly in the western districts and not on the frontier.

1838. The frontier being in the eastern district?—Yes.

1839. How did the discontent act so much on the eastern frontier as to induce those people to go away?—Every man feels that when dissatisfaction gets hold of a country it spreads throughout the whole country; added to that, the insecurity after the war of 1835 aggravated the cause.

1840. Do you think the circumstance of the insecurity of cattle and property on the frontier also was a cause of emigration?—It added to it.

1841. Was not it caused by the treaties which were made?—The Glenelg treaties?

1842. The treaties generally?—The depredations?

1843. Yes.—No; the depredations have been continued from time immemorial almost.

1844. I understand you that when the boers repelled those depredations themselves, they did it more effectually than we subsequently did?—Yes; the old commando system I speak of.

1845. Therefore putting a stop to the old commando system was one cause?—No; I say the dissatisfaction sprung partly from the manner of compensation for the slaves; that produced a great deal of irritation; but there were many other causes, and one great one, which I have mentioned, is, the nature of the country, and the nature of the people who are always wishing for land, and emigrate where it is to be found, as it is all over the world. This took place after the Kafir war of 1835; great quantities of people going in masses, which took place before there was even the name of Glenelg heard among them, which I have the documents to show, so that those treaties could not have contributed to it.

1846. Then

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1846. Then you do not actually regard the infraction to which I before alluded, of the treaty in June, subsequently to the treaty being formed, was the cause?—I should rather refer you to my despatch to Sir Benjamin D'Urban; he must have had that information from me, and I refer you to my despatch.

1847. Was the Kat settlement at that time formed?—Yes.

1848. Was the Kat settlement self-supporting?—Yes; it never had one farthing of support, and has done more for the Government than any other part of the country.

1849. Were not supplies of clothing and other support given in 1836?—During the war, and never otherwise that I know or heard of.

1850. Were not there complaints from the Kat river on the 14th of December 1836 of depredations that had happened by the Kafirs?—It must be there before you.

1851. Do you recollect it?—I should not specifically recollect it; if it did take place, it is there; my despatch will show it.

1852. Are you not aware in consequence of that, that there were applications to the amount of 578 applicants for relief, and application sent on behalf of 2,679 individuals for clothing and different support at that time at the Kat river?—In consequence of the war; yes, decidedly, they were ruined by the war.

1853. Was there not a loss stated of 988 head of cattle?—During the war.

1854. Those were applications made in consequence of losses during the war?—Yes, during the war.

1855. But you have no immediate recollection, and can only refer me to the returns on the subject of the violation of the treaty?—Yes, whatever I know of it, is all in my despatches, and you have them.

1856. Mr. Monsell.] Lord Glenelg's system was introduced in 1836?—December 1836.

1857. How long do you conceive it was faithfully carried out?—I can only speak as long as I was in the country, the two first years.

1858. You returned in 1840 to the colony?—Yes; it was in some measure put a stop to by amendments made by Sir George Napier.

1859. How long do you consider the system had a fair trial?—I can only answer for two years.

1860. During those two years, did it work in a manner satisfactory to you?—I have just read a letter from Sir George Napier, and there are many more of the kind; I should refer to

to him rather ; he is more unbiassed ; there has been so much feeling on that subject, I was naturally biassed in my view.

1861. Was the system you found in operation when you returned to the frontier in 1840, substantially the same system as existed when you left?—When I returned to the frontier, Sir George Napier made his amendments.

1862. Did you consider at that time that those amendments were fatal to the system?—Yes, I did.

1863. Mr. *Hindley*.] You do not consider there was an absolute reversion of the policy of the Government?—There were one or two points that certainly were in direct opposition to it, I thought.

1864. Were you in the colony in the year 1845?—Yes.

1865. At that time petitions were presented to the Governor of Cape Town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on the frontier, and of depredations committed by them?—Yes.

1866. Do you remember meeting the Governor in Council on the 7th of October 1845?—I do not recollect the date; I was not in Council.

1867. Do you recollect the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of petitions by the Secretary to the Government, by the Attorney-general and by Mr. Cloete?—They were in the newspaper, and I believe I read them; I recollect them.

1868. You would consider that speeches made on that occasion would be very likely to contain a very good account of the state of the colony on the frontier, and the effects of the system pursued?—I should suppose that such men as Mr. Montagu, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cloete must have very good information.

1869. Then I come to the speech of the Secretary to the Government; he says, "There seems too much disposition too hastily to circulate reports of Kafir depredations, without taking sufficient pains to ascertain their truth; they are thus sent about among the colonists, who do not see the contradictions, or what may be urged on the part of the Kafirs, and, unfortunately, the contradiction of an unfounded report is not always to be found in the medium which circulated the error;" do you believe that many of the reports were unfounded?—I believe what you read there is perfectly correct.

1870. Do you remember that he makes a comparative statement with respect to the security of the colony then and the previous time, and that then he states that it has been reviving, and that the depredations are diminishing?—I believe he said so.

1871. With

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1871. With respect to the incorrectness of those reports, do you recollect the case of Mr. Hewson, who stated he had had some cattle stolen from him, and which were eventually found to be upon his own farm?—I do not recollect that case; but it is of constant occurrence. If you refer to my evidence in 1835 and 1836, you will find it is one of our great misfortunes that a man will pursue cattle into Kafirland, and gets compensation from an unfortunate kraal, and afterwards finds his cattle in an opposite direction. That was one of the statements which gave so much offence in regard to my testimony in 1835 and 1836; but truth is truth, whether it gives offence or not.

1872. You think this was the cause of frequent complaints?—Frequent, perhaps I should not say, but those things do occur constantly.

1873. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Were the majority of instances of that description?—No, I should not say so. It has often occurred that we have had unfortunate cases in earlier times, where a man has thought himself right in tracing the spoor, and gone to a kraal and insisted upon compensation, and brought cattle back, when his own have been in quite a different direction, or in the pound.

1874. Mr. *Hindley*.] Now, I go on to the speech of the Attorney-general, in which he declares, “Although my career in this colony has not yet been a long one, it has yet approached a period of seven years, and during that time I have not been entirely neglectful of the opportunities which occurred of informing myself respecting the past history and present state of our frontier relations; and I set out by declaring my conviction—a conviction formed after an attentive reading of documents laid before Parliament, and such other authentic sources of information as have come in my way—that at no former period in the history of this colony, from the day of Van Riebeck’s landing to this present moment, were our frontier relations, comparatively speaking, so comfortable as at present; that never did our colonists suffer so little from native tribes beyond their boundary as they do at this very time.” Now, is that your belief?—No.

1875. As the result of the policy of Lord Glenelg?—I believe that at that time, in 1845, the Kafirs were preparing to attack the colony in consequence of Lord Glenelg’s treaties having been put a stop to.

1876. Do you think that fact would not have been known to the Attorney-general?—The Attorney-general must have taken

taken a sweep of a few years; but at that time we were in great danger, when he made that speech.

1877. He adverts to one point, that the value of property had risen, and was rising higher than it was ever known; was that the fact?—I believe so.

1878. Then do you not believe that the circumstance of the greater value of property proves confidence and great security?—I have read what Sir George Napier states; that was Sir George Napier's feeling.

1879. Mr. *Hawes*.] That letter was dated 20th November 1838; was not it?—Yes.

1880. Mr. *Hindley*.] I will refer now to the speech of Mr. Cloete, in which he says, "With an experience of 30 years in this colony, I may add that I entirely concur with the observation made by my honourable friend opposite (the Attorney-general), that the great difficulty of this government has been, and must be for a long time to come, the Kafir and frontier question; yet I am quite ready to admit, that at no period during those 30 years were affairs in that quarter managed in a more systematic and just manner than at this present moment; I say this quite independently of any feeling connected with the office to which I am likely soon to be appointed;" that confirms the statement of the Attorney-general?—Yes, it does.

1881. But yet you cannot take the same view as those gentlemen?—At that time we were in a very precarious position.

1882. And you think that that was not owing to the system of policy laid down by Lord Glenelg, but rather to its having been varied and altered by Sir George Napier?—I would rather give a detailed answer to that. The first that I heard of a feeling in Kafirland with reference to the abolition of the treaties by the Governor in 1844, was the Kafir chief Maquomo sending to me to ask whether he could visit me; I, being in retirement, said he must not come near me; I wished to have nothing to say to him; but he came notwithstanding, and said, "I have taken an oath at King William's Town for your word, and I have kept the peace in Kafirland hitherto; now the Governor is come, and he has had some communication with our dogs, as he calls the Gonaquabe tribe; an inferior race; we are very jealous; he has sent letters; he has broken the word, and says that we must now subscribe to new treaties; those have been put before me, and I have taken my pen and put my name down; and when I put my name down I said to the diplomatic agent, 'I put it down again, not for those treaties, but the old treaties.'" I

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told Maquomo, "You have signed these new treaties, and you are bound by them; and if you have anything to say, you must go to Colonel Hare; I have nothing to do with these matters." He said, "Then war must come, if you cannot help me; let the Governor know we will have nothing to do with those new treaties; when I put my name down, I told the diplomatic agent I was signing for the old treaties."

1883. When did that conversation with Maquomo occur?—Shortly after they had signed those new treaties.

1884. *Chairman.*] Do you mean that Maquomo stated that he signed the new treaties under the impression that he was signing the old treaty?—No; he knew they were new, but being pressed to sign, he put down his name, and said, "I sign for the old treaties."

1885. Yet he knew, in fact, the document he was signing was the new treaty, and not the old one?—I told him so, and he said he did not care a straw what they contained, he signed for the old treaties.

1886. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] Did you not tell him he was guilty of deception?—I told him he was bound by the treaty he signed.

1887. *Mr. Hindley.*] Would you give the date of the treaty to which Maquomo alludes?—It is in 1844.

1888. That was a treaty made by Sir Peregrine Maitland?—Yes.

1889. The treaty at variance with the policy of Lord Glenelg?—Yes.

1890. And from that treaty you date the origin of the disturbance?—It was subsequently.

1891. Can you give me the date of that speech?—This was about the end of 1844, or the beginning of 1845.

1892. Those facts might not have come to the knowledge of the Attorney-general then?—No, I believe not.

1893. Had Maquomo then signed the treaty under the impression that he was compelled to do so?—I told him he was bound by the new treaties, and referred him to the Lieutenant-governor.

1894. He did not go to the Lieutenant-governor?—I do not know that; there is a communication of mine to Lieutenant-governor Young upon the subject in print somewhere, in which I stated that; Sir Henry Young had it printed.

1895. Did Maquomo suppose he was under the influence of constraint when he signed that?—Yes.

1896. What would have been the result if he had refused

to sign it?—I do not know; it would be better to refer those questions to the diplomatic agent himself.

1897. Do you recollect the name of that diplomatic agent?—Mr. Stretch.

1898. Mr. *Hawes*.] You have been referred to the debate which took place in the Legislative Council on the 7th of October 1845?—Yes.

1899. The officers of the Government in that debate stated that the Kafir frontier was then quiet, and that the Government had done all in its power to maintain tranquillity?—Yes.

1900. Was not it the fact, at the time there were great complaints against the Government for not taking more efficient measures to preserve tranquillity?—I believe those speeches were made in consequence of those complaints.

1901. And you state that at that moment the colony was in considerable peril from the Kafirs?—I think it was in peril for years.

1902. You have been referred to the statement made in the debate of the 7th October 1845, to this effect: "Will any man deny that farms on the immediate frontier, which 15 or 20 years ago were purchased for a trifle, too small almost to be reckoned as a valuable consideration, can now be sold for a consideration large enough to justify in the fullest sense the use of the term valuable;" now, at that time was not it the fact that the price of land was high?—The land had been gradually rising in value for many years back, and this was immediately after the upsetting of the Glenelg system, and the introduction of Sir Peregrine Maitland's system.

1903. And that system was not consistent with the treaties which had been sanctioned, I think, at the time of Lord Glenelg?—Not consistent? Why?

1904. Mr. *Hindley*.] That treaty of Sir Peregrine Maitland could not have operated upon the value of land in a few months?—Unless there had been some sort of miracle.

1905. Sir *Joshua Walmesley*.] I understand you to say, that up to 1844 the value of land in the colony had been improving, and the state of the colony up to that period was satisfactory; but that the breaking of the treaties with the Gaiika tribes at that period, attempting to substitute new treaties instead of the old one, was the means of laying the foundation of the present war, and the great dissatisfaction on the part of the Kafirs generally?—From that time there has never been peace upon that frontier.

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Sir A. Stockenström. 1906. You attribute, then, the cause of the present disturbances to the breaking of those treaties in 1844?—I do.

26 June 1851. 1907. Mr. Booker.] And you attribute the blame to the Government, and no portion of it to the chiefs?—No, I do not.

1908. Do you impute it to our Governor?—Not to the Kafirs nor the colonists, but to the Government exclusively.

1909. Sir E. Buxton.] Generally speaking, was there a state of peace in Kafirland after 1836?—Peace is comparative with barbarous tribes; there are always disagreements between them, but no war.

1910. Were the people quiet or irritated against the Governor at that time?—As long as I had to do with them; you see what Sir George Napier says.

1911. Could any system be devised which would altogether prevent the depredations of the Kafirs?—As long as the frontier is in that state, it is impossible altogether; you may just as well try to put a stop to pocket-picking in London.

1912. Can you point to any period during which the depredations of the Kafirs have been entirely put a stop to?—I have been 42 years connected with that frontier, and I do not know a period when there was not some little depredation, more or less.

1913. What were the main differences between Lord Glenelg's treaties and those made in 1844?—I should not like to say, for being unconnected with public matters I have not compared them.

1914. You have stated that the value of land increased from 1836 to 1845?—Yes.

1915. Has it decreased since that time?—Just before this last war it was very high; it gradually increased, I think.

1916. Has land been saleable since the war began?—I have not been there since.

1917. Do you conceive that there has been much political excitement produced at Cape Town, which has had an effect upon the Kafirs during the last two years?—Not in the remotest degree; it could not have been by any possibility, unless people were sent into Kafirland for the purpose of agitating.

1918. Would a constitutional Government in the Cape colony produce, in your opinion, a more kind and just policy towards the natives than that which has been in force during the last four years?—Decidedly I think so.

1919. Mr. Hindley.] Sir George Napier stated, that the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was more popular among the

the colonists than the policy of Lord Glenelg?—Yes, undoubtedly.

1920. To what do you attribute that?—I do not know; there was a dislike to the policy decidedly, and there was great clamour against Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy before Lord Glenelg's policy was introduced.

1921. Do the colonists like to have an unlimited entrance into the occupation of land upon the frontier?—It is the natural state of things in such localities as that; you see it in America.

1922. And then to ask that their property should be secured to them by the military force of the Government?—It must be observed that the British settlers in 1819 were sent there against their will, and they expected the British Government to protect them.

1923. Still you think that is the natural desire of the colonists?—Everywhere in the world where colonists come in contact with barbarians, civilized man goes on; there is no preventing it. I have done all in my power in the various situations which I have been in to struggle against them.

1924. Do you think this feeling on the part of the colonists led to the adoption of rather a different policy by Sir Peregrine Maitland?—No, I do not think it had anything to do with it.

1925. You consider he was not urged to the adoption of his policy by representations from the colonists?—The colonists were very much opposed to the system which was introduced; even when Sir George Napier had amended it, they were very much opposed, and were constantly complaining of it, although his amendments were at first very popular.

1926. Were they opposed to, or did they approve of the alteration made by Sir Peregrine Maitland in the treaties?—They were delighted; they illuminated the town and burnt me in effigy; it was quite delightful.

1927. And why?—It is difficult to say what their motives may have been; I know the fact, they burnt me in every direction. They were very much pleased indeed, but the demonstrations were unfortunately too soon followed up by conflagrations from one end of the frontier to the other; the whole country was in a blaze; every farmhouse was on fire; so much so they were obliged to resort to me, though in retirement, to take the lead and repel the enemy.

1928. What part of the treaty was it that particularly delighted them?—There never was any particular part stated; it was just a dislike to the old treaties.

1929. Did they conceive it an alteration from a humane to  
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a military policy, the treaty that Maquomo signed in 1844?—I cannot distinguish; you will observe that I do not know when the treaties were signed; but the Napier treaty was broken, or at least annulled in 1844.

1930. I want to ask a question respecting the speech of the Attorney-general, made on the occasion referred to. He says, "I therefore consider that placed as this colony is, it is by christianizing and civilizing the Kafirs,—by religiously respecting our own engagements, by a judicious admixture of firmness and forbearance, reward and punishment, by encouraging the well-disposed, and strengthening their hands against the mischievous, and by gradually cultivating amongst them the notion of moral obligation: that it is by such things, more than by commandos; more than by seizing land, more than by military force, that the ultimate safety of the frontier farmers is to be secured"?—There never was a more sound truth pronounced.

1931. And that you conceive to be the best policy to be adopted?—Yes.

1932. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Is it not consistent with that policy, that in the meantime before those moral influences can have effect, that military government must be maintained?—You cannot now, for a considerable time, do without a very strong military force.

1933. Colonel *Thompson*.] What are the forms of breaking a treaty at the Cape?—This was one, which was merely telling the people that the treaties were at an end, and that new treaties would be laid before them sometime thereafter for them to sign.

1934. Then the Government at the Cape assumes the right of breaking a treaty whenever it pleases?—It did on this occasion. Sir George Napier, on making his amendments, did not do that. I disapproved of Sir George Napier's amendments. At the same time he had a discussion with the Kafirs, and the Kafirs have to thank themselves if they cut their own throats; he made a treaty regularly with them.

1935. Do the Kafirs break treaties in return; do they exercise the same right of breaking treaties?—They have not hitherto; we have not allowed that those Kafirs should send to us to say, We are tired of these old treaties, and we will put new treaties before you next month.

1936. By what form are treaties annulled at the Cape?—I am not aware of treaties having been annulled before this instance.

1937. What was the form in which it was done in that instance;

instance; was there any form in fact at all?—I am not aware, except that the Governor just announced that he had done so, but it will appear from the documents; I only had it from thence.

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1938. *Chairman.*] I think you stated that the feeling of the colonists was in favour of a very summary and stringent policy to be exercised towards the frontier tribes, for the defence of the colony?—Yes, I believe that was the feeling with many.

1939. Am I right in supposing you think that the opinion of the colonists in that direction is stronger than from motives of justice and humanity, you, yourself, would be disposed to go along with them?—Much of it is; many of the popular views, it is well known, I do not adopt. I know that injustice invariably recoils on ourselves.

1940. Speaking generally of the prevalent feeling of the colony, do you think that the prevalent feeling of the colony runs in that direction rather more strongly than you think is consistent with the dictates of humanity and of justice, especially among those colonists that reside upon the frontiers?—There are many of them there; I should not like to class the whole of the colony in that way; there are excellent people there.

1941. You have stated circumstances to the Committee with respect to illuminations and bonfires, where a policy was adopted towards the natives that you thought was not altogether consistent with justice, and you, yourself, were burnt in effigy?—They thought it right to mark their approbation of the new treaties in that way, and it gave them satisfaction; and they had bonfires and burnings in effigy.

1942. It is plain, therefore, that among a considerable part of the public there was an opinion that a more stringent and decisive policy towards the natives was necessary than you yourself thought right?—Yes, decidedly; I agree fully with Mr. Porter's speech just read, and many people think otherwise.

1943. *Mr. Stanley.*] Looking back to past times, what period would you indicate as that during which the frontier was most free from depredations on the part of the Kafirs?—It has been varying; I should not like to take upon myself to fix any time; we have always had depredations so long as I have known the frontier; I came up as a boy in 1808, and up to the present time they have never been without depredations;



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depredations; to fix any time when they were more or less is impossible.

1944. Then you think, in that respect, there has been no great difference between one year and another?—There has been, but the returns will show it better; I could not fix upon any particular time; I should not like to do so.

1945. I ask because I find it stated in a Parliamentary Paper that the annual average loss of colonists in cattle was computed, between 1810 and 1834, at about 1,200 head; that in 1835 and 1836 there were hardly any; that in 1837 and 1838 there were above 2,000; in the four following years about 1,200, and in 1843 there were about 1,900; do you at all acquiesce in that statement?—Not at all; it is all erroneous, and no return is worth anything but that of the agent-general.

1946. Sir George Napier, in 1841, expresses an opinion that the character of the Kafirs was improving, and that they were *bonâ fide* anxious to cultivate good feeling with the British Government; do you believe that is correct?—I believe so, if they are justly dealt with; it must be always understood, with this qualification, those people have all the vices of barbarians, but when honestly and justly dealt with, as Mr. Porter has stated, they are, I believe, disposed to be friendly.

1947. In 1842 there was great suffering among the Kafirs, arising from the pasturage?—Yes.

1948. Did not the Lieutenant-governor supply them with food to a considerable extent?—Those droughts are periodical; they operate upon us every four or five years; I should not like to speak to any particular period.

1949. Did not the Lieutenant-governor upon that occasion supply them with food to a considerable extent?—I believe something was done, and money was subscribed, but what year it was I cannot fix.

1950. Did you remark whether it produced any effect upon their conduct towards the colonists?—Their conduct I should not like to speak of; but the diplomatic agent told me they were very thankful and very grateful, and he thought it a very wise measure.

1951. How long did the effect of that last; was there any difference found in their conduct towards the frontier colonists?—Not so much that I believe it was ever mentioned; I will not say there was none, but I do not think it had any permanent effect.

1952. I find that Lieutenant-governor Hare writes, in August

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1843, in these terms: "Murders are read of in every county; but, comparatively speaking, I am persuaded that fewer would be found to be perpetrated on that frontier than in any county of England;" do you consider that true?—I believe it perfectly true.

1953. I find it again stated, by Sir George Napier, that many of the depredations of which the frontier colonists complain were really committed by natives whom they had encouraged to squat on their farms, with a view to secure their services as herdsmen and labourers?—Often it happens so.

1954. Mr. *Booker*.] I find in a letter among the papers which came to our hands yesterday, in page 232, "Enclosure 1, in No. 50. Amended Treaty." The first article of that amended treaty is this: "It is agreed between the said Governor and the said contracting chiefs, that all former treaties between the colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the said chiefs shall be annulled, and the same are hereby annulled accordingly, and this present treaty shall stand henceforth in room and stead thereof." Now would the British Government, or the representatives of the British Government in that colony, undertake to enforce an article of that kind, without the free consent of the other contracting parties, the chiefs, thereto?—They say they did not.

1955. What is your opinion?—I have only this instance before me; I know it led to the war; that is all I can say.

1956. Did that amended treaty lead to the war?—That amended treaty led to the war; the abolition of the treaties before it and the substitution of this led to the war; there have been other causes, but this was the chief.

1957. Is it your opinion that the consent of the chiefs to that amended treaty was not a voluntary one, but was an enforced one?—I can only say what the chief said to me when he signed the treaty; he put down the pen, and said, I sign for the old treaties.

1958. Was his attention directed to the last article?—I was not there; I never had them in my hand till now; I do not know what took place there on the spot.

1959. Is it part of our policy, or is it our policy, to make treaties and break them when we please, holding the other contracting parties to those treaties as long as we please?—I know that was undoubtedly done in this instance, but I was not present at the time, nor have I ever seen them.

1960. Lord *Mandeville*.] Was not it in consequence of the

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treaties being constantly broken by the Kafirs, that they were annulled by Government?—Depredations were taking place constantly; I am not aware of any breaches of the treaty.

1961. It was an infringement of the treaty?—An infringement it could not be, unless the Government had demanded satisfaction in consequence of the articles of the treaty, and the Kafirs had refused to give it.

1962. *Chairman.*] Was not it alleged, at least on the part of the Government, that the provisions of the existing treaty had been found inadequate to secure that peace of the frontier which they were designed to obtain, and that, therefore, a new treaty with new provisions became necessary?—Those statements will be found in the official documents; I should not like to answer that question.

1963. *Mr. Booker.*] At page 229, I find this statement in a despatch from Sir Peregrine Maitland to Lord Stanley: "My next step was to invite the chiefs of the T'Slambie, Congo, and Fingoe tribes, the best disposed of our Kafir borderers, to an interview at Fort Peddie, where, after giving them credit for their conduct as neighbours, I proposed to them a new treaty, calculated to unite them in closer relations of amity with the British Government, and to promote the welfare of the inhabitants on both sides of this part of the frontier. At this meeting, my proposal was received by them with gratitude and lively satisfaction"?—That is not the Gaika tribe; it is not the Kafirs I allude to at all.

1964. *Colonel Dunne.*] I wish to ask you a question with regard to your own treaty; the 4th article of that treaty, by which the Kafirs were to return part of the ceded territory, says this: "As a special mark of his said majesty's grace and favour, any part of the territory between the Keiskamma and the Kat River, as a loan, to be by them or their tribe, or any part thereof, held upon such terms and to such extent as shall be laid down by or on the part of his said majesty, which terms shall be incorporated in this treaty; they, the said chiefs, promising at no period ever to lay claim to the possession or occupation of any other part of the territory known by the name of the ceded territory, except such part as shall be allotted to them in the manner hereinabove stated": was not that the case?—That is there I believe.

1965. That is your fourth article of your own treaty?—Yes.

1966. Then, under the guns of Fort Peddie, on the 2d of August, that is, about six months after the treaty was made, was not there an attack made upon the Fingoes who were included

cluded in that treaty?—I know there was a collision of that kind, but I beg of you to refer to my reports.

1967. But did not that amount to an infraction of the treaty?—I could only refer to those documents; I could not now state what has taken place without referring to those documents.

1968. I have before me the report?—If you will refer to my letter to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and Lord Glenelg's letter on the subject, the whole case was decided you find.

1969. Mr. *Monzell*.] I understood you to say in 1845, at all events, the colonists were in favour rather of a military system than of the milder system you had been the medium of introducing into the colony?—I do not know that we should call it a military system, but a system of more strictness.

1970. You were in favour, yourself, of the milder system?—The system that was introduced in 1836.

1971. Then why do you conceive that representative institutions, if introduced into the colony, would most probably lead to a better mode of dealing with the Kafirs than the system that now prevails, if you believe that the colonists are not in favour of that milder system?—The very circumstances of the frontier first of all, and then the advantage to be derived from the diffusion of opinion by public discussions, and that greater knowledge and truth which certainly are not attained now.

1972. Sir *E. Burton*.] You wrote a letter, I believe, during the summer of 1850, relating to the complaints made by the settlers on the Kat River?—Yes.

1973. Can you state to the Committee what grounds of complaint the Kat River settlers had at that time?—All that they stated to me I stated in that letter, about burning them out of their houses; I cannot recollect exactly every word; I received it from one of the chiefs, and it is there in my despatch.

1974. That letter was written some months before the war began?—Yes; I believe it was written in July; the war broke out towards the new year, about Christmas.

1975. Was there much irritation in the minds of the Kat River settlers in consequence?—Yes.

1976. From that injustice, as they supposed?—Yes, very great; it was connected with such grievances as they thought they had; I ought to state, on that subject, that up to 1847 there was never a more loyal set of people in the world. During the year 1846, I was asked to take the lead of those

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men, burghers, white and black, and I had the force under me against the Kafirs, and no men could behave better. Since I retired from the war they served under Sir George Berkeley, whose report may be seen, where it is pointed out that upwards of 90 per cent. were in the field, and those men serving the Government after they had been robbed by the Kafirs of all their property. They were naked and hungry, and charitable contributions were made to keep the women and children alive, and never did I hear one disloyal word. But it is since then that this change has taken place among them, which greatly surprises every one. Moreover, I should like to refer, with regard to the Kat River, to Justice Menzies' report and Sir John Wilde's men, who have no bias, as I may be supposed to have, and to Sir George Napier and Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Sir Peregrine Maitland and Sir Harry Smith, as to the conduct of those men on all occasions, and their loyalty and readiness to serve the colony up to 1847.

1977. Has the change produced in their minds since 1847 been produced by the measures of the British Government?—This is one thing that they complained of, and they also, on the same occasion, complained of magistrates being put over them known to be hostile to them; but those were only subordinate matters I think, and if the Kafir war had not broke out, they would have emigrated beyond the Orange River to get rid of the connexion with the colony, but rebellion never was dreamt of by them before the war broke out.

1978. *Chairman.*] Do you think any circumstances of offence on the part of the settlers of the Kat River can be adduced at all adequate to account for the conduct they have pursued?—Not adequate to account for their conduct; it is impossible; I know more of them than most people, and it is a perfect riddle to me.

1979. *Mr. E. H. Stanley.*] Were not some of the differences and complaints merely accidental; did they not arise from the individual misconduct or misunderstanding between them and those magistrates on the spot?—I do not know; I do not think that this Committee will ever get to the bottom of this rebellion, (I cannot give it another name,) without a most minute investigation on the spot of all the parties, and particularly the missionaries, who risked their lives and stayed among them, and made every sacrifice to keep them within bounds. I do not believe, without the most minute investigation on the spot by the most impartial men of the highest character, totally unconnected with any party in the colony, and

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hearing all sides of the question, that this mystery will be ever solved; where this has come from I do not understand; the Kafir war gave it an impulse; but in 1846 those men fought under me against the Kafirs with greater desperation than the boers.

1980. You mean the Kafir war was the occasion rather than the cause?—It was a great impulse.

1981. Mr. *Booker*.] Were you present at any conference between the present Governor and any of the chiefs?—Yes; when he delivered over the Kafirs to me in 1836, I relieved him.

1982. I am speaking of the present Governor?—I relieved him in 1836.

1983. Mr. *Hindley*.] You have stated that the returns quoted by Mr. Stanley were inaccurate?—Yes.

1984. You are not yourself prepared to state in what year or in what series of years the least number of robberies had taken place?—No. Without reference to the official return of the agent-general you cannot get it.

1985. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Sir George Napier was asked these questions: "You state that you thought Sir Andries Stockenstrom had very great influence over the Kafirs?" The answer is "Yes." "Do you think he has exercised it at all to maintain peace?" "That I cannot say. With respect to the Kafirs, I am asked a question, and I shall certainly answer it. I do think that if Sir Andries Stockenstrom had gone down or written to the Governor, and said, things are going wrong at the Kat River, I will go there and answer for the loyalty of that settlement, he would have made that settlement do whatever he liked. I am sure he would have kept them in loyalty if he had gone there; that settlement was made by him, and was always a favourite settlement of his; and when I was up there I saw the influence which he had; he ruled the whole of that part with great justice." Have you any statement to make upon that, that you might have kept that colony loyal if you had chosen to go there?—I was in Cape Town immediately after the war broke out in 1850. The Kat River people, including their missionaries, sent me an address, requesting me to take the command of the burgher forces against the Kafirs as I had done in 1846. The people of Port Elizabeth sent me a similar address. From other parts of the country I received applications to the same effect. I was then pledged to the colony to come to this country on a different errand; but my answer was, that if the colony released me from that pledge, I was ready to lead the burgher forces against the Kafirs, although my medical friends thought that in my state of health my doing so would have been suicide.

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My answers to the Kat River and Port Elizabeth addresses were published. If the Governor had called upon me, I should have gone, but when he appointed another officer, I had no right to interfere. Sir George Napier thinks rather too much of my influence. I might have done good perhaps, but I could take upon myself no authority which the Governor conferred on another.

1986. You could not properly go to the Kat River settlement, unless you were appointed to command the burgher forces by the Governor?—It would have been interfering with Colonel Somerset.

1987. Mr. Hawes.] What was the date of your last visit to the Kat River settlement?—After I resigned my office, I never went back again; I had no business there.

1988. About what time was that?—The papers will show that. I believe I resigned in October 1846. The war was not over. Sir Henry Pottinger then came; that was immediately after my convention with Kreli. I differed with Sir Peregrine Maitland, and I thought it better to withdraw, and I did withdraw, and have never been there since.

1989. Did you ever meet, within the colony, a report made by Mr. Biddulph, of the state and condition of the Kat River settlement in May 1847?—Yes, and I addressed Sir Henry Pottinger upon it.

1990. Did you differ from him, or agree with him?—I strongly differed.

1991. You thought that description of the settlement erroneous?—Libellous; I thought it was exceedingly improper to publish it, and that was one of the causes of this discontent. The Hottentots said that Mr. Biddulph was put over them because he was known to be hostile to them.

1992. Then this description given by Mr. Biddulph, and addresses to the Secretary of the Governor, you think would be altogether unfounded: "It is quite impossible to describe the scene presented at these posts from the thousands of people and cattle which have been all huddled together. 'Where the carcass is, there the eagles flock,' and accordingly Fort Armstrong and Eland's Post can be compared to nothing else but immense dunghills. At the former, in particular, near 2,000 people, fed at the public expense, and with nothing to do, have actually been too lazy to remove the dirt from before their huts, and it has been suffered to accumulate for 13 months close under the walls of the fort. I merely mention this, as showing to what an evil extent this indiscriminate and profligate

profligate expenditure of food to indolent people has been allowed to go on."

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1993. Do you doubt that statement?—I know it to be incorrect. It is very well to talk of those people in that style immediately after a war, when the Government, first of all, has brought thousands together in one batch for its own convenience, to make use of them against the Kafirs. They were brought into one camp, where all their cattle perished from hunger; the Kafirs took away some, but the greater proportion died on the spot from want of grass. The women and children were kept together, and the men were employed in the Government service; they lost all by the war; they were naked; they were hungry; they were exhausted by the war, and that poverty, therefore, should be conspicuous in every corner is not to be wondered at; it could not be otherwise. It is very little known what the colony and the Government are indebted to those people. Sir Harry Smith I appeal to; Sir George Napier I appeal to; Sir Benjamin D'Urban, even Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was going to follow out my plan in the Kat River. In one of his despatches, he said he was going to follow it up. I appeal to that document.

1994. Were not there large contributions made for the people?—When they were starving, after being exhausted in the service of Government.

1995. From the Government funds, constantly and liberally?—Not, except in war, when they were actually exhausting every breath they had in the Government service, and the women and children were starving, then the Government had to come to their assistance, and even the charitable part of the community of Cape Town had to contribute to keep those people alive. The secret of this rebellion is unaccountable to me. Sir George Napier is quite right, and Justice Menzies, and Sir Harry Smith, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban were aware of the services that these men had rendered the Government; you can never repay them, the colony in particular, and the missionaries who have been slandered, but who have sacrificed everything, and risked their lives in order to preserve those men in loyalty and utility to the Government; they can never be repaid.

1996. Are you aware that Sir Henry Pottinger adopted the views of Mr. Biddulph?—I know it; I think you will find in Downing-street, in the Colonial Office, my letter to Sir Henry Pottinger upon the subject, or at least the Secretary of State, through Sir Henry Pottinger; I complained to the Secretary



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of State of those statements, and of Sir Henry Pottinger publishing such libellous slander.

1997. If I do not misunderstand your testimony, the rations and clothing, and the assistance that were given to those settlers, were confined entirely to those in the field?—No; during the war, when they had lost everything by acting with the Government in the field, when the charitable contributions ran short, the women and children had to be kept also; but I believe in war actually only.

1998. Am I to understand, from the account you now give, that the aid afforded to the settlers was entirely afforded to them on the ground that they discharged military duties in the field?—Yes, and they even refused to take pay for those duties when offered.

1999. That no other support or assistance was given to the settlers except that?—Except from charity; the Government gave for the military services, and in consequence of those military services taking the men away from their wives and children, there was nothing but starvation for them, and there was no sending them to the rear, because the services of their husbands were wanted in the front, and they would have starved unless the Government had assisted them.

2000. What remark have you to make upon this passage in Sir Henry Pottinger's despatch of the 2d of November 1847: referring to certain documents he says, "From them it will be learned that the Lieutenant-general and myself then quite concurred as to the amount of rations that I had originally sanctioned, as well as the terms; but it is to be borne in mind that half the burghers had intermediately deserted their duty in the field, and had returned home to wallow in filth and idleness at the expense of Government"?—I never heard it; I never knew it; those people had served throughout the war under Sir Peregrine Maitland, under my direct orders, and they were exhausted; then came Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir George Berkeley. At first it was thought they could do without any burgher force, but it was found that that was required, and those people were again appealed to, and they volunteered in great numbers, and they were again for a considerable time in the field. But Sir George Berkeley's report stated the proportion of Hottentots to be more than 90 per cent., whereas the proportion of the burgher population was very small indeed, but upwards of 90 per cent. of those men were serving under him during Sir Henry Pottinger's government; Sir Henry Pottinger was altogether misled therefore; but such men as the Rev. Mr. Thompson, not a party man, and the other missionaries,

sionaries, were amongst those people at the time they were accused of filth and misery and starvation; but the state they were in was in consequence of the war and the measures of the Government. I repeat, let there be inquiry on the spot by honourable impartial men.

2001. Mr. Stanley.] Do you think that such a plan as is proposed for compensation by the Government for losses incurred by colonists upon the frontier, is advisable or not?—Certainly, I should think not, because if the Kafirs thought the Government would pay, they would not pay; if they could avoid the payment, they would. They are barbarians. But I should wish before answering that question to be referred to the document to which you refer. I am 12 years out of office now. If the Kafirs were not bound to comply with the treaties, then the treaties would not be worth the paper they are written upon: they must be kept to their treaties. I must be understood to speak of losses by depredations, not by war.

2002. Sir George Napier appears to have considered one of the principal causes of the predatory habits of the Kafirs, that they attach no sort of idea of disgrace to theft; he therefore proposed to punish them for such offences with a view to degrade them in the eyes of their tribes; was that policy wise; would it answer the purpose?—Any punishment would do, provided it went through the regular channel; I would like to show Sir Harry Smith's view of obtaining redress through the agency of the Kafirs themselves. It is the same document that I quoted from before: "Now for the law which may be ridiculed, but which is as applicable to the society we have to deal with as Blackstone. A robber being delivered up to the superintendent of police, with the evidence, the chief of the tribe to assemble a jury of 12 of his people, who in the presence of the superintendent of police, will try the offender; if they pronounce him guilty, the superintendent of police will, as a judge, pronounce sentence, having previously recorded the evidence adduced, the whole to be instantly dispatched to the Lieutenant-governor, the parties to be detained in the meanwhile, and if the sentence be approved by the Lieutenant-governor, be it what it may, capital or otherwise, to be immediately put into execution. Those ignorant of Kafir manners and customs will exclaim 'Oh, the Kafirs would never find their people guilty;' such I say is not the case. I never saw more honest or unprejudiced people when assembled for such purposes, or evidences who more plainly speak out without lying; I have never on such occasions fined but one man for a lie; on trivial occasions they will lie fast enough, but not in council or in jury, 'so it is.' This would be

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be my law if it were possible to establish it." These are Sir H. Smith's suggestions, and I adopted some of them. The date is the 12th of July 1836. Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter enclosing them to me is the 9th of November 1836.

2003. Do you agree in thinking that such a jury would do ?—No, Sir Harry Smith goes too far ; I spoke of the chief and his councils, but Sir Harry Smith may be right ; I doubt it.

2004. You apprehend such a jury would be altogether too much under the control of the chief?—I think there is some pride in a native councillor ; I have not that faith that Sir Harry Smith seems to have in their veracity ; I do not go to that extent.

2005. *Chairman.*] Therefore would there not be more difficulty than Sir Harry Smith conceived at that time, in obtaining a verdict of guilty for cattle-stealing from a Kafir jury?—I think so ; I have not the faith in a Kafir jury which Sir Harry Smith has.

2006. *Mr. E. H. Stanley.*] Of what nature are the criminal trials among Kafirs, for offences committed among themselves?—Both the civil and criminal trials are very solemn and very particular.

2007. You are inclined to think that among themselves they would probably do justice, but they would not do justice between white men and black men?—I cannot say that ; they have no juries ; I was speaking of juries ; I have no faith in their juries. With the chief and the councillors, I think we have a very good chance according to treaty ; that is when there is good understanding ; I have not that faith in a jury of 12 common Kafirs that Sir Harry Smith has.

2008. If that system were adopted, would you have the punishment inflicted by the Colonial Government, or by the chief himself?—By the chief himself.

2009. *Viscount Mandeville.*] You have stated you thought strictness was necessary ; in what respect?—Necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties.

2010. *Colonel Estcourt.*] I am going to refer to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Aborigines, and to your own evidence given on the 19th of August 1835, and I shall be glad to know whether you still agree in the opinions you then expressed. This is the question put to you : "One of your opinions was with reference to the treatment of the Kafirs, that some greater degree of indulgence should be extended towards them ; did that opinion give dissatisfaction at head quarters?" The answer is, "I am not aware that it did give dissatisfaction, but I know that that was not acted on ; my orders and complaints were disregarded." The

next question was, "Did I understand you correctly, that your system was one of very great severity towards the Kafirs if actually detected in the offence?" The answer is, "Yes; very conscientious men have often criticised my system as too bloody; but I felt that I had also to protect the colonists against murderers and plunderers, and could not sacrifice those to conciliate my accusers"—Those are my sentiments at the present moment.

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2011. Therefore you depend upon the military force in the colony to redress complaints against the Kafirs?—That is not implied there.

2012. I think you say you would depend upon your own force to resist the Kafirs?—I am decidedly of opinion that you require force not only with barbarians, but with civilized people to keep them to treaties; I should not rely upon the integrity of any party; I should always be sure to have a strong force to back me under any circumstances, in cases of treaties with any party.

2013. Viscount *Mandeville*.] You stated that a considerable force is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties?—I said I believe that it would require a considerable force for a long time upon that frontier; I should think power necessary to keep any party to a treaty, that the opposite party shall be always aware you have the power to enforce your rights.

2014. You believe you could not depend upon the chiefs to keep the treaties unless they knew you had the power to enforce them?—To that question I must give the same answer, that I think that in all treaties, and we see it every day in all people, European or African, it is absolutely necessary that the opposite party should be thoroughly aware that you have the power to enforce your right.

2015. Mr. *Hawes*.] I think in a former part of your examination you stated, that from what you had heard, the Kafir chiefs, when they entered into the treaties they did with Sir Peregrine Maitland, did it unwillingly, and in some degree compulsorily?—Unwillingly decidedly; I would not say compulsorily; they objected to the upsetting of the former treaties.

2016. Let me call your attention to a passage in Sir Peregrine Maitland's despatch, and ask you to make any observation upon it that occurs to you: "My next step was to invite the chiefs of the T'Slambie, Congo and Fingo tribes, the best disposed of our Kafir borderers, to an interview at Fort Peddie, where, after giving them credit for their conduct as neighbours, I proposed to them a new treaty calculated to unite them in closer relations of amity with the British Government, and

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and to promote the welfare of the inhabitants on both sides of this part of the frontier. At this meeting my proposal was received by them with gratitude and lively satisfaction. One chief, Eno, of the Gaika tribe, who had hitherto treated only in concert with the rest of that nation, was present, and expressed a desire to enter into the same treaty, and renounce his connexion with those habitual marauders. To this I gladly acceded, and promised to conclude with him a treaty similar to that about to be contracted with the T'Slambie and Congo Kafirs?—I have nothing to remark upon that; I know nothing about it.

2017. You do not know any of the circumstances?—I know nothing with regard to the details you read.

2018. You observe here a new treaty was entered into, which has had the effect of cancelling the old ones with feelings of gratitude, according to Sir Peregrine Maitland?—I spoke of the Gaika tribe.

2019. Now what treaties do you refer to that were unwillingly entered into?—The same with regard to the Gaika tribes.

2020. When Sir Peregrine Maitland entered into treaty with the Gaika chiefs, are you aware, whether or not, Mr. Stretch communicated to them the contents of the treaty?—I am not aware; I suppose he did; I would rather not venture upon that. Let Mr. Stretch be heard as well as the Kafirs.

2021. You are not acquainted with the circumstances?—No; except that which was stated to me by the chief, that in signing, he said, I sign for the old treaties, or I adhere to the old treaties. Mr. Stretch reported the fact.

2022. Being aware that what he signed was, in fact, a new treaty, cancelling the old?—I told him he was bound by what he signed.

2023. *Chairman.*] Is there anything in addition to what you have stated to the Committee, you wish to add to your evidence?—No; except in regard to the question of the emigration of the boers, I said it had been somewhere stated, that the emigration of the boers was in consequence of the breaking of the treaties; I have the documents to show that was impossible, and that Retiff made a strong remonstrance to the Government against the proceedings of the Governor before Lord Glenelg's name was heard of.

2024. *Viscount Mandeville.*] It was in consequence of their considering they were not sufficiently protected against the Kafirs; that was one of the principal causes for leaving?—They complained of the result of the war of treaties having been made with those Kafirs, without the Kafirs being compelled

pelled to restore the property taken throughout the war, and an order had been issued by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, strictly prohibiting Colonel Smith ratifying his treaty with the Kafirs, before they should have delivered up all the fire-arms in their possession; we demanded the horses, we demanded the cattle, and we demanded the guns, and they set us at defiance, and laughed at us, and never delivered up one; and that is what actuated the boers, and particularly that man Retiff; I was obliged to threaten him, because he said, unless he got satisfaction for everything that was lost, and for all for which they had had no compensation whatever, he would go into Kafirland in defiance of me and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and go and take them; I warned him, and he continued, and I was obliged to put him out of the place.

2025. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think those feelings were, to a certain degree, well grounded, that we had not given the boers that defence they were entitled to?—They were certainly dissatisfied with the result of the war; they got no compensation.

2026. They were not indemnified for what they lost?—Very partially; even these men that were exhausted after serving under the commanders, when allowed to go home, at last their horses were seized from under them, and they complained of not getting compensation for that, or very partially at least.

2027. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Then again, there was a considerable emigration when they heard that the ceded territory was to be returned to the Kafirs?—Not the slightest; they were all preparing when I reached the colony.

2028. They had heard it was to be returned?—No, they could not have heard it.

2029. Colonel *Dunne*.] That was the ultimate conclusion of the war; we never completed the war?—The Kafirs have never been subdued. I here most positively repeat my positive denial that Lord Glenelg's measures had the slightest influence on the emigration of the boers; I can prove by Sir B. D'Urban's own documents that excitement was at its height before those measures were heard of; I also repeat that this inquiry is incomplete without its being followed up on the spot. All parties have a right to be heard.

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## MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Labouchere.  
Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Colonel Thompson.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Sir E. Buxton.  
Mr. Fitzpatrick.

Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Viscount Mandeville.  
Mr. Monsell.  
Sir Joshua Walmsley.  
The Marquis of Granby.  
Mr. Booker.  
Colonel Dunne.

THE RIGHT HON. H. LABOUCHERE IN THE CHAIR.

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*Andrew Smith, Esq. M.D., called in; and further  
Examined.*

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2030. Mr. *Hawes.*] I BELIEVE you are able to give the Committee some information as to the number of tribes, as well as the population of each tribe, in British Kafiraria?—I think I can state pretty nearly what they were in 1830. I should say there were 12 principal tribes: Gaika tribe, Eno's tribe, Botman's tribe, T'Slambie tribe, Congo's tribe, Hintza tribe, the Tambookie tribe, Unyeki's tribe, Qanda's tribe, Depa's tribe, Faku tribe, and Kapai's tribe; those were all the tribes.

2031. Viscount *Mandeville.*] Can you distinguish what are properly the Gaika tribe?—The tribe of which Sandilli is the principal chief.

2032. They were at any rate the same nation; the Gaikas are part of the Amakosa nation?—The Gaikas are part of the Amakosa nation; the whole that I have enumerated are of the same nation; they are merely branches of one nation; they are all sprung from one tribe, the Zwide tribe, the first recognised by the Kafirs.

2033. Mr. *Hawes.*] Do the tribes which you have named occupy the space between the Keiskamma and Natal?—No; there are nearly 200 miles unoccupied territory before you reach Natal. They occupy the space between the Keiskamma and Umzimvoobo Rivers; one of those tribes, Kapai's tribe, when

when I passed that country to go to Natal, in 1830, was living to the eastward of the Umzimvoobo River; but that was not properly his place; he happened to be living then to the eastward; all the rest were to the westward. The Umzimvoobo River was regarded by the Kafirs as their eastern boundary.

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2034. But with regard to that tract of territory called the Orange River Sovereignty, and the territory between it and the Keiskamma, are there any tribes in that district which you have not mentioned?—There are Bechuana tribes.

2035. Have you described all the tribes immediately adjoining the British boundary?—Yes, to the eastward; but there are some to the north-east I have not described, the Bechuanas. There are four or five different collections of them; there are the Basutos and Mantatees. Then there is the collection of Bechuanas not called by any particular name, consisting of a congregation of the remains of tribes living at Thaba Unchu, under an elected chief. There is another collection living near the mouth of the Caledon River, under a chief of the name of Lapui; they are in the same condition, being remnants of a variety of tribes which are collected together at a missionary station.

2036. So far as you know, are all those the tribes that occupy that tract of country, bounded on the west by the Keiskamma, on the east by the colony of Natal, on the north by the Orange River, and on the south by the sea?—Yes.

2037. What are the tribes nearest that Vaal River?—They are Bechuana tribes.

2038. Colonel *Dunne.*] The Vaal and Yellow River are identical?—Yes. There are besides those settled tribes a number of minor tribes inhabiting the mountain region lying between the Basutos and the Amakosa Kafirs, consisting of persons of different tribes under particular chiefs; those are generally very actively engaged in depredations; they do not hold any settled habitation, and are constantly moving from place to place.

2039. Mr. *Hawes.*] Can you now inform the Committee what was the population of those tribes, so far as you have information upon the subject?—From questions put to the natives in various ways, and from my own observations, I came to the conclusion, about the year 1830, when I passed through Kafirland, that the Gaika population was about 45,000; the T'Slambie about 35,000; Eno, Botman, and Congo, together, about 20,000.



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2040. Colonel *Dunne*.] You include in that men, women, and children?—Yes. Hintza about 40,000; the Tambookies about 40,000; Umyeki, 15,000; Qanda, Depa, and minor tribes connected with them, 15,000; Faku, 45,000; Kapai, 15,000; and the scattered tribes about 10,000.

2041. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Are those the tribes to the north?—No, those in the mountainous parts. The Basutos about 15,000; the Mantatees about 10,000; the Thaba Unchu tribe about 10,000; and the Lepui tribe about 6,000 or 7,000. I may mention that the editor of the *Graham's Town Journal*, who had a great deal of facility of ascertaining the population of Kafirland in 1836, after the termination of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war, gives the population, not exactly in the detail I have given it, as 395,000.

2042. Mr. *Hawes*.] Your total estimate amounts to about 311,000?—Yes, about that. The editor estimated it from documents which he had obtained, and he made it, as I have said, 395,000.

2043. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] That is more than your estimate considerably?—But it was made six years later. There might have been an increase of population in that time.

2044. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] In that calculation you do not estimate the Zoolu tribe?—No; there are no Zoolu tribes near. After you leave the Kafirs, you pass over 200 miles of unoccupied territory; but since Natal has become a British colony, a number of Kafirs, broken-up tribes, have come into that country, feeling that they can live there in security. You travel 80 or 90 miles beyond Natal, before you come to the Zoolu country.

2045. Then have you no knowledge of the scattered tribes between the Zoolus and Kafiraria Proper?—No farther than that they were principally hunters; I saw occasionally six, or eight, or 10 men, but I should not suppose, in the whole 200 miles from east to west, and the 100 miles from north to south, there were more than 300, or 400, or 500 Kafirs.

2046. Have you any knowledge of the number of the Zoolus?—The number is very great; I should say the Zoolus have about 25 regular regiments; their system is very much like our system in regard to militias of counties. In the centre of each of their districts they have a large barrack established, where they yearly assemble all the warriors and keep them at drill a month; each of those barracks is calculated to hold from 1,500 to 2,000 men, so that I should say they certainly had, of regular warriors, 60,000 or 70,000 up every year to drill.

2047. Under one king?—Yes.

2048. They inhabit the territory to the east of Natal?—  
To the north-east of Natal.

2049. *Chairman.*] To the north-east the Zoolus have a more regular military organization, have they not?—They have a regular drill, according to their own view; and a regular movement in the field, according to their own view.

2050. Has this system been recently adopted, in imitation of our own, or has it subsisted for a long time under their own institution?—I believe it originated with a chief of the name of Chaka, the first great Zoolu chief, and it was followed up by his brother Dingan.

2051. Do you apprehend the Zoolus to be more formidable, or less formidable than the Kafirs, as warriors?—They were more formidable in 1830, but I cannot say now, because the Kafirs have got guns and horses, the others have not; they could easily have overrun the Kafirs when I was with Dingan; they do not throw the spear, they rush on.

2052. They use the assagai?—Yes, in close combat.

2053. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] Which do you consider the original aborigines of the country in which you have described those tribes; do you consider that the Kafirs, the Hottentots, or the Fingoes are the aborigines?—I should say for a certain distance from the Keiskamma, perhaps for 40 miles to the eastward, the Hottentots were the possessors of the country in 1752. The Kafirs had not advanced then much to the westward of the Kei; there were a few villages to the westward of the Kei, but not many. Within the next 30 years the Kafirs reached as far as the Fish River, having taken possession of the Hottentot country.

2054. Should you consider the Hottentots were the aborigines of that part of the country you have described?—Certainly.

2055. And that they were driven out of it by the Kafirs?—I would not say exactly driven out of it, because the Kafirs and Hottentots more or less amalgamated together. The Kafir, being the more considerate person, and having property and taking better care of it, seemed to live while the Hottentot perished; the Kafirs also took their women for wives, and so gradually the Hottentots disappeared; still you see, in many Kafirs of the present day, evident indications of Hottentot blood. I do not think they drove them away altogether.

2056. They overpowered them?—They amalgamated with them.

2057. Were they Fingoes or Zoolus?—The Fingoes were a people who came from near Natal, and belonged to the  
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Zoolu race; they came into Kafirland, thinking they would be well treated, but found out their mistake.

2058. Sir J. Walmsley.] You have given us the names and number of the tribes to the east of the Keiskamma and north-east; can you now define the boundaries, or give anything like a definition of the boundaries of each tribe?—It is very difficult.

2059. The nearest approximation you can give, for the information of the Committee, would be desirable?—The Gaika tribe live towards the Amatola mountains, upon the Keiskamma and streams falling into it; the T'Slambie Kafirs live between the Gaika Kafirs and the sea, to the eastward of the Keiskamma, between it and the Kei.

2060. Could you say in miles anything like what the distance would be, as that would still further facilitate the information you are giving us?—I should find a difficulty in doing that, because the boundaries are so irregular; they go by the rivers; thus perhaps the boundary will extend a considerable distance to the north one way, and then it will turn back again. There is no well-defined boundary. Probably the T'Slambies might extend 40 miles from the sea, but that is a guess; I cannot say for certain. Eno, Botman, and Congo's tribes also lived in the same territory, but more to the westward, towards the Keiskamma, and therefore immediately upon the frontier of the colony; they extended also down to the sea. The Gaikas had possession of the whole country towards the Amatola mountains and sources of the river; they are the most powerful tribe, and situations of the kind they occupied are the best; they held the best territory.

2061. Marquis of Granby.] Have the numbers of the Hottentots diminished much of late years?—Very much; they have been gradually diminishing ever since the commencement of the colony. The next tribe in succession to the eastward is the Tambookies. The country of the Tambookies is towards the sources of the Kei, Bashe, and Umlala rivers; they also extended a short way down towards the sea; they principally lived on the higher grounds; they were one of the most powerful tribes.

2062. Colonel Dunne.] Is Hintza a Gaika?—No, he belonged to another branch, a more direct branch of what we may call the Royal family; a nearer branch to the original stock. Between the Tambookies and the sea Hintza lived. The tribes of Unyeki, Qanda, and Depa lived between the Bashe and a small river situated about twelve miles to the eastward of the Umlala river. The Amapondas occupied the district

district between the small river referred to and the Umzimvoobu, and they reached from the sea to the mountain belt which divides the present sovereignty from Kafirland. The tribe of Kapai lived on the eastern side of the Umzimvoobu, near its sources. Between Kapai's tribe and Natal, a distance of about 200 miles, the country in 1830 was almost without inhabitants; I do not think I saw during a journey through it more than 50 Kafirs.

2063. And you think at present there are not more than 500?—I believe there is towards Natal a collection of broken up tribes that has come since the white people were established there to seek protection direct from them against the native chiefs, who are apt to put them to death if they continue to live in their neighbourhood.

2064. Those are the Zoolu tribes that live to the westward of Natal. You were speaking of the district between the Umzimvoobu River and Natal?—Yes.

2065. You say that it is very thinly populated there, but that a portion of the Zoolus have come down and occupied the territory between Natal and this river?—I did not mean you to understand that. I meant to say a very considerable number of Zoolus have congregated about our settlement at Natal, seeking protection against the chiefs.

2066. *Chairman.*] Within the limits of the colony?—Yes.

2067. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] But extending to the westward of Natal, towards Kafaria Proper?—When I passed through the country, between the Umzimvoobu and Natal, I did not see 25 Kafirs; and I do not believe there were more than 500 scattered over the whole of that district then, as far as I could ascertain from the number I saw; they were merely out there hunting for elephants. They were scattered over the country, and the total would not amount to more than 500.

2068. You have given the population of the various tribes, from the sea to the Vaal River, and the Keiskamma to the eastward, as far as Kafaria Proper, at 300,000, or thereabouts?—Yes.

2069. What number of fighting men may be estimated in that country, in proportion to the population?—It is exceedingly difficult to say, because with the Kafirs the boys, that is, boys of 15, 16, or 17, are considered the very best troops; those that are most to be trusted. I should say, taking the population with that understanding, one in six. Does the question mean the number they could bring into war?

2070. You have given the population as 300,000 men in this district; I want to know what proportion of those you would

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consider fighting men, able to be brought into the field in their own mode of warfare, not as a body?—I must explain why I say one in six; I mean that in consequence of the great quantity of cattle the Kafirs always have, there is a very considerable number of able-bodied men required to be away with them to protect them. Those could not serve as fighting men; but if we include those, and say men that they could bring, provided they had no charge of that kind, I should say one in five.

2071. Taking them at one in six, that would give an amount of 50,000 fighting men in that district?—Yes.

2072. Are those men well supplied with fire-arms and ammunition?—In my time they were not well supplied; they dreaded fire-arms then; and could scarcely be induced to touch a gun.

2073. Do you anticipate, from your knowledge of those tribes, that they would unite generally against the British?—I think so.

2074. You think the whole of those tribes would unite against the British?—Yes, they consider that the Government has taken the country of the Hottentots, and further, that it has taken more or less territory that they consider Kafir territory; hence they anticipate that the day will come, and that it is not very distant, when we shall endeavour to take all their territory, therefore they think their only chance is in union among themselves.

2075. And that country generally is very favourable for their mode of fighting?—Yes.

2076. Being a great deal of bush fighting?—Yes.

2077. In which they might contend against European troops with advantage?—Yes, they would have considerable advantage.

2078. You say there are 50,000 troops in that district; you said also the Zoolus were a very powerful nation?—Yes.

2079. And that they were under one head or king, who had troops to the amount of 60,000, well organized and drilled?—Yes.

2080. Have they any fire-arms?—No; there was not I believe a serviceable musket in the whole Zoolu country.

2081. You are aware they approach closely to the colony of Delagoa Bay?—No.

2082. The Portuguese country?—That country is far beyond the Zoolus.

2083. Would they not be likely to be supplied with fire-arms through that source in case of war?—They might be supplied

supplied from Delagoa Bay. The frontier Kafirs have such ample opportunities of getting supplies, that you cannot prevent their getting what they are determined to have.

2084. They are a very formidable force; a very powerful nation to the north-east of Natal, close upon the colony of Natal?—In my time they were powerful; but I may mention that subsequently to that Dingan's tribe (the true Zoolus) was broken up by an attack of the emigrant boers, and entirely scattered. Now, the natives, that are in the vicinity of Natal, are a congregation of broken-up tribes under a chief who during Dingan's time was tributary to him; they are a newly organized tribe since my time; a heterogeneous tribe, not connected together, as the Zoolus were when under Dingan.

2085. The boers were driven again to the north-west?—Yes; but notwithstanding that, they made a very serious attack upon Dingan, and drove him away.

2086. *Chairman.*] Are you speaking of the Zoolus within the limits of the British colony, or the Zoolus without?—I am speaking of the Zoolus without the limits of the British colony.

2087. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Those within the British colony are, then, runaway Zoolus?—Yes.

2088. The Zoolus within Natal are those that ran away from their own country, through crimes and other things?—Exactly so.

2089. They are the servants of the colony, and do a great portion of the work; of the labour of the colony?—I believe so.

2090. They are rather an athletic people?—The real Zoolus are a smaller people than the Kafirs.

2091. And not capable of doing a great deal of work?—They are never tried in that way, because they never do work; their only occupation is hunting and war.

2092. Do you know what the European population is at Port Natal?—No; I have not been there since it became a colony.

2093. Do you know the number of troops there?—One regiment, consisting of about 650 men.

2094. Then with so powerful a nation close upon them, with so small a force, do you think Natal a safe colony as a British possession?—Not if the natives became our enemies.

2095. Then you consider that the safety of that country depends entirely upon the will of the Zoolus?—In a great measure; they could destroy the whole colony if inclined;

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Dingan could have done it easily; the present man may not have the tact and management of Dingan; the latter could have overrun it without difficulty.

2096. Since then the Europeans at Port Natal have greatly increased in number?—Yes, they have; but the European force of that country is still small.

2097. *Mr. Hawes.*] Do you know anything of the number of the natives in the colony of Natal at this moment?—I have not the least idea.

2098. You know nothing of the relations that have been recently established between the colony of Natal and those natives, as to the mode of governing them, or managing them?—No; as far as I have understood from conversation I have had upon the subject, we have no particular understanding with Panda, who is now the native chief.

2099. Have you any knowledge of the system now pursued in Natal, as to the government of the natives?—Not from my own observation.

2100. Nor from reading?—No.

2101. My question goes simply to this, whether have you any knowledge of the system that has been recently adopted in that colony, with a view to the management and government of the natives who now resort to that colony?—No, none.

2102. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Is there any further remark you wish to make as to the numbers or localities of the tribes or the country?—No, I think not.

2103. *Mr. Monsell.*] Are the customs of those tribes similar to one another?—Very nearly; there are some slight modifications, but generally they are the same; so much so, that Hintza, who was considered to know best the established customs of the Kafirs, was always resorted to in cases of doubt.

2104. You have made yourself intimately acquainted with the customs and habits of the different tribes?—I think I know all their customs.

2105. What are the relations between the different tribes; how do they arrange disputes that arise between themselves?—If it is a dispute that involves the chief or the whole of the tribe, it is either settled by friendly negotiations between the respective chiefs and their counsellors, or by recourse to arms. The disputes which occur are principally about the stealing of cattle and things of that kind, not at all considered as national disputes; they are only considered as border disputes;  
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if the people of one tribe take cattle from another tribe, the losers retaliate and take cattle, perhaps not always from the same persons who took theirs, but from others. Such border warfare never involves the chief, even though he knows what has been done, and has, perhaps, partaken of the cattle that have been taken.

2106. Are there any sorts of contracts or other treaties between the tribes?—None beyond an understanding that no tribe must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing grounds of another tribe.

2107. Are they generally faithful to those engagements?—Yes, I should say so; at least a weak tribe will be faithful towards a strong tribe, but not always the converse; a strong tribe will occasionally take liberties with a weak tribe, knowing it cannot avenge the injury.

2108. Have they a different feeling as to engagements made amongst themselves, that is, made by one tribe with another tribe, to that which they have as to engagements made between the British Government and the Kafirs generally?—I should say they have; they consider that the Government has treated them ill, by taking their lands; therefore there is a special feeling, creating an aversion to the Government, which does not exist in regard to their own tribes, who have not taken land from them.

2109. From your observation, do you think generally the agents of the British Government have fairly respected their prejudices and feelings?—Decidedly so; but unfortunately in respecting them they have not benefited the Kafirs or the colonists. In regard to respecting their prejudices and feelings, the Kafirs do not view any consideration of that sort as a proof of kindness, but of fear.

2110. Have you ever known an instance of a Kafir chief being required to execute upon a criminal a sentence of the colonial court?—Yes; I was present as the medical officer to see a Kafir executed.

2111. Is not such a course as that very abhorrent to the feelings of the Kafirs?—Yes, it was a most unfortunate case; it occurred when Gaika was living. A murder had been committed in the colony, and Gaika was required to send in the murderer to be tried by the colonial court at Graham's Town. After reporting from time to time that he could not discover the murderer, at last a man arrived at Graham's Town; he was tried by the colonial court, was found guilty of the murder upon the evidence of a Hottentot boy, and was sentenced to be executed. The colonial government directed that

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that the commandant of the frontier should carry the man into Kafirland and require Gaika, in the presence of his people, to put him to death. The commandant proceeded with about 500 troops, carrying along with him the criminal, and arrived at the Chumie missionary station late in the evening. A messenger was sent to Gaika the next morning, to say his presence was required at the institution; the messenger returned, saying Gaika could not attend. A second message was sent, with some threats if he did not attend that it would be necessary to take some steps against him. He then came, but halted about a mile from the institution, upon the top of a ridge, when it was discovered that he was accompanied by 1,000 or 1,500 Kafirs. On the ridge he remained till a third messenger was sent to invite him to the institution. I must mention that previously to this the troops had been concealed in a bush that was close to the institution, so that there appeared very few about the station. On the third invitation being sent, he came on, accompanied by his men, and approached to within 100 yards of the missionary's house, where he halted, standing in a semicircle, in which he had formed his people. The commandant of the frontier, myself, and another staff officer, then went to see him, and after a few ordinary observations, he was informed what was the object of his being sent for, namely, that he was to put a criminal to death. He immediately objected, and put the question to the commandant, "How would you feel, provided you were required to execute a person of whose guilt you were perfectly ignorant?" "My people," he said, "look to me for protection, and what will they think of me, if I go and execute this man without having tried him, or having proved that he had been guilty of any crime? I have no doubt the crime has been proved against him by your court, and that being the case, I think you and not me ought to execute him." The argument went on for some time; at last the commandant said to me, "Cannot you help me out of this difficulty?" My reply was, "It is of no use, for Gaika has the best of it, and you can never drive him from the position he has taken." The commandant then said, "I cannot help it, it must be done;" and holding up his hand 500 or 600 troops immediately sprung out of the bush, and marched forward and formed in rank directly opposite to Gaika's people; Gaika then commenced to tremble, and turning round said to his son Maquomo something or other, which our interpreter did not catch. Maquomo looked round, and on seeing a leathern thong in the hands of one of the men, immediately seized it, and

and rushed up to the criminal, who was standing present guarded by two British soldiers, and aided by two Kafirs immediately seized him by the ankles before he was aware of their intentions, pulled his feet from under him, and cast him on his face. Maquomo then placed his foot on the man's neck, and gave orders to the person who possessed the thong to pass it under the neck, and to pull it with the assistance of the other till the man should be strangled. Gaika departed much disgusted, carrying with him all his people; he left the corpse at the missionary station to be buried.

2112. In what year did this take place?—1821 or 1822.

2113. Have any similar cases occurred, do you know?—Not during my time; I never heard of any other.

2114. That is merely an exceptional case; it is not the system that was carried out?—No.

2115. Colonel *Dunne*.] Who was the commandant?—Colonel Scott.

2116. Mr. *Monseil*.] Were you in the country when Sir Andries Stockenstrom was Lieutenant-governor?—Yes, for six or eight months only.

2117. Did you approve of the system called Lord Glenelg's system; the system he was appointed to carry out?—I approved of it to a certain extent; but I thought something more was wanted: namely, that there should be a commissioner appointed to reside among the Kafirs, who should endeavour to organize a government for each chief, and so enable them to prevent their subjects committing depredations in the colony, and thereby ensure peace. The system, so far as it went, of giving back the land to Kafirs, I could not help approving, because I think it has been taken from them unjustly; they had been given to understand since 1778, when the Dutch government established the boundary, that the whole of the country to the east of the Great Fish River was to be considered Kafir country, and I do not think they had done sufficient in the interim to justify their being driven beyond the Keiskamma.

2118. Are you of opinion that the system of which you have just been speaking, namely, that which was introduced by Lord Glenelg, would on the whole have worked more successfully than the system substituted for it?—Yes, provided steps had been taken to create an executive for the Kafirs; if on the contrary no such steps had been adopted, I do not know that matters would have been better than before the occurrence of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war. I consider it was essentially necessary to the success of the system of Lord Glenelg.

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Glenelg, that there should have been some British authority amongst the Kafirs, because, as mentioned before, they have no confidence in the Governor of the colony; they consider he is interested in the white people, and in the white people only, and that he would sacrifice the black people's interest at any moment to promote the interest of the white people, whether right or wrong; that is their idea. Had a commissioner been appointed, one of his principal objects should have been to get the chiefs to subdivide Kafirland into small districts and create an executive for each, and look to it rather than to the voluntary services of any number of subjects. Had that been effected the system proposed by Lord Glenelg would, in my opinion, have answered better than the system that was substituted for it.

2119. Would you describe, in a few words, what you mean by Lord Glenelg's system?—It was to give up the country to the Kafirs and allow them to live independent, as they had done previously; that is, to give up the country which the Kafirs maintained was their country, and which the colonial government had recognised to be their country so far back as 1778, namely, the country east of the Fish River.

2120. Mr. *Hawes*.] The effect of that was to return to the old boundary of the colony, the Fish River?—Yes.

2121. How far did or did not that system comprehend the maintaining the territory between the Fish River and the Keiskamma as a neutral territory, as was previously arranged under the administration of Lord Charles Somerset?—I believe it required that the neutral territory should be given up. The Kafirs will very frequently enter into an agreement when they have 600 or 700 soldiers before them; and will sign anything from fear, but the moment they go away they say they were compelled to do it, and they do not hold such as an agreement amongst themselves; they are always ready to throw off any agreement of that kind the moment an opportunity offers.

2122. Mr. *Monsell*.] Returning to the consideration of Lord Glenelg's system with the addition you propose; suppose such a system had been consistently carried out, do you conceive, from your knowledge of the Kafirs, that there would have been reasonable grounds for believing they would have observed the treaties that were made with them?—To a very great extent; there would be always depredations, because as long as they are so desirous of getting cattle, there will be occasionally thieving.

2123. Mr. *B. Carter*.] You stated that you wished they should

should have a commissioner to lead them to establish some sort of executive?—Yes.

2124. Would you have that under one head, or could you have separate executives for separate tribes?—I would have separate executives for separate tribes.

2125. *Mr. Monsell.*] Do you consider the Kafirs to be very deficient in the appreciation of the truth; did you find them not very careful in keeping their word?—In some respects they are very careful in keeping their word; they consider it an honour to prove themselves efficient thieves, therefore they are not very particular in that respect. I never lost anything which they promised me they would take care of for me. I used to put my cattle under the charge of the chief, or perhaps simply of a subject, and I never lost any; they would have considered it a dishonour to have made away with cattle under such circumstances. Had I gone into Kafirland and not taken that precaution, they would have thought it justifiable to have stolen one, two, or more of them.

2126. Did their proneness to break their treaties with the British Government arise in any degree from a feeling that the British Government did not respect the agreements made with them?—I think it arose more from a desire to obtain cattle; at the same time they considered they had been ill used by the Government, and that they might fairly take advantage of the colonists, when an opportunity offered.

2127. *Colonel Dunne.*] You said the system of Lord Glenelg, which you have described, was more an alteration of boundary than an alteration of policy; do I understand you to say the alteration of the system was merely an alteration of boundary?—That was not all, as far as I understood the system. It was just coming into operation when I left.

2128. What is the system; very often you have spoken of the system before that of Lord Glenelg and the system subsequently, and the reversal of this and of that system; I want to know what those systems were, and the differences between them; after we took the colony are you aware of the boundaries we received from the Dutch?—Yes, I knew them; at the time we took the colony, in 1795, the acknowledged boundary was the Fish River.

2129. The Fish River was one boundary when we received it from the Dutch?—Yes, that was established as the boundary in 1778 by the Dutch, and we took over the colony, considering that to be the boundary.

2130. In what year was the treaty with the Dutch?—1795.

2131. Did

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2131. Did we finally get possession then?—We gave it up again in 1802.

2132. When did it come finally into our possession?—In 1806.

2133. Then what was the next change of boundary made?—The neutral territory in 1819, by Lord Charles Somerset.

2134. What was that?—That the country lying between the Fish River and the Keiskamma should be neutral; that is, it was not to be occupied either by whites or blacks.

2135. There seems to be a distinction between the colonial boundary and the British territorial boundary. Was the colonial boundary pushed to the Keiskamma?—No colonist was sanctioned to live upon the neutral territory.

2136. Then in fact it was a mere neutral territory?—Yes.

2137. And the Keiskamma was no more the boundary to them than the Fish River was to us?—No more.

2138. Was the neutral territory to be totally uninhabited by either party?—Yes; but we did not keep the treaty.

2139. The treaty was understood so?—Yes, but we broke the treaty. We built Fort Wiltshire upon the banks of the Keiskamma.

2140. Did you consider that we violated that treaty?—Yes.

2141. Mr. Hawes.] Was not it an understanding at the time that a fort should be built on a certain portion of the neutral territory, for the protection of the neutral boundary?—I never understood that.

2142. Colonel Dunne.] Was the treaty ever reduced to writing?—No, I think not; it was a mere verbal treaty with Gaika, who, within a few hours, denied that he ever consented to such an arrangement; he said the white people say I consented, and I suppose I must consent.

2143. Was it, in fact, a mere compulsory affair?—I was given to understand so. There was a second proposition made in 1820, by Sir Rufane Donkin; he got Gaika to consent to allow a certain portion of the neutral territory to be inhabited by British settlers; he consented to it, because he could not help himself.

2144. In fact, whether compelled by force or inclination, such a consent was understood?—Yes, it was said to have been obtained.

2145. Now, what was the difference of the system of policy pursued; was there any difference in the means of holding those

those separating boundaries. After the Dutch handed it over to us, we defended the boundary by the commando system?—Yes.

2146. Who was the next Governor that changed that system; it continued to what date?—It is difficult to say; the system was altered frequently, from the necessities of the case; in general terms, the system of protecting the colonial frontier was continued, either by means of Burgher commandos or military troops, up to 1837.

2147. What do you understand by military troops?—I mean the military.

2148. When did we first send the regular soldiery on the frontier?—In 1806, when we took possession of the colony.

2149. Then that was a combined defence of the local force and the regular military force?—Yes.

2150. And ever has been?—Our principle was, that anything done against the Kafirs should be done by the military, if possible; but at times it became necessary to have additional assistance, and that was sought for from the Burghers.

2151. Some time after we received the colony from the Dutch, did we not allow the Burghers to defend themselves without any military interference?—Yes, frequently.

2152. When did we adopt the plan of stopping the commando system?—I think in General Burke's time; in 1827.

2153. That was previously to the adoption of Lord Glenelg's system?—Yes.

2154. What was Lord Glenelg's system; I do not speak now as to boundary?—To protect the colony by means of the military, and then to carry on a communication with the Kafir tribes, when any crime had been committed, by means of the civil authorities.

2155. Do I understand that in the former case the Burghers who lost cattle were allowed to pursue them and avenge their own injury, and in the latter, that we made the whole tribes responsible?—In the latter we did not make the whole tribes responsible, because when the spoor of the cattle was traced to a certain part of the boundary, the Kafirs living in the district opposite to where we traced it were held responsible to produce them.

2156. We held the tribe into whose territory the spoor was traced responsible?—Yes.

2157. Was it in pursuance of that responsibility that the

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execution you have spoken of took place?—No; that was a case in which some Kafirs had entered the colony, and had murdered one of the herdsmen of a colonist.

2158. It was not in consequence of that system?—No, it was long previous to that system.

2159. Can you point out the difference between the patrol system and the commando system, or is there any difference?—A patrol consisted of a body of troops going out for observation; not going out in pursuit of depredators, but to see if they could discover depredators: a commando was a body again that was in pursuit of depredators: the one was trying to discover wandering Kafirs, the other was in pursuit of depredators, a depredation having been committed.

2160. I do not quite see the difference?—There were a series of posts along the boundary line, and troops were placed at each of them, and once or twice a week the regulation was that an officer and six or eight, or 10 or 20 men should patrol the frontier between them half-way to the next post, where they were to be met by the patrol from the next post.

2161. Then one was for the prevention of crime, and the other for the detection and punishment of it?—Yes.

2162. Do you think the best defence of the frontier would be by those patrols along the boundary?—No, I do not think they were of much use.

2163. Then would you suppose that the commando system was the more effective system?—The commando system is not of much use; you must raise the condition of the people, get the Kafirs to think differently, and get the chiefs to be the efficient persons to restrain depredations; you will never effect much by commandos or patrols.

2164. Would you look to the defence of the frontier totally to the moral elevation of the Kafirs, and not to force?—I would; that ought to be the main effort, the moral elevation of the people; but you cannot change them all at once; in the meantime you must be prepared to resort to force, if necessary.

2165. Therefore, for the moment, we must look to the ordinary human means of force?—Yes; but you will not want so much of that if you raise the moral character of the Kafirs.

2166. From your knowledge of the Kafirs, is there any reasonable chance of raising their moral character, so that cattle stealing, instead of being an honourable employment, should

should be a dishonourable employment?—It will take a long time to do it.

2167. In the meantime, would you not say it is quite necessary to keep up some frontier system that would enforce the protection of our colonists?—No doubt of it.

2168. Mr. *Hindley*.] You said Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in 1819, permitted the colonists to occupy some portions of the neutral territory?—I said Sir Rufane Donkin; he established a military village, called the Beka, in 1820.

2169. How far did the occupation of that part of the territory by the colonists extend?—It was merely on the banks of the Beka River; it did not extend any great distance, perhaps four or five miles on each side.

2170. Then when might the colonists have been considered to have occupied the neutral territory?—Generally after Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war, I think; but I ought to mention that the colonists were always occupying parts of that country, but never before 1825 with the consent or concurrence of the Government. Such occupations were frequent sources of war between the Kafirs and the colonists; the colonists were always desirous to obtain additional territory. The pasture on some of the places in the colony not being very good, or not so good as was wished, they were always applying to the Government to allow them to take additional places beyond the colony.

2171. Then afterwards seeking the protection of the Government?—Yes, having deprived the natives of portions of their land. I hold in my hand an extract from a memorial that was addressed to the first English Governor immediately after we took possession of the colony in 1795; it embraced a number of points, and was signed by 30 farmers. One paragraph ran to this effect: "And we beg further leave most humbly to request your Excellency will be pleased to allow us to occupy another tract of land, situated on the other side of the Great Fish River, unto the Konap (or if it would be unto the Kat River), in order that not only those who dwell too near each other may thereby be enabled to enlarge their business of breeding cattle, but also those who have not yet got any place, and who are still obliged to dwell with others, may likewise thereby be enabled to obtain one, and thus to forward their business." Their object was to get the Governor to consent to this.

2172. Mr. *Hawes*.] What was the reply of the Governor?—A refusal.

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2173. You attribute a great deal of the dissatisfaction that was felt to the encroachments of the colonists?—Yes.

2174. Do you mean encroachments or advances into Kafirland beyond the Fish River?—Yes, to a certain extent. At one time the Kafirs occupied the country to the west of the Fish River, especially towards the sea, and maintained that they had purchased it from the Hottentots, who were the original possessors of it, and that they were there encroached on by the colonists.

2175. Is there any doubt upon this point that the Fish River had been for a very long period of time, before the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope by the British Government, the boundary of the colony?—In the Graaff Reynet district it was the boundary, but not in the Utenhague district till after the Kafirs were driven out of the Zuurveldt in 1812.

2176. And it still continued the boundary of the colony?—Yes.

2177. Now, speaking with reference to the encroachments of the colonists, do you know any instance of a settlement by the colonists, irrespective of the consent of the Government being sought for it, beyond the Fish River?—Yes.

2178. Will you state any case of that sort?—The moment there occurred a drought in the colony, or anything like a scarcity of grass, the boers immediately used to move over to Kafirland and take certain places, and establish themselves there. There was a man I can speak particularly to, of the name of Prinslo.

2179. I asked with reference to there being anything like a regular settlement by the colonists beyond the established colonial boundary?—Yes, there were temporary settlements; the colonists migrated occasionally, and took possession of the country.

2180. I asked whether, in point of fact, you could state any particular place or tract of country that was occupied by the colonists beyond the old boundary?—Yes, between the Fish River and the Konap River.

2181. Then I understand you to say there were settlements formed in that part of the country which was beyond the boundary?—Yes, many of the persons who signed the memorial already referred to were at the time living beyond the boundary.

2182. Was that ever brought under the notice of the local Government?—I dare say it was; it was constantly being brought under the notice of the Dutch Government, but it had not the means of restraining them.

2183. I am

2183. I am speaking of the British Government, and I wish to know whether those encroachments upon the Kafirs, beyond the colonial boundary, had ever been brought under the notice of the local Government?—I think they were, from time to time.

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2184. Do you happen to know the course the Government took?—The Government desired that the settlers should be ordered back, and they generally came back, but they soon returned again; the distance was so great that the magistrate knew little of what went on.

2185. Did not those disputes originate the arrangement made by Lord Charles Somerset in 1849?—No, I do not think that they had much to do with it; the constant depredations which were going on, and the opinion in the colony that the Fish River Bush, being so extensive, afforded great facilities to thieves, led him to think it desirable that this bush should not be occupied by either party.

2186. Was not all his policy directed to this, to establish not only more clearly the old boundary, but to keep a certain tract of country beyond that free from all settlers, with a view to secure peace and quietness on the frontier?—Certainly.

2187. Before that was done, there were communications between the Governor and the Kafir chiefs?—Yes.

2188. From that time to the present have there been encroachments on the part of the colonists beyond the boundary?—Frequent encroachments since that time.

2189. To what extent, and will you state the dates when?—I am hardly prepared to say, but I think a number of farmers located themselves in the country between the Fish and Konap Rivers between 1822 and 1825.

2190. Has the boundary of the colony ever been acknowledged to an extent so as to comprehend those encroachments?—Yes, after they were made.

2191. Can you give the Committee any notion of the extent to which that has been carried?—Perhaps 40 or 50 farmers occupied 40 or 50 farms; some badly disposed farmers, who used to take temporary possession of farms, in that manner used to excite the natives to plunder from the colonists, in order that there might appear some reasons for dispossessing the Kafirs, so that the colonists might get permanent possession.

2192. You are speaking of your own knowledge?—No; but I have been told so by farmers, good and just men, of which there are many; they mentioned to me, amongst others, a man of the name of Buis, who was well known as a person

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who used to excite the Kafirs to commit depredations upon the colonists merely to bring on a war, that he might have a pretence for seizing cattle.

2193. About what date was this?—That date was previous to the one mentioned, about 1793 or 1794.

2194. I am speaking of the encroachments to which I thought you referred subsequently to the boundary being fixed by Lord Charles Somerset?—I mentioned that there had been encroachments between the Fish River and the Konap. But I do not ascribe so much of the hostility that exists between the Kafirs and the colonists to those late acts, as to the general system that has long prevailed. The moment a Kafir sees a white man come and take his position near his tribe, he fancies he is following up the old system.

2195. Did you approve of the treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs and signed by Sir Andries Stockenstrom?—I cannot say that I ever saw the treaties.

2196. Colonel *Dume.*] Were you in the country at the time they were signed?—I believe I was; but I was about coming home.

2197. Were you on the frontier?—No; I was in Cape Town.

2198. Mr. *Hawes.*] You are aware that treaties were entered into at that time, and the whole boundary of the colony was restored?—Yes.

2199. Was that policy successful, and was peace better secured by that arrangement than by any former arrangement?—I am not prepared to say as to that, because I left shortly afterwards. I have been told there was a modification of those treaties followed very soon after, and to that modification was ascribed the outbreak of the Kafirs; but I was not in the country.

2200. From the knowledge you have of the colony, have you any reason to say that the frontier became peaceful and quiet after the signing of those treaties?—I was in the colony only a short time after those treaties were signed; six or eight months; and I had no communication with the Kafirs. Still I heard they were very much satisfied, and considered that an act of justice had been done.

2201. That was just at the conclusion of the war?—It might have been about the end of the year 1836.

2202. When did Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war terminate?—In 1835.

2203. That was shortly after the termination of the war?—Yes.

2204. When they were likely to feel the consequences of the war in which they had embarked?—Yes; but they were very much dissatisfied before the treaties were signed. I saw some of the Kafirs after the war was ended (the D'Urban war), and they were exceedingly dissatisfied touching the province of Adelaide and the war. They said they never of their own accord asked for peace, and they complained of their having been brought into subjection, not in a fair way. They considered advantages were held out to them by persons who were sent to them to advise them to sue for peace, and that, when peace was established, they did not get those advantages and privileges they were led to expect.

2205. Are you at all aware of the means that were taken to inform the Kafirs of the meaning of the treaties they entered into?—No.

2206. Do you place any great reliance upon treaties with Kafir chiefs?—No; unless there be a commissioner or resident to aid and assist them to carry them out, and that they are so detailed that the Kafirs cannot misunderstand them.

2207. Even with that precaution, do you think, without sufficient force to maintain them, it would be safe to rely upon such arrangements?—I think so; I would rather rely upon them than simply upon physical force; I would prefer moral to physical force. The Kafirs are an independent and daring people, but I rarely found them difficult to manage when I endeavoured to persuade them by just arguments. They are very quick, and soon see when they have the advantage of you; still I seldom found them unreasonable.

2208. You think that civil commissioners or residents, without the aid of force to support them, would be sufficient to maintain peace between the colony and the Kafirs?—I think more likely than by means of troops.

2209. Mr. Hindley.] Were you on the frontier when the treaty was made by Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—No, I was in the interior at the time.

2210. When the treaty was afterwards established, and the English Government threw up the country to the east of the Great Fish River, was it satisfactory to the colonists?—I think not, as far as I recollect.

2211. Because that put an end to the system of which you have spoken of, people going and occupying portions of the country, and then claiming the protection of the Government?—Yes.

2212. To that they decidedly objected?—Yes; some at least did, but I cannot say that the dissatisfaction arose on

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that account ; I think the reversal of the general policy of Sir B. D'Urban, which the colonists generally considered the proper one, tended greatly to create it. When I spoke of the colonists as having been always anxious to obtain extension of land, I alluded to the old Dutch colonists, who, being merely graziers, considered each man required 6,000 or 8,000 acres to enable him to keep the quantity of cattle necessary to ensure his respectability ; men of that way of thinking immediately made application to Government, when their sons reached the age of manhood, for additional farms ; and if refused, they or their sons sought for them beyond the colonial boundaries. From the time the colony was established, in 1652, up till at least 1837, that practice was more or less observed.

2213. Then supposing the Government were to communicate to the Kafir chiefs, that any colonist settling to the eastward of the boundary must not be considered entitled to the protection of the British Government, and that whatever the Kafirs did to him would not be noticed by the Government, do you think that that would be effective?—The Kafirs would not believe him ; they would want proof of it. It would require 10 or 12 years to satisfy them that Government meant that.

2214. You said the chiefs respected each other?—Yes.

2215. And you think they do not respect the English Government?—I think they have not much respect for the Government ; they believe, whether from misapprehension or otherwise, that the agreements they have made with it have not been kept. I think the belief generally arose out of a misapprehension, because no Government could have dealt more nobly and generously than the colonial Government usually dealt with the Kafirs : the lenity of the Government brought much bloodshed and ruin on the Kafirs. The successive governors always endeavoured to prevent the Kafirs being much interfered with, and always urged on the frontier authorities to keep in mind how far the Kafirs were in arrear as regarded civilization and moral feelings, and therefore that they should be treated leniently. Those kindly feelings were not rightly appreciated by the Kafirs ; they imagined we were lenient to them because we feared them, and were unable to subdue them.

2216. You said the Kafirs had an opinion that we were constantly stealing their land, and that there was foundation for that feeling?—Yes.

2217. At the same time, we have not impressed upon the Kafir

Kafir a sense of our power to enable us to maintain our conquests?—No.

2218. *Mr. B. Carter.*] The Kafirs, believing the Government treated them with lenity, thought those encroachments were in defiance of the Government?—No, I do not think they thought that the Government treated them with lenity from a kindly feeling; they thought the very kind treatment they had was in consequence of fear; they ascribed it to fear.

2219. *Chairman.*] You believe that the Kafirs entertain an opinion of harsh conduct on the part of the British Government towards them, though you maintain that was not justified by the reality?—Certainly.

2220. *Mr. Hindley.*] Were you acquainted with the character of their missions, and their general effect upon the characters and relations of the Government?—I have seen a good number of the missionary stations.

2221. Do you believe that the missionary establishments have had a tendency to promote a good understanding with the Kafirs?—Generally speaking, the chiefs do not like the missionary stations, because from the preaching of the missionaries the Kafirs get a certain degree of light, which makes them not so completely subservient to their chiefs, and it has happened frequently that as soon as a chief has found out that, he has required the missionary to leave. The people liked the missionaries, because they found protection from them.

2222. *Marquis of Granby.*] With respect to the treaty you spoke of, establishing a neutral territory between the Great Fish River and the Keiskamma, in what year was that treaty made?—In 1819.

2223. Was that the treaty of Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—No, of Lord Charles Somerset.

2224. Was that the treaty which they violated immediately after it was made?—The Government built a fort, called Fort Wiltshire, on the very eastern part of the neutral territory; that was a violation of the treaty.

2225. Then, in fact, there has never been a neutral territory kept inviolate by the colonists on the one hand, and the Kafirs on the other?—The Government never sanctioned the colonists living on that ground; they put troops there, but never sanctioned colonists taking up ground on the neutral territory. Frequently, when there happened to be a drought in Kafirland, and the grass, partly by the cattle and partly by drought, had almost entirely disappeared, the Kafirs used to apply to the frontier authorities for permission to come over into the neutral territory to feed their cattle there, as there was plenty of grass.

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They frequently were allowed to come over, and perhaps remain three or four months, until the grass had grown in their own country.

2226. Is not it your opinion that the best method of preventing those incursions and disputes would be to establish a *bona fide* neutral territory, which neither colonists nor Kafirs should be permitted to enter?—I do not think that would effect much good; they would cross that neutral territory; a Kafir in the night will go 60 miles.

2227. You do not think it will do any good, because it is impossible to establish a really neutral territory?—Even if it were established they would steal nevertheless; they would cross that territory, and go to the farmers to the westward of it; I do not think it would do much good.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Smith, called in; and Examined.

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2228. *Chairman.*] WHEN were you in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—I left it in January 1847.

2229. How long had you been there?—I arrived at the Cape in May 1840, and early in 1841 was sent towards Natal, and remained there till 1845; I went as far as half-way between the eastern frontier of the Cape colony and Natal in 1841, and remained there till 1842.

2230. What do you mean by half-way?—Near the Umzimvoobo River. I had perhaps better explain the circumstances under which I went.

2231. Do, if you please?—Shortly after my arrival in the Cape colony the Dutch boers at Natal attacked one of the native chiefs at that place, and carried off a considerable portion of the cattle of his tribe; this determined the then Governor, Sir George Napier, to send a force in the direction of Natal for the protection of the native tribes; this force he placed under my command.

2232. What was the amount of force you commanded?—About 200 men; of Europeans not more than 150.

2233. Did you go by land?—Yes, by land.

2234. Had your experience in the colony been chiefly with Natal, on the Kafir frontier?—I had some experience on the Kafir frontier afterwards, having held a situation there when the last Kafir war broke out; I was appointed frontier commissioner. That was long subsequent to the period I have mentioned. On the appointment of a Lieutenant-governor to Natal I went to the Cape of Good Hope; that was in the latter part of 1845.

2235. Were

2235. Were you present on the Kafir frontier at the time the war in 1846 broke out?—I was.

2236. Had you any means of forming any opinion of what the causes of that war were?—It immediately originated in the seizure of a prisoner by the Kafirs when under escort; he was being sent under escort to Graham's Town.

2237. Speaking generally, do you believe the breaking out of that war to have been caused by the conduct of the Kafirs, or our own people?—By the conduct of the Kafirs.

2238. When you were at Natal you had, doubtless, an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the number and nature of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of that colony?—I had.

2239. The largest portion are the Zoolus?—The Zoolus.

2240. Do you consider them a formidable enemy in case of war?—Not so formidable as the Kafirs; at least, I speak of the period when I was there; they had not then attained the use of the musket, which is so common among the Kafirs bordering upon the Cape colony.

2241. But do you not think it likely they will soon obtain a supply of fire-arms, and become acquainted with their use?—Undoubtedly they will, through the various traders that will sell them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary.

2242. In that event, you think them likely to become a formidable enemy in the time of war?—They are peculiarly situated at Natal. A vast body of natives are located in the colony. I think the number was calculated, when I was there, as being close upon 100,000.

2243. Do you think the attachment of the natives within the limits of the colony to the British connexion can be calculated upon in the event of a struggle between the colony and the Zoolu tribes without the limits of the colony?—I think those that are within the colony would resist the Zoolus, because nearly the whole of them have fled from the tyranny of the Zoolu king.

2244. It has been represented to the Committee that there is a considerable degree of military organization among the Zoolus; is that the case, in your opinion?—There is; but I did not conceive it to be dangerous during the time I was there, as opposed to Europeans.

2245. Are they formed in regiments, something like European regiments?—I never perceived it. It was stated to be so in Chaka's time, but it was not kept up, I believe, by his successors.

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2246. You do not think there is any essential distinction between them and other savage tribes?—No.

2247. Are they superior, or physically inferior, to the Kafirs?—I should say they are inferior.

2248. Rather smaller men?—Rather smaller men.

2249. Within the limits of the colony, they do the hard work of the colony?—They do a great deal in that way, but it is difficult to get them to engage as permanent labourers; they will hire themselves as servants, and remain a certain time, but not long. The Kafir must leave his employment and go and “sit,” to use his own expression, because among themselves the women do all the work; the men do nothing.

2250. Can you state to the Committee what, in your opinion, you think would be the best policy for that colony to pursue towards the independent Zoolus in the neighbourhood of the colony of Natal—the independent tribes?—I think it requires, on the part of the Government, a great degree of firmness, with regard to the Zoolus, in the event of their committing thefts of cattle, so that they should be compelled to restore them.

2251. Is the influence of the chiefs great among the independent Zoolus?—I think the influence of the Zoolu king is greater than that of any other chief among the native tribes in South Africa.

2252. Do you know if he has it in his power to restrain his people from committing those depredations?—I think so, to a certain extent.

2253. What are their own habits; are they owners of cattle to a great extent?—Yes, to a large extent.

2254. Do they engage in agriculture much?—Very little; they are essentially a pastoral people.

2255. Are they hunting tribes?—Yes; they make large hunting parties, going out 500 or 600 men at a time, or even more than that; but these hunting parties only occur occasionally; they do not make it their business.

2256. Is cattle stealing an honourable employment among their young men?—It is among all the tribes; and will be so until you can alter their habits. No Kafir can obtain a wife unless he purchases her by so many head of cattle; and as polygamy is allowed, they may have as many wives as they can purchase; this makes it so difficult to repress their thefts from the colonists.

2257. Mr. Hawes.] Is theft common among themselves?—Yes; one tribe plundering cattle from another, but not among the people belonging to the same tribe.

2258. Chairman.]

2258. *Chairman.*] That would be reckoned dishonourable? —That would be reckoned dishonourable.

2259. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Do you know the extent of the colony of Natal Proper?—The boundaries have been fixed since I left Natal.

2260. Do you know what number of miles it is?—I believe somewhat between 13,000 and 14,000 square miles.

2261. *Chairman.*] Is it a country formed for agriculture, as distinguished from pasturage?—It is admirably formed for both.

2262. Speaking generally, do you think it is possible to anticipate a large population there of European origin engaged in the pursuits of agriculture?—I think so.

2263. There is nothing in the soil or climate to prevent that being the case?—I consider the surface particularly available; in some parts of the Cape colony seven-tenths are calculated as desert, but at Natal you have nothing of that sort.

2264. It is almost all good soil?—Yes.

2265. It is much troubled with drought?—It is so occasionally, but it has the advantage of being well watered by streams and rivers.

2266. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Under what tenure is the land generally held; is it held from the Government by the people?—When the Boers originally went there they formed a government of their own, and granted land to the different persons forming the community.

2267. Now as to the Zoolu tribes that are within the colony; how do they hold their land, and from whom?—An arrangement has been made since I left; but I believe certain locations have been set apart for them.

2268. How do they pay their rent; is it in kind or money?—They paid none until lately; they now pay, I understand, a sort of head-tax.

2269. What are the means taken to levy the rent?—It is collected by the gentleman placed over the Kafirs in that colony as a superintendent.

2270. Is it levied by the troops?—Not by the troops, I believe.

2271. You speak with certainty upon that subject?—No; this has all taken place subsequent to my being there.

2272. *Chairman.*] Comparing the colony of Natal with British Kafrraria, in point of soil and climate, which do you think is the most attractive to the settler?—I should say Natal.

2273. *Mr.*

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2273. Mr. *Hindley*.] By whom were the boundaries of this colony fixed?—By the Government.

2274. Were any arrangements made with the native tribes?—There was a boundary fixed.

2275. Who were the parties to the arrangement for determining the boundary?—A commission appointed by the Lieutenant-governor of Natal. The Zoolu king was communicated with on the subject, and the river Tugela was chosen on the part of the Zoolus as their boundary.

2276. So that you think no future disputes can arise respecting the boundary?—I do not think a dispute can arise in that respect. The chief disputes that are likely to arise between the natives without the colony and the Government will arise from their people leaving them, and taking refuge in the colony; this I found a source of exceeding trouble when I commanded there.

2277. Mr. *B. Carter*.] What is the character of the coast between Umzimvoobo and Natal?—It is a pastoral country chiefly.

2278. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Is it thickly inhabited?—Not thickly, except certain portions near the Umzimvoobo, occupied by Faku, the king of the Amapondas, and a large number of his people; but this may be accounted for by the natives occasionally migrating in search of better pasture ground.

2279. Mr. *Booker*.] You say this tribe are becoming more and more formidable, by reason of being better armed and disciplined?—Yes.

2280. Have they facilities for obtaining arms and ammunition?—Yes, very great; they are imported into the colony by merchants, and the traders contrive to smuggle them along the frontier.

2281. Would there be any great difficulty in preventing that trade?—Possibly not; but more stringent regulations should be adopted.

2282. Do you think it would be expedient to check it?—I think very expedient.

2283. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] The only object of allowing powder is to enable the colonists to defend themselves?—It is, of course, for that purpose.

2284. Could not the power of purchasing arms and powder be only obtained under some sort of regulations, so that no more powder and arms should be imported into the colony than was obtained by settlers?—It might be limited in that way.

2285. Mr.

2285. Mr. *Hawes*.] Do you think you could prevent the smuggling in of arms and gunpowder?—Not entirely.

2286. *Chairman*.] Would not the Zoolus be supplied by the Portuguese Government from Delagoa Bay?—No; it is too far to the north.

2287. Mr. *Hawes*.] Have you not heard that there are considerable importations of arms and gunpowder into Delagoa Bay by the Portuguese?—There was not the slightest communication between the two settlements when I was at Port Natal.

2288. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Would it be possible to prevent arms and ammunition being smuggled in?—To a certain extent; not entirely.

2289. How would you set about such a restriction?—There might be a registry of arms; the merchants, for example, could tell the exact number of arms they imported into the colony; and keep a record of the persons to whom they were sold, for the information of the Government.

2290. Taking into consideration the extent of coast you would have to guard, how would it be possible to prevent smuggling of arms there?—The coast is very extensive, but there are not many places of communication.

2291. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] There is a difficulty of access?—Yes.

2292. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You would be obliged to have a depôt at the various rivers and creeks along the whole of that coast?—Yes; at such of them as are accessible.

2293. Should not you think that would be very expensive?—It would be expensive, of course.

2294. And it would be almost impossible to prevent the smuggling?—And almost impossible.

2295. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] You say it would be impossible to guard that coast?—I think it would.

2296. From Algoa Bay to Port Natal there is scarcely any creek or place where it is easy for a vessel to have communication constantly with the shore; are you acquainted with that particular locality so as to answer the question?—There are places where vessels could have communication, but not very many.

2297. But with considerable difficulty?—But with considerable difficulty.

2298. That being the case, would there be likely to be much smuggling going on; would a vessel go and smuggle powder and arms without having any previous communication with the shore, and knowing to whom they were to sell?—I do not think the arms that find their way into the colony are

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are smuggled that way; they are imported by the merchants to a large extent.

2299. I mean to say, that supposing by any prohibitory Act the landing of powder and arms was entirely prohibited, so as to make it smuggling to land them, would there be any facility for that between Delagoa Bay and Port Natal; that is the question?—There would be facilities for landing at certain places, but I do not think the smuggling would be practised to any great extent.

2300. Then if some prohibitory Act was passed, and only those who had licences were allowed to have powder and arms, the Kafirs and Zoolus might be prevented from obtaining them so easily as they do at present?—I think they might, but the facility for obtaining them in the Kafir country would be much greater than at Natal.

2301. Mr. *Hawes.*] Would not this prohibitory law simply interfere with the colonists importing arms?—Of course.

2302. The colonists exclusively?—I think so; but it would check the supply to the Kafirs, as it is through arms being imported by the merchants that the natives obtain them.

2303. It would not interfere with the Zoolus obtaining supplies of arms and ammunition from the Portuguese settlers at Delagoa Bay?—There is not the slightest probability, in my opinion, of their obtaining them from Delagoa Bay.

2304. Colonel *Thompson.*] Would there be anything to hinder the Americans from trading with them in arms and gunpowder?—The Americans do send traders to Natal, but during the period I was there, they came but once every year, and nothing of that kind was ever brought.

2305. Mr. *Hawes.*] When you were in the colony you estimated the number of natives at about 100,000?—Approaching nearly to that; that is, in round numbers.

2306. The numbers had been considerably increased in consequence of war on the northern frontier between the tribes, had not it?—Which war do you mean; the last?

2307. I mean the war of the Zoolu tribes themselves?—Very largely increased.

2308. What steps did the local Government take to manage this increase of native population?—They were placed in ten separate locations, in different portions of the colony, under the control of magistrates; but the very great difficulty was in preventing the influx of these people into the colony. I believe that to be an insurmountable difficulty.

2309. Did

2309. Did you find the magistrates acquire any influence over them?—Very considerable.

2310. Did you know one of the name of Shepston?—No, for his appointment was subsequent to my departure from Natal; but I am aware that he obtained great influence, and that they had great confidence in him.

2311. Were they allowed to follow their own laws and customs?—Yes, with some few exceptions.

2312. What was the duty of the magistrate?—A general superintendence over their laws. They were not permitted to practise witchcraft, or anything where the loss of life would have occurred.

2313. When you left were they generally contented?—They were generally very contented when I left.

2314. And from those natives the chief supply of labour was obtained for the settlers?—Yes, it was.

2315. Did they cultivate the land at all themselves?—Very considerably during the time I was at Natal.

2316. Did they cultivate it on their own account?—They did cultivate it on their own account.

2317. Then they entered into trade in fact?—There was an increasing want of articles of European manufacture among them, for instance blankets instead of their carosses or skin coverings.

2318. Did they readily submit to the decisions of the civil magistrate?—Yes.

2319. Did they ever resort to the courts of justice?—There was hardly any government established when I was there, but they often brought their complaints to me for decision.

2320. What was the amount of force you had to control this body of natives?—About 600 men; but at the time I originally went to Natal the force was much smaller.

2321. *Chairman.*] Is there any considerable difference between the Zoolus and Kafirs with respect to their disposition to adopt the habits of civilized persons?—I prefer the character of the Zoolu to that of the Kafir.

2322. In what respect?—I do not think they are quite so dishonest. I will mention an instance. Previous to my arriving at Natal I took up my position near the Umzimvooboo River; I was there fourteen months; and during that time the Amapondas were perpetually in the camp, and had the most unrestrained intercourse with every person in it, and not a single theft was committed during the whole time. The few cattle we had with the troops were sometimes missing for

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two or three days, but they were always found again; they had merely strayed; they were not stolen.

2323. Sir J. Walmsley.] There were 600 troops at Natal, you say, when you were there?—Yes.

2324. Was there at that period any native levies?—No native levies.

2325. Are you aware there have been any since?—I think not.

2326. You are not able to say what sort of troops the natives make under British instruction?—No. I should rather consider it a hazardous experiment making troops of them.

2327. Mr. Hawes.] Were the boers at that time settled in any great numbers in Natal?—There were a considerable number of the boers when I went, but the long delay of the Government in arranging about the settlement of their lands, led them to go beyond the boundary of the colony.

2328. Did they acquire any influence?—They were very much disliked by the natives.

2329. The natives preferred the British authority and settlers to the Dutch farmers?—Infinitely more so.

2330. Do the natives, in case of disputes among themselves, voluntarily bring those disputes before the civil magistrates for settlement?—In many cases; and there has been, subsequently, no unwillingness on the part of the natives to resort to the British courts to arbitrate their disputes.

2331. Chairman.] Are there any chiefs among the Zoolus, within the limits of the British colony, that retain any authority over their people?—The petty chiefs have some influence over them.

2332. Has it been the policy of the British Government to maintain the authority of those chiefs at all?—It has. During the time I was there I endeavoured to maintain their authority. I think it would be advantageous to do so. I do not know what course has been pursued subsequently.

2333. You have stated what was the immediate cause of the war of 1846 at the Cape; what do you believe to have been the real reasons that induced the natives to have resort to hostilities at that time?—I imagine they saw that there was a determination on the part of the Government to put a stop to their perpetual thefts against the colony.

2334. Do you think the gradual diminution of the authority of their chiefs had anything to do with the war, by producing a hostile feeling in their minds towards the British Government, to whom they might have attributed that diminution?—I think not; at that period there had been no very great

great steps taken to reduce the authority of their chiefs; it has been subsequently to that year, I believe, that arrangements have been made to that effect.

2335. You are aware generally of what has since occurred at the Cape, and the circumstances under which the colony now is with a war raging between the Kafirs and the British Government?—Yes.

2336. Have you formed any opinion, suppose the war to be terminated, and the opposition on the part of those savage tribes to the British Government to be put down, what ought to be the policy to be pursued with regard to the frontier in future?—I think the policy that ought to be pursued by the Government should be one of great decision and firmness in putting down and restraining their thefts from the colonists; our policy hitherto, without being so intended, has been a one-sided policy; we entered into treaties with the natives, which we compelled our own subjects to observe, but it was out of our power to compel the Kafirs to observe them in the same degree.

2337. What, in your opinion, would be the best means of enforcing in future the observance of engagements on the part of the Kafirs, and especially of preventing this system of plundering, which leads to collisions?—I should be much disposed to make the chiefs responsible for the cattle stolen.

2338. Do you think their authority over their people is such that they can be justly held responsible?—No thefts of cattle, I think, take place by the members of any tribe without the chief becoming aware of it.

2339. There is always a part of the Kafir population, especially the more active part, the young men, who are very much inclined to embark in those marauding expeditions; do you think if they were checked it would be very difficult for the chief long to maintain his authority?—I do not know in that case; but they have a very expressive phrase for doing justice on their own people, which is what they call "eating them up;" in fact the chief seizes the cattle of any of his refractory people.

2340. Do you think those active young men, who are disposed to take the cattle of other people, would acquiesce in such a process being applied to them?—I think they would be compelled to acquiesce by the chiefs; they would have sufficient power for that.

2341. What may be called public feeling among the Kafirs is very much in favour of this cattle stealing?—It is unquestionably a matter of distinction.

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2342. The young men engage in it in order to get wives? —They do so; until the whole habit of the Kafir is altered, I do not think you could ever put it down; you may restrain it.

2343. With really the best intentions, would not it be very difficult for the head chief of a Kafir tribe to effectually restrain it so long as this disposition remains unaltered among his people?—Only to a certain extent can it be restrained.

2344. What practical means would you take to restrain it, so far as you think it could be done?—I should be inclined to hold the chiefs responsible for the thefts committed by their tribes; I do not mean to say that would put a stop to it entirely.

2345. How would you enforce it against the chiefs themselves?—By seizing their own cattle.

2346. Suppose the case of cattle being stolen in the colony, how would you proceed?—If the cattle were traced into the territory of any particular chief I should make him responsible, because I feel perfectly certain that no cattle can be stolen by men of a particular tribe, and brought in, without the chief being aware of it, or having the means of acquiring that knowledge.

2347. You would not pursue the cattle beyond the frontier; you would stop there, and then you would go to war with the chief if he did not give back the cattle?—I should follow the cattle up into the territory.

2348. You would send the patrol into the territory?—Yes, patrols for the purpose of following up stolen cattle.

2349. That would be hardly making the chief responsible. You would follow the cattle to the actual robber?—Into his tribe I should; and so far assist the chief in finding the cattle stolen.

2350. Mr. Hawes.] Do I understand you, you would send a patrol into the country, and that the patrol should have power to seize any cattle he found?—I should send the patrol to the kraal of the chief himself; I should make the patrol, if they could, seize the cattle actually stolen. If the cattle were traced to the kraal of the chief I should follow it up to the kraal of the chief himself.

2351. How would you proceed, then, to make the chief responsible, the cattle not being found?—I should make him give an equivalent.

2352. Do not you think other chiefs might be likely to join him

him in resisting the attack?—It is possible they might do so; but my own belief is, that the great cause of cattle stealing has arisen from the want of sufficient firmness in not insisting on immediate reparation being made.

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2353. You were frontier commissioner?—A very brief time.

2354. When was that?—In 1846.

2355. Were you frontier commissioner when the boundary was extended to the Keiskamma?—No, I was not; I left it before that war had been completed.

2356. Looking to the old boundary of the Fish River, and the boundary subsequently of the Keiskamma, which do you think the best for the preservation of peace on the frontier?—The Keiskamma; the great difficulty of the Fish River is, there is a dense bush that the Europeans cannot penetrate through.

2357. *Chairman.*] Comparing the Keiskamma with the great Kei, as a boundary, which would be the best?—I should say the Keiskamma; the other is too extended a boundary.

2358. *Mr. Hawes.*] Do you think it would tend to the peace of the frontier to have military posts on the boundary of the Keiskamma, or not?—It is likely to do so, I think. The great object in choosing posts is to choose them in a grass country, clear of the bush, so that any movement of the Kafirs may be discovered, and more easily detected.

2359. As frontier commissioner, have you at all considered the case arising out of the treaty of 1836 in reference to the frontier?—In regard to the treaties, I considered they were one-sided treaties, so far as this: you compelled your own subjects to observe them, and you could not compel the Kafirs to observe them.

2360. You are not generally for entering into treaties with Kafir chiefs?—No. I think the great mistake has been dealing with the savage as if he perfectly understood the usages of civilized society.

2361. Could you rely simply, do you think, upon the appointment of civil commissioners to advise the different chiefs to endeavour to maintain something like order without any military force to support them?—I do not think you could do without a military force. The Kafirs are the most sagacious savages I ever came into contact with. They immediately perceive your weakness if you have not sufficient power to enforce any regulations you make connected with them.

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2362. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You think they would be disposed to take advantage of that weakness?—I do think so:

2363. Colonel *Dunne*.] The Forts Peddie, Wiltshire, and Cox are in advance of the frontier of the Keiskamma?—They are.

2364. Would it be possible to preserve that frontier without the occupation of those forts?—Fort Peddie is a very essential one. Fort Wiltshire was not occupied when I was there; it had been abandoned.

2365. But they must keep certain posts. Fort Wiltshire and Fort Cox are in advance of the Keiskamma?—Fort Cox is on a height just above the Keiskamma.

2366. Is<sup>a</sup> Fort Cox supplied with water?—Only from the river.

2367. Is not that an inconvenience to those forts?—Unquestionably.

2368. Is there any local reason why that should not be remedied?—Tanks might be erected there. The difficulty of getting water at Fort Cox would not be very great: the river flows not far from it; but there is another of the forts, Fort White, where the supply is bad.

2369. They would be untenable by a British force without a supply of water?—Fort Cox would not be so; you might command an access to water there.

2370. Do you know the Amatola Mountains?—Yes.

2371. Would you approve, as a military measure, of clearing those mountains, in order to preserve the frontier?—I do not think it is practicable; it has been several times attempted; but if you drive the Kafirs out they immediately return.

2372. If it could be done it would be a great benefit?—Yes.

2373. Would it be possible to occupy posts that would give you the total military command there?—I think it would be a matter of great difficulty. Fort Cox has been considered by some as the key to the Amatola.

2374. What force should each of those forts be garrisoned with?—Forts of that description require not only a sufficient number of men for their own protection, but enough for patrols or escort duties, or for communicating with other forts.

2375. There is no necessity for any strong fortification; a stockade would be quite sufficient?—Yes.

2376. What is the extent of the range of the Amatola Mountains

Mountains across the frontier at right angles ; what is the length from the frontier to the termination on the eastern side? —I could not at this moment answer the question.

2377. Could you give any guess ; a hundred miles, or anything of that sort?—It is considerably less in extent, neither have they any great elevation.

2378. What would you think would be the total number of troops which would be requisite for the defence of the frontier? —It is a matter of extreme difficulty to pass an opinion upon that. I am not aware besides what number of posts are likely to be taken up.

2379. *Mr. B. Carter.*] What is generally understood by the term patrol system ; is it limited to the ordinary military term patrolling?—Not entirely so ; you send out patrols at the Cape, for instance, to recapture stolen cattle and on various duties ; and you patrol through the country for the purpose of seeing that there is no enemy in it.

2380. What do you believe to be generally understood by the patrol system, as applied to the frontier arrangements of the Cape?—Patrols sent out from post to post, to see the country is kept clear of the natives, and as a general matter of security. Patrols were sometimes sent out during the time I was there after cattle ; they are sent out generally for the security of the frontier.

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*T. C. Smith.*

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*Jovis, 3<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Hawes.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Colonel Thompson.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Lord Mandeville.  
Sir Joshua Walmsley.

Mr. Mackinnon.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Marquis of Granby.  
Mr. Monsell.  
Mr. Cardwell.  
Sir Edward Buxton.

BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

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Captain *Henry Charles Cunliffe Owen*, called in; and  
Examined.

2381. *Chairman.*] WHEN were you in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—From January 1845 to March 1848.

2382. In what capacity were you employed?—I was a Lieutenant of the Royal Engineers.

2383. You were there just before the war broke out, and served, I presume, under Sir Peregrine Maitland?—I did, beyond the Orange River.

2384. You were not then on the immediate boundary of the Cape?—I went up to the north-east frontier when the war broke out.

2385. Will you state what took place in that district when you were there?—The exact pretext for the war I do not exactly recollect.

2386. What was the object of the operations you were engaged in at that time?—It was to support the Griquas against an attack that had been made upon them by the Dutch Boers who were settled in their country.

2387. Can you at all state to the Committee the nature of the aggression made by the Boers upon the Griquas?—The exact circumstances of it I do not recollect, but in a general way it arose from our having supported the government of a native chief, under the direction of a missionary, in the government of a tract of country the most powerful part of the population of which was formed of Dutch farmers.

2388. Can

2388. Can you inform the Committee what it was the Dutch farmers did; did they endeavour to deprive them of their lands?—It was beyond the Orange River, in the neighbourhood of Philippolis; I do not recollect the precise circumstances of the aggression.

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2389. How was the dispute settled?—It was settled after the defeat of the Dutch farmers by our troops, by establishing British authority in the country, to which the Dutch farmers were amenable.

2390. Then was that with the consent of the chiefs of the tribes in that district?—Entirely so.

2391. Was it at their request the British force interfered for their protection?—It was; they would have been exterminated if it had not been for the presence of our troops.

2392. Was there any force left there to maintain tranquillity, or was there any civil magistrate appointed upon the troops withdrawing?—There was a civil magistrate appointed, and there was some force left to support him.

2393. Then you returned to Cape Town?—Yes, and subsequently I went up to the frontier on the breaking out of the Kafir war in 1846.

2394. Did you at all gather from either the military men with whom you associated, or from missionaries, or from any source whatever, the causes which led to that war?—I think there is no doubt the Kafirs had been preparing for it for a great number of years, nearly ever since the end of the war under Sir Benjamin D'Urban; they considered that their defeat had been caused by the wants of fire-arms, and they made use of the peace time to accumulate a quantity of arms and ammunition.

2395. The arms and ammunition they obtained was by selling their own raw products, hides, ivory and gums, or whatever produce for which they could obtain in exchange fire-arms and gunpowder?—Yes, exactly, but ivory is not an article of trade with them.

2396. And they obtained their supplies generally through travelling traders?—Generally through the traders.

2397. Can you state to the Committee the force which the Kafirs assemble to attack the colony?—I cannot speak to that, it is very difficult to estimate it.

2398. Reverting then to the causes of the war, did you at all learn what was the operating cause with the Kafirs?—They waited that we should give them a pretext for the war, and that

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that pretext was found in our sending a small party to survey a piece of ground within their territory.

2399. Will you state exactly where that survey was made? —It was in the bend of the Chumie River on which now Fort Hare stands.

2400. Beyond the Fish River or the Keiskamma?—That was beyond Chumie. The Chumie runs into the Keiskamma.

2401. I may assume, therefore, it was beyond the boundary last fixed, namely, the Keiskamma?—Yes, the Chumie and the Keiskamma formed the boundary of what was called the neutral territory.

2402. It formed the eastern boundary?—Yes, it formed the eastern boundary.

2403. Upon this alleged encroachment upon the territory of the Kafirs, did they make any representation, so far as you know, to the Government or to the general in command?—Of that I am not aware.

2404. Mr. *Monsell*.] For what purpose was the survey made?—With the view of obtaining their consent to place a military post on that spot.

2405. Had their consent been asked?—It had not, but it was intended to have done so after the survey had been made, if the ground had been found suitable for a post.

2406. *Chairman*.] The fort was not established, but there was simply a preliminary survey made, with a view to establish a fort there?—That was all; an officer and three sappers pitched their tents on the ground, and commenced their surveying operations.

2407. Can you state why a fort was thought necessary there?—Because the engineer officers on the frontier had found it very difficult to meet with a spot in the neutral territory suitable for a large post, and where there was a proper supply of water.

2408. Had it reference to the checking of depredations on the part of the Kafirs or not?—Not in the choice of that particular spot; it was thought necessary to have a large post in the neutral territory, and after surveying several places and finding that they did not do, it was determined to survey this place.

2409. Were you one of the surveying party?—I was not.

2410. Colonel *Dunne*.] The ground surveyed was on the neutral territory?—The ground which was surveyed was beyond the Chumie, and was not in the neutral territory.

2411. Mr.

2411. *Mr. Mackinnon.*] It was in the Kafir territory?—  
Yes, in the Kafir territory.

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2412. *Chairman.*] Then I understand you to state this, that the survey was only preliminary to the establishment of a fort there; that the fort had simply reference to a good situation for the supply of water for the military that might be stationed there?—Yes.

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2413. And that the value of the position, after the survey, would have become the subject of a report to the general officer before any post was established?—Yes.

2414. *Mr. Monsell.*] I understand you to say, no communication had been made on the subject with the Kafirs?—None that I know of.

2415. *Chairman.*] Then are you aware whether the Kafirs resorted to representations, or demanded explanations, before they resorted to arms?—I am not aware of that; I know that the making of that survey, and the pitching of our tent on that ground, was used by them as a pretext for invading the colony.

2416. And I gather from your evidence that, in your opinion, they had been long preparing for war, and seeking for such a pretext?—Certainly.

2417. Can you state to the Committee the grounds on which you form that opinion?—It is rather difficult to do that, but it was the general opinion of those in the colony best acquainted with the circumstances.

2418. Are you at all acquainted with the papers that have been printed and laid before Parliament on this subject?—I have looked over some of them; not the whole of them.

2419. When you were at Cape Town, did you hear the Government complained of for want of energy in not taking more active steps to avert a war which was expected?—Yes, I did. I think that it was generally the impression among the colonists on the frontier that a war sooner or later must take place; that a Kafir irruption would take place. I think that it was with a view of putting those apprehensions at rest that Sir Peregrine Maitland wished to establish a large and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force might be always ready to move upon the Kafirs in case of invasion.

2420. *Mr. Hindley.*] Is Fort Hare in the neutral territory?—It is not in the neutral territory.

2421. *Chairman.*] Fort Hare, I think, was established after the conclusion of the war; was not it?—It was established during



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during the war. I commenced the erection of Fort Hare myself in 1847.

2422. There was no fort, was there, beyond the boundary of the Keiskamma before the commencement of the war?—None.

2423. The forts that had been established there, then, simply had reference to the military defence of that boundary? Yes, the forts erected there had that object.

2424. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the boundary of the colony, that is, the Keiskamma, to state whether you think it a good boundary, and more easily defended than the old boundary of the Fish River, or not?—I do not think there is much to choose between them. The boundary must be always very undefined; it is very difficult to fix it. All the rivers are fordable at a great many points; I suppose at every half mile or mile of their length they are fordable.

2425. You are of opinion, then, that there is no good boundary as a mere defensive boundary in itself?—None whatever.

2426. In point of fact, the defence of the frontier of the colony must rather turn upon military considerations than upon any natural boundary?—I should say so.

2427. Have you yourself ever been in contact with the Kafirs?—On a few very unimportant occasions.

2428. Can you state to the Committee whether you consider them good soldiers?—I think, as long as they adhere to their own particular mode of fighting, they are very difficult to deal with.

2429. Will you describe what that mode is, to the Committee, minutely?—They do not show themselves, but keep in the bush and take advantage of our men being in the open to fire at them; when we return the fire we do so with scarcely any effect, having nothing but the bush to fire at.

2430. Is it not therefore important, that wherever there are military posts they should command the open country?—It is very desirable that they should have a large tract of open country in their neighbourhood, not for the reason stated in the question, but for the security of the cattle, which must necessarily be pastured near the posts.

2431. Is it possible to find such open country between the Keiskamma and the Old Fish River; is not that a country very much covered with jungle and rock?—There is no extent of open country, except towards the coast, where Port  
Peddie

Peddie stands. There is there a considerable quantity of open country.

2432. Would not it follow, therefore, that the Keiskamma would be a better boundary, supposing it to be defended by military posts to the eastward of it, where the country is more open?—Then you must go across the Buffalo to the country between the Buffalo and the Kei; that is the only really very open country that I know of.

2433. Is not King William's Town a post that fulfils that condition of being in an open country and upon the Buffalo?—Yes.

2434. And having the advantage of a direct communication with the sea?—It has a very good natural road to the sea.

2435. Is it your opinion, from what experience you have had in the colony, that maintaining a force at King William's Town would be one of the best means of defending the frontier of the colony from an inroad on the part of the Kafirs at any time?—I think King William's Town is about one of the best military stations in the colony.

2436. Did you ever come into contact with any of the chiefs?—Never; I am not acquainted with the Kafir language.

2437. Can you at all give the Committee any opinion as to whether, if treaties were made with the chiefs, they would be likely to adhere to them, or have they the means of enforcing the obligation of treaties upon their people?—None whatever.

2438. You would place no reliance upon treaties made with the chiefs?—Not the slightest.

2439. You think it expedient to trust alone to the military defence of the frontier, rather than to any treaties?—Certainly.

2440. Can you give the Committee any information as to the force the Kafirs could, at any time, bring into the field?—Not with any degree of accuracy. I should think that, during the last war, they must have had from 20,000 to 30,000 fighting men at different times.

2441. How do they support their force when in the field?—Principally by the cattle they capture; they carry, perhaps, a very little grain with them, tied to their belts. They principally depend upon the cattle they capture, and it is only in war they eat meat; in peace time they feed on corn and milk altogether.

2442. Have you or not heard that the larger use of animal food,

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food, on those occasions, has occasioned mortality and illness among the Kafirs?—I never heard so.

2443. Have you ever heard that any of the tribes amongst the Kafirs have anything like a disciplined force?—No.

2444. Have you ever been up to Natal?—I was never at Natal.

2445. Have they any opportunity, do you think, beyond the depredations they commit, of finding the means of maintaining any large force in the field for any length of time?—No; they have no commissariat arrangement.

2446. Could they maintain a war for any great length of time, do you think?—No, I do not think they could, if their own country is the seat of it, because that would prevent their women from tilling their fields, and that would thus soon leave them in a state of famine.

2447. Then the military occupation of Kafria is one of the best means of keeping the Kafirs in check, inasmuch as, at once, it gives a command over their sources of supply for food?—The military occupation of it, certainly. An offensive attitude is the only one that is of any avail in Kafirland, in peace or war.

2448. And that would consist rather in diminishing and destroying their supply of food, than in beating them in open fight?—It is the only way in which you can have any effect upon them, by constantly harassing them in such a way that they cannot sow their fields, particularly at harvest time, and by capturing their cattle. Their cattle they drive away far to the rear, or else send them to friendly tribes who are at peace with us, to take care of during the war.

2449. Are they very generally supplied with muskets?—They are now very generally supplied with them.

2450. They have given up, in a great degree, the use of the assagai, and resort to the musket?—Most of them have assagais besides the musket.

2451. Are they good marksmen?—No, they are bad marksmen; they never practise with fire-arms at all; they never use them for the purpose of sport or shooting game, therefore their only practice is when they come to war, and from what I have heard, they generally fire from the hip; they do not bring the musket to the shoulder; however, that is a thing which after a time would wear off; no doubt, in the course of another 10 years they would become very good marksmen.

2452. What sort of muskets are they supplied with?—They are common muskets with flint locks, inferior to those which our soldiers used to be supplied with.

2453. Colonel

2453. Colonel *Dunne*.] Are they all flint muskets they have now?—All flint muskets; I never heard of their having percussion arms.

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2454. Do you think there would be any way of interrupting the importation of arms into that part?—I think it is practically impossible.

2455. How is the introduction of arms now, as you understand, carried on into Kafirland, and by whom?—By our traders.

2456. But have we no power of preventing the traders carrying them into Kafraria?—I think if we prevented our traders from taking them in, they would be landed on the coast at the Umzimvoobo.

2457. What would they give in return for the muskets?—Hides, horns and gum.

2458. Would those be received by foreign traders as well as colonial traders; would they be articles they would take in exchange?—No doubt; they are marketable articles everywhere.

2459. You have been in all the forts along the frontier?—In most of them.

2460. What is the construction of them; are they regular fortifications, or merely field works stockaded?—They are of very different characters; those that have been completed, and are called permanent, are mostly situated on the Fish River; they are built of stone, with stone loopholed inclosures.

2461. Is not a common stockade quite sufficient against any attack of the Kafirs?—It is, certainly.

2462. Are those forts supplied with water?—Very few of them, if any.

2463. In case of attack, would not it be necessary they should be always supplied with water?—I do not think they are very likely to be subjected to a blockade from the Kafirs; but in case of a blockade it would be fatal.

2464. Fort Cox for instance; is not it with considerable difficulty, and from a great distance, that they obtain water?—It is badly situated in that respect.

2465. Have they not to send 80 to 100 men whenever they want to get water for the garrison?—I have heard that that has been the case.

2466. Would not it be one of the best things to provide those forts with tanks, and some means of having water?—It is certainly very desirable when small inclosed forts are used that they should be provided with water.

2467. You

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2467. You say King William's Town is the best military post we have?—Yes.

2468. That is far in advance of the Keiskamma, is not it?—It is on the Buffalo.

2469. Would you propose the Buffalo as the better frontier, taken in a military sense, than the Keiskamma?—It is a better military position; the country immediately in advance of the Buffalo is open.

2470. It is more desirable in that country to have an open space in immediate advance of the frontier?—Certainly.

2471. Does that open space extend nearly to the Amatola Mountains from the sea?—The Amatola Mountains are on the flank as it were of that tract.

2472. They run at right angles to our boundary?—They do run so.

2473. What do you consider to be the present frontier?—The present frontier nominally is the Kei.

2474. It is said that the Amatola Mountains are covered with bush, and furnish a kind of fastness for the Kafir tribes from which they may issue against the colony?—Yes.

2475. Do you think it would be a prudent military measure to clear those mountains of the Kafirs, and drive them back beyond the Kei?—Certainly.

2476. Have you any idea of the practicability of that?—I think it is practicable if you make up your mind to keep military possession of them for a certain time, to prevent the Kafirs either pasturing their cattle there or cultivating the ground.

2477. Suppose the Kafir tribes who occupy them are driven back, is there sufficient ground in the rear for them to occupy and live on; are you aware of that?—I should think there was abundance.

2478. Do you think that the system of posts with a moveable column between would be a proper defence for that frontier; posts that could communicate from one to another, and, in case of attack, at any signal could assemble and defend any part of the frontier?—No, I do not think that would be very effective.

2479. Then what is the defence you would propose?—As far as the military force is concerned, if you have a military force, it is better to have it massed in as large numbers as possible.

2480. Is it possible, consistent with the warfare which the Kafirs carry on, which is perfectly desultory, you can have large columns and masses, or is it requisite?—You might dis-

perse

perse them when it is necessary, but, as a matter of posting them, I think the larger the posts are the better.

2481. But if you have large posts, will not the Kafirs get in between the posts and ravage the country?—That they will do if they are ever so close; if they were 10 miles or one mile apart.

2482. Would not the system of patrols, if established there, prevent it to a certain extent?—I am not aware what system of patrols you allude to.

2483. What is the distance to the frontier from the mouth of the Keiskamma, inland, that we require to defend; the distance to the Amatola Mountains?—I feel great awkwardness in answering that question, or any other involving the term frontier; because I do not consider that the defence of *any* frontier, in the way understood by military men in Europe, is possible in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. I think it is possible to occupy certain districts, and keep the Kafirs in such order as that they would find great difficulty in organizing a descent on the colony.

2484. Then you do not think that adopting any line of country, and defending it by posts, or by usual military defences, is practicable?—Quite impossible.

2485. The only way is keeping the Kafirs so much in subjection that they would be afraid to do anything we did not like, and disregarding any particular line of defence?—That would answer for a time.

2486. Would anything else answer?—I do not think anything like peace will last with the Kafirs.

2487. There must be continual readiness for war, if not actual war?—Precisely.

2488. Do you think the system of military colonies would be of any use?—To a certain extent.

2489. I mean planting farmers with their families round the fort or stockade, which they could enter and drive their cattle into?—I think it would to a certain extent.

2489\*. It would be a desirable policy?—Yes; I submitted a report to Sir Harry Smith, when I was in the colony, upon this very subject, which has been published with his despatches, and laid before Parliament.

2490. You are an advocate for that system?—I think so.

2491. Will you state to the Committee what your plan of defence by these military colonies is?—It was to locate a certain number of farmers in the country, who would have a certain amount of stock and capital, and who would be likely to employ a number of military settlers for a certain time,

until those settlers became sufficiently acquainted with the ways of the colony to become farmers themselves; and I should propose, that those farmers and all their tenants, that is to say, their workmen and labourers of all kinds, should hold their land by a sort of a military tenure; that they should be obliged to serve the Government for a certain number of days every year, when called upon.

2492. Then, in fact, that is forming a system like the old border system on the frontier between Scotland and England?—Perfectly.

2493. Then would you support that by bodies of military of regular troops, in case of danger they would be unable themselves to meet?—Yes.

2494. Do you consider that would be the cheapest means of defence for this country, or do you conceive holding large bodies, that is a regular military force there, would be as cheap as the system I have asked you about?—The more you make the inhabitants of the colony depend upon themselves the less will you require a large military force.

2495. Is there a population in that neighbourhood of the country that would enable you to make those colonies, or should you introduce colonists from other parts of the Cape of Good Hope, or from England?—I would rather select for those farmers who are in the country already.

2496. Can you get them to go there?—Yes, I think so.

2497. Is there not an indisposition among the Boers to adopt that system, or rather, are they not inclined to withdraw themselves from our Government?—I think if you granted them the land or sold them the land under those conditions, or granted it to them giving them the right to defend their own land, and for a certain time supporting them by our troops, I believe they would undertake to go there.

2498. *Chairman.*] Are you not now describing what was very much the old Dutch system when we took possession of the colony at first?—Yes.

2499. *Colonel Dunne.*] Do you think any colonists, whether Dutch or English, will remain on the frontier where they had not the permission to defend themselves?—They would only remain on account of the large profits arising from our military expenditure.

2500. If you afforded them sufficient defence?—No defence could be so effective or so economical as that which they could give to themselves.

2501. I mean to say this, if you deny them the right to defend themselves on the spot, and they have to appeal to

civil

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civil authorities for power to assist in their defence, do you think any colonist would reside on the frontier?—No, certainly not, except with the views alluded to in my reply to the last question but one,

2502. It must tend to drive men from the frontier?—It did actually drive the Boers from the frontier.

2503. Do you not think that those commandos by which they defended themselves may be so regulated as to be an effective defence without violating the ordinary rules of humanity?—I believe that the rules of humanity, as generally understood, would be violated, and cruelty would be committed, and great suffering would be caused to the Kafirs, but I do not believe that there would be more caused than by the present system of a very tremendous war, where very large bodies are engaged on both sides, every nine or ten years or at less intervals.

2504. Therefore, am I to understand you, that your opinion is, that with all its abuses, the old system is a more humane one in the aggregate than the present system which ends in those bloody wars?—It is quite as humane, if not more so.

2505. Mr. Mackinnon.] Is not that at variance with what you stated in the earlier part of your evidence, wherein you stated that the Boers, if left to themselves, would have exterminated the Kafirs?—They would have exterminated the Griquas in that particular instance, beyond the north-eastern frontier to which I allude, and I believe also that, in the long-run, the same will be the fate of the Kafirs.

2506. Then, consequently, if the Boers, left to themselves, would have exterminated the Kafirs, that system which they carried on must have been more cruel, and more determined than that which now the British Government is carrying on?—I do not quite see that; I think, sooner or later, whether we do it ourselves, or leave the colonists to do it, the Kafirs cannot remain long in our neighbourhood.

2507. Truly; but then do you not consider it would be more humane to let them gradually recede before us than to leave them to be exterminated at once, as it were, in the mass?—I think that they are gradually receding; it would be only a part that would recede; a great many would be exterminated.

2508. Still the extermination would be more gradual in one case than in the other?—I think not; spreading it over a great number of years, it would be the same in one case as in the other.

2509. What was the cause of the difference between the



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Dutch Boers and the Griquas to which you alluded?—At what period?

2510. At the period you first mentioned, when that misunderstanding took place.—It was the Griquas; they were not a tribe of Kafirs at all; they are supposed to be a bastard tribe, formed originally from the runaway slaves from the colony, who established themselves beyond the Orange River, and they were afterwards supported by our Government as an independent community; but, as I said before, the immediate cause of the quarrel between them at the time I went up there, has escaped my memory, but I dare say it could be found by reference to Sir Peregrine Maitland's despatches.

2511. In all probability it was the encroachments of the Dutch farmers on the land they occupied?—Possibly something of the kind.

2512. It appears to me that the sum total of your evidence comes to this, that the commando system of defence adopted by the Dutch, when they had power in the colony, would go to exterminate the Kafirs with much greater quickness than the system which the British Government has adopted?—Not more quickly, but as quickly.

2513. Colonel *Thompson*.] Do the Kafirs ever send commandos into the colonial territory?—They do not now; but there is no doubt they send what is equivalent, marauding parties.

2514. Then a commando is a marauding party?—The Dutch commandos generally went out to avenge.

2515. Do the Kafir commandos avenge?—No; generally they come to plunder.

2516. What is the consequence of those Kafir commandos; what is the kind of feeling it creates and keeps up among the colonists?—Great irritation amongst those colonists who lose their cattle.

2517. And do not the English commandos keep up the same spirit amongst the Kafirs?—Yes, they do, of course.

2518. Is not it, in fact, a sure way to have a continuance of ill-feeling on both sides, that there should be commandos on both sides?—I do not think, in the long-run, there is more ill-feeling created than by the terrible wars we have had within the last 20 years.

2519. Colonel *Dunne*.] Is not the difference between a Kafir commando and an English commando, that one is an aggression and the other a reprisal?—It is; I never heard the term Kafir commando before. I perfectly understand the

word,

word, but they are totally different things; the Kafirs will come in parties of five or six, and carry off the cattle during the night.

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2520. Colonel *Thompson*.] Have the Kafirs, in your opinion, no cause or pretext for making reprisals?—That is a matter which I have no knowledge of; I was not in the colony at all during the time that the commando system was in vogue.

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2521. Sir *E. Buxton*.] You have spoken of Kafir commandos; do you mean that the Kafirs collect in considerable numbers, and enter the colony to plunder?—No; that is the reason why I think the term Kafir commando is likely to mislead the Committee.

2522. If they come in to plunder, they come in small companies of two or three?—Exactly so.

2523. Mr. *Hindley*.] You said that, in your opinion, and in the opinion of the colonists, the Kafirs had been preparing for war ever since the termination of the war of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in 1836, that is, preparing for the war that broke out in 1846?—I did.

2524. Then I wish to know why you suppose they desired war; what was their object in desiring such war, and having it in contemplation seven or eight years?—I think they were anxious to drive us out of the colony.

2525. Because they imagined the colony belonged to them; was that it?—No, I do not think that; because they are not the aborigines of the country any more than we are.

2526. You say they waited for a pretext, and you think they found one in our having sent a surveying party to survey a piece of ground in their territory in 1846?—Yes.

2527. That survey was undertaken by Major Walpole, then Captain Walpole?—Yes; at the desire of Sir Peregrine Maitland.

2528. Had Sir Peregrine Maitland given orders for a survey to be taken?—I never saw the correspondence.

2529. Have you heard of it?—I have heard of it, but not with sufficient minuteness to answer the question.

2530. Are you aware whether or not Sir Peregrine Maitland, in his official despatch, denies that he gave his authority for the survey?—I am not.

2531. I will read you the words: "I accordingly gave verbal instructions to Major Wortham, then the commanding royal engineer at Cape Town, to desire Captain Walpole, the commanding engineer then on the frontier, to go over to

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Blockdrift, and inspect the ground, and observe generally the advantages which it possessed for the position of a post of the same magnitude as the Victoria post. A regular survey was not in my contemplation, but merely a personal inspection by Captain Walpole, that I might know enough about the ground to guide me whether or not to enter on a final arrangement with Sandilli for it." You are not aware of that?—I have not read it.

2532. "On the arrival of these instructions on the frontier, Captain Walpole laid them before Colonel Hare, and asked for a surveying party to go over to Blockdrift, and survey the ground, after he had himself fixed on the precise spot. Colonel Hare, it appears, did not read the instructions, but supposing they ordered 'a survey,' immediately issued an order for an engineer officer, Lieutenant Stokes, with four sappers, to proceed to Blockdrift. The party, in consequence went to the spot, pitched their tent, and for several days carried on the survey, when some events occurred to interrupt it, and threw the frontier, on both sides, into a state of the greatest excitement." Did you ever hear of that circumstance?—I never remember having read that despatch.

2533. You never heard that Captain Walpole was acting without instructions for a positive survey from Sir Peregrine Maitland?—No, I never did.

2534. Was not it likely that Sandilli would feel that the British had committed an act of gross injustice when they came upon his ground, and, without saying a word to him, commenced instituting a positive survey?—I do not think he would have felt the injustice of the act, because it was doing him no harm.

2535. Are you not aware that it led to a very great disturbance in the country?—I believe that they did make use of it as a pretext for a disturbance.

2536. Then I will read to you the opinion of Sir Peregrine Maitland himself upon the occurrence, and then I will ask you your own opinion upon it: "The sending of the surveying party to Blockdrift, prior to the conclusion of a formal agreement with Sandilli for the ground, was a great error; it was a trespass on the chief's territory, and had in his eyes the natural appearance of a treacherous attempt to occupy a post in it without his permission. The chief, therefore, was justified in demanding the instant abandonment of the survey, and would have had an unquestionable right to drive us out by force of arms, if he could, should we have hesitated to do a simple act of justice by immediately withdrawing." Now, do  
you

you think that injustice was done to Sandilli in sending a surveying party, because no doubt it was a surveying party, without a previous understanding with him upon the subject?—I consider that it was a pretext for war, and, perhaps, a just pretext for complaint, but not for war.

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2537. Just, on the part of Sandilli?—On the part of Sandilli; but still I hold that the Kafirs were preparing for war, and glad of that pretext.

2538. You have said that the chiefs do not respect treaties; would you mention some of the treaties they have broken with our Government?—I have only a general knowledge of the treaties; but I believe that the general object of the treaties entered into with the Kafirs was, that they were to use their best endeavours to repress cattle stealing among their subjects, and that I do not believe they ever kept to.

2539. Is that an easy matter for them to do?—I do not think it is an easy matter, and for that reason it is that I think that treaties are so useless.

2540. Are you aware that, on the evidence of Sir George Napier to this Committee, it has been proved that those depredations were diminishing from the time of Sir Andrew Stockenstrom's treaty in 1836?—I am not aware of any of the evidence that has been given to this Committee before.

2541. Then you do not know any other instance in which you consider they have broken a treaty, except that they have not fulfilled it up to the extent of preventing depredations which, you admit, it was extremely difficult on their part to do?—I think it was the main object of those treaties to put a stop to those depredations. I do not say whether from unwillingness or want of power; but that the spirit of them was not kept, nor the letter of them, is very clear.

2542. Have our Government respected treaties?—Yes, I believe they have respected them.

2543. You said you would recommend the system of selling land to farmers, and defending them, for a certain time, by military force, until they had sufficient strength to defend themselves?—Yes, I did.

2544. What land is it you would dispose of in that way, and where?—The whole of the neutral territory, and a great part of the land occupied by the tribes who have made this last attack upon us.

2545. Would you go up to the Buffalo, and sell any land there?—Yes, I would.

2546. So that, in fact, you would take possession of that

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part of the country completely, and dispose of it for British purposes?—I would.

2547. Sir *E. Burton*.] You would drive the Kafirs over the Kei?—I would not allow them to occupy, with any degree of independence, those lands that they occupied previous to this last outbreak.

2548. Supposing the land now belonging to the Kafirs on the West Kei were taken possession of by our Government, what means of subsistence could be provided for the Kafir tribe?—I do not think that that is a question for our Government to enter into.

2549. Is it your opinion that it is necessary to exterminate the Kafirs now living on the west side of the Kei?—No; merely to prevent them occupying those districts.

2550. Have you any idea what resources would be open to the Kafirs, provided that course was adopted?—I am not aware; but my impression is, that there are parts of Kafirland not nearly so thickly populated as our immediate frontier.

2551. Can you say where they are situated?—Between the colony and Natal.

2552. On the east side of the Kei?—On the east side of the Kei.

2553. Practically, therefore, the effect of that policy would be to drive the Kafirs over the River Kei?—It would, in a great measure.

2554. Mr. *Hindley*.] Do you think it would be likely we should secure the respect of the Kafirs by such a proceeding?—I think so, because they have most respect for that which they fear most.

2555. Then it would be respect for our power, not for our justice?—That is a question which I think it is difficult to answer. It would be a respect springing from fear, which is the only moral check you can have on them.

2556. Colonel *Estcourt*.] You said you preferred having our troops in large bodies concentrated in one place?—Yes.

2557. And you would make King William's Town that place?—King William's Town is about one of the best points.

2558. Supposing King William's Town were that point, could you maintain a communication with the sea without much difficulty?—I think so.

2559. And what point would be the point upon the sea?—The Buffalo mouth.

2560. Is that a seaport?—It is a very fair landing place, but not a harbour.

2561. Sufficiently

2561. Sufficiently good to depend upon for supplies?—

Quite so.

2562. Supposing King William's Town a military point?

—Yes.

2563. Suppose King William's Town occupied in the manner you propose, would the effect of having that force at King William's Town be sufficient to keep all the country in order and subjection?—I think it would be the best means of keeping the country in subjection; and I also think that, from the troops being in one large body, they would be kept in a higher state of discipline than being scattered over a number of small posts.

2654. They would be more efficient?—Yes, they would be more efficient.

2565. Then you would have no posts along the frontier of the Keiskamma?—I think not.

2566. And you think that, supposing depredations to be committed upon the frontier by Kafirs, with the post of King William's Town occupied, any force in the manner you propose would be sufficient for us to gain redress from the Kafir chiefs?—I think so, on this account; that from having a large force at King William's Town, you would have a force always concentrated to move upon any part of the country that was distracted; instead of that, when the force is distributed in a number of small posts, it takes a much longer time in concentrating the force; and when the troops are in the field, there are more points left to defend. You cannot abandon your buildings and stores; you are obliged to leave a number of men in those posts, who are practically lost for most purposes of war.

2567. Then for the ordinary depredations committed along the frontier, you would depend upon the individual settlers?—As much as possible.

2568. You would give the independent settlers permission to defend themselves?—I would.

2569. Would you require them to give notice that depredations had been committed to those central posts, or should they be entirely independent of the control of the central post?—That is a question I should hardly like to give an opinion upon. I cannot give an opinion upon that point without considering, very minutely, the organization which would be necessary on the frontier in commencing such a system. I think, generally, that the best defence for the frontier must spring from the settlers themselves; and I think also, that from the present very unnatural state of things on the

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the frontier, that they must have some military support for a considerable period of time.

2570. Would you draw this sort of distinction; supposing a settler to be attacked, you would allow him, of course, to defend himself?—Certainly.

2571. But suppose his cattle were driven away to a distance into Kafirland, would you require him then to give notice to this central military post, and expect redress through the post?—I would certainly allow him, if he considered himself strong enough, to follow his cattle, and capture them wherever he could.

2572. Into Kafirland?—Into Kafirland.

2573. To follow the spoor?—To follow the spoor, and execute summary justice on the robbers, if he could.

2574. And supposing the spoor were to be lost, you would not permit him then, perhaps, to seek redress from any neighbouring tribe, the nearest tribe?—At first I would not certainly; but I give that answer in a very general way; that is really going into those very details which I do not at present feel myself competent to answer.

2575. Then, in fact, you would depend, in regard to this military post, upon the moral effect of its being there supported by its own physical strength, to keep the country occupied by the Kafirs in subjection?—Yes, I would.

2576. That being the case, the Kafirs, I suppose, might be allowed to occupy where they pleased, and you would not locate them, or drive them away across the Kei to any other country, but let them occupy as they pleased?—I would not allow them to have the same advantages after the present war as they had before.

2577. As to location?—No; I think they ought to be made to feel, and feel severely, the consequences of this outbreak.

2578. Then, supposing the Kafirs were entirely subdued, and to sue for peace, would you then think it necessary to drive them away from the land now occupied by them in Kafirland?—From a portion of it; not from any wish to gain territory, but to make them feel the disadvantages of going to war.

2579. In fact you think this force, situated as you describe it, might be depended upon as sufficient to maintain our influence in Kafirland?—One or two such forces; I do not limit myself to one.

2580. Then would you give up the frontier of the Keiskamma. You said something about any frontier not being capable

capable of being maintained in the manner that frontiers are in Europe, for instance?—No; I do not consider that any frontier could be kept up.

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2581. Would you think it necessary, then, to name a frontier; after the war was over, and the country was in subjection, would it be necessary to name a frontier at all?—I think it would, for legal purposes. I doubt whether it would be possible at first to extend the laws of the colony, as they at present stand, to the country that is partly occupied by Kafirs; therefore it would be necessary to say the laws of the country only operate up to a certain line.

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2582. Still, would not you say that though the laws of the colony were only to extend up to the Keiskamma, as it were, still, if Kafirland is kept in subjection, and we hold Kafirland in subjection by military posts, we might permit the Kafirs, if they pleased, to live quietly in the country, merely keeping those military posts as security for their good behaviour?—My own idea is, that if after this outbreak the Kafirs were left in possession of the same lands that they were in possession of before it, they would break out again sooner than they would otherwise.

2583. Then, in fact, you are for driving them away from the land they now occupy to a certain extent?—To a certain extent; and I would make them feel the loss of some of their most valuable pasturage.

2584. By way of punishment?—By way of punishment.

2585. And in a general way can you state to what extent?—I think more particularly the Amatola Mountains.

2586. To drive them out of the Amatola Mountains?—Yes.

2587. Supposing they were driven out of the Amatola Mountains then, and you were to occupy King William's Town, would not they at once come back again into the Amatola Mountains, without your being able to prevent them?—No, they could not. They might come there occasionally; but I think, if it was determined upon, they could not be allowed to herd their cattle in the Amatola Mountains, nor to till the ground.

2588. Then if they were to come, you would immediately march upon them a force, and drive them out again?—Quite so.

2589. Colonel Dunne.] Have there been surveys made over Kafirland frequently, without being a cause of irritation?—In no instance to my knowledge.

2590. Are



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2590. Are you aware that the Blockdrift was the place where the survey took place?—Yes.

2591. Were you aware that Sandilli had absolutely asked the English Government to place a post there, and withdrew the permission?—I am not aware of that.

2592. The frontier law would be military law; I understand you to say that you would not convey the colonial law to the frontier; what law would you have, military law?—That is a question I should hardly like to answer.

2593. It would be a military occupation, would not it?—It would, to a certain extent.

2594. Would it be possible to have the ordinary colonial tribunals in a colony so occupied?—No; I think the operation of the ordinary tribunals of the country would be too slow.

2595. Of course, the policy of those who had property there, would be to keep the war as much as possible at a distance from the frontier?—Certainly.

2596. Mr. B. Carter.] You said that one means of holding the Kafir in check lies in their tillage land?—It is possible to prevent them tilling the ground.

2597. They live in ordinary times of peace principally upon the produce of agriculture?—Entirely upon the Kafir corn and milk.

2598. Is there any permanent occupation, as far as you have seen, of any large plots or districts of land?—There are large tracts of it under cultivation.

2599. Should you say that, putting aside the cattle, which we are aware they possess, they are in any degree an agricultural people?—They are an agricultural people in the fullest sense of the term, because they subsist principally, as I said before, on the fruits of the ground.

2600. Then do you think that their present agricultural habits could be in any degree encouraged so as to enable you to have a greater hold over them as a nation, than you would naturally have over a wandering nation merely subsisting in that way?—You cannot make them grow more produce than they consume; they already grow what they want for consumption; I do not think you could make them grow for export.

2601. I understood you that they would be naturally disinclined to commence a war upon any slight misunderstanding, because they would, probably, lose the results of the care they had bestowed upon the tillage of certain districts of land?—That is their weakest point; that is where they have most

to fear from us, because they can drive their cattle away, and they must leave their crops in the ground.

2602. Do you think that upon that ground any reliance could, in future, be placed by any extension of agriculture to secure a better understanding between us, and make that the ground of good behaviour on their part?—I do not think that any such extension of their agriculture is possible by any means that we can adopt. 3 July 1851.

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2603. You said you thought treaties with their chiefs were not to be relied upon?—No, they are not.

2604. Supposing they were to be subsidized, and you made a grant of a certain amount to a chief, do you think his influence over the people is sufficient to lead him to keep down depredations for the purpose of receiving the subsidy?—No, I do not think so.

2605. Mr. Mackinnon.] In reference to what you stated just now, you seem to think they depend more for their support upon agriculture, than they do upon their herds and cattle?—They seldom or never kill an animal to eat.

2606. They live chiefly upon milk, and whatever little corn they get by scratching the land?—Upon milk and corn.

2607. Is their state of cultivation such as to make it necessary for them to dwell upon the same spot continuously, or could they not cultivate sufficient land to supply themselves in that fine climate, and probably virgin soil, if they went from one spot to another?—Quite so; I do not think that with them a field at all improves by being repeatedly cultivated.

2608. There is a great distinction, then, between their mode of cultivation of the land and that which there is in a civilized nation, because with respect to the people here who cultivate the land, the longer they cultivate it, the more valuable it becomes, in some measure; but with those people, I understand you, your opinion is, that whether they cultivate a piece of land in one locality or another, it makes no difference?—No; the only thing is, of course, being dug once, it is the easier to dig again.

2609. Mr. Monsell.] They grow nothing but corn?—I am not sure whether they do not grow a little tobacco of some sort, or a substitute for it.

2610. Mr. Mackinnon.] Is not that facility of cultivation exemplified by the Boers, who make no difficulty of migrating from one locality to another?—It is.

2611. Consequently, in the event of circumstances rendering

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it necessary to drive the Kafirs out of the Amatola, or any particular locality, you do not consider that the suffering to them, or injury done to them, would be so great, because they would find a locality elsewhere where they might exist in the same manner as they do now?—Quite so.

2612. Provided they do not encroach upon the neighbouring tribe?—I do not think there are any of the tribes so thickly settled but what they might receive many additional families.

2613. What extent of acres have you seen in any particular tribe in cultivation in one spot?—I cannot speak to that.

2614. Viscount *Mandeville*.] Four or five acres?—I do not know; I never made any measurement, or heard of any.

2615. *Chairman*.] Is their cultivation a kind of garden cultivation, rather than that of farming?—You sometimes see a large tract of country under cultivation, the side of a hill covered; they are called in the country “Kafir gardens;” but they might be called fields.

2616. Mr. *Mackinnon*.] Where there is a great amount of population?—Where there is a large population.

2617. I wish to call your attention to a former part of your evidence, in which you mention that it was supposed that which gave rise to the war was the surveying party going out of your bounds, or out of the neutral territory, and fixing their tent for surveying in Sandilli’s country?—That was the mere pretext for a war.

2618. I wish to call your attention to a despatch of Sir Peregrine Maitland’s, dated 21st of March 1846, in which he states that it was merely a pretence they made for the war; that it was not in fact the cause of the war. I will just read you the passage: “That the survey was unfortunate, I have said; as it might, to a suspicious Kafir, have the appearance of an encroachment; but I cannot agree with Colonel Hare, that it was the real cause of the hostile aspect which Sandilli, his Amapakati, and warriors assumed. The sketch which I have given of the increasing influence of the war party, and the evidences of an unfavourable change in Sandilli’s sentiments before the surveying tent appeared on his ground, convince me that the survey was not the cause, but only the occasion, of the outburst of bad feeling which then took place.” Is that your opinion; have you heard anything to confirm that statement of Sir Peregrine Maitland?—That is in substance what I have already given.

2619. Marquis of *Granby*.] You think the Buffalo River, as the boundary, would include the whole range of the Amatola Mountains;

Mountains; the whole country that you wish to occupy of the Kafirs?—Do you mean after the present war?

2620. Yes; after the present war.—I have not stated that, I think; because, if I am right in my view of the case, a portion of the land between the Buffalo and the Keiskamma would be forfeited to the colony by the present misconduct of the Kafirs, and a portion of it would be left to the tribes which had not been implicated in it, or not been so much implicated in it as the others.

2621. But would not it be very difficult to form a boundary that should not have some great river, or great mark, to denote where it was?—I think a boundary, except for legal purposes, is not wanted at all. As a military question, I think it leads to difficulties of all kinds.

2622. *Chairman.*] I gather your opinion to be this; that you would generally organize a system of frontier defence by means of the settlers themselves?—Quite so.

2623. And that you would support them for a time by a military force?—Yes, just so.

2624. Would you, from what knowledge you have of the colony and the native tribes, attempt or not to bring the chiefs into alliance with the Government; that is, would you respect their rights and the boundaries of their tribes, and leave them quite independent?—As long as they were peaceable neighbours I would recognise their authority, but not the complete independence which we recognise in a civilized power.

2625. Do you think it possible to make any attempt to civilize them?—No, I do not believe any attempts will prove successful.

2626. Do you think it would be of any avail attempting to raise a native force in combination with British troops, or should you be disposed to rely entirely upon a British force?—I should depend, as much as possible, upon the force of the British, white men or mulattoes.

2627. You would not rely at all upon either the Hottentots or the Kafirs, for the defence of the colony?—On Hottentots you may, to a certain extent; principally those Hottentots that have lived a long time in the colony, and been mixed up with the whites and with other races of people, and are no longer the original race of Hottentots; some reliance might be placed upon them.

2628. Probably you have heard that recently a portion of the Hottentot force has deserted, and turned against us?—Yes, I have.

2629. Had you that fact in your mind when you stated you would

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would rely on a Hottentot force in aid of a British force?—Yes, I had.

2630. You are still disposed to think that they might be made useful allies?—To a certain extent I think they might, but that too much reliance should not be placed on them.

2631. When you say to a certain extent, will you explain that limitation to the Committee?—That they might be mixed advantageously with a white force; but that a large force composed entirely of Hottentots is mischievous.

2632. Have you any general observations which you wish to make to the Committee?—There is one remark which I wish to make, which is this, that in consequence of the questions put to me by an Honourable Member, that I only knew of one instance of the treaties being broken, that is rather putting a wrong construction upon my words, because I considered that the general object of those treaties was to stop cattle stealing, and that as this cattle stealing was not stopped, the treaties were broken in every point, whatever might be the separate provisions of those treaties.

2633. Colonel *Dunne*.] By the Kafirs?—By the Kafirs.

2634. Colonel *Estcourt*.] That is, there were frequent robberies of cattle?—There were.

2635. And, therefore, you were speaking to that one point, that the treaties were broken in that one point, as regards the general question of stealing cattle, that frequent robberies were committed?—There were.

2636. It was not a single robbery?—No, it was constantly done.

2637. Mr. *B. Carter*.] I understood you to say that your plan was to allocate districts to farmers who knew the country, and to allow them to take into their service certain military dependents who, after they had become acquainted with the character of the country, might ultimately become settlers also?—Yes.

2638. Do I understand by that, that you would allocate a frontier to those farmers in the first place?—I would divide the country which becomes available from the expulsion of the Kafirs into convenient portions, and either grant it or sell it upon certain conditions.

2639. Should those portions be connected with each other?—They should touch each other. There can be no objection in having any waste between.

2640. Would not the consequence of that, being in a Kafir country, be, to form naturally at once some sort of frontier. If you live in a country where you would occupy a series of connected

connected districts, those districts must have some boundary, and one boundary would be in the direction of the Kafirs?—A frontier is an obstacle to people going through it; for instance, as the Rhine is a frontier, the frontier you allude to would not be one.

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2641. This district would necessarily have some boundary towards the Kafirs. If you take any district, whatever it may be, and separate that district into farms or allotments, that, at all events, and we may say in this case the eastern side of those districts, would naturally be bounded by Kafir land of some sort?—Yes.

2642. And then, in fact, it would be a boundary in the direction of the Kafirs, the crossing of which by the Kafirs the settlers themselves would have to defend themselves against?—Quite so.

2643. Then, in fact, as far as regards colonial purposes, whether it be a military frontier or defended in other ways, there would be a boundary against the Kafirs?—Between the Kafirs and the whites there would be a boundary; that is to say, there would be a boundary on one side of which the rights of the land were recognised to belong to the whites, and on the other side of which the rights of the Kafirs would be considered.

2644. Which rights you propose to be maintained by the settlers themselves, with the assistance of a military post?—Quite so.

2645. Marquis of *Granby*.] Are you aware whether, previously to the survey for Blockdrift, Sandilli had changed his sentiments towards the British Government?—I have no particular knowledge of the circumstance.

2646. You said, I think, that the Kafirs had for a long time wished for a pretext to quarrel with the British Government?—Yes, I did.

2647. Are you at all aware what the causes of discontent were, that made them so desirous for a pretext?—I think it was eagerness to possess themselves of our lands and our herds.

2648. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Have you any knowledge of the country to the east of the Kei?—I was never on the Kei.

2649. You were talking of dispossessing the Kafirs of their land, which is now called the ceded territory or British Kafria, and driving them over the Kei; that was the general tenor of your observations?—I do not think I said that. I would only drive enough of the Kafirs out of that territory to make  
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them feel the evil of having made war upon us in this last instance.

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2650. I understand, then, you do not desire to drive the whole of the Kafirs out of what is termed British Kafria, over the Kei, but to drive some portion of them over?—Only some portion of them.

2651. Those chiefs mostly implicated in the war?—Yes.

2652. With their tribes?—Yes.

2653. My question then is to ascertain whether you know sufficient of the land, to the eastward of the Kei, whether it is sufficiently fertile to sustain the tribes you would drive over, besides those who now occupy that district, that is, Kafria proper?—I have already stated that I have every reason to think there would be quite sufficient facilities.

2654. You think the land is of sufficient fertility to sustain the people?—I think so, from all that I have heard; personally I have no knowledge of it.

2655. You said, in an earlier part of your evidence, that the Kafirs had been preparing for war for six or eight years; what do you mean by preparing for war for six or eight years?—Accumulating arms and ammunition.

2656. Generally savage tribes do not require so long a preparation as that for war?—No, they do not.

2657. Their actions are more impulsive than is generally consistent with a long-settled disposition for war for six or eight years?—Yes.

2658. You speak of them as preparing for war; were those preparations made in consequence of the irritation which they received from the British Government, by any acts of our Government or of the colonists?—No; I do not think so.

2659. You think there were no causes of irritation arising from any acts of the white people. You have spoken of one only; were there other causes besides that of the survey?—No; I am not aware of any other causes than that of the survey.

Major Sir *James Edward Alexander*, A.D.C., called in; and Examined.

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2660. *Chairman.*] WHEN were you last at the Cape of Good Hope?—From 1835 to 1838; three years.

2661. What object had you in going there, or what was the nature of your duties there?—I was asked to go to Africa in the first instance, by the Royal Geographical Society, under the auspices of the Colonial Office, to survey and explore.

2662. You

2662. You were on the staff of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in the year 1835?—Yes.

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2663. Can you state to the Committee generally, from such information as you possess, the causes which led to the outbreak in 1835?—They were believed to be the natural propensity of the Kafirs for plunder, and the defenceless state of the frontier; the military force at that time only consisted of 400 bayonets of the 75th regiment, and 200 of the Cape Mounted Rifles, and they guarded a frontier of 100 miles. There was another cause, that Macomo had been driven out of the Mankazana, near the Chumie, and some friends of his in the colony had told him that that was unjust, and that he had been unfairly dealt with, and they would endeavour to get back the Mankazana for him. There was another cause, which was, when Sir Benjamin D'Urban assumed the government the commando system was done away with by orders from home. I understand as Sir Lowry Cole had established it when he was the governor previously, Sir Benjamin D'Urban was ordered to do away with it; for this reason the Kafirs thought we were afraid of them; it was perhaps too lenient a system to do away with it.

2664. Then generally in your opinion, the causes which led to the war were these: the smallness of our military force, the depredations of the Kafirs, and the abolition of the old system of defence called the commando system?—Yes.

2665. Those causes combined led to that state of irritation which ultimately ended in war?—Yes. I beg also to state, that in 1834, the districts of Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage, were exceedingly flourishing; the farmers had plenty of cattle, and that excited the cupidity of the Kafirs to an extent they did not seem to be able to resist.

2666. Whilst on the spot, did you hear whether the colonists had unjustly encroached upon the Kafirs, or committed depredations upon them?—No, I did not hear that they had committed any encroachment to occasion the Kafir irruption of 1834 and 1835.

2667. Did you hear, on the other hand, that the Kafirs had committed constant depredations upon the colonists?—Yes, the amount of depredations I remember in 1834, immediately previous to the outbreak, amounted to 3,000 head of cattle, besides sheep and horses.

2668. Were any lives lost on the part of the colonists?—The Kafirs began the war by murdering some of the traders who were in Kafirland, and destroying some of the missionary stations; that was the first we heard of the war.



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2669. Now what course did the Government take with a view so obtain redress before war was proclaimed?—The first thing I remember was Colonel Smith, now Sir Harry Smith, being sent to the frontier, to inquire into the nature of this irruption, and to organize a force to repel it; he was followed by Sir Benjamin D'Urban himself.

2670. Was there any attempt to call the chiefs to account for the depredations they had committed?—I do not remember hearing of that; I arrived at the beginning of 1835, but Sir Benjamin D'Urban intended to have gone to the frontier, previously to the outbreak; he had been only a year holding the government, and he intended to make a progress through the eastern part of the colony, and also to visit the frontier and Kafirland, probably with a view to inquire into those depredations.

2671. Who was the principal chief at that time, who was supposed to be the most active in committing depredations?—Macomo, I believe, and Tyali his brother, were the most active leaders of the Kafirs.

2672. How was the war conducted; were the districts which they resided in invaded, or were they called upon to make restitution?—A force was organized by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the base of departure was between Fort Wilshire and Fort Beaufort, and his invading army was composed of four divisions; he was with the head quarter division. Colonel Somerset commanded the right division, and Van Wyk, a Dutchman, commanded the left; the left centre was commanded by Major Cox, now Colonel Cox, and they advanced into Kafirland.

2673. What was stated to be the object that Sir Benjamin D'Urban had in advancing into Kafirland?—To punish the Kafirs, and recapture the cattle which had been driven from the colony; they had taken away upwards of 100,000 head of cattle, and some thousands of horses, sheep, &c.

2674. Within what period had that number of cattle been stolen?—December and January, 1834 and 1835.

2675. Have you any document to prove that so great an extent of depredation was committed?—I have the returns here of the number of cattle, horses, and sheep which were made out during the war, and after the war, to show the losses of the farmers in December and January, 1834 and 1835.

2676. Who made out the account?—I believe it was Mr. Hudson, who was the agent for collecting that information.

2677. What office did he hold?—I think he was called the Agent-general

Agent-general for inquiring into the losses sustained by the farmers.

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2678. Are you able to place that account before the Committee?—I have got it here; there were 111,418 head of cattle, 5,438 horses, 156,878 sheep, and there were 455 houses burnt, not merely wigwams, but stone houses of the farmers; there were 7,000 subjects of His Majesty all ruined at that time, and they subsisted on rations during 1835.

2679. Are you reading an extract from the official account given in by the Agent-general?—These are notes I made respecting the losses, and I believe they were collected and made out by Mr. Hudson.

2680. Was the account made out before the outbreak, or afterwards with a view to obtain compensation for the losses?—After the outbreak, when the information was collected regarding it. Besides that, there were 40 people murdered without any declaration of war.

2681. By the Kafirs?—Yes.

2682. And previous to the declaration of war on the part of the Government?—Previous to the declaration of war on the part of the British Government.

2683. Sir J. Walmsley.] Were they numerous bodies that crossed the frontier when those depredations were committed, or were they incursions from small bodies of men?—Large bodies came over and surrounded the military posts, and some of the smaller posts were immediately abandoned; they were occupied by the Cape Mounted Rifles; there were only 200 of these along the frontier; the 75th were in Graham's Town principally.

2684. This was a sudden incursion in December 1834, and in the beginning of 1835?—Yes, without any declaration of war on the part of the Kafirs.

2685. Had that system of depredations, to any extent, been carried on previously on a small scale?—They used to come in, in small numbers, to make their forays; but this was a grand irruption; the whole frontier was attacked simultaneously.

2686. Which continued for a few months?—Until the troops moved into Kafirland; because after they had carried off this immense spoil of cattle and horses, they drove them beyond the Kei into Hintza's country.

2687. How many chiefs were concerned in that marauding excursion?—They were principally the Gaika people, also the T'Slambies.

2688. They were united in this foray?—Yes, they were

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united. The people of Pato, Cobus, and Kamer remained friendly.

2689. Colonel *Dunne*.] You have been travelling in the interior a great deal, as well as on that part of Africa bordering on the colony?—Yes.

2690. On the western boundary, I believe?—Yes, to the north of the Orange River, and near its mouth, the tribes are scattered in no great numbers; the Namaquas and Hill Damaras. I travelled among them beyond the Tropic of Capricorn.

2691. You do not think there is any necessity for entering into the consideration of the defence of that frontier at the present moment?—No.

2692. Have you been on the frontier that is at present attacked?—Yes, I have.

2693. What was the frontier when you was in Kafirland with Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—It was the Keiskamma; the neutral territory was between that and the Great Fish River.

2694. Do you think the neutral territory was in the rear of the Keiskamma?—Between that and the Fish River.

2695. Have you been into Kafiraria, between the Keiskamma and the Kei?—I went across from the Keiskamma to the Kei, which is 95 miles.

2696. Are you aware of the Buffalo River, and the situation of King William's Town?—Yes; I was there when Fort Hill was constructed.

2697. Is the country about King William's Town open, and adapted for the movement of troops better than that on the frontier of the Keiskamma?—Much better; it is an open country.

2698. Therefore, for a military purpose you would prefer pushing your posts as far as King William's Town?—I would like first to have a strong post at the mouth of the Buffalo.

2699. That would include pushing your post as far as the Buffalo?—Yes, decidedly.

2700. Have you been in the Amatola mountains?—Yes.

2701. Do you know whether they are a kind of fastness from which the Kafirs issue and attack our settlements?—It is a very difficult country; indeed, it resembles the Highlands of Scotland; there are ravines, rocks, precipices, and forests.

2702. Would it be an advantage to the defence of our colony if we cleared those Amatola mountains?—The best way would be to make roads in them.

2703. Would you clear the people out of them?—It would be exceedingly difficult to clear them out, or keep them out.

2704. Is

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2704. Is there any ground on the other side of the Keiskamma where they could find a sufficient support?—It would not be altogether safe to drive them across the Kei as long as we have Natal; because, if we drive them in that direction, they might attack the flourishing settlement of Natal.

2705. Where are the Zoolus?—To the north-west of Natal.

2706. Is there any gap between the Kei River and the settlement of Natal?—There is the people of Kreli, the son of Hintza.

2707. What tribe is that?—A large tribe called the Amagalekas, in contradistinction to the Amakosas.

2708. What tribes inhabit the Amatola mountains?—The Amakosas, the Gaikas, the people of Macomo and Sandilli.

2709. They would not be received by the tribes between Natal and the Kei?—I think not; at least there would be difficulties and trouble.

2710. What would you propose, as a defence of that frontier; would you defend it by posts and military colonies?—First of all, I would survey the mouths of all the rivers as far as Natal. The mouth of the Umtata is supposed to have a good harbour, but I am not aware of any good survey having been made of it; I went to survey the mouth of the Buffalo with Colonel Smith, and made a sketch of it, and of late advantage has been taken of the mouth of the Buffalo; stores have been landed there, and the Kafirs have been taken in the rear and prevented from coming into the colony, since the beginning of this present war.

2711. Would it not be difficult at times at the mouth of the Buffalo?—It is better than the mouth of the Fish River.

2712. Have you surveyed any part of the Amatas?—I have been through them.

2713. But you did not survey them?—It was during the war time; we could not well, without being assagaied.

2714. Would you think it was necessary to have posts in Kafiraria if we adopt the Keiskamma on forts Hare and Cox and those posts?—I would have posts decidedly along the Keiskamma, and I would have a post, if I could, in the Amatas; I would have some very strong posts to overlook and overawe the Kafirs; and that, with the roads, would be a great advantage.

2715. How would you make those roads?—With our own people.

2716. Have we any people that we can apply to that purpose?—I would employ Hottentots, perhaps for hire, and Fingoes.

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2717. Are you acquainted with the habits of the tribes on that frontier?—I saw a great deal of them in 1835.

2718. Do you believe that any treaty with the Kafirs would prevent their committing depredations and robberies?—I think not; it is only the strong hand that would prevent that.

2719. Do you believe the cause of every war that has occurred there, which you have experience of, has not been the incorrigible habits of robbery which the Kafirs have?—They are brought up to robbery and plunder; but from the way in which some of the wild natives of India have been civilized, (I should remark that I was in India for some years), I think it is possible that even the Kafirs might be civilized.

2720. Do you think within any reasonable time the habits of the Kafirs would be so altered that we could make treaties with them?—I should say within 10 years a change might take place for the better.

2721. How would you operate that change on them?—First of all, by military posts, and then inducing them to attend fairs for the purpose of exchanging their cattle for British goods.

2722. Then you prefer establishing fairs to permitting the traders to go through the country?—Decidedly; though they may be men of good character who supply the goods, they are obliged to employ men sometimes of very inferior character—British deserters sometimes—to sell them.

2723. Sir E. Burton.] Can you prevent traders of this sort going into Kafiraria?—I think they might be checked to a certain extent—men of bad character, because if they go with waggons, they can only go along particular roads, and over particular fords.

2724. Colonel Dunne.] I believe every trader is obliged to have a pass?—He used to be.

2725. Do you not think by checking the traders going into the country, and making the inhabitants resort to those fairs, you might prevent the introduction of ammunition and muskets?—It might be considerably checked, but not altogether prevented.

2726. Do you think that check would operate to make them less ready to go to war?—I think so.

2727. Do you know the Kat River settlement?—I have been there.

2728. Is it near the frontier?—It is near the frontier.

2729. Are you aware that they latterly have joined with the Kafirs in this war against us, or is it so?—I have heard so.

2730. Do you not think that it is a post where it is dangerous to have people of doubtful fidelity?—It is dangerous.

2731. Would

2731. Would you think it a prudent measure to withdraw that settlement, and supply it with more faithful subjects?—I think the measure that was at first proposed, if it had been carried out, to people the Kat River with 500 Scotch highlanders, would have been the best thing that could have been adopted; that was not done.

2732. You think that colonists from this country should have been placed there instead of Hottentots?—Yes.

2733. You have served with the Cape corps?—I have been in the field with it.

2734. Did they behave well on the occasion you served with them in the field?—I think they had been too much "cried up," and too much reliance had been placed upon them.

2735. Do you think for the future it would be much better to substitute for those Hottentots a corps, the whole or a very large proportion of which should be recruited from this country?—The best thing would be to do something similar to what happened in America during the last war; namely, to have a few Hottentots who should accompany the Europeans to act as guides, from their knowledge of the *spoor* and the habits of the Kafirs, and in that way they would be useful; but having large bodies of Hottentots together would be very dangerous, as it appears on the present occasion they have turned against us in the most ungrateful manner.

2736. Therefore, you think at least the larger proportion of the regiment should be European?—Yes, Europeans; men who are able and willing at all times to go into "the bush."

2737. Were you there at the time of the existence of the old commando system?—No.

2738. When you went to the frontier, I understand you, it was thriving and flourishing?—Yes.

2739. An immense destruction occurred from the incursion of the Kafirs?—Yes.

2740. It was thriving and flourishing under the old commando system; am I to understand that?—It was very flourishing in 1834.

2741. When did the commando system cease?—In the beginning of 1833, I think.

2742. In 1835 it was destroyed?—It was abrogated altogether, by orders, I think, from home.

2743. And the result was a war?—It was understood at the time on the frontier that it was too lenient a system doing away with it, and the Kafirs imagined we were afraid of them, and they could venture to act with impunity.

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2744. Are we able now, after the destruction that has gone along the frontier, to establish a system of militia?—I think so.

2745. Would it be an efficient system of defence?—In conjunction with the regular troops.

2746. Would it be possible to have a system of colonies along the frontier holding by military tenure, such as was the former feudal system on the borders of England and Scotland, for the defence of that country?—I think it would be a very good system, and well worth a trial.

2747. Do you think it possible to carry it out?—It is possible, if you could get people to live there. If there is no protection, of course they could not settle there.

2748. Do you think that any people would go on the frontier if they were not allowed the privilege of defending themselves, or their property when attacked?—It would be a dangerous thing to allow settlers to go on their own account into Kafirland, they might commit injustice.

2749. Under the regulation of the magistrates, would it be difficult?—Under strict regulation it might be very well; it would be a dangerous thing to allow people unrestrictedly to do it.

2750. Were they ever allowed to do it?—I believe often in the old time, when there were cattle depredations, the Field Cornet of the district would assemble the Boers, and go on commando.

2751. Was the Field Cornet a magistrate?—Yes, a magistrate under the Dutch, and under the English also.

2752. What is the length of frontier from the boundary of the Keiskamma to the Amatola mountains, we should have to defend?—It is, in a straight line, about 70 miles; it is usually considered that the length of the frontier in that quarter is 100 miles.

2753. What number of troops would you consider necessary to defend that frontier?—I would have a regiment of European light dragoons, and three regiments of British infantry, besides the native levies.

2754. What will the native levies consist of?—I would endeavour to have Griquas, or Bastards, as they are generally called, to assist.

2755. Would they be more faithful than the Hottentots?—I think so.

2756. Is the Keiskamma fordable in every place?—No; but in various places.

2757. In so many places that you could not defend it by parties

parties placed at the fords?—No; it is fordable in some seasons of the year in a great many places.

2758. And the banks of the river?—They are precipitous, with bush.

2759. Adverse to our defence, and favourable to the Kafirs?—Favourable to the Kafirs, but not nearly so as the bush of the Great Fish River.

2760. Therefore the Keiskamma is a better boundary for our military posts?—Yes.

2761. Is the Buffalo fordable?—It is; the banks of it are tolerably flat; they are not precipitous.

2762. Therefore it is a better boundary than either?—It is a river of minor importance altogether; the best is the Kei. There are few fords across the Kei; the banks are open so far as I saw, free of bush and wood.

2763. *Chairman.*] I think you stated you travelled in Africa under the auspices of the Geographical Society?—Yes.

2764. Can you give the Committee any information as to the agricultural capacity of the Cape, whether it is not at present a good field for colonization?—It would present a very good field if attention were paid to irrigation; there is too little attention paid to that; there ought to be tanks everywhere; the valleys ought to be crossed by dams or bunds, as they call them in India.

2765. It is subject occasionally to long droughts?—Yes; but this might be obviated.

2766. Is it generally a good soil?—There are large tracts of fine soil, and very fertile valleys also.

2767. Is the finer land generally to the eastward round about Graham's Town, and eastward of that in Kafraria?—About Graham's Town the land is indifferent, but the course of the Kowie, the river that takes its rise nearer Graham's Town, presents favourable spots for agricultural purposes.

2768. Is Kafraria generally more fertile than the land within the boundary to the westward of the Keiskamma?—I think it is, as far as I saw; the land increases in fertility as you leave the Keiskamma and proceed to the north-east, until you get to Natal, which is exceedingly fertile.

2769. What is the average temperature at Cape Town?—About 70 degrees I should say was the average.

2770. At Cape Town?—In the summer time, which is our winter, I have seen the thermometer at 90 in Cape Town, and a few miles from Cape Town I have seen a difference of 10 degrees, about 80; that was at the hottest season of the year; at other times I have seen it at 55 and 65.

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2771. Is the range between 55 and 90 throughout the year?—I should think that must be considered the range of the thermometer.

2772. Would that apply to the other portions of the colony about Graham's Town, and again to the eastward of Graham's Town in Kafraria?—Not much difference; I have seen it as much as 110 in Namagualand, a little beyond the Orange River.

2773. All tropical products might be grown with success—Yes.

2774. Have you made any inquiry as to the possibility of cultivating cotton?—At Natal it has been tried, and coffee also.

2775. In the Orange River district?—They have a sort of tobacco grown in considerable quantities.

2776. Is any portion of the Cape colony capable of being applied to the growth of cotton?—I never heard of its being attempted within the Cape colony proper, only at Natal.

2777. Are you of opinion it would at all succeed in any part of Kafraria?—I think it might.

2778. Do you think natives could be induced at all to plant and cultivate cotton?—I think it is worth the trial.

2779. You stated you thought the Indian system of managing the chiefs might be resorted to?—Yes.

2780. Is it possible to induce them, and through them their people, to cultivate cotton for sale?—I think it is possible. There has been a very successful experiment in Rajapootana, in a country very similar to Kafraria. The people there, the Mairs, have been altogether reformed. There was a war there in the first instance; but now they are exceedingly prosperous, and they cultivate the soil. It is in the country between Goozerat and Delhi.

2781. You are speaking of the district under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dixon?—Yes.

2782. What do you think should be the preliminary measures, as between the Government and the chiefs, to induce them to resort to cultivation and the growth of cotton, for instance, for the purposes of trade?—I think that conferences ought to be held with them, and the advantages of a change in their habits ought to be shown.

2783. You would begin probably by respecting their rights and local customs?—Yes.

2784. Do you think it expedient to attempt to confer small pensions upon chiefs, to induce them to resort to industrial occupations?—I think it would be worth a trial. I remember Waterboer, the chief of the Griquas; all he got which made

him

him friendly to the English was 50 *l.* a year, and 200 muskets to arm his people with. He seemed well satisfied. It would not require a large outlay to satisfy the chiefs.

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2785. Do you then think it possible to bring the native chiefs and their people to follow industrial occupations, and to act in harmony with the British Government?—I think it is very well worth a trial, and might possibly succeed with the assistance of intelligent missionaries and schoolmasters.

2786. In your opinion, have the missionaries been successful in introducing civilization?—There are some very valuable men among the missionaries who have appeared in Africa. Mr. Moffat was particularly successful. The Rev. Mr. Shaw and Mr. Schmeling were also very successful.

2787. Have they been successful in introducing pursuits of industry?—They induced the people to cultivate the land to a considerable extent, and I think they reformed their habits.

2788. Where has the most successful experiment of that sort been tried?—Mr. Moffat has been the most successful.

2789. Where?—Amongst the Bechuanas.

2790. That is to the north of the Orange River?—Yes, to the north of the Orange River.

2791. He has had no force to support him?—No; but the people there are not so warlike as the Gaikas. They are a milder people; not so wild and savage as the people on our borders seem to be.

2792. Supposing for a moment the leading chiefs who have taken an active part in this war were removed, whilst the rights of the people were respected, do you think that that would facilitate the means of producing industrial pursuits?—Perhaps it would; if it could be possible to get those men to surrender themselves; Macomo, for instance; he is the head and front of almost all this war.

2793. Macomo is now a man advanced in years somewhat?—Yes, and he was very debauched in his habits; I wonder he has lived so long; they say now he is reformed. Formerly he was always drunk when he had an opportunity.

2794. But supposing the Kafir chiefs were assured of protection, that the rights they now possess were assured to them, and that their boundaries and their lives would be respected, do you think that would facilitate the missionary operations, and also facilitate the efforts of the Government to induce them to follow useful pursuits?—Yes.

2795. May I consider it to be your opinion that it would be inexpedient to attempt to drive the Kafirs out of Kafaria, or to remove the chiefs; but that it would be desirable, by means

of

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of small pensions, to induce them to take to industrial pursuits? —I think it would be the best plan.

2796. Do you think it could be done without the maintenance of a considerable force for some time?—There must be a considerable force to overawe those people, of course, but at the same time, on no account to oppress them or treat them with undue harshness.

2797. Are the Kafirs so different from the Bechuanas you have spoken of, that missionaries and civil magistrates could not induce them to follow peaceful pursuits without the support of the military?—I think not. They have got so many muskets among them, and so many bad characters mixed up with them, which make them worse than they naturally are.

2798. When were you at the Kat River settlement?—In July 1835.

2799. In what state was the settlement then?—The settlement then was divided into two congregations; one was the congregation of the Rev. Mr. Thompson, composed of what they call Bastards; that is a mixed people between the Hottentots and the Dutch; they were very good men indeed; they were the chief cultivators of the Kat River settlement, and converted it into fertile fields. The others were the congregation of the Rev. Mr. Read; they were Hottentots, and they were not so good as those under Mr. Thompson; at least I thought so, from what I saw.

2800. Did the natives actually cultivate the land, and depend upon the produce of the land for their support and subsistence?—Chiefly; the congregation of Mr. Thompson did; the others were more idle; the Hottentots are idle people.

2801. Did they raise any produce for sale?—I did not hear that they raised any for sale, or beyond merely what was wanted for the supply of their own wants.

2802. Was it in the flourishing state that you have described it at that time?—It looked very flourishing at that time.

2803. As far as you know, at that time was there any direct Government aid given to them?—It was during the war time, when the Kat River people, as well as others, were obliged to be supported by rations from the Government; the Kafirs had plundered them also:

2804. The aid then given was only to the families of those persons who were in the field engaged in the war?—Yes, for a temporary purpose.

2805. Are there any general observations you would wish to make?—Merely, I would say, I consider that the best way to maintain friendly relations with the people beyond our borders

is by an annual mission to them, and by small pensions to the chiefs, and inducing them also to visit Cape Town, and to receive the missionaries and schoolmasters, and also to engage in trade as much as possible, and to give them a taste of European habits.

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2806. Mr. *Hindley*.] Do you think that is practicable?—I think it is quite possible; it has never been fairly tried.

2807. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think that any treaty would bind them, to prevent them from stealing cattle?—Not without a strong force to overawe them.

2808. Then, in fact, all moral improvements must be preceded by a very strong force to keep them in subjection?—Decidedly; they would laugh at any treaty without a sufficient force.

2809. Are you aware of any rules that the herdsmen are obliged to comply with on losing their cattle, which make it very difficult to obtain the cattle, and whether the farmers on the frontiers have repeatedly made complaints to the Government on the impossibility of obtaining justice?—There was at one time a rule, that when a Kafir was found plundering, he could not be fired at, but merely pursued with a hue and cry, and followed to the border.

2810. Are they not obliged to comply with four or five requisitions before they can obtain any justice; was not the farmer obliged to take his oath "that he traced his cattle across a particular spot on the boundary line; that the cattle, when stolen, were properly guarded by an armed herdsman; that the pursuit was commenced immediately after the cattle were stolen; that, if stolen during the night, the cattle had been properly secured in a kraal; that the pursuit in that case was at latest commenced early next morning;" before he could obtain anything from the magistrates, was not he obliged to make oath to those five points?—I am aware that was the custom.

2811. How far was the magistrate from him, to whom he would make oath on this subject?—Sometimes 20 or 30 miles off.

2812. Was not the consequence this: when it could not be sworn before a magistrate, and no magistrate could be found, that the plunder became a legal prize to the Kafir who stole it?—It would be exceedingly difficult to recover it then, of course.

2813. But did not it, in fact, legalize the robbery, if the person could not swear to those things, though he had lost the cattle?—If they could not go through those forms.

2814. Literally,

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2814. Literally, robbery was legalized by our own arrangements on the frontier; was it not so?—It seemed to be a mistaken system altogether.

2815. You condemn that system?—It was not stringent enough.

2816. Are you aware that several petitions were presented to our governors on the frontier, complaining, in fact, that they could get no justice and no defence for their property, from the system that was adopted?—I have heard of that.

2817. Sir E. Burton.] Were you in the colony when these rules were in force?—It was before I went to the colony.

2818. In what year?—I went to the colony in the beginning of 1835, and I was there until the beginning of 1838; three years.

2819. Colonel Dunne.] Were they not continued while you were in the colony, and afterwards; was there any abrogation of those rules that you know of?—The Kafir war had changed altogether the system, and then, when Sir Benjamin D'Urban was removed from his governorship, a new system took place altogether.

2820. Are you or not acquainted with the facts, that those rules remained as the rules for the recovery of stolen cattle to a later period than the one you speak of, when you were engaged with Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—I have heard they continued in force in 1838, and after 1838.

2821. Sir E. Burton.] Were they in force when you were in the colony?—The system was upset altogether in consequence of the Kafir war of 1835.

2822. Have you any practical experience of the inconvenience of those rules which have been mentioned?—I remember one cause of complaint of a Dutch settler was this, in relation to the protection of the natives. There was a Dutchman said, if he inflicted a blow on his own coloured servant, he had to go a long distance to a magistrate to answer for it, and was perhaps fined 5*l.*, and so on. He had to go long distances to answer complaints, which was a great grievance.

2823. Did you feel that to be a grievance when you were in the colony?—It seemed to be a new thing for them altogether; it harassed the minds of those people, because they did not conceive they were very cruel, or cruel at all, to their coloured people, who were exceedingly idle and careless as servants, and that was the great cause of irritation to the Dutch on the frontier.

2824. Was it a reasonable cause of irritation?—I think it was,

was, to be taken away from their employment to answer frivolous complaints often on the part of their coloured servants.

2825. Colonel *Dunne*.] You speak of those complaints that were frivolous?—Of those that were really frivolous.

2826. Then if it were a complaint well grounded, of a man having ill treated his servants, you would not disapprove of his being brought up?—No; merely of the frivolous complaints.

2827. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Do you approve of the permission to strike a hired servant on the part of the Boers?—No, certainly not.

2828. You do not mean that?—Certainly not.

2829. Colonel *Dunne*.] In fact, in any society where a magistrate is at such a distance from the people, there must be a balance of inconvenience?—Yes.

2830. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Have you any knowledge of the land beyond the Kei, as to the quality of it?—I know it by report only; I saw it from the heights in the upper part of the Kei, as far as the Bashee; it seemed to be a very fine country; it had a very promising appearance, as far as I could see.

2831. Have you reason to believe it is as fertile as British Kafiraria, or the Ceded Territory?—Yes.

2832. Do you know whether it is densely populated?—The population of Hintza's country beyond the Kei was reckoned about 80,000, but I doubt that; some say it was then only 40,000. Sir Benjamin D'Urban removed from Hintza's country 17,000 Fingoes, who were slaves to the Kafirs of Hintza; I do not include those in the population of Hintza's country; they were a distinct people altogether.

2833. My desire in asking that question was to ascertain your opinion as to the propriety of driving such tribes, or portions of such tribes, from the westward to the eastward of the Kei?—I think it would be rather a dangerous experiment, seeing that we appear to wish to promote the prosperity of Natal, because that might induce those people to attack our people at Natal instead of the people on the west, or of Cape Colony Proper.

2834. Are you then of opinion that driving a large portion of the Kafirs from British Kafiraria over the Kei into Kafiraria Proper would again drive the other tribes on the eastward towards Natal?—The expatriated Kafirs might attack Natal.

2835. And the result would be dangerous to that colony?—Yes; if Natal was not there it might be tried; but that being occupied as a British settlement, it would be dangerous.

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2836. Otherwise do you believe there is a sufficiency of land to drive a number of the tribes from British Kafraria over the Kei for them to occupy; is there any sufficient space?—There are 200 miles usually reckoned to the south-west of Natal, without a single inhabitant hardly.

2837. Then, believing that the land of Kafraria Proper is as fertile as that of British Kafraria, and seeing also there is a large quantity of that land unoccupied, you do not think it would be a very great hardship upon the people to drive certain tribes over the Kei?—But the difficulty is how to do it, and how to keep them there.

2838. Would you think it a great hardship upon those people?—No; I should not think it a great hardship, because the country is fertile, and capable of cultivation in their simple way of cultivating the ground. It is also susceptible of supporting large flocks and herds.

2839. I ask the question, because evidence has been given of the desirability of driving some portion of those predatory tribes of Kafirs across the Kei?—Perhaps so.

2840. Mr. Mackinnon.] You state that if we drive them across the particular boundary, it would drive the other tribes to the north-east towards Natal?—It might.

2841. Upon what do you found that opinion; because, as you stated, there is a sufficiency of land, namely, 200 miles of land, unoccupied. Why, if that be so, and they were driven there, should those tribes in their turn be driven farther on to the eastward?—I did not say so; that it would drive other tribes on Natal, but the Gaika Kafirs themselves on Natal; they would plunder our settlements there, instead of plundering the Cape colony as they have done hitherto; that is what I mean to say.

2842. The tribe driven out by us, would be itself driven on farther towards Natal?—Yes.

2843. You did not quite say that; you said other tribes would be driven, as I understood you?—I mean to say the people who had been driven out of Gaika's country would take to plundering Natal, because they have got so many muskets and ammunition; whereas the Zoolus have no muskets or ammunition yet, but they may have soon.

2844. Then it is your decided opinion, that if we drove them out of the district they now possess, they would not locate amongst the other tribes, but become a sort of roving tribe?—I think it would be likely to be the case; unless their present habits and feelings were changed they would be desirous

sirous of revenge, and revenging themselves particularly on the British wherever they found them.

2845. Mr. *Hindley*.] You have given an account of the depredations of the Kafirs in 1834 and 1838?—Yes.

2846. Do you think their character and conduct are improved since?—It appears not; I do not hear of any improvement in them at all.

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*Lunæ, 7<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Labouchere.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Sir Joshua Walmsley.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Sir Edward Buxton.

Viscount Mandeville.  
Mr. Monsell.  
Marquis of Granby.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Colonel Thompson.

THE RIGHT HON. H. LABOUCHERE, IN THE CHAIR.

General Sir *Peregrine Maitland*, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

2847. *Chairman*.] WHEN did you fill the situation of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope?—On the 14th of March 1844 I was sworn in.

2848. How long did you continue there?—About three years, till the beginning of 1847.

2849. You are aware of the objects for which this Committee was appointed?—To examine into the state of our Kafir relations.

2850. I think at the period you were so employed you had occasion to consider very minutely the state of the colony with reference to the Kafir tribes?—I had.

2851. What was the general condition of the Kafir frontier when you were there?—The Kafir frontier at that time was a great deal unsettled on account of the number of robberies that had been committed, and there had been one or two boers killed. The petitions from the frontier were very numerous, and there had been others previous to my arrival, in Sir  
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George Napier's time, which had been transmitted to Lord Stanley, and Lord Stanley desired me to investigate the state of things, and to modify, if necessary, the existing treaties.

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2853. When was that interval?—It was after I had visited the frontier, and entered into new treaties with the Griquas; after placing troops in the ceded territory, and forming a post there, there was a cessation of plunder altogether, I think, for more than six months, which was unprecedented.

2854. What do you apprehend to have been the principal cause of the outbreak of hostilities in 1846?—I ought previously, I think, to explain what was the occasion of the recommencement of the Kafir plunder. The expatriated boers beyond the frontier had attacked the Griquas, who were our allies, and to prevent them from destroying that tribe, I had to move the troops from the Kafir frontier. At the same time, there was great excitement in the minds of the boers in the colony, and a very strong threat to join their brethren to repel the troops which were sent to aid the Griquas. That, I think, was the occasion of the Kafirs renewing their depredations. It seems, from a speech of Mr. Nell's, who was the great orator of the boers, that the Kafirs sent messengers to the boers, to ask them why they let us subdue their brethren? why they did not join them to drive us away from the country? I think that that excitement had an influence upon the Kafirs.

2855. I find this sentence in an address which you published on the 31st of March 1836: "So far as a feeling of hostility amongst the Kafirs might be provoked or palliated, by even one solitary act of violence, outrage, or injustice, committed by any colonist in Kafirland, the Kafirs are without excuse. No Kafir can charge the commission of any such act during, at all events, the last seven years. It is with pride and pleasure that I make this statement, which I believe to be accurate, even to the letter"?—I believe so.

2856. This was your deliberate opinion at that time?—That was my deliberate opinion at that time, and I think so still; I have no reason to think otherwise.

2857. To what, therefore, generally speaking, do you attribute the hostilities of 1846?—I attribute it to our attempting to control their thieving in the colony.

2858. The war was a very troublesome and expensive war?

—Very

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—Very troublesome and expensive; it was rendered very much more so by the pressure of the drought that prevailed.

2859. At that time the communications were much less perfect than they are now?—They were, and when the war began, all the communications were at times interrupted by the Kafirs.

2860. The communication between the colony and the eastern frontier was very slow, and the transport of every thing very expensive?—Yes, the things were landed at Port Elizabeth, and after a time, our supply from that quarter entirely ceased; had not we landed the things in Pato's country, after driving him back, we should have been starved.

2861. You did not continue in the colony, I think, until the termination of those hostilities?—No, I was with the troops in Krel's territory, beyond the Kei, expecting to finish the war there, when I was recalled.

2862. You have, I dare say, a general knowledge of what has taken place in the colony since you left it, and the circumstances under which it is now placed by the present Kafir war?—Yes, to a certain extent I have.

2863. Will you favour the Committee with any opinion that you may have formed, as to the general policy which you think it is advisable for this country to pursue with regard to the frontier of Cape Colony?—I think well of the line of frontier I had intended to take, and the manner in which I had intended to defend it, might be still applicable, only that it would be now difficult not to take the Amatolas in.

2864. What is that line of frontier?—The course of the Keiskamma and Chumie, taking in Blockdrift.

2865. Would you make the Great Kei the boundary?—I would make the Great Kei the boundary for British Kafirland; that is, I would admit Kafirs there, the Kafirs that would become British subjects, and that would give up their arms and register themselves and their cattle.

2866. Would you carry the limits of the British colony itself as far as the Great Kei?—No; I would not locate British subjects, I mean white men, beyond the Fish River. I should take in the ceded territory, and occupy it with the troops and coloured settlers, as I have explained in my despatches.

2867. You would occupy in a military manner the country as far as the Great Kei River, including the Amatola ridge?—What I had intended was this: I had driven the Kafirs out of the ceded territory; that I intended to maintain; to have no Kafirs in it at all, but to have occupied it with troops; to have had four or five strong posts, and not to have dispersed the troops in small posts in Kafirland; so that I could send

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out a respectable force whenever I pleased, to act immediately upon Kafirland. I would have had no Kafirs there; I would not have had them intermingled with my posts. I would have placed Hottentots and Fingoes there under a defensive organization, superintended by British officers, and have given them up all the old fortified barracks for their wives and families; they would have had also the protection of the line of troops in the ceded territory.

2868. Do you think those people could be depended upon, as a barrier against the Kafirs on the frontier?—I certainly thought so then, and I have still great faith in them. I believe that the Hottentots have been misled, probably in part by the state of things in the colony. They are restless, but they are easily brought to reason.

2869. Is it essential, do you think, supposing the present war to be terminated favourably, and the country to be completely subdued, to keep on the frontier a considerable military force of regular troops for some time?—Certainly; a large force for some time.

2870. Can you tell at all what number would be required?—I should think 6,000 men.

2871. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] With your present views do you desire to allow the Kafirs to come within the ceded territory or entirely over the Great Kei?—Not to come within the ceded territory, nor entirely over the Great Kei.

2872. You would drive them out of British Kaffraria?—Out of the ceded territory. They were driven out before I came away; and I settled that they should leave the ceded territory altogether; they were coming in and registering themselves, and giving up their arms, this being understood.

2873. Then what would be the limits at the outside of which you would keep the Kafirs?—I would keep the Kafirs without the Keiskamma and the Chumie, which would connect our line unbroken with the Kat River settlement.

2874. Would you have forts to the eastward of the Keiskamma?—No, and only one to the eastward of the Chumie, which is Block Drift, where the position is particularly favourable. I would have had my other posts in the ceded territory, I should have had no Kafirs, but other coloured people, on my line of communication.

2875. *Chairman.*] Have you formed any opinion of the policy that it would be desirable for this country to pursue towards the Kafir tribes, with a view to prevent their constant depredations?—The most effective policy would be the locating of the Fish River Bush with Hottentots and other coloured people.

people. When the Kafirs occupied that boundary it was impossible to prevent them from getting off with their plunder. A friendly coloured people, grazing their goats and cattle in the bush, would be the best guardians we could have.

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2876. In the event of those depredations still taking place, what system should be adapted in order to prevent their recurrence and to punish them?—I should have sent immediately the police, and insisted upon the chief, who was the head of the district, giving up the plundered property, and if he would not, I should have immediately marched a body of 700 or 800 troops in, and compelled restitution and a just fine.

2877. Do you approve of what has been called the patrol system in the pursuit of Kafir robbers?—That has been the only alternative hitherto; we have never followed them with a military force in time of peace; but now we should have them under a different organization; all those would be considered British subjects who remained on our side of the Kei, and those who did not choose to register themselves as such, and give up their arms, would be driven across the Kei, where there is plenty of room for them, and there we would have entered into treaties with them.

2878. You think it would be our policy to uphold the authority of the chiefs, and deal with the Kafirs through the medium of the chiefs?—I intended not to have done quite that; the chiefs should not be hereditary, but I would appoint the chiefs to be heads of districts, and they should hold their authority from the Governor.

2879. You would have given them magisterial authority?—Yes.

2880. And have held them responsible?—Yes, under a civil commissioner.

2881. Do you think the Kafirs would acquiesce in that?—The chiefs gave in their submissions to me upon those terms, clearly explained to them.

2882. And you think the Kafirs themselves would acquiesce in such a system?—I think they would, under strict but kind management, and if they saw that you had force enough to support it.

2883. Did you find in the Kafir war you were engaged in, great inconvenience in consequence of the distance of the seat of Government from the scene of that war?—It was lessened by the zeal of my council. But Cape Town was the seat also of mercantile business, and of my commissariat resources.

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My commissary-general was necessarily there, at a distance of 600 miles; a great inconvenience.

2884. Do you think the residence of the principal officer of the British Government ought to be nearer the Kafir frontier than Cape Town?—I think decidedly there ought to be an officer, with paramount authority on the frontier; it is always a questionable thing to move a capital, particularly one as Cape Town is situated. I should be very loath to move the Government from Cape Town; but there should be a competent authority on the frontier.

2885. Would any authority be competent, except the authority of the principal governor in the country?—I suppose you might constitute one.

2886. Do you think a Lieutenant-governor would be sufficient?—Whether you call him Lieutenant-governor or Governor, he ought to be left to act entirely independently.

2887. You think there should be somebody on the frontier who could act independently, and upon his own responsibility, as occasion required?—I think so, certainly.

2888. Mr. *Hindley*.] That was not your opinion with regard to the relation in which you stood to Colonel Hare?—In what I did I abided by the tenor of my commission. I had also to revise the treaties Lord Stanley's desire; this I should have done, whatever opinion I held.

2889. *Chairman*.] Do you think, speaking generally, that it would be true to say, that the conduct of the British Government towards the Kafirs has been marked by a want of that proper degree of forbearance which is due from a civilized country to tribes less civilized?—I should say not: my most ardent wish was to have benefited them in every way.

2890. Do you think any advance has been made in civilization among the Kafir tribes, by the efforts of missionaries, or others?—I think not a great deal; but I think the few that came over to us with the missionaries were most exemplary people: there were few, but their conduct was very exemplary.

2891. You are acquainted with India?—Yes, a little.

2892. Had you had occasion to see some of the wild tribes in India, some of the mountain tribes?—Not much of the mountain tribes.

2893. Have you any means of comparing the Kafirs with those Indian tribes, with respect to their disposition to receive civilization, and the stopping of those marauding habits among them?—The best way, I think, is to employ missionaries, to establish schools, and encourage agricultural pursuits.

2894. Have

2894. Have they a disposition to enter into the pursuits of commerce?—No; only as far as selling their hides and the gum of the mimosa. Here I may remark, that one plain proof that the Kafirs were preparing themselves for hostilities is, that they are so well furnished with arms and ammunition, because the Kafirs have not a head of game in their country. They are not like the tribes of North America, hunters; the women cultivate the soil, and the sole occupation of the men is the acquisition and care of cattle.

2895. As a matter of humanity and policy, is it indispensable that there should be such a force for some time upon the frontier as shall not expose those wild tribes to the temptation of supposing they can resume hostilities with advantage?—I think so, clearly. It is the most humane thing we can do.

2896. They are formidable opponents in war, are they not?—In the bush they are.

2897. And they have improved in that respect since you were there, I apprehend?—I should think in some degree they no doubt profit by the Hottentots that have joined them.

2898. When you were there you think they could not make much stand against regular troops?—Not for a lengthened period, nor in the open country at all.

2899. In the bush, and among the rocks, they could?—Yes; but they never did make any long stand; they generally evaded us.

2900. Mr. Mackinnon.] Do you consider that the Kafirs are a more agricultural or a pastoral nation?—I should say pastoral; they have not sheep, but cattle.

2901. Do you consider that they would incur great hardship and privation if they were driven out of the Amatola, as you have been stating, on the other side of the river?—There would be plenty of room, and plenty of open space for them, on the other side of the Kei. On this point I inquired particularly of a missionary, who knows that country very well; from him I understood, I need be under no apprehension on that account.

2902. Then they would not be received hostilely by the tribes, or the parties on the other side of the river, into whose land they would be driven?—No; it is land that is in fact unoccupied.

2903. As a matter of fact, then, there would be no cruelty or hardship?—No; there would be no cruelty or hardship as regards space; but I should be sorry to dispossess the submissive ones of the land further than the Keiskamma, because we should have there a much better opportunity of civilizing them;

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them; the refractory ones would, for their own sakes, not less than ours, be better beyond the Kei.

2904. The outline of your recommendation is that a settlement should be made with the Fingoes and Hottentots in the rear, and then in front we should have a line of posts?—Yes, a line of strong posts, but not surrounded by the Kafirs; to small and dispersed posts I particularly object. Considering the limited number of troops that I could count upon, I should have taken up the line of the ceded territory, as I have stated, relying upon Waterloo Bay for my landing place. We had not more accidents when I so employed it, than I see have occurred at the mouth of the Buffalo. I should have got Madras surf boats.

2905. If the Fingoes and Hottentots were settled as you mention would they cultivate the land?—They would cultivate the land to a certain extent, and their cattle browse the bush.

2906. And locate themselves there?—Yes, and locate themselves there.

2907. I think you said that occasionally the Hottentots were rather changeable?—They do not like being away from home long.

2908. Therefore they would be satisfied and contented with cultivating the land in the rear of the posts you have mentioned?—Yes.

2909. Marquis of *Granby*.] Do you think that, in a military point of view, the Buffalo River is a better boundary than the Kei?—It will require more troops than I was likely to have had to protect it; and I think it would not be complete without the Amatolas in our possession.

2910. As regards the coloured settlements you have spoken of, I see in your despatch of the 18th of September 1846, you say, you would have a defensible village, or the villages defensible; do you adhere to that as between the Fish River and the Buffalo River? I will read the passage to you in your despatch; it is this: "To occupy this country by a series of coloured settlements, each consisting of a defensible village, in which the population of the settlement shall reside, and surrounded by ample lands for pasture and tillage."—That was not actually the last opinion I formed. I changed my view once or twice as I got more acquainted with the country. I would have placed the Hottentots and coloured settlers in our old military posts on the Fish River line. These places of security for their families would have induced them to locate immediately.

2911. You think it would be better to have a settlement of coloured

coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, than have Europeans in that ceded territory?—Certainly.

2912. You think it is better to have them, than leave the country to be altogether depopulated, and have a space without any inhabitants whatever?—I would place the Hottentots and Fingoes first of all in the rear of the troops, that is, in the rear of our posts, and along the Fish River; we should see what the effect of that would be, whether it would protect the colony; then I would go on locating the ceded territory with the coloured people, if I found it answered.

2913. And, with regard to Kafirland, the district of country beyond the Keiskamma, I see you state in this despatch, "Over the country between the boundary line I have suggested and the Kei river, probably some sort of control ought to be maintained." What sort of control do you allude to there?—I thought it would be necessary to establish over them a system of control and superintendence, whereby their submission might be completed and fostered into a habit. Therefore, when they sued for peace, the terms proposed by me were, their loss of the territory west of the Chumie and Keiskamma, the surrender of their arms and booty, a stipulated payment of cattle for the injuries they had inflicted, and submission to the British rule if they remained west of the Kei river. To this the Gaika chiefs, one by one, agreed, and came to be registered, professing to place themselves at my disposal, under the distinct understanding, that in so doing they abdicated their chieftainship, and that any power they might possess thereafter, would be only by delegation from the British Government.

2914. Mr. *Monseil*.] Do you think sending the surveying party by Colonel Hare had anything to do with the breaking out of the war in 1846?—No, after I had seen the Kafirs in 1844, and entered into new treaties with them, Sandilli's councillor got up, and on behalf of Sandilli, who was present, he congratulated the Gaika chiefs upon the British Government having taken it into their hands to check the marauders, and place a post in the country; he said, "Now we shall be able to master the thieves;" and he made a long speech to that effect. Sandilli himself, by the diplomatic agent, proposed to me to place a post at Blockdrift. I should not have had an idea of a post there but for his proposing it.

2915. There was some difference of opinion between you and Colonel Hare upon the subject?—Yes; but Colonel Hare thought his explanation to Sandilli had removed any unfriendly feeling the chief might have had; and he was quite satisfied afterwards that the war party were influenced by other motives.

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2916. Do you know anything of the character of the native tribes in the neighbourhood of Natal?—Very little.

2917. Do you know whether they were likely to become troublesome to the British settlers there?—I suppose they will some of them be troublesome.

2918. Are they of much the same character as the Kafir tribes?—The Zoolus are not; they now occupy Natal, as our subjects, about 120,000 at present, have been driven in by the tyranny of their chiefs.

2919. Marquis of *Granby*.] With reference to the surveying party at Blockdrift, your opinion was quoted the other day, and I think it was somewhat mistaken; I should like, therefore, to set it right. At question 2536, you were asked this: "Then I will read to you the opinion of Sir Peregrine Maitland himself upon the occurrence, and then I will ask you your own opinion upon it;" and the opinion the honourable Member read was this: "The sending of the surveying party to Blockdrift, prior to the conclusion of the former agreement with Sandilli for the ground, was a great error." That is put in as your opinion, and I think, in referring to the despatch, you will find that it was not your opinion, but the opinion of Colonel Hare that you quoted?—I quoted Colonel Hare's opinion, but there is no doubt about it; it was unfortunate; but every explanation was given, and Colonel Hare was satisfied of the contentment of the chief. I would not certainly have sent a party to survey; what I meant was that Colonel Walpole should ride over, and look at the ground that Sandilli had proposed that we should occupy.

2920. Colonel *Dunne*.] When you say it was proposed, you mean that Sandilli had proposed it?—Two years before he had proposed it.

2921. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Unless the Kafirs had been already inclined to go to war, they would not have taken up such a slight error as that?—Certainly not; the Resident was on the spot when Colonel Walpole arrived, and he would have said, Do not bring the surveying party here, had he been made aware that Sandilli would object to it.

2922. Colonel *Dunne*.] It was a mere pretence for war?—It was not made a pretence for war afterwards; it was our taking into custody within the colony a man who had stolen in the colony from a shop at Fort Beaufort; they sent in a party to rescue him, they fired upon our party and did rescue him, and the Hottentot he was bound to they murdered, and cut his arm off. We demanded the people who had inflicted the injury, and they would not give them up to us; and it was

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only a little before I accepted the chiefs' submission, in November 1846, that they gave them up on my repeating the demand. They could not make the survey a pretence for this outrage.

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2923. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Did you, in the main, adhere to the policy which was established by Lord Glenelg, with reference to the Kafirs?—I think, in the main, except the putting of posts in the ceded territory, and which had the effect, as I have said, for six months, of keeping all matters quiet; that was such a cessation of robberies as had not been previously known. The ceded territory brings the Kafirs close to our border; they cannot resist the temptation to steal the cattle. Their laws and usages are unfortunate: a young man has to buy his wife, he has to give so many cattle for her; what can he do? he asks his friend to assist him to get them in the colony, and says, I will do the same for you. They have no other active occupation.

2924. *Chairman*.] You stated, that the limits of the colony are now the Great Fish River?—The Keiskamma and the Chumie I took as limits; the limits of European farms I meant to be the old Fish River.

2925. Are you aware whether there are many European settlers now beyond the Great Fish River?—No, there are none of the colonists there, unless they have been placed there lately since I came away. I do not know whether there has not been a military settlement placed there.

2926. Am I to understand you, you would revert to the policy of keeping what is now called Victoria as a neutral ground, which should be neither inhabited by the Kafirs nor by the British settlers?—No; I should place the troops there; if Victoria means the ceded territory, I would not have any Kafirs there.

2927. Nor European settlers?—I would have no European settlers there, unless in towns. I would not let them have any cattle farms there.

2928. Do you imagine it would be possible for us to drive the Kafirs out of the Amatola Mountains?—I conceive it quite possible to do so.

2929. And to maintain that as a frontier freed from the presence of Kafirs?—I think so; I think you may do it.

2930. To effect that where would you station the troops?—I should station the troops just upon the same principle; as I have stated, I would take up the line of the Buffalo; but then I would let no Kafirs settle between the Buffalo and the colony, nor in the Amatolas. I would let no Kafir be in the

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rear of my posts; and I would adopt the same principle of four or five large posts, instead of scattering small posts through the country.

2931. Mr. B. Carter.] I understand that the opinions you have given with regard to the frontier policy were what you would have done?—What I should have done.

2932. And now you think it is desirable, as Sir Harry Smith has expressed an opinion in favour of making the Buffalo the frontier, to carry the same policy out, taking the Buffalo instead of the Keiskamma?—Yes; but then I must put in the proviso that he is allowed troops to do it. I was always pressed to send back the troops as soon as I could spare them, and I took the line most compatible with the amount of force likely to be permanently spared.

2933. I understand that you have stated the general principle upon which you would have dealt with the frontier, in your own time, and that those principles may yet be carried out, subject to such alterations as may have become necessary from the state of circumstances at present occurring, which may render it necessary to advance the frontier?—Yes, just so.

2934. Do you consider more troops would be required at the Buffalo frontier than the Keiskamma?—Yes; I think any extension of frontier would require that; the frontier would not be extended in length, but it would be further from the colony, and the course of the frontier would be rather altered by taking up the Buffalo line.

2935. Colonel Dunne.] Is not there an advantage gained by the Buffalo, that you can get your supplies by sea more easily?—Yes; but from what I have seen in the papers I judge the loss of shipping to be as great at the Buffalo as it was near the mouth of the Great Fish River.

2936. There is no advantage gained, you think, as a better landing place?—I fear little; the report of the naval officer I sent was not very encouraging in that respect; there is smooth water within the bar; but the bar is dangerous.

2937. Must not the base of all our operations now be from some port, and not from the colony?—Certainly, from some port or landing place in Kafirland.

2938. Sir E. Buxton.] Would you drive the Kafirs altogether out of the territory between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo?—If the latter river is decided to be our line, certainly I would.

2939. You would not allow Kafirs, even though they were subject to British rule, to remain in that territory?—I would not,

not, between the troops and the colony. I think that our cattle farms offer a temptation that they cannot resist.

2940. Mr. *Hindley*.] You would not have Kafirs between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo?—Not if you take up the new line; you see I should have taken little away from the Kafirs but what was formerly neutral ground, and had been restored to them, and this for the sake of getting a better line, and interposing coloured settlements as a barrier between them and our cattle farms.

2941. Sir *E. Burton*.] Can you give the Committee any opinion as to the effect upon those Kafirs who may be driven to the eastward of the Buffalo?—They would not like it, of course. I had given up the idea of taking up the line of the Buffalo; it is a tempting line, but it requires a larger force, and is not, I think, complete without the Amatolas.

2942. Mr. *Hindley*.] In what respect is the Buffalo line tempting?—It is a shorter line, and the prospect of a landing place at the mouth of a river in smooth water is a tempting consideration, though a dangerous bar is to be first crossed.

2943. In the event of the Buffalo being made the frontier line, what use would be made of the land between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo?—I should keep it free from settlers entirely; I would not let European settlers into it.

2944. Nor Kafirs?—Nor Kafirs; I should not object to Kama's Kafirs; they are friendly and attached to us.

2945. Sir *E. Burton*.] Their chief is Kama?—Yes; he is a Christian; but his tribe are not Christians, or but few of them are.

2946. Would not such a measure as you have described, namely, the driving of the Kafirs to the east of the Buffalo, reduce them to poverty?—No, I do not think it would reduce them to poverty; because, as I have said, beyond the Kei they have plenty of land, and there is nothing to make them poorer, if they take their cattle with them.

2947. Mr. *Hindley*.] In all this arrangement of the frontier, do you discard all considerations except those of expediency?—No, I do not discard all considerations except those of expediency. I think that nothing can be more demoralizing than to have a state of frontier in which you are perpetually disturbed by inroads, and in the course of the year two or three people fall; it is a perpetual state of warfare.

2948. Is not it demoralizing if the Governor and the British do not recognise the principles of justice?—Certainly.

2949. And can it be consistent with those principles to be dealing with the Kafir land precisely as we please, and appointing

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ing the Kafir chiefs as you propose, without any regard to the hereditary rights those chiefs possess?—It comes to this; you must either drive the Kafirs out, or they will drive you out, one or the other. Your questions to me have all been those of expediency.

2950. Viscount *Mandeville*.] It is just a question whether you are unjust to the colonists or protect them. You see no injustice in punishing the Kafirs for their robberies?—I do not hesitate to say the Kafirs had no cause of complaint whatever against the colony; that their plunder has been altogether for the love of plunder, and that they had no cause of complaint against the colony; there were no reprisals made. Macomo came and said he had lost two horses. I desired the garrison to be paraded, and he could not find out the people he had lent them to; but I found out that two of the 7th Dragoons had deserted and taken the two ponies he had lent them. I paid him for those horses far more than they were worth.

2951. Colonel *Dunne*.] Was not it the fact that those Kafirs who inhabit this country did become possessed of it in the way we have?—Yes, just so.

2952. Sir *E. Buxton*.] How long since?—They removed the Hottentots, and the Hottentots removed the Bushmen.

2953. How long ago was it they became possessed of it?—I forget at this moment.

2954. Colonel *Estcourt*.] They having begun the war, it would be quite fair to adopt a line of policy upon the frontier that would suit our defence for the future?—Yes, and I think humanity requires it.

2955. Whether you take land from the Kafirs or not, it would not be dealing unjustly with them, they having begun the war?—No, certainly; they began the last war. You cannot allow the Kafirs to take a prisoner out of your hands, and to murder your escort, with impunity.

2956. Mr. *Hindley*.] Do you think the complaints of the colonists respecting depredations committed by the Kafirs were always just and well founded?—I think in some instances they were; in a few they were not, but they were generally well founded.

2957. Are you aware of a circumstance that took place, I think in the year 1842; you may perhaps have heard of it; on the 19th of June 1841, it was reported that “a man of the name of Redman, a superintendent of cattle belonging to Mr. Howse, went to the door and looked out; the moment he did so a Kafir shot him through the head, and he fell back into the hut,

hut, and never spoke afterwards; the Kafirs immediately left the place; they only fired the one shot, and those that we heard were fired by two Hottentots belonging to the deceased." That is signed "J. F. Lonsdale, Captain 27th Regiment." That was on the 19th of June 1841. On the 19th of June, the very same day, there was a requisition for a public meeting at Graham's Town; that meeting was held on the 21st, and a number of very strong resolutions were passed, accusing the Kafirs of plunder and depredations, and outrage and murder, the murders chiefly being, I believe, confined to this fact. Lieut.-Governor Colonel Hare had immediately informed the Kafir chiefs, and he says that they were exceedingly diligent in sending out persons to discover the Kafir who had shot this Redman. Now, on the 25th of June, that is four days after the meeting, I find the following letter from Mr. West, the resident magistrate, to Mr. Hudson, the acting secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor:—"In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, received this morning, I beg to acquaint you that I have no doubt Redman came to his death by accident, and by his own hand. The examinations with respect to this matter are not yet finally concluded, it being the intention of the public prosecutor to proceed against one of the two Hottentots sent up in custody from Fort Brown, for perjury, in having falsely accused the other; but under any view of the case, there is not the slightest pretence for charging Redman's death, either directly or indirectly, upon the Kafirs." Now, does not this manifestly state a great exaggeration on the part of the colonists?—They certainly do not understate their grievances.

2958. Do you not think they exceedingly exaggerate them? —I think that is the case; but in England you would hear very much the same language under the same circumstances. I hope I shall not be misunderstood. When I am asked all those questions about the best frontier, I am answering as to the point of expediency as things are in existence, not entering into the question of the justice at all. You are now asking me what I think is best to be done to put an end to the war. I am in no apprehension as to the issue of the war, nor from the first have I feared that there will be anything like a victory gained by the Kafirs; but still it is a very dilatory, and harassing, and expensive kind of war; and I believe you will find it so. They may not have a drought to contend with, as I had, and which augmented our expense twenty-fold, and reduced me to the necessity of taking a longer process. I was obliged to open a new line of country through Pato's country, and instead of moving against the Amatolas at once, I had

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first to drive the T'Slambies back to the Kei; we should have been starved but for this precaution.

2959. Do you not think that the Kafir chiefs have a sense of the principles of justice?—I think some have, to a certain extent. I think a great many of their subjects have not.

2960. We have it in evidence that the chiefs respect each other, but I am sorry to say we have it in evidence the chiefs never respect our Governors at the Cape; can you account for that?—That is a very a strong assertion; I doubt its accuracy. I was six or eight weeks with the Gaika Kafirs when they were coming in and registering, and they must have been very great adepts in hypocrisy if they had no respect for me. I was on good terms with Macomo and others.

2961. Sir J. Walmsley.] Looking at the position of things as they now stand, seeing the Kafirs are in hostility to the British, do you see any other course than that of prosecuting the war now?—No, I do not; that I am decided upon; you must not appear to draw back or give in in any thing; if you do, they will attribute it to fear and weakness.

2962. Chairman.] You think that it is absolutely necessary, to keep us out of war with them, that the Kafirs should be convinced we are the stronger party?—Yes, the Kafirs should be thoroughly convinced that we are the stronger party.

2963. Colonel Estcourt.] And having concluded the war, we must maintain the frontier by a military force for some time?—Yes. If we had gone on making the Kafirs give up their arms and plunder, and register themselves as British subjects, or go beyond the Kei, they would have felt that we were the victors. Sir Harry Smith attempted it in a different manner. He thought, perhaps, the submission they gave to him in kissing his feet would have the same effect, but I doubt whether the Kafirs felt it in the same way.

2964. Mr. Hindley.] Should you think 6,000 men would be required to keep our frontier?—Yes, I think humanity would require as many. One reason why I have such an objection to small posts is, that they present a temptation to the Kafirs to attack. I consider that humanity requires you to maintain a large force.

2965. Sir E. Buxton.] What number of men had you during the time you were governor of the Cape, before the war broke out?—At the beginning I had very few; I expected two regiments, which would have arrived very very opportune, if they had not been detained. The Kafirs very likely seeing those regiments, would not have gone to war; they would have thought more of it, and would have postponed it. The

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Kafirs have a strong idea that the English people will not suffer them to be beaten or deprived of their territory to any extent. They have an idea that it will be restored to them as it was before. We found a book in Tatzo's hut, "the Wrongs of the Kafirs," which taught them, that if they had continued the war of '36 a little longer, the British nation would have risen in their favour.

2966. *Chairman.*] Who was that book published by?— I do not know.

2967. *Sir E. Buxton.*] Who was it written by?—I forget who it was said to be written by. The author's name was not prefixed.

2968. *Chairman.*] It is an English book?—It is an English book.

2969. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] You have given an opinion that 5,000 or 6,000 troops will be required; you only mean that they will be required for a limited period?—I mean for a limited period.

2970. You would in the meantime endeavour so to encourage the coloured people, the Fingoes and Hottentots, and others, to locate themselves upon the territory nearest to the Kafirs, so as finally, in a few years, to be able to defend that frontier themselves with a small number of troops?— Yes.

2971. *Mr. Hindley.*] You thought, you said, that there was not much improvement among the Kafirs?—There was not any great improvement among them. I think the missionaries have laboured very faithfully; but I do not think they have been very successful.

2972. Will you allow me to read to you a report of Sir Harry Smith's statement to the Kafirs at King William's Town, in the course of this year; it is taken from a work entitled "Periodical Accounts relating to the Missions of the Church of the United Brethren established among the Heathen;" it is as follows: "He then expresses his satisfaction with the progress in civilization; he observed that they had adopted the use of money, and had learned to sow and plough, &c. He declared that the missionaries had laboured with more success during the last three years than ever before"?— That is since I came away; I dare say they have.

2973. That is part of a letter from Mr. Kelvin; the letter contained information from Shiloh of the account of the war, and this is a conversation which took place at King William's Town?— All I can say is, that the missionaries had, humanly speaking, a better chance of labouring with success among the

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Kafirs after the last war than they had before. In addressing the Wesleyans, I expressed my earnest wish that "You will not withhold your hands or relax your efforts, but that rather, with increased opportunities you will augment your endeavours to fulfil your chosen task." I do not mean to say the colonists have not exaggerated their sufferings in some degree; it is natural they should; people that are suffering, and are living in a state of insecurity, generally do.

2974. The Marquis of *Granby*.] With regard to the pretext of the war being the survey at Blockdrift, you were of opinion at the time that it was an advantage to Sandilli, and that he merely seized that as a pretext for war?—Certainly The war did not take place on that account; I distinctly state that the war did not take place upon that. The matter was explained to the satisfaction of Sandilli. The war took place upon quite a different ground. As I have said, it arose out of one of the Kafirs stealing an axe from a shop at Fort Beaufort within the colony. The man belonged to Tola; Tola went off to his tribe, got a number of his men under arms, waylaid the constables who were carrying the man to prison, and murdered a Hottentot, and wounded one of the party conducting him. They took the Hottentot, to whom the man was chained, across the boundary, and cut his hand off, and they would not give up the perpetrators of the outrage.

2975. The opinion you formed at the time of the survey at Blockdrift, that the Kafirs were anxious to obtain a pretext for war, was confirmed afterwards, that is, after the war had broken out, by the position of the Griquas, by their organization, and by the quantity of muskets and gunpowder they had collected together?—Yes; and by the report of the missionaries among them, and other strong evidence. It was impossible, as the war continued, to doubt that an immense deal of ammunition had been got together for the purpose of hostilities.

2976. They must have been years in collecting those arms and ammunition, you think?—Yes.

2977. Viscount *Mandeville*.] It has been stated in evidence that Macomo referred to some treaties having been signed with you, that is, as having been forced to do it, and against his will; will you explain that circumstance?—I do not know how you can make a man sign a treaty against his will. I can only say this, that so far from its being true, there were two articles which the Gaikas were taught to think injurious to them, which I struck out, though they had agreed to them. I had them first explained to them. They were to the effect that instead of the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom it was difficult

difficult to attend the appeals quarterly at Fort Beaufort, they should have a commissioner and a permanent court of appeal. I explained that to them, that it would be beneficial to all parties; however, they objected, and I withdrew the articles.

2978. Did you ever hear that statement made when you were in the colony?—That he was forced to sign the treaties? No, I never heard it.

2979. You stated just now that the Kafirs had gone to Mr. Nel to ask him to rise in favour of the boers beyond the frontier?—Here is what Mr. Nel stated: "I know the Kafir does not fear the Government, and I believe that I have the power, if I chose to exercise it, but from which God protect me, to bring the whole of Kafirland upon the colony. The Kafirs have repeatedly sent messages to the Dutch boers, to ask them why they do not stand aside, so that they may drive the English into the sea. Even lately, when the troops were sent against the emigrants, Kafirs have come from Kafirland and have asked several Dutch boers whether they did not see that the Government was determined to annihilate the boers, and why they did not assist their countrymen and leave the Englishmen to them. This can be proved."

2980-81. Then you consider that the Kafirs may be at least in some degree influenced by the state of politics in the colony?—No doubt. I suppose both the Hottentots and the Kafirs to be influenced to a certain degree by what is going on in the colony.

2982. Colonel *Dunne*.] There is a despatch of yours that goes very fully into the policy of the colony, and the military defence of the colony, in 1844, to Lord Stanley?—Yes.

2983. Do you recollect that despatch?—Longer experience in Kafirland may perhaps have altered in some things my views since 1844.

2984. I wish to refer you to that despatch, if you please; it is a statement as to the nature of the frontier between the Fish River and the Keiskamma?—I see it. I am just of the same opinion now.

2985. The question I want to ask you is this; considering that frontier to be a military frontier, would not there be an advantage in pushing it further, where the country would be open?—That is just what I proposed doing; and the line, I mention here, is just where I wanted to place the Hottentots and other coloured settlers under a defensive organization, so that they might at any time reinforce our military posts which were pushed forward.

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2986. I believe the policy you recommend, in fact, is to keep the war in front of our line of colony?—Yes.

2987. And at a greater distance from our line of colony?—Yes, certainly.

2988. As to the employment of Kafirs as police or soldiers, is your opinion favourable to that?—I commenced forming that Kafir police corps that has since gone over. I thought then well of it.

2989. What is your opinion of the Cape Rifle Corps?—I would have trusted myself with the Cape corps anywhere. There must have been some delusion practised to mislead the Hottentots.

2990. At that period, also, I think you mentioned in that despatch that the tribe of Sandilli had, in fact, become, according to his own account, much more wicked?—Yes.

2991. And that the missionaries having remonstrated, he told them so?—Yes, he told them so.

2992. And, in fact, he had re-established several of the abominable customs of the tribe?—Yes, giving that as his reason.

2993. Therefore the missionaries would have had no possible influence over that tribe?—The missionaries went in a body to him, and remonstrated with him in vain on that occasion.

2994. Colonel *Estcourt*.] It has been suggested in evidence here, that if representative institutions were given to the colony, the colony itself would, either in part or in the whole, be able to take care of its own frontier; do you think that possible; do you think the colony has the means of defending itself?—They would be very sorry to try it. It must be recollected that they have not even the same means that they had formerly of doing it; because since the former Kafir war of 1836, a vast number of the principal boers have left the country; they have expatriated themselves.

2995. Mr. *Hindley*.] Do you not think, as far as your observation and experience goes, it is desirable that the Kafirs shall, as much as possible, have the same persons to deal with on the frontier; not to have many changes?—I think so, certainly.

2996. Because then they get accustomed to the temper of the people?—Quite so; I agree in that.

2997. In speaking of the frontier, I suppose it is understood, whatever may be the opinion of different Governors, the boundary is determined entirely by the Home Government?—Certainly.

2998. So

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2998. So that no Governor can take any steps independently of the Colonial Office?—Certainly they cannot take any steps finally; they are dependent upon Her Majesty's approval.

2999. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Is it your opinion that the establishment of a constitutional government at the Cape would have a beneficial effect upon our relations with the Kafir tribes, and with the frontier tribes particularly?—I do not see how it would affect it at all.

3000. Is it your opinion that the relations with the Kafir tribes should be arranged by the Government of the Cape, or by the Colonial Office, as it is at present?—I think they must depend upon the Government in England; I do not think it would do at all, if they had a constitution, to give them the power of deciding in questions of boundary or treaty; I should not give the colony the power to decide anything on these points; I think that should rest entirely with the Queen.

3001. Mr. *B. Carter*.] In the address dated January the 20th, 1847, after the close of the war of 1846, there is the following passage: "The tract of country adjoining the present colonial boundary, commonly called the Ceded Territory, together with that part which formed a deep indenture in the colonial line (giving the Kafirs the advantage of completely overlooking Fort Beaufort), and also the western side of the Chumie Hock, I have taken away entirely from the Kafir tribes as forfeited territory." That was part of the penalty which you thought fit to enforce upon them at the conclusion of the war?—Yes; it formed a vast indenture in the colony; it separated us from the Kat River settlements, and enabled Macomo's Kafirs to see everything that was going on in Fort Beaufort.

3002. Does it apply also to the western side of the Chumie Hock?—The tract is on the western side of the Chumie Hock. I was very sorry to deprive Macomo and his son of any part of his territory.

3003. Was Macomo aware of the grounds on which it was forfeited?—I think he was quite.

3004. It has been stated in the evidence of Sir Andries Stockenstrom as to this district; he called this district the bone of contention. Do you conceive that the object of recovering this small district can have been the grounds of the Kafirs' present invasion?—No; have they declared it to be so?

3005. Did they sufficiently understand the settlement of the question, then, to have no real grounds of complaint on which they could found any future attack upon us?—I think, certainly. Mr. Calderwood explained it to them fully.

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3006. You say they have at times been encouraged with the hope that they would recover their territory; was that by parties within their own boundaries?—I think they were encouraged by the fact that it was given back to them after Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war.

3007. Then, in point of fact, you think it very undesirable after we have occupied any territory that we should re-cede it to them, upon the ground that they would not appreciate any retrocession on our part?—I am afraid they would take it as weakness.

*Mercurii, 23<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Monsell.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Mr. Cardwell.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. Hawes.  
Sir E. Buxton.

Sir J. Walmsley.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. Fitzpatrick.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE,  
IN THE CHAIR.

The Rev. *Henry Renton*, A. M., called in; and Examined.

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3008. *Chairman.*] WHAT was the occasion of your visit to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope?—I went as Commissioner from the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland to visit a few missionary stations that body has on the frontier, among the Kafirs.

3009. What was the date of your arrival in the colony?—The 3rd of November 1850.

3010. Did you go immediately into the Kafir country?—I went with all celerity.

3011. How long did you remain there?—I remained from the middle of November among the Kafirs, till the 21st of January, when I had to go into the Kat River Settlement.

3012. What was the state of things in the Kafir country when

when you arrived there?—I found rumours of war all the way up on my journey; I found them very prevalent on the frontier, but I discredited them for various reasons.

3013. Do you mean rumours among the white settlers?—Yes, rumours among the white settlers; I had been reading with care reports for two years antecedent to my arrival from the missionaries of the body with whom I am connected, and from the civil commissioners to the Governor of the colony, as published among other official papers at the Cape; those accounts, to my mind, quite harmonised in representing the increasingly quiet and settled state of matters among the Kafirs; in fact, on the assumption that matters were being consolidated, one or two new stations had been proceeded with, at a considerable outlay of money, from the belief that there was a fair prospect of security, if not of tranquillity; this state of information in my mind before going made me extremely incredulous of the mere rumours. Then I found a proclamation from the Governor, dated King William's Town; he had gone up in October, had met the Kafir chiefs, had made inquiries of his commissioners, and seemed to have arrived at the conclusion that there was no just reason for the rumour and panic which prevailed in the colony. Thirdly, when I got to the frontier, my first business was to ask anxiously of the missionaries what their views on the state of matters were; the missionaries to whom I applied had been in communication with the Kafirs, and I believe enjoyed their confidence in as great a measure as any missionaries have ever done; their testimony was confirmatory of my previous impression; they said "We know of various causes of discontent, but we can see no indication on the part of the common people of a desire to engage in war."

3014. Are you speaking of the missionaries who were living among the Kafirs?—I am.

3015. And they were of a contrary opinion from the settlers in the neighbourhood, and did not anticipate any Kafir outbreak?—They did not see grounds to apprehend it at that time.

3016. Where did they reside; in what part of Kafaria?—The station to which I went was the Chumie station; the first and the oldest, therefore, and also the largest missionary station among the Gaika Kafirs. I had occasion, from an investigation which I was to prosecute, to summon there two or three missionaries, who continued for a period of days, indeed of weeks, with interruptions. There was the missionary of that station, the oldest and most numerous missionary

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stationary station among the Kafirs, the Chumie. Mr. J. F. Cumming was missionary there—(*the Witness described the position of the Missionary Stations on the Map*). Another missionary there was the Rev. Robert Niven, who had gone to Uniondale, a new station toward the head of the Keiskamma, the very centre of the Amatolas.

3017. Had you any communication with the Kafirs themselves?—I had.

3018. Were you led to believe, from their representations, that there would be no outbreak?—Yes, I was.

3019. What was the nature of these assurances?—I conversed, first of all, with some of those men on the Chumie station, pointed out to me as the most intelligent Christian Kafir men, who had been very faithful and exemplary under former wars and trials, and who were very acute men, as most of the Kafirs are. They said to me, that they did not think that any of the Kafirs wanted war, and they did not themselves see any preparations for war. Then I had a visit from the head of the Tyalie tribe, the Inkosikazi, widow of the late chief, acknowledged by our Government as the head during the minority of the young chief. She came over attended by counsellors, and asked me why the English wished to go to war; I stated the English did not want to go to war. "Why should the Kafirs want war?" she said; "the Kafirs did not want war; they dreaded war." I referred to some individuals in her tribe who had not paid fines that were imposed on them by the civil commissioners as evidences of a refractory spirit. She said, "If those black people," as she designated the common people, "if those black people behave ill, let them be punished; but why punish all the rest of the Kafirs because a few black people were disaffected?" I said, "You ought to punish them; you ought to enforce their obedience." She said, "You have taken away all my power; you take away the power of the chiefs; and then you find fault with us for not keeping the people in order." But so far as I could judge from the manner of the woman, and the look of depression and anxiety she had, the impression was deepened in my mind that they dreaded war. I paid a visit to her some days after, perhaps the succeeding week, as a sort of act of courtesy, and put a variety of questions to her and to her counsellors, the "Pakati" they call them, but I elicited nothing to alter this opinion that they were fearful of an outbreak and dreaded it, and were averse to it, and that had an influence on my mind. I had repeated opportunities of being and conversing with the Gaika Commissioner,

missioner, Mr. Brownlee, an able and upright magistrate, and I asked him what his views were of the state of matters. He said, "We know very well that Sandilli has been plotting long; we know very well his designs; but I cannot find among the people, from all my sources of information, through the police and under my own eye, evidences of any general sympathy with Sandilli or any design to break out into revolt." Well, this was additionally confirmatory. I made inquiry of Mr. Brownlee in relation to the civil causes that came before him; I believe he occupied what was considered the most invidious position of any European there; he was represented as having been put in the room of the deposed Sandilli, which is a great mistake, and I see it is so represented in this country, though such is not the case. He administered without the intervention of Sandilli, as the local chief of a small section or tribe of the Gaikas, after Sandilli's deposition, the affairs of that portion, and that directly, without those affairs coming up through the intervention of a local chief, but he was not any otherwise over Sandilli, or substituted in his place, than he had been since the last peace, when, as civil commissioner, he was put over the whole of the Gaika chiefs, and when matters were not settled by those chiefs, they were appealed to him. I asked him, as a material point, whether there were many of those causes which he decided as appeals between the chiefs and the people which were appealed against to Colonel Mackinnon, his superior officer, and I think he said, "Only one for 12 months," while the causes were numerous in which the chiefs and people, instead of appealing, came to him directly to settle the matter, through the confidence they had in his justice. That was very material; and then, finally, when I spoke to missionaries about the state of things as compared with what they had been before 1835, they all concurred that the common people of the Kafirs had a security for their lives and for their property, and an amount of personal liberty such as they never had enjoyed at any former period; so that it was not the interest of the common people to rebel; they were much better off socially than they had been under the single control of their chiefs, who could find occasion against a rich man at any time to mulct him of his property.

3020. Mr. Monsell.] Do you attribute the diminution in the power of the chiefs to the confidence that the people had in this gentleman's system of administration?—Decidedly; I believe that the righteous and impartial administration of justice under the Gaika commissioner for those tribes, and under the T'Slambie commissioner for the other tribes, efficiently

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superintended, as both were, by Colonel Mackinnon, was rapidly undermining the power of the chiefs.

3021. *Chairman.*] The end of it was there was a formidable outbreak?—There was a formidable outbreak.

3022. You were there at the time?—Yes.

3023. To what do you principally attribute this outbreak, which as you say, although it had been to a certain extent by the settlers, was not expected by the missionaries who were so conversant with the habits and feelings of the Kafirs?—While the missionaries did not see any evidences as they thought of a desire to revolt, they did apprise me that there were latent causes of disaffection in the minds of the people.

3024. But still those causes were not in their opinion sufficiently active to be likely to produce an outbreak?—Unless some occasion arose to excite those latent influences.

3025. What were the causes that, in your opinion, led to the outbreak?—I think had those latent causes not existed, and to a certain extent predisposed the minds of the Kafirs, that the occasion which arose would have been insufficient.

3026. What were, generally speaking, those latent causes?—There was among all the Gaikas a soreness under the thought of having lost so much territory; there was a soreness at the deposition of Sandilli, an act which no Kafir really acknowledged; they believed him to be chief by a kind of Divine right; he succeeded Gaika, and was the head of the Gaikas; they are a very strongly feudal people; it seems inbred in them, the spirit of feudalism. Then there was a complaint and local grievance that a portion of land had been taken after the last war, which the English had no right by the war to take. They admitted that there was a right since they went to war that the English should take possession of what had been originally neutral, and latterly the ceded territory; but they said this piece of land had never belonged to the neutral territory, never belonged to the ceded territory; a piece of land running from Fort Hare to the head of the Chumie River. They said this had been seized, that it was a piece of robbery by the English, and it was taken from the Tyalie tribe.

3027. Do you consider the loss of power among the chiefs, which you have described, as one of the latent causes of discontent?—A powerful one to the chiefs, not to the people; but sufficient motive to make every chief desirous of an occasion which might give him a chance of recovering his power.

3028. Will you go on to state any other reasons you have

to

to mention?—Within this spoliated tract, as they considered it, this piece of land taken by spoliation from them, there were planted a line of military villages; those had been designed as a defence of the frontier; I am satisfied it was a most unfortunate step. The men placed in those villages were generally men of bad character; they were placed on the one side of the Chumie River, which is there the boundary between the Kafirs Proper and the extended colony.

3029. Were those British settlers?—They were British; they were discharged soldiers. They had a right of pounding cattle at each of the villages; and that, though a small matter to our view, is a very serious matter to a population situated as that population is, where there are no fences dividing the land. The right of seizure and pounding was felt as a grievance by the Kafirs on the colonial side, the Christian Kafirs. It was felt as a great grievance by the Kafirs on the Kafir side, when the cattle came through the river where it was shallow, as it often is, indeed, except at floods it is always passable at certain fords. When the cattle came through there, and were seized and pounded, it gave a great deal of irritation; those men had been in the habit of acting violently, I mean in their deportment, speaking offensively, and showing contempt and insult to the Great Place of the Kafirs; and at one of them, Woburn, their village nearest the Chumie station, a very sad matter had occurred two or three years ago: Tyalie, the chief of that district, and the most respected of all the Gaika chiefs for character, had died at his great place; he had been buried where he died; the funeral was one of unusual circumstance and pomp among the Kafirs, from the universal reverence in which this chief was held, the brother of Sandilli and Macomo and others, but more respected than any of them. Into his grave had been put, with his remains, his clothes, which he had had from the governor, his saddle and bridle, his assagai, his muskets, and various utensils and articles considered personal to the chief. The grave was watched day and night for a considerable period by one of the clansmen, and this very Woburn was unfortunately located by the side of this grave. After its location the men of that village, aware of what was buried with the chief, dug up the grave, to get possession of the saddle and bridle, and guns, and what not, that might be of use to them. On the other side of the river, by a spot that could command a view, was the great place of his widow, and his heir, and the great men of his tribe; and this act of outrage, I was assured by the missionaries, had excited the Kafirs in that district to an extent that could not be supposed.

3030. How

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3030. How long ago did this event take place?—Some two or three years ago.

3031. You have stated all these latent causes of discontent; but if there were so many causes of irritation operating upon the minds of the Kafirs, in your opinion, at that time, how came it that you, and the missionaries with whom you were communicating, were so much astonished at the notion of the Kafirs taking some opportunity of making an outbreak in the colony?—I did not say we were astonished, but that, under the benefits they were enjoying, and under the belief of the impotency of resistance, and under the credit given to the British power, we did not think that they would venture, unless powerfully excited by some circumstance, to rebel; though we believed that if a rebellion broke out there were a great many men who were tolerable subjects, who would immediately sympathize with the revolvers.

3032. Are you of opinion that at this time, although there were causes of discontent, yet upon the whole that the great body of the Kafirs were well off, and that the great body of the Kafirs were sensible that they were better off under the system that had been recently introduced than they were before?—I have no doubt of the fact of the great body of them being better off than they had ever been before.

3033. Did you reckon among the latent causes of discontent the check which had been put upon the plundering of cattle by the young men among the Kafirs?—I should think that the chiefs and certain portions of the Kafirs would, of course, feel that; but the body of the common people had not benefited by those forays.

3034. Would not those who felt that restriction most be the most active and enterprising portion of the nation, and would not they be able to influence the minds of others?—They might influence them; but I did not see, and I have not yet reason to think, that unless they had been powerfully acted upon, there was a sufficient inducement in those causes, some of which you see were rather grumbings in regard to the past than present felt grievances; they were connected rather with their traditional associations and their pride, and above all, identified with a feudal attachment.

3035. Still do you think it extraordinary that a semi-civilized race, such as the Kafirs are, with all those topics of irritation, more or less well founded, existing among them, a very slight and accidental cause should suffice to produce a general outbreak?—I should say that the prevalence of rumours along the frontier and within the colony, of war, had

had a very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the expectation of it, in inducing a sort of restlessness of feeling, and along with that, apprehensions that something was meditating, and thereby calling into activity those latent elements to which I have referred as being upon their minds.

3036. Do you believe that the unprotected state with regard to the want of sufficient military force there, had anything to do with the aggression of the Kafirs, by inducing them to think the moment was come when they could strike a blow with advantage against British power?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with military affairs to be warranted in giving an opinion; it did not strike myself. I had heard of the vigilance of the Kafir police, and their remarkable success in executing all police matters up to that time; and though there were but few troops on the frontier, I could not judge of their sufficiency or insufficiency against an outbreak.

3037. You have stated, I think, that the chiefs among the Kafirs were very much dissatisfied with the existing state of things in consequence of their diminished influence; but the great bulk of the people were sensible of their improved condition from British influence?—I have no doubt of it.

3038. Reverting to what you said about the violation of Tyulie's grave, did you yourself see the grave in this state after it had been rifled?—I went to visit it, not being aware of the outrage that had been committed; and was struck, on coming to the spot, to see its dilapidated confused condition, rather like the ruins of some house foundation than what I expected, save that there were verdure and plants growing up sown by the wind, I suppose; and I inquired how it was the chief's grave was in such a state of ruin, apparently, and confusion; and I was then told the fact which I have mentioned.

3039. Do you know whether any investigation at the time was instituted with a view to discover who had been guilty of this outrage, and to punish them for it?—I was told that a representation had been forwarded to the Government; that the Governor had replied by expressing his strong disapprobation, and had intimated that an inquiry would be made; but nothing had been done which the Kafirs knew of, or which the missionary at the adjacent station knew of, which the missionary deeply lamented, for he thought that if punishment had been inflicted, it would have allayed the feelings of indignation which were cherished by the Kafirs about that matter.

3040. Did

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3040. Did anything take place more than you have stated about it, to your knowledge?—Not that I am aware of.

3041. Where were you when the outbreak actually took place?—At the Chumie station.

3042. To what do you attribute generally the outbreak that actually took place?—I understood that Sandilli had been plotting long with Anta, his brother, and some others, to foment revolt; that a person called Umlangeni, who went by the name of "the prophet," had been exercising a superstitious influence over the Kafirs who came to him in furtherance of Sandilli's project; that he had obtained perhaps more influence than was suspected by the officials up to the time that the outbreak occurred.

3043. Do you consider the outbreak to have been principally the work of the chiefs acting upon the people, or of the people themselves?—Of the chiefs acting upon the people.

3044. Will you state any other reasons that you think were the immediate occasion of the outbreak?—I think that the course followed by the Governor, unintentionally, but unfortunately, precipitated it.

3045. In what respects?—He came up to Fort Cox; held a meeting with the Gaika chiefs and their retainers; I was present; the numbers computed who met of the Gaikas that day, were about 2,500. His Excellency made what seemed to me an excellent declaration of his purpose to punish the guilty, whom he considered to be only a few individuals in some kraals, and to protect all the innocent. He stated his disbelief of any design on the part of the Kafirs to revolt, and his determination to maintain peace. He renewed his denunciation of Sandilli, offering a reward for his apprehension; and he assured them that he would not allow a red coat to go out to hunt Sandilli. All this, with the views I had, and the impressions under which I came, seemed to me to be excellent. Unfortunately he indulged, besides this declaration, in an extemporaneous harangue, and so expressed himself as to excite, I fear, distrust and suspicion in the minds of the Kafirs as to the declaration he had made to them. To a question which was put by one of the Pakati to the Governor, "if he believed that they did not desire war, and if he did not desire war, and if he was not going to hunt Sandilli, what did he mean by those camps," referring to the men that were immediately behind them, some infantry, and the Cape Mounted Rifles; that question, which struck me as a pertinent and natural one, under the circumstances, the Governor answered rather quickly and angrily, by merely saying that he had said he was not going to send

send out any red coats to hunt Sandilli, and that was enough. Then several of the chiefs, along with the protestation to maintain peace, intimated that he had not produced proofs of Sandilli's defection to justify his deposition or his being cast off, and that they should like the proofs. This was met by affirming that he had information from Tois, another chief, and some other party that he could credit. The appeals for mercy for Sandilli were met by very strong expressions of indignation at such a request, stating that he would lose his head if he showed mercy to Sandilli; that the Queen would chop off his head, and could he be such a fool as to lose his head for Sandilli, upon whom he poured out all manner of vituperative epithets; and he spoke of Macomo, who was present, in terms of a very irritating nature, stating that he did not care whether he touched the stick of peace to-day or not; that he might have been a great man, but he was now a drunken beast and had to be turned out of the colony, and a number of things, which I lamented, as they seemed to be uncalled for; and knowing the feudal attachment of the Kafirs, I thought very likely needlessly to ruffle their feelings; but I left greatly satisfied with the purpose and the views of the Governor, after the information and impressions that I had. I thought he was taking a very wise course, and only lamented that he marred the good effect of his purpose and intentions by so much indiscreet language and behaviour. On going home that evening I was surprised to find that some of the Kafirs whom I knew to be tolerably well affected to the British Government did not concur with me in the views now of peace. They said they saw there was to be war. I asked what put that into their heads. They said, Oh the Governor is going to hunt Sandilli. I said, The Governor is going to do the very reverse; he said, You Kafirs must hunt Sandilli, so that unless some of you catch him he is a free man; the Governor had said not a red coat shall hunt him, and you have quite misunderstood him. I said, Did you not hear him say it? and they admitted that; but then they said he would not answer that question about what he was going to do with the red coats and the mounted rifles; and you saw how he spoke when any reference was made to Sandilli. And what did you infer from that? That the Governor means something else than what he said; that he is going to hunt him, and that this is a pretence; and I was both sorry and angry at their unjust interpretation of the Governor's views, and told them I had seen the Governor privately before the public meeting, and I was as confident as I was of my own sentiments that the Governor meant nothing of the kind; that he was

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perfectly sincere and they might rely upon his integrity in the matter; this was on the Thursday night. On the Saturday morning following, we heard with great distress at the Chumie, that some of the refractory kraals were obstinate and sullen, and not disposed to submit; the missionary at the Chumie, and the missionary from the Kat River, Mr. Read, junior, who had come over to pay a visit that morning, went directly to those kraals to use their influence in urging the people to instant and unconditional submission, unless they wished to provoke war, and to bring down upon themselves and all the Kafirs the vengeance of the British power; they went and dealt with them, but came back greatly dissatisfied with the state of the people's sentiments; uneasy symptoms continued to increase from that day, which was Saturday; on the Sunday, on the Monday, and on the Tuesday, Colonel Mackinnon marched up, by his Excellency's orders, as I have understood, from Fort Cox, through the gorge of the Keiskamma; you are aware that the rear of the large body he had with him was attacked by a handful of Kafirs; that several, including some officers, were killed, and several were wounded; and that when attacked the men were not loaded, and were quite unprepared for such an occurrence.

3046. Mr. *Monsell*.] Was the march in the direction of Sandilli's house?—It was through what was considered Sandilli's stronghold; it was an act in the estimation of the missionaries and of all who knew the Kafirs, of the utmost imprudence, unless it was meant as a declaration of war.

3047. *Chairman*.] I think the next day after this the military villages were destroyed?—They were; after that occurrence in the Keiskamma some of the men who had spoken to me about their interpretation of the Governor's meaning at Fort Cox on the preceding Thursday, said, We told you the Governor was going to hunt Sandilli; he would not give an answer, and this must have been his intention, or he would have given one. Now there were, I believe, thousands of Kafirs who were not disposed to embark in revolt, but would sooner have died than have surrendered Sandilli.

3048. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You spoke of the stick of peace and of the Governor's referring to it; will you tell us what you mean by that?—All I can say is, I saw what might have passed for a long broomstick, seven or eight feet in height perhaps, with a brass round handle of a door stuck at the top of it, which the Governor held during his interview with the Kafirs, and which he called the stick of peace, and flourished, and he required all those of the chiefs that were pacific to touch

touch the stick, and those who would not do so he regarded were not in favour of peace; I thought, perhaps, it might be in accordance with some emblem that had been used among these barbarians, but I heard it was a device of his Excellency, and the exhibition he made of the stick was not calculated to make any impressions favourable to the dignity or authority of the representative of the British power, in my humble opinion.

3049. Was that at the same period that a distant wagon was attempted to be blown up?—It was at a former time the exhibition of the wagon took place.

3050. You speak of Macomo; who is Macomo?—Macomo is a son of Gaika; the son of the greatest intellect, and the greatest military tact, but he was not the son of the great wife, and consequently is not the chief of the Gaikas.

3051. Is he a man held in great estimation?—The highest estimation among the Gaikas in all military matters, and for intellect.

3052. You spoke of some opprobrious terms which the Governor used towards him; do you know of any other act towards Macomo of that character?—What the Governor had done to Macomo formerly I know was felt by all the Kafirs; they referred to what was done with feelings of indignation. On his arrival at Algoa Bay, I was informed, after he came out as Governor, he called in Macomo, who was then living in that neighbourhood, and ordered him to put his head under his foot, and he put his foot upon Macomo in the room of the hotel, in the presence of a number of people.

3053. What was Macomo's observation?—Macomo rose up and said, "I always thought you a great man till this day."

3054. Mr. Carter.] How would the question of the refractory kraals bear upon this general proceeding of the Kafirs?—Incidentally along with the panic that prevailed among the colonists on the frontier, and along with the facts of Sandilli's and Umlanjani's plotting. There occurred two or three cases of resistance to the police in the Tyalie tribe, which act of resistance the commissioner regarded as of some moment in the then circumstances. Under the desire, I was informed, of avoiding a forcible collision, he did not send down the force that he might have done to overwhelm the refractory individuals, but referred the case to the Governor, forbidding the police to use violence. The cases themselves, I understand, were some ordinary police cases,

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but fines had been imposed, and when the police went the fines were refused to be paid, as well as some muskets known to be in the possession of those people refused to be surrendered. The commissioner instead of employing force to execute his decision under the circumstances, referred to the Governor. He thought this resistance was indicative of some dangerous design in connexion with what they knew Sandilli and Umlanjani had been doing.

3055. Were any means taken directly by the Governor with respect to this refractory kraal?—Yes; he came up to Fort Cox; he intimated that the police should be sent down to levy the fines, and that if that did not do he should enforce them; and I suppose it was for such a purpose he took up the military.

3056. Do you believe the military were actually employed?—No; it had not come to that.

3057. The collision took place irrespective of those refractory kraals, without their being employed upon that service?—A collision took place without the employment of force, so far as I am aware, to exact the fines imposed upon those kraals.

3058. Mr. Hawes.] You have spoken of two interviews that took place between the Governor and the chiefs; will you give me the dates of the two interviews you have spoken of?—The interview to which I referred at an early part of my examination, when the Governor issued a proclamation, after the interview with the Gaikas, was in October 1850.

3059. When was the other?—The second interview which he had, the last meeting with the Gaika chiefs, was in December 1850; on the 19th.

3060. Was that the occasion to which you refer, when the stick of authority was exhibited, and the language of which you have spoken was used?—On the latter occasion.

3061. Had not this stick of authority been long in use in Kafraria?—I understood it had not been employed till the present Governor instituted it; that he first employed it.

3062. You are aware, are you not, that the present Governor was there in the year 1848?—I have understood that he had used this since he assumed the government of the colony.

3063. Had not perfect peace been maintained, and the civil authority been thoroughly respected from 1848 down to the end of 1850?—I understand so.

3064. During the whole of this time, this mode of communicating the orders of the Governor, by a messenger carrying the

the stick, had been in use?—I am not aware how long it had been resorted to; probably for a considerable period.

3065. Are you or are you not aware that the civil officer had carried on the business of the government with perfect peace and security under that system?—I am.

3066. Why then have you been led to suppose that this mode of symbolizing the authority of the Government among the Kafirs tended to bring the authority of the Government into disrespect?—I merely stated my own sentiment and feeling in relation to the manner in which this symbol was flourished by the Governor, and I think that such exhibitions do harm and not good before a grave, subtle, and discriminating race like the Gaika Kafirs.

3067. Had not for two years previously this emblem of authority been used?—I believe so.

3068. And perfect peace and perfect obedience to the law had been maintained?—I believe so.

3069. Then why do you suppose that at the end of 1850 this peculiar exhibition of the stick was so fatal to the authority of the Governor?—I did not say so; I have no idea that it was the exhibition of the stick.

3070. Are you aware whether that has any foundation in local customs or usages?—I understand not.

3071. From whom have you understood that?—I asked of some of the missionaries, and probably some others, because my impression was that it must have been so; but I was told it was not so.

3072. Are you aware or not that amongst an adjacent body, the natives of Natal, for instance, a somewhat similar means have been used to give authority to the Government messengers and weight to the Governor's orders?—I have not heard of that.

3073. Mr. *Cardwell*.] You have spoken of the causes of distrust between the Gaika Kafirs and the Governor, and you first said that one of the latent causes was the question in their minds as to the lawfulness of the assumption of a certain piece of land. Then you have said that one of the immediate causes of the outbreak was the suspicion they entertained that the Governor did not intend to keep faith with them with regard to hunting Sandilli. Is it your opinion that the Gaika tribe are a people over whom you could exercise a moral influence if you preserved in their minds the belief that you were acting towards them with justice and good faith?—Yes.

3074. You believe that they are sufficiently civilized and sufficiently docile for the moral power of the British Govern-

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ment to be exercised over them, if that essential condition were maintained?—I have an impression that it is much more difficult to deal with them now than it would have been at any preceding period; they are a very deceitful, very deep race of people; but I have heard numerous testimonies regarding individuals, regarding chiefs, that if they had once pledged their word you might rely upon it. Several persons have told me that Sandilli never broke his word; that they never knew him to do so; they have told me so, and of others also, and what I saw inclines me to the conclusion that if you could impress them with the belief of our perfect sincerity and determination to abide by a compact to which they were intelligent consenting parties, not constrained, but intelligent voluntary parties, you might rely upon them; that is the conclusion I decidedly come to.

3075. Then is it your opinion that if this war were once put down, and the British power vindicated, you could continue to govern those tribes by civil commissioners, without maintaining there the perpetual presence of an overbearing military force?—That is a very difficult question, especially as I am ignorant of military matters; it involves other previous questions. You say, “if this war was put down;” now very much depends upon the way in which that shall be accomplished.

3076. Suppose it were put down by military force in the first instance?—I doubt the practicability of that; I have no idea that the Gaikas will stand to be defeated, so as to acknowledge that you have conquered them. I apprehend that so soon as they find that you are in earnest, moving in a strong force upon the Amatolas, they will retreat and leave you in possession of the territory, and say, We have never been conquered; and there arises a great difficulty, for after the impunity with which they have committed outrages now, it would be a great calamity that that race, or any other native race, should imagine that the power of the British is to be trifled with. Existing circumstances seem to me to render extremely difficult the formation of a compact consequent upon such a vindication of the indomitableness of the British power, as should exert a wholesome influence for the time to come; that seems to me to be desirable over all the native tribes.

3077. Have you formed in your own mind any prospect with regard to the future operations between us and the Gaika tribes?—I have thought much on that subject, but the result is only to augment the sense of its difficulty.

3078. However, you would be disposed to desire that in the

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first instance full manifestation should be made of the indomitable superiority of the British power?—Certainly.

3079. That being done, what would be the next step you would propose to take for the pacification of these regions?—That is a very grave question, and a very difficult question; I lament that our territory was ever extended so far as it has been; we have nothing to gain by that extent of territory; we can only retain it at an enormous expense; we have lost much treasure, much blood, and much moral influence by its extension, and if it were possible after the unmistakeable vindication of the indomitable power of Britain to act a magnanimous part, and say, We care nothing about your land; what we want is your benefit, and if you will be faithful allies and preserve that territory from invasion, to give back a large part of it; that would, I think, be a saving of much money, and would be the means of restoring goodwill and confidence in the minds of the Kafirs towards us.

3080. How far do you propose to retire, in carrying out the course of policy you are now suggesting?—My ignorance of military tactics and matters renders my opinion of no value. I am told that the Fish River does not afford a good line of defence, otherwise I should have thought it desirable to have gone back to what was our territory in 1819.

3081. Suppose we had retired considerably, either to the Fish River or to some good military frontier, what would be the personal situation of the missionaries established in what would be indisputably Kafir territory?—Personally their situation would be just what it was before. The colonial connexion has been hurtful and not beneficial to the progress of Christian missions. At this time I am informed by the French missionaries, than whom there has not been a more successful class of men in any part of Africa, that they find their usefulness is impeded by the approximation of the British colony to that territory in which they have been labouring among Bassutos; and for Christian missionaries I think nothing ought ever to be conceded in the way of political protection; they ought to go asking nothing political, and seeking no political influence, and trusting entirely to other means. The Kafirs gave them perfect protection; but I think their disposition towards missionaries is less favourable now than it ever was; nevertheless, they pledged protection to the missionaries of the Chumie station, who were cut off from all communication with the colony at the time that their revolting fury was most violent.

3082. Then do I understand you to think that if we had vindicated our power by some exemplary manifestation of

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force, and then retired considerably within the limits we at present occupy, to whatever might, in a military point of view, be the most tenable frontier, we should place both the Kafir tribes, and the missionaries residing among them, in a better state than we have any prospect of placing them in by a continued extension of our power to the north?—I am disposed to answer your question in the affirmative, because I cannot see how our power is to be extended colonially to the north, without fomenting a mass of discontent and rebellion among the tribes now beyond, and without needing to multiply our defences, and therefore our forces, correspondingly without accomplishing any compensating benefit.

3083. In short, the question of the possession of land and of the powers exercised by the chiefs are at the bottom of all controversy between us?—Certainly.

3084. Then remove those two questions and you prepare the ground for the exercise of moral force on the part of the missionaries?—You do.

3085. By that moral force you do not doubt that the British influence might be exerted over those tribes very beneficial to us in regard to political consequences, and very beneficial to them in regard to moral and religious consequences. When I use the word British, I mean the influence of our race over the Kafir race. But I am assuming that the missionaries are to be the instrumentality through which that influence is to be accomplished; do you agree in that?—I agree with you concerning that; there was in the minds of the Kafirs a prestige possessed by the British over other races, a prestige that would have been increased had they known the British only through the mollifying influences of Christianity and civilization, which grow concurrently where they have missionary stations.

3086. What has been the conduct of the Kafir chiefs towards the missionaries?—Faithful and friendly.

3087. Then in short, to sum up in very few words the course of policy you would recommend, would be, first, the vindication of the British name by our exemplary display of force; secondly, the withdrawing of the exercise of British power within the narrowest possible limits; and thirdly, the extension of moral power to those half civilized tribes through the instrumentality of the missionaries?—That is the course I should prefer.

3088. Mr. Mackinnon.] In the course of your examination you have stated that you consider the indomitable power of the British name to be of vast consequences as a moral influence over the Kafir tribes; you also have stated afterwards that

that you considered it would be desirable, after we had conquered them and reduced them to submission, to give them back a great part of the territory we now occupy, which has been within some years past taken by the British; does it not strike you that those two statements are rather at variance; would the mass of the Kafir population imagine that we had really got the ascendancy, if after the war we gave them up a great part of the territory which we have already occupied for a considerable time?—The apparent discrepancy is guarded against by specifying that all would depend upon the way in which the war was finished; the difficulty about this restoration lies in the vindication of our power sufficiently to preclude the idea that this cession of territory is made from weakness; it is the necessity of that that led me to speak of the desirableness of the vindication of our power, and to say that unless we do vindicate it, to give them back land would be liable to a misconstruction, and therefore to great danger.

3089. But does not it strike you that whatever vindication of our power we might make, yet that ceding the land we had occupied so considerable a time past would to all the tribes, I may say, in South Africa, appear like a weakness on our part, and weaken our power?—Not necessarily, if proper means are taken; if the vindication of our power is unmistakable, and if our views are communicated clearly and deliberately through channels that would preclude all dubiety and distrust, I do not dread that consequence.

3090. With the character that we have of those different barbarous tribes, do you not suppose any private communication with any one particular tribe, and then our ceding a very great portion of territory, would have a very bad moral effect upon the mass of the Kafir tribes as to our power and sovereignty?—It has been a great misfortune hitherto, that at the conclusion of successive hostilities there have been compromises or equivocal positions which diminished, in the estimation of the Kafirs, the authority and the power of Britain; that has been a great evil.

3091. And you think that that authority would not be diminished by the cession of a great part of the territory we now occupy?—I should think it would, unless you had previously to that made a most unmistakable vindication of your power.

3092. Mr. *Hawes*.] You have stated it to be your opinion, that it is now necessary that British power and authority should be thoroughly vindicated?—That is my conviction of the painful necessity.

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3093. And that the Kafir tribes should be humiliated and brought to the belief that their defeat is inevitable in any conflict with the British power?—That is my view.

3094. What then do you mean by that more specifically; to what extent is this war to be carried on according to your views; are the Kafir tribes to be beyond the Kei, for instance, or what is your notion of the thorough vindication of British power which you think to be so essential?—It is easy, of course, after results have taken place, to say what would seem to have been desirable. My impression was that in the case of a violation of an acknowledged law, prevailing under the system of government that had obtained for three years, on the violation of that law there should be a most rigorous uncompromising vindication of it, although there should have been brought 9,000 or 10,000 men to enforce the law. It would have been a great point for us to have been able to say to every Gaika, "You broke that known law, and if you had been punished for resisting that law, you would have been righteously dealt with." I think that any exercise of power in a clear case of that sort, is invaluable in convincing the barbarian, as the civilized man, that the authority of the law is supreme. Now that we lost that by getting into collision, I do not know what can be done unless by doing what the Governor said he would do, driving them out of the Amatola mountains, which I do not think would be a matter of great difficulty; that has been done before by Sir A. Stockenstrom; therefore a moderate force knowing that country, with skilful leaders, could do it again. I do not see how that is to be avoided now, and if it had been possible without the dreadful resort to war to have vindicated our authority, nothing is so desirable, but I do not see how that is possible myself at present, I lament to say.

3095. You are aware, of course, that the territory now occupied by British military authority was the territory which was once included within the colony and was subsequently surrendered to the Kafirs?—I am not aware that the Kafirs at any time were not the occupants, since British power was in South Africa, of the land that they at present occupy.

3096. Are you aware of the proclamation of Sir Benjamin D'Urban that included the whole of British Kafiraria up to the Great Kei within the colony of the Cape?—Yes.

3097. Are you aware that that territory was subsequently surrendered and left entirely in the hands of the Kafirs and their chiefs?—Yes, I am.

3098. You are aware perhaps, also, that subsequently, when  
Sir

Sir Peregrine Maitland was Governor, he was forced into a war with the Kafirs?—I am aware that a war did take place at that time.

3099. Are you aware whether or not Sir Peregrine Maitland thought it necessary again to occupy a part of that territory to preserve the peace of the colony?—I have understood so.

3100. In what way do you conceive it would be beneficial or likely to promote peace and security if we should once again conquer in Kafirland, and once again surrender the land to the chiefs and retire into our own boundary?—If you do not mean to acquire Kafirland, there is no necessity for doing it, but Kafirland is not yet subjected to British power; I mean to say that persons who occupy it are in a state of revolt; I would put down that insurrection, although I lament that it cannot be put down, I conceive, but by fighting; I was not disputing the position of the land the Gaikas occupy being in the British possession.

3101. Then you would carry on the war simply for the purpose of subduing the Kafirs, without any intention of occupying any of the additional territory?—Yes.

3102. Do you think the defeating them in the field, and subduing them by military power, would be sufficient to maintain our authority, if, afterwards, we surrendered all the territory we had occupied in so subduing them?—I think that towards such a step a variety of conditions would be indispensable with the chiefs and with the people, conditions that should be very distinct, and conditions about which no party in Kafirland should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misapprehension.

3103. Mr. Monsell.] I think at the period you left off your narrative of the events you had witnessed, you were about to speak with regard to those military settlements. Will you state to the Committee what your opinion is of the effect produced by the existence of those military settlements as between the colonists and the Kafirs?—I think that the location of military villages was a very unfortunate step, first on account of the bad moral character of a great number of the men who came to settle there. In the village of Woburn, for example, that was nearest the Chumie Station, there was not a married man, but every man had his concubine; those men were a moral nuisance on the frontier, and were a continual source of irritation; and therefore instead of being a defence, were the cause of danger in provoking collision along that part of the territory.

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3104. Will you mention what occurred just after those occasions you have been describing in your narrative, in answer to the Right honourable Chairman, in regard to those military villages?—On the day after the collision in the Keiskamma, the whole of these military villages were destroyed; it was on them that the outburst of the fury of the Kafirs was expended. I was a painful witness of the conflagration of Woburn, and the spectacle of the fugitive women and children from the other villages. There was not a man spared at Woburn, or at Auckland, which is further up. One or two escaped from one of the others, but the women and the children, whether from Woburn or Auckland, where there were some more respectable men, were all spared by the Kafirs; they were sent to the mission station; they were told to fly there, and the poor creatures came with nothing but what was barely sufficient to cover their nakedness.

3105. Mr. Hawes.] Might not the attack upon the military villages, especially upon the men, arise from an impression upon the minds of the Kafirs that they were beginning to be an organized military defence to the colony?—The Kafirs were aware of that being the design; those villages were not numerically so strong as they had been previously; some of their number had gone off; and it was doubtless a political object with the Kafirs to cut off one source of retaliation and punishment certainly.

3106. Sir E. Buxton.] What happened to the missionaries at Chumie and the neighbourhood of Chumie, at the breaking out of the war?—There were three European missionaries there; one of them came in consequence of it, Mr. Niven from Uniondale. He fled there with his wife and family, and they were spoliated on their way of all their horses and some of their clothes by the insurgent Kafirs who did not know him, but after he got there he remained from that day, Christmas day, until the 20th of January, and the missionaries and their families were unmolested. The head of the Tyalie tribe, Macomo and Sandilli, successively sent messages to myself, under the apprehension that I had some superintendence of the missionaries, to sit still, meaning by that that there was no occasion for our going away, and they guaranteed protection to our persons and our property, which guarantee they redeemed.

3107. Were the buildings belonging to the mission at Uniondale preserved by the Kafirs?—They were burnt, and also at every station which was deserted by the missionaries in Kafirland; the buildings were burnt and the property confiscated

cated at every station from which the missionaries fled. There was no station where missionaries remained among the insurgent Kafirs except that one station at Chumie. There was another station, at which an old missionary, Mr. Keyser, remained for some time after the war, and while there his house and garden were unmolested; the son of Macomo conducted him out when he would not remain longer. But I believe the mission property throughout the whole extent of Kafirland has been destroyed, save at the Chumie, which was on the colonial side, but in the midst of the insurgent district.

3108. Are you correct in saying that the Kafirs who robbed Mr. Niven were not aware that he was a teacher?—That he was a missionary.

3109. What they call a teacher?—They were strangers to him and he to them; they had taken the five horses on which he and his family were riding; they seized his coat, which they tore off and demanded his money, and he gave them the little money he had in his pocket; fortunately the rest of his money was in the hands of one of the females; the man who had taken his coat went to the Great Place of the Tyalie tribe the following day; they heard what he had done, and the coat was taken from him and sent to the missionary station, with an apology from the Inkosikazi, who expressed her regret that the teacher had been touched, and that she would endeavour to recover the horses, but they were taken over to Sandilli, who also said he would deliver them, but they were never obtained.

3110. Is it your impression that if Mr. Niven had remained at Uniondale the buildings belonging to the society would have been saved?—That was my impression.

3111. Are you aware whether acts of great cruelty were committed by the Kafirs on the outbreak of the war?—Very great on the male population.

3112. But have any of the missionaries been injured in person?—Not one, save that case of Mr. Niven coming over to the Chumie station, and passing through the district when the blood of the insurgents was boiling and the destruction of the military villages going on; he was not aware of any mischief in our direction; he imagined if he got to us he would find all quietness; he left, intending to go back the next day, but the excitement produced in his family by the affair in the Keiskama induced him to leave for their safety.

3113. Is it your opinion that the effect of missionaries of various denominations, on the Kafir tribes, has been extensively useful?—I was disappointed in finding the amount of that influence to be considerably short of my anticipation. I found

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found individuals on whom the success seemed to me, as we should say, complete and indubitable; perhaps at every station there was to be found some; in some instances very few, and in others considerable numbers, but you might find all over Kafirland individuals who had abandoned their superstitions and habits, and incurred the obloquy of their friends and adopted European manners and dress, and who were yielding the most consistent obedience to the precepts of the Gospel, and following our arts of tillage. You might also find what certainly is of some account, that although the number who had been Christianized seemed to be few, taking it in the strict sense of the term, as men yielding obedience to the precepts of the Gospel, yet through the presence and influence of the missionaries there was a very great diffusion among the Kafirs of the knowledge of the first principles of the Christian religion. You do not find a Kafir who disputes the existence of a God, his unity, and the infinitude of his perfections, nor who disputes the authority of the Word of God. They all understand it is a revelation from God. They do not like appeals to conscience; they do not like appeals to a future reckoning. They are more disconcerted by that than all the arguments you can use; when I came to talk with them I found that not only with the common people, but with the chiefs, and Sandilli among others.

3114. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Are the missionaries in the habit of giving advice to the chiefs upon temporal matters?—I understand that the missionaries avoid, on principle, giving advice on political matters. In relation to such temporal matters as are connected with husbandry and ordinary affairs, they give them advice readily.

*Jovis, 24<sup>a</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Estcourt.		Mr. Hawes.
Sir J. Walmsley.		Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Bonham Carter.		Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Dunne.		Mr. Cardwell.

BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

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Reverend *Henry Renton*, A. M., called in; and further Examined.

3115. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] WILL you state what was the time of your going to the Kat River Settlement, and what were your reasons for going there?—I went on the 20th January 1851, from the Chumie station, accompanying the missionaries Messieurs Niven and Cumming on their resolution to quit, and finding there was no other route by which there was a prospect then of getting into the colony, which I desired to do, by Fort Beaufort or Somerset.

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3116. What was the state of the settlement at that period?—Disaffection extensively prevailed; the followers of Hermanus, who had rallied after his defeat, and had received accessions from numerous discontented Hottentots from the colony, had drawn into their vortex some of the Hottentots in the lower part of the Kat River, and were exercising a most pernicious influence. There seemed to be no civil or military authority in the settlement competent to the exigency; there seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without, or to control the turbulence within.

3117. Are you speaking of the period at which you were there?—On going there.

3118. Can you give us any information as to the treatment of the population in and after the war of 1835-36, and 1846-47, when the sacrifices and services were the greatest, and no compensation was made?—I understood on inquiring of the missionaries, and again on inquiring of intelligent Hottentots and bastards, into the causes of the extraordinary disaffection,

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disaffection, that there were a long series of matters which had soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke primarily of the war of 1835-36 and 1846-47. It appeared that on the first of those occasions the whole settlement were brought from their homes to Fort Armstrong as the place of rendezvous. They had to abandon with their houses their fields, and property they could not take with them. The whole of the males of the settlement capable of bearing arms were required to do duty either in the field or in the garrison; that, I had understood, amounted to 90 per cent. of the whole population; the women and children and old men were huddled together at this miserable camp: the cattle grazed around, and a great quantity perished; the ordinary means of subsistence and of industry were suspended for upwards of an entire year, and of the losses sustained you may form some idea from the statement founded upon official returns which I have. Before that war of 1835, the people of the settlement had 624 horses, during the war they lost of those 557; they had of black cattle before the war 5,406, and they lost of those during the war 3,992. They had before the war of sheep and goats 8,925, and they lost of those during the war 5,460; they had sown before the war 310 muids of wheat, barley and oats; 70 muids of Indian corn, beans and peas; 645 ridges of pumpkins, and the greater part of them were destroyed; 44 of their dwellings were burnt to the ground; 2,673 of the inhabitants had to receive support from the Board of Relief, of whom 1,470 were also partially clothed.

3119. *Chairman.*] What document are you reading from?—I am reading from a valuable memorandum furnished to me by Dr. Innes, the superintendent-general of education in the colony, founded upon official returns which he was kind enough to go over, for this object, and containing an accurate and full statistical account of the Kat River settlement, which I should be happy to submit to the Committee entire.

3120. Sir J. *Walmsley.*] Has that paper reference to 1835-36?—That which I have read is a part of the facts relating to that period.

3121. *Chairman.*] Is it compiled from official documents and documents which have already been printed?—I am not aware how far they have been printed, but it is founded upon official returns in some degree, particularly, I may add, that part which I have now quoted, and other parts are founded upon Dr. Innes's own investigation when visiting the settlement on official duties at different periods, during the course of the last twenty years.

3122. Then

3122. Then I presume when he was there on official duties he reported the results of his inquiry to the secretary to the Governor, or to the Governor?—I presume so; but in this document I find some quotations from his journal in regard to his impressions of matters at different periods of the settlement's history.

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[*The same was delivered in, and is as follows:*]

MEMORANDUM on the *Kat River* Settlement.

1. At the close of the Kafir war of 1819 a Parole Treaty was entered into by Lord Charles Somerset and the paramount chief of the Amakosa tribe, Gaika, the father and predecessor of Sandilli.

2. By this treaty, which left the eastern boundary of the colony the same as that proclaimed by Lord Macartney in 1798, it was provided that the Kafirs should forthwith give up and retire from the tract of country lying between the Great Fish River and the Kieskama. It was then occupied by remnants of the Gonaqua Hottentots or Gonas, the Gaika, Tslambi and Amagonaquabie or Kongo Kafirs.

3. This tract was denominated the Neutral Territory, and by the stipulations of the treaty was in future to be occupied neither by colonist nor Kafir, or in the language of the Amakosa chief, its waters were to flow undisturbed into the sea. The basin of the Kat River forms the upper, and from its abundance of water the most fertile part of this tract of country. Its area is about 200 square miles.

4. On the arrival of the British settlers in 1820, and previous to their being located in the *Zumveld* (near Albany), the then acting Governor, Sir Rufane Donkin, obtained the consent of Gaika to occupy this tract of country, which from that time was designated the Ceded Territory. His Excellency's plan then was to locate in the basin of the Kat River the body of emigrant Highlanders under a Captain Grant, whom he daily expected. This was to form the left flank of a line of defence which he intended to form by a chain of military posts along the Ceded Territory, to terminate in another settlement on the Baka (called Frederk'sberg), which was to form the right flank of the line.

5. Captain Grant and his body of Highlanders never arrived; the occupation of this part of the line of frontier by a body of hardy and warlike mountaineers was abandoned, and soon after (1822) parties of Kafirs were permitted to re-occupy portions of the Ceded Territory undisturbed, so long as they continued to live peaceably among themselves and desisted from plundering the frontier inhabitants. It was then that Macomo and his followers were allowed to return to and settle down in the Kat River basin, whilst Tyali took possession of the valley of the Mancasana, a tributary of the Kat River.

6. In 1829 Macomo and his followers were removed from the Kat River in consequence of his having attacked a kraal of peaceable Tambookies, plundered them of their cattle, and pursued with great slaughter the fugitives into the Tarka, a frontier district of the colony. On this occasion the Commissioner-general of the Eastern Province,

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Sir Andries Stockenstrom, was dispatched from Cape Town, the seat of Government, to carry into effect the expulsion of Macomo from the sources of the Kat River.

7. In April 1829 the Commissioner-general arrived at Algoa Bay, on his way to the frontier to expel Macomo, but with no instructions as to the future occupancy of the Kat River. From Uitenhage he first addressed the Government on the subject, and in due course received its sanction to occupy the Kat River, by a large body of Hottentot settlers, upon the same principle as Sir Rufane Donkin had contemplated in 1820, the location there of a body of emigrant Highlanders under Captain Grant.

8. The location of the Kat River settlers was conducted under the personal superintendence and direction of the Commissioner-general. They consisted chiefly of Hottentots from the missionary institutions of Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, bastards from the districts of Baviana's River and Zwagerishoek, and some Gonahs who had been suffered to remain after the expulsion of Macomo. At first it was in contemplation to mix up a certain amount of English and Dutch with the coloured classes in this settlement, but this was abandoned on the ground that an English or Dutch settler would not consent to take a grant with which a Hottentot would be satisfied, and that if they accepted of a grant at all, it would be in the hope, by persevering industry and superior energy, of adding others to it, thereby defeating the main object of the settlement, and leaving the Kat River as open to inroads as any other part of the eastern frontier.

9. With the exception of some seed distributed among the settlers on their arrival at their locations by the Commissioner-general, no aid was given them in the shape of rations, implements of husbandry, or in any other form, whilst undergoing the trials and privations of a first settlement. Of this they were made fully aware before leaving their homes, nor did they express any dissatisfaction with the decision of the Government on this head. Those who brought the means of subsistence with them until the first crop was reaped, experienced no inconvenience; those who did not lived on bulbs, roots, berries, and wild beans indigenous to the country, until their crops yielded them more substantial food.

10. For some time the best friends of the coloured people had their fears and apprehensions as to the ultimate success of this experiment of forming on a large scale native settlements on our immediate borders, more especially in the immediate vicinity of those tribes which had been but very recently expelled from the very lands which the Hottentots were called to cultivate and defend; these, however, were soon removed by the most favourable and glowing report of the late Mr. Justice Menzies, in 1832, and the no less encouraging statements of the acting Governor, Colonel Wade, when we visited the frontier in 1834, after the arrival of Sir Benjamin D'Urban to assume the administration of the government.

11. In 1830, the first year of the settlement, the population consisted of 900 souls, of whom from 250 to 300 were available for the purposes of defence. At that time, however, they had barely produced sufficient grain for food and seed. In 1833 the whole settlement had been subdivided into 640 allotments capable of irrigation, with

with grazing commons attached; the average size of the allotments was three morgen, or six acres, which, in the aggregate amounted to 3,840 acres; in that year the population amounted to 2,114, of all ages and sexes; their stock consisted of 250 horses, 2,144 head of cattle, and 4,996 sheep; they had reaped 2,300 muids of wheat and barley (6,900 imperial bushels); besides temporary cottages of wattle and daub; they had built 12 substantial stone houses, planted 13 orchards, and completed 55 canals for irrigating their allotments, of which 44 measured 41,750 feet in length, or, in round numbers, 24 miles.

12. In the following year, and in 1835, they had to bear the brunt of the most formidable Kafir war which had yet been experienced on our frontiers; they had now to defend 26 miles of frontier, exposed, from the circumstances already explained, to the most determined attacks of the followers of Macomo and Tyali.

13. The returns from the settlements previous to this outbreak in December 1834 were as follows: horses 624, black cattle 5,406, sheep and goats 8,925; quantity of seed sown, 310 muids of wheat, barley, and oats; 70 muids of Indian corn, beans, and peas; 645 ridges of pumpkins; the quantity reaped amounted to 1,500 muids of wheat, barley, and oats, 60 muids of Indian corn, &c., and 33 loads of pumpkins.

14. With regard to their live stock, 557 horses, 3,992 black cattle, and 5,460 sheep and goats, were swept away, and the greater part of their produce destroyed; 44 of their dwellings were burnt to the ground. On that occasion 2,673 of the Kat River inhabitants had to receive support from the Board of Relief, of whom 1,470 were also partially clothed. From 1835 to 1839 it is not in my power to furnish anything like a connected narrative of the progress of the settlement, based on official statements, which for obvious reasons I prefer.

15. In 1839 I visited the settlement for the first time; the impressions then formed as I passed from the Chumie Station to Balfour, the residence of my esteemed and much respected friend Mr. Thomson, are thus expressed in my private journal: August 5th, 1839, "I arrived at Balfour from the Chumie about three o'clock in the afternoon, passing through several of the Hottentot locations on my way. I was much struck with the simple but neat appearance of many of their cottages, surrounded with their gardens and cultivated fields. In no part of the colony have I seen cultivation carried on to the same extent; every patch of ground capable of irrigation has been encircled by their watercourses. At present their crops, which are more extensive this year than at any former period, afford a most luxuriant prospect. I am sorry to say, however, that the rust has attacked their crops in many places, and that in consequence the grain crop will be to a considerable extent a failure. This is greatly to be lamented, as the poor people have suffered much from drought during the last two years, and the prospect they now have of surmounting their difficulties is in a great measure cut off. They are, however, by no means disheartened, as their crops of barley, oats, and Indian corn, are rich beyond all former years. Really at present the Kat River is one of the most interesting sights in South Africa. Not an inch of ground is left unturned that can be brought within

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the reach of irrigation, whilst on the slopes of many of the hills, fields have been prepared by the Fingoes, which are planted with Kafir corn."

16. During my visit in 1839, I had an opportunity of forming an opinion of the state of education in the settlement. In connexion with Mr. Thomson's congregation, there were two elementary schools partly supported by a small stipend from the Government, and partly by fees paid by the parents. In connexion with the church at Philipton, there were schools established at 12 of the locations, partly supported by fixed allowances from the London Missionary Society, and private individuals in England (after whom some of the locations were named), and partly by fees paid by the parents. These elementary schools were in charge of young Hottentot men, who were at the same time receiving instruction from Mr. Read, jun., whom they met twice a week at Philipton. Of these I wrote at the time as follows: "I speak in perfect sincerity, when I say that I have seldom met with a more interesting body of young men. It is neither from their attainments nor experience that I thus speak of them, for high expectations cannot be reasonably formed of either, but it is for this; that they possess in an eminent degree the spirit and the zeal of the teacher. Their unwearied activity, directed by the younger Mr. Read, is the soul of the system; and I cannot but admire the efforts they have made for personal improvement under considerable difficulties. At this time Mr. Thomson had three day schools, and 12 Sabbath schools, very efficiently conducted in those parts of the settlement occupied by the people of his congregation. The chief drawback to attendance throughout the settlement proved to be the exaction of fees."

17. It was on the same occasion that I sat down with my friend, Mr. Thomson, to calculate, on a rough estimate, the value of the labour which the settlers had expended in constructing drains and cutting watercourses, for the purpose of irrigating their allotments. The result of this was, that up to that period labour had been expended to the amount, on a moderate estimate, of 3,500 *l.* for that object. This includes many cuttings which were abandoned when it was found that the water could be made to embrace a larger area.

18. From 1841 to 1844, both inclusive, I visited the settlement four times. I found it steadily progressing, but not in the rapid manner that characterised the first 10 years after its formation; it had perhaps become somewhat over-stocked and over-peopled. Its progress, however, will be best shown by the following statistical returns:—

In 1844 the road-rate was first imposed on the fixed property of the colony; this was exactly 10 years after the commencement of the Kafir war alluded to in paragraph 12. The fixed property of the Hottentot settlers of the Kat River was then assessed at the aggregate value of 36,000 *l.*, which in reality represents fixed property to the amount at least of 40,000 *l.* Of their live stock at this time, or rather in the year following (1845), which consisted of 550 horses, 9,100 black cattle, and 9,500 sheep and goats, the aggregate value amounted to 20,180 *l.* The produce of their cultivated lands consisted of 7,560 muids (22,680 bushels) of grain, 50,000 lbs. of oat hay,

hay, with a proportionate quantity of pulse, pumpkins, potatoes, fruit and vegetables. These, together with the value of transport service, wood cut down and sawn up into planks, beams, &c., amounted in the aggregate to 5,575 *l.* The value of the settlement therefore at this period amounted in fixed property, live stock and annual produce, to upwards of 65,850 *l.*, being on an average of 330 *l.* to every square mile of area.

19. This area, as already stated, was divided into 640 allotments, and, at the time I refer to, sustained a population of 5,000 souls. Had it been granted to stock farmers it would, on the average area of such farms on the eastern frontier, have been subdivided into 25 farms, on which there would have been a population of not more than 350, of all classes and colours. The whole of these lands realized to the Crown, in the shape of quit-rent on the several allotments, a sum not short of 1,200 *l.*, exclusive of the forest of the settlement, which in 1848 could not have produced less than 50 *l.* for licences to cut wood. During the years 1844 and 1845, the erfholders or occupiers (not more than 600 in number) paid in road-rate nearly 300 *l.* From 1840 to 1846, both inclusive, that section of the settlement in connexion with the London Missionary Society contributed in money, exclusive of the repairs of buildings, 1,100 *l.* towards the support of their religious and educational institutions. Within the same period Mr. Thomson's congregation erected a new and spacious church at Tambookie Valley, which must have cost them at least 1,000 *l.*, giving a fair value to their labour.

20. At this time the infant, juvenile, evening and Sabbath schools throughout the settlement were affording instruction to upwards of 1,200 persons, diffusing extensively a knowledge both of the Dutch and English languages.

21. I did not again visit the Kat River until 1848; it was then severely suffering (though rallying) from the effects of the war in 1846; their losses in that war have been estimated at 30,000 *l.*, and to complete their misery, the floods of 1848 carried away dams, water-courses, and all the apparatus they had constructed for the purposes of irrigation. In the words of my friend Mr. Thomson, "The Hottentots had now to encounter the severest trial that had fallen on them since the formation of the settlement." When allowed to return to their locations from the military encampments of the settlement their houses had to be rebuilt, their families fed, and their lands cultivated. For the purposes of cultivation, seed had been issued to them by the Government, which, with hired oxen (chiefly) was put in the ground; for subsistence and the purchase of stock, they went to the forest; and at the time I visited the settlement there were upwards of 90 saw-pits in active operation, whilst boys of nine years of age and upwards were withdrawn from school to aid their parents in the work. At the time I visited the settlement a large quantity of draught oxen and other stock had been exchanged with the farmers for planks, beans, and other produce of the forest; but their efforts had glutted the market, and so low had the prices become, that one of the inhabitants of an interior district town declared to me, while several Hottentot buyers were standing in the market laden with wood, that after deducting the expense of transport and the licence

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of 6 s. payable on each load, there remained little or nothing for the labour of cutting, hewing, and sawing in the forest.

22. My opinion is, that the Kat River Settlement had not entirely recovered from the war of 1846-7 when that of 1850 commenced.

Cape Town, 30 May 1851.

(signed) *J. Rose Innes.*

3123. Are you at all acquainted with the proceedings that took place at the time at the Cape, with reference to these things?—Not beyond the fact of the people being supplied with rations that were utterly destitute; I am not aware of any other proceedings in the Cape beyond those eleemosynary supplies.

3124. Does the paper you have just put in contain any account of what steps the Government did take, or whether they took any, to inquire into those complaints?—I think there is no reference to it in the memorandum.

2125. Upon that subject you yourself personally are ignorant?—My information irrespective of this document, to which I have referred incidentally, is taken down pretty fully from the lips of the missionaries and of the natives; and I find their statements to be on all the points where they come together, in harmony with what I found subsequently in that document, which is more exact as to statistics.

3126. The statements you took down were statements made to you in the year 1851?—Entirely; all that I propose to give is the account of the people in the place of their grievances; I do not profess to do more.

3127. That is to say, an account given in 1851 of the complaints and grievances that had occurred in 1835-36?—In answer to my inquiries about the causes of disaffection they referred to this fact, that in the year 1835-36 they returned to the dilapidated buildings, to fields run wild, to places in which the ditches and watercourses had been obstructed, deprived of their cattle, without anything, and having suffered to an extent in the defence of the colony to which no other district had been subjected.

3128. In what you have stated you have referred to the years 1835-36; I want now to draw your attention to the period of 1846-47; have you any information to give the Committee as to that?—They had been diligent during the interval in recovering their position by industry from 1835-36 to 1846-47; in that latter period they state that again the whole male population of the settlement were called out for the defence of the colony; they were collected again,

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not in one as before, but into three camps, at Fort Armstrong, at Eilands Port, and the Blinkwater; about those camps, within which they were without the means of comfort and almost of decency, their cattle depastured, but under the drought a very large proportion of them perished; there was disease, and there was considerable mortality; at both periods the means of instruction were suspended, and they felt that not only were they brought down by poverty, but that the morals of their youth were corrupted, and the benefits of education and of Christian instruction during the past period had been fearfully counteracted.

3129. Was any compensation made to those people for the losses they had sustained?—They complained in connexion with that last war that while they were doing duty as burghers they did not receive the same treatment as others who were serving in defence of the colony; that certain rations were withheld from them, such as coffee and soap, which diminished their comfort and their cleanliness, and made them feel they were treated as a degraded race; they complained that they got no compensation; they complained that solemn promises made to them by successive governors were broken. According to their statement Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was Governor at the war of 1846 and 1847, promised assistance after the war; Sir Henry Pottinger, who succeeded him, promised all the cattle captured in their incursions upon the Gaikas and the T'Slambies; there was a quantity of seed corn and of oxen and clothes, which had been set apart for their use by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, in compliance with the promise of Sir Peregrine Maitland, which were refused them, and the cattle they had taken were withdrawn from them; those were the acts of the first magistrate appointed over that settlement, namely, Mr. Biddulph. To the representations of the people that they were reduced to poverty and destitution, he replied that they were a set of lazy paupers who had been living on Government rations, and that if they had nothing to subsist upon, they might hire themselves as servants to the English and Boers in the colony, or go to hell; his reply to their statements that pledges had been made by the Governor, was, that it was under martial law, but he now came to administer civil law, and therefore that the arrangements under martial law were good for nothing; this statement was made to me by the missionaries.

3130. Mr. B. Carter.] There were certainly strong expressions used there; was that complaint made to you by more than one individual, or was it the expression of one

person who complained of it?—I got the same account from several.

3131. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Including the missionaries?—Yes, including the missionaries.

3132. Who corroborated the statements?—Yes.

3133. Have you reason to believe those statements are correct?—I am sure they were fully believed by the people; and from what I saw of the men that I took them down from, and who were all loyalists and in no way mixed up with the rebellion, men who never wavered in their allegiance, I consider them entitled to credit.

3134. *Chairman.*] Have you any means of checking this statement yourself?—I have not; I only took the precaution of asking various parties; they complained also in regard to that magistrate, that a tax was imposed upon wood cutting, which was the means of industry to which they betook themselves after the war of 1846 more than they had done before, as the readiest to procure money, and that this tax, which was exacted at first upon the purchasers, was afterwards exacted upon the wood cutters, and between the people's zeal to get some means by this employment and the operation of this tax they felt themselves greatly aggrieved. Doctor Innes states, I think, in that memorandum, that a respectable inhabitant on the frontier told him, that the remuneration to the people for their labour would be almost nothing at one time, that is, at the period to which I refer, from the operation of the tax, and from their resorting to wood cutting as a means of meeting their present necessities.

3135. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Was this a tax recently levied?—It was levied since the last war; since 1846-47.

3136. What was the amount exacted for the tax?—Seven and a half per cent. I think they say; it amounted to so many shillings per waggon load.

3137. *Chairman.*] What objection on principle do you take to that tax?—I do not speak to the principle, I merely mention the fact as a part of the narrative of their complaints.

3138. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] The people had not previously been taxed in that way?—They considered the wood as their own; as a part of the property that was given to them on their location in that district.

3139. *Chairman.*] Do you mean they were not allowed to cut down wood standing within the grant of land made to them?—That is their statement, that they were not allowed to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or forest, without paying a tax of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

3140. My object is to elicit an explanation upon this point ; was it a tax upon wood felled in the forest, or do I understand you to say that they could not fell timber within the grant of land which was made to them?—I understood that they could not fell timber and take it away for sale, without paying a tax of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

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3141. That is, the wild timber growing in the forest?—  
Growing in the forest.

3142. Sir J. Walmsley.] Not included in their particular grant of land ; that is, they had not the grant of the forest, I presume?—The dispute, I suppose, hangs upon the property of the forest ; they consider they have a certain district called the Kat River for pasture and for forest, and up to that period they had at discretion entered the forest and cut when they pleased, and what quantity they pleased, and disposed of it as they pleased, and subsequently the tax was levied.

3143. Do you know the date at which that tax was levied?—Subsequently to the war of 1846 ; they complained of it as coming upon them after their second impoverishment by war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their prosperity, and as a bitter grievance to those who had suffered greater sacrifices in the defence of the colony than any other portion of the colonial population. I think I have seen it stated in the official report of Sir George Berkeley or Colonel Somerset, that the contingent of the male population furnished by the other districts of the colony for that war was three per cent., whereas the proportion furnished by the Kat River was ninety per cent.

3144. Chairman.] Have you seen Mr. Biddulph's report upon the Kat River settlement?—I have seen it, and I may mention, since that is adverted to, that his report in which he represented the inhabitants of the settlement as a worthless and immoral class of people, excited universal indignation throughout the settlement, and was succeeded by remonstrances which led to his removal from the settlement. I have understood that persons out of the settlement, and that in particular Sir Andries Stockenstrom, who knows it more intimately than any person out of it, instantly on the reading of that report, which was published as a despatch by Sir Henry Pottinger, sent in a very strong paper to the Government in reprobation of the statements contained in it. The Kat River people complained that although that officer was removed from them, who was known to cherish hostile prejudices to the coloured people—

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3145. Known by whom?—Before he came to the settlement.

3146. Are you making this statement upon anything like authority, or mere hearsay?—I am merely stating their allegation that he was known to be hostile in his feelings towards the coloured people.

3147. Colonel *Estcourt*.] That Mr. Biddulph was hostile?—Yes, before he was appointed; and I made the remark on hearing the same complaint from different quarters, that the Governor had done what he could; he removed the obnoxious man when he behaved in this offensive manner, and what more could he do?—They replied, that would have been well, but he appointed the man who had behaved so ill to a more lucrative magisterial office in another part of the colony, and they considered that, therefore, as an evidence that the Governor was not dissatisfied, though as a matter of policy he had taken him out of the way.

3148. *Chairman*.] Have you any means of controverting the statements made by Mr. Biddulph?—I think so.

3149. Will you proceed to state them?—In the document which I have submitted as furnished by Doctor Innes to me, founded upon official returns, there are facts showing the extent of irrigation, showing the extent of cultivation, showing the extent of building by the natives, showing the rapid accumulation of property in that settlement, showing at what amount they were rated for the public burthens, and containing what I apprehend will be accounted demonstration that whatever the people of that settlement lacked, they did not lack industry.

3150. To what period does that refer to, in Doctor Innes' report?—The state of them up to 1835, and the state of them up to 1846 again.

3151. Do I understand Doctor Innes' statement as intended to controvert Mr. Biddulph's report?—Doctor Innes' statements do not advert, so far as I remember, at all to Mr. Biddulph's or any other report; I am quoting Doctor Innes' report merely as an unbiassed calm statement founded upon statistical data.

3152. And made upon personal inspection of the settlement?—Along with personal inspection of the settlement.

3153. Do you happen to recollect at this moment the data of Mr. Biddulph's report; was not it later than that of Doctor Innes?—His report was immediately posterior to the war; I think in 1848.

3154. You are aware also that Mr. Biddulph's report was

drawn up in the shape of an official report to the Governor from a personal inspection of the state of the settlement?— I do not call that in question; he was resident in the settlement.

3155. You have stated that Mr. Biddulph called the population of the Kat River settlement worthless and immoral; are you accurate in that; does not he rather describe them as being very idle, and living in filth, and neglecting industry altogether, rather than ascribing to them anything in the shape of immorality?—I do not profess to quote any terms of his report, which I have not, and but once saw. I was merely giving my impression of the general character which he by that report conveyed of the settlement. Then, again, I should refer to the progress of education in that settlement as successful up to the time when it was wholly interrupted by the carrying off all the people into military posts; and on this matter, antecedent to the war, I apprehend that the testimony of the superintendent general of education is very decisive. He says, "During my visit in 1839, I had an opportunity of forming an opinion of the state of education in the settlement. In connexion with Mr. Thomson's congregation, there were two elementary schools, partly supported by a small stipend from the Governor, and partly by fees paid by the parents. In connexion with the church at Philipton, there were schools established at 12 of the locations, partly supported by fixed allowances from the London Missionary Society and private individuals in England (after whom some of the locations were named)"—such as Wilberforce, Buxton, and so on—"and partly by fees paid by the parents. These elementary schools were in charge of young Hottentot men, who were at the same time receiving instruction from Mr. Read, jun., whom they met twice a week at Philipton. Of these I wrote at this time as follows: 'I speak in perfect sincerity when I say that I have seldom met with a more interesting body of young men. It is neither from their attainments nor experience that I thus speak of them, for high expectations cannot be reasonably formed of either; but it is for this, that they possess in an eminent degree the spirit and the zeal of the teacher. Their unwearied activity, directed by the younger Mr. Read, is the soul of the system; and I cannot but admire the efforts they have made for personal improvement under considerable difficulties.' At this time Mr. Thomson had three day schools and 12 Sabbath schools, very efficiently conducted, in those parts of the settlement occupied by the people of his congregation."

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3156. That description of the settlement was written in the year 1839?—Yes, as to education.

3157. Will you read any description that may refer to the state of the settlement at a later period?—Dr. Innes furnishes from official returns some important facts, which I deem valuable because so shortly previous to the last war. “In the year 1844 the road rate was first imposed on the fixed property of the colony; this was exactly ten years after the commencement of the Kafir war, alluded to in paragraph 12. The fixed property of the Hottentot settlers of the Kat River was then assessed at the aggregate value of 36,000 *l.*, which in reality represents fixed property to the amount, at least, of 40,000 *l.* Of their live stock at this time, or rather in the year following (1845),” that was just the year before the last war, “which consisted of 550 horses, 9,100 black cattle;” now you will remember that the horses were reduced to 70, and that their black cattle had been reduced to a little more than 1,000, “and 9,500 sheep and goats, the aggregate value amounted to 20,180 *l.*; the produce of their cultivated lands consisted of 7,560 muids,” a muid is equivalent to three bushels, therefore it would be 22,680 bushels; “of grain, 50,000 lbs. of oat hay, a proportionate quantity of pulse, pumpkins, potatoes, fruit, and vegetables; these, together with the value of transport service, wood cut down and sawn up into planks, beams, &c., amounted in the aggregate to 5,575 *l.* The value of the settlement, therefore, at this period amounted in fixed property, live stock, and annual produce, to upwards of 65,850 *l.*, being on an average 330 *l.* to every square mile of area.”

3158. Was that to be considered as the property of the Hottentots exclusively?—I understood so.

3159. Are you clear upon that point, whether or not, for instance, there were not other settlers who had also property to a considerable extent in that settlement?—There were the Bastards and Gonahs; this includes, I presume, the whole of the coloured settlers; they are mixed up indiscriminately.

3160. But not, I think, all together in Mr. Biddulph's report; he speaks rather more particularly of the idleness of the Hottentots as contradistinguished from the industry of some other settlers?—The Hottentots constitute an overwhelming majority.

3161. But they are the most industrious class of settlers?—I do not say so.

3162. Was not it a settlement intended to benefit them, and to promote their welfare?—It was.

3163. And do you think that that has really been the result, from your own experience and inquiry?—I think that, if we look at the progress up to 1835, if we look again at what it was from 1836 up to the outbreak of the war in 1846, if we look again at their condition before this present war, when I saw with my own eyes cultivation surpassing what I had seen anywhere between the sea coast and Port Elizabeth until I came into that settlement; if we look at this and take into account the trials to which the people had been subjected, the successive losses of all the fruits of their industry once and again, with the occurrences of the most formidable discouragements, it would seem to me unwarrantable to say it was a failure; and I question if any body of Irishmen, or Scotchmen, or Englishmen would have submitted to be taken away from all their employments, and to lose all their property, and to get no compensation, and yet go on again with more spirit than the people of that settlement have done.

3164. Were they not paid when they were called out to serve in the field, and were not rations also given to their families at the same time, as well as clothing?—I understand they got nothing but rations; no payment.

3165. Did not the men receive pay during the time they were in the field?—I understand not.

3166. Are you speaking now from statements made to you, or from information which you have carefully acquired by an examination of the documents themselves?—I speak from the impression on my own mind left by the information given to me; I am not of course positive, but I speak distinctly from that impression.

3167. When you speak of the great losses sustained by those settlers in the Kat River district, you are of course aware that other settlers in other parts of the Cape suffered great losses from the Kafir war, both in 1835-36 and in 1846-47?—I am aware that many cases occurred of great individual losses; but in other districts it was optional to men to abandon or to remain at their homes; it was in a great degree optional with them to come out and to retire. The Kat River men were the first called out, and the last relieved; they were ordered all to quit their homes in defence of the colony, which was done with no other district.

3168. Was it no condition of that settlement that they should serve in the event of being called out upon the occasion

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of the Kafir war?—I suppose the design of the settlement was to make them a sort of bulwark to the colony, which they have proved, for they have borne the brunt of every war.

3169. In your opinion they always turned out readily, especially on the last occasion, to act in defence of the colony?—I have understood that on every occasion the Hottentots were ready to obey orders, and were zealous in their loyalty.

3170. And that the present disaffection, to which you have referred, is traceable alone to the neglect of those complaints, and the absence of redress for those losses to which you have referred?—I do not say alone; there had been a succession of causes inducing a spirit of disaffection; those two were there specified as main causes; then there was the conduct of this magistrate, Biddulph; then there was the conduct of the magistrate who succeeded him, Bowker, who had published a letter in a Graham's Town paper, vindicating the statements of Mr. Biddulph; and the man who had done that was put over this settlement, who were rankling under what they considered the insult and injuries of the man who had been removed.

3171. Was not Mr. Bowker a very old resident in that district?—I believe he resided in the neighbourhood.

3172. And possessing considerable property there?—That might be; I do not know.

3173. Have you any reason to doubt he was a respectable man, and that his statement is as much entitled to belief as those of the Hottentots, from whom you received yours?—I speak of the fact that he had publicly vindicated the statements which had given offence to the entire settlement; statements which had been impeached not only by the settlement, but by responsible parties out of it as unwarrantable.

3174. The statements you refer to affected the character of the settlement, and were calculated to create great discontent in the minds of those who were more immediately the object of them, were they not?—They were calculated to do so.

3175. But the question is really whether they were true or not, and you have no means of throwing any light upon that question yourself, from the inquiries you made; you are aware Mr. Biddulph was officially employed to report upon the state of that settlement; he did report, and reported most unfavourably; and I understand you now to say that Mr. Bowker, a gentleman resident in that district, whose personal responsibility you are not prepared to impeach, confirmed that statement?—Yes.

3176. Against

3176. Against that I understand you to place the statements of certain parties in the settlement which are in opposition to those of Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker; have you any reason to doubt under those circumstances that the statements made by a person officially employed, confirmed by a resident in the district, were not as well entitled to belief as the statements of parties affected unfavourably by the statement made by the person officially employed to investigate the condition of that settlement?—When I found that the whole coloured population of the settlement were indignant at the statement made by the magistrate; when I found that missionaries in the settlement and that missionaries out of the settlement who knew it, spoke to me of that statement as a grievous injury to the people of that settlement; when I found that men of the character and standing of Sir Andries Stockenstrom remonstrated on reading that statement against the injustice which it did to the people, and when I found that the magistrate who had made himself obnoxious by that statement was removed from his office over the settlement, I have no hesitation from personal knowledge of various of the parties, in giving credit to their testimony before the testimony of those two magistrates, Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker, who furnished, I conceive, evidence that they were actuated by hostile prejudices towards the coloured classes.

3177. Where do you find that evidence?—I shall speak immediately to what Mr. Bowker did, according to the statements furnished to me.

3178. Do you mean statements to show that Mr. Bowker was hostile to the Hottentot population, or the coloured population generally?—Actuated by prejudices.

3179. Does the statement you are going to refer to contain evidence of that fact?—I conceive so; the people of the Kat River complained of certain proceedings of Mr. Bowker in burning the huts of proprietors in Lower and Upper Blinkwater.

3180. At what date was that?—Shortly after his coming into the settlement, and in the winter season, I think of 1849, but I have not the date.

3181. Was not it subsequently to the report of Mr. Biddulph?—Subsequently to the report of Mr. Biddulph, and subsequent to Mr. Bowker being magistrate.

3182. How does that show he was animated by prejudices against the coloured inhabitants at the time he supported the statement made by Mr. Biddulph?—In regard to his prejudices

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judices at the time, I can only say that his letter in the newspaper was considered as a repetition of the offence.

3183. Of what offence?—Given by Mr. Biddulph, and that he was reported in the district to be a man who was known to entertain those prejudices.

3184. Known to entertain those prejudices by whom; what evidence is there of the fact?—I cannot furnish you with any evidence beyond the popular impression.

3185. I am sure you will perceive that you are in some degree impeaching the character both of Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker, and I wish to know, as far as you can possibly furnish the Committee with information, the grounds upon which you impeach the fidelity of that report, and the perfect propriety of Mr. Bowker supporting that official report, supposing he deemed it to be true and correct?—I do not appear to impeach either gentleman; I only offer the statements given to me on the spot.

3186. Given by parties who were affected injuriously, as they thought, by the report of Mr. Biddulph?—And also by their teachers, and by respectable parties out of the settlement.

3187. Who were all parties, were they not, more or less interested in the settlement?—I do not know what interest they could have beyond that of intelligent and benevolent men, who had watched its progress.

3188. Without implying in the slightest degree any prejudice against any particular parties, I believe that the Kat River Settlement was supported by particular parties in the colony, and equally opposed by others?—I believe so; the missionaries out of the settlement who spoke to me, were not connected with the London Society who had missionaries in the settlement, and who expressed to me their conviction that the statements were most unwarranted, that they gave a representation of the state of the Hottentots such as no candid man would have given or could have given.

3189. Are you aware that the Governor adopted Mr. Biddulph's report?—I am aware that he published it as a despatch, and was understood to sanction it.

3190. Have you any personal acquaintance with Sir Henry Pottinger?—None; but the fact of Mr. Biddulph's removal after remonstrances and complaints, was considered as an acknowledgment by the Governor that that magistrate had done what could not be vindicated.

3191. Might not an officer who had done his duty thoroughly in

in reporting the abuses of any settlement become unpopular? —Decidedly.

3192. And upon that ground, though without the slightest blame or reproach, it might be expedient to appoint a fresh officer to that district?—I also see that clearly, and the mere fact of his removal does not prove that he had done anything wrong.

3193. I might perhaps illustrate it in this way: a Poor-law Commissioner in Scotland or in Ireland, who had conceived the poor had been neglected and ill-treated, might become very unpopular in the parish upon which he reported?—Yes, decidedly.

3194. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Your previous observations have had reference to Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker; were there other magistrates in any way identified with those circumstances?—I am not aware that there were, identified with either of those points to which reference has been made. In the case of Mr. Bowker, there were two acts much complained of; the one about the burning of the huts of certain parties that I have mentioned.

3195. *Chairman*.] Subsequently to the date of the report? —Yes, subsequently to his succeeding Mr. Biddulph.

3196. Mr. *Estcourt*.] This is an after complaint?—Yes. And again, about driving the Gonahs out of the district into Kafirland, where, having fought against the Kafirs, they were likely to incur special hostility. In relation to these two matters there were commissioners appointed by the present Governor, who reported against Mr. Bowker, and he it is understood escaped dismissal by being allowed to retire. On Mr. Bowker's withdrawal from the office under the finding of the commission against him, the English residents in the settlement showed their sympathy with Mr. Bowker by inviting him, with one exception, unanimously to a public entertainment, and that act was regarded by all the coloured people as the approbation and identification of the English residents with a man whom they considered had injured and oppressed them.

3197. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Were there any other magistrates in that district against whom the settlers complained?—There were.

3198. Will you state the circumstances?—The late magistrate of Fort Beaufort, Mr. Borchers, hired out the grazing lands of the people on the Mankasana, a tributary of the Kat River, without their consent obtained or asked, to Fingoes; an application and remonstrance was sent to the Governor;

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the people were directed to impound the cattle illegally depasturing on their own land, but they complained that the sums which Mr. Borcherd had derived in rent were not paid to the parties injured, and that no compensation was made to them for the loss of the pasture for seven months, which sustained the cattle of 100 Fingoes. There was a subordinate magistrate in that district, superintendent Cobb, who by impounding the cattle on the people's own grazing lands, and by different assaults upon individuals, for one of which he was fined in the Criminal Court, and some other cases of which were pending for adjudication, increased the excitement and discontent in the spirit of the people. These are supplementary cases that were given to me connected with the conduct of magistrates. There was another matter about which great soreness had been excited. Towards the close of last year complaints had been made by the farmers and boers about Fort Beaufort of losses of sheep and cattle, which they attributed to people residing at the Blinkwater; a commission was appointed to investigate the matter, consisting of Messrs. Blakeway, Godlonton, and Gilbert, all of them personally interested, as sheep and cattle farmers, in the district. It is complained that instead of hearing and disposing of the complaints, those gentlemen went personally into the houses of the district, and without any magistrate's warrant searched them, inquiring, where any flesh was found, how it had been obtained, and descending, in some cases, to wipe the insides of the cooking pots with their fingers to find if any grease could be discovered in them; occasioning by this scrutiny and procedure great offence, not only to the parties subjected to it, but to the population of the settlement generally, who concluded that a vagrant act must have been passed, which had been an object of great dread and aversion for a good while previously. These, I think, together form the various causes to which I could refer, on the showing of the people and of their missionaries, as creating great discontent and irritation, though they by no means justified a resort to arms or revolt.

3199. Have you any observations to make on the location of Hermanus on the settlement?—I have understood that that was an infringement of the original design of the settlement, and all accounts lead me to the conclusion that it was singularly unfortunate; Hermanus was a red Kafir; he had a body of followers who greatly increased; his place became the rallying point, I am assured, for discontented and disorderly persons, and the presence of such a body was necessarily

sarily injurious to the morals, if not also dangerous to the allegiance of the people of the Kat River.

3200. Have you any knowledge of the precautions that were taken for the defence of that place at the time of the outbreak?—There were some means attempted; on the 26th of December last Mr. Van Rooyen, a native missionary at Tidmanton, that is close by Blinkwater, gave information to the authorities at Fort Beaufort of his suspicions that Hermanus, who had been to Umlangerie, and was obeying the prophet's orders, was preparing to take part in the revolt, yet after that information ammunition was known to have been supplied from the Queen's stores at Fort Beaufort to that individual, to Hermanus, who shortly after fell in the attack that he led on on that place.

3201. *Chairman.*] How was that known?—This is the statement of Mr. Van Rooyen himself.

3202. Do you mean the local authorities there supplied Hermanus with arms and ammunition?—On his application; previous to the outbreak he had been considered loyal. Mr. Van Rooyen gave this statement to myself, which I now make to the Committee. On December the 28th, Mr. Van Rooyen sent a letter to the field commandant Groepe, at Fort Armstrong, and the field cornet at Tidmanton sent one to Colonel Sutton, at Fort Beaufort, with intelligence that Hermanus had a force of about 900 men, and that if they had had possession of guns and ammunition they could have withstood him. Colonel Sutton replied that he had not a supply of arms and ammunition to furnish; and Commandant Groepe, to whom a messenger had again gone on the 28th, and to whom Mr. Van Rooyen sent a second letter on that day, and to whom once more he went personally on the 30th, stating the extreme danger in which the people were placed, and the fact that Hermanus had taken some of the young men, yet afforded no assistance, although it is alleged that 50 men could have been sent from Fort Armstrong, whose presence at that juncture would have saved extensive defection, if it had not turned the course of events. In this state of things not only could no resistance be offered to Hermanus by the people at Tidmanton, but many of them were compelled against their will to join him; and the example of want of power on the part of the authorities to afford protection to the loyal, or to resist the rebellious, was most detrimental throughout the settlement.

3203. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Have the missionaries great influence



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fluence with the Kafir chiefs, or with the tribes generally? —I should say they have.

3204. Have they generally exerted that influence for the purpose of keeping the peace of the country?—In the district of the Kat River, the influence of the missionaries, as well as of the minister of the Dutch Church, was exerted incessantly to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of the rebels.

3205. Did they take any direct means from time to time of apprising the authorities in the colony of the best means of defence, and the best mode of pacifying the tribes?—This outbreak in the Kat River came suddenly upon all parties.

3206. *Chairman.*] Is not Mr. Read the chief missionary? —There is old Mr. Read and young Mr. Read; old Mr. Read was invited to become their minister by the coloured population who assembled in Kat River, on the formation of the settlement.

3207. Is it true that he has married a native woman? —He was married many years before he came there to a Hottentot, and has by her a numerous coloured family. I wish to state that I hold in my hand a copy of the memorandum of a conference with the insurgents at Blinkwater, on the 9th of January, which document was sent to Major-general Somerset by Cobus Forie, then the field cornet, and subsequently field commandant of the district; of a conference which was held with the rebels when making known to them the offer of pardon from his Excellency. In this memorandum there is an account of what passed between Mr. Read, jun., and the rebels, as well as what passed on the part of the other individuals who accompanied the field cornet, and the sentiments by which at that time the rebels were actuated. This is a copy of the official document; the date, I think, is the 9th of January.

[*The same was delivered in, and is as follows:*]

#### MEMORANDUM.

Pursuant to General Somerset's instructions, and in the absence of my colleague, Adam Waymers, I proceeded on my mission to make known to the insurgents the gracious offer of pardon from His Excellency the Governor.

The Rev. Messrs. Read, junior, and Van Rooyen, field cornet Bottha, my son-in-law Andreas Hatha, and my two sons, accompanied me. On approaching the Blinkwater we saw hundreds of men, between 600 or 700 on foot and mounted, coming over the ridges to the station of Wilberforce, where the main body of the Hottentots are encamped. Being rather taken aback by coming on them so suddenly,

and

and being unarmed, we stopped for a little, and sent forward field cornet Botha and my eldest son, to know if we might approach, and signs being made affirmatively, we rode up to the men, who were marching in regular order to the spot they had appointed as a place of meeting. The Hottentots marched in rank and file as they were ordered by their officers, while the commander rode about from point to point screaming at the men, and imitating the bearing of a general officer on parade, putting his men through their various evolutions. The Kafirs were led on after our way, humming their war songs, whistling, groaning, beating and clattering their assigais as they made for the place of rendezvous. Mr. Read having assumed a central position, and the vast concourse of people, including women and children, who stood behind the ranks, having surrounded him, he beckoned to us to come and take our station by his side. He then said, "Those who consider themselves as the heads and responsible parties had better come forward." John Hermanus then came forward, and on Mr. Read asking him whether he was his father's successor, his men replied, "Yes, he is Hermanus himself." Kupido Klas approached as the head of the "Kafir servants." Addressing him, Mr. Read said to him, "Well, Kupido, how is this? Why, your appointment as Kafir interpreter of the Hertzog Court is lying in the magistrate's desk, and you are now one of the leaders of the revolt. You have brought me into a sad predicament, as I recommended you to the magistrate. Where did you get so many Kafir servants? I thought you told the commissioner that there were comparatively few among Hermanus's Kafirs." He merely smiled, and said, "Yes, so it is;" and intimated that he was able to justify his conduct. The Hottentots said that they would not say who were their leaders, as it might expose such to danger should the chances of war throw them into the hands of the Governor; but each man who had taken up arms was personally responsible for what he did, and all were prepared to suffer the consequences of their present course. Mr. Read then asked Kupido whether he would be so good as interpret for me, which he at first refused to do, but afterwards consented. Having requested Mr. Read to explain the proclamation, he proceeded to do so. He commenced by asking them whether they were all British subjects. They replied, "Yes, and we have always been the faithful subjects of the Queen, and have for many years fought side by side with white soldiers and burghers against the Kafirs." Mr. Read then begged that they would first allow him to address a few words to them, and that they may afterwards make any statement they pleased to me. He again told them, as he did some days before, what the British Government and the religious public of England had done for the Hottentots, apprentices, and other natives of this country within the last 50 years, and the ungrateful and unenviable position they now appeared in, in taking up arms against a Government and a people that had done so much for them. That their state within the time named had been of gradual improvement and amelioration, and that the top stone of their liberties was about being put on, by their being entitled to vote for members of the South African Parliament, and thereby getting a share in the government of the country through their representatives. That although he could not defend individual acts of the Government, or the conduct of some functionaries of Government, he thought, notwithstanding, on the whole since

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their civil emancipation, the Colonial Government had shown a disposition to protect the Hottentots, apprentices, and other natives of colour in the colony; that their present proceedings would shock the feelings of the civilized world, and grieve all their religious friends in England and in this country. He asked the interpreter whether there was a word for traitor and treachery in the Kafir language, and on being told there was, he charged that on Hermanus and all those who participated in his guilt, as they were guilty of treachery to the Queen and country. On this sentiment being uttered, there was a good deal of feeling manifested. One Kafir in a menacing attitude exclaimed, as he forced his way past Mr. Read, "The time of speaking is past, and the time of fighting is come"; others said they felt the treacherous nature of the case, and that was its bad point; while others said the Fingoes were traitors to their king Hintza; others again asked what Pato and the T'Slambe chiefs were, who were now in arms against their Sovereign. Malan Ranabana then stood forward and said, "This land is our land, but what portion of it was in the possession of the Hottentots? Strangers inhabited it, while the real owners had only this ostrich nest, the Kat River, and this was called giving a nation land." Then addressing the Kafirs, he said, "Don't think that because we are with you against the settlers, we will submit to you; we are ready to fight you at any day, if we see that you wish to domineer over us as you did before."

Agie Michaels, a Gona, spoke of the hatred which existed against the Hottentots and the Kafirs, as also that the ironks were full of Hottentots, but that white men escaped punishment, though guilty. Mr. Read said, "But you Gonas must remember that by your own admission you have shown that you have greater confidence in the justice of the Colonial Government than in that of the Kafirs." "How so?" said he: the speaker replied, "When Sir Andreas Stockenstrom was forming the settlement the Gonas who were there among the Kafirs, came to him and made some doleful complaint as to their ill usage by the Kafirs, and then requested Sir Andreas to receive them back into the colony by giving them lands in the settlement." Hendreck Noeca said, that "for 20 years they had been faithful subjects of the Queen, and within that period had been engaged in several wars and commandoes against the Kafirs on the behalf of Government, but that they had been most shamefully treated by the Governor, Sir H. Pottinger, who preceded Sir H. Smith, as also by the two functionaries Biddulph and Bowker. That they had received no thanks from Government after the last war, although they had served for more than two years, and only receiving rations for themselves and families without any pay; that they were sent away from military posts where they have been stationed, like dogs, by Mr. Biddulph, who said, 'You may now go to serve the settlers and the Boers, or go to the —.'"

That the proclamation by which cattle taken in war had been given them was said in time of peace to have been superseded by the civil law, and that by virtue of this Mr. Bowker had taken away cattle which they had acquired in war and given them to those who afterwards claimed them, and that in the same way the civil law would supersede martial law, and their lives now guaranteed would be forfeited. Again, that the people of the settlement were disarmed by

Mr. Biddulph without any cause being assigned, and that two magistrates, Bowker and Cobb, had been doing nothing but annoy and oppress the people; that Mr. Blakway had unjustly taken a portion of the grazing lands of Blinkwater and built a house on it, and although they had repeatedly complained of it, no redress had been given by Government; that a part of the grazing lands had likewise been advertised for sale by Government.

That a commission consisting of men whom they looked upon as their enemies had been appointed as a Board to inquire into certain charges which they themselves had preferred against the people of Blinkwater, and that they had proceeded in a most unwarrantable manner to search their houses and inquired into the mode of supporting themselves, and entered their houses without a search-warrant from the magistrate, and that they (the rebels) consequently firmly believed that a vagrant law had been passed, or these men could not have acted as they did.

Mr. Read again tried to defend the general character of the Colonial Government, and added that they must remember that when Sir H. Smith came to the colony and heard how they had been treated by his predecessor and one of the functionaries already mentioned, he warmly sympathised with them, and dismissed the magistrate; and that being oppressed by another magistrate, Mr. Bowker, he had, after due inquiry, dismissed him also, and appointed Mr. Weinand, who had so impartially administered the laws; that the Government had shown a great readiness to hear their grievances, and they should also remember the impartiality with which Commissioners Brownlee and Calderwood had acted in the cases they had sat on. At this point of the business of the meeting a messenger came up to John Hermanus, and said that the English had murdered certain Hottentots near Waterkloof, who were on their way to the Kat River; in consequence of this, the assembly broke up in the greatest confusion; horsemen catching their horses, and setting off in the most furious way in the direction whence the affair was reported to have happened; some of our party thought it was a mere trick to escape the unpleasant charge which Mr. Read reiterated against them of having acted the part of traitors against the Government, and which seemed to affect them more than anything besides; he said, moreover, that judges and magistrates of the land may try their conduct legally, but that the civilised world would judge the moral delinquency of persons and communities, and that if they persisted in their course, the truthfulness of the Hottentots, which was proverbial, would be greatly damaged by their treacherous proceedings. They all said that they confessed that this was the weak side of their case. Mr. Read further said, in consideration of certain circumstances and features in their case, the Government had made so many concessions, that he could not, in conscience, take on himself to ask for anything more. That longer time for repentance had been given, and the exceptions against Klaas Stuurman and Kupido Klaas, had been left out in his Excellency's proclamation.

During all this time the rain was falling in torrents, and the wind blowing briskly. After the great bulk of the men had left Waterkloof, a second meeting was held, and the proclamation read word

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for word. The conversation was desultory, and some of the speakers began to put queries about the powder which was in the tower at Fort Armstrong, and the English who were living there, and a kind of half joking, half threatening intention, held out that they would attack the fort if the English were not sent away.

Thereupon Andreas Hatha said, "This is really too bad, friends, you speak as if we were prisoners of war in your camp, or that you have already conquered us," and added, "It is not for you to ask the secrets of our camp, and we told you we did not want the secrets of your camp; though now you are rebels, you must still stick to honourable conduct and general rules, which obtain among mankind even in war. Remember we are on the side of Government, which is the side of order and law, and we have come in order to beg of you and to advise you to return to your duty and allegiance. Let us again be one; we have heard your complaints; we regret there should be occasion for these; we agree with you as to the treatment you have received, but differ with you as to the means of their redress. You have recourse to arms; we say we must get our rights by the pen and argument. You should also remember that the Government has in several instances shown a willingness to hear complaints and give redress, and we have now a magistrate who acts justly between man and man. The Government cannot help it, if some of the magistrates are not good. What will our friends Sir Andreas and Fairbairn say, when they hear of this defection in England? What will our venerable father and friend Dr. Philip say, who obtained our liberties for us? You have ruined our ministers by your conduct, and you will grieve the hearts of the directors of the London Missionary Society, Mr. Freeman and the British public, when they hear of what has transpired. I must tell you plainly, that though I heard that you have grievances to complain of, I see no cause for rebellion. I at least will take no part in proceedings which have treachery for their foundation, and must therefore needs end badly. Remember further that Government cannot remove the prejudices against colour and class on which you lay so much stress. Now we must understand each other well; I wish then to say, that we who are still loyal to the Queen, had undertaken to defend the posts, the tower, the powder magazine, the magistrate, his establishment, and all our white fellow colonists who have taken shelter under our ruins; and if you friends touch any of these, we shall at once come into collision and fight you." One of them rejoined, "I am not afraid of another Hottentot; and if we who came from one mother come into contact, we shall hang on each other's necks like Turkey cocks, and fight till we die together; and where we meet in a hostile manner there the grass will never again grow." Then old Cornet Botha, who had listened very quietly, stood forward, and slowly lifting his shambock, said with a low deliberate tone of voice, "Boys, you have done this thing without the old people, the commandant, or the field cornets; you won't hear what the ministers say, and you seem not inclined to accept the Governor's gracious pardon, which the magistrate and ministers have asked of him for you. If you come near any Government posts we defend, or you injure a single poor Englishman who has sought shelter among us, or do anything to the magistrate, his clerk or the constables, we shall take it as a declaration of war. I tell you," he proceeded to say, with emphasis,

emphasis, and as he gave a piercing glance to one of the leaders, "take care my child, and don't burn your fingers, you know me," I merely said, "Take care children, I warn you, and if you want to fight you may have it; we pity you; don't provoke us. Had an obnoxious law been passed, there would be some excuse for your conduct; but I say there is neither cause nor excuse for your conduct"; "Come home" says the Governor, "and go to your work, and get your bread honestly."

(signed) *Cobus Forie.*

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3208. Did you see Mr. Read yourself, when you were there?—Daily.

3209. Did he speak of a meeting that he had with Major-general Somerset, when he came to the Kat River Settlement?—It was at the close of the operations in February.

2210. Did he speak to you about that interview?—He did; I was on the spot at the time.

3211. Will you state yourself what passed?—The general came in to Philipton, on Tuesday, I think, the 25th of February; I had a long private conversation with him that evening about the general state of matters as they came under my own observation during the preceding four weeks in the settlement, and gave him all the information I possessed about the facts, and about my views of matters; about the number of loyal parties about which he made particular inquiries then at Philipton, and other circumstances. He seemed in a very friendly mood indeed; Mr. Read, I understand, had a long conversation with him afterwards, and this same individual Forie, who had been appointed then field commandant of the Kat River Settlement, had also an interview with him. They had, I know, a list carefully scrutinized, and regularly authenticated, of the individuals on whom implicit reliance could be placed. Several of those individuals I knew, having seen them frequently during the preceding four weeks; some of them I have seen in circumstances of peculiar trial, when their patriotism and their valour were demonstrated in a way that could not be surpassed, namely, on the Friday preceding when there was a double visit of Sandilli with a large Kafir force, and Uithalder with a large Hottentot force. The rebels came into the place professedly to seize the Fingoes' cattle, but that was so very trivial an object that universal suspicion was entertained they meditated the seizure of the cattle belonging to the Hottentots at Philipton, and of the property known to be collected at Philipton. There was then no force capable of withstanding this fearful body of Kafirs and Hottentot rebels, but a number of the men who had been loyal throughout

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out determined secretly that though they could not withstand this force, they should not suffer a head of the Hottentot herds to be seized nor the person of a Fingoe, nor injury done to any parties in Philipton, without avenging it by the immediate slaughter of the leaders of the rebellion. One man marked out Sandilli as his victim, whom he should shoot on the first signal, and another Uithalder and other leading chiefs of the rebels; and there they kept within a few paces of their victims, if a contingency arose, ready to fire off their muskets, although they knew it would be succeeded by the penalty of their own lives.

3212. Was this towards the end of February?—On the Friday preceding the siege of Fort Armstrong, the 21st of February. I then mentioned that among other things to the general; on the day succeeding that of the interview with him, Mr. Read, sen., came to me on the morning as I was coming out from breakfast very dejected, and said they had had a most dreadful address from the general, who had called a meeting and denounced all the people at Philipton as a band of rebels, and spoke of it as the focus of rebellion, and talked of all the waggons as those of rebels and being filled with stolen property. I asked who were present; he said loyal men of the place were there, and a number of the burghers were there, and he and Mr. Thomson were there.

3213. You were not present at that interview?—No; it was early in the day, before nine o'clock, I should think. I asked him whether he and Mr. Thomson had allowed that to pass without protest; he said the general was so very excited and violent, and they were so thunderstruck, that they could say nothing; but he immediately went aside to the general, and told him he had committed a very great error; that those were all loyal men belonging to the place he had spoken to, and merited very different treatment. I asked Mr. Read if it was so, that any of those waggons (there might be about 60 of them) did belong to the rebels; he said, None he knew of, and he understood there had been great care about their admission, for he assisted Forie in deciding about what waggons should come into the place; the general had ordered that all the waggons containing the stolen property should be marched to the centre of a sort of square by 12 o'clock. About that hour I came back, having witnessed in the interval a very painful spectacle; a considerable patrol of burghers had gone out from Philipton in the direction of Readsdale, in which district there was not a tainted man, in which district the cultivation was at the highest pitch to be found in the whole

whole Kat River Settlement; following the course of that patrol, I observed rising from time to time a smoke, indicating the conflagration which they made of the houses that were left there, and it was sad to think that all the effect was to burn down the dwellings of the loyalist inhabitants who had never been in any way involved with the rebels; they had come in in obedience to published orders to rendezvous to Philipton. After 12 o'clock I went to the square to see what waggons had been sent in in obedience to the major-general's orders; there was not one; I saw old Mr. Read subsequently, and said, Well, your rebels are very obstinate, or you are pretty free. He laughed, and said he apprehended the general would have great difficulty in discovering the rebels' waggons there. In the afternoon I heard of some waggons being searched; I heard a complaint that an honest widow had had her waggon searched by some parties who had said she was a rebel. I found two or three waggons in that state on going up; I made inquiry what was going on, and was told the people suspected some of them were rebels; I asked if that was ascertained, and was told, "O, yes, there was no doubt of it," so that seemed to be authorised; but the intimation was given to me that every waggon was to be searched, to which I demurred immediately, saying, I should take care no hand should touch my waggon under such an imputation without a regular warrant, and that it should be then under protest if such a step was taken; and I conceived that what was due to me as a British citizen, accidentally shut up there, was due to the meanest Hottentot, against whom no distinct ground of charge had been brought forward. The searching of the waggons, about which the burghers and levy were standing, was done in the most loose way. "Show me that," one cried, "that cannot belong to a Hottentot; it is too good for a Hottentot; does it belong to you?" There was the most loose manner of going to work in the disposal of property in these waggons that they were searching. But the general, I understand, had countermanded that. We did not know then that he meditated the evacuation of the settlement. His language to myself induced the belief that he meant to select some proper post of defence, at which they might be congregated as in former times. Information was sent that evening that all were to leave for Eilands Post next day; the next morning all had to go out, those who could find the means of carrying their property with them doing so; those who could not had to go without it. From Eilands Post the whole body was subsequently moved on to Lushington and

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to Burgher's Post, and then to Fort Hare; and on reaching Fort Hare, which we did on the evening of the succeeding Sunday, all the cattle that the loyal Hottentots had brought out with them from Philipton where their cattle were collected, amounting, I think, to some 3,000 head, were suddenly seized and distributed by the Fingoes and Burghers within the guns' range of the fort that evening.

3214. Was all this done by the military?—Done by those who were in the force General Somerset brought into the Kat River with him.

3215. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Was that done under the authority of Major-general Somerset?—I do not suppose he gave a distinct sanction to it, but it was the force he had under his command,—the same force he brought into the Kat River.

3216. *Chairman*.] All of what I now understand you to describe was done by the military acting under the immediate eye of the major-general commanding?—Yes; understanding by that, not our regular troops, but the burgher and levy force, and Fingoes that he had as his force in the Kat River.

3217. Not the Queen's troops, but the native force?—Yes.

3218. Under the command of the general?—Yes; but there were no British soldiers proper; there were Cape Mounted Rifles with him, who had nothing to do with this affair of pillage.

3219. The fact is that the insurrection broke out in that Kat River Settlement?—The insurrection had broke out first at the Keiskamma among the Kafirs on the 24th of December.

3220. One of the principal insurrectionary movements was at the Kat River Settlement?—Immediately following the outbreak of the Kafirs.

3221. It was also the fact that great numbers of persons belonging to that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined the rebels?—Yes, a great many.

3222. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] And you are of opinion that the Hottentots as a people are a very loyal people?—Very loyal. From the time of the British occupation of South Africa, they have been to the British power most loyal, and at this present time they are as a race most loyal; a great outcry has naturally been made and great astonishment and indignation have naturally arisen at the defection of the Hottentots at the Kat River, but at the time of my quitting the colony there were not fewer than 3,000 Hottentots under

arms

arms at King William's Town and Fort Hare, while I suppose, the whole number in actual rebellion did not exceed one-sixth part of that number in the main; then it was a curious circumstance in the Kat River, that when speaking to the Hottentots and charging them with rebellion, those of them that were involved, they always repudiated it, and even the leader Uithalder repudiated it, affirming that they were not against the Queen, not against England; that they were only against the settlers; drawing a distinction between hostility to a certain party on the frontier, whom they considered as their enemies, and what they regarded as England and the Queen.

3223. *Chairman.*] However subsequently they joined the Kafirs?—They were involved.

3224. *Mr. Monsell.*] You only stated a sixth of them?—More than 3,000 men are actually fighting for us at this moment, and not above one-sixth of that number, I do not mean one-sixth of those 3,000, but a number equal to one-sixth, are engaged in actual rebellion. I should say that the instances of proof of the Hottentot loyalty are numerous. Now, for example, I heard in the Kat River that at the time there had been a great excitement in the colony about the convict question, while the inhabitants of the Kat River entirely joined with the colonists in opposition to the admission of convicts, they were indignant at the threats which the colonists were making about the Cape, and had a meeting, and passed a resolution condemning that, and declaratory of their readiness to come and fight for the Government in maintaining order. Then again, there was the conduct of those few men that I spoke of at Philipton, in circumstances of far greater trial than meeting an enemy. Such was the habitual feeling of the people, and I believe that up to this time there is in the minds of the Hottentots, a strong conviction that England would do them justice, and a strong attachment to England, although a portion of them have been carried away in the time of excitement into their present position.

3225. *Chairman.*] That is, a portion of them have been carried away?—A portion, and only a portion.

3226. Was the portion which took a more active part in the insurrection that portion which had been most instructed, and which previously was to be relied upon, in the opinion of Mr. Read, for instance?—I understood that the greater number of those who took part in the insurrection were residents in the lower districts of the Kat River, nearer to Hermanus, and those places where the grievances had occurred, and that they com-

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prised individuals who were understood to have been instructed, and who were in membership with the church. There are some 640 allotments in the Kat River; of those holding allotments, which comprise some six acres or so, the greater number have been in no way involved.

3227. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you formed any opinion as to the desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in a settlement by themselves?—I think that a very difficult and a very momentous question, especially in the existing state of sentiment throughout the colony; a question worthy of a most careful consideration by all parties, both the statesman and the Christian, and especially by the missionary societies; if one were to judge alone of the Kat River settlement, I incline to think that nothing unfavourable could be deduced from it, because I ask what any portion of my own countrymen would have done, passing through such an ordeal, taken from the lowest class of the people, imperfectly educated, and with a character and position to gain in society? I ask myself what they would have done, and what they would have been had 5,000 of them been collected in any district and left to themselves, and had they been required to act as they have been, and treated as they been? I am inclined to a conclusion favourable to the inhabitants of the Kat River in that light.

3228. Chairman.] But speaking generally in reference to the question just put, are you or not favourable to the establishment of exclusively coloured settlements?—I hesitate very greatly about the expediency of that course.

3229. You think it would be better to mix the coloured races with the white; with the English race or Dutch Boers?—It seems to me desirable if society is to be amalgamated, that there should be a general diffusion of all the classes who are to unite in that amalgamation, and that there should be as general a similarity of treatment as possible, all understanding and enjoying the rights that are common to all.

3230. Sir J. Walmsley.] Do not great prejudices exist against the coloured races on the part of the whites in the colony?—In a part of the colony, unhappily, very strong prejudices, which I fear form an element of difficulty, if not of danger, equal to any that exists out of the colony on the frontier in the way of preserving tranquillity, and an element that it seems to me it is more difficult for Government to grapple with.

3231. Chairman.] It is a difficulty which prevails as far as you know, does not it, in all places and in all countries where there is a white and a black race?—It no doubt prevails in

in all; but it is remarkable in some portions of the colony that it scarcely exists in comparison of what it does in others, even though the presence of the black population is very considerable.

3232. Speaking now of the eastern district of the colony, taking Graham's Town as the centre, do you think that that prejudice against the coloured race exists in any peculiar force?—In a very formidable degree among the English population generally; there are of course a portion of the English population there who are as free and as enlightened men as any in this country. If you go to Cape Town, again, you meet with a vast body of coloured people, Malays and Hottentots, and people of a mixed race, and you find a very excellent feeling prevailing, and an amount of voluntary means for the elevation of the coloured races, for their instruction, which I suppose is not to be met with in any other spot in the British colonial empire.

3233. Do you think that prejudice exists in such force as to present an element of great difficulty in the preservation of peaceful relations between the settlers and the Kafirs?—On the frontier, among the English settlers, I have understood, greatly more than among those to the westward of the old Dutch settlers.

3234. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Does a prejudice to the same extent exist among the Kafirs against the British colonists?—There is a jealousy of the white men and a feeling of injury from the aggression of the white men, and that is concentrated more towards the Englishman than towards others.

3235. When you speak of aggression, you mean the aggressive policy as regards their land?—Yes.

3236. And they are fearful, consequently, of our taking their land and dispossessing them?—Yes, and a feeling which is not unnatural still rankles, though it may not, in times of peace, be at all alarming.

3237. You have spoken particularly of the conduct of some of the magistrates and as to a commission; have you any observations to offer generally upon the fitness of the magistrates who have been appointed to the colony, and their usefulness on the border districts?—Without giving any opinion about the system which has been tried for several years with the Kafirs, the government of whom is quite distinct from the colonial government proper, I am bound to say, from many inquiries, that the magistrates there, the civil commissioners over them, seem to me to have most admirably discharged their duties in at once maintaining what is due to British

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authority and doing justice to the natives. The same remark seems applicable to the magistrate in Victoria, who has been over that district, which was a ceded territory formerly; but from the statements which I have submitted to-day, and from information given me by reliable individuals of facts, I have no doubt that in several cases men without sufficient capacity, of hot temper, and of adverse prejudices towards the natives, have been appointed to the office of magistrate, and that their influence has therefore been injurious. It is of course a matter of great difficulty in a colony such as that to get thoroughly qualified men.

3238. To what portion of that colony do you particularly refer in speaking of magistrates?—I refer to different parts of the colony, and also to the extended boundary beyond Kafaria. There are so many jurisdictions in our South African possessions, and from the nature of them and the circumstances of them they are so varied and peculiar, that it must be a matter of great anxiety to Government to get the men that they should exactly like; but I humbly conceive if suitable men could be found, though at a large increase of expenditure, from the mother country, the additional outlay would be well expended.

3239. *Chairman.*] You are aware the magistrates are not paid by the mother country at all?—I think that the inadequate payment may account in some measure for the difficulty of getting the right sort of men; that seems to me more valuable than money.

3240. Did you come into contact with the gentlemen who acted as commissioners under Colonel Mackinnon?—With one of them.

3241. Are those the gentlemen whom you refer to as having discharged their duties so well?—They are; both from what I saw and from what I ascertained from various quarters.

3242. Have you information enough to tell the Committee whether they had acquired any influence over the Kafirs, and had acquired their confidence?—I believe they had; probably as much as any men could have done in their circumstances.

3243. Do they speak the Kafir language?—Most fluently.

3244. Is not it rather an essential qualification that those who exercise authority over the native races should be thoroughly able to speak their language?—If the choice lay between an able, thoroughly just, and intelligent man, who did not speak their language, but could, by an interpreter, communicate with them, and one who was inferior but could talk fluently, I should of course prefer the former; but if an intimate knowledge of the Kafir tongue can be got in conjunction

junction with those moral and intellectual qualities, it is of the utmost value.

3245. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Do you think it difficult to find among the colonists, that is, the white people in the colony, such magistrates as you have described?—The colony, over a vast extent of territory, comprises, after all, so small a population, and party spirit and all the littleness that comes along with it, meet you so provokingly at every step, that I fear, out of such a district as Cape Town, there would be great difficulty in getting enlightened and liberal-minded men.

3246. Then I gather from what you have said that you would prefer magistrates being sent from this country who even did not know the Kafir language at present, rather than select them from those persons you consider prejudiced against the coloured races now in the colony?—Decidedly.

3247. Have you in your mind formed any definite idea as to the preliminary course necessary for the foundation of tranquillity in the colony and of peace among the Kafir tribes?—It appears to me that an Imperial or Parliamentary commission from this country, composed of men of capacity and high character, entirely removed from all colonial local influence, and with ample power to call parties and documents before them, who should thoroughly and impartially, on the spot, investigate facts, is most desirable if not most necessary to the ends of truth and justice; and that the idea of permanent tranquillity cannot be entertained unless you have the foundations laid clearly and solidly in justice.

3248. Mr. *Monseil*.] You mean, I presume, a separate commission; not one in which the present governor should be included?—No.

3249. Colonel *Estcourt*.] Suppose you sent out a commission of that sort, would not it take away from the authority of the governor in the colony in the minds of the inhabitants?—I do not see that it should impair his executive authority at all, if this commission had no power of action beyond investigation and report.

3250. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Would, in your estimation, such a commission be calculated to give satisfaction to the Kafirs, and put down that excitement that at present exists among them; would they have confidence, in other words, in such a commission?—I think that it would command their respect if they knew of it; but I look not only at the probable relation of such a commission to the Kafirs, and to other tribes on the frontier who are turbulent, and with whom we are apt to get into collision, but also to what is needed within the

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precincts of the colony proper. And I conceive that in the present excited state of party in the colony, and amid the unhappy jealousy and antipathy which prevail there, such a commission would command the universal respect and confidence, and be a guarantee to all, which it might be, I fear, impossible to secure by any local commission, however excellent the individual members of it, which could be furnished in the colony, that an adequate remedy was really to be applied.

3251. *Chairman.*] Do I understand you to recommend that the commission to which you have referred should be appointed rather to inquire into the state and condition of the Cape colony, and into the feelings, and wants, and wishes of the people there, than into the relations between the colony and the Kafir tribes, or their better government hereafter?—I referred to the latter case; to the dealing with all that has been involved in the question about Kafirs and Hottentots, and what not, on the frontier; to find out all the facts in relation to the alleged grievances, whether real, or only supposed to exist.

3252. As between the colony and Kafirs, or the grievances and complaints of the Cape colony proper?—Both; I would take in the whole question in relation to the coloured tribes.

3253. *Mr. Monsell.*] You have described the excited feelings of the Hottentots as directed chiefly against the settlers, and not against the British Government, not against England; do you conceive that observation would apply also to the case of the Kafirs?—To the Kafirs also.

3254. Do you conceive the Kafirs draw a clear distinction in their minds between the colonists and the mother country?—I think they do, though not so broadly as the Hottentots; that is, at present; I gather from the mode in which the missionaries of all denominations have acted to them; they look upon them, for example, as friendly and as trustworthy. They conceive that they are the representatives of a class of people in this country who have no unkindly feelings towards them, and who wish to do them good; they conceive that there is something behind what they can see in the colony. They have a more favourable impression of England than they have of the people that they come in contact with on the frontier; they prefer, I think, the military; they have a higher opinion of our soldiers and officers than they have of the settlers, and the people resident on the frontier.

3255. Still have you not described the Kafirs as feeling considerable distrust even of the Governor and of those concerned

cerned in the government of the military department?—Yes, they have in that respect, certainly.

3256. *Chairman.*] You stated the existence of strong prejudices as regards the coloured and white populations; does not that imply that the charge of partisanship would be generally made against all individuals in important positions under existing circumstances?—Not necessarily; I conceive, for example, that the Commissioners over the Kafirs were looked upon personally without jealousy or any unkindly feeling by the Kafirs, and with confidence by the colonists.

3257. But there is not an uncommon tendency either to charge with partisanship or actually to partisanship?—There is a strong disposition to it.

3258. *Mr. Monsell.*] You would look with considerable distrust at any measure which should increase the power of the colonists, as regards the government of Kafria, in dealing with the Kafir tribes?—I should.

3259. *Chairman.*] With reference to the feelings expressed to you as regarded Messrs. Biddulph and Bowker, was that feeling, in your opinion, in consequence of their having brought charges which were held to be utterly unfounded, or that they were indiscriminating in their condemnation?—The conclusion at which I arrived from the representations made to me was, that the charges had not only been indiscriminating, but several of them unfounded.

3260. That they had in fact considerably misrepresented the circumstances?—That was the conclusion at which I arrived.

3261. I gather from your evidence that it is your opinion that in the pursuance of the general policy adopted towards the Kafirs, that course has been considerably complicated and interfered with by acts of indiscretion on the part of individuals which our relations with the savage tribes have given some importance to?—I should say that I hold, especially with regard to the Kat River Hottentots, with that exception of what they deemed a violation of the pledges made about help, at the close of the war in 1847, and the retention of the cattle which they had captured from the enemy, they have been not acts by the Government, but local acts of indiscretion, sometimes to mere individuals, on the part of magistrates; but being occurrences coming after the sufferings of the inhabitants of the settlement, they have operated as if they were public universal injuries. It is to be noted that the Hottentots are a very sensitive and very sympathetic

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pathetic race, and that when they become excited they are very jealous, and so it holds that where one man suffers all suffer; and I apprehend that that sympathy has had no small influence on the Cape Corps in their recent defection.

3262. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Following up that question, I think I gather from your previous evidence that a great deal of the irritation arose from the supplemental harangue of the Governor at Fort Cox, and that you were of opinion that that was the great cause of the outbreak?—My opinion of that was, that the indiscretion of the Governor in the manner of that harangue, and that the still greater imprudence of the march up the Keiskamma, precipitated the outbreak, and furnished the occasion for which Sandilli and others were anxious, though it might be sooner than they themselves had anticipated; but I have no doubt, from what transpired, that although the Governor had not made that address in that manner, and although that had not taken place, an outbreak would have occurred, though it would not have been in the same circumstances. It is an important fact that the Kafirs in the present war were the first to shed blood; that is a fact against them, and I only lament that an occasion for their hostilities was furnished by apparently the imprudence of this act I have spoken of.

3263. Do numerous missionaries still remain in the disaffected and disturbed districts?—There is not in the whole district over which the insurrection has spread a single missionary or mission family remaining, save at the Chumie Station, where the widow and the family of a deceased missionary, who was very much respected among the Gaikas, continue unmolested, and I am sure will on the part of the Kafirs, though I should not have equal confidence if the Burgher commandoes were going to that district.

3264. Were the missionaries ordered to withdraw by the colonists?—Not by the colonists; about the beginning of December, when some symptoms of alarm prevailed, a notice was sent to the missionaries among the Kafirs, to be ready to provide for their immediate safety; that was followed by a counter notice, previous to the meeting at Fort Cox, that it was unnecessary to leave, and they were assured they should be apprised if danger arose; but they got no further information, because the outbreak came so unexpectedly upon the authorities.

3265. Do you think it desirable that the missionaries should withdraw from the seat of war, or that they should remain?—That is a question about which good men and wise men differ,  
and

and much is to be said on both sides ; but it is obvious to me, that if the missionaries can remain with personal safety, there are various important ends to be gained by their continuance, in exerting their influence to prevent the well affected from being involved in the rebellion, which would otherwise be inevitable. Again, in supplying the means of communication with the British authorities, that would often be most important, as well as in preserving the property of the missionaries, which is an important object in its own department.

3266. As respects the Kafirs, they were quite willing that you should remain in their country ; that you might sit where you were in peace ?—Sit still was the expression.

3267. Had you any interviews with the Kafir chiefs, at which you received their protection or their assurance of protection ?—I had from Sandilli himself, who came to the station three weeks after the outbreak, with a large body of armed men, and when we were absolutely in the power of the insurgents, without arms and without ammunition.

3268. What was Sandilli's language on that occasion ?—That of assurance to the teachers as they were called, and to myself, that we might sit still ; he proposed also, on our intimating an intention of leaving, that we were not to remove to any military post, or go anywhere without apprising him, in which case he would engage to give an escort. I told him of my purpose to leave, and he fulfilled his pledge ; he left a confidential man of his tribe as a sort of guard, not from the Kafirs of the district, but from strangers, Kafirs who were insurgents, passing to and fro, from doing any harm to the teachers' families, as the missionaries were called ; and when I did go out his escort went with us to the borders of the Kat River.

3269. What was the nature of his remarks as to the war itself, so far as you could gather his own views and opinions ?—I might have supplied you with all that passed ; it was all taken down ; but I have not the document here ; he was very much excited ; there was nothing very material. He complained that he did not send any of his people across the sea-water to England to invade our country, and why did the English come across the sea-water to this country to invade him ; he said that the Queen did not make him a chief ; she could make great men, she could make governors, but God made him a chief ; he was the chief of all the Gaikas, and God had given the white man England, and He had given the coloured men South Africa, Kafirland, and why did we English wish to undo what God had done ? He said they had stripped him

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of his land; he complained that the teachers or missionaries wherever they went alienated his children from him; that whenever they became Christians they ceased to be his subjects; and he complained that the young men that were educated left Kafirland and went into the colony, instead of remaining among their own people and doing them good, if that was the object. I expressed my entire concurrence with him in the last view, and lamented that any Kafirs should leave Kafirland that were themselves educated or christianized, and I said I hoped the time was coming when they would need no white teachers at all; that we wished as much as possible to have only Kafirs teaching Kafirs. He stated that his object in coming was to claim all his own children, by which he meant all the residents on the station. I asked him to exempt them from fighting, stating that as Christians it was against the Gospel to fight; that it would be wrong in any of them to fight against their own countrymen, but I must equally object to any of them fighting against the English; and he asked me if Somerset would exempt them from fighting against him. I told him I could give no pledge for Somerset, as I had not communicated with him, but that I should prefer the same request to him as to himself, and I had great hope he would allow them to continue free; but he would not consent without this pledge to promise exemption, and the determination with which he adhered to refuse consent unless he could have the pledge that the people on the station should not be made to fight against him, impressed me with the respect which he had for pledges, and with the confidence which might be reposed in him if his pledge were actually given.

3270. When was the first intimation you received of your conduct being questioned as regards the war?—After I got to Fort Hare, I cannot say how long.

3271. Was it questioned whilst you remained in the settlement of which you have first spoken, where you saw Sandilli and others?—Not to my knowledge.

3272. The first time you heard your conduct questioned, as having taken part with the rebels, was at Fort Hare?—Yes.

3273. And no offensive interference did you find till you got to Graham's Town?—No.

3274. Do you believe that the missionaries, as far as your judgment and information go in that district, took any part, directly or indirectly, in promoting the rising of the Kafirs?—None whatever.

3275. That you are quite clear about?—Quite clear; all their influence was distinct and unmistakeable in reprobation of

of the outbreak, because before it had happened I never missed an opportunity, and I know my brethren there did not, of impressing upon the minds of the Christian Kafirs who were on the station, who were the only parties, with the exception of those I before referred to, with whom I came into contact, and with the view of their carrying it to others, the inevitable ruin that conflict with the British power would entail upon them.

3276. Colonel *Dunne*.] At the time that they deprecated war, did not the missionaries in many instances hold out to the Kafirs that they were very much illused by the English?—What they may have done, I cannot say; I witnessed no such representations, and I was privy to none.

3277. Was not Shiloh a missionary station?—Yes.

3278. Was not some of the plunder that was taken from Fort Armstrong found in Shiloh afterwards, that being a missionary station?—I think I have heard so; but I am not positive that I have.

3279. I want to know whether, when the troops went to Shiloh, they did not find a part of the plunder that was taken from the settlement at Armstrong in the missionary station at Shiloh?—When you mention that, I think I have heard so; but I cannot speak positively. I beg to add the painful fact, that as regards the pillage of Fort Armstrong, not only rebels but people in the neighbourhood indiscriminately came in and seized what they could carry, so as to leave nothing; the rights of property were all in abeyance; and that was done by many who were not regarded as taking part in the rebellion.

3280. What were they; Kafirs or Hottentots, or whom?—Hottentots and Bastards.

3281. From the settlement at Shiloh?—I am not aware that any were from Shiloh.

3282. Was any of that plunder found in Shiloh?—I think I have heard what you mention, but I am not aware of the fact.

3283. Was not Shiloh defended against the troops by Hottentots belonging to the missionary station there?—Yes.

3284. Did they not defend the church with great force?—I understand so.

3285. Do you understand 140 alone were defending the church; one of the detachments at Shiloh?—I cannot speak as to the number; but I may state, that while at Philipton there were two or three very disastrous occurrences, which aggravated the state of affairs very greatly, and one of those was this affair of Shiloh.

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24 July  
1851.

*Lunæ, 28<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Estcourt. Mr. Bonham Carter. Mr. Hindley. Colonel Dunne.		Mr. Labouchere. Mr. Hawes. Mr. Mackinnon.
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The RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE, IN THE  
CHAIR.

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*Benjamin Hawes, Esq., a Member of the Committee;  
Examined.*

*B. Hawes,  
Esq., M.P.*  

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3286. *Chairman.*] ARE there any observations you are desirous to make to the Committee, with reference to a letter which has been addressed to the Chairman of this Committee by Sir Andries Stockenström?—In Sir Andries Stockenström's letter, I find the third paragraph to be to this effect: "The Under Secretary for the Colonies, after handing to me during my examination on the 26th ultimo, the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, referred me to others of Sir G. Napier's despatches; but I searched in vain for that of the 1st of February 1839, although in doing so my eye accidentally fell on one of the 20th November 1838, which I read to the Committee, and which was strongly indicative of the opinion which Sir G. Napier then entertained of the Glenelg system, of my proceeding under it, and of those by whom I was so furiously and factiously resisted in that important task. I have, however, this morning purchased another copy of the said Blue Book of the 23d ultimo; but I do not find in the copy so purchased the said letter of Sir G. Napier of the 20th November 1838, such as it was handed to me by the Under Secretary, such as I then read it to this Committee, and such as it must appear in my evidence, inasmuch as in the latter copy there appeared in said letter, in page 40\* of the said Blue Book, in the second line from the bottom, the following sentence parenthetically between the figure 1819 and the word "as;" viz., "the worst importation

tion that ever came to this colony." I feel it an imperative duty to notice this omission, because I audibly read this passage before the Committee in the hearing of a number of bystanders; and as the letter, such as I received it from the Under Secretary, with the said passage, is gone to the Cape and may there be published, I cannot allow the cause of the discrepancy to be left doubtful." In the passage which I have read from Sir Andries Stockenstrom's letter, the Committee will observe that he points out that certain words within a parenthesis were in the copy of the papers delivered to the Committee, and that they are not to be found in the copy delivered for general circulation. I wish to explain to the Committee how that arose: The papers, as the Committee is aware, were prepared with considerable haste, with a view to being placed in the hands of the Committee; and the moment that the papers were collected and printed, I desired that 15 copies of them should be at once delivered to the Committee. The copies that I ordered to be delivered passed under my view, and also came under the notice of Lord Grey; and it was decided they should be laid, as they were laid, before the Committee. The copies for general circulation were not delivered for about a week afterwards, and during that interval the gentleman who is at the head of the department of all matters relating to the Cape, perceived these words in the parenthesis; he thought they cast a very unnecessary imputation upon a body of settlers, and he took upon himself, without communication with Lord Grey or with myself, to strike them out. I was not aware that they were omitted until Sir Andries Stockenstrom pointed out the omission in his letter. I desire also to state that in laying such papers as these before Parliament, whenever a paper is not given *in extenso*, it is at once marked "copy" or "extract." In this case, it will be perceived that it is stated to be an extract. I would further remark also, that it is the practice in the office, and I apprehend a wise and proper one, that where in the papers or despatches personal reflections are cast upon individuals, as far as is consistent with the duty of laying before Parliament or the Committee the fullest information upon the subject to which the papers relate, they are omitted, provided the omission does not in any way affect the main information to be conveyed to the House or to a Committee, as the case may be. Under those circumstances, though I think those words were irregularly and improperly struck out, inasmuch as this was done without the authority of the Secretary of State, contrary to a standing regulation of the Colonial Office; but otherwise

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there is not much blame to be attached to the gentleman who, from motives which may be readily appreciated and understood, took upon himself to omit them.

3287. Colonel *Estcourt.*] Was not this a copy of that which was shown to Sir Andries Stockenstrom in his examination?—The copy which Sir Andries Stockenstrom read from was the early copy I presented to the Committee, containing those words; and in the course of his examination he quoted the passage in question.

3288. And those copies were the copies given to the Committee alone?—And those copies were intended for the Committee alone. It is, however, but right to Sir Andries Stockenstrom to state, that a copy was given to him at the time.

*Mercurii, 30<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Labouchere.  
Sir J. Walmsley.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Mr. Mackinnon.  
Colonel Dunne.

Sir E. Buxton.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. Hawes.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY LABOUCHERE, IN THE  
CHAIR.

*Sir Andries Stockenstrom*, called in; and further Examined.

*Sir A. Stock-*  
*enstrom.*

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3289. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] HAVE you any knowledge of the Neuaber localities, relations of the various Kafir and other tribes?—No; I do not think that anybody can give you that accurately; I have formed some sort of idea, having been a great deal among them, but I think any statement I can make upon the subject must be very vague.

3290. Are you prepared to give the Committee any information as to the number of the tribes to the east and north-east of the Keiskamma?—As far as I could, I have paid a great deal of attention to the subject, but any information I could give upon it must be very vague; I believe them to be about

200,000 strong, that is including the Galaikas and the Rarabes, and including the Amagonaquabies, which is a Pato tribe.

3291. In those tribes do you include the Tambookies?—No, they are independent of them; when I speak of the Kafirs, I speak of what we call now the Kreli Kafirs, and the T'Slambie, and the Pato Kafirs.

3292. What do you designate the Tambookie?—The Amatembu are never called Kafirs; they may have been some centuries ago the same stock.

3293. Then when you speak of the Kafir tribes as being 200,000 strong, you do not include the Tambookies?—No.

3294. What other tribes do you not include upon that frontier?—There are the Basutus, and if you go on into the interior, you come to the Pondus and the Zoolus, and various other tribes, which have been coming upon the colony like waves, from the destructions committed by the Chartre in 1823; but Kafirs we only call the Galaikas and the Rarabes, the Amagonaquabies, the Tambookies, and the Amatembus, so called.

3295. You have no specific knowledge of the Tambookie tribe?—No, only generally.

3296. Were the Tambookies in friendly relation with the colony during the previous war?—That leads to a lengthy subject; I must begin in 1829; those people were at war, and up to that period there was no union among them against the colony; then the Kafirs attacked the Tambookies and pursued them into the colony, and carried on the war, to the great terror of the farmers; such was then the enmity between those two races. Sir Lowry Cole in consequence of this punished the Kafirs that were living by sufferance in the Ceded Territory, and drove them out and established a Hottentot settlement upon that same ground, which had originally been measured for Scotch islanders.

3297. Mr. Hawes.] Did you take any part in the expulsion of Maquomo at that time?—I was the principal instrument.

3298. Did you approve of the policy pursued?—Fully. Maquomo had taken possession of a part of the Ceded Territory; they were allowed by sufferance to remain there; and when they committed this outrage upon the Tambookies, they pursued them into the colony, and the Government very properly made an example of them; and that, I must say, has been very much disapproved of in this country; but still I think that it was necessary. This hostility continued, and the Tambookies were extremely grateful to the British Government for the assistance they had received on this occasion. In the war of 1835 the Tambookies did not only remain neutral, but

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whatever they did was in favour of the British Government; consequently they had no share in the war against the Government; but as soon as the war was over, we rewarded them by annexing their country to the colony, and placing them under the D'Urban system. This they never forgave. Up to that period there had always been jealousies between the Tambookies and Kafirs. When the D'Urban system was put a stop to, this country fell back, of course, to the Tambookies. When the war of 1846 broke out, the consequence of this treatment which they had received was, that on a part of the nation, the Mapassa, joined the Kafir tribe again for the first time that they had shown any hostility towards us. That part joined the Kafirs against us in 1846; but a great proportion remained neutral, owing to the influence of the missionaries. During the war of 1846 we attacked those people, the Mapassa, and, of course, what we called punished them; and at the same time we also sent a detachment by mistake—a very improper measure—into a peaceable kraal, who were living under the protection of the diplomatic agent, in the middle of the night, and men, women, and children were destroyed.

3299. Mr. *Bonham Carter.*] What is that attack known by; is there any reference to it anywhere?—It is in the Colonial Office in Downing-street; it was the kraal of Guadda. Perhaps it is as well to explain what I mean by the improper measure. When I was sent by Sir Peregrine Maitland to bring Kreli to terms, I requested the assistance of 200 Hottentots to bring up any supplies; these were Zwellendam Hottentots, then serving under Captain Hagart, 7th Dragoon Guards; I was told that they could not be spared, because Colonel Hare, who had to defend the Amatola Mountains, would be too weak during my absence at the Kei; but as soon as I was absent they spared 1,000 men out of the same force, and deranged all my plans; one detachment was sent from Shiloh, of boers who were serving under my orders, and were beaten in consequence of mismanagement, and a detachment of British soldiers was sent into this kraal of Guadda; they of course knowing no better than that they had to deal with enemies. The kraal was destroyed in the manner I have just stated. Those men complained to me, and I reported it; they never got any redress, which very much exasperated them. After the war, the present Governor, upon the memorial of some of the farmers, attached the land as far as the Kei to the colony, and had a number of farms measured out for those farmers. I saw the reply to this memorial in the

Governor's own hand, in which they were told that their request was complied with, provided they would not disturb the Kafirs under the chief Kama. The boers took it for granted that the land was theirs, and part of it was actually measured out for them. As soon as the present war broke out, the whole of the Tambookie tribes west of the Kei joined the Kafirs against us.

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3300. Sir J. Walmsley.] It has been given in evidence that the aggressions in the colony have all been on the part of the Kafirs, and not by the colonists; is this, in your opinion, correct?—When I speak of the wars of 1846, and of everything that has taken place since then, I draw a broad distinction between the colonists and the Government; I think them the results of the acts of the Government, and not of the colonists.

3301. Do you think the aggressions have been on the part of the Government, or on the part of the Kafirs, or both?—I think that the war of 1846 was brought about by the violation of our treaties with the Kafirs in 1844, and everything that has followed since was just the consequence of that.

3302. Chairman.] Is there any other point you are desirous of offering observations to the Committee upon?—I must observe, if the Committee will allow me to say, the same question was put to me the first time I was heard here, and as I then did not know whether the Government would pursue this inquiry at the Cape, I thought that it was my duty to wait until that point was decided; because I do not think it right that I should say all that I have to say with reference to individuals, and with reference to classes, in their absence, if there is a chance of my having the opportunity of saying so to their faces: if, therefore, there should be an inquiry at the Cape, where those people can be confronted with those who charge them, and where all the blacks as well as the whites can be heard, and every one whose name shall be put forward shall be put in a position to defend himself; if that can be done, I think it would not be well for me to add here what I have to say. But if there is no inquiry to follow, and all the things are to rest here, I say the whole inquiry is incomplete.

The Reverend *Henry Renton*, A.M., called in; and further  
Examined.

3303. Mr. *Hindley*.] YOU have stated, in your answer to a question put by a Member of this Committee, that you had heard that a part of the plunder that was taken from the settlement at Armstrong was found in the missionary station at

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at Shiloh; have you any reason to believe that that was correct, or was it merely a flying rumour you heard in the colony?—I heard a great many idle rumours in the colony, many of them I am aware quite unfounded; on the question being put to me the other day, I thought I had heard that among others, but I have not the slightest evidence of the fact, nor the slightest reason for thinking that the rumour is well founded.

3304. You were not at Shiloh?—No.

3305. From what you heard at Shiloh, would you believe that the general disposition of the people there was loyal to the Government?—Decidedly; they had been a community not only of undisputed, but of eminent loyalty, from their foundation up to the present unhappy occurrence.

3306. Did you hear of the circumstances which attended the destruction of Shiloh, and the previous occurrences?—I was at Philipton when the tidings of the destruction of Shiloh arrived. I was with the missionaries and the minister of the Dutch church there at the time, and we took down from two men, who came to consult us what they should do, a statement of what had taken place; that statement I hold in my hand. It was forwarded to General Somerset, along with a minute of our view of the matter, and we took the view we did from the unanimous and strong conviction up to that moment that Shiloh was a most unlikely spot from which an emanation of hostility to the Government might have been anticipated. I have also here a subsequent statement which I took down from an individual who had acted as the secretary of the commandant for some weeks at Shiloh; a man who came to Philipton subsequently, and who gave a very distinct account from a journal he had kept, and continued at Philipton, remaining steadfast and loyal, and who was enrolled in the levies, and whose testimony seems to me important in connexion with that of the other witnesses.

3307. Can you give the purport of that statement?—These men, David Taai and Hendrick Vischer, after a reference to some skirmishes between the Fingoes and the Tambookies, in the neighbourhood of Shiloh, stated that four men, who had gone down to the Kat River to bring up their families, returned to Shiloh on the 29th of January. On the return of those men, Captain Tylden wrote a letter to Mr. Bonatz, the presiding missionary at the station, stating that he must immediately appear with those four men at Whittlesea. Two of those, who belonged to Shiloh, went with Mr. Bonatz, and, on their arrival, were put in prison by Captain Tylden, at Whittlesea.

Whittlesea. The captain required the other two to be brought. The commandant told them he could not take those two men prisoners, as they belonged to the Kat River, and were ready to leave for that destination. Captain Tylden then said the Shiloh people were not on the side of Government, because they would not give up those two men. On Thursday, January the 30th, a letter was drawn up to Captain Tylden, which two of the missionaries and three of the people carried and delivered to him; he refused to have anything to do with it, and stated that, instead of sending it, the Hottentots ought to have come and fallen down on their knees before him. He demanded that by 12 o'clock that day, 10 men from Shiloh should be sent, with their guns and ammunition, to be delivered up to him, and at one o'clock 10 more to do the same, and, after giving up their guns and ammunition, they were to be sent to Cradock to prison. By their submission, he said he would see that they were still on the side of Government. On the missionaries reporting to the men of Shiloh the captain's demand, and urging them to compliance, they refused, assigning as the reasons of their refusal, that they recollected how Mr. Shepston had acted to the people of the Bushman station, taking their guns, and breaking them to pieces, and then putting them in prison, and half-starving them; and that they had heard how the people at Bavaians River had been treated by the Pringles; their guns taken from them, and broken, and the people afterwards fired upon, and some of them killed. Captain Tylden replied, that if they did not submit, and bring in the guns within two hours, the missionaries must leave immediately. Upon that, the missionaries left the same afternoon; six missionaries, four of whom had families, with four waggons. On January the 31st, Captain Tylden came with a body of Fingoes, Kama's Kafirs, and English to attack the station. The Shiloh people, numbering about 70, went out to meet the force, but were driven back into the station. The Whittlesea people took possession of their houses, and fired upon them. On the following morning, February the 1st, the English and Fingoes who had retired on Friday returned before sunrise, and renewed the attack. They fought from that time till about one o'clock in the afternoon, the Shiloh people occupying a position within the square. The assailants went into their houses, and into one of the mission houses, and made holes in them, through which they fired. They also took away and destroyed the property of the Berlin missionaries which was in the infant school. They burnt the mission-house, consisting of nine rooms, besides store and pantries, which was full

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of valuable mission property; they also burnt the kitchen and cabinetmaker's shop, supplied with complete sets of smith's, carpenters' and wheelwrights' tools; also the shop of merchandise belonging to the mission. The premises were set on fire by an Englishman named John Webster, who got up by a ladder to a window in the gable, and with lucifers, which he had taken from the infant school, began his work of incendiarism. About 15 Fingoes and Kafirs were shot in Shiloh, but the inhabitants drove back the assailants into the plain, and saw them afterwards carrying some dead bodies; they interred subsequently in one large grave the body of the Englishman, who had been shot from the ladder, with those of the Fingoes and Kafirs. One of the Shiloh men was killed, and two were wounded. The assailants took away all their cattle and sheep. That is the substance of their statement in relation to the attack on Shiloh, by which the station was destroyed. The other individual, who had been acting as secretary to the commandant at Shiloh, related to me that on the 27th of January four men came to Commandant Paarl, and asked his permission to go to Kat River to buy soap and tobacco, as they could not get anything to buy at Whittlesea; the ministers also had nothing of the kind. On the 29th those four men came back to Shiloh. When Commandant Tylden heard they were come, he wrote to Mr. Bonatz a letter that Commandant Paarl should bring them to Whittlesea. Commandant Paarl went to the four men, and told them of Captain Tylden's demand, ordering them to submit to the requisition; the two belonging to Shiloh went with them, the others would not. When Mr. Bonatz, with the two men, came, Captain Tylden said, "There were four men; where are the other two?" On Mr. Bonatz stating the circumstances, Captain Tylden wrote to the Commandant Paarl, saying, that before six o'clock he must deliver up the two men at Whittlesea. Paarl ordered some of his men, but he could get no one to transport them as prisoners to Whittlesea; he then went to Captain Tylden in person, and told him he could find no men to carry out his orders; that the two men did not belong to Shiloh, and were ready to go to Kat River. The same evening two of the missionaries returned to Captain Tylden to tell the same fact. On the 30th two of the ministers went to Whittlesea about the matter. They reported that Captain Tylden accused some of the Shiloh people of having been seen among the Kafirs the day the Kafirs and Fingoes fought. Mr. Bonatz said if that was true he would give his head, for he was sure that it was untrue, and pointed to a Fingoe who was in the field

field of battle to bear testimony; the Fingoe assured Captain Tylden that no Hottentot was among the Kafirs. A letter was then written to Captain Tylden from the people of Shiloh, that they had solemnly resolved to give their lives as a sacrifice for the ministers and Fingoes, as faithful subjects of the Government, and that the reason why they had not fired upon Mapassa, was not only because they had not enough powder, but because they expected an order from Commandant Tylden; that as they did not receive the order, they had stood ready for an attack; that they were reminded when in the last war Mapassa attacked them, and they were obliged to defend themselves, they were charged with having attacked the Kafirs without reason, and now they had no orders from anybody to fire, and that was the reason why they had not fired upon Mapassa. Captain Tylden wrote that no way was now open but to deliver up the men within two hours; that they were to come down to Whittlesea 10 by 10 to lay down their guns and powder, and go to Cradock and answer for their conduct, and if they did not do so he would hold them as rebels. When the ministers saw that they would not lay down their guns and powder, and their reasons for refusing to do so, the ministers left the same day. Such was the statement of Balie, the secretary.

3308. You made a representation of those circumstances to General Somerset?—We did. I might have added, that, on taking down the statements of those men, we sent an immediate representation to the Major-General, with an authenticated copy of the same, submitting most respectfully and earnestly the suggestion to him, that until the rigorous inquiries which the case demanded could be prosecuted, a suspension of the work of destruction between the people of Whittlesea and the people of Shiloh was an object of urgent moment, not only for the sake of those communities, but to prevent the extension of the disaffection among the coloured classes, which was already, unhappily, so widely spread, and which this transaction was greatly fitted to aggravate. We suggested that this might be effected by an order from the Major-General to Captain Tylden to suspend all operations against Shiloh, on the condition that the people of Shiloh should engage that no offensive operations should be resumed on their part. That suggestion was submitted not only on account of the very extraordinary manner in which Captain Tylden was represented to have acted, but because we well knew that previous to that occurrence the Shiloh people were a community of undisputed loyalty, and of most peaceable and exemplary

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department, and because, from the statement of the men, those people considered themselves as forced in self-defence to do what they had done by the hazard to their property, their liberty, and their life, to which the demand of Captain Tylden, and the subsequent attacks of the Whittlesea people, exposed them.

3309. Are you aware what steps General Somerset took after that statement had been received?—He sent a despatch through Philipton to Captain Tylden, arresting any further operations until that office had reported fully his conduct; and the arrival of that despatch prevented further hostilities, which were fixed to be recommenced on the morning that it came.

3310. Colonel *Dunne*.] Do you think that any conduct on the part of an officer of the Queen's troops would justify the people of Shiloh resisting the authority of the Queen, or the missionaries encouraging them?—I conceive there may be conduct on the part of an officer that would justly raise the question of the duty of submission.

3311. I mean to say, do you think the missionaries would be justified in countenancing any armed resistance from a colony of that kind against the Queen's troops, on a suspicion that the military officer commanding was not doing what they conceived to be his duty?—The missionaries at Shiloh, instead of offering any resistance, did all they could to induce the people to submit to the order; and because the people would not do so the missionaries left.

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*Jovis, 31<sup>o</sup> die Julii, 1851.*

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Dunne.  
Mr. Bonham Carter.  
Colonel Estcourt.  
Mr. Mackinnon.

Sir J. Walmsley.  
Mr. Hawes.  
Mr. Hindley.  
Sir E. Buxton.

BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Rev. *Henry Renton*, A.M., called in; and further Examined.

3312. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] YOU were proceeding at your last examination to assign some reasons for the conclusion at which you had arrived that the Kat River settlement was not a failure; have you any other reasons to state besides those already adduced?—On looking to the services and sacrifices and subsequent treatment undergone by the population, I should not have regarded the experiment as having had a fair trial had the case been one of Irishmen or Highlanders instead of Hottentots and coloured people. The progress that was made up to 1835, the extent to which they had recovered themselves after that deplorable war before 1846, and again the extent to which they had recovered before this present outbreak, preclude, I humbly conceive, any conclusion, on just grounds, that the settlement was a failure. I had referred to the progress of education and of industry. I should have gone on to have noticed the fact that there was no canteen in that settlement; nearly all the inhabitants are total abstainers from any intoxicating liquors; they are proverbially honest; the number of criminal cases that have come before the magistrates in that settlement I understand to be fewer than the number in any corresponding part of the colony. There is a handsome church which was built for Mr. Thompson's congregation by the voluntary labours and contributions of the people, with the exception of 100*l.* contributed by the Government. I have heard the building estimated at 1,000*l.* value. There was before the last war a large church in the

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course of erection by the voluntary efforts of Mr. Read's congregation; a place of worship between 80 and 90 feet in length and above half that in breadth nearly completed as to the walls; and considerable contributions, for their circumstances, have been raised towards missionary objects. Looking at these things I think no one would be surprised at the succession of strong testimonies that have been borne, not only by visitors but by official men, from the late Judge Menzies down to the present Governor, in favour of that settlement.

3313. You said in your Answer 3204, that the missionaries had exerted themselves incessantly to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist violence; have you any particular instances to bring forward in support of that statement?—I produced a minute the other day of a conference with the rebels at Blinkwater, an official document, in which the conduct of one of the missionaries was at some length exhibited, and in which also there is considerable light thrown upon the state and views of parties, both loyal and insurgent, at that period. I have here a copy of a letter of Major-general Somerset to the Rev. Messrs. Read and Van Rooyen, dated Fort Hare, 17th January 1851, in which he says, "Reverend Sirs,—I have been made aware by the resident magistrate of the Kat River settlement, Mr. Wienand, of your exertions in explaining to the misguided Hottentots of the Blinkwater his Excellency the Governor's most gracious proclamation in reference to their revolt, and their illegal proceedings in the colony. I most fully appreciate the loyalty and zeal you have evinced, and the truly Christian feeling that has guided you in endeavouring to induce these misguided men to return to their allegiance, which has had the effect of inducing 11 of these men, hitherto loyal and valued subjects of Her Majesty, to return to their allegiance; and which, as some days will yet elapse before his Excellency's most gracious pardon held out to these misguided men will cease to operate, I trust may still be the means of inducing others to see the enormity of their rebellion, and of bringing them to a sense of their duty. I remain, Gentlemen, your obedient servant, *W. Somerset*, Major-General." That I produce as evidence of the views he had of their conduct. You will notice that the Rev. Messrs. Read and Van Roogen alone are addressed there. I had a private letter while at Chumie from the Rev. Mr. Thompson, the minister of the Dutch reformed church in the settlement, dated the 10th of January 1851, from which I beg leave to read the following extract, as showing his views at that period:

period: "Very important events, in connexion with our present troubles, have taken place since I wrote to you last. The defeat at Fort Beaufort, and the death of Hermanus, have already, I doubt not, prevented an aggravation of our circumstances. Had the reverse of these events taken place, and success attended the attempt on Fort Beaufort, it would have greatly emboldened the Kafirs, and probably induced more of the Hottentots to join in the rebellion. I hope the result will be the opposite of this; and I cannot help looking upon what has taken place as most providential, and it may be the means of shortening the war, and of preventing a much greater shedding of blood. Thinking it a favourable time to work upon the minds of those who had been led away, the Messrs. Read and a few of their influential people rode to Blinkwater yesterday, and had an opportunity of speaking with a good number. The result we can scarcely yet speak of. None have yet appeared to give in their submission; some we expected to do so; but it is not a good token of regret for their conduct, that they endeavour to magnify their complaints, so as thereby to insinuate that they had just cause for their conduct. I do not mean to say that their complaints are groundless. I understand that they are desirous the magistrate should meet them, in order to hear these complaints. This would almost seem as if they meant to take the position of treating for concessions to their demands. If so, it is doubtful how they may be met, or the benefits of the amnesty extended to them. What shall be the end of these things is a question which forcibly presents itself to the mind. The elements of discord and strife between opposite elements and classes of society have been awakened, which, if not controlled and subdued by the hand of God, may lead to the most lamentable consequences. I am glad you have been allowed to remain so long undisturbed at Gwali, and wish the same comparative quietness may continue; but I must say that if the war is prolonged, and when the Governor enters upon offensive measures, it is very doubtful to me that your position will be tenable. Without doubting the present favourable disposition of Sandilli towards the mission, or Soga's sincerity, circumstances may arise such as will rouse the passions of barbarous men, so that the immunity you now enjoy may be disregarded. I quite feel, with you, the weight of the reasons for remaining at the station, if possible. Humanly speaking, there is great risk, but God may cover with His hand the many children whom he has gathered in that place: for their sakes I pray that the enemy may not be per-

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mitted to break in upon you. At all events, it is, I think, prudent and desirable that the ladies and children should be removed, as appears to be now the design of the brethren." I should say that, subsequently, the whole conduct of those gentlemen was in accordance with what the facts brought before you would lead you to anticipate. Their influence was very great, and it was energetically and successfully exerted to abate the evils that were accumulating. On the 22d of January, the rebels came in great numbers to Fort Armstrong, to demand the surrender of the English, and of the property there, threatening also the slaughter of the farmers, and offering exemption only to the ministers and their families, and the magistrates and officials. The very fact of the ministers and their families being there was a proof of their devotedness; they had no occasion to have left their own homes; there was no party going to disturb them, and their families were considered sacred; but they took away their wives and children into the wretched accommodation that was to be found there, of a temporary kind, partly as an example to others, at the request of the magistrate, and partly because others, especially the English, did not feel themselves safe unless they were there. A question was started on that day that a vast force was collected of the rebels, whether it was not the duty of the ministers to give up the English, that is, to consent to the demand, and not to expose their own families to a siege, and their own persons, and a great number of others, who would be all safe if the obnoxious persons were delivered up. There was but one sentiment in the minds of every minister and missionary, that although unprepared to act on the offensive, it was their duty to incur the last hazards to their families and themselves, sooner than surrender one Englishman under these circumstances.

3314. Colonel *Dunne*.] Was this at Fort Armstrong?—  
Yes, on the 27th of January.

3315. *Chairman*.] Will you explain to the Committee what you mean by its being the duty of the missionaries to give up the English?—It happened that on that morning the greater number, if not all, of the missionaries were at Philipton, whither Messrs. Read and Thompson had come to see my brethren and myself, who had arrived there. When the message was brought of the assemblage of a vast force about Fort Armstrong with this design of demanding the English, a lady present, who was excited, started the question to which I have referred—Were the families of the missionaries, and themselves and hundreds of other people, to be exposed to destruction,

struction, when the surrender of a few individuals would save them all? That was the circumstance under which the question arose; and it was put to myself with the addition, "You are a peace man; what would you say to that?" I gave the answer first, that whatever might be my hostility to war, in such circumstances, I considered they were under the most solemn obligation to incur the last hazards, if all their families and themselves should perish, sooner than give up an Englishman; and every one of the missionaries present emphatically added his determination so to do. Mr. Thompson rode off, and Mr. Read followed him, and they encountered a party of rebels on their approach to Fort Armstrong at the ordinary entrance to Fort Armstrong; they that day prevented a collision which would inevitably have produced vast bloodshed. The fort was miserably without defences; there was no fortification, and no defence except a small tower; but there were some, I have said, who were anxious to fight. Confidence was not entire in the minds of some of the ministers about the fidelity of all that were within the fort; though they had not, nor the magistrate either, evidence against any sufficient to act upon. Having found that besides prayer to God, parley with the rebels was the only means left them, they engaged the leaders of the rebels in a parley; they reasoned, and expostulated, and remonstrated; they got them to forbear, then to consent to delay; then to allow the English three days to retire; and I consider that on that occasion all the evil that was prevented and all the good that was secured was due to the interposition of those gentlemen.

3316. Have you any reason to suppose that the missionaries had any knowledge beforehand of the intended outbreak?—I understood, about the time of the meeting at Fort Cox, that there were some manifestations or expressions of reluctance, on the part of the Hottentots, in the event of an outbreak, which was then universally talked of, to go out beyond the Kat River settlement; but I have no knowledge of any expectation on the part of any of those gentlemen, including Mr. Thompson, of an outbreak in the settlement, or by those belonging to it.

3317. But at that time there was an impression, if I understand you rightly, that an outbreak was impending?—Over all the frontier.

3318. Did any of the missionaries, from the superior information which they necessarily possessed, communicate with the Governor?—I understand there were different communications between them and Mr. Wienand, the magistrate, on

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the one hand, and the Governor and the authorities under him, on the other, anticipatory of circumstances if they should emerge; but I am not privy to the nature of those communications; I only know the general fact of their taking place.

3319. As far as you know, was there any hesitation whatsoever on the part of the missionaries to communicate the earliest and most accurate information to the Governor?—I believe none.

3320. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You have spoken of obnoxious persons demanded to be given up; were there many of them?—There were some 30 or three dozen of Englishmen at Fort Armstrong.

3321. Why were they obnoxious?—Several of them had been residents in the settlement; some of them carrying on business at Fort Armstrong, and others, I believe, farming, and I heard that they manifested strongly the prejudices which many English on the frontier showed to the coloured people; but at the period spoken of, the ill-will of all the insurgent classes to Englishmen had become very strong; that is on the 22d of January. I should add that on the day following those occurrences all the Englishmen in Fort Armstrong escaped and were conducted from Phillipton to Whittlesea; they have themselves acknowledged that mainly to Mr. Read, junior, were they indebted for their life, he having accompanied them through some defiles, and led them by those passes in which he conceived they would be most secure from the attacks of those parties of rebels that were out. On the day succeeding the 24th, all the English females connected with those individuals were brought to Phillipton with a considerable portion of the property, in safety, through the protection of the ministers. Then on the 25th there was an excitement surpassing what had obtained before, from news of the deplorable occurrence in the Mankusana. The details were subsequently furnished in formal depositions before the magistrate of the settlement on that and the succeeding days. According to these a laager or camp, which had been formed immediately after the Kafir outbreak, of Hottentots, Bastards, and some English on Mr. Bennet's place, having broken up on the 22d in consequence of a party in it showing themselves in collusion with some rebels, had been overtaken on their way to Fort Armstrong, which they understood to be still the rendezvous of the Royalists, by a party of Burghers who had demanded their arms. They had somewhat reluctantly, by the order of their commandant, surrendered, and had gone back to the camp, after losing their arms and having their property and

and cattle taken away; they were attacked under night, and several of them were killed; several were wounded, and they attributed this to Fingoes under the guidance of some of the Burghers, to whom they had on the previous day surrendered their arms. The men who had voluntarily surrendered were all loyal, and were on their way to the loyal rendezvous, as they supposed. Those men were excited to the last degree, and not only those, but all the loyalists in the settlement were intensely excited; it seemed to strengthen the power of the rebels, who mustered immediately in great force, and proposed to set off as a commando to punish the Burghers, who had made this assault. Through the interposition of the missionaries, the injured men, who had been steadfast loyalists, were prevented from seeking in any manner private vengeance. Through the influence of the ministers, also, the rebels were kept under restraint from executing their purpose. The injured party were urged to the course of giving their depositions, and trusting to the justice they were sure to obtain; and by the wisdom of that course, I conceive that a torrent of resistless destruction was stayed at a time when, but for the presence and exertions of those ministers, the whole Kat River Settlement would have been carried away by the desire of retaliation, and when the mischief they would have done on the frontier would have very greatly exceeded anything which has yet taken place. I have in my hand copies of the depositions which were made on that occasion, specially of the commandant and of the sub-commandant. I find from the statement of the former that the cattle and sheep belonging to himself and three others amounted to 2,400 sheep, 130 cows and oxen, 33 horses, besides 300 muids of grain. He stated, on giving his deposition, that the house which was set on fire contained, among others, his wife, who had been confined only two days before, and that when she was compelled to leave it she had nothing but the clothes she had on, and not a handkerchief to put her baby in. Another loyal man who was with them, and continued a steadfast loyalist till the end, after all this occurrence, stated that he had at that camp 112 head of cattle, 56 ewes, all having lambs; that he had 50 goats, two stallions, and two mares, and a new waggon; and that the whole of his property had been swept away by the parties who attacked the camp, in the manner he had deposed, along with 2½ muids of corn. I think that under the impulse of feeling and the conviction that they would be massacred, there was nothing but the moral influence of the ministers

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to prevent the revolt of the whole settlement at that time. Then, unhappily, on the succeeding week, Wednesday the 29th, the magistrate having resolved to quit and to take the depositions with him, was escorted by four of the field cornets, by Mr. Read, junior, by the son of the Dutch clergyman, and by some two dozen other loyal men of the settlement of fort Beaufort. On reaching it, where they were welcomed by Colonel Sutton, they found themselves suddenly exposed to insults, to threats, and to personal injury; they came back with complaints against the English settlers and Fingoes at Fort Beaufort, one of them, the bravest man in the settlement, declaring that he had escaped assassination; and the feeling then produced was as bad as ever throughout all parties towards what they conceived a course on the part of the English that showed they were bent upon destroying every coloured man. It was the presence of the missionaries which prevented violent measures, inducing as they did the parties offended to give distinct depositions, all of which have been transmitted to the authorities, with claims for redress. There were many instances after that when the leaders of the rebels came to Philipton, demanding the powder and property, and were only prevented from accomplishing their objects by the firmness and remonstrances of the missionaries. I referred formerly to what had been done when Sandilli joined the Hottentot rebels, and I should say generally that but for the presence and influence of those gentlemen not a loyalist could have continued to lift up his head; that not an Englishman would have been preserved; that no property would have been protected; and that the whole Kat River Settlement would have been swept away in the tide of rebellion.

3322. Colonel *Dunne*.] What was your object in going to Kaffraria?—I have stated in the beginning of my evidence that it was to visit some missionary stations connected with the body to which I belong.

3323. You went on missionary purposes solely?—Yes.

3324. How long were you there?—From about the middle of November till going into the Kat River on the 20th of January.

3325. That is about 67 days in Kaffraria; therefore all your knowledge of that country is founded upon your experience of that 67 days?—And information collected.

3326. I find in your evidence that you have had conversations and negotiations with several chiefs?—After being there some time.

3327. What were the subjects of those conversations, were they

they religious or political?—They were in reference chiefly to the position of the missionaries after the outbreak; messages to sit still, and so on.

3328. Had you no communications with the chiefs before the outbreak, immediately on going up?—I had with the head of one of the tribes, the Unkosikazi.

3329. That was the widow?—Yes.

3330. Were the conversations with her chiefly relating to politics?—They related to rumours of an outbreak.

3331. Had you also conversations with Mr. Brounlee, a magistrate there?—I had conversations with him.

3332. And with some of the Gaika chiefs?—Subsequently to the outbreak.

3333. Not before?—No.

3334. Were those or not all on political subjects?—Yes; they related to political matters.

3335. Were not a great deal of the missionary communications with the chiefs more political than religious?—I am not aware.

3336. Those conversations you yourself admit were undoubtedly political, as they entered into the grievances under which they said they suffered?—They referred to these, but they more particularly related to the security of the missionaries and the mission property.

3337. Have there not been abundant instances in which the missionaries have entered into a kind of negotiation with the inhabitants, and a kind of intercession with the Government; Mr. Read, for instance, on account of what the Kafirs termed their grievances?—I do not know of any negotiations with the Kafirs on the part of the Messrs. Read; but I am aware that the Messrs. Read have often been employed as negotiators on the part of the Government.

3338. Have there been no instances of their doing that on their own account, without any actual authority from the Government?—I believe when the people of the settlement have been desirous of communicating their views and grievances, they have been the medium frequently of transmitting them.

3339. Can you estimate the number of Kafirs that are under the spiritual guidance of the missionaries?—I am not prepared to answer that question at present, though I have seen very exact returns, authenticated by Colonel Mackinnon. They are published; they were returned to Colonel Mackinnon in answer to statistical questions, giving periodically an exact  
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account of the number of stations and people under Christian instruction.

3340. Did the missionaries usually report to Colonel Mackinnon as to the number of converts they were presiding over?—The missionaries had to report regularly to their respective churches or societies; but independently of these, there were returns asked for by Colonel Mackinnon for the Government, which were readily supplied.

3341. Would you be able to put in in evidence the numbers who were attached to the missionaries you were sent to superintend?—I could give that to the Committee.

3342. The missionaries you say were employed occasionally by Government as the media of political communication?—I should say, at all events, communications about matters in which politics were involved.

3343. Do not you think it is undesirable, if not prejudicial to the cause of religion, to mix up in the cases of persons so situated as missionaries, the two purposes of religion and politics?—I think it is very desirable to keep the two quite distinct, but I apprehend that in many cases there are no other suitable parties through whom communications can be made.

3344. Do you not think that that unfortunate necessity has caused a considerable degree of ill feeling in the colony between the missionaries and the settlers?—I cannot speak as to that. I speak of communications between the missionaries and the natives, or between the missionaries and the Government.

3345. Was there in Graham's Town a meeting held in March, which condemned very much the conduct of the missionaries in respect of the Kafirs?—There was a meeting at that time in which strong disapprobation, at all events, was expressed at the conduct of the missionaries.

3346. And was not the tendency of that condemnation to the effect that the missionaries had given a kind of indirect encouragement to the insurrection in several instances?—I only once at Fort Hare glanced over the report, and I have but a very vague recollection of it.

3347. You are aware there was such a meeting?—Yes.

3348. You say that the missionaries have a very great influence over the Kafirs. Does that extend merely to those who are under their spiritual care, or to the Kafir tribes in general?—I should say it was great over those under their spiritual care, and that on the part of the neighbouring Kafirs connected with these there was an impression that the missionaries

sionaries were friendly and kind to them, and their influence therefore was considerable.

3349. Was there a feeling held out by the missionaries that they were the mediators between the native tribes and the English Government?—I am not aware.

3350. What was the cause of the influence?—Before the native tribes had any transactions at all with the Government, and where they have none, in those cases the influence of the missionaries is paramount, for the parties at the stations look upon them as their instructors, and as the medium through which they get knowledge, religion, and other benefits.

3351. Does it extend to people who are not under their spiritual superintendence? In what do they instruct those whom they do not instruct in spiritual matters?—They do not give instruction proper except of a spiritual kind, but there is a reflex influence accompanies it, and the influence of civilization is also felt in some measure, though it may be a small one, by the heathen Kafirs.

3352. Would not that reflex influence be felt and would not that civilization be felt, and would not there be the same influence from traders or any persons residing among them, if there is nothing spiritual in that reflex influence?—If you had traders of truth and integrity who equally commanded the confidence of the people, and who acted uprightly and candidly with them, there would be a great deal of that.

3353. Am I to understand that the traders generally engaged with the tribes are not men of such character as you describe?—I fear several are not; but there are respectable men among them.

3354. Do you know of what business the traders are who are called "Winklers"?—It is the Dutch name for a small trader.

3355. They are not connected with the missionaries?—No.

3356. You spoke of the immorality of the military villages. In your answer to Question 3103, you said that the people of Woburn were a nuisance on the frontier, and a continual source of irritation, and you also mentioned that the immorality was keeping concubines; do you mean that was a nuisance to the Kafir tribes or to the missionaries?—It was to both. I do not mean that the mere act condescended upon rendered them a nuisance to the Kafirs; they were also intemperate men as well as men that lived in that manner; and they were violent in their language and conduct, exciting irritation.

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3357. What was their conduct, actually; did they steal cattle from the Kafirs?—No, they did not steal them, but the eagerness with which they seized cattle that trespassed, and sought opportunity of petty annoyances in that way, had all the effect of more serious injuries, in keeping up irritation. I conceive that industrious, peaceably disposed men would have acted a different part.

3358. Were those soldiers discharged for bad conduct, or were the characters they got on leaving their regiments bad?—I cannot say as to that; there were strong inducements to men held out after the last war to accept discharges with a view to going up there.

3359. Were not those men generally discharged with good characters?—I have no doubt some of them were so. I stated so of the village of Auckland.

3360. You say they were a moral nuisance, therefore the corruption of those villages warranting that very strong expression must have been very great and demoralizing?—I conceive that the location of communities that shall be marked by immorality and intemperance, by violence of temper, and by irritating conduct to the neighbours, must be a nuisance anywhere.

3361. Then, on what authority do you accuse them of those crimes?—I stated what I learned on the spot; about the village of Woburn in particular; my other information I gathered from many individuals who have spoken in the same manner of those villages.

3362. Has there been any tangible crime committed, or any outbreak committed on the Kafirs by the men inhabiting those military villages?—Not beyond the circumstances I have adverted to.

3363. Will you state any circumstance of that sort?—I have spoken of their character, and their manner of speaking to the Kafirs, and the vexatious nature of their pounding proceedings, and their not making allowances for the accident of cattle coming through the stream when the water is very shallow, and the difficulty of herding them at all times.

3364. Then am I to understand you, that it was their injudicious severity in exercising their undoubted rights that made them offensive to the Kafirs?—I have heard of instances of their being in the wrong in an unwarrantable exercise of their alleged rights with regard to the Kafirs on the colonial side.

3365. Are you aware of their ever going into Kafirland and plundering their cattle?—No.

3366. Did the Kafirs ever plunder their cattle; are you aware

aware of any instances of that kind?—I have not heard of that.

3367. Do you suppose that the Kafirs are of that sensitive morality that it would cause those military villages to be abhorred from their immorality?—The Kafirs, though they practice polygamy, are very jealous in regard to the rights of purity; they are not a licentious people; and they are very acute in marking the inconsistencies and bad conduct of Englishmen.

3368. I believe, though not licentious, it is the custom of the chiefs of the tribes to go among the tribes, and take any of their women over 12 years old?—There was an abominable usage of that sort prevailed before their being brought under British control.

3369. Has not that been practised lately by Sandilli?—He attempted, I suppose, to practise it, but our Commissioners do not tolerate anything of that sort; I believe it is the fact that the Kafirs allow certain rights, as they deem them, to be exercised by the chief which they would reprobate in others.

3370. Is not almost all the employment of the Kafirs, and is not it considered to be an honourable employment, that of stealing cattle?—In their heathen state I suppose a great deal of that goes on.

3371. Are you aware of their roasting a boy they took at Eland-point?—No; I never heard of it.

3372. You are aware generally of their barbarous treatment of their prisoners?—They have of late years, I understand, been increasingly barbarous to their male prisoners; but they have always shown lenity to women and children.

3373. You were present at the attack on Woburn?—I was in the vicinity; I saw the smoke of the burning village.

3374. And of Auckland?—I was in that vicinity also.

3375. Not a man of the colony was spared in either of those places?—No.

3376. Did the missionaries make any use of that large influence you say they possessed to prevent those murders?—They could not.

3377. Were they present at those murders, any of them?—There were some of them in the vicinity with myself, at Chumie. We learnt of the attack at Woburn, after we saw the smoke, but we were aware that the station was in the midst of imminent danger.

3378. Were any of the missionaries or their families molested at the point?—None except Mr. Niven, in the course of journeying through a part of the excited district.

3379. Was

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3379. Was not this attack a treacherous one ; and were not several of those Kafirs or Hottentots who made the attack, at that very moment partaking in the festivities of the village?—It was so, decidedly.

3380. That was not an open attack?—No.

3381. You say, as to the Kat River, that you have a favourable view of that settlement?—I have a view favourable to the extent that justice seems to me to require, on a review of the circumstances.

3382. I understand you to say that the Hottentots in general are faithful to their engagements?—Yes, up to this occasion they had been ; and the majority of the proprietors, the people properly possessed of the allotments, are still.

3383. You also say that they have had discontent, from being employed in the last war for a considerable time?—It was not the mere employment that I specified as occasioning the discontent, but the conditions of it, and the treatment afterwards, and the losses they suffered.

3384. When Sir Andries Stockenström placed that colony there, were they not placed there expressly as a military post, for the defence of the frontier, and was not that part of the obligation of the settlement, that they were to give military service?—I am not aware that the settlement was given them on that tenure, though I am fully aware it was with the design of their proving a bulwark to the colony that the settlement was formed.

3385. Does not that come to the same thing?—No ; I think a tenure by military service is distinct from such a design. I am not aware that there was such a tenure.

3386. Was there any condition of tenure at all?—I cannot say.

3387. Did not Sir Andries Stockenström put them there, with the understanding that they should be a military bulwark?—Yes.

3388. Therefore the withdrawing them, or using them, was a legitimate use of them by the Cape authorities?—I say nothing upon that subject.

3389. As to the losses estimated by them, was not a return sent in to the Government, and were not those losses paid by the Government?—I have never understood so.

3390. Do not the Blue Books furnish a list of every man's loss, and of the actual indemnification for those losses?—I have not understood that they received indemnification.

3391. Were they not supported by rations?—Yes.

3392. And also their families?—They were supported by rations, and from nothing else could they have subsisted, for all

all their own means were taken from them. I stated the other day my distinct impression that they had received no pay, and I find that impression was correct, on looking at official documents.

3393. Do you consider that the rest of the Hottentots settled along the frontier were as loyal as you say those at the Kat River were?—I believe quite as loyal.

3394. Are you not aware that Colonel Somerset, and almost all the frontier authorities, represented them as perfectly disaffected in almost all those settlements at the breaking out of the last war?—I was not aware of that.

3395. Are you aware of the proclamation of the Governor, Sir Harry Smith, that at the Kat River there was a most extensive, combined and wicked rebellion, at that very post of the Kat River?—That was subsequently to the outbreak.

3396. Are you not aware that in the previous time it was called the hot-bed of insurrection, previously to that proclamation?—I am aware that Major-general Somerset used such an expression at Philipton.

3397. Then at Shiloh, were not the Hottentots there in insurrection?—All that remained after the missionaries left were involved in resistance to the authorities at Whittlesea, but subsequently to the cessation of hostilities there was a portion that were never engaged in any way in rebellion against the Government. I refer to one man whom I personally knew, who resided at Philipton constantly afterwards; the man from whose statement I quoted yesterday.

3398. Were there not Hottentots among those who murdered the military settlers at Woburn and Auckland?—I heard that a Hottentot or Hottentots had been seen among the Kafirs who attacked these settlements, but I understood there were only one or two.

3399. But at Shiloh, were not there several bodies of Hottentots found, after the church was stormed, in the church, and were not several taken prisoners?—I am not aware of any being found in the church.

3400. Were they not also found at Fort Armstrong?—Several were found about Fort Armstrong; that was after the general engagement.

3401. You have not any doubt then that there was a very large disaffection; that if not a majority, certainly a very large proportion of the Hottentots along the country were perfectly disaffected?—Before any outbreak had taken place in the Kat River there were complaints of the conduct of bands of Hottentots in some parts upon the frontier within the colony;

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those were not Kat River Hottentots. Subsequently to the outbreak there was a very large disaffection in the Kat River settlement, and that spread to other quarters; but in large portions of the colony, and I should say over the whole of the western province, I have not heard of any disaffection. On the contrary, there was no class in the colony from which the Governor met with anything like the same readiness to enroll themselves as among the Hottentots of the western province.

3402. Did not a large body of the Cape Corps desert?—A very large number.

3403. They were all Hottentots?—Either Hottentots or half Hottentots.

3404. Are you aware that a person who had been employed in the Commissariat preached to them, and was the person supposed to seduce them?—I heard that he was understood to be a person possessed of considerable influence.

3405. And have you any reason to doubt that fact?—I have no reason to doubt it.

3406. Those Hottentots who deserted were chiefly from this Kat River settlement?—I do not know; I am aware that some of them were.

3407. They were found, some of them, killed in action with our troops?—So I have seen it stated.

3408. Would not that therefore lead you to suppose that it was injudicious, the forming those colonies of Hottentots on the frontier who were so easily seduced from their allegiance?—There have been several Kafir wars, and there have been several insurrections of Dutch Boers, and during all those the Hottentots have never shown the slightest sympathy with either party of insurgents, and the fact that a portion of that race has now been involved in disaffection does not indicate a very great readiness to become enemies of the Government.

3409. Do you think there are any causes acting upon those Hottentots in the conduct of the Government that would warrant that disaffection?—The statements I have submitted of their own views of their local grievances I think are sufficient to account for, and to occasion, disaffection in their minds, though by no means to justify the course they have adopted.

3410. Do you not think that the repetition by the missionaries of their grievances to the Government is, to their minds, a kind of encouragement to those people?—We know where parties have been excited how ready they are to go back upon

upon all the causes that have given them at any time offence or irritation, and how they will be led, under this state of excitement, to magnify some of them unduly, and to dwell upon some of them unreasonably; but if there are substantial grounds of complaint not removed, I conceive that the seed is left of certain murmuring and disaffection.

3411. You have stated a cause at the Kat River of the discontent among the Hottentots to be, that they were not remunerated for what they suffered by their losses; but you have not told us that that extended to all the Hottentots on the frontier, or to the Cape Corps. I would be glad if you would state to the Committee what are the actual and tangible complaints that you think they have ground for?—Then they have complained of the acts, as I formerly mentioned, of some of the magistrates preceding the present one.

3412. What were those acts which they have complained of?—They are detailed in the evidence already given.

3413. Do you mean the report of Mr. Biddulph, who reported unfavourably?—That is one.

3414. Do you think that because a magistrate reports conscientiously of a colony, and it may be not favourable to the colony, that that is a just ground of complaint?—If he reports conscientiously, and states the truth, however unfavourable to the colony, that is not a just ground of complaint; but if a magistrate is charged with misrepresenting the colony, and not stating the truth, if the colony shall unite in affirming that, and other parties shall say it is their solemn conviction that that statement is a gross misrepresentation, or, as I understand one gentleman to have designated it, a libel, I do think that that is a just ground of complaint.

3415. Who is to be the judge, the colony, or the persons sent to examine?—It would be a very hard thing if in consequence of the accident of an incompetent or a deeply prejudiced man being sent to report, his testimony should be held infallible in defiance of the united testimony of all the people he was sent to examine about, and of numerous other witnesses.

3416. Was not there another magistrate sent to examine who approved of that report, Mr. Bowker?—That magistrate approved of the report before he was appointed his successor.

3417. Was the Government responsible for Mr. Biddulph's report?—If the Government sanctioned that report, as the publication, not merely of the report, but of his private letter, by the then Governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, in an official manner, seemed to do.

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3418. Did the Government sanction it?—They published it as a despatch.

3419. Was that a sanction; was there any public act that followed in consequence, to the injury of that settlement?—The very publication of it officially was naturally regarded as the Government sanction.

3420. That was another cause of discontent; are there any other further causes of discontent that the Hottentots had a right to complain of, in your opinion?—I understand myself as relating to you their causes of complaint; I do not think the whole settlement had a right to find fault with the Government because there were acts affecting individuals, or particular localities. But aware, as I am, of the sympathetic character of the Hottentots, I do not wonder at the feeling that was occasioned by those acts.

3421. I want to know your opinion of what were the real grievances that they complained of, which you consider substantial grievances; you seem to say that there were some substantial grievances, and I want to know what those grievances were in your opinion; in your opinion, and from any information you have been able to collect, were the Hottentots remunerated, or were they not remunerated?—I am under the impression that they were not.

3422. Do you consider that they had reason to complain of the Government because Mr. Biddulph reported against them?—I do not say they had reason to complain of the Government in respect of that.

3423. In respect of the publication of his despatch?—I think in respect of the publication of it.

3424. Would you state any other grievances, in your opinion, as the cause for this very extensive outbreak and defection of those people from their allegiance?—I have no other reason to adduce beyond those formerly stated; but I have never considered that all their reasons put together justified the revolt.

3425. I only find two reasons related in your previous evidence; the one not being sufficiently remunerated after the war, and the other, Mr. Biddulph's statement; I see no other reason given for it?—I think you will find there is a reference in that evidence to certain acts of Mr. Bowker's, to the duty that was imposed upon timber, and to certain acts of some other subordinate magistrates, as well as to certain conduct of a commission that was appointed at the end of last year, as all having concurred to increase the feelings of acerbity and alienation on the part of numbers of the settlers.

3426. But

3426. But are those all the sole reasons that you think caused the outbreak?—I have not knowledge of them, but I apprehend that there must have been communications from the Kafirs with a part of the Hottentots, endeavouring to obtain their neutrality, and probably their co-operation. The occurrences at the lower part of the Kat River, where Hermanus was the first to lead the revolt, himself a Kafir, who had about him the discontented Hottentots, brought from the other parts of the colony, with his Kafirs, and the contagion of evil influence, no doubt operated in that way, and acted upon the then state of feeling to bring about that deplorable disaffection which afterwards spread so widely.

3427. But the Shiloh people combined with Mapassa, who was a Kafir; was not that stated in the proclamation of Sir Harry Smith?—There seemed to have been at Shiloh communications between those Kafirs and some of the Hottentots, assuring the latter that no evil would be done to them, and thereby seeking to procure their neutrality. That I have gathered from documents, letters, and other sources which I have seen since I left the district.

3428. Have you any doubt that there was a communication and combination between all the Hottentot settlements on the frontier, and even the soldiers of the Cape Corps, on the subject of the outbreak?—I have no idea of a combination; it was the opinion of those in the settlement, of the ministers, and it was my own opinion from what took place, that there was just a concurrence of accidents and circumstances, but that there was no regular plan.

3429. And the combination of the Cape Corps occurred after the outbreak of the war?—It was manifested after the outbreak.

3430. You know nothing of the details of that outbreak, of the cause of this person who seduced them, the person who preached to them, bringing them off towards the Kat River?—I heard that some reports had been conveyed to them of what had taken place in the Kat River, exaggerated reports, and that the men had been excited; and, from my knowledge of the sympathetic character of the Hottentot, I conceive it very likely. He is an impulsive being, and his attachments are strong; and I conceive that if a Hottentot thought his family or friends were injured or outraged, he would be ready to fly off like an explosion of gunpowder.

3431. You know nothing of that meeting at Graham's Town?—Not beyond having seen the report.

3432. And you are perfectly convinced that the missionaries

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did all they could to prevent the war?—My belief is that they did; they exerted themselves, especially in the Kat River, to an astonishing extent.

3433. I also understand you to say that you consider the political interference of the missionaries to be injudicious in all instances?—I have not so said; I have stated that I conceive it desirable to have the political and religious functions kept as distinct as possible; I think it a great misfortune that missionaries should be involved in political negotiations.

3434. Mr. B. Carter.] But being on the frontier, and being there for the education and increase in knowledge of the Kafirs, it almost necessarily arises that they are the most available persons, and that they are necessarily somewhat employed in that way?—There are cases in which I do not see how it is possible to conduct negotiations, especially of an amicable nature, except through their instrumentality.

3435. Chairman.] Does the missionary of your church at all consider it a part of his duty to instruct the natives in the arts of industry and agriculture?—Our direct object is teaching the truths of the Gospel and conveying what is called elementary education; but to our mission stations we have sent out ploughs and articles of that sort; and it is our instruction to the missionaries to exert their influence to encourage and promote the cultivation of the soil and other habits of industry, and the useful arts.

3436. To what extent have you been successful in that respect?—We have only three principal stations among the Kafirs, and at each of those there were a good many acres under cultivation by the plough, and there were small portions with paddocks, as we should call them, with inclosures; but the progress in that respect has as yet been limited, although I am aware it was going on generally at all the missionary stations.

3437. Do those missionary establishments more or less attach to them anything like model farms for the instruction of the natives?—At the stations of the church that I belong to, there are not; there are other mission stations connected with other bodies where there is a regular, and I should say tolerably perfect system of instruction in those matters.

3438. To what mission do you allude particularly?—I allude to the Moravian mission especially.

3439. Have the Moravian missions been, do you think, more attentive to the instruction of the natives in the arts of agriculture and industry than other missions?—I think so.

3440. Is it desirable, in your opinion, that those missions should, as much as possible, combine with spiritual instruction

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the teaching of the useful arts?—I think it desirable that they should go concurrently, and I conceive that, to a certain extent, they must; but it is a question worthy of grave consideration whether missionaries and their assistants should not devote their labours entirely to the one object of instructing the mind, leaving it to a separate department in conjunction with them to take the subordinate part of the cultivation of the land.

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3441. Do you mean a separate department of the mission, or individuals altogether disconnected from it?—I should think it desirable to have the provinces distinct; that while they should be united there should be a separate department, but that if by individuals disconnected, the other party should make arrangements to concur with them.

3442. Should you be disposed to say generally, from your knowledge of missionary labours in South Africa, that the missionaries have succeeded in introducing any useful arts, either improvements in agriculture or any manufacture, or any useful art generally?—It is entirely owing to the missions that the Kafirs have been taught at all to plough the land, and that applies not only to converts but to some of the heathen Kafirs.

3443. Speaking of any one mission of which you are best acquainted, to what extent should you say the land is under the plough?—I am not prepared to answer the question; but I am aware of this fact, that at some of the Moravian stations such was the extent of cultivation and industry that they were not only self-supporting, bearing all the expenses of the mission, but that they had a surplus to contribute to missionary objects beyond.

3444. I understand you to place the Moravian mission in the first rank as regards the teaching of the arts and industry?—Yes.

3445. What mission would you next mention as devoting most attention to that subject?—The London Society has given considerable attention to it; at various of their stations there is a large portion of ground under cultivation, and at one of them, Hankey, which is within the colony, a tunnel has been executed recently to distribute water for the purposes of irrigation over a space which we should account a considerable farm.

3446. Is it or not your opinion that those missions which have given most attention to the instruction of the natives in the useful arts have the greatest influence over the natives?—I should think the influence of missions was very much pro-

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portioned to the number of individuals they have got under good instruction, whether with or without the arts. I believe that all solid improvement is based on sound knowledge; and that where that is the most distinctly and extensively conveyed, and where the foundation is laid of sound moral principle, there you have the best and surest influence.

3447. Was there any other mission in South Africa where there was so large a number of natives under immediate missionary superintendence, and supposed to be well instructed, as in the Kat River settlement?—There is a very large Moravian station at Glenadendal, in the western province.

3448. Excepting that, was there any other where there was so large a number of natives immediately under missionary superintendence, and who for so many years had received both moral and religious instruction from the missionaries?—Probably not.

3449. Are you able to throw any light, then, upon the cause of the great disaffection that prevailed in that settlement, which had been so remarkably closely superintended for so many years by the missionaries?—I suppose, for the amount of population the cultivation of that settlement exceeded that of any other mission station in the whole of South Africa. I conceive that they were subjected to an expense which no other was, through their position, and the demands made upon them in those successive wars; and I think that was a detriment to their educational progress, by the suspension of the schools, the interruption of their religious improvement, and the deplorable influences of having a number of idle people, of young men and females, congregating together; those would unavoidably counteract what we should have expected otherwise to have witnessed.

3450. You think no fair comparison could be made between the state and condition of that settlement, from the circumstances you have referred to, and that of others, the Moravian settlement, for instance, that you have referred to?—I do not consider them analogous.

3451. And that therefore no fair comparison can be drawn?—I think not; there are many circumstances quite peculiar to it, and differing from any other experiment.

3452. Sir J. Walmsley.] You stated in evidence, a short time ago, that you were in the vicinity of Woburn, and Auckland, at the time of the aggression made by the Kafirs upon those places?—Yes.

3453. When you say you were in the vicinity, what distance were you from them?—About three miles from Woburn.

3454. Can

3454. Can you say, then, whether the missionaries with whom you were at that time had any, and what means of aiding the inhabitants of Woburn and Auckland?—The spectacle of the conflagration, succeeded by the tidings that there was a large body of Kafirs surrounding them, coming after the intelligence of the disastrous war of the preceding day at the Keiskamma, filled us with consternation. We had neither arms nor ammunition at the station; there were only then there the Kafirs connected with the Chumie station; and if there had been the inclination or the purpose, there was no force to have gone out to the insurgent body that we were told had environed Woburn.

3455. Do you know of an instance; that is, was there any case, to your knowledge, where the missionaries either directly or indirectly had given sanction to the rising of the Kafirs?—I never heard of such a case.

3456. Do you believe that such a thing ever existed?—I never heard of such a case.

3457. *Chairman.*] I understand you to say distinctly that, as far as you know anything of missionary influence and labour in South Africa, they have been devoted to the preservation of peace and the maintenance of good and loyal feeling towards the Government?—Most decidedly.

3458. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] When and where did you first hear of the defection of the Cape Corps?—I first heard of the defection of the Cape Corps while at Chumie, within a few days after the outbreak at the Keiskamma. The defection reported to me then had taken place at Fort White.

3459. *Sir E. Buxton.*] Had you heard of it before it took place?—No; I heard that there had taken place defection on the part of some of the Cape Corps men stationed there when the Kafirs attacked that post.

3460. *Sir J. Walmsley.*] Are you aware whether any notice was taken of that fact in the despatches at the time?—There was not; on the contrary, I had referred to that, among other alarming occurrences, in a communication to a friend at Block Drift, which I had an opportunity of sending by the Kafir women, and in reply I was assured that I must be under some great mistake, that nothing of the kind had been reported there, and if it had happened the military authorities must have known it.

3461. *Chairman.*] I do not quite understand your meaning when you say no notice was taken of that in the despatches; do you mean the despatches that were sent home, or in the local accounts?—The despatches that appeared in the colony.

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3462. Sir J. Walmsley.] In your opinion, were there any means that could have been taken to repress the rebellion in the Kat River settlement after it had broken out?—Could a very small number of regular troops, could a company, or half a company, with a military officer, have been sent into the Kat River, I have no doubt it would have been sufficient to have rallied the loyal, and to have put down the insurrection, there was so much vacillation visible; but it was impossible from the state of the fort at Fort Beaufort, the nearest post, and I understood from Major-general Somerset that it was equally impossible for him. There had been immediately on the outbreak, I was told, a representation sent requesting that Sir Andries Stockenstrom might be sent there, and I understood that a similar representation went from other parts of the colony; and I have no doubt that had he come in with authority, though he had not had a soldier at his back, if he had had authority to come there, his influence is so very great from the confidence reposed in his integrity, capacity, and courage, and the general reverence felt for him, that he would have been able to suppress it.

3463. There were numbers in that settlement that were loyal, I suppose?—A considerable number.

3464. Do you know whether arms were given to the loyal inhabitants at the time?—That suggests a point I might have adverted to before; it was one of the complaints which I heard, that Mr. Bowker had recalled 300 or 400 stand of arms, which had been furnished to the inhabitants at the previous war. An application was made for arms by the regular channels through the field cornets after this outbreak, and they got only, I think, some three dozen stand of arms, which was only half a dozen for each of the field cornets.

3465. *Chairman.*] Was there any store on the spot from which arms could have been issued?—None.

3466. The outbreak at the Kat River settlement was conducted with great secrecy?—It came upon all of us as a thunder clap, so unexpected was it.

3467. So that there were no means of providing beforehand against it?—On the part of the Hottentots I mentioned that indications of Hermanus's defection were observable immediately after the outbreak in Kafirland, on the second day after or so, by the native missionary in the lower part of the Kat River, who communicated his views to the authorities at Fort Beaufort; but they had supposed, I conceive, that it must have been a mistake.

3468. Am I to understand you to imply that there was any unwillingness

unwillingness on the part of the authorities at Fort Beaufort to trust the inhabitants of the Kat River settlement with arms?—I have not an idea that there was the slightest. Colonel Sutton, who is a popular man in the settlement, the man the parties applied for, or proposed to apply for, to be their commandant, stated that he had not arms or ammunition to supply when the application was made.

3469. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] You have stated, in answer to a question put to you by an Honourable Member, that the Kafirs were increasingly barbarous; can you give any reasons for that increasing barbarity on the part of those tribes?—I heard from individuals that the successive collisions with the English seemed to have had a very deteriorating influence upon the feelings of the men, and that they had heard that there had been private gross outrages by parties of the British force formerly, which they retaliated; that it was Englishmen whom they had first seen rip up the body of a foe, and that a Kafir was never known to do that until it had been done by them.

3470. *Chairman*.] Do you mean English soldiers?—Yes.

3471. Mr. *Bonham Carter*.] Regulars?—I cannot say.

3472. Sir *E. Buxton*.] You heard that as the report?—It was before the war.

3473. *Chairman*.] What war do you refer to?—To this present one. It was in conversation with those who had known the Kafirs for 20 years, and who stated the change they had seen in them; and the general impression was, that they were worse men now than then.

3474. Do you attach any value to that report, that any part of the force, whether local or regular, was guilty of such an atrocity?—The instance was detailed to me; but I am unable at present to specify what were the circumstances which led me to regard it as a true account, that in one instance the aggravated occurrence had taken place by a party; but I am unable just now to state it.

3475. Was it whilst they were in the field, or was it an act of atrocity by an individual?—It was an act, so far as I remember, of a party who had been out skirmishing; that they had shot an individual, and had done this, and that the spectacle of it was seen, of course, by some of the Kafirs; and that some time afterwards they did a similar act, if I mistake not, to the body of a British officer, who had been shot.

3476. Whether it was by any portion of the local native force, or the British regular force, you are quite unable to say?—I am; I incline to think it was not the regular force.

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3477. Sir J. Walmsley.] You have been asked as to charges made against the missionaries at Graham's Town; do you know anything whatever of those charges?—I saw the report which Colonel Dunne referred to, and I became myself subsequently the victim of prejudices and hostility on the part of a large body in the colony.

3478. Did you attend a meeting at Graham's Town subsequently?—Yes.

3479. Did you satisfy the people that you were not guilty of any of the acts that had been rumoured or laid to your charge?—I do not know that I did; their conduct was so very extraordinary altogether.

3480. Did you attend a public meeting to defend yourself against the charge?—I attended a public meeting to meet the charges, but the whole of that affair was to my mind, as I have said, so very extraordinary, that I cannot say what measure of satisfaction or dissatisfaction prevailed. I know I did not regard myself as in a state of safety notwithstanding.

3481. Then you know of no instance in which any charge of disaffection on the part of the missionaries has been proved?—Not one.

The Rev. Peter La Trobe, called in; and Examined.

3482. *Chairman.*] I THINK you are connected with the Moravian Missions in South Africa?—I am Secretary to the Church of the United (or Moravian) Brethren in this country, and have been in connexion with the missions of that church for 30 years.

3483. I think you wish to put in some statement with regard to your mission at Shiloh?—Certainly,

3484. Will you put it in?—I will, with the permission of the Committee.

[*The Witness delivered in the same, which is as follows:*]

THE undersigned, secretary to the Church and Missions of the United (or Moravian) Brethren in England, begs leave respectfully to submit to the Committee on the Kafir Tribes the following statement relative to the recent occurrences in Kafaria, in as far as they have reference to the Moravian settlement of Shiloh.

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The missions of the Church of the United or Moravian Brethren were commenced in the year 1732, and have, consequently, existed for a period of 119 years. The field of labour which they occupy contains 69 stations, situated in Greenland and Labrador; in America, Northern,

Northern, Central, and Southern; in the West Indies, in South Africa, and in the Australian continent. Wherever they exist, and under whatsoever circumstances carried on, whether for the benefit of the Arctic, the Indian, the Negro, or the Hottentot races, or under the sovereignty of Great Britain, Denmark, Holland, or the United States, they have but one great object, and are established and maintained upon one leading, and it is hoped, scriptural principle. They are designed to bring the heathen, under the blessing of God, to the knowledge of the gospel of Christ, and the enjoyment of the spiritual and temporal benefits attendant on its reception, and, at the same time, to the gradual adoption of the usages and practice of the arts of civilized life, whereby their minds may be enlarged, their habits improved, and their usefulness, as members of the great human family, extended. Among the principles inculcated by the Moravian missionaries, at all times and in all places, those of loyalty, subordination, industry, honesty and sobriety, hold a foremost place; while, in the conduct they have pursued, they have manifested an anxious desire to devote themselves to the performance of their proper work, and to abstain from all interference in matters of a purely civil or political nature.

The Moravian Mission in South Africa—commenced in 1736 and renewed in 1792,—comprised at the time of the late insurrection eight stations (besides the Leper-Hospital on Robben-Island) of which three were situated in the western and two in the eastern district of the Cape Colony, and three in British Kafaria. The consequences of the present unhappy war have been felt by all, more or less severely; the three settlements in Kafaria (two of them but recently established) having been laid utterly waste, and a fourth, Enon, on the Witte river, partially abandoned, while from the older stations in the west of the colony, no fewer than 900 men, young, able-bodied, and for the most part fathers of families, have been called away from their homes and ordinary occupations, to perform military service on the frontier.

To the Christian character and beneficial results of the Moravian Mission in South Africa, every successive Governor of the Cape colony, from the period of its first capture by the English in 1795, to the present time, has borne willing, and perhaps only too partial testimony. Among the number of those who have shown it the greatest favour may be named Lord Charles Somerset, at whose request the Leper-hospital was placed under the charge of a Moravian missionary, and by whom the regulations of the principal settlement of Genadendal, were officially approved and confirmed; Sir Benjamin D'Urban, whose written testimony the undersigned has in his possession; Sir George Napier, at whose particular solicitation, the settlement of Clarkson was founded in 1838, with the benevolent object of instructing and benefiting the Fingoo refugees; Sir Richard Bourke, Sir Henry Pottinger, and Sir Harry Smith, on whose respective applications, stations were formed at Shiloh in 1828; Mamre, on the Beka, in 1848, and Goshen, on the Windvogelsberg, in 1849. To the value of the settlement of Shiloh, and the important services rendered to the colony and its defenders, during the wars of 1835 and 1847, by the missionaries at that place, and the people under

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their charge, both Tambookies and Hottentots, the strongest and most cordial testimony was borne by the present governor, Sir Harry Smith, in an interview with which his Excellency favoured the undersigned, previous to his departure from England in 1847, and on occasion of his first visit to Shiloh in January 1848, when he expressed his sentiments on the subject, to both missionaries and people assembled in the church, in the kindest and warmest manner. Indeed it is but simple justice to acknowledge, that both from his Excellency himself and from Colonel M'Kinnon, the respected and benevolent Chief Commissioner for the Kafir tribes, the Moravian missionaries in Kafaria have experienced nothing but encouragement and support.

Of the progress made by the mission at Shiloh, during the 22 years of its existence, it may be more difficult to speak with confidence. That it had been less rapid and permanent than could be wished, must be freely admitted, a circumstance which may, however, be in some measure accounted for, by the fact, that it has been subjected from the very outset to heavy trials and serious calamities; first, from the inroads of predatory Fetkannas; afterwards from successive Kafir wars. Though resolutely maintained by the missionaries and the people under their care, during the war of 1847, it suffered severely and in various ways from its effects, as that enlightened and steadfast friend of the Hottentot and Kafir races, Sir Andries Stockenstrom, is prepared to testify. In the course of the past two years, its prosperity was, however, gradually increasing, as the reports of its actual state, made by two independent and altogether trustworthy witnesses, Archdeacon Merriman and the Rev. Mr. Freeman, of the London Missionary Society, are sufficient to prove. At the close of the year 1850, the number of inhabitants of the place was about 750, of whom above one-third were Hottentots and Fingoes, and nearly two-thirds Tambookies. Of the whole number, about 261, including children, were baptized, of whom about 60 were Tambookies. Some of these people occupied well-built houses; a yet larger number were possessors of good and productive gardens, and well cultivated fields, and not a few were industrious artisans. To the mission-premises were attached a corn-mill, a smithy, and a carpenter's shop, and by the help of these, and the produce of the soil, the station had been for several years self-supporting.

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The spiritual and moral condition of the people had been of late such as to cause the missionaries more or less anxiety. The small flock of Tambookie converts gave them generally satisfaction by their steadiness and apparent sincerity; the Hottentots, especially the younger portion of them, manifested a spirit of indifference and insubordination which pained them deeply. The contiguity of the settlement to the village of Whittlesea evidently promoted habits of sensual indulgence. That the missionaries, under these circumstances, regarded with disquietude and apprehension the outbreak and progress of the war with the Kafirs, will not be a matter of surprise; but that the people under their care should so far forget their duty, as professing Christians and as loyal subjects, as to act as they are alleged to have done, is an event for which they were not prepared, and which causes them far deeper sorrow, than any amount

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of suffering or of loss to which they have been themselves exposed. So far as their information, experience, and ability extended, they spared no exhortation and neglected no effort for the prevention, repression and counteraction of the disloyalty, to whose influence, by some strange infatuation, the poor people appeared suddenly to yield themselves; and as soon as it became evident, that their entreaties and endeavours were unavailing, they hesitated not to abandon the scene of their long and pleasant labours, their comfortable dwellings, and the bulk of their property of every kind, and what cost them a yet greater struggle, the native congregation whose best interests they had so faithfully and perseveringly sought, and to become houseless wanderers and exiles in a strange land. Into this exile they were accompanied by one Kafir and three Hottentot families, and by the whole of the Fingoo portion of their flock, amounting to upwards of 100 individuals.

Of the occurrences at Shiloh, both previous and subsequent to the departure of the missionaries, the accounts are hitherto imperfect, and in part conflicting. From the statement of the missionaries themselves, on which the undersigned can place the fullest reliance, it would appear that the Tambookies withdrew from the settlement some time before it was attacked, under the influence of superstitious fear (its destruction having been announced by the prophet Umlangeni), and of an intelligible, however, in this instance, culpable national feeling. For the conduct of the Hottentots less excuse is to be made; cause of complaint they had none, nor did they profess to have any; and making, therefore, every due allowance for the effects of sudden alarm, of national sympathy and of exaggerated rumours upon minds not of the strongest order, it is impossible not to mourn over and condemn the facility with which the well-disposed majority (for such it is believed they were), allowed themselves to be influenced and seduced by the disloyal and refractory minority, first into conduct insubordinate and reprehensible; afterwards, as is alleged, into acts of open rebellion.

On the other hand, it appears only proper and reasonable to remark, in palliation of their offence, that up to the 30th of January, the day on which the missionaries quitted Shiloh, the people do not seem to have been chargeable, nor indeed to be actually charged, with the commission of any overt act of rebellion. The refusal to deliver up two Hottentots from the Kat River, who happened to be in the place, however blameable under the peculiar circumstances of the time, can be the less regarded as such, since the two Shiloh Hottentots, whose surrender was likewise demanded by Captain Tylden, the military commandant at Whittlesea, gave themselves up at once, at the instance of the missionaries, though expecting the imprisonment to which they were immediately subjected, and apprehending even a worse fate. Such being the case, it appears therefore to the undersigned, as it did at the time to the missionaries themselves, to have been an unfortunate circumstance, that Captain Tylden, acting no doubt on honest convictions of duty, possibly on information which he officially possessed, but of which the missionaries knew nothing, and not improbably on the suggestions of interested and even prejudiced parties, of whom there was no lack at Whittlesea, refused to accept the submission which the Hottentots at Shiloh were at

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length induced to tender, so far as regarded the delivery to him of the two Kat River Hottentots, and the admission of a garrison into the settlement and church; and required that they should lay down their arms in successive companies of 20, and consent to be transported to Cradock. That they should decline to submit on these conditions, especially under the excitement and alarm caused by the report which had reached them of the recent tragedy at Dods Pringle's, will not perhaps excite much surprise, however deeply it may be deplored. The withdrawal of the missionaries, and the eventual destruction of the settlement, appear to have been the melancholy result of this abortive negotiation.

As to the events which occurred on the 31st of January, the day immediately following the departure of the missionaries, with the Fingoes and the few Hottentots who remained faithful and determined to share their lot, considerable uncertainty appears to prevail. The published reports charge the Shiloh people with having committed the first act of open hostility; the manuscript depositions of two respectable Hottentots of Shiloh, Nathaniel Baalie and David Taai, go to prove, that the Whittlesea people were the aggressors. A searching inquiry on the spot will perhaps alone ascertain all the facts of the case. One fact, however, admits of no question; the utter desolation of the settlement during the progress of the attack made upon it by the colonial forces on the 1st and 2d of February; the destruction of the mission-premises, a severe but possibly a necessary act, justifiable on military principles; the burning or plundering of the greater portion of the property belonging to the mission and to the missionaries themselves; the ruin of the habitations and grounds of the people under their care, and the utter dispersion of the Hottentots and Tambookies belonging to their flock. This grievous catastrophe, with all its distressing concomitants,—a sad requital, in the judgment of man, for their faithful and persevering and disinterested labours of above 20 years,—the missionaries are however disposed to receive as a chastisement from the hand of God himself, rather than as an injury inflicted by the hand of their fellow-men and fellow-subjects; and in doing so, to endeavour to derive instruction and profit from the visitation. That their principles and practice, their motives and their general conduct, as loyal subjects and right-minded instructors and guides of the native population, are not unappreciated by those in authority, is evident from the invitation addressed to them by Captain Tylden himself, only a few weeks after their withdrawal from Shiloh, to return and re-occupy the desolated settlement, with such of their people as had adhered to them, including the whole Fingoo portion of their flock, many of whom had shown their loyalty and their bravery in the field of action, and resume the cultivation of the fields and gardens, which had but lately yielded so abundant an increase. In compliance with this invitation, given with the cordial approbation of the Governor himself, the missionaries had returned with their flock of faithful refugees from Colesberg, and entered anew upon their manifold labours at Shiloh, making themselves and their families as comfortable as circumstances permitted among the ruins of the place.

According to the latest advices received from them, the major count

of the Hottentots belonging to their former congregation had returned to their duty, and not a few of their number were already engaged in assisting in the defence of the colony, and the posts in British Kafria.

The conduct of the 900 volunteers, who on the first outbreak of the war, and before any considerable number of burghers or colonists had joined the forces under his Excellency the Governor or his subordinate officers, cheerfully came forward and enrolled themselves in the ranks of the defenders of the colony; dismissing from their minds the recollection of the privations to which the families of the levies from Genadendal, Groenekloof and Elim, had been subjected for many months, at the commencement of the war of 1847, appears to be the theme of general commendation. They are reported to have thus far distinguished themselves by bravery in the field and good conduct in the camp and on the march, and the numerous letters which they are continually writing to their wives and families, who are meanwhile liberally provided for, are creditable alike to their principles and feelings.

(signed) *Peter La Trobe.*

Rev.  
*P. La Trobe.*  
—  
31 July  
1851.

EXTRACT of a Journal kept at the *Cape*, in 1849 (from the "Colonial Church Chronicle, and Missionary Journal," for June and July 1850, No. XXXVI, p. 457, and XXXVII, p. 29.) By Archdeacon *Merriman.*

Moravian Settlement, at Shiloh.

\* \* \* After service and breakfast, we walked on to Shiloh, where we spent the rest of the day and following night, among a set of the most simple, hard-working, and earnest missionaries, as it seems to me, of any I have seen in this land.

Shiloh has been established 20 years: there are at present four Moravian brethren, three of whom are married, and two have small families. There are about 700 people round the station, a mixture of Hottentots, Fingoes, and Kafirs; about 300 are baptized, several are possessors of considerable property, have comfortable houses, waggons, horses, oxen, and sheep. Most of them have a piece of land, which they cultivate for themselves, enjoying the privilege of water from the watercourse, which was dug by the first missionaries, with the assistance of native labour; and altogether there is an appearance of industry far greater than what is witnessed at the missionary stations of other bodies. The whole buildings were erected, and the whole of the furniture made, and the mill constructed by the hands of the missionaries themselves. This renders it less astonishing, both that the institution itself should be self-supporting, and even return a yearly surplus for the assistance of weaker stations, and that the converts should adopt habits of industry more readily than elsewhere. It was a goodly sight, to see so many Kafir men, whose incorrigible disinclination to cultivate the ground is so much spoken of, labouring voluntarily in their own fields. In the house of one Kafir which I entered, and which was almost as comfortably furnished as the house of an English agricultural labourer, I saw several

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Rev.  
P. La Trobe.

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sacks of different kinds of grain; nor did he show any jealousy, but rather pleasure, when I remarked on his wealth as the product of his own industry.

Mr. Bonatz, who devoted his whole time to us for the day, which he said he was able to do, being "house-father" at present, took great pleasure in showing us the new watercourse, which they had led out from a distance of above three miles, for the purpose of having plenty of water to turn their mill, without taking away any of that which was devoted to the irrigation of the native grounds; and thus cutting off all occasions for murmurings and jealousy in a dry season. He confessed to me that, in spite of all the good appearances, the ingratitude of the natives had tried him sorely.

Graham's Town, 22 October 1849.

HAVING just returned from a second visit to the Moravian missionary station of Shiloh, on the borders of Kafirland, I wish to give you a few of my thoughts on the subject; but first I must refer you to my journal of June last for a general account of the station and its inmates, their numbers, their work, their expenditure, and other matters.

On this second occasion I took ——— with me, who is no less delighted with the sisters of the establishment than I was with the brethren. Their frankness, simplicity and kindliness win more and more upon us the better we know them.

Besides giving the abstract of their year's accounts, which the frank kindness of Mr. Bonatz enabled me to do, I have said in my second visit that I was very minute in my inquiries about the expenses of their newly contemplated station at Windvogel, because I thought we might learn more from them, than from any other body of Christians who are engaged in missionary work in this land.

Now, when we consider that Shiloh is only of 20 years' standing; that they have incurred the plunderings consequent upon the Kafir wars, when all their cattle was swept away from them (though they were never compelled to quit the station, nor was any one's life lost); it is a subject worthy of much reflection, that for some years past they have not only been a self-supporting society, but have actually returned a surplus in aid of poorer missions. £. 400 was all that their Society received from the Government, at whose instigation two solitary men first came to settle on this trackless wild (as it then was), surrounded by a fierce tribe of savages. They had a promise of a grant of land, it is true; but it is the industry which they have bestowed on this land, and their simple, self-denying lives, which has placed this and other Moravian missions on the present footing; the missionaries having taught the natives while they maintained themselves by the sweat of their own brow.

I found that Mr. Bonatz considered it would be a very great outlay if it cost their Society 1,000 *l.* from first to last before the new station in Kafirland was able to maintain itself. He was himself engaged in making the door-frames and window-frames for the mission-house to be conveyed to Windvogel; and a Christian Kafir carpenter (the only handicraftsman of that nation I ever saw) was working with him.

3485. Sir

3485. Sir *J. Walmsley*.] Is there any information which you wish to give to the Committee which is not contained in that document to which you have referred?—I was anxious, as reference had been made in the previous examination to that which had taken place at Shiloh, affecting the character both of the missionaries and the people under their care, to be permitted to state what I know on that subject; that the missionaries there, as I believe was the case everywhere else, as soon as they had the least suspicion that anything was going wrong, did their very utmost to allay the prevailing irritation, and to bring the people to reason, who appeared for the time to be under a degree of infatuation for which they could themselves scarcely account. This was especially the case with regard to the Hottentots, of whom I am bound to say, that, so far as our knowledge extends, they had no cause of complaint against the local authorities, or against the Government; and concerning whom, up to the time referred to (for they were to a certain extent, but only to a certain extent, involved in the prevailing disaffection), the missionaries had an opinion that they would have stood by them to the very last extremity.

3486. Sir *E. Buxton*.] Can you in any way account for the outbreak at Shiloh?—It is right to state, that there is very great uncertainty connected with that event. There was, in fact, no outbreak at Shiloh, up to the time when the missionaries left on the 30th of January. It was in order to show that at all events *their* loyalty was above suspicion, and that they were willing to suffer any loss rather than be in the slightest degree implicated in anything like disaffection, that they quitted the place. Up to that time no overt act, amounting to rebellion, had been committed; there was simply a refusal of the Hottentots to deliver up two men from the Kat River who were suspected, and over whom they had no control. Up to that period there was no outbreak; and there is considerable doubt, from what was stated by Mr. Renton, and the depositions which the Committee have allowed to be put in, whether the first aggression was on the part of the Whittlesea people or the Shiloh people.

3487. Have the Moravian missionaries any station at Whittlesea?—No.

Rev.  
*P. La Trobe*.

31 July  
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## APPENDIX.

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### Appendix, No. 1.

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COPY of LETTER from Rev. *James Read*, Sen., Missionary of the London Missionary Society, *Philipton, Kat River*, dated Alice, 26 March 1851. App. No. 1.

Sir,

HAVING addressed a letter to the Governor, and lodged my protest against the representations and resolutions of Major-general Somerset in his despatch of 28th February, I deem it necessary, in order to counteract and abate the erroneous impressions on the public mind, which that despatch is fitted to produce, before the impartial and rigid investigation which I have demanded can be made, and more especially to prevent the conclusion, which I am given to understand my silence will be held to sanction, that I am unable to gainsay the allegations in said documents, to offer through your columns some animadversions upon those portions of it which relate to Philipton and myself.

In the first paragraph of the despatch, there are six points which I take leave to notice :

1st. "That Philipton, so proverbially stated to be loyal, had in fact been the focus of almost all the disaffected of the settlement." This is a sweeping accusation, which it is easy to utter, and which, coming from a person in authority, is fitted to blast the character of a place: in the absence of any proof to support it, I am constrained to repel the charge, and to challenge the Major-general to substantiate it:

2nd. "That the two field cornets, Andries Botha and Piet Bruintjis, were both with the rebels."

One would imagine there were no field cornets at Philipton on the Major-general's arrival, whereas there were other two. That Piet Bruintjis was not with the rebels, the General is, I suppose, ere this satisfied, as after coming into Fort Hare he was set at liberty. That Botha was with them has not been proved, and I understand evidence can be produced that he was not.

App. No. 1.

3rd. Says the Major-general, "I found upon undoubted evidence, that from this body of people detachments had been furnished to support the rebels in their desultory attacks on the farms in the colony; in fact, that the most disgraceful deception had been carried to an incredible extent."

Here again are most sweeping and injurious, but, as will be noticed, vague and unsupported charges: being ignorant of any foundation for them, I am entitled to ask, what detachments went from Philipton? Who furnished them? and by whom were they carried on?

4th. He proceeds to say, "On the morning of the 26th I assembled the whole of the people, and in presence of their missionary, Mr. Read, I explained to them my full perception of their conduct; that under such circumstances, there was but one course for me to pursue, viz., to break up such a nest of traitors and rebels, and bring them all away, disarming every one."

There was on the morning referred to a considerable number of people suddenly collected, partly mine, partly Mr. Thomson's; whom, in Mr. Thomson's presence and my own, the Major-general addressed in the excited and extraordinary manner he has described. I told him privately, at the close of his address, that it was a pity he had spoken as he did, as the men whom he had denounced as traitors and rebels were faithful and peaceful subjects of the Queen, and I told him so the evening before; men who, instead of being treated in such a manner, deserved to be commended for their loyalty and steadfastness. Moreover it is not the case that he disarmed every one: the greater number were allowed to retain their arms; some had no arms, and others from whom arms were taken were neither disloyal nor suspected, but only unknown to Commandant Forie, who, not being cornet of the district, was a stranger to them, and could not be responsible for them.

5th. The Major-general goes on to say, "I found 17 waggons belonging to the rebels in the place; about 100 women and children, and property to a great extent."

On the morning in question he spoke as if all the waggons in Philipton, amounting to between 50 and 60, were those of rebels, and so as they have been represented in some newspaper accounts. But the fact is, that although, with a rashness and rudeness which to Englishmen at home would seem incredible, many waggons were seized and searched, not four altogether, I am not sure if more than two, were found to be or to have been those of rebels: of all those in question, and indeed of all at Philipton, accurate accounts can be furnished whenever demanded by competent authority. I am afraid the property to a great extent said to have been found belonging to rebels at Philipton will have dwindled into very small amounts when the returns of the proceeds are made into the Government's treasury, and I also apprehend that few farmers will boast of having found their stolen property at Philipton; that property to a great extent was found there is perfectly true, but it was the lawful property of loyal people, of which I am sorry to say that the greater part, in cattle, corn, and meal, was rifled from them by the Major-general's

general's forces, either at Philipton, on the journey to, or at Alice, App. No. 1. where the plunder of cattle and flocks was wholesale.

6th. The Major-general adds, "On the 27th I carried this measure into effect, moving everybody off to Eiland's post; conveying away also the reverend missionaries resident at Philipton."

The strain of the document and the form of this remark now lead one to fancy that the missionaries were a sort of captives. How stands the case? A strong representation was sent from those of the Kat River, and from the council of the Loyal Burghers Association, two days before, to the Major-general, against leaving them or the loyal inhabitants of the settlement, unless he left an adequate force to protect them. Other missionaries and a Scotch minister, who are at Philipton, supported this application, and some of them, I believe, sent private letters requesting to be taken out.

In the fourth paragraph of the despatch the Major-general states that Field-commandants Forie and Piffer rendered every assistance, and their information was most valuable to him.

Why did he not act upon that information? Kobus Forie gave him a list of upwards of 100 loyal men at Philipton whom he could answer for; a list which on the day the Major-general entered Philipton, I referred him to as quite correct; yet it was those men who chiefly composed the meeting he addressed next morning as traitors and rebels.

The Major-general proceeds to say, "Your Excellency will perceive that I have decided upon and adopted, after very mature reflection, a strong measure in breaking up this settlement; but I have felt it an imperative duty. It is impossible to conceive the mischief that has occurred from the delusions that have been engendered in the minds of these people. The measure I have adopted has, at one blow, dissolved the charm. I can already perceive a complete change in the minds of these people; the honest and well-intentioned are reassured; the vacillating and disloyal have been struck with terror, and the arm of rebellion is broken, and all seem anxious now in word and in deed to return to their allegiance. I am now returning to Fort Hare, where I purpose trying the principal ringleaders by a general court martial. I shall then decide as to the disposal of the captured property, but as very many of the waggons are the property of those worthy men who have been robbed and plundered by the rebels, I shall restore the whole as far as possible."

On the most important announcement in the despatch, "The strong measure he had decided on and adopted" of breaking up the settlement, I forbear to say more at present, than that, while heartily desiring the detection of the criminals, and approving of the confiscation of the property of such as shall be proved to be traitors and rebels, I believe it is beyond the power of any military commander to break up the settlement in this off-handed style; and the Government and the public, both here and in England, will perhaps be surprised to find after all the dreadful accounts of the Kat River people, that very few of those holding property had any participation in this rebellion; although, by the forces of the Burghers and the Fingoes

App. No. 1, which came into the settlement with the Major-general, their houses were burnt, and their property destroyed, as if they had been counted rebels.

I wish I could entertain as strong a confidence as the Major-general, that the rebellion is broken. Had the third or the fourth of the large force which has lain idle at Fort Hare for about a month, been employed in scouring the mountains and bushy defiles of the Kat River, I doubt not that ere this every rebel would have disappeared from it. It was a mistake to fancy that the victorious siege of Fort Armstrong, however important an event, followed up by the evacuation of all the loyal, with all the women and children in the settlement, was the suppression of the rebellion. I suppose there were about 200 men in Fort Armstrong when besieged, and I fear the principal ringleaders, who are to be tried by court martial, have yet to be captured.

The exaggerations are, unhappily, very great, both of the defection of the Kat River Hottentots and the victory which has been achieved over them. I deprecated and lamented, and did all I could, in conjunction with other brethren in the Kat River, to stop that defection. I deprecate and lament not less all delay and inefficiency in suppressing and punishing it; and I mourn over the injury done to hundreds of innocent persons, particularly of women and children, by some of the measures which have been taken for that object.

But I wait and pray for our impartial and searching investigation into the conduct of all parties concerned.

I am, &c.

(signed) J. Read, Sen.

Appendix, No. 2.

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LETTER from Colonel *C. Ovens* to the Honourable Sir *John Malcolm*, &c. &c. App. No. 2.

Honourable Sir,

Poonah, 12 August 1830. (a)

ACCORDING to your request, I have the honour to lay before you the following account of the settlements made with the Naiks and Bheels of the districts composing the Kunur agency. These settlements were undertaken, when every other expedient for reducing to order the wild and lawless tribes of that country had failed of success; and the result has proved the efficacy of a conciliatory and liberal mode of treatment in reforming a race of men, who may almost be said to have considered plunder as their birthright, and who, from being the scourges of the country, are now quietly engaged at the plough, or employed in preserving the peace of these very districts, which they formerly ravaged.

2. These districts, with the exception of a few villages of the Kunur purgannah, all lie below the Adjunta range of hills, which here form the southern boundary of Khandeish. They are for the most part badly cultivated, thinly peopled, and intersected in all directions by wild wastes covered with low jungle, well calculated for the operations and concealment of banditti.

3. The range of hills alluded to throughout this report extends from the Kusarbaree Ghat on the west, to a point about 20 miles from Adjunta on the east, where Khandeish ends. The western portion of this range, from Kusarbaree to Gaotala, belongs to the Company, and immediately below it is the Chaleesgam talooka. (b) The eastern part, from Gaotala to Adjunta, belongs to the Nizam. A low, waste, jungly strip of country, also belonging to the Nizam, intervenes between this range and the Bhurgam talooka. (b) But to the eastward of Adjunta, the Jhamneir talooka runs down and touches the hills. These three talookas, (b) viz. Chaleesgam, Bhurgam and Jhamneir, are part of the Khandeish collectorate, and are those which form the Kunur agency.

4. These hills, in many places, rise almost perpendicularly from the plains, and are, generally speaking, very difficult of access. They are covered with dwarf teak, bamboo and other trees, and are broken into deep,

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(a) Sir J. Malcolm was then Governor of Bombay.

(b) A revenue division of the country under a mamlutdar, or native collector.

App. No. 2.

deep, scraggy "koras," or ravines, inaccessible to all but Bheels. There are, however, numerous passes through them for laden cattle and foot passengers, but the Adjunta and Kusarbaree Ghats (c) are the only ones at all practicable for wheeled carriages, and these are about 70 miles asunder.

5. These mountains are divided by the natives into different ranges, each of which has its particular denomination. The principal of these are the Arnuddee Hills (so called from a small mountain-stream running through them) which extend from Kusarbaree to the hill fort of Kunaira; the Sathmala Hills (so called from a high bluff peak) running from Kunaira to Gaotola; and the Kaldurree Hills (so called from a deep chasm, the Kaldurree Kora), in the midst of which is the strong and celebrated fortress of Untoor.

6. It was in these separate ranges, that the Bheel Naiks (d) formed their "huttees," or temporary encampments, and from them they derived their names, as Rora Naik, of the Arrunddee; Saiba Naik, of the Sathmala; and Bhaeejee Naik, of the Kaldurree; though these appellations may possibly have originated from the Naiks being the guardians of the passes of their particular hills. For the Bheel Naiks of this agency have never had, as far as I can learn, any acknowledged rights or authority as independent chiefs; they have no lands, no tenures of any kind, save the hucks (e) and enams (f) they possess as the hereditary superintendents of the police of the different purgunnahs of which they are the wuttundars. (g)

7. According to the immemorial usage of this country, the Naik was considered answerable for the general police of his purgunnah, the jagleea (h) for that of his particular village, and the Naik, was also bound to see that the jaglees did their duty. Indeed, the Naik originally seems to have had the right of appointing all the jaglees of his purgunnah ordistrict, as is still the case in the Bhurgam purgunnah, where the jagul right continues to be vested in the Kaldurree Naiks, who, to this day, appoint their own jaglees (h) to every village there. But in the other districts of this agency, this power has now become so far modified, that the present jaglees, from long possession, are considered as wuttundars, (g) though, when they become extinct in any particular village, the jagul still reverts to the Naik. And to this, as well as to his being their official head, we may, probably, trace the influence exercised by the Naiks over the jagleea Bheels of this range.

8. For the performance of his duties, the Naik was paid by hucks, chiefly in kind, on every village of which he was wuttundar, and the jagleea received his karee-peendee (i) like the rest of the baruh-bulota. (j) But though this, as far as I can ascertain, seems to have been the original

(c) Passes in the hills.

(d) Chiefs so called.

(e) Payments in kind and money for services performed.

(f) Lands held in perpetuity for services performed.

(g) Hereditary owners.

(h) Village watchman.

(i) Portion of grain.

(j) Village servants.

original situation of the Naiks in this quarter, they nevertheless appear, at an earlier period, to have risen to considerable consequence here. Each Naik has still his purdhan, (*k*) his kharbaree, (*l*) or his jemidar, (*m*) who has a certain share of the hucks, and in the memory of the oldest inhabitants they are only known as living in or near the hills, at the head of a body of their followers, who were more or less formidable according to circumstances. They then, as now, held themselves responsible for all robberies in their own districts, and their hucks were usually collected and taken to their huttees by the jagleas, who, though looking up to the Naik as their head, were generally present in their villages, until the famine of Fuslee 1213, A. D. 1803.

9. At that time nearly all the villages in this part of the country became depopulated, and the Bheels suffered in common with the rest of the inhabitants. The lands fell waste, and their hucks, of course, ceased. Many of them fled into Berar, and the remainder, as well as others of different castes, driven by hunger, joined the Naiks in the hills, who now began to plunder the country far and near for a subsistence.

10. The disturbances succeeding this unhappy period served to increase the confidence of these bands, and to recruit their strength. Many of the Naiks now assumed the state of petty rajahs, and kept regular bodies of armed men in their pay for the purposes of plunder. The evil, too, was only increased by the attempts of the native governments to correct it. They did not hesitate to employ fraud as well as open force to effect their object, and many cruel massacres of the Bheels are said to have taken place. Seeing, therefore, that their extermination was determined upon, they at last became utterly desperate, and avenged themselves on the surrounding country by such atrocities, as caused their very name to be equally dreaded and abhorred by the inhabitants.

11. This was the state of things on our taking possession of the country in 1817-18, when some settlements were made with the Arrundee and other Naiks, which, however, were found to be ineffectual in restoring the peace of the country. The jagleea Bheels still kept to the hills, and continued their depredations. Detachments of troops were employed at different times against them, but all to no purpose. The gangs dispersed for a time; and then returned to their old haunts and habits.

12. "The distress occasioned by these robberies" (says Captain Briggs in a despatch to Mr. Elphinstone, dated in January 1819), "to the inhabitants, is not to be imagined;" and after describing the terror felt by the people, on receiving the insolent and threatening requisitions which the Bheels were then in the habit of sending to the villages, and stating that one or two purgunnahs had actually refused tucavee (*n*) to extend their cultivation, until their persons and property were secured; he goes on to argue, that until some provision

was

(*k*) Minister.  
(*m*) Commander.

(*l*) Manager.  
(*n*) Advances of money.



App. No. 2. was made for the Bheels, little or no improvement in the state of the country could be expected to take place.

13. It was not, however, until 1824-25, that the conciliatory line of policy and the settlements which have been productive of so much good, and which, as will be seen by the extract above quoted, had been so long before pointed out as essential to the peace of the country, were first fairly brought into operation. (o) Indeed, it may be doubted whether, at an earlier period, these settlements would have succeeded as they have now done. For when we consider the state of Khandeish, overran as it formerly was by bands of freebooters, rendered desperate and daring beyond example by the absence for years of anything like regular government, it will be evident that nothing but an opinion of our irresistible power could possibly have paved the way for a more settled order of things, or have induced the Bheels, habituated as they then were to all kinds of violence, to have adopted a different course of life.

14. It must be admitted, therefore, that though the military operations carried on at intervals from the period of our conquest failed in restoring permanent quiet to the country, still such coercion was unquestionably indispensable to break the power of the different bands, and to prepare the means of effecting the good subsequently done. Indeed, the course adopted at the time I have now arrived at, viz. 1824-25, towards the Bheels, who had then assembled in the Arrunddee and Sathmala ranges of hills, and who, under active and daring leaders, were then ravaging the country both above and below the Ghats, sufficiently proves the truth of what I have here advanced.

15. It was first necessary to show these Bheels that all resistance would be hopeless. Detachments of regular troops were employed against them, which by penetrating into every part of the hills, reduced them to extremities. An amnesty was then offered to the Naiks, and generally to all the Bheels of this range, with a few exceptions, on condition of their returning to their villages, and refraining from all future aggressions, and an attempt was to be made to reform this wild and hitherto intractable race, and provide for their future support, by giving tuccavee (p) and waste lands to cultivate to all those who could be persuaded to take to the plough.

16. A very successful commencement of these settlements was made by the late Mr. Graham, then second assistant collector of Khandeish, who had charge of this agency until October 1825. By his judicious and active measures, the most desperate and formidable of the outlaws were secured, and several of the principal Naiks persuaded to take advantage of the liberal and humane offers of Government. To these, as well as to the rest of the leaders and their followers, as they continued to come in, tuccavee was given, and waste lands were allotted wherever they themselves chose to settle. Of course it required both time and patience to put things on a regular and permanent footing in these

(o) I took charge of this agency in 1825.—C. Ovens. (p) Advances of money.

these infant villages, composed, too, as they were of such wild materials, but the fact of there now being 25 of these colonies established in this agency will, I trust, prove the progress made in this part of the undertaking.

17. At first, the plan of setting the Bheels to cultivate was considered almost hopeless, such was their wild, intractable and savage character in this quarter. And, certainly, the difficulties to be overcome in bringing about such a change in their habits were not much exaggerated; but the Bheel is wonderfully susceptible of being worked upon by kind and liberal treatment. By attention to his little wants and petitions, by a present to his women, and by showing him that you take an interest in him and his affairs, anything may be done with him. The true secret, however, of the power we now possess over the minds of this wild people is, that they feel themselves secure on the faith of our kowls.(g) This they never did before; and it is owing to this implicit reliance on the sanctity of our word, that they submitted themselves so readily, and have re-established themselves so generally, with their wives and children, in their wuttunny(r) villages in the plains, where upwards of 600 families are now settled at the plough alone.

18. So entirely, too, have the prejudices of the Bheels, with regard to engaging in cultivation, been got over, that it would not now be difficult to increase the number of ploughs in this agency, were it expedient to do so. But it ought, at present, I think, to be our object, rather to watch over and secure the present settlements, than to extend them unnecessarily. To all wuttundar(s) Bheels, however, of these districts, who return to their homes, and who have no other means of support, ploughs must be given, as also to the grown-up children of those now settled, as soon as they are of an age fit to cultivate.

19. After the settlement of the Naiks (t) and their followers, the next object was that of the jagleas, (u) and the reorganization of the police of the country on its ancient footing. The Naiks, by the restoration of their hucks, (x) in the shape of a money payment, again became responsible for the general police of their respective districts, but the jagleas hucks, in the present depopulated state of the country, were found to be quite insufficient for their support. An agreement was, therefore, entered into with the patels and jagleas of every village separately, by which one particular Bheel was, by common consent, set apart to do the jagul duty and receive the hucks, and the others agreed to receive tuccavee, and to cultivate for their livelihood.

20. About 400 Bheels have in this manner been re-established in their wuttunny villages throughout this agency, in their original occupation of village watchmen, and as enam lands have been given, wherever there was none before, to all these jagleas, in addition to their grain hucks, it is to be hoped they will not again be driven by want into any excesses.

21. In

(g) Paper of protection. (r) Hereditary villages. (s) Hereditary.  
(r) Chiefs. (u) Village watchmen. (x) Rights.

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21. In those purgunnahs where wuttundar Naiks were not found to exist, one or two Bheels, belonging to the same purgunnah, have been appointed as rukwaldars, to superintend the jagleas, and to preserve the general peace of their division. These Bheels are entered as malseebundus, (y) and receive pay as such. But they reside in their own villages, in the midst of the purgunnah, of which they have police charge, where they are constantly on the alert to prevent robbery, as well as to detect it if committed. And this system, being in conformity with the ancient constitution of these purgunnahs, answers very well.

22. Thus an efficient police has been created in these districts without expense, and simply by reverting to the old-established usages of the country, which an experience of nearly five years has proved to work better, perhaps, than any other that could have been devised, and, in fact, the effects of these settlements altogether have been such, that this country, formerly described as being in so distracted a state that neither life nor property was secure, now enjoys perfect tranquillity. The roads too, which were unsafe, even for armed men, are now travelled at all hours by single passengers without fear, and almost all the deserted villages have been re-established.

23. The Bheels themselves also, from being savage outcasts, wandering about the hills and jungles, with their hands against every man, and every man's hand against them, are now reunited to society, and living quietly in their villages, and gradually becoming useful and obedient subjects,

24. It was to be expected that exceptions would occur; the inveterate habits of a race of men like the Bheels are not to be changed in a day: but these exceptions only prove the efficacy of the present system; for instance, five or six families from Bholték, the most turbulent colony above the hills, took to the hills in November last, and recommenced the old system of plunder; but in a few days they were all seized, except one man, and brought in by their own Naik, assisted, in the first instance, by a small detachment of the Bheel corps, and this is the only defection of any consequence since I concluded my settlements with the Bheels.

25. It would be tedious to go into all the details of these settlements, but it may be necessary to mention, that a general register of all the Bheels of this agency has been made; that every Bheel has had a kowl (x) given to him with my own hands, which they generally carry about with them, and on which they set great value; that the Naik and jagleea hucks have all been inquired into and adjusted, and the patels bound down to see that the jagleas receive their proper dues, as well as to assist those Bheels who cultivate. The Bheels, on their part, also are required never to leave their villages even for a day, without permission from the Naik or the patel; if they do, it is immediately reported, and the patels and jagleas are strictly

(y) District policeman.

(x) Paper of protection.

strictly enjoined to bring in all stray Bheels to give an account of themselves, and to receive kowl. App. No. 4.

26. A darogah kharkoon (*a*) is employed in each talooka, who constantly moves about from village to village, to see that all these orders are attended to, and that the Bheels are present, and busy at their ploughs. A darogah malseebundy (*b*) is also stationed in each colony to superintend and overlook them, and report their proceedings; during the dry weather, likewise, I move about from place to place, to receive the urzees (*c*) of the Bheels, and to ascertain, by personal inspection, that all is doing well.

27. In the letter from Captain Briggs to Mr. Elphinstone, dated the 8th January 1819, and which has been before alluded to in the 12th paragraph of this Report, such appeared to be the urgency at that time, for making some provision for the Bheels, and for re-establishing the police of the country on its ancient footing, that the political agent then proposed giving each Bheel jagleea an allowance of two rupees per month for his support, and this was to be raised by a house tax, which he calculated would amount to 1,38,034 rupees annually; but even this measure, so burdensome in its nature to an already exhausted country, would not have answered the end in view; for it would have kept the Bheels in a state of idleness, and the money, instead of being spent in grain, would most probably have been thrown away on liquor, of which, like all savages, they are immoderately fond.

28. The present outlay of tuccavee, on the other hand, by which these settlements have been effected, only amounts to about 42,000 rupees, of which one-third at least is now forthcoming in the shape of bullocks and agricultural implements. A further advance, to the extent of a few thousand rupees, may still be necessary, as until the produce of the fields of the cultivating Bheels is adequate to their support, they must, of course, be assisted with tuccavee. But this money is not sunk, as the sums given in the shape of pay would have been. Part of it, at least, will be recovered, and Government will be amply remunerated for the remainder, by the re-establishment of the waste villages, and by the improved condition generally of this country, owing to the security of person and property now enjoyed here by all classes. The large tracts of jungle already cleared by the cultivating Bheels, now computed at about 8,000 beegas, must likewise ultimately yield some return to the State. Besides, the Bheel, instead of being a burden to Government, now looks to his own honest labour for his support, and his mind being occupied in attending to his fields, his habits are undergoing a slow but certain reform. No system of money payments could, I think, have produced such effects.

29. By the kowls (*d*) which have been given to the cultivating Bheels for the waste lands allotted to them, they are bound to repay the  
above

(*a*) Native writer.  
(*c*) Petitions.

(*b*) Native policeman.  
(*d*) Agreements.

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above tuccavee in seven years: but these terms must not, of course, be insisted upon, particularly as there is authority from Government, under date the 12th of January 1828, for not bringing these lands under the full assessment for a period of 20 years; and, in fact, in a late report, I have proposed at once to give fresh kowls for the above period: but even when this extended term expires, great allowances must be made. The realization of the tuccavee, or of revenue from this class, is a very secondary consideration; their thorough reform is everything, and hereafter, instead of laying a beegotee (e) on their fields, the best plan would probably be, to levy a small sum on each plough, which system seems to suit best with the habits and feelings of all half-civilized communities.

30. On the recall of Major Deschamp's detachment in 1825, 200 regulars, with two European officers, were left in the Chalusgam talooka; this number being then considered necessary for the protection of that district alone. The services of the whole of this body, except 25 men, have now been dispensed with, and parties of the Bheel corps have been substituted in their stead. The 25 regulars remaining are stationed in the Bhurgam and Jhamneir talookas, chiefly with a view of protecting our eastern frontier from the incursions of freebooters from the Nizam's country, and the Bheel sepoy's occupy all the other posts.

31. And here in justice to the Bheel corps, which was composed of the same wild materials as those now settled in the villages of this agency, and which, in fact, is an indispensable part of the Bheel system as now followed up in Khandeish, I trust I may be permitted to say a few words regarding it. This corps absorbed those young and fiery spirits who could scarcely have been expected to have remained long at rest in their villages. It drew Bheels of this stamp from all quarters of the province, and by the ability displayed by Lieutenant Outram in the management of it, it soon became an honourable and popular employment. The Bheels of this corps are now engaged on every kind of duty, in guarding prisoners, escorting treasure, in outposts in the most unhealthy parts of the country, and I speak from personal experience when I say, that no body of men could possibly be more zealous or efficient, and what is still higher praise, more orderly in their conduct, particularly when we consider what these Bheels were before they were embodied.

32. It only remains for me now to add a few observations on the appearance and character of this singular race, which, in the midst of civilization, has so long retained its own wild and peculiar habits. The Bheels of the Adjunta range are divided into two classes, Moosulmans and Hindoos. The former, however, are only found to the eastward, in the Parchora, Loharra, Seendhoornee, Jhamneir and Bornar purgunahs. The exact time of their conversion is not known. They do not differ much in appearance or manners from the common Moosulmen of the country, but they retain a good deal of the ferocity of their tribe, and are of a discontented quarrelsome disposition, which renders them difficult to manage.

33. All

(e) Rate per beega.

33. All the Bheels to the westward of Parchora are Hindoos; they are generally of low stature, of slight but active make, plain features, and dark complexions. They speak the common language of the country, and are naturally quick and intelligent; but they are of indolent, dissipated and singularly improvident habits, so much so, that even yet they can scarcely be trusted with the smallest sum of money of their own, as they would, in all probability, at once make away with it, without any thought of the wants of to-morrow. They eat all sorts of flesh, cows' flesh not excepted, and have great knowledge of roots and herbs, which they were occasionally driven to subsist on when in the hills. They take as many women as they can afford to marry and feed; but they cannot manage without one at least to cook and perform other menial offices; and so dependent are they in this respect, that they have been known to come in and surrender themselves on their women being seized. As may be supposed, there is little religious feeling amongst the Bheels. They keep all feast and festivals, both Hindoo and Moosulman, with equal zeal, and they are staunch believers in all kinds of "jadoo," or witchcraft. They have also their "bhuguts" (*f*) amongst them, who at times pretend to be inspired, and in whose responses they place implicit confidence.

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34. With all his faults, however, the Hindoo Bheel is not without some redeeming qualities. He is attached to his own patel and his own Naik; he is kind and affectionate to his own family and kindred, and he is faithful to his word, of which I have had good proof, as of all the Bheels to whom I have given kowl, very few, comparatively speaking, have as yet broken their engagements.

35. Such is the people whose reformation is now in progress in this agency, and which, if it prove permanent, will be productive of so much good, both to the Bheels themselves and to the country at large. The plan, too, for effecting this reformation, so ably sketched out by Lieutenant-colonel Robertson, and so zealously followed up by his successors in Khandeish, of which I have here attempted to give the details, has been proved by experience to have been equally wise, politic and humane. Nor has Government left anything undone on its part to ensure success; so that, if the experiment does ultimately fail, the fault will not be ours. But I hope for better things. Partial breaches of the peace there may and will be, because, as I have said before, such inveterate habits are not to be changed in a day; but there never can, I think, be a general relapse as long as the above system be persevered in; and as the present race dies away, the rising generation, enured to labour from their youth up, will lose sight of old times, and gradually become useful, obedient and peaceful subjects.

I have, &amp;c.

(signed) C. Ovans,  
Bheel Agent, Khandeish.

(True copy.)

(signed) C. Ovans.

*(f)* Priests.

I I

## Appendix, No. 3.

App. No. 3. LETTER from Sir *A. Stockenström* to the Right Hon. *H. Labouchere*,  
Chairman.

Sir,

London, 7 July 1851.

At the close of my last examination, on the 26th ultimo, by the Committee over which you preside, I was not informed whether I should again be required to appear or not; and from my not having received any subsequent summons, I conclude that the inquiry, which must necessarily here be so utterly incomplete, will be continued at the Cape. In the meantime, there are certain points which it becomes my duty to bring to the immediate notice of the Committee.

In the first place, I must take the liberty to call to the recollection of the Committee, that during my examination, I repeatedly referred to a despatch addressed by Sir George Napier, as Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 1st February 1839. I was anxious to have the Committee in possession of that document, as well as of its enclosures, together with my observations thereon, Lord Normanby having transmitted it to me for my report as soon as it reached Downing-street. To the best of my recollection, Sir G. Napier, in that despatch, dwells particularly on the nature and working of the Glenelg system. He had then been about a year in the colony; had visited the greatest part of the frontier; had minutely examined into the character of my proceedings under the said system for near two years, and their results, and was fully competent to give an unbiassed opinion. My observations on that despatch appear to me to be also essential in the inquiry here pending, as showing, if I recollect right, in how far I agreed with, and in how far I differed from, the Governor, particularly my objections to the slightest deviation from the principles of the said system by means of military interference.

The Under-Secretary for the Colonies, after handing to me during my examination on the 26th ultimo, the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, referred me to others of Sir G. Napier's despatches, but I searched in vain for that of the 1st February 1839, although in doing so my eye accidentally fell on one of the 20th November 1838, which I read to the Committee, and which was strongly indicative of the opinion which Sir G. Napier then entertained of the Glenelg system, of my proceeding under it, and of those by whom I was so furiously and factiously resisted in that important task. I have, however, this morning purchased another copy of the said Blue Book of the 23d ultimo; but I do not find in the copy so purchased the said letter

letter of Sir G. Napier of the 20th November 1838, such as it was handed to me by the Under-Secretary, such as I then read it to this Committee, and such as it must appear in my evidence, inasmuch as in the latter copy there appeared in said letter, in page 40\* of the said Blue Book, in the second line from the bottom, the following sentence parenthetically between the figure "1810" and the word "as;" viz., "the worst importation that ever came to this colony." I feel it an imperative duty to notice this omission, because I audibly read this passage before the Committee in the hearing of a number of bystanders; and as the letter, such as I received it from the Under-Secretary, with the said passage, is gone to the Cape, and may there be published, I cannot allow the cause of the discrepancy to be left doubtful.

Moreover, I beg leave to observe that upon further examination, it will be found that Sir G. Napier's despatch of the 1st February 1839, to which I have so often referred, does appear in the said Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, but escaped my notice, because I could not find the matter to which I attach importance. The three first paragraphs of said despatch are entered in page 41, but for that part which I deem most essential to the proper understanding of the subject under consideration, there are five asterisks substituted, and my report on the whole transaction does not appear at all. I must leave to the wisdom of the Committee whether the said deficiencies ought to be supplied; but as my object is to show what I have throughout maintained, viz., that if the Glenelg system had been strictly adhered to, it would ultimately have proved perfectly successful, I cannot but deeply regret the omissions, whilst I may at least refer the Committee to one of the enclosures of the said despatch, where in page 44, it appears that on the 3d January 1839, Colonel Somerset reported (as I have before stated) that he "never observed such apparent quiet throughout the country;" adding, "that war can only have been contemplated by those who wish to keep up a feeling of excitement in the minds of the tribes, either against each other, or against the colony, and thus disfigure and distort every subject; but in the minds of the Kafirs nothing of the kind was ever contemplated."

I also find by page 35, that on the 1st September 1838, Sir G. Napier wrote thus to Lord Glenelg: "and as the most perfect tranquillity exists upon the frontier, and is acknowledged even by the opponents of the treaties, there is no reason to expect any interruption of our present peaceful relations."

Lieutenant-governor Hare's report of the 10th October 1838, to be found in pages 37 and 38 of said Blue Book, is equally strong and satisfactory. He says, amongst other matter, "I have no hesitation in declaring to your Excellency my opinion from what I have myself observed, as well as from the reports of the officers at the outposts, that this frontier, with reference to the Kafir tribes, was never more tranquil than it is at present; contentment seems to prevail throughout; and I am happy to say there are marks of improving industry visible in many parts of the Kafir country; they are much in want of instruments to turn up the earth; and if a few hoes and spades were procured from England as presents, they would be more acceptable, and certainly more useful, than beads and baubles."



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Now, if the said omitted parts of the said despatch of Sir G. Napier, dated 1st February 1839, should be found to confirm the above views and facts, as I expect from my own recollections, as well as from Lord Normanby's reply of the 10th May 1839, which is likewise only given in part, in page 261 of the said Blue Book, the Committee will be able to judge of the actual working of the Glenelg system, as well as of the opinions of the highest officers of the Government, of the character of that system at the time when I retired from the administration of the eastern districts, and for some time afterwards. What is above stated by Governor Sir G. Napier, Lieutenant-governor Colonel Hare, and the military commandant Colonel Somerset, can be proved beyond the possibility of doubt. The causes of the subsequent failure of the same system could best be explained by the diplomatic agents, Bowker, Stretch, and Fynn. The former is dead, but the evidences of the latter two are indispensable. Mr. Fynn, during the Kafir war of 1846, read to me a memoir, which he had drawn up on this subject, and handed to the then Governor Sir P. Maitland, in 1844. Messrs. Stretch and Fynn therefore, I humbly submit, ought to be heard. A return of depredations and murders committed by the Kafirs during the said two years of my administration of the Glenelg system, should likewise be called for from the Agent-general's office. No other return can be of the slightest value. I have seen returns, pretending to be founded on authority, which are utterly false. When all the documents and testimonies above appealed to shall be united, I have no doubt as to the conclusion to which they will lead any candid mind.

In the second place, the Committee will recollect that I was on the said 26th ultimo particularly pressed by an honourable Member on the point of some collisions between certain Kafirs and Fingoes, as they appear detailed in pp. 15 to 25. As these transactions occurred about 14 years since, it was, of course, impossible for me at once to call to mind the particulars thereof; but as I have since glanced through the Blue Book, which was handed to me when I was thus pressed, I think it due to the Committee and to myself to be as explicit as the reperusal of the said pages enable me to be, especially as the discussion of the subject at issue affords an opportunity of entering upon the history and nature of the so-called D'Urban system, upon which there has been as much wilful misrepresentation as there has been affected misapprehension.

The Committee will observe that I shall state nothing of which the proofs or disproofs are not within the immediate reach of the Colonial Under-Secretary.

In the year 1835 the Governor, Sir B. D'Urban, deemed it expedient to carry war into the territory of the Galeka Kafirs beyond the Key. He found there many thousands of Fingoes living under the protection of the then paramount chief of Kafirland, Hintza, whose miserable end in that war we need not here dwell on. These Fingoes were refugees, or remnants of tribes, who had been driven out of their own country and almost annihilated by equally barbarous tribes. They found shelter and home in Hintza's country, among Hintza's people. They become what we were pleased to call the "slaves" of the Kafirs, but what the Kafirs call their "dogs," as they call themselves

selves our dogs, when they wish to express their sense of our superiority. They were not saleable; hard labour for men there is not in Kafirland; agriculture, which is carried on by the women, is comparatively limited; as herdsmen, therefore, were they mainly employed, and they were beginning to intermarry and to acquire property; still they were bondsmen, and treated as inferiors; and under such circumstances instances of severity or hard treatment may be supposed. These Fingoes Sir B. D'Urban liberated and brought to the frontier of the colony, allowing them to bring with them the flocks of their masters; and with these flocks they were placed in possession of some of the finest tracts of the Kafir territory, in close contact with the dispossessed infuriated Kafirs on the one side, and the unprotected, at least badly protected, discontented colonists on the other.

It is in my humble opinion self-evident that to keep the peace between the Kafirs and their late slaves under such circumstances, without an overwhelming force, was just as possible as it would be in the north of this island if some hundreds of thousands of Russian serfs were placed in possession of the lowlands of Scotland, and the proprietors of the soil driven and squeezed up into the highlands.

All the said Kafirs and Fingoes, besides many thousands of Tambookies, with whom we had never had a quarrel, were incorporated with the colony, and made British subjects; but although it was said that all was peace and contentment, these happy British subjects were ruled by martial law under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel (now Sir H.) Smith. This was the D'Urban system.

Now let the Committee, in the first place, call for the strictures passed upon this system by Mr. Justice Menzies, long before it was known what the Home Government would think of it.

However this system was in force when I reached the colony as Lieutenant-governor, and my orders were to administer the law as it then stood until I should receive further instructions, which were to be conveyed to me as soon as Lord Glenelg should have received from Sir B. D'Urban the final report, for which his Lordship had applied to his Excellency by despatch of the 26th December 1835. (*Vide* Blue Book of the 30th May 1836, page 118.)

In compliance with this order I left Cape Town on the 17th August 1836, with the positive understanding between myself and Sir B. D'Urban that I should carry on his system until the receipt of the said final instructions (*vide* Blue Book of 12th July 1837, page 28); but I had not proceeded 50 miles on my journey when Sir B. D'Urban, without reference either to Lord Glenelg or me, abolished his system by repealing martial law, and extending the jurisdiction of the civil courts over some 150,000 barbarians, the greatest proportion of whom he had proclaimed "irreclaimable savages." (*Vide* Proclamation, 18th August 1836.)

The D'Urban system, without martial law, was, of course, like the British Constitution without Parliament; accordingly on my reaching King William's Town, Colonel Smith asked me how I was to "eat up" a Kafir according to Blackstone. Mr. Stretch, a great friend and strong supporter of Sir B. D'Urban, said, "The sooner we

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pack up and walk out of the province the better." Captain Bain, likewise a warm admirer of the Governor, officially wrote in much stronger terms. His words, as sent to Sir B. D'Urban under cover of my despatch of the 3d November 1836, run thus: "The premature adoption of the British laws among the Kafir tribes will certainly be the cause of much bloodshed, turmoil, and never-ending dispute." These were the very officials who had been the main instruments in the administration of the D'Urban system; and there was not a man of sense on either side of the frontier who did not ridicule the idea of controlling the heterogeneous masses thus jumbled together, by the intricate forms of the civil law, which could hardly maintain order in a civilised colony of near two hundred years old.

There then is the D'Urban system abolished by its own author, in defiance of Lord Glenelg's order, and of Sir B. D'Urban's engagement with me. That the judges compelled Sir B. D'Urban to abolish that system shows the inherent vice of the system, but cannot be charged either against Lord Glenelg or myself, nor does it palliate the delusions so long fostered as to who really was guilty of the abolition.

Here we have martial law repealed and civil law impossible. Some 150,000 "irreclaimable savages" to be ruled by attorneys and briefs, by Blackstone and Van der Linden, instead of gunpowder and bayonet, when our whole army had been unable to prevent witch burning under the noses of our magistrates, or to obtain the delivery of a single musket according to agreement.

However, in the midst of this chaos it was clamorously maintained that the D'Urban system was working successfully, that the Kafirs were completely subdued, praying for peace and mercy, that plundering had altogether ceased, and that on both sides of the frontier all was peace and contentment; whereas this was so notoriously contrary to the truth, that in my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 11 October 1836, the following passage will be found: "On the 8th instant, he (Colonel Somerset) brought to me, on the Gouappe, the chief Cobus Congo, who had stated to him, and then repeated to me, that it had been seriously intended to assassinate all the troops and other white people at the late meeting with Colonel Smith and myself at King William's Town, and that the attempt was only prevented by Umhala refusing to assist. Pato and Kaina gave me the same information at Fort Peddie on the 10th; in receiving which, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that these chiefs are very jealous of the Gaika tribe." In the same despatch I transmitted a letter of a missionary, Mr. Boyce, (a great friend of Sir B. D'Urban, and very much opposed to me,) in which letter, dated 10th October 1836, he informs me that "a large proportion of the (Kafir) population are ready for war, and anxiously expecting orders for its commencement." What Lieutenant-governor Hare said on this subject, upon the authority of Mr. Stretch, the Committee may find in page 183 of the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, and the Kafir chiefs have repeatedly admitted that they were at the very period, under the D'Urban system, making extensive preparations for recommencing the war. As for their being "completely subdued," they insisted upon it that they had beaten us, and that we had sued for peace; and this was in so far proved that we never could compel them to restore one single article of the booty which they had captured from

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us. That "plundering had altogether ceased" under the favourite system, the Committee will likewise find illustrated by the said Lieutenant-governor in the same page 183 of the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, by this passage: "I have never been amongst the advocates of that system, nor have I ever regarded it as one calculated to improve matters on the frontier, or give more security to the farmers' property than they at present enjoy; and in this opinion I am fully borne out by the official returns of Kafir depredations during the eight months that that favourite system continued in existence and in full operation. An authenticated extract by the agent-general from the returns is herewith transmitted, showing depredations to the amount of 514 head of cattle and 129 horses, from February to September 1836; an amount equal to any since, within the same period, if I except the depredations of last year by Tola, and for which that chief has been punished."

The following official documents afford the same species of proof:

1. Extract of my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 20 September 1836, running thus: "I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter addressed by me to the Commandant of Kafaria, on the 17th instant, and of that officer's reply; particularly referring, among other matter, to the numerous depredations which have of late taken place, previous to his resuming the general command of the forces in this division; which depredations Captain Armstrong represents as 'unprecedented since the war.'"

2. Ditto, dated 7 October 1836, where, in transmitting a report from the Civil Commissioner of Albany, dated 29 September 1836, I wrote thus: "I take the liberty to call your Excellency's attention to the following passage of the Civil Commissioner's letter as enclosed, viz., 'The losses which have been sustained by the people since the conclusion of the peace have been felt with peculiar severity.' This fully corresponds with the complaint of every farmer who has spoken to me. They positively declare that up to the present hour there has never been a week's successive tranquillity since the peace was made; that the Fingoes and Kafirs, since they have become British subjects, plunder worse than ever they did before the war, and that this state of insecurity is the main cause of the expatriation now in progress."

Such was the "successful working" of the D'Urban system, and the "peace and contentment" prevailing under it, when I received Sir B. D'Urban's order, dated 13 October 1836, to carry out Lord Glenelg's system. I took this order to be the "final instructions" of the King's Government which were to be sent me after the explanations which had been called for from Sir B. D'Urban. This the Committee will find, by Lord Glenelg's despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 1 May 1837, at page 278 of the Blue Book of 12 July of that year, not to have been the case, for the explanations called for were never sent, and consequently the final instructions could not be framed. In ignorance of this fact, I had no alternative but to obey Sir B. D'Urban's orders, one of the necessary (at the same time most salutary) consequences of which proceeding was the

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restoration to the Kafirs of that part of Kafirland beyond the Ceded Territory which had been given to the Fingoes.

If in the midst of the ocean of confusion, anarchy, and disorder into which the frontier was then plunged, the Glenelg system had been established, and something like order created without the least collision between the masses of combustibles there jumbled together in active and incessant friction, it would indeed have been a miracle. Such collisions accordingly did take place between the Kafirs and Fingoes. If these collisions were the result of the introduction of the Glenelg system, and if this introduction was premature, it is clear that the responsibility lies on the Governor who thus prematurely introduced it in defiance of the instructions of his superior, as he had abolished his own system by the repeal of martial law, and not upon that superior, nor upon his lieutenant, both of whom he misled. However, my exertions prevented the said collisions from leading to that renewal of the war which was so anxiously desired by those who had so lately scrambled for half a million of British money, and hoped to see another half million squandered; this I prevented. The Kafirs were quite prepared for the war, which we were not. Our most efficient forces were discontented and irritated, great number of them emigrating beyond the Orange River. Of those remaining, not one hundred would at that time have taken the field. The regular troops were not sufficient even for defence, and the auxiliary forces having been detained in military service against their will after the white burghers had been dismissed to their homes, were in a state bordering on open mutiny. The war for which the Kafirs had been long preparing would consequently have annihilated the Fingoes, and completed the ruin of the colony which had been partially accomplished, whilst it would have enriched a few. My proceedings in this crisis were fully approved of by the Supreme Government, as the Committee will find in pages 256, 257, and 258 of the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo; and I see by page 262 of the same book, that Lord Normanby declares that I retired "from the service in possession of the cordial approbation and esteem of the Government under which I had acted." I may be allowed to add, that upon no official act of my life do I look back with more satisfaction than upon having prevented the war which was imminent at the period referred to. Peace at that moment gave time for the consolidation of the Glenelg system, which worked successfully for two years at least, as has been shown before this Committee, and which, if strictly adhered to, would, I conscientiously believe, have saved this country a few millions of money, and prevented all the bloodshed and crimes which have befallen the Cape frontier for the last five years. The D'Urban system has been in operation once more, and has, as an inevitable consequence, produced a war which will require at least another million from the British Exchequer, besides drawing into the same vortex of slaughter and misery every tribe along our frontier. Nor will the ruinous expense cease when the war is concluded. It will take 5,000 troops at least, for a long period, to maintain anything like even partial tranquillity; and unless some just and equitable system for the influencing of the native tribes by means of their chiefs be resorted to (whether our frontier be the Key, the Fish, or the Sunday River), our only alternative will be extermination, which

will

will be no less honourable than economical to this great nation. I repeat it, South Africa will be to England what Algiers is to France. App. No. 3.

I now come to a third point, about which the Committee appeared to me to be peculiarly solicitous; viz., the cause of the emigration of the boors subsequent to the war of 1835. After stating the true causes in my evidence, I gave, as I now again give, the most direct denial to the assertion that the Glenelg system did in the remotest degree produce, increase, or accelerate that emigration. First, it was pretended that rumours of the intended reversal of the D'Urban system had produced emigration, and next, that the restoration of the Adelaide province to the Kafirs was the cause; and some addresses were scraped together from factious and ignorant men to give some likelihood to these assertions. I proceed to prove both assertions to be utterly unfounded, mainly by Sir B. D'Urban's own documents.

It is quite notorious that long before anything was known in the colony of Lord Glenelg or his views, whole clans and neighbourhoods were beginning to sell off and move; and it is equally notorious that the boors were perfectly indifferent about the Adelaide province; that they openly declared that they would not live in it; that they went away expressly to get rid both of the English Government and of the Kafirs, and that they would seek land towards the north, beyond the Orange River.

As early as the 16th October 1835, within one month after the D'Urban treaties, thus long before the Home Government as much as knew of these treaties and the system founded thereon, such was the state of excitement and discontent among the boors that an influential military officer was sent to try to pacify them, as appears by page 246 of the Blue Book of the 12th July 1837.

Before the 13th August 1836 (about four months before the introduction of the Glenelg system), the said excitement and discontent had risen to such a pitch, and emigration was going on at such a rate, that the Attorney-general of the colony was appealed to by Sir B. D'Urban, and gave it as his opinion that the emigrating boors "evidently mean to seek their fortunes in another land, and to consider themselves no longer British subjects, so far as the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is considered; would it therefore be prudent or just, even if it were possible, to prevent persons discontented with their condition to try to better themselves in whatever part of the world they please? The same sort of removal takes place every day from Great Britain to the United States." And farther on, "Is there any effectual means of arresting persons determined to run away, short of shooting them as they pass the boundary line? I apprehend not; and if so, the remedy is worse than the disease; the Government, therefore, if I am correct in my conclusions, is and must ever remain without the power of effectually preventing the evil, if evil it be."

The unfortunate Retief was named by one of the honourable Members of the Committee. With reference to him I need only quote the following passage of my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 27th September 1836: "Previous to my leaving Balfour, the Field-commandant, Pret Retief, met me and informed me that a number of inhabitants of his division had made up their minds to emigrate from  
the

App. No. 3. the colony, but were wavering in hopes of a change in the present state of affairs. Their grievances he represented to be, that the country was swarming with armed blacks of all sorts, as Fingoes, Mantatees, Tambookies, Kafirs, &c.; that by these they were every day plundered of the little left them or acquired by them after the war; that the present frontier system afforded no prospect of protection for the future, and that they lost all hopes of being compensated for their losses." This same Retief told me on a subsequent occasion when I rebuked him for keeping up agitation, that it was impossible to submit to the actual state of things; that peace had been begged of and made with the Kafirs, leaving them in full possession of the property plundered from the colonists; that even in violation of a positive published pledge that the treaty should not be ratified before the Kafirs had surrendered all the fire-arms in their possession, the ratification had taken place without any, the least, such surrender, and that therefore he was determined to collect a force and go and take said property and fire-arms from the Kafirs, in defiance of the peace and the treaty. My warning to him need not be repeated here, but he soon after wrote to Captain Armstrong two letters, dated 9th and 12th October 1836, containing similar threats. These letters were transmitted by Captain Armstrong to the Commandant of Kaffraria, who handed them to me, complaining that Retief "was making himself extremely troublesome." *Vide* my despatch to the Governor, dated 20th March 1837.

Moreover, the following facts, taken from a Graham's Town paper, I pledge myself to prove, viz.: "In the statement of grievances laid before the local authorities by Mr. Retief, there is no allusion whatever to any supposed, rumoured, or contemplated change of frontier policy. The numerous body of farmers whose grievances he enumerated had not heard of any. The grievances under which they laboured were not theoretical, prospective, or speculative, but real, direct, and positive evils."

There then, I suppose, is an end of the long encouraged and oft repeated fraud that the Glenelg measures either produced or in the least increased the poor emigration; and I may close this point with observing that the impartial part of mankind will judge whether, after the above opinion of the attorney-general, publicly proclaimed by the Governor and Lieutenant-governor of that day, and after the assurance given the emigrants by the present Governor, Sir H. Smith, that unless a majority of at least four out of five should volunteer to submit to British rule, they should not be interfered with,—the treatment which these men have since received as "rebels and as traitors" be fair and honourable, and whether a refusal of the oft-demanded investigation of their case be consistent with Englishmen's ideas of justice.

On other matters I can afford to be brief; it is only necessary to refer to the dates of my letters in the Colonial Office in Downing-street. By my communications of the 15th November 1847, 12th February 1848, 21st February 1848, 10th June 1848, 26th August 1848, (three of the same date,) 9th October 1848, 15th May 1849, 22nd May 1849, 1st August 1849, and 11th August 1849, I was, by the force of circumstances, compelled to make representations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, relative to certain transactions connected

connected with the political state of South Africa and the frontier tribes. I was reluctantly drawn from my retirement in private life into these disagreeable controversies; but I have duties towards my Sovereign and the land of my birth, where I have every farthing of my property in jeopardy. I had consequently a right to complain and appeal, and from a public duty I have never shrunk. I am thoroughly convinced that if the said representations had been inquired into, if redress had been given and justice had been done, the calamities which have since befallen my unfortunate country would have been prevented, and the British exchequer might have saved a million or two to facilitate the reduction of taxes. I was informed that the Secretary of State was determined "not to assist in the continuance of a controversy which can only be injurious to the public interests." A public investigation which might have saved South Africa was thus contemptuously refused, whereas I have lately been informed that secret and underhand evidence was collected at the Cape, militating against my statements, and forwarded to Downing-street without the slightest notice or reference to myself.

On such dealings my sentiments are known, and what the character of the said secret and underhand evidence may be can be imagined from the malicious calumny which appears in page 126 of the Blue Book of the 20th March 1851, where the Cape secretary to Government accuses the "farmers, principally the Dutch," with "determined and dogged inactivity;" whereas everything effectual that has been as yet done against the enemy has been accomplished by these very farmers, whose "inactivity," if it had existed, would have been easily accounted for by the unredressed ill-treatment which they received during the former war, and whose loyal zeal to assist in the struggle was restrained by the very Government which now goads them by slander, and did not shrink from patronising and encouraging the most infamous and disgraceful libels against some of the most loyal of Her Majesty's subjects, amongst which was not the least, that I had used my influence to prevent the boors from taking the field. Similar calumnies indeed swarm in some of the late Blue Books, of which even the Prime Minister of England condescended to avail himself in an attack which he made in the House of Commons upon four men who believe they did their duty in resisting despotism and jobbing. I hope, therefore, and pray most fervently, that the present Committee, on whose proceedings the fate of millions may depend, will be the means of dragging to light the above documents, public as well as secret and underhand, or at least of causing the investigation here begun to be continued there, where so many witnesses must be heard, if indeed truth be the object; where not only the Englishman and the Dutchman, but the Hottentot and the Griqua, the Kafir and the Tambookie, the Bassuto and the Coranna, the emigrant and the resident, may be heard in his own defence.

I conclude with a brief reference to some questions pressed by the Colonial Under-Secretary, as to my opinion of the failings of the Cape colonists with reference to the aboriginal tribes; and I deliberately state, with appeal to my evidence before the Committee of 1835 and 1836, that I believe the Cape community, like all others, to be composed of good and bad; that there are men there as bad as bad can be, who would with heart and soul hail a mandate for extermination, and rejoice in war as long as it is profitable to themselves; but these



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I have, &c.

(signed) *A. Stockenström.*

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#### AMATOLA MOUNTAINS:

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2. *Impracticability of clearing the Amatola Mountains, and making them the Boundary of the Frontier.*

##### 1. *Importance of the Amatolas being cleared of the Kafir Tribes as a Means of finishing the War:*

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##### 2. *Impracticability of clearing the Amatola Mountains, and making them the Boundary of the Frontier:*

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*Assagais.* Those Kafirs who are not armed with guns use the assagais, a kind of spear, which is a very formidable weapon, *Bissett* 875-877.

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*Barbarians.* See *Border Tribes.*

*Barbarity.* The Kafirs never take a prisoner or give quarter; they slay all that fall into their hands, *Bissett* 990—Acts of very great cruelty were exercised by the Kafirs on the male population at the outbreak of the war; but the missionaries were unmolested except in one instance, that of Mr. Niven, *Renton* 3106-3112—Evidence as to their barbarous treatment of their prisoners; they have of late years been increasingly barbarous to their male prisoners, but they show lenity to women and children, *ib.* 3371, 3372. 3469-3476.

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*Biddulph, Mr.* Observations upon Mr. Biddulph's Report upon the Kat River settlement, *Renton* 3144-3155—This report, in which he represented the inhabitants of the settlement as a worthless and immoral class of people;

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See also *Kat River Settlement, 1. Magistrates, 1. Timber Tax.*

*Bissett, Major John Jarvis.* (Analysis of his Evidence.) Has resided at the Cape all his life; belongs to the Cape Mounted Rifles; left the colony on 1 April 1851, having received a wound at the beginning of the Kafir affair, 732-737—Witness conceives that the chiefs made the late outbreak with a view of regaining their power, which they were gradually losing, 740. 749. 767.—Witness attributes the recent outbreak to the want of sufficient military power to keep the Kafirs in awe; it was very unfortunate that the military force had been reduced, 740-745. 748—Witness is confident that the Gaika Kafirs would not have entered upon the war had not they been sure of the co-operation of the Kat River Hottentots; cause of the defection of the Kat River settlers, 746, 747—Opinion that there will never be peace for the colony as long as the Kafirs are allowed to occupy the Amatolas; they ought to be expelled altogether, and pushed over the Kei, 750-769. 780-798. 839. 917-923—Witness does not think the reason of the Gaika tribes rising has been the fear of expulsion from their territory, 766. 770, 771.

The influence of superstition is very great among the Kafirs; this is very much made use of by the chiefs for political and any bad purposes, 772-774. 893-898—It would be very desirable after the expulsion of the hostile tribes from Kafirland to bring about a more dense settlement of the people there; people, for agricultural purposes, might be located there to any extent, 775-778—The Amatola ridge might have a military post upon it, but it is not capable of military defence except by having an open country to the east of it, 779—The great difficulties in Kafir warfare are the bush and the mountains; expelling the tribes from the Amatola would give the British troops a great advantage, 798, 799. 976-980—Necessity for a large military force for the protection of the frontier should the Kafirs be driven beyond the Kei, 800, 801. 957-962. 981-986.

Manner in which the chiefs of the various tribes acquire their position as chiefs; with most tribes it is an hereditary office, 802—The Kafirs have lately become much more formidable enemies compared with what they were by the possession of fire-arms and horses, 803-805. 816, 817. 848. 1001-1009—Impossibility for some years to come of doing without the presence of a considerable regular military force upon the frontier; it would be impossible to trust altogether or mainly to the settlers for the defence of the frontier, 806-811. 967-962—Employment of the Kafirs as a police force in the colony; in the character of policeman the experiment answered very well, but it failed when this country was engaged in a war against their nation; they went over to the enemy on the very first attack, 812-815—Witness considers the Kat River settlement as a collection of all the bad coloured people in the whole of the provinces; opinion that



Report, 1851—*continued.*

*Bissett, Major John Jarvis.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Colonel Somerset in breaking up that settlement would do a very politic and wise thing, 818-827. 940-947.

Opinion that instead of recruiting the Cape corps with recruits from the Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this country who would serve in the colony and become military colonists, 827. 833-838. 924-227—The Hottentots cannot now be as much depended on as troops in our service as they were formerly, 828, 829—Satisfactory manner in which the civil appointments in the colony and on the frontier are filled; no irritation has been occasioned by the conduct of any of the magistrates, 830-832—How far it would be possible to defend the chain of the Amatolas by a chain of military posts along the mountains, 839-847—Remarks as to the way in which the Kafirs are supplied with fire-arms and ammunition; impossibility of preventing their introduction into Kafirland, 848-855.

Witness does not think that the effect of the influence of the missionaries upon the natives of Kafirland has any tendency to civilize them, 856-858. 975—Existence of an anti-government feeling on the part of the boers at the colony, arising in a great degree from the late convict question, 859, 860—Much practical inconvenience arises from the distance at which Cape Town is from the eastern frontier; it would be very advisable to transfer the seat of government, 861-868—Observations relative to the emigration of the Dutch settlers; large number that have crossed the Vaal and gone to the north, where they are totally independent of our sovereignty; witness does not consider there is any possibility of stopping them and making them defend the frontier, 870-874—Those Kafirs who are not armed with guns use the assagais, a kind of spear which is a very formidable weapon, 875-877-1

Impossibility of the Kafirs manufacturing powder; if it were possible to prevent the exportation of powder and fire-arms to them it would put a stop to further war, 878-884. 1006-1009—There is no doubt that the Kafir population generally were satisfied with the policy pursued towards them; the discontent is on the part of the chiefs, who feel their power declining from the advance of civilization and the restraints of law, 885-888. 906-920—On the event of the Kafirs being driven from the Amatola district, across the Kei, they would find ample land for pastoral purposes, 889, 890. 933—In the event of the removal of the principal chiefs of the Kafirs who have been the cause of the present discontent, and the people driven over the Kei, it would be advisable to place commissioners to see them located, 891—Cultivation of the land by the Kafirs; nature of the traffic carried on with the traders; the sale of gunpowder has never been traced to the traders, 899-905.

There is no actual recognition of property rights among the Kafir chiefs; they move from one place to another as suits their convenience, 929-933—The tribes which are friendly to this country should not be removed from Kafirland, as that would be a breach of faith, 934-939—Witness is not aware that the Kat River settlers have had any reason to complain of the conduct of the government or of particular magistrates, 948-950—Opinion that the political excitement which has been going on among the white people

Report, 1851—*continued.*

*Bissett, Major John Jarvis.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

people in the colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives, 951, 952—Explanation as to the present character of the military occupation of the country of British Kafiraria; insufficiency of such occupation up to this time, 953-956.

Necessity for the Kafirs being conquered before any proper system of defence could be put up; the last war was never completely finished or the present war would not have occurred, 962-965—Provided Kafirland be peopled by a white population when the natives are driven out, they would require to be protected by means of forts, 966-972—Surprise expressed by the Kafirs at the shooting of the rifle brigade, 973, 974—Impossibility of the regular troops carrying on the war with efficiency with their present equipments, 976-978—Opinion that the policy adopted by Sir Harry Smith in the government of the colony has been very beneficial, and has afforded great protection to the farmer and settler within the whole boundary, and has been the means of saving the colony much loss and devastation, 987-989.

The Kafirs never take a prisoner or give quarter; they slay all that fall into their hands, 990—In witness's opinion the Kei is a much more defensible frontier than any we have yet occupied; the most defensible boundary is an open space in which cavalry can act, 991-1005—Circumstances which led to the late unexpected outbreak; the British troops meeting a reverse at first, numbers went into the war who would not perhaps otherwise have joined it, 1010.

*Blacks.* See *Coloured Races.*

*Blinkwater.* Copy of memorandum of a conference with the insurgents at Blinkwater on 9 January, this document being sent to Major-general Somerset by Cobus Forie, then field cornet, and subsequently field commandant of the district; this conference was held with the rebels when making known to them the offer of pardon from his Excellency, *Renton* 3206-3218—Account in this memorandum of what passed between Mr. Read, jun. and the rebels, as well as what passed on the part of the other individuals who accompanied the field cornet, and the sentiments by which at that time the rebels were actuated, *ib.* 3207-3218.

*Blockdrift.* See *Surveys.*

*Boers.* Evidence showing that the defence of the frontier by the boers is a much more effective system than the operation of regular troops; but witness would be sorry to see the system re-established, *A. Smith* 376-385—Existence of an anti-government feeling on the part of the boers at the colony, arising in a great degree from the late convict question, *Bissett* 859, 860—The emigrant boers are at present very quiet, but they are in a very discontented and excited state; they feel themselves very much aggrieved, and they are very anxious to have the causes of their late collisions with the Government most minutely investigated, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1483 *et seq.*—As things have turned out, witness considers the wisest plan would be not to meddle with them at all, but that as long as they commit no injury or outrage upon the colony,

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*Boers*—continued.

we should not take any notice of what they do in other respects, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1485-1510—Great dislike of the natives round Natal to the Dutch boers; they prefer the British authority and settlers infinitely before the Dutch farmers, *T. C. Smith* 2327-2329.

See also *Commando System*, 1. *Defence of the Frontier*. *Disaffection*. *Emigration*. *Griquas*, 2. *Military Force*, 2. *Representative Government*.

*Border Tribes*. Witness has had abundant opportunities of forming an opinion on the subject of the policy pursued by this country with respect to the border tribes upon the frontier of the colony, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1255—There is no doubt the border tribes are just barbarians, who will plunder, and require to be kept tight, *ib.* 1256—The customs of the various tribes are very nearly similar to one another; there are some slight modifications, *A. Smith* 2103, 2104—Way in which they arrange disputes that arise between themselves, *ib.* 2105.—See also *Boundaries*. *Frontier Tribes*.

*Boundaries*. The Kafir boundary is very accurately defined as far as the course of the river is concerned; the Kafirs have a ready capacity for making boundary lines; the boundary has been distinctly marked out from time to time by the Government and the chiefs together, *Freeman* 161-165—The old boundary of the colony was the Fish River, *ib.* 176, 177—The Kafirs at that time occupied what is now called the neutral or ceded territory, *ib.* 178—At that time there were constant depredations and disturbances upon the boundary, *ib.* 179—Difficulty of defining the boundary of each tribe; statement of the nearest approximation witness can give, *A. Smith* 2058-2067—Opinion that a boundary, except for legal purposes, is not wanted at all; as a military question it leads to difficulties of all kinds, *Owen* 2619-2621.

See also *Amatola Mountains*. *Buffalo River*. *Colonial Office*. *Frontier Boundary*. *Kei River*. *Keiskamma*. *Neutral Territory*.

*Bowker, Mr.* See *Magistrates*, 1.

*British Influence*. See *Chiefs*, 3.

*British Power*. The grand point in the present state of affairs will be to prove the indomitable superiority of the British power; but the question as to what is to be done after this is a very grave and difficult question; much must depend upon the way in which the war is put down, *Renton* 3075-3079.

See also *Kafir War*, 4. *Military Force*, 1. *Policy of the Government*.

*British Troops*. In the defence of the frontier it is desirable to rely as much as possible on British troops, *Owen* 2626.—See also *Military Force*.

*Buffalo River*. There is a tribe of Kafirs which continues friendly, between King William's Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River, but it is a very small tribe, *Fairbairn* 577—The Buffalo River, as a boundary, would require more troops for its defence than the Kei, and it would not be complete without the Amatolas in our possession, *Sir P. Maitland* 2909, 2941—If it is considered desirable that Sir Harry Smith should establish the Buffalo River as the frontier boundary he should be allowed sufficient troops for the purpose;

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*Buffalo River*—continued.

pose; there can be no objection to our taking possession of the country to the Buffalo River on the ground of justice to the Kafirs, they having been the aggressors should be punished by the loss of territory, *Sir P. Maitland* 2931-2955.

*Bush Fighting.* The great difficulties in Kafir warfare are the bush and the mountains; expelling the tribes from the Amatolas would give the British troops a great advantage, *Bissett* 798, 799. 976-980—The country generally is very favourable to their mode of fighting; there is a great deal of bush fighting, *A. Smith* 2075-2077.

*Bushmen.* Witness was stationed at the Cape of Good Hope for sixteen years, on the medical staff of the army, and during part of the time was employed confidentially by different governors in reference to the frontier tribes, the Kafirs and bushmen, *A. Smith* 262—Witness was employed with the object of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the local government, and to ascertain whether, at least as far as regards the bushmen, they were contented or discontented with that policy; this was in the north part of the colony, towards the Orange River, *ib.* 263-270.

## C.

*Cape Corps.* Opinion that, instead of recruiting the Cape corps with recruits from the Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this country, who would serve in the colony and become military colonists, *Bissett* 827. 833-838. 924-927—Disaffection among the Hottentots in the Cape corps; great advantage of sending European troops to the Cape; it might be advantageous to form a regiment partly of Europeans and partly of Hottentots, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1561-1564—Too much reliance has been placed upon the Hottentot Cape corps; the greater proportion of the regiments should be European, a few Hottentots being attached thereto as guides, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2733-2736—Witness always had a good opinion of the Cape Rifle corps; there must have been some delusion practised to mislead the Hottentots, *Sir P. Maitland* 2988, 2989.—See also *Hottentots*.

*Cape Mounted Rifles.* The Cape Mounted Rifles consist nearly entirely of Hottentots; they have always behaved well up to the present war; now a number of them have deserted, and suspicion has fallen upon the whole body; witness is unable to account for their conduct, *Fairbairn* 443-445—The disaffection among the Cape Mounted Rifles did not show itself till after the breaking out of the war; previously much reliance was placed upon them, *ib.* 578-580.

*Cape Mounted Police.* See *Police*

*Cape Town.* See *Seat of Government*.

*Cattle.* Remarks relative to the great pride taken by the Kafir chiefs in their possession of large herds of cattle, *Adamson* 1101-1105.

See also *Droughts*.

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**Cattle Stealing.** The love of marauding and cattle stealing is a strong passion among the Kafirs, *A. Smith* 359—But if they could once be got to think that it was as honourable to find subsistence by other means than their forefathers adopted there would be a great change wrought, *ib.* 359, 360—Sir G. Napier considered that one of the principal causes of the predatory habits of the Kafirs was, that they attach no sort of idea of disgrace to theft, *Sir A. Stockenström* 2002—He therefore proposed to punish them for such offences, with a view to degrade them in the eyes of their tribe, *ib.*—In witness's opinion any punishment would do provided it went through the regular channel, *ib.*

The great cause of cattle stealing has arisen from the want of sufficient firmness in the Government in not insisting on immediate reparation being made by the chiefs, *T. C. Smith* 2352—Inconvenience of the ceded territory being occupied by Kafirs, as it brings them close to our border, and they cannot resist the temptation to steal the cattle, *Sir P. Maitland* 2923—Witness's objections to Europeans being allowed to establish cattle farms on the frontier are the great temptation which they offer to the Kafirs, *ib.* 2939-2950—Almost all the employment of the Kafirs, in their heathen state, is stealing cattle; it is considered an honourable employment, *Renton* 3370.

See also *Chiefs*, 2. *Commando System*, 1. *Servants*.

**Ceded Territory.** The Kat River settlement is in what is called the ceded territory; but witness has great doubts whether it ever was ceded by treaty with the British Government; grounds on which witness considers it neutral territory, *Freeman* 41-48. 183-185—From such information as witness could gather, he has always thought that upon the whole it was a wise policy to occupy this neutral territory, and to give the Hottentots the occupation of it, *ib.* 49-53. 64-71. 144-149—But still witness thinks something more should have done to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the Kafirs who were excluded, and especially of the chief Maquomo; he ought to have been provided for more distinctly, *ib.* 49, 50. 141-149—A distinct provision being made for the necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have secured more fidelity and more affection on their part, *ib.*

The effect of this location was, no doubt, to bring the Hottentots more immediately into contact with their fiercer and more warlike neighbours, the Kafirs, and many depredations were committed on the settlers, *Freeman* 54-57. 61—But there was no serious crime committed till that particular case which led to the late war in 1846-47, which Sir Peregrine Maitland took up; viz., the murder of a Hottentot constable; a Kafir was also killed, *ib.* 58-60. 62, 63—Extent of the district which witness considers has been improperly added to the ceded territory, *Sir A. Stockenström*, 1459-1472.

See also *Boundaries*. *Cattle Stealing*. *Kat River Settlement*, 1.

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**CHIEFS:**

1. *Generally.*
2. *Complaints of the Chiefs as to their being held responsible for the Depredations of their Tribes.*
3. *How far the diminished Influence of the Chiefs has led to their inciting the People to War.*
4. *Recommendation that the Chiefs should be removed, and other Authorities appointed in their stead.*
5. *Extent to which the Authority of the Chiefs should be upheld.*

1. *Generally:*

State of feeling of the chiefs in relation to each other, as to their territories and tribes; constant state of internal dissension existing, *Adamson* 698—Manner in which the chiefs of the various tribes acquire their position as chiefs; with most tribes it is an hereditary office, *Bissett* 802—Witness would not interfere with the domestic affairs of the Kafirs except through their chiefs, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1264-1266. 1331-1341—Great advantage would result from the British Government making small allowances to the chiefs as long as they maintained good order among their people and prevented depredations, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1541, 1542. 1551-1554. 1691—Witness believes that the Kafirs when honestly and justly dealt with are inclined to be friendly, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1946-1953.

2. *Complaints of the Chiefs as to their being held responsible for the Depredations of their Tribes:*

Witness, in his time, has had personal intercourse with every chief in Kafirland, *A. Smith* 293—They made many special complaints to witness; nature of these complaints, *ib.* 294 *et seq.*—They were always complaining of the Government holding them responsible for the thieving which went on among their tribes, notwithstanding that they had not the power of restraining it, *ib.* 295, 296—This was the great complaint of Gaika when he was appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium of communication between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound to restore all stolen cattle and so on, *ib.* 295-300.

The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect for the chief, but nothing beyond that; if he exacts anything from his subjects which is not agreeable to the whole body, he has no certain means of enforcing it, *A. Smith* 295—Opinion that everything ought to be done through the chiefs; there is no doubt that the chiefs have sufficient authority over the tribes to prevent their committing depredations, and they should be held responsible for the acts of their tribes, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1523-1525. 1533. 1658, 1659—It is witness's opinion that the policy to be pursued with the Kafirs should be one of great decision and firmness in putting down and restraining their thefts from the colonists; the chiefs should be held responsible for the cattle stolen, *T. C. Smith* 2336-2352—In the event of depredations continuing the chiefs should be compelled to make restitution and pay a just fine, *Sir P. Maitland* 2876.

3. *How*

Report, 1851—continued.

CHIEFS—continued.

3. *How far the diminished Influence of the Chiefs has led to their inciting the People to War :*

Witness conceives that the chiefs made the late outbreak with a view of regaining their power, which they were gradually losing, *Bissett* 740. 749. 767—There is no doubt that the Kafir population generally were satisfied with the policy pursued towards them; the discontent is on the part of the chiefs who feel their power declining, from the advance of civilization and the restraints of law, *ib.* 885-888. 906-920—Formerly the authority of the chiefs in Kafirland was so complete over the Kafirs generally that they might be held justly responsible to the English Government for the conduct, both public and private, of the Kafirs connected with them; witness does not know how this may be now; the power which the chief has in concurrence with his council is very great, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1342-1356. 1360-1362.

It is witness's firm opinion that the chiefs do possess great influence over their tribes, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1543-1546. 1548-1550. 1590-1592—Opinion that the diminution of the authority of the chiefs had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Kafir war in 1846, *T. C. Smith* 2333, 2334—Witness considers the outbreak to have been principally the work of the chiefs acting upon the people, *Renton* 3041-3043—Witness has no doubt that the chiefs among the Kafirs were dissatisfied with the existing state of things in consequence of their diminished influence; but the great bulk of the people were sensible of their improved condition arising from British influence, *ib.* 3037.

4. *Recommendation that the Chiefs should be removed, and other Authorities appointed in their stead*

It appears to witness that it would be almost necessary, for the advancement of civilization, that the native chiefs should be got rid of or reduced as quickly as possible, and that some other authorities of better character should be substituted in their places, *Adamson* 680-682—Even in cases of warfare the effects of the warfare should be considered as having an influence on the stations of the chiefs alone, and not of the people who have been under their direction, *ib.* 680—Evidence relative to the mode in which witness would recommend that this plan should be carried out; great advantages which would result therefrom, *ib.* 683-697.—In witness's plan for removing the native chiefs and appointing magistrates to their authority he had no idea as to the missionaries taking any part or interest in the matter, *ib.* 709—The seizure and removal of the leading chiefs who have been active in the war, whilst the rights of the people were respected, would facilitate the means of producing industrial pursuits, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2792-2797.

5. *Extent to which the Authority Chiefs should be upheld :*

The native chiefs should not be interfered with while they remain at peace, but in the event of war they should be removed from their authority, *Adamson* 690. 696, 697—The authority of the chiefs should be upheld, they being allowed to govern the people by their own laws, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1602-1604. 1628, 1629—As long as the Kafir chiefs are peaceful neighbours witness would recognise their authority, but not the complete independence which is recognized

CHIEFS—continued.

5. *Extent to which the Authority of the Chiefs, &c.*—continued,

recognized in a civilized power, *Owen* 2624—Opinion that the chiefs should not be hereditary, but should be appointed by, and hold their authority from, the Governor; they should be invested with magisterial authority under a civil commissioner, *Sir P. Maitland* 2878-2882.

See also *Cattle Stealing*. *Ceded Territory*. *Civil Commissioners*.  
*Cotton Cultivation*. *Depredations*. *Government Grants*. *Kafir Wars*, 1. 4. *Kei River*. *Kreli, Chief*. *Local Government*.  
*Missionaries*, 2. 4. *Moshesh*. *Policy of the Government*, 2. *Rights of Property*. *Superstition*. *Treaties*. *Wandering Tribes*.  
*Zoolus*.

*Christianity*. The Kafirs are generally without any belief in a future state; the missionaries have not been very successful, in point of numbers, in inducing Kafirs to embrace Christianity, *Adamson* 1050-1052—The colonial connexion has been hurtful and not beneficial to the progress of Christian missions, *Renton* 3081-3085.

*Civil Appointments*. Satisfactory manner in which the civil appointments in the colony and on the frontier are filled; no irritation has been occasioned by the conduct of any of the magistrates, *Bissett* 830-832.

*Civil Commissioners*. In the event of the removal of the principal chiefs of the Kafirs, who have been the cause of the present discontent, and the people driven over the Kei, it would be advisable to place commissioners to see them located, *Bissett* 891—Impossibility of protecting the frontier without a large military force; the appointment of civil commissioners would be useless, *T. C. Smith* 2361, 2362—Opinion that the magistrates or rather the civil commissioners who have been appointed over the Kafirs have most admirably discharged their duties in at once maintaining what is due to the British authority and doing justice to the natives, *Renton* 3237-3244.—See also *Chiefs*, 5. *Magistrates*.

CIVILIZATION:

1. *How far the Efforts of the Missionaries have been successful in civilizing the Kafirs.*
  2. *Opinions that their Civilization is impracticable.*
1. *How far the Efforts of the Missionaries have been successful in civilizing the Kafirs:*

The general effect of the missionary labours at the Cape has been considerably to advance the natives in moral qualifications and in civilization, *Adamson* 667, 668—Witness does not think that the effect of the influence of the missionaries upon the natives of Kafirland has any tendency to civilize them, *Bissett* 856-858. 975—It is possible that the Kafirs might be civilized so that treaties might be made with them, but it would require ten years to effect the change in their habits, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2719, 2720—Success which has generally attended the efforts of the missionaries in South Africa, and with the assistance of intelligent missionaries and schoolmasters it might be possible to civilize the Kafirs, *ib.* 2785-2791. 2805—It does not appear that the character or conduct of the Kafirs has improved since 1838; they are still



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**CIVILIZATION**—continued.

1. *How far the Efforts of the Missionaries, &c.*—continued.

still as depredatory and uncivilized, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2844-2846—The missionaries have not been successful in their labours to improve and civilize the Kafirs, *Sir P. Maitland* 2990-2993.

2. *Opinions that their Civilization is impracticable :*

Impossibility of civilizing the Kafirs; it is witness's opinion that they will never be much better than they are, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1521—Witness does not believe any attempt to civilize the Kafirs would be successful, *Owen* 2625—Very little advance has been made towards civilization among the Kafirs; they have very little disposition to enter into the pursuits of commerce, *Sir P. Maitland* 2890-2894. 2971-2973.

See also *Chiefs*, 4. *Depredations*. *Griquas*.

*Climate*. Evidence as to the general good climate and fertility of the soil of Kafirland; the country is more fertile than any portion of the Cape colony proper, *Adamson* 1045-1049—Evidence relative to the climate, soil, and general agricultural capacity of the Cape colony and British Kafirland; it would present a good field for colonization if attention were paid to irrigation, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2763-2775.—See also *Natal*.

*Coal Fields*. Existence of extensive coal fields in the northern sovereignty; importance of this circumstance, which may ultimately become of great economic value, *Adamson* 680. 1088.

*Collisions*. From what witness knows of the character of the Kafirs he thinks it possible that the establishment of a form of government will be sufficient to prevent collisions taking place between the settlers and the Kafirs, *Fairbairn* 567.—See also *Boers*.

*Colonial Office*. Whatever may be the opinion of the different governors of the Cape as to the frontier, the boundary is determined entirely by the Home Government; no steps can be taken independently of the Colonial Office, *Sir P. Maitland* 2997, 2998.

*Colonists*. It is desirable to have some surveillance over the dealings of the colonists with the Kafirs as a means of preserving peace, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1650-1654—Speaking of the wars of 1846-47, and of everything that has occurred since, witness draws a broad distinction between the colonists and the Government; witness considers them the acts of the Government and not of the colonists, *Sir A. Stockenström* 3300.

See also *Commando System*, 1. *Compensation*. *Constitutional Government*. *Europeans*. *Kafir Wars*, 5. *Kat River Settlement*, 4. *Neutral Territory*. *Treaties*, 2.

*Colonization*. See *Climate*.

*Coloured Races*. There are two classes of persons in the colony; those who take what witness would call a just and benevolent and liberal view of the question, and who would endeavour to raise and improve the coloured races, *Freeman*

Report, 1851—continued.

*Coloured Races*—continued.

*Freeman* 110—And there are others who deem them utterly incapable of improvement, and would sweep them from their land entirely, *ib.*—Witness presumes that the coloured race within the limits of the British colony are increasing in number, but there are no statistics on the subject which can be depended upon, *ib.* 111, 112—It is one of the greatest misfortunes that could have happened, to have called in the blacks to our assistance, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1258, 1259.

The desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in a settlement by themselves is a very difficult and a very momentous question, especially in the existing state of sentiment throughout the colony, but witness hesitates very greatly about the expediency of this course, *Renton* 3227, 3228—It seems to witness to be desirable if society is to be amalgamated, that there should be a general diffusion of all the classes who are to unite in such amalgamation, and that there should be as general a similarity of treatment as possible, all understanding and enjoying the rights that are common to all *ib.* 3229—There is no doubt that in parts of the colony great prejudices exist against the coloured races on the part of the whites in the colony, *ib.* 3230-3233.

See also *Europeans. Griquas. Kat River Settlement, 4. Magistrates, 2.*

**COMMANDO SYSTEM :**

1. *Opinions in favour of the Commando System; how far expedient to revive it.*
  2. *Objections to the Commando System.*
1. *Opinions in favour of the Commando System; how far expedient to revive it.*

After the old commando system had been abandoned, the belief was both on the part of the authorities of Cape town and also throughout the colony, that the robberies had greatly increased, *A. Smith* 276-279—Witness was for investing the frontier emigrants with a kind of summary power of redress in the event of depredations on their cattle; there was no locally organized force, nor was there any disposition to form one, *ib.* 280-288. 289, 290—They depended on the field-cornets collecting their people; sometimes they answered to the summons of the field-cornets with alacrity, and sometimes they did not, *ib.* 282, 283. 288-290—Witness would say that the loss of life and property was greater before the commando system was totally abolished than it has been since, *ib.* 373-385.

Evidence generally with respect to the commando system formerly adopted in the colony; witness cannot see any material difference between that and the existing system, *Fairbairn* 472-501—Witness has no doubt that a great deal of blood arose under the commando system, but not so much as under the new system of frontier protection, *ib.* 500, 501—It would not be acceptable to the general body of the colonists to revive the old commando system; they would not like to be called suddenly out, *ib.* 502—The colonists would prefer a regular paid military force always maintained for the

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**COMMANDO SYSTEM**—continued.

1. *Opinions in favour of the Commando System, &c.*—continued.

protection of the colony, not of the nature of a volunteer force, *Fairbairn* 502-509. 592—Independent of the maintenance of a regular force, witness would have the old system continued of making it necessary for the inhabitants when called upon by the proper authorities to turn out with their arms and assist in repelling their enemies, *ib.* 509. 592-594.

Upon receiving the colony from the Dutch, the burghers were allowed to defend themselves without any military interference, *A. Smith* 2151—The commando system was stopped in General Burke's time in 1827; opinion that the commando system is not of much use as a means of protection for the frontier, *ib.* 2152-2163—Evidence generally relative to the commando system formerly adopted; opinion that that system is more humane in the aggregate than the present system, which ends in these bloody wars, *Owen* 2497-2522—In ordinary depredations committed along the frontier, witness would depend upon the individual settlers, who should have permission to defend themselves, and execute summary justice on the robbers; they being supported for a time by a military force, *ib.* 2567-2575. 2622, 2623. 2644—Thriving and flourishing condition of the frontier under the old commando system; the result of that system being done away with was a war, *Sir. J. E. Alexander* 2737-2743—Great inconvenience to the farmers and herdsmen on the frontier of the rules in force up to 1838 for the recovery of stolen cattle; necessity of the farmers making oath before a magistrate before any proceedings could be taken to recover the cattle, *ib.* 2809-2829.

2. *Objections to the Commando System:*

At the time the old boundary of the colony was the Fish River, there were constant depredations upon the frontier, *Freeman* 179—These depredations were repressed by the commando system which had prevailed under the Dutch government; this led to very great abuses and involved constant wrongs, *ib.* 180, 181—The establishment of a neutral territory was made with a view to put an end to this system, *ib.* 182. 196, 197—After the establishment of this neutral territory Maquomo was again allowed to come in and the depredations and disturbances were revived; this led to the driving of Maquomo from territory, *ib.* 183-195.

See also *Kafir Wars*, 1. *Patrol System*.

*Commercial Pursuits.* See *Civilization*, 2.

*Commissioners.* See *Civil Commissioners.* *Commission of Inquiry.* *Special Commissioner.*

*Commission of Inquiry.* Grounds on which witness maintains firmly, that without a commission deputed to the Cape, totally unconnected with the colony, or any party therein, to examine the numbers of witnesses of opposite opinions and interests, whom it is almost impossible to bring over to this country, the British Government and Legislature will never be able to ascertain the true causes of the disaffection, disturbances, and wars at present raging at the Cape, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1255—And that they will never be able to do justice unless a free constitutional government be granted to that colony

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*Commission of Inquiry*—continued.

colony, whose local knowledge and public scrutiny would render all mystifications at least very difficult, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1255—Witness does not believe that this Committee will ever get to the bottom of this rebellion without a most minute investigation on the spot of all the parties, and particularly the missionaries, who risked their lives, and stayed among them, and made every sacrifice to keep them within bounds, *ib.* 1979, 1980—It appears to witness that an Imperial or Parliamentary Commission from this country, composed of men of capacity and high character, entirely removed from all colonial local influence, and with ample power to call parties and documents before them, who should thoroughly and impartially, on the spot, investigate facts, is most desirable, if not most necessary to the end of truth and justice, *Renton* 3247-3258—Witness considers such a commission would give satisfaction to the Kafirs, and would command their respect, *ib.* 3249, 3250. 3253-3258.

See also *Griquas*, 3.

*Compensation.* Such a plan as is proposed for compensation by the Government for losses incurred by the colonists upon the frontier is not advisable, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 2001—Explanation as to the treatment of the population in and after the war of 1835-36, and 1846-47, when the sacrifices and services were the greatest, and no compensation was made, *Renton* 3118 *et seq.*—The present disaffection of the Hottentots is mainly attributable to the neglect of their complaints and the absence of redress for their losses, *ib.* 3170—See also *Griquas*, 3. *Moshesh*.

*Conciliation.* See *Kandeish*. *Policy of the Government*, 3.

*Constitutional Government.* The colony of the Cape of Good Hope accepts the constitution which has been granted, and accept it with all its legitimate responsibility, but it would not be in the power of the colony for a considerable time to pay the expenses of the war, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1745—The constitution is a distinct point from the Kafir war; the colonists had nothing to do with it; it is entirely the result of Government measures, *ib.* 1745-1748—A constitutional government in the Cape colony would decidedly produce a more kind and just policy towards the natives than that which has been in force during the last four years, *ib.* 1918.

See also *Commission of Inquiry*. *Legislative Assembly*. *Representative Government*.

*Convicts.* See *Boers*.

*Cotton Cultivation.* Recommendation that the Indian System of managing the chiefs should be resorted to; it is worth the trial to induce the natives to plant and cultivate cotton; small pensions should be conferred upon the chiefs to induce them to resort to industrial occupations, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2776-2785. 2995. 2805.

*Crime.* See *Ceded Territory*.

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*Criminal Trials.* The criminal trials among Kafirs for offences committed among themselves are very solemn and very particular, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 2006.

*Cruelty.* See *Barbarity.*

*Cultivation.* Cultivation of the land by the Kafirs; nature of the traffic carried on with the traders; the sale of gunpowder has never been traced to the traders, *Bissett* 899-905—The Kafirs are a pastoral nation; there would be no hardship in driving them across the Kei, the country beyond that river being unoccupied, *Sir P. Maitland* 2900-2903.

See also *Tenure of Land.*

*Customs of the Natives.* See *Border Tribes.*

## D.

*Defection.* Circumstances which led to the late unexpected outbreak; the British troops meeting a reverse at first, numbers went into the war who would not perhaps otherwise have joined it, *Bissett* 1010.—See also *Police.*

*Defence of the Frontier.* Reference to the evidence given by witness before the committee of 1835, in which he stated that the Government could at any time have laid down a system of preventive measures, which would have effectually protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard the cattle, and could make stricter rules for said territory than perhaps it would have been able to do on the western side of the old frontier; nature of the preventive measures contemplated in this answer, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1709 *et seq.*—These measures were subsequently carried out by order of Lord Glenelg in the treaty witness made and signed at King William's Town on 5 December 1836, *ib.* 1709-1713—Evidence showing that the view of Sir Harry Smith was confirmatory of these measures, *ib.* 1709, 1710—Up to the beginning of 1839, when witness left the frontier, he considered his plan to have worked well, and Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approval of it, *ib.* 1714—How far Sir George Napier has since felt it necessary to amend this treaty, *ib.* 1715-1720.

See also *Boers. British Troops. Expenditure. Fish River. Forts. Frontier Boundary. Kat River Settlement. Kei River, 1. Military Colonies. Military Force. Military Posts. Patrol System. Representative Government, 1. 2. Seat of Government. Treaties, 2. Western Frontier.*

*Depredations.* Opinion that the frontier cannot be maintained in peace by any force so long as we have people in an uncivilized state who believe it is their right to steal whenever they can steal, *A. Smith* 291, 292—Witness considers it perfectly just that the frontier tribes should be held responsible for depredations committed on the settlers, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1554-1560—During witness's tenure of governorship, he was very reluctant to go to war with the Kafirs in consequence of trifling depredations; the number of depredations did not increase from that line of policy *ib.* 1640-1642—Witness was in the colony in

the

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*Depredations—continued.*

the year 1845, at the time petitions were presented to the governor of Cape town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on the frontier, and of depredations committed by them, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1864, 1865—Reference to the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of these petitions by Mr. Montagu, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cloete, stating that the rumours of these depredations were unfounded, and that the colony was never in greater security and tranquillity, and more free from depredations, *ib.* 1867-1874. 1876-1881. 1898-1905.—So long as the frontier is in its present state it is impossible altogether to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, *ib.* 1911, 1912.

Enormous extent to which the depredations of the chiefs were carried on and great number of murders committed by them previous to the proclamation of war against the Kafirs in 1835, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2673-2688—Opinion that treaties with the Kafirs would not prevent their committing depredations; it is only the strong hand of military power that could prevent it, *ib.* 2717-2719. 2807-2838—The complaints of the colonists respecting the depredations committed by the Kafirs were generally speaking just and well founded, though they may have been somewhat exaggerated, *Sir P. Maitland* 2956-2958. 2973.

See also *Ceded Territory. Chiefs. Commando System, 1, 2. Kafir Wars, 1. Military Force, 2. Patrol System. Plunder. Treaties, 1. Zoolus.*

*Disaffection.* Witness cannot account for the general disloyalty which has recently prevailed among the Hottentots in the Kat River settlement; it is a most mysterious thing, a thing which strikes witness with great surprise; opinion that it is a political movement, and not at all a religious one, *Freeman* 24. 84-91\*—On witness's visit to the Kat River settlement in January 1851, he understood that there were latent causes of disaffection in the minds of the people, but they were not sufficient to produce an outbreak unless some occasion arose to excite these latent influences; statement generally of these latent causes, *Renton* 3023-3035. 3038-3040.

On making inquiries of the missionaries as to the causes of the extraordinary disaffection, witness learnt that there was a long series of matters which had soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke primarily of the wars of 1835-36 and 1846-47, *Renton* 3118—Witness does not consider that the small portion of the race that has shown disaffection, and has been engaged in the late outrages, is any proof of their readiness to become enemies of the Government, *ib.* 3394-3410—There have been several Kafir wars, and there have been several insurrections of Dutch boers, and during all these the Hottentots have never shown the slightest sympathy with either party of insurgents, *ib.* 3408.

See also *Cape Mounted Rifles. Commission of Inquiry. Compensation. Hottentots. Kat River Settlement, 2, 3. Magistrates, 1. Missionaries, 4.*

*Disloyalty.* See *Disaffection.*

*Disputes.* See *Border Tribes.*

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*Division of the Colony.* Objections to separating the present Cape colony into two distinct colonies, with two governments; such a separation would weaken both, *Fairbairn* 452. 454—Opinion that the safety of the frontier is better provided for by one strong government, wherever it seat may be, if the colony is to pay its own expenses, and have the management of the frontier policy, *ib.* 452—Witness does not consider that the colony is inconveniently large, in point of extent, for legislation by representatives; there is no doubt that the inhabitants of the eastern district would agree with the inhabitants of the western district, as to the policy to be pursued on the frontier, *ib.* 611–622.

See also *Seat of Government.*

*Droughts.* Droughts are very common on the eastern frontier of Kafraria; they occur every four or five years; this has the effect of inducing the colonists to spread their cattle over the country in search of pasture, and at times the people come into collision, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1474–1477—Troublesome and expensive nature of the war in 1846; it was rendered more so from the pressure of the drought that prevailed, and the imperfect communication between the colony and the eastern frontier, *Sir P. Maitland* 2858–2861.

*D'Urban, Sir Benjamin.* Circumstances attending the reversal of the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the giving up of the territory between the present boundary and the river Kei; prediction of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in his despatches, that a future war would be the consequence of a reversal of his policy, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1695–1708—Witness never approved of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system, he disapproved of it from first to last; difference between his system and the arrangement entered into by witness, with Kreli, in 1846; evidence showing that Sir B. D'Urban himself upset his own system, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1749–1769—The statement of Sir George Napier that the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was more popular among the colonists than the policy of Lord Glenelg is correct, *ib.* 1919—There was great clamour against Sir Benjamin's policy before Lord Glenelg's policy was introduced, *ib.* 1920.—See also *Fingoes. Kei River, 1.*

*Dutch Boers.* See *Boers. Commando System, 1. 2.*

*Dutch Race.* The feeling of alienation and estrangement between the Dutch and English races in the Cape colony is quite gone, *Fairbairn* 548–550.

## E.

*Education.* Evidence showing that the progress of education in the settlement was successful up to the time when it was wholly uninterrupted by the carrying off of all the people into military posts, *Renton* 3155, 3156.

See also *Schools.*

*Emancipation of Slaves.* See *Emigration.*

*Emigration.* Observations relative to the migration of the Dutch settlers; large numbers that have crossed the Vaal and gone to the north, where they are totally independent of our sovereignty; witness does not consider there

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*Emigration*—continued.

there is any possibility of stopping them and making them defend the frontier, *Bissett* 870-874—Witness does not see why, if the war terminates successfully, the frontier should be much denuded of inhabitants, unless the measures of the Government be such as to drive the people to emigration, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1395, 1396—It was an accusation on the part of *Sir Benjamin D'Urban* that the policy pursued by witness, in fact that his treaty of 5 December 1836 was one of the causes of the emigration of boers from the frontier; statement made by witness that he can prove the contrary, *ib.* 1823-1830. 1845. 2023-2029—In witness's opinion the causes of the discontent which induced the emigration were various, *ib.* 1831-1846—One was the manner in which the emancipation of the slaves affected many, and the manner in which compensation was given also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction, *ib.* 1836-1839—The circumstance of the insecurity of cattle and property on the frontier was also a cause of emigration, *ib.* 1840-1846.—See also *Boers*.

*Encroachments.* In regard to the general policy, one of the principles which ought to be adopted in all transactions with the natives would be to give them absolute security that in no cases should the possession of their land be interfered with, *Adamson* 680—It would be very preferable that the lands should be preserved absolutely for the support of the natives, *ib.*—Opinion that there has been a constant tendency and encroachment upon the land justly belonging to the Kafirs, and that this has led to bad feeling on the part of the Kafirs towards the colonists, as between the Kafirs and the settlers, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1721, 1722—This has brought our relations to their present unsatisfactory condition, *ib.* 1723—Evidence relative to the encroachments made by settlers on the territories of the Kafirs; witness attributes a great deal of the dissatisfaction of the Kafirs to the encroachments of the colonists, *A. Smith* 2168-2194.

See also *Griquas*. *Kreli*, Chief. *Retrocession of Territory*. *Surveys*.

*English Settlers.* Witness thinks it would be a very good thing if there was a body of Englishmen in Kafaria along the whole line of that country; such a system might be accomplished by degrees by encouraging soldiers to settle there, and allowing them to settle with their families, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1567-1577—There is a feeling of jealousy of the white men among the Kafirs, and also a feeling of injury from the aggression of the white men; this is concentrated more towards the Englishmen than towards others, *Renton* 3234-3236.—See also *Dutch Race*.

*Europeans.* There are very few Europeans resident in the Kat River settlement, *Freeman* 22—On several occasions the Kafirs and the Hottentots have combined to attack the white man, *A. Smith* 366, 367—Opinion that the political excitement which has been going on among the white people in the colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives, *Bissett* 951, 952—Great dread on the part of the Kafirs that the whites will dispossess them of their territory; how far the present war is to be traced to this feeling, *Adamson* 1072-1074—Dispossessing the Gaika tribes of their territory would greatly tend to increase this dread of the whites, *ib.* 1075, 1112, 1113.



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*Europeans—continued.*

The land which has been taken from the natives for the European settlers in British Kafria has caused great irritation among them; it would decidedly be advisable to put a stop to further extension of European settlements in that direction, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1454-1458—There has been no great accession of European colonists on the eastern frontier of the colony during the last four or five years, *ib.* 1473—Witness considers it would be better to have a settlement of coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, on the ceded territory than to have Europeans, *Sir P. Maitland* 2911. 2921-2927.

*See also Cape Corps. Cattle Stealing. Coloured Races. Jealousy. Kat River Settlement. Magistrates, 2.*

*Expenditure.* Opinion that the colony would be willing to bear a proportion of the expense of protecting the frontier, say one-third or one-fourth the whole amount, *Fairbairn* 582-588—Opinion that the great expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* would not have occurred in 1846 if the colony had had the control of the war, *ib.* 594—Reason of the war in 1846 costing the enormous amount of two millions of money; if the troops had to derive their resources from the sea, and through a regular commissariat, the same expenditure might again be occasioned, *ib.* 595, 596—Impossibility of the Cape colony defraying the expense of the military force necessary for the protection of the frontier; the expense must be borne by the mother country, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1694.

*See also Legislative Assembly. Military Force, 2. Revenue and Expenditure.*

*Extermination.* How far allowing the settlers on the frontier without the interference of the Government to carry on war against the natives would result in a system of extermination, *Fairbairn* 472-474.

*See also Coloured Races.*

## F.

*Fairbairn, John.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Proprietor and editor of the "South African Commercial Advertiser" newspaper at Cape Town; has been residing at the Cape for the last twenty-six or twenty-seven years, 422-428. 581—Witness has no personal knowledge of the tribes beyond the frontier; all he knows of them is through the despatches of Government and other papers which have been published, 428—Witness has been in the Zwellendam district of Kafirland, but it is twenty years ago; has also been at Graham's Town, 429-431—Witness has considered the policy of this country in regard to the frontier tribes, and has formed opinions upon it, but recent events have so altered the circumstances of both parties, the Kafirs and the colony generally, that witness cannot say what ought to be done, 432—Recent events have very much disappointed witness's expectations; the accounts from Kafirland were highly satisfactory for two or three years, but the sudden outbreak has shown that there was some deception or mistake somewhere, 433.

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*Fairbairn, John.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

The policy of the present governor differed from that of his predecessors in dealing with the frontier tribes, as he took possession of the country and established military forts within British Kafirria, 434, 435—The natives have been recently more employed in the British service as police, with a view to check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs, 436—The native Kafir police were perfectly trustworthy when pursuing thieves, but when Sir Harry Smith employed them against their own chiefs he greatly mistook the Kafir character; their feelings led them to join their old chiefs against the Government, 438-440—Remarks relative to the outbreak of the Kat River settlers against the Government; complaints made by those tribes of certain acts of the Government, 441.

The Cape mounted police consist principally of Kafirs, 442—The Cape mounted rifles consist nearly entirely of Hottentots; they have always behaved well up to the present war, now a number of them have deserted, and suspicion has fallen upon the whole body; witness is unable to account for their conduct, 443-445—General feeling of mistrust of the tribes by people on the frontier, who have been for years declaring that the tribes were hostile, and that the Government and a great portion of the people in the colony were deceiving themselves in supposing that they were in a state of security, 446, 447—Opinion in favour of the seat of the Legislative Government being at Cape Town, 449—Necessity for an officer of high rank with a strong force being constantly stationed on the frontier, 449-451. 458-460.

Objections to separating the present Cape colony into two distinct colonies with two governments; such a separation would weaken both, 452-454—Opinion that the safety of the frontier is better provided for by one strong government, wherever its seat may be, if the colony is to pay its own expenses, and have the management of the frontier policy, 452—Objection to transferring the seat of government from Cape Town to Graham's Town, 453-457—If a representative system were brought into operation in the colony, the legislature at Cape Town would be disposed adequately to provide for the defence of the frontier, 455-457. 461—Nature of the policy which witness considered would be the most advantageous to be adopted previous to the present war breaking out; now witness is unable to suggest any line of policy, looking forward to the future, 463, 464.

In the event of the establishment of a legislative assembly in the colony they would undertake to pay a large portion of the expenses of the colony; not the whole, as that would be equivalent to a separation from Great Britain, 465-471—How far allowing the settlers on the frontier, without the interference of the Government, to carry on a war against the natives, would result in a system of extermination, 472-474—Evidence generally with reference to the commando system formerly adopted in the colony; witness cannot see any material difference between that and the existing system, 472-501—Remarks relative to the nature and extent of the Kafir frontier, 490, 491. 510—Witness has no doubt that a great deal of bloodshed arose under the commando system, but not so much as under the new system of frontier protection, 500, 501.

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*Fairbairn, John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

It would not be acceptable to the general body of the colonists to revive the old commando system; they would not like to be called suddenly out, 502—The colonists would prefer a regular paid military force always maintained for the protection of the colony, not of the nature of a volunteer force, 502-509. 592—Extent of the military force necessary to be maintained for the protection of the colony; witness does not know what the expense would be, but it must be considerable, 505, 506—Amount of the revenue of the colony, and amount of the present expenditure of the Government, 507, 508—Independent of the maintenance of a regular force, witness would have the old system continued of making it necessary for the inhabitants when called on by the proper authorities to turn out with their arms and assist in repelling their enemies, 509. 592-594—Necessity for the maintenance of the military forts and forces on the Kafir frontier, wherever the military men thought they would be most efficient, 511.

Evidence relative to the various tribes inhabiting the country on the other side of the Kafir frontier; the Kafir population may be estimated at about 80,000 or 90,000, but it is impossible to form an idea as to the numbers of the other tribes, 512-521—Further explanation as to the nature and extent of the Kafir frontier; the whole of Kafaria is British, and the frontier of the British possessions is the great Kei, 522-527—Remarks relative to the Tambookie frontier; this has hitherto been a very peaceful frontier, but now the Tambookies are at open war with the colonial government; a greater force will be required hereafter on that frontier, 528-531.

Evidence relative to a number of emigrant boers having established themselves in the country of the Griquas, who border on the Orange River; circumstances which led to their emigrating beyond the limits of the colony; line of policy best adapted to recover their affections so as to control their actions, 532-547—Necessity for the establishment of an open government or legislative assembly at the Cape of Good Hope; until such is carried out, it will be impossible to obtain correct information as to the real state of southern Africa, 534—The feeling of alienation and estrangement between the Dutch and English races in the Cape colony is quite gone, 548-550.

In the event of a representative assembly sitting at Cape Town, opinion as to whether the Dutch or English element would predominate, 551—Grounds on which witness found the opinion that the establishment of a representative government at Cape Town would tend to re-establish a hold upon the affections of those boers who have penetrated beyond the frontier into Kafaria, and there established independent authority, 552-566—From what witness knows of the character of the Kafirs, he thinks it possible that the establishment of a form of government will be sufficient to prevent collisions taking place between the settlers and the Kafirs, 567—Explanation as to the cause of the Kafir war breaking out in 1834; 568—Evidence relative to the cause of the out-break in 1846; 569, 570—It is an indispensable condition of any future policy that there shall be no further encroachment upon the Kafirs upon our side; it is a great question whether we ought not to give up certain lands which we have taken from them, 571-575.

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*Fairbairn, John.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

There is a tribe of Kafirs which continues friendly, between King William's Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River, but it is a very small tribe, 577—The disaffection among the Cape mounted rifles did not show itself till after the breaking out of the war; previously much reliance was placed upon them, 578-580—Opinion that the colony would be willing to bear a proportion of the expense of protecting the frontier, say one-third or one-fourth the whole amount, 582-588—In the event of a local government being granted to the Cape, the Governor's voice should be supreme, and his assent be required for every measure which passes the assembly, 583—There are but a very small number of persons in the colony interested in promoting, or in the continuance of the frontier wars; their influence would not be appreciable in its effect upon the legislature of the colony, 589, 590. 597-604.

Opinion that the great expenditure of 2,000,000*l.* would not have occurred in 1846, if the colony had had the control of the war, 591—Reason of the war in 1846 costing the enormous amount of two millions of money; if the troops had to derive their resources from the sea, and through a regular commissariat, the same expenditure might again be occasioned, 595, 596—Complaints of the Hottentots in 1846, that while the men were serving on the frontier their families were left almost to starve; this has been remedied; the Government in the present war promising to supply food to the families of all parties serving on the frontier, 605-609—Great losses to which the Kat River settlers were subject in the last war; a great number of them have now joined the Kafirs, 610.

Witness does not consider that the colony is inconveniently large in point of extent for legislation by representatives; there is no doubt that the inhabitants of the eastern district would agree with the inhabitants of the western district as to the policy to be pursued on the frontier, 611-622—Evidence relative to the complaints of the colonists of their being deceived as to the dangerous state of Kafirland by the despatches of the Governor; witness does not consider that the Governor at present has full means of getting correct information, 623-659—Opinion that it would have been better if the whole truth had been laid before the colonists by the Governor, and openly discussed, 659.

*Farmers.* See *Boers.*

*Field Cornets.* See *Commando System.*

*Fingoes.* Particulars in detail relative to the strong difference of opinion between witness and Sir Benjamin D'Urban as to the treatment of the Fingoes; opinion expressed by Sir Benjamin, that witness had abandoned and sacrificed the Fingoe race to the tender mercies of their inveterate enemies, the Kafirs, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1798-1822. 1964-1968.

See also *Europeans.* *Missionaries*, 1.

*Fire-Arms.* The Kafirs have lately become much more formidable enemies compared with what they were, by the possession of fire-arms and horses, *A. Smith* 412; *Bissett* 803-805. 816, 817. 848. 1001-1009—The Kafirs are better armed than they were; difficulties in the way of preventing fire-

arm

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*Fire-Arms*—continued.

arms and gunpowder being smuggled into the colony, *Bissett* 848-855; *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1434-1447—In witness's time they were not well supplied with fire-arms and ammunition; they could hardly be induced to touch a gun, *A. Smith* 2072.

There is no doubt that the savage tribes will soon obtain a supply of arms, and become acquainted with their use through the various traders that will sell them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary, *T. C. Smith* 2241—Expediency of establishing some check on the supply of fire-arms and powder to the natives around Natal; impossibility of altogether preventing the smuggling of arms, though it might be prevented to a certain extent, *ib.* 2279-2304—Supply of fire-arms and ammunition obtained by the Kafirs from the travelling traders, *Owen* 2395, 2396—Witness looks upon it as practically impossible to prevent the importation of arms into Kafirland; provided the traders were prevented from supplying them, they would be supplied by foreign traders, and landed on the coast, *ib.* 2449-2458.

See also *Assagais. Gunpowder. Traders.*

*Fish River.* Considering the frontier between the Fish River and the Keiskamma as a military frontier, there would be an advantage in pushing it further where the country would be open, *Sir P. Maitland* 2982-2987—The Fish River does not afford a good line of defence, otherwise witness would have thought it desirable to have gone back to what was our territory in 1819, *Renton* 3080—Supposing we had retired considerably either to the Fish River or to some good military frontier, the personal situation of the missionaries established in what would be indisputably Kafir territory would be just what it was before. *ib.* 3081.

See also *Boundaries. Commando System, 2. Kei River, 1. Keiskamma.*

*Flogging.* Objection to the system by which if a man has committed a crime which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the colonial courts, and it is supposed there is not sufficient proof before these courts, he is tied up and flogged, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1263-1283. 1323. 1325-1341. 1357-1359. 1363-1385.

*Forests.* See *Timber Tax.*

*Forts.* The policy of the present Governor differed from that of his predecessors in dealing with the frontier tribes, as he took possession of the country and established military forts within British Kafiraria, *Fairbairn* 434, 435—Provided Kafirland be peopled by a white population when the natives are driven out, they would require to be protected by means of forts, *Bissett* 966-972—Opinion that the frontier can only be protected by a line of forts and military posts; amount of military force that would be required for this purpose, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1595-1601—Remarks relative to the forts on the frontier; great difficulty of obtaining a supply of water; it is very desirable that tanks should be provided for the forts, *Owen* 2459-2466.

See also *Keishamma. Military Force, 2.*

**Report, 1851—continued.**

*Freeman, Rev. Joseph John.* (Analysis of his Evidence.) A Protestant dissenting clergyman. Has been connected with the colony of the Cape of Good Hope as a visitor from the London Missionary Society of this country, but not as a resident there; spent about a year there in 1830, about half a year in 1836, and a year and a half about a year ago; has lately returned, 1, 2, 4, 5—On witness's last visit he went out as a visitor from the Missionary Society, deputed by them to visit and inspect all their missionary stations in South America, whether within the colony, or beyond the boundaries of the colony, and to report upon them, 3—Number and situation of the stations of the mission in South Africa; there are altogether about 34 stations in and beyond the colony, 6—As an approximate estimate of the number of the native population in connexion with the Missionary Society, witness would say there are from 25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with their missionary labours, 7—The Hottentots within the colony may form about one-fourth of the number; they are mixed with the late apprentices, 8—The latter have no distinct home, but that of "late apprentices," meaning those that were till lately in slavery; these constitute another fourth, 8—The other two fourths, or one-half of the whole number, would be Kafirs, Griquas, Bechuanas, and Fingoes, 8—The number of natives in connexion with the London Missionary Society has not been increasing very largely of late years; but since the emancipation it has increased considerably, 9.

General statement made by witness, that in his evidence he has no intention or design to impugn the character of Harry Smith or his government, 10—Witness has looked at the effect of certain Government measures upon the Hottentot population of the Kat River settlement, and has thought some of these measures to be decidedly unfavourable to the people, 10—Witness refers rather to individual acts of the local magistrate, who is however appointed by the Government, than to any general and comprehensive measure of the Government itself, 10—Detail of several of the acts of the late magistrate, Mr. J. H. Bowker, of an extremely injurious and irritating character, going far, as witness thinks, to account for, though not to justify the disaffection of the Hottentots, which has unhappily broken out during the present Kafir war in the shape of disloyalty, 10-14, 21, 92-102.

Allusion to the case of the forests which the people had simply, from usage, supposed to belong to the respective allotments or settlements, 14—The whole district is called the Kat River settlement, but it embraces twelve or thirteen divisions, which are called settlements, 14—The cutting of timber and selling it has been a great source of profit to them, 14—Since the war of 1847 the Government has seen it right to impose a tax of 6*s.* per load on the timber cut; way in which this has tended to discourage the people, 14—Agriculture, pasturage, and the conveyance of goods are the principal occupations of the people, 15—The number of native inhabitants within the settlements is rather more than 5,000; 16—Generally speaking, the people are an extremely well-conducted people; there is but one settlement where there is any disposition to intoxication, 17—The whole population is not in connexion with the London Missionary Society, 18—There is a congregation in connexion with the Dutch Reformed Church at Balfour, 18—But nine-tenths of the people are in connexion with the London Missionary Society, 19—The children attend the schools in large numbers

## Report, 1851—continued.

Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

numbers, and the people generally are able to read and write; they are familiar, to some extent, with the English as well as the Dutch languages, 20, 21.

There are very few Europeans resident in the settlement, 22—The Kat River settlement extends about twenty-five miles north and south, by twenty miles east and west, 23—Opinion that no general change in the existing relations between the British Government and these people is required, 24—The main thing would be to secure to them a magistracy in which they would have confidence, 24, 25. 103-110—Witness feels sure that upon the whole they are a thoroughly loyal and devoted people; their present state of disaffection and disloyalty is entirely a new thing; the disaffection may have been general, but the disloyalty has been very partial, 24—An important end would be gained by giving them a personal interest in the land, and encouraging them to become *bonâ fide* landholders; at present they have simply permission to occupy, 25-38.

With respect to the question whether giving title to these Hottentots to hold their lands for ever would tend to retard the civilization of the colony by preventing Europeans from efficiently cultivating the land, witness can only say there were two views on the part of the Government in granting the Kat River settlement to the Hottentots, 39—One was to reward them for faithful services for many years past, especially in the war, 39—And the other, to have a body of men who might serve as a defence to the colony in the event of a Kafir attack, 39—Having 5,000 or 7,000 men just on that spot, if we secure their fidelity and loyalty, we have that defence; but we should not have it in the small number to which a body of European farmers would be limited, 39—There is a great deal of jealousy existing between the Kafirs and the Hottentots; grounds for this feeling, 40.

The Kat River settlement is in what is called the ceded territory; but witness has great doubts whether it ever was ceded by treaty with the British Government; grounds on which witness considers it neutral territory, 41-48. 183-185—From such information as witness could gather he has always thought that, upon the whole, it was a wise policy to occupy this neutral territory, and to give the Hottentots the occupation of it, 49-53. 64-71. 144-149—But still witness thinks something more should have been done to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the Kafirs, who were excluded, and especially of the chief Maquomo; he ought to have been provided for more distinctly, 49, 50. 141-149—A distinct provision being made for the necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have secured more fidelity and more affection on their part, 49, 50. 141-149—The effect of this location was, no doubt, to bring the Hottentots more immediately into contact with their fiercer and more warlike neighbours, the Kafirs; and many depredations were committed on the settlers, 54-57. 61—But there was no serious crime committed till that particular case which led to the late war in 1846-47, which Sir Peregrine Maitland took up, viz., the murder of a Hottentot constable; a Kafir was also killed, 58-60. 62, 63.

Witness is aware of the opinion expressed in the report of Mr. Biddelph on See also. ment drawn up at the request of Sir Henry Pottinger, that the locating

Report, 1851—continued.

*Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

locating of large numbers of labouring people together in this manner is not favourable to the colonial interests; it is locating in one spot labourers who might be advantageously distributed over the colony, 72—Witness's notion of a settlement is, that the persons so located should have lands granted to them with a good title; that they should cultivate them and maintain themselves, and be ready, if necessary, to take their share in the defence of the frontier, 73—This description corresponds with the Kat River settlement, only that the parties have no right in the soil, 73-79—Looking at all the circumstances, and all the disadvantages being considered, witness would describe the Kat River settlement as an industrious and thriving settlement, 80, 81—Witness is not aware that they have any cause to complain of want of protection on the part of the Government, except in the instances of the acts of Mr. Bowker, the magistrate mentioned above, 82, 83. 92-102.

Witness cannot account for the general disloyalty which has recently prevailed in the settlement; it is a most mysterious thing, a thing which strikes witness with great surprise; opinion that it is a political movement and not at all a religious one, 84-91\*—With regard to appointing natives magistrates, witness would say that there are many respectable men, perhaps in Graham's Town, but certainly in Cape Town, which is the seat of government, who are well qualified to act as magistrates, 103-110. 122-127. 157-159—There are two classes of persons in the colony; those who take what witness would call a just, and benevolent, and liberal view of the question, and who would endeavour to raise and improve the coloured races, 110—And there are others who deem them utterly incapable of improvement, and would sweep them from their land entirely, 110.

Witness presumes that the coloured races within the limits of the British colony are increasing in number, but there are no statistics on the subject which can be depended upon, 111, 112—Religious or sectarian feeling and rivalry does not run so high in this part of South Africa, but there is a little of it, 114, 115—Impracticability of maintaining a certain space of neutral ground between the two races, the Hottentots and the Kafirs, 116-118—There is no system of local self government among the Hottentots through the medium of their chiefs; there are headmen of the villages appointed by the people; functions of the headmen, 119-121. 132. 138-140—The magistrates are always Europeans; reasons why witness thinks that at present this is better than that they should be appointed from their own race, 122-127.

There are half castes in the colony who would be respected if they were known to be men of character and intelligence; but they are few in number, 128-130—The half castes are increasing, as the result of marriages between respectable white men and Hottentot women; opinion that from this circumstance the Hottentot race will become extinct, 131—The only other settlements of the Hottentots besides that of the Kat River are the missionary institutions, where the people have congregated round the missionaries, 133, 134—A portion of land, say 5,000 acres, is perhaps allotted by the Government as the location of the Hottentots, where a missionary resides and a schoolhouse is built, and a church or a chapel, as the case may be; missionaries are appointed from the societies at home 134-137.



## Report, 1851—continued.

Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Any institution like that of juries has not made any progress in the Kat River settlement, 141-143—There is only one magistrate for the Kat River settlement; he is stationary; all questions are brought to him; no inconvenience arises from this, 150, 151. 153, 154—There is no desire among the Hottentots to be independent of our Government, 152—Witness believes the natives are satisfied with their present magistrate, Mr. Wien, and who is the third who has been appointed; the two former appointments were rather unfortunate, 156—As regards the appointment of magistrates, if the natives themselves had the power of making a strong recommendation, perhaps of a veto to a certain extent, still leaving the appointment finally with the Government, it would give them great satisfaction, 157-160.

The Kafir boundary is very accurately defined, so far as the course of the river is concerned; the Kafirs have a ready capacity for making boundary lines; the boundary has been distinctly marked out from time to time by the Government and the chiefs together, 161-165—Evidence showing that the Kafirs are a very scattered population; reason of this, 166-169—Some of the Hottentots have had grants of land made to them; but they sold or parted with their grants, which interposed a difficulty in the way of continuing these grants; there would be no harm in this if they were tied down to sell it only to a Hottentot, 170-175—The old boundary of the colony was the Fish River, 176, 177—The Kafirs at that time occupied what is now called the neutral or ceded territory, 178—At that time there were constant depredations and disturbances upon the boundary, 179—These depredations were repressed by the commando system, which had prevailed under the Dutch government; this led to very great abuses and involved constant wrongs, 180, 181—The establishment of a neutral territory was made with a view to put an end to this system, 182. 196, 197—After the establishment of this neutral territory Maquomo was again allowed to come in, and the depredations and disturbances were revived; this led to the driving of Maquomo from the territory, 183-195.

Evidence on the subject of the complaint of the Griquas, of having been deprived by Sir Harry Smith of a portion of their territory, seemingly under treaty, 198 *et seq.*—The Griquas are commonly called bastards; they are chiefly descendants of Hottentot women and Dutch farmers, 201—The point at present complained of is, that although Sir Peregrine Maitland made a treaty with them recognizing a division of their territory into alienable and inalienable land, Sir Harry Smith has deprived them, by his last treaty with them, of the date of February 1848, of the whole of that portion which is called alienable land; detailed narrative on this point, 201-219—Sir Harry Smith treated the Griquas as mere squatters, and witness conceives his object was to carry out the principle with which he set out on the frontier, that where he found black men, there they should be; and where he found white men, there they should be; he assumed this as a general principle of policy with the people as a whole, 220.

The Griquas do not at this moment object to the land being taken from them for ever, but they ask us to pay them compensation, 220-229. 233, 234. 236-243—The British Government has taken the land, and now lets it, and receives

Report, 1851—continued.

*Freeman, Rev. Joseph John.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

receives a quit-rent over the whole; under the present treaty the Griquas could not take possession of the land paying a quit-rent, without being British subjects by so doing, 230-332—There were great disputes between the boers and the Griquas, and it was the object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the boers on the land to which they had a perfectly clear right, and to remove the Griquas from close contact with the Dutch farmers, 233—Recommendations as to the mode in which compensation should be made to the Griquas; opinion that a money payment would be more acceptable to them than by giving them land in any other district, 235—The Griquas, generally, are not so far advanced in civilization as the coloured races living within the colony, but some of them are very far advanced; a great many of them are decidedly Christians, and many of them are good men, 244, 245.

Reference to witness's recommendation to Lord Grey, that there should be some inquiry into the case of the Griquas on the spot, 246, 247—Witness is of opinion that Government ought to make compensation with respect to the inalienable property also, 248-255—The number of the Griqua population is from 10,000 to 15,000; 256—Observations with respect to the Bassuto tribe, 257-261—Detail of the mode in which the territory belonging to Moshish, the chieftain of the tribe, was taken from him without compensation being made to him; witness would say it was taken away from him by intimidation, 257-261.

*Frontier Boundary.* Witness would say that the extent of frontier which we have to defend now is about 120 miles, *A. Smith* 368-372—Remarks relative to the nature and extent of the Kafir frontier; the whole of Kafria is British, and the frontier of the British possessions is the great Kei, *Fairbairn* 490, 491. 510. 522-527—Details relative to the boundary and nature of the frontier of the Cape colony, and the various tribes inhabiting the districts across the frontier, *Adamson* 680—The extent of territory has not been increased; we hold now the same boundary as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had after the war; Sir Andries Stockenstrom gave it away again, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1538-1540—Opinion that the boundary must be always undefined; there is no good boundary as a mere defensive boundary in itself; the defence of the frontier must rather turn upon military considerations than upon any neutral boundary, *Owen* 2422-2426. 2580.

See also *Amatola Mountains.* *Boundaries.* *Buffalo River.* *Defence of the Frontier.* *Division of the Colony.* *Fish River.* *Kafir Wars.* *Kei River.* *Keiskamma.* *Military Force.* *Military Law.* *Military Posts.* *Military Villages.* *Neutral Territory.* *Open Frontier.* *Patrol System.* *Plunder.* *Tambookie Frontier.* *Western Frontier.*

*Frontier Tribes.* General feeling of mistrust of the tribes by people on the frontier, who have been for years declaring that the tribes were hostile, and that the government and a great portion of the people in the colony were deceiving themselves in supposing that they were in a state of security, *Fairbairn* 446. 447.

See also *Amatola Mountains.* *Bassuto Tribes.* *Border Tribes.* *Bushmen.* *Depredations.* *Gaika Tribes.* *Griquas.* *Population.*

## Report, 1851—continued.

## G.

**Gaika Tribes.** Witness is confident that the Gaika Kafirs would not have entered upon the war had not they been sure of the co-operation of the Kat River Hottentots; cause of the defection of the Kat River settlers, *Bissett* 746, 747—Witness does not think the reason of the Gaika tribes rising has been the fear of expulsion from their territory, *ib.* 766. 770-771—The Gaikas are included among the Kafirs; their cattle has been captured to a considerable extent, *Adamson* 1092-1094—Opinion that the Gaika tribe are a people over whom a moral influence might be exercised if we preserved in their minds the belief that we were acting towards them with justice and good faith, *Reuton* 3073, 3074.—See also *Chiefs*, 2. *Europeans*.

**Glenelg, Lord.** Lord Glenelg's system was introduced in December 1836; witness can only speak as to its being faithfully carried out the first two years, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1856, 1857. 1859, 1860—It was in some measure put a stop to by amendments made by Sir George Napier; when witness returned to the colony in 1840 he considered that these amendments were fatal to the system, *ib.* 1858. 1861-1863—Grounds on which witness forms the opinion, that in 1845 the Kafirs were preparing to attack the colony in consequence of Lord Glenelg's treaties having been put a stop to, *ib.* 1874, 1875. 1882-1897. 1901-1905—Remarks relative to the system adopted by Lord Glenelg for the protection of the colony, *A. Smith* 2153-2158—During witness's governorship he adhered in the main to the policy which was established by Lord Glenelg with reference to the Kafirs, *Sir P. Maitland* 2923.

See also *Defence of the Frontier*. *Treaties*, 1.

**Government, The.** See *Colonists*. *Policy of the Government*.

**Government of the Colony.** See *Constitutional Government*. *Legislative Assembly*. *Local Government*. *Policy of the Government*. *Representative Government*.

**Government Despatches.** Evidence relative to the complaints of the colonists of their being deceived as to the dangerous state of Kafirland by the despatches of the Governor; witness does not consider that the Governor at present has full means of getting correct information, *Fairbairn* 623-659—Opinion that it would have been better if the whole truth had been laid before the colonists by the Governor, and openly discussed, *ib.* 659.

**Government Grants.** In the event of Government grants being made to the chiefs, witness does not think they possess sufficient influence over their tribes to lead them to keep down depredations for the purpose of receiving the subsidy, *Owen* 2604.—See also *Missionaries*, 3.

**Governor of the Colony.** See *Chiefs*, 5. *Colonial Office*.

**Graham's Town.** See *Seat of Government*.

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Grants of Land.* Some of the Hottentots have had grants of land made to them; but they sold or parted with these grants, which interposed a difficulty in the way of continuing these grants; there would be no harm in this if they were tied down to selling it only to a Hottentot, *Freeman* 170-175.

See also *Tenure of Land.*

**GRIQUAS:**

1. *Generally.*
2. *Complaints of the Griquas of being dispossessed of their Territory.*
3. *Opinions that Compensation should be made to them.*

1. *Generally:*

The Griquas are commonly called Bastards; they are chiefly descendants of Hottentot women and Dutch farmers, *Freeman* 201—The Griquas generally are not so far advanced in civilization as the coloured races living within the colony, but some of them are very far advanced; a great many of them are decidedly Christians, and many of them are good men, *ib.* 244, 245—The number of the Griqua population is from 10,000 to 15,000, *ib.* 256.

2. *Complaints of the Griquas of being dispossessed of their Territory:*

Evidence on the subject of the complaint of the Griquas of having been deprived by Sir Harry Smith of a portion of their territory seemingly under treaty, *Freeman* 198 *et seq.*—The point at present complained of is, that although Sir Peregrine Maitland made a treaty with them, recognizing a division of their territory into alienable and inalienable land, Sir Harry Smith has deprived them, by his last treaty with them, of the date of February 1848, of the whole of that portion which is called alienable land; detailed narrative on this point, *ib.* 201-219—Sir Harry Smith treated the Griquas as mere squatters, and witness conceives his object was to carry out the principle with which he set out on the frontier, that where he found black men, there they should be; and where he found white men, there they should be; he assumed this as a general principle of policy with the people as a whole, *ib.* 220.

There were great disputes between the boers and the Griquas, and it was the object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the boers on the land to which they had a perfectly clear right, and to remove the Griquas from close contact with the Dutch farmers, *Freeman* 233—Evidence relative to a number of emigrant boers having established themselves in the country of the Griquas, who border on the Orange River; circumstances which led to their emigrating beyond the limits of the colony; line of policy best adapted to recover their affections, so as to control their actions, *Fairbairn* 532-547—Explanation relative to the operations in which witness was employed beyond the Orange River in the neighbourhood of Philippolis, in supporting the Griquas against an attack of the Dutch boers, defeat of the boers and establishment of a civil magistrate in the country, *Owen* 2386-2392.

3. *Opinions that Compensation should be made to them:*

The Griquas do not at this moment object to the land being taken from them for ever, but they ask us to pay them compensation, *Freeman* 220-229, 233, 063.

Report, 1851—continued.

**GRIQUAS**—continued.

3. *Opinions that Compensation should be made to them*—continued.

234. 236-243—The British Government has taken the land, and now lets it, and receives a quit-rent over the whole; under the present treaty the Griquas could not take possession of the land, paying a quit-rent, without becoming British subjects by so doing, *Freeman* 230-232—Recommendation as to the mode in which compensation should be made to the Griquas; opinion that a money payment would be more acceptable to them than by giving them land in any other district, *ib.* 235—Reference to witness's recommendation to Lord Grey, that there should be some inquiry into the case of the Griquas on the spot, *ib.* 246, 247—Witness is of opinion that Government ought to make compensation with respect to the inalienable property also, *ib.* 248-255.

See also *Missionaries*, 1. *Treaties*, 2.

**Gunpowder.** Although gunpowder is prohibited from being exported from the colony, large quantities find their way into the interior, where it is an article in great demand, *Adamson* 672—Witness does not think that any exertions of the missionaries would have the effect of preventing the natives getting gunpowder, as it has become almost necessary to their existence, *ib.* 725-728—Impossibility of the Kafirs manufacturing powder; if it were possible to prevent the exportation of powder and fire-arms to them, it would put a stop to further war, *Bissett* 878-884. 1006-1009.

See also *Fire-Arms*. *Traders*.

H.

**Habits of the Natives.** See *Civilization*, 1.

**Half-Castes.** The half-castes are increasing, as the result of marriages between respectable white men and Hottentot women; opinion that from this circumstance the Hottentot race will become extinct, *Freeman* 131.

See also *Magistrates*, 2.

**Hawes, Benjamin, M. P.** (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Observations and explanations with respect to a letter which has been addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, stating that certain words contained in a letter of Sir G. Napier's of 20 November 1838, and which were inserted in the copy of the papers which were delivered to the Committee, were omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, 3286-3288—This sentence was, "the worst importation that ever came to this colony;" reasons for their being omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, 3286-3288.

**Headmen.** See *Chiefs*. *Local Government*.

**Hermanus (Chief).** Observations relative to the location of Hermanus on the settlement, showing that his presence was dangerous to the allegiance of the people of the Kat River Settlement, *Renton* 3199-3202. 3206.

See also *Kat River Settlement*, 3.

*Hereditary*

Report, 1851—continued.

*Hereditary Chiefs.* See *Chiefs*, 5.

*Hottentots.* There is no desire among the Hottentots to be independent of our Government, *Freeman* 152—The Hottentots cannot now be as much depended on as troops in our service as they were formerly, *Bissett* 828, 829—The number of Hottentots has been very much diminishing ever since the commencement of the colony, *A. Smith* 2061—From witness's knowledge of these tribes, he is of opinion that they would unite generally against the British, *ib.* 2073, 2074—Opinion that the Hottentots might be made useful allies by combination with the British forces, *Owen* 2627—2631.

Witness has understood that on every occasion the Hottentots were ready to obey orders, and were zealous in their loyalty, *Renton* 3169—Reasons why witness would still say that the Hottentots are a very loyal people, *ib.* 3222—3226—When witness stated that the Hottentots had had discontent from being employed in the last war for a considerable time, it was not the mere employment he specified as the cause, but the conditions of it, and the treatment afterwards, and the losses they suffered, *ib.* 3383—3392—Witness considers the rest of the Hottentots settled along the frontier were as loyal as those at the Kat River, *ib.* 3393—Witness has no idea that there was any combination between all the Hottentot settlements on the frontier, including the soldiers of the Cape Corps, on the subject of the outbreak, *ib.* 3426—3430—But witness apprehends there must have been communications from the Kafirs with a part of the Hottentots, endeavouring to obtain their neutrality, and probably their co-operation, *ib.*—As far as witness's knowledge extends, the Hottentots had no cause of complaint against the local authorities or the Government, and the missionaries had an opinion that they would have stood by them to the very last extremity, *La Trobe* 3485.

See also <i>Aborigines.</i>	<i>Cape Corps.</i>	<i>Cape Mounted Rifles.</i>	<i>Ceded Territory.</i>
<i>Compensation.</i>	<i>Disaffection.</i>	<i>Europeans.</i>	<i>Gaiha Tribes.</i>
<i>Grants of Land.</i>	<i>Kafir Wars, 3.</i>	<i>Kat River Settlement.</i>	<i>Magistrates, 1.</i>
<i>Missionaries, 1.</i>	<i>Rations.</i>	<i>Tenure of Land.</i>	<i>Treachery.</i>

## I.

*Incursions of Territory.* One of the chief causes of offensive operations on the part of the Kafirs arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1478—1482—It would not be expedient in any way to interfere with the internal government of the Kafirs beyond the frontier, with the view of preventing incursions into the British territory, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1522. 1690.—See also *Military Posts*.

*Indian Government.* See *Bheels.* *Khandeish Province.*

*Industrial Occupations.* See *Cotton Cultivation.* *Kat River Settlement, 1.*  
*Useful Arts.*

*Influence.* See *Chiefs, 2. 3.*

*Insurrection.* See *Disaffection.* *Kafir Wars.*

*Irrigation.* See *Climate.*

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Itinerant Traders.* Great advantage would result from checking the itinerant traders visiting Kafirland, and the establishment of fairs for the purpose of trading with the natives, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2722-2726.

See also *Fire-Arms. Traders.*

## J.

*Jealousy.* There is a great deal of jealousy existing between the Kafirs and the Hottentots; grounds for this feeling, *Freeman* 40—The feeling of the Kafirs against the white man is more that of jealousy and fear than that of hostility; they fear eventually that they will be sacrificed by the white men, *A. Smith* 363-365.

*Jones, Dr.* See *Kat River Settlement*, 1.

*Juries.* Any institution like that of juries has not made any progress in the Kat River settlement, *Freeman* 141-143—Objections to Sir Harry Smith's view of obtaining redress through the agency of the Kafirs themselves, that is, by a chief assembling a jury of twelve of his people to try the offender, in presence of the superintendent of police, *Sir A. Stockenström* 2002-2005, 2007, 2008.

## K.

*Kafir Chiefs.* See *Chiefs.*

*Kafir Force.* Estimated force of the Kafirs; manner in which they are supported; impossibility of their maintaining a war for any length of time from the want of provisions, *Owen* 2440-2448, 2605.—See also *Population.*

**KAFIR WARS:**

1. *Explanation as to the Cause of the War of 1835-36.*
2. *Evidence as to the Cause of the Outbreak in 1846.*
3. *Circumstances which may be alleged to have led to the present War.*
4. *Opinions that no other Course can now be pursued than that of prosecuting the War with the utmost Rigour, and entirely subduing the Kafirs.*
5. *How far the Feeling of the Colonists is against a War.*

1. *Explanation as to the Cause of the War of 1835-36:*

Explanation as to the cause of the Kafir war breaking out in 1835, *Fairbairn* 568—Opinion that the causes which led to the outbreak of the Kafir war in 1835, were the smallness of our military force, the depredations of the Kafirs, and the abolition of the old system of defence called the Commando system, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2663-2668—Course taken by the Government with a view to obtain redress from the Kafir chiefs before war was proclaimed in 1835, *ib.* 2669-2682.

Report, 1851—continued.

**KAFIR WARS**—continued.

2. *Evidence as to the Cause of the Outbreak in 1846:*

Evidence relative to the cause of the outbreak in 1846, *Fairbairn* 569, 570—The immediate origin of the Kafir war in 1846 was the seizure of a prisoner by the Kafirs when under escort; the breaking out of that war was caused by the conduct of the Kafirs, *T. C. Smith* 2235-2237—The causes of the discontent in 1846, which made the Kafirs so desirous for a pretext for war, was their eagerness to possess themselves of our lands and herds, *Owen* 2645-2647.

3. *Circumstances which may be alleged to have led to the present War:*

Witness is unable to give a decisive opinion as to the cause of the late outbreak among the Kafirs; reference to a letter from a missionary at Union Dale station, in the centre of the Amatola mountains, who makes allusions to the commencement of the outbreak, *Adamson* 673, 674—Opinion that the Kafirs had been preparing for war for some years past, nearly since the end of the war under Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and only wanted a pretext for breaking out, *Owen* 2394-2416, 2417. 2523-2537. 2655-2657—Witness remained with the Kafirs from the middle of November 1850 till the 21st January, when he had to go into the Kat River settlement, *Renton* 3011—When witness went into the Kafir country he found rumours of war all the way upon his journey; witness found these rumours very prevalent on the frontier, but he discredited them for various reasons, *ib.* 3012—From what witness could learn from the missionaries, he could not find that there were any grounds for anticipating an outbreak, *ib.* 3013-3016. 3021-2025.

Witness had communication with the Kafirs themselves, and from their representations and assurances was led to believe there would be no outbreak; evidence in detail relative to the nature of these assurances, and showing that the Kafirs at this time even dreaded war, *Renton* 3017-3019—The prevalence of rumours along the frontier, and within the colony, of war, had a very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the expectation of it, and thereby calling into activity these latent elements, *ib.* 3025—The insurrection broke out first at the Keiskamma among the Kafirs on the 24th December, *ib.* 3219—And one of the principal insurrectionary movements was at the Kat River settlement, immediately following the outbreak of the Kafirs, *ib.* 3220—It is also the fact that great number of persons belonging to that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined the rebels, *ib.* 3221.

4. *Opinions that no other Course can now be pursued than that of prosecuting the War with the utmost Rigour, and entirely subduing the Kafirs.*

Necessity for the Kafirs being conquered before any proper system of defence could be put up; the last war was never completely finished, or the present war would not have occurred, *Bissett* 962-965—There is not a man in this country, nor at the Cape, who can tell what must be done at the close of the war; everything depends on its termination, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1257. 1264-1266—What we are now to do is not to rest till we have put these people down; unless they are put down they will drive us out of the colony, *ib.* 1257—The Kafirs must be conquered now and put down by



## Report, 1851—continued.

**KAFIR WARS**—continued.4. *Opinions that no other Course can now be pursued, &c.*—continued.

force, and the only way of controlling them hereafter will be through their chiefs, unless we crush them altogether, and a sort of moral control must be kept over their chiefs, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1301-1307. 1408-1423—Up to the present moment we have never yet reduced the Kafirs, *ib.* 1408-1423—Opinion that the first step must be to put the Kafirs down, and that so completely as to force them to cry out for peace, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1515-1517—This can only be done by a strong military force being placed at the complete disposal of *Sir Harry Smith*, *ib.* 1515—Looking at the position of things as they now stand, seeing the Kafirs are in hostility to the British, there is no other course open than that of prosecuting the war, and convincing the Kafirs that we are the stronger party, *Sir T. Maitland* 2958-2962.

5. *How far the Feeling of the Colonists is against a War :*

There are but a very small number of persons in the colony interested in promoting or in the continuance of the frontier wars; their influence would not be appreciable in its effect upon the legislature of the colony, *Fairbairn* 589, 590. 597-604—Opinion that taking the united interests of the colonists, there is a stronger interest in the colony against a war than in favour of one, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1643-1645.

See also *British Power*. *Chiefs*, 3. *Coloured Races*. *Commando System*, 1. *Commission of Inquiry*. *Constitutional Government*. *Defection*. *Depredations*. *Disaffection*. *Encroachments*. *Expenditure*. *Hottentots*. *Kat River Settlement*, 2. *Military Force*. *Missionaries*, 1. 4. *Neutral Territory*. *Police*. *Regular Troops*. *Sandilli*. *Surveys*. *Treaties*, 1.

**KAT RIVER SETTLEMENT :**

1. *Particulars as to the Formation, Extent, and Population of the Settlement; Character of the Settlers.*
  2. *Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses in the different Wars.*
  3. *Evidence as to the present Disaffection existing in the Settlement.*
  4. *Opinion that it would be expedient to break up this Settlement.*
1. *Particulars as to the Formation, Extent, and Population of the Settlement; Character of the Settlers.*

The Kat River settlement extends about twenty-five miles north and south, and twenty miles east and west; the whole district is called the Kat River settlement, but it embraces twelve or thirteen divisions, which are also called settlements, *Freeman* 14. 23.—Agriculture, pasturage, and the conveyance of goods are the principal occupations of the people, *ib.* 15—Having 5,000 or 7,000 men just on that spot, if we secure their fidelity and loyalty we have that defence, but we should not have it in the small number to which a body of European farmers would be limited, *ib.* 39—Looking at all the circumstances, and all the disadvantages being considered, witness would describe the Kat River settlement as an industrious and thriving settlement,

Report, 1851—continued.

**KAT RIVER SETTLEMENT**—continued.

1. *Particulars as to the Formation, Extent, &c.*—continued.

*Freeman* 80, 81—Circumstances which led to the formation of the Kat River settlement; Government aid granted to the settlers; unfavourable reports as to the industry and character of the people there, *ib.* 1030-1045.

Evidence relative to the establishment of the Kat River settlement, and the state of that colony, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1660-1687—Witness has met with a report made by Mr. Biddulph of the state and condition of the Kat River settlement in May 1847; witness strongly differs from him; he considers the description of the settlement to be libellous; reference to certain statements made in this report which witness knows to be incorrect, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1989-2000—State of the Kat River settlement on witness's visit in July 1835; idleness of the Hottentots generally, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2798-2804—Memorandum of the Kat River settlement drawn up by Dr. Jones, the Superintendent-general of education in the colony, founded upon official returns and documents, delivered in and read, *Renton* 3118-3125—Witness supposes the design of the settlement was to make them a sort of bulwark to the colony, which they have proved, for they have borne the brunt of every war, *ib.* 3168.

Reasons for Sir Lowry Cole punishing the Kafirs that were living by sufferance in the ceded territory, and driving them out and establishing a Hottentot settlement on the same ground, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 3296—Witness fully approved of the policy pursued at that time, and was the principal instrument in the expulsion of Maquomo, *ib.* 3297-3299—Reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the Kat River settlement has not been a failure, *Renton* 3312—On looking at the services and sacrifices and subsequent treatment undergone by the population, witness does not regard the experiment as having had a fair trial, *ib.*

2. *Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses in the different Wars :*

Remarks relative to the outbreak of the Kat River settlers against the Government; complaints made by those tribes of certain acts of the Government, *Fairbairn* 441—Great losses to which the Kat River settlers were subject in the last war; a great number of them have now joined the Kafirs, *ib.* 610—In 1836 the Kat River settlement was self-supporting; it never had one farthing of support, and had done more for Government than any other part of the country; it was ruined by the war, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1847-1855—Witness wrote a letter during the summer of 1850 relating to the complaints made by the settlers on the Kat River; their principal complaint was about burning them out of their houses; there was much irritation in the minds of the settlers; this was before the war, *ib.* 1972-1976.

Detail of the grievances of the people as related to witness on his visit to the colony in 1851, *Renton* 3126 *et seq.*—Complaints were made by them that both in 1835-36 and 1846-47 they were treated as a degraded race, and that they had received no compensation from the losses they had sustained by the wars; they also complained that solemn promises made to them by successive Governments had been broken, *ib.* 3129 *et seq.* 3157-3167—Witness is aware that many cases occurred of great individual losses to other settlers in

Report, 1851—continued.

**KAT RIVER SETTLEMENT**—continued.

2. *Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses, &c.*—continued.

other parts of the Cape from the Kafir war, but it was optional with them to come out or to retire, *Renton* 3167—The Kat River men, on the contrary, were the first called out and the last relieved, *ib.*

3. *Evidence as to the present Disaffection existing in the Settlement :*

Up to 1847 there was never a more loyal set of people in the world, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1976, 1977—Since then the change which has taken place among them greatly surprises every one, *ib.* 1976-1978—Witness went to the Kat River settlement on the 20 January 1851; reasons for his going there, *Renton* 3115—Disaffection prevailed there extensively at that period, *ib.* 3116, 3117—The followers of Hermanus who had rallied after his defeat had received accessions from numerous discontented Hottentots, and were exercising a most pernicious influence, *ib.* 3116—There seemed to be no civil or military authority in the colony competent to the exigency; there seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without or to control the turbulence within, *ib.*

Copy of letter from the Rev. James Read, sen., missionary of the London Missionary Society, dated 26 March 1851, in refutation of the statement contained in Major-general Somerset's despatch, that Philipton, Kat River, had become the focus of almost all the disaffected, *App.* 485-488.

4. *Opinions that it would be expedient to break up this Settlement :*

Witness considers the Kat River settlement as a collection of all the bad coloured people in the whole of the provinces; opinion that Colonel Somerset, in breaking up that settlement, would do a very politic and wise thing, *Bissett* 812-827. 940-947—Witness would approve of breaking up the Kat River settlement; if witness had had to make that settlement, he would never have placed it there, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1565, 1566—Remarks as to the Kat River settlement; it is a very dangerous post to have people of doubtful fidelity; opinion that colonists from this country should have been placed there instead of the Hottentots, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2727-2732.

See also *Biddulph, Mr. Ceded Territory. Disaffection. Europeans. Gaika Tribes. Hermanus. Hottentots, Juries. Kafir Wars, 3. London Missionary Society. Magistrates, 1. 2. Military Force, 1. Missionaries, 4. Morals. Population. Schools. Tenure of Land. Timber Tax.*

**KEI RIVER :**

1. *Recommendations that the Kafirs should be driven across the Kei, and this River made the Frontier Boundary.*
2. *Objections to the Kei as the Frontier Boundary.*

1. *Recommendations that the Kafirs should be driven across the Kei, and this River made the Frontier Boundary :*

In witness's opinion the Kei is a much more defensible frontier than any we have yet occupied; the most defensible boundary is an open space in which cavalry can act; necessity for a large military force for its defence,

*Bissett*

## Report, 1851—continued.

## KEI RIVER—continued.

## 1. Recommendations that the Kafirs, &amp;c.—continued.

*Bissett* 800, 801. 957-962. 981-986. 991-1005—Extension of the boundary of the Cape colony to the River Kei, by Sir Benjamin D'Urban; the majority of the colonists were in favour of this extension, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1605-1608. 1646, 1647—Advantage of driving the Kafirs over the great Kei; by such a proceeding the Government would secure the respect of the Kafirs, as they have most respect for that which they most fear, *Owen* 2544-2555. 2576-2584—In recommending that the Kafirs should be driven over the great Kei, witness only refers to those chiefs and tribes most implicated in the war, *ib.* 2648-2654—Opinion that it would be very unsafe to drive the Kafirs across the Kei, as long as we have Natal; because if driven in that direction they might attack the flourishing settlement of Natal, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2704-2709. 2830-2844—Opinion that the best boundary for our military posts is the Kei; it is preferable to the Great Fish River or the Keiskamma, *ib.* 2752-2762—Recommendation that all the Kafirs should be driven across the Great Kei, and that river adopted as the frontier boundary; no Kafirs should be located in British Kafaria unless they registered themselves and gave up their arms, *Sir P. Maitland* 2862-2875.

## 2. Objections to the Kei as the Frontier Boundary.

Objections to the removal of the Kafir tribes beyond the Kei, as proposed by Major Bissett, *Adamson* 1066-1071—It is witness's opinion that driving the Kafirs out of their own country across the Kei would only remove the evil for a short time, and would not tend to bring about the desired result, *ib.* 1076-1087—There would be no difficulty in driving the Kafirs from their country across the Kei, provided the Government was determined to do it, *ib.* 1094-1100—A few years ago there might have been an advantage in pushing the frontier as far as the great Kei River, but witness does not see how it is to be done now, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1260-1263—With respect to making the Kei River the boundary of the colony, it must depend in a great measure on the terms which may be come to with the Kafirs and their chiefs, *ib.* 1304-1307—Witness would not propose to push the frontier to the Great Kei, unless it is proposed to keep Kafaria; opinion that Kafaria can only be kept by a military force, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1519—Necessity for the Kafirs being allowed the free range of their country; provided they were all forced into one spot they would starve, *ib.* 1520, 1521.

See also *Amatola Mountains. Buffalo River. Civil Commissioners. D'Urban, Sir Benjamin. Frontier Boundary. Keiskamma. Krelis, Chief. Soil. Wandering Tribes.*

*Keiskamma.* Opinion that the Keiskamma is the most advantageous frontier to maintain, along which there were very excellent forts built, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1518. 1655-1657. 1688, 1689. 1692—Opinion in favour of the Keiskamma as the frontier of the Cape colony; great difficulty of protecting the Fish River boundary; the Great Kei would be far too extended a boundary, *T. C. Smith* 2353-2358—Observations relative to the military forts on the Keiskamma frontier, there would be no difficulty in occupying these forts with a British force, *ib.* 2363-2369—Information as to the number of the various Kafir

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Keiskamma*—continued.

tribes to the east and north-east of the Keiskamma, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 3290-3296.

See also *Aborigines. Fish River. Kei River, 1. Somerset, Lord Charles.*

*Khandaish Province.* Troubled state of the Khandaish territory at the time it fell into our hands in 1817; it was completely overrun by mercenary bands of Arabs, Pindarees, and Bheels, so that the roads were nearly impassible, and neither life nor property was secure, *Ovans* 1116, 1117 — Nature of the conciliatory policy adopted by the agents, and complete success which attended that policy, by which Khandaish has become as quiet as any district under the Bombay presidency, *ib.* 1128-1138. 1158-1246 — Amount of the Indian force employed in the Khandaish province; formation of two native regiments whose fidelity has been found uninterrupted, *ib.* 1139-1146 — Report made by witness to Sir John Malcolm in 1830, stating the success which had attended the conciliatory policy in the Khandaish province; this report was approved of by Sir John and also the home Government, and was printed and distributed for future guidance of officers, *ib.* 1132-1136. 1147-1149.

See also *Bheels.*

*King William's Town.* From the mode of warfare of the Kafirs, it is very desirable that the boundary should have the command of an open country; opinion that King William's Town is about one of the best military stations in the colony, *Owen* 2427-2435. 2557-2566 — The country about King William's Town is more open and better adapted for the movement of troops than that on the frontier of the Keiskamma; therefore for a military purpose witness would prefer pushing the posts as far as King William's Town, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2692-2699.

*Kreli, Chief.* Explanation relative to the arrangement entered into by witness with the chief Kreli in 1846; the fourth article of which treaty was that Kreli is "to acknowledge the right of the British Government to all land west of the Great or White Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he, Kreli, or any other Kafir, chief or subject, may have possessed, to any part of the said territory," *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1724-1726 — Although witness generally objects to encroachments upon the lands held by native tribes, he hoped that by treating with Kreli as the paramount chief and obtaining from him the land west of the Kei, we might thus obtain a title to the principal strongholds and restore the remainder, holding him responsible as any other independent chief, *ib.* 1724 — But we broke the convention which was made with Kreli, by marching an army against him, which only exposed our weakness, shook more than ever the faith of the barbarian in our justice, and the result is that he has joined the war against us; witness can therefore no longer recommend this plan, *ib.* 1724-1736. — See also *D'Urban, Sir Benjamin.*

## Report, 1851—continued

## L.

*Labourers.* Witness is aware of the opinion expressed in the Report of Mr. Biddulph on the Kat River settlement, drawn up at the request of Sir Henry Pottinger, that the locating of large numbers of labouring people together in this manner is not favourable to the colonial interests; it is locating in one spot labourers who might be advantageously distributed over the colony, *Freeman* 72.

"*Late Apprentices.*" Beneficial effect of the missionary labours with regard to the "late apprentices," *Adamson* 667—Remarks relative to the aid granted by Government to the missions to the "late apprentices;" manner in which it is applied, *ib.* 1038, 1039.—See also *Missionaries*, 1.

*La Trobe, Rev. Peter.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Secretary to the Church of the United (a Moravian) Brethren in this country; has been in connexion with the mission of that Church for thirty years, 3482—Statement relative to the recent occurrences in Kafaria, in as far as they have reference to the Moravian settlement of Shiloh, 3483-3486—Every exertion was made by the missionaries to allay the prevailing irritation among the Kafirs, 3485—As far as witness's knowledge extends, the Hottentots had no cause of complaint against the local authorities or the Government, and the missionaries had an opinion that they would have stood by them to the very last extremity, 3485—There is considerable doubt whether the first aggression was on the part of the Whittlesea people or the Shiloh people, 3486—The Moravian missionaries have not a station at Whittlesea, 3487.

*Laws of the Colony.* See *Military Law.*

*Legislative Assembly.* In the event of the establishment of a Legislative Assembly in the colony, they would undertake to pay a large portion of the expenses of the colony; not the whole, as that would be equivalent to a separation from Great Britain, *Fairbairn* 465-471—Necessity for the establishment of an open Government or Legislative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope; until such a plan is carried out, it will be impossible to obtain correct information as to the real state of Southern Africa, *ib.* 534—Opinion as to whether the Dutch or English element would predominate, in the event of a Representative Assembly sitting at Cape Town, *ib.* 551.

*Local Government.* There is no system of local self-government among the Hottentots through the medium of their chiefs; there are headmen of the villages appointed by the people; functions of the headmen, *Freeman* 119-121. 132. 138-140—In the event of a local Government being granted to the Cape, the Governor's voice should be supreme, and his assent be required for every measure which passes the Assembly, *ib.* 583.

*Location of Settlers.* See *Ceded Territory.* *Coloured Races.*

*London Missionary Society.* The number of natives in connexion with the London Missionary Society has not been increasing very largely of late years; but since the emancipation it has increased considerably, *Freeman* 9—The whole

## Report, 1851—continued.

*London Missionary Society*—continued.

whole population of the Kat River settlement is not in connexion with the London Missionary Society, *Freeman* 18—There is a congregation in connexion with the Dutch Reformed Church at Balfour, *ib.*—But nine-tenths of the people are in connexion with the London Missionary Society, *ib.* 19.

See also *Missionaries*, 1. *Schools*. *Useful Arts*.

*Losses*. See *Compensation*. *Kat River Settlement*, 1. 2.

*Loyalty*. The tribes which are friendly to this country should not be removed from Kafirland, as that would be a breach of faith, *Bissett* 934-939.

See also *Hottentots*. *Kat River Settlement*, 3.

## M.

*Mackinnon*, Colonel. See *Patrol System*.

## MAGISTRATES :

1. *Complaints of the Kat River Settlers of the Conduct of former Magistrates.*
2. *How far expedient to appoint Native Magistrates.*
3. *Observations relative to the Magistrates of Natal.*

1. *Complaints of the Kat River Settlers of the Conduct of former Magistrates :*

Witness has looked at the effect of certain Government measures upon the Hottentot population of the Kat River settlement, and has thought some of these measures to be decidedly unfavourable to the people, *Freeman* 10—Witness refers rather to individual acts of the local magistrate, who is, however, appointed by the Government, than to any general and comprehensive measure of the Government itself, *ib.*—Detail of several of the acts of the late magistrate, Mr. J. H. Bowker, of an extremely injurious and irritating character, going far, as witness thinks, to account for, though not to justify, the disaffection of the Hottentots, which has unhappily broken out during the present Kafir war in the shape of disloyalty, *ib.* 10-14. 21. 92-102.

Witness is not aware that the settlers have any cause to complain of want of protection on the part of the Government, except in the instances of the acts of Mr. Bowker, *Freeman* 24, 25. 82, 83, 92-110—Witness believes the natives are satisfied with their present magistrate, Mr. Wienand, who is the third who has been appointed; the two former appointments were rather unfortunate, *ib.* 150. 156—Witness is not aware that the Kat River settlers have had any reason to complain of the conduct of the Government or of particular magistrates, *Bissett* 948-950.

Reference to the complaints made by the Kat River settlers of the conduct of the first magistrate who was appointed over the settlement, namely, Mr. Bidulph, *Renton* 3129-3134—And also of the magistrate who succeeded him, Mr. Bowker; respects in which this magistrate gave them offence, *ib.* 3170-3176—Evidence upon which witness bases the opinion that Mr. Bowker was actuated by

**MAGISTRATES**—continued.1. *Complaints of the Kat River Settlers, &c.*—continued.

by prejudices against the Hottentot population and the coloured population generally, *Renton* 3176-3196—There were also other magistrates in the district against whom the settlers complained; circumstances under which these complaints arose, *ib.* 3197, 3198—Grounds for witness's arriving at the conclusion that the course of the general policy adopted towards the Kafirs has been considerably complicated and interfered with by acts of indiscretion on the part of individual magistrates, *ib.* 3259-3262. 3411-3425.

2. *How far expedient to appoint Native Magistrates :*

With regard to appointing native magistrates witness would say that there are many respectable men perhaps in Graham's Town, but certainly in Cape Town, which is the seat of government, who are well qualified to act as magistrates, *Freeman* 103-110. 122-127. 157-159—The magistrates are always Europeans; reasons why witness thinks that at present this is better than that they should be appointed from their own race, *ib.* 122-127—There are half-castes in the colony who would be respected if they were known to be men of character and intelligence; but they are few in number, *ib.* 128-130—As regards the appointment of magistrates, if the natives themselves had the power of making a strong recommendation, perhaps of a veto to a certain extent, still leaving the appointment finally with the Government, it would give them great satisfaction, *ib.* 157-160—Witness would decidedly prefer magistrates being sent from this country who even did not know the Kafir language, rather than select them from those persons now in the colony whom he considers prejudiced against the coloured races, *Renton* 3239-3246.

3. *Observations relative to the Magistrates of Natal :*

Nature of the duties of the magistrates in the colony of Natal; satisfaction of the natives with the magisterial controul, *T. C. Smith* 2309-2313—There is no unwillingness of the natives in the colony of Natal to bring their disputes before the civil magistrates; it has always been the policy of the Government to maintain the authority of the chiefs, *ib.* 2330-2332.

See also *Biddulph, Mr. Chiefs, 4. 5. Civil Appointments. Civil Commissioners.*

*Maitland, General Sir Peregrine, K. C. B.* Was governor of the Cape of Good Hope from March 1844 to the beginning of 1847; 2847, 2848—Unsettled state of the frontier at the commencement of witness's governorship on account of the number of robberies by the Kafirs; numerous petitions received from the frontier, 2851—Visit paid by witness to the frontier and new treaties entered into with the Griquas; after placing troops in the ceded territory; cessation from plunder consequent upon these proceedings, 2852-2854—Opinion as to the principal cause of the outbreak of hostilities in 1846; it is attributable to the Government attempting to control the thieving in the colony, 2854-2857—Troublesome and expensive nature of the war in 1846; it was rendered more so from the pressure of the drought that prevailed and the imperfect communication between the colony and the eastern frontier, 2858-2861.



Report, 1851—*continued.*

*Maitland, Gen. Sir Peregrine, a. c. v. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Recommendation that all the Kafirs should be driven across the Great Kei, and that river adopted as the frontier boundary; no Kafirs should be located in British Kafraria unless they registered themselves and gave up their arms, 2862-2875—In the event of depredations continuing the chiefs should be compelled to make restitution and pay a just fine, 2876—The patrol system has been the only alternative hitherto in the pursuit of Kafir robbers, 2877—Opinion that the chiefs should not be hereditary, but should be appointed by and hold their authority from the Governor; they should be invested with magisterial authority under a civil commissioner, 2878-2882—Great inconvenience from the seat of government, Cape Town, being so great a distance from the frontier; there ought to be an officer with paramount authority on the frontier, 2883-2888—Witness does not consider it would be true to say that the conduct of the British Government towards the Kafirs has been marked by a want of that proper degree of forbearance which is due from a civilized country to tribes less civilized, 2889.

Very little advance has been made toward civilization among the Kafirs; they have very little disposition to enter into the pursuits of commerce, 2890-2894. 2971-2973—As a matter of humanity and policy, it is indispensable that there should be such a force for some time upon the frontier as shall not expose the Kafirs to the temptation of supposing they can resume hostilities with advantage, 2895-2899. 2964—The Kafirs are a pastoral nation; there would be no hardship in driving them across the Kei, the country beyond that river being unoccupied, 2900-2903—Recommendation that a settlement should be made with the Fingoes and Hottentots in the rear, and then in front there should be a line of military posts, 2909-2913. 2970.—The Buffalo River, as a boundary, would require more troops for its defence than the Kei, and it would not be complete without the Amatolas in our possession, 2909-2941—Witness considers it would be better to have a settlement of coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, on the ceded territory than to have Europeans, 2911-2924. 2927.

Witness does not think that sending the surveying party by Colonel Hare had anything to do with the breaking out of the war in 1846; witness had no idea of placing a post at Blockdrift until it was proposed by Sandilli himself, 2914, 2915. 2919-2922.—Remarks relative to the Zoolus who occupy Natal, as our subjects; they were driven in by the tyranny of their chiefs, 2916-2918—During witness's governorship he adhered in the main to the policy which was established by Lord Glenelg with reference to the Kafirs, 2923—Inconvenience of the ceded territory being occupied by Kafirs, as it brings them close to our border, and they cannot resist the temptation to steal the cattle, 2923—Witness conceives it to be quite possible to drive the Kafirs out of the Amatola mountains, and maintain that as a frontier freed from the presence of Kafirs, 2928-2930.

If it is considered desirable that Sir Harry Smith should establish the Buffalo River as the frontier boundary, he should be allowed sufficient troops for the purpose; there can be no objections to our taking possession of the country to the Buffalo River on the grounds of justice to the Kafirs; they having been the aggressors, should be punished by the loss of territory, 2931-2955—Witness's objections to Europeans being allowed to establish cattle

## Report, 1851.—continued.

*Maitland, Gen. Sir Peregrine, G. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

cattle farms on the frontier are the great temptation which they offer to the Kafirs, 2939-2950—The complaints of the colonists respecting the depredations committed by the Kafirs were, generally speaking, just and well founded, though they may have been somewhat exaggerated, 2956-2958. 2973—Looking at the position of things as they now stand, seeing the Kafirs are in hostility to the British, there is no other course open than that of prosecuting the war, and convincing the Kafirs that we are the stronger party, 2958-2962.

Opinion that it will be necessary to maintain a military force of some 5,000 or 6,000 troops on the frontier for some time, 2963-2970—The Kafirs had been for years previous to 1846 preparing for war by the collection of arms and ammunition, and the occasion of the survey of Blockdrift was seized on by them as a pretext for commencing the war, 2974-2976—Remarks relative to the treaties entered into by witness with the Griquas; denial that Maquomo was forced to sign the treaties, 2977, 2978—There is no doubt that the Kafirs and the Hottentots may be in some degree influenced in their proceedings by the state of politics in the colony, 2979-2981—Considering the frontier between the Fish River and the Keiskamma as a military frontier, there would be an advantage in pushing it further where the country would be open, 2982-2987—Witness always had a good opinion of the Cape Rifle Corps; there must have been some delusion practised to mislead the Hottentots, 2988, 2989.

The missionaries have not been successful in their labours to improve and civilize the Kafirs, 2990-2993—Witness has heard that if representative institutions were given to the colony, the colony in itself would be able to take care of its frontier; witness very much doubts the power of the colony to defend the frontier; they would be very sorry to try it, 2994—Whatever may be the opinion of the different governors of the Cape as to the frontier, the boundary is determined entirely by the home Government; no steps can be taken independently of the Colonial-office, 2997, 2998—Witness does not see how the establishment of a constitutional government at the Cape would have any beneficial effect upon our relations with the Kafir tribes, 2999, 3000—It is very undesirable that after we have occupied any territory we should re-cede it to the Kafirs; they would not appreciate any retrocession on our part; they would take it as weakness, 3001-3007.

*Maitland, Sir P.* The colonists were delighted with the alteration made by Sir Peregrine Maitland in the treaties, the feeling of many of the colonists was in favour of a very summary and stringent policy to be exercised towards the frontier tribes, and therefore the change from a humane to a military policy delighted them, *Sir A. Stokenstrom* 1921-1932. 1938-1942. 1969-1971.

See also *Treaties*, 1.

*Manufactures.* See *Useful Arts*.

*Maquomo* (Chief). See *Ceded Territory*. *Commando System*, 2. *Kat River Settlement*, 1. *Treaties*, 2.

## Report, 1851—continued.

**Military Chief.** How far it would be necessary to place the whole of the frontier under a military chief, with summary powers to act for himself in his treaties with the Kafirs, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1578, 1579—In the event of Kafria being placed under military possession, the authority of the chiefs should be upheld, they being allowed to govern their people according to their own laws, *ib.* 1602-1604. 1628. 1690.

**Military Colonies.** Opinion in favour of the system of military colonies; manner in which they could be established; plan of defence, *Owen* 2488-2497. 2543. 2637-2644—Suggested establishment of a system of military colonies along the frontier; the settlers being protected by a military force, *Sir J. A. Alexander* 2744-2751.—See also *Military Villages*.

**MILITARY FORCE:**

1. *Insufficiency of the Force in the Colony at the Period of the recent Outbreak.*
2. *Necessity for the Maintenance of a large Military Force on the Frontier.*
3. *How far the Colony itself would be able to bear the Expense of such Force.*

1. *Insufficiency of the Force in the Colony at the Period of the recent Outbreak:*

Witness attributes the recent outbreak to the want of sufficient military power to keep the Kafirs in awe; it was very unfortunate that the military force had been reduced, *Bissett* 740-745. 748—Explanation as to the present character of the military occupation of the country of British Kafria; insufficiency of such occupation up to this time, *ib.* 953-956—The outbreak which has recently taken place is decidedly attributable to the absence of a military force of sufficient number on the frontier, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1267-1272—There has never been a sufficient military force at the Cape to guard the frontier as it ought to be guarded, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1534.

Witness is not sufficiently acquainted with military affairs to say whether the want of sufficient military force had anything to do with the aggression of the Kafirs by inducing them to think that the moment was come when they could strike a blow with advantage against British power, *Renton* 3036—At the time of the outbreak if a very small number of regular troops with a military officer could have been sent into the Kat River settlement, there is no doubt it would have been sufficient to have rallied the loyal, and to have put down the insurrection, *ib.* 3462-3468—When application was made for arms and ammunition there were none to supply, *ib.* 3463-3468—The outbreak was conducted with great secrecy and was most unexpected; there were no means of providing against it beforehand, *ib.* 3465-3467.

2. *Necessity for the Maintenance of a large Military Force on the Frontier:*

Necessity for an officer of high rank with a strong force being constantly stationed on the frontier, *Fairbairn* 449-451. 458-460—Extent of the military force necessary to be maintained, for the protection of the colony; witness does not know what the expense would be, but it must be considerable,

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**MILITARY FORCE**—continued.

2. *Necessity for the Maintenance, &c.*—continued.

able, *Fairbairn* 505, 506—Necessity for the maintenance of the military forts and forces on the Kafir frontier wherever the military men thought they would be most efficient, *ib.* 511—Impossibility for some years to come of doing without the presence of a considerable regular military force upon the frontier; it would be impossible to trust altogether or mainly to the settlers for the defence of the frontier, *Bissett* 806-811. 957-962; *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1273-1277; *Owen* 2483-2487. 2556-2566; *Sir P. Maitland* 2895-2899. 2964—If it is intended to keep the whole of Kafria, it can be done only by a military occupation of the country, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1517; *Owen* 2447-2448; 2592-2602.

Opinion that an army of about 4,000 effective men would be necessary to be stationed on the frontier for its protection; such a force would tend materially to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1530-1532. 1693; *Sir P. Maitland* 2963-2970—To provide the necessary force for the proper protection of the frontier will be a very great expense to this country, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1535—Witness has heard it said that provided the military were withdrawn the settlers and boers would protect themselves; witness does not think they could, *ib.* 1597.

3. *How far the Colony itself would be able to bear the Expense of such Force.*

With respect to the question whether the colony would be disposed in the event of their having representative institutions to bear the expense of a military force, witness can only say this must depend on the manner in which the war is settled, and the frontier delivered over to them; the colony is entitled to a representative government and accepts it of course with all its legitimate responsibilities, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1278—Witness considers that the colony would be disposed to contribute a part of the expense of maintaining a military force on the frontier, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1536.

<i>See also Buffalo River.</i>	<i>Cape Corps.</i>	<i>Civil Commissioners.</i>	<i>Com-</i>
<i>mando System, 1.</i>	<i>Depredations.</i>	<i>Expenditure.</i>	<i>mando</i>
<i>Wars.</i>	<i>Kat River Settlement.</i>	<i>Kei River, 1. 2.</i>	<i>Kafir</i>
<i>Regular Troops.</i>	<i>Rifle Brigade.</i>	<i>Tambookie Frontier.</i>	<i>Natal.</i>
<i>ties, 2.</i>	<i>Zoolus.</i>		<i>Trea-</i>

**Military Law.** Opinion that military law should prevail on the frontier and not the ordinary laws of the country, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1580.

**Military Officers.** Advantage of employing military officers as agents between the Government and the natives; amount of salary given to the Bheel agents, *Owens* 1154-1157.

**Military Posts.** It would require a line of military posts along the immediate frontier to protect it from the incursions and robberies committed by the Kafirs, *A. Smith* 306, 307—Opinion that adopting any line of country in Kafirland as a frontier, and defending it by posts or by usual military defences, is quite impossible, *Owen* 2467-2485. 2563, 2580—Necessity for the frontier 0.63. O O 2

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*Military Posts*—continued.

being defended by means of posts and military colonies, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2710-2714—Recommendation that a settlement should be made with the Fingoes and Hottentots in the rear, and then in front there should be a line of military posts, *Sir P. Maitland* 2909-2913. 2970.

See also *Amatola Mountains*, 1. *Forts. King William's Town.*

*Military Villages.* The establishment of military villages and a line of signals along the frontier would be very advantageous, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1648, 1649—Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that the location of military villages was a very unfortunate step, *Renton* 3103-3105. 3356-3369.

See also *Military Colonies.*

## MISSIONARIES :

1. *Generally.*
2. *Advantages and Benefits derived from the Labours of the Missionaries.*
3. *Opinion that the Progress made by the Missionaries has not been great.*
4. *Exertions made by them to repress the Spirit of Rebellion.*
5. *Inexpediency of any Political Communication between the Government and the Missionaries.*

1. *Generally :*

Number and situation of the stations of the London Missionary Society in South Africa; there are altogether about thirty-four stations in and beyond the colony, *Freeman* 6—As an approximate estimate of the number of the native population in connexion with the Missionary Society, witness would say there are from 25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with their missionary labours, *ib.* 7—The Hottentots within the colony may form about one-fourth of the number; they are mixed with the "late apprentices," *ib.* 8—The latter have no distinct name but that of "late apprentices," meaning those that were till lately in slavery; these constitute another fourth, *ib.*—The other two-fourths, or one-half of the whole number, would be Kafirs, Griquas, Bechuanas and Fingoes, *ib.*—The only other settlements of the Hottentots besides that of the Kat River are the missionary institutions, where the people have congregated round the missionaries, *ib.* 133, 134—A portion of land, say 5,000 acres, is perhaps allotted by the Government as the location of the Hottentots, where a missionary resides and a schoolhouse is built, and a church or a chapel, as the case may be; the missionaries are appointed from the societies at home, *ib.* 134-137.

Statement as to the number and denominations of missionaries distributed over the Cape colony and its boundaries, *Adamson* 699-702—In the whole district over which the insurrection has spread there is not a single missionary or mission family remaining except at the Chumie station, *Renton* 3263, 3264—Whether it is desirable that the missionaries should withdraw from the seat of war or that they should remain is a question about which good men and wise men differ, *ib.* 3265—There is much to be said on both sides, but it is obvious to witness that if they can remain with personal safety there are

various

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MISSIONARIES—continued.

1. *Generally*—continued.

various important ends to be gained by their continuance, in exerting their influence to prevent the well affected from being involved in the rebellion; the Kafirs were willing that they should remain in their country, *Renton* 3265-3273—Witness is aware that a meeting was held in Graham's Town in March, in which strong disapprobation was expressed at the conduct of the missionaries, *ib.* 3345-3347. 3431. 3477-3481.

2. *Advantages and Benefits derived from the Labours of the Missionaries :*

Opinion that the labours of the missionaries at the Cape have been highly advantageous and beneficial to the colony, *Adamson* 665 *et seq.*—The missionaries are looked on favourably by the natives and received with kindness, and their influence extends very far beyond the stations which they occupy, *ib.* 703, 704—There is every reason to be satisfied with the progress of missionary labour in South Africa, *ib.* 705-708—Opinion that missionary influence must be kept perfectly distinct from Government and magistrate influence, *ib.* 709-713—Generally speaking, the influence of the missionaries over the native tribes is very beneficial, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1451-1453.

Remarks relative to the missionaries at the Cape; they generally aided the Government in their attempts to preserve peace with the Kafirs, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1608-1614—Generally speaking the chiefs do not like the missionary stations, because from the preaching of the missionaries the Kafirs get a certain degree of light which makes them not so completely subservient to their chiefs; the people like the missionaries, *A. Smith* 2220, 2221—The conduct of the Kafir chiefs towards the missionaries has been faithful and friendly, *Renton* 3086—The influence of the missionaries over the Kafirs who are under their spiritual influence is very great, and from this circumstance there is a reflex influence over the Kafir tribes in general, *ib.* 3348-3355.

3. *Opinion that the Progress made by the Missionaries has not been great :*

Remarks relative to the progress made by the missionaries among the Kafirs in Kafirland; witness does not think that the progress among the Kafirs, as a whole, has been great, *Adamson* 729, 730—Evidence relative to the nature of the duties imposed upon missionaries at the various stations, *ib.* 1011—Opinion that at present it is scarcely possible to dispense with the aid given by Government to the missionary stations, *ib.* 1038—Great doubts as to whether the missionaries are doing any good among the Kafirs and tribes of Southern Africa, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1521—Witness was disappointed in finding the amount of influence of the missionaries of various denominations to be considerably short of his anticipations; still great good has been done by them, *Renton* 3113.

4. *Exertions used by them to repress the Spirit of Rebellion :*

The missionaries have great influence with the Kafir chiefs and with the tribes generally in the district of the Kat River; the influence of the missionaries, as well as of the minister of the Dutch Church, was exercised incessantly

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**MISSIONARIES**—continued.4. *Exertions used by them to repress the Spirit, &c.*—continued.

to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of the rebels, *Renton* 3203-3205. 3313-3331. 3432—As far as witness's judgment and information go, the missionaries in Sandilli's district took no part whatever, either directly or indirectly, in promoting the rising of the Kafirs, *ib.* 3274-3276—Witness has never heard of any instance where the missionaries either directly or indirectly had given sanction to the rising of the Kafirs, *ib.* 3452-3457—Every exertion was made by the missionaries to allay the prevailing irritation among the Kafirs, *La Trobe* 3485.

5. *Inexpeñency of any Political Communication between the Government and the Missionaries :*

Witness thinks it a very unadvisable thing to have any political communication between the Government and the missionaries, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1614—Witness is not aware whether many of the communications between the missionaries and the chiefs have been more political than religious; some of the missionaries have been employed as negotiators on the part of the Government, *Renton* 3322-3338. 3342—With respect to the question whether it is prejudicial to the cause of religion to mix up in the cases of persons the two purposes of religion and politics, *ib.* 3343—Witness would say that it is desirable to keep the two quite distinct, but he apprehends that in many cases there are no other suitable parties through whom communications can be made, *ib.* 3343, 3344. 3433, 3434.

See also *Barbarity.* Chiefs, 4. *Christianity.* Civilization, 1.  
*Commission of Inquiry.* Gunpowder. *Hottentots.* Late Apprentices.  
*London Missionary Society.* Policy of the Government. *Politics.*  
*Shiloh.* Traders.

*Morals.* Generally speaking the people of the Kat River settlement are a well conducted people; there is but one settlement where there is any disposition to intoxication, *Freeman* 17—Witness would look for the defence of the frontier totally to the moral elevation of the Kafirs, and not to force; it will no doubt take some time to raise their moral character to the required standard, *A. Smith* 2163-2167.

*Moravian Mission.* See *Shiloh.* *Useful Arts.*

*Moshesh,* Chief. Detail of the mode in which the territory belonging to Moshesh, the chieftain of the tribe, was taken from him without compensation being made to him; witness would say it was taken away from him by intimidation, *Freeman* 257-261.

*Murders.* See *Depredations.*

## N.

*Napier,* Sir George T., K.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has held the office of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope; was Governor there between six and seven years, 1511-1513—Opinion that the first step to be taken must be to put the Kafirs down, and that so completely as to force them to cry

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Napier, Sir George T., K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

cry out for peace, 1515-1517—This can only be done by a strong military force being placed at the complete disposal of Sir Harry Smith, 1515—If it is intended to keep the whole of Kafraria, it can be done only by a military occupation of the country, 1517—Opinion that the Keiskamma is the most advantageous frontier to maintain, along which there were very excellent forts built, 1518. 1655-1657. 1688, 1689. 1692—Suggestion that Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort, and along there might be kept as a depôt for stores and for some troops, 1518—The Keiskamma should be maintained as it was under Lord Charles Somerset; opinion that he understood the Kafirs and the management of that frontier better than any governor who was ever there before or since, 1518.

Witness would not propose to push the frontier to the Great Kei, unless it is proposed to keep Kafraria; opinion that Kafraria can only be kept by a military force, 1519—Necessity for the Kafirs being allowed the free range of their country; provided they were all forced into one spot they would starve, 1520, 1521—Impossibility of civilizing the Kafirs; it is witness's opinion that they will never be much better than they are, 1521—Great doubts as to whether the missionaries are doing any good among the Kafirs and tribes of Southern Africa, 1521—It would not be expedient in any way to interfere with the internal government of the Kafirs beyond the frontier with a view of preventing incursions into the British territory, 1522. 1690.

Opinion that everything ought to be done through the chiefs; there is no doubt that the chiefs have sufficient authority over the tribes to prevent them committing depredations, and they should be held responsible for the acts of their tribes, 1523-1525. 1533. 1658, 1659—Observations as to the alterations made by witness in the treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom with the Kafir chiefs, 1525-1529—Opinion that an army of about 4,000 effective men would be necessary to be stationed on the frontier for its protection; such a force would tend materially to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, 1530-1532. 1693—Witness will venture to say that the treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom were never once infringed by the colonists, but they were frequently infringed by the Kafirs; the moment it occurs to a savage that it is his interest to do so and so, treaties may go to the wind, 1533. 1581-1592.

Nature and extent of what may be called the open frontier of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1534—There has never been a sufficient military force at the Cape to guard the frontier as it ought to be guarded, 1534—To provide the necessary force for the proper protection of the frontier, will be a very great expense to this country, 1535—Witness considers that the colony would be disposed to contribute a part of the expense of maintaining a military force on the frontier, 1536—Witness thinks it better that the seat of government should be at Cape Town, 1537—The extent of territory has not been increased; we hold now the same boundary as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had after the war which took place; Sir Andries Stockenstrom gave it away again, 1538-1540—Great advantage would result from the British Government making small allowances to the chiefs as long as they maintained good order among their people, and prevented depredations,



## Report, 1851—continued.

*Napier, Sir George T., K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

1541, 1542. 1551-1554. 1691—It is witness's firm opinion that the chiefs do possess great influence over their tribes, 1543-1545. 1548-1550. 1590-1592.

Great influence possessed by Sir Andries Stockenström over the Kafirs, which he exercised to maintain peace and loyalty, 1546, 1547—Witness considers it perfectly just that the frontier tribes should be held responsible for depredations committed on the settlers, 1554-1560—Disaffection among the Hottentots in the Cape Corps; great advantage of sending European troops to the Cape; it might be advantageous to form a regiment partly of Europeans and partly of Hottentots, 1561-1564—Witness would approve of breaking up the Kat River settlement; if witness had had to make that settlement, he would never have placed it there, 1565, 1566—Witness thinks it would be a very good thing if there was a body of Englishmen in Kafria, along the whole line of that country; such a system might be accomplished by degrees, by encouraging soldiers to settle there, and allowing them to settle with their families, 1567-1577—How far it would be necessary to place the whole of the frontier under a military chief, with summary powers to act for himself in his treaties with the Kafirs, 1578, 1579—Opinion that military law should prevail on the frontier, and not the ordinary laws of the colony, 1580.

Witness attaches no value to treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs; such treaties would only be observed as long as it suited their interests, 1593, 1594—Opinion that the frontier can only be protected by a line of forts and military posts; amount of military force that would be required for this purpose, 1595-1601—Witness has heard it said that provided the military were withdrawn, the settlers and boers would protect themselves; witness does not think they could, 1597—In the event of Kafria being placed under military possession, the authority of the chiefs should be upheld, they being allowed to govern their people according to their own laws, 1602-1604. 1628. 1690—Observations as to the great success which has attended the policy of the Government, as pursued with the Zoolus in Natal, 1602. 1615, 1616.

Extension of the boundary of the Cape colony to the River Kei by Sir Benjamin D'Urban; the majority of the colonists were in favour of this extension, 1605-1608. 1646, 1647—Remarks relative to the missionaries at the Cape; they generally aided the Government in their attempts to preserve peace with the Kafirs, 1608-1614—Witness thinks it a very unadvisable thing to have any political communication between the Government and the missionaries, 1614—The itinerant traders introduce arms, ammunition, and brandy in Kafria; great deal of smuggling carried on by them; they should not be allowed to go into Kafria, except as they did under the system established by Lord Charles Somerset, 1617-1624—Opinion that the Kafir servants coming into the colony are the means of stealing cattle from the farmers, 1625-1627.

It is advisable that Kafirs should not be allowed to enter the colony without a pass from their chief and from the political agent, 1628-1631—Importance of the Amatolas being cleared of the Kafir tribes as a means of finishing the war; witness would not recommend the permanent occupation of the

Report, 1851—*continued.*

*Napier, Sir George T., K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

the Amatolas, the Keiskamma would be the better boundary, 1632-1639—During witness's tenure of governorship he was very reluctant to go to war with the Kafirs in consequence of trifling depredations; the number of depredations did not increase from that line of policy, 1640-1642—Opinion that taking the united interests of the colonists, there is a stronger interest in the colony against a war than in favour of one, 1643-1645.

The establishment of military villages and a line of signals along the frontier would be very advantageous, 1648, 1649—It is desirable to have some surveillance over the dealings of the colonists with the Kafirs as a means of preserving peace, 1650-1654—Evidence relative to the establishment of the Kat River settlement and the state of that colony, 1660-1687—Impossibility of the Cape colony defraying the expense of the military force necessary for the protection of the frontier; the expense must be borne by the mother country, 1694—Circumstances attending the reversal of the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the giving up of the territory between the present boundary and the River Kei; prediction of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in his despatches, that a future war would be the consequence of a reversal of his policy, 1695-1708.

See also *Defence of the Frontier. Glenelg, Lord. Printed Papers.*

*Natal.* Evidence showing that Natal is not a safe colony as a British possession if the Zoolus became our enemies; there is only one regiment there, consisting of about 650 men, *A. Smith* 2078-2096—Statement as to the extent of the colony of Natal proper, *T. C. Smith* 2259-2260—Favourable nature of the country and climate of Natal; it is preferable to British Kafaria; it is possible to anticipate a large population there of European origin engaged in the pursuits of agriculture, *ib.* 2261-2272—Manner in which the boundaries of Natal were fixed; nature of the arrangements made between the Government and the native tribes, *ib.* 2273-2276—Estimated number of native tribes in the colony of Natal; great influx of natives since the last war; amount of military force employed to control the native population, *ib.* 2305-2320.

See also *Boers. Kei River, 1. Policy of the Government, 3. Zoolus.*

*Native Chiefs.* See *Chiefs.*

*Native Magistrates.* See *Magistrates, 2.*

*Neutral Territory.* Impracticability of maintaining a certain space of neutral ground between the two races, the Hottentots and the Kafirs, *Freeman* 116-118—All the policy of Lord Charles Somerset was directed to establish more clearly the old boundary, and to keep a certain tract of country beyond free from all settlers, with a view to secure peace and quietness on the frontier, *A. Smith* 2186—Opinion that the establishment of a *bonâ fide* neutral territory which neither colonists nor Kafirs should be permitted to enter, would not effect much good; the Kafirs would cross that territory and steal, *ib.* 2226, 2227—There has always been an impression among the colonists on the frontier that a Kafir war would take place, and it was with a view of putting these apprehensions at rest that Sir Peregrine Maitland wished to

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*Neutral Territory*—continued.

establish a large and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force might be always ready to move upon the Kafirs; establishment of Fort Hare, *Owens* 2419-2421.

See also *Boundaries*. *Ceded Territory*. *Commando System*, 2. *Frontier Boundary*. *Treaties*, 2.

*Niven*, Mr. See *Barbarity*.

## O.

*Open Frontier*. Nature and extent of what may be called the open frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1534.

*Orange River*. See *Griquas*, 2.

*Owens*, Colonel C. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Colonel in the Bombay Army; has served in India thirty-two years, 1114, 1115—Witness was sent a Bheel agent to Khandeish, 1115—Troubled state of the Khandeish territory at the time it fell into our hands in 1817; it was completely overrun by mercenary bands of Arabs, Pindarees, and Bheels, so that the roads were nearly impassable, and neither life nor property was secure, 1116, 1117—Detail relative to the military operations carried out against the Bheels by the Indian Government in 1819, in order to restore the tranquility of the district; failure of those coercive measures to restore peace and order, 1118-1122—On the failure of the military operations, orders were received from England in 1824 and 1825 to endeavour to introduce a different and conciliatory system, 1123.

Appointment of European officers as Bheel agents, with full magisterial powers to settle all the Bheel disputes; division of the Khandeish province into districts for this purpose, 1123-1127—Nature of the conciliatory policy adopted by the agents, and complete success which attended that policy, by which Khandeish has become as quiet as any district under the Bombay Presidency, 1128-1131, 1158-1246—Amount of the Indian force employed in the province; formation of two native regiments, whose fidelity has been found uninterrupted, 1139-1146—Report made by witness to Sir John Malcolm in 1830, stating the success which had attended the conciliatory policy in the province; this report was approved of by Sir John and also the home Government, and was printed and distributed for future guidance of officers, 1132-1136. 1147-1149—Opinion that the same conciliatory policy as that pursued at Khandeish might be pursued with equal success with the Kafirs and wild tribes of South Africa, 1150-1152.

Remarks relative to the conciliatory policy followed by Mr. Shepstone respecting the settlement of Natal, and success thereof; the same system would succeed with the Kafirs, 1152. 1244—Recommendations as to the measures which should be taken in Southern Africa to apply the Indian conciliatory policy to the settlement of the differences which exist between the local government and those tribes, 1153 *et seq.*—Advantage of employing military officers as agents between the Government and the natives; amount of salary given to the Bheel agents, 1154-1167.

Report, 1851—continued.

*Owen, Captain Henry Charles Cunliffe.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope from January 1845 to March 1848; was a lieutenant of the Royal Engineers, and served under Sir Peregrine Maitland, 2381-2384—Explanation relative to the operations in which witness was employed beyond the Orange River, in the neighbourhood of Phillipolis, in supporting the Griquas against an attack of the Dutch boers; defeat of the boers and establishment of a civil magistrate in the country, 2386-2392—Opinion that the Kafirs have been preparing for war for some years past, nearly since the end of the war under Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and only waited a pretext for breaking out, 2394. 2416, 2417. 2523-2537. 2655-2657—Supply of fire-arms and ammunition obtained by the Kafirs from the travelling traders, 2395, 2396—The Kafirs found a pretext for commencing the war in 1849 on our sending a small party to survey a piece of ground within their territory, beyond the Chunie River; nature and objects of this survey, 2398-2415.

There has always been an impression among the colonists on the frontier that a Kafir war would take place, and it was with a view of putting these apprehensions at rest that Sir Peregrine Maitland wished to establish a large and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force might be always ready to move upon the Kafirs; erection and establishment of Fort Hare, 2419-2421—Opinion that the boundary must be always undefined; there is no good bounearry as a mere defensive boundary in itself; the defence of the frontier must rather turn upon military consideration than upon any neutral boundary, 2422-2426. 2580—From the mode of warfare of the Kafirs, it is very desirable that the boundary should have the command of an open country; opinion that King William's Town is about one of the best military stations in the colony, 2427-2435. 2557-2566—Witness does not consider the slightest reliance can be placed upon treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs; it is expedient to trust alone to the military defence of the frontier, 2436-2439. 2538-2542. 2603. 2632-2636.

Estimated force of the Kafirs; manner in which they are supported; impossibility of their maintaining a war for any length of time, from the want of provisions, 2440-2448. 2605—Witness considers the military occupation of Kafria as the only means of keeping the Kafirs in check, 2447, 2448. 2592-2602—Witness looks upon it as practically impossible to prevent the importation of arms into Kafirland; provided the traders were prevented from supplying them, they would be supplied by foreign traders and landed on the coast, 2449-2458—Remarks relative to the forts on the frontier; great difficulty of obtaining a supply of water; it is very desirable that tanks should be provided for those forts, 2459-2466—Opinion that adopting any line of country in Kafirland as a frontier, and defending it by posts, or by usual military defences, is quite impossible, 2467-2485. 2563. 2580—The only means of preventing Kafir incursions into the colony, is by maintaining a large military force on certain spots of the boundary in continual readiness for war; witness does not think that anything like peace will ever last with the Kafirs, 2483-2487. 2556-2566.

Opinion in favour of the system of military colonies; manner in which they could be established; plan of defence, 2488-2497. 2543. 2637-2644—Evidence generally relative to the commando system formerly adopted; opinion

## Report, 1851—continued.

**Owen, Captain H. C. C.** (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

opinion that that system is more humane in the aggregate than the present system, which ends in these bloody wars, 2497-2522—Remarks relative to the survey made on part of the territory of Sandilli, the Blockdrift, at the desire of Sir Peregrine Maitland, which the Kafirs made a pretext of war in 1846; such an encroachment might have been a just pretext for complaint, but not for war, 2523-2537. 2590, 2591. 2617, 2618—Advantage of driving the Kafirs over the great Kei; by such a proceeding the Government would secure the respect of the Kafirs, as they have most respect for that which they fear most, 2544-2555. 2576-2584—For ordinary depredations committed along the frontier, witness would depend upon the individual settlers, who should have permission to defend themselves and execute summary justice on the robbers, they being supported for a time by military force, 2567-2575. 2622, 2623. 2644.

Opinion that the Kafirs should be driven out of the Amatola mountains, and never again be allowed to herd their cattle there or till the ground, 2585-2588—In the event of Government grants being made to the chiefs, witness does not think they possess sufficient influence over their tribes to lead them to keep down depredations for the purpose of receiving the subsidy, 2604—From the nature of the cultivation adopted by the Kafirs, it would be no hardship to push them across the Great Kei, they being migratory tribes, seldom inhabiting the same spot for long together, 2605-2616—Opinion that a boundary, except for legal purposes, is not wanted at all; as a military question it leads to difficulties of all kinds, 2619-2621—As long as the Kafir chiefs are peaceful neighbours, witness would recognise their authority, but not the complete independence which is recognised in a civilized power, 2624—Witness does not believe any attempts to civilize the Kafirs would be successful, 2625—In the defence of the frontier, it is desirable to rely as much as possible on British troops, 2626.

Opinion that the Hottentots might be made useful allies by combination with the British forces, 2627-2631—The causes of the discontent in 1846, which made the Kafirs so desirous for a pretext for war, was their eagerness to possess themselves of our lands and herds, 2645-2647—In recommending that the Kafirs should be driven over the Great Kei, witness only refers to those chiefs and tribes most implicated in the war, 2648-2654—Witness knows of no other cause of irritation arising from any acts of the white people, which could have led to the war in 1846, than that of the survey of the Blockdrift on the Chumie River, 2658, 2659.

## P.

*Parliamentary Commission.* See *Commission of Inquiry.*

*Pastoral Employment.* See *Amatola Mountains, 1. Cultivation.*

*Passports.* It is advisable that Kafirs should not be allowed to enter the colony without a pass from their chief and from the political agent, Sir G. T. Napier 1628-1631.

Report, 1851—continued.

**Patrol System.** It has become very difficult to rule the Kafir tribes under the present system, that is, the patrol system, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1261-1263—There is not a more able officer anywhere than the officer who has been for two or three years carrying on this system, Colonel Mackinnon, *ib.* 1261-1263—He is a man of the strictest integrity and wishing to do justice, but under the present system he cannot do it, *ib.* 1262, 1263—Strong objections witness entertains towards the present patrol system; difference between this system and the commando system; way in which the commando system has been mistaken; opinion that the patrol system, which has with the exception of the interval from 1836 to 1844, been going on since 1817, has brought all the misfortunes on the colony, *ib.* 1282-1295, 1309-1315, 1320 *et seq.* 1387.

In witness's opinion the commando system was decidedly less unjust and less injurious than the patrol system; the commando system is necessary on a barbarous frontier, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1387-1394—The patrol system was put down by witness; but the depredations by the Kafirs were never completely stopped; this was never expected, *ib.* 1737-1744—Explanation as to the difference between the patrol system and the commando system; neither system is effective for the protection of the frontier boundary, *A. Smith* 2159-2163—Explanation as to the meaning of the term patrol system; nature of the patrol system as applied to the frontier arrangements, *T. C. Smith* 2379, 2380—The patrol system has been the only alternative hitherto in the pursuit of Kafir robbers, *Sir P. Maitland* 1877.

See also *Commando System*.

**Peace.** Peace is comparative with barbarous tribes; there are always disagreements between them without war, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1909, 1910—Opinion as to the preliminary course necessary for the foundation of tranquillity in the colony, and of peace among the Kafir tribes, *Renton* 3247 *et seq.*

See also *Chiefs*, 6.

**Pensions.** See *Chiefs*, 1.

**Plunder.** The passion for plunder is stronger with the Kafirs than the passion for war, but war generally arises from this, *A. Smith* 361—They attack other native tribes in the same way as they attack the colonists, *ib.* 362—Unsettled state of the frontier at the commencement of witness's governorship on account of the number of robberies by the Kafirs; numerous petitions received from the frontier, *Sir P. Maitland* 2851—Visit paid by witness to the frontier, and new treaties entered into with the Griquas, after placing troops in the ceded territory; cessation from plunder consequent on those proceedings, *ib.* 2852-2854—Opinion as to the principal cause of the outbreak of hostilities in 1846; it is attributable to the Government attempting to control thieving in the colony, *ib.* 2854-2857.

See also *Cattle Stealing*. *Chiefs*, 2. *Commando System*, 1. *Military Posts*. *Shiloh*.

**Police.** The natives have been recently more employed in the British service as police, with a view to check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs, *Fairbairn* 436—Employment of the Kafirs as a police force in the colony; in the character of policemen the experiment answered very well, but it failed

## Report, 1861—continued.

*Police*—continued.

when this country was engaged in a war against their nation; they went over to the enemy on the very first attack, *Fairbairn* 438-440; *Bissett* 812-815  
—The Cape mounted police consist principally of Kafirs, *Fairbairn* 442.

## POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT:

1. *Defective Nature of the past and present Policy pursued by the British Government; Difficulties of suggesting any practical Measures on the Subject.*
  2. *Suggestions as to the most expedient and practicable Policy for the British Government to pursue in reference to the Frontier Tribes.*
  3. *Opinions that a System of conciliatory Policy might be pursued with Success.*
1. *Defective Nature of the past and present Policy pursued by the British Government; Difficulties of suggesting any practical Measures on the Subject.*

Witness considers that the political system now pursued by the British Government towards the native tribes is defective, inasmuch as there has been a great tendency to take the lands of the natives, which has had the effect of driving them before our advance, and cooping them up in places not suitable to afford them the means of support, and of course keeping them in a somewhat dissatisfied and discontented state, *Adamson* 675-678—Witness has considered the policy of this country in regard to the frontier tribes, and had formed opinions upon it, but recent events have so altered the circumstances of both parties, the Kafirs and the colony generally, that witness cannot say what ought to be done, *Fairbairn* 432, 433, 463, 464—Difficulty of suggesting any practical measures which the Government of this country ought to adopt in reference to these tribes in the event of the British authority being completely re-established over them, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1258—Witness did suggest measures 20 years ago, but it is a very difficult question now, *ib.*

2. *Suggestions as to the most expedient and practicable Policy for the British Government to pursue in reference to the Frontier Tribes:*

There might be one of two courses adopted; either to let them entirely alone and allow them to manage their own affairs, as was the case when witness first went to the colony, or take them under the British jurisdiction altogether, *A. Smith* 304 *et seq.*: 322-332—If the latter plan were to be adopted every great chief must be immediately removed from the country, *ib.* 305—We shall never manage the Kafirs keeping their own chiefs, *ib.*—Opinion that the policy adopted by Sir Harry Smith in the government of the colony has been very beneficial, and has afforded great protection to the farmer and settler within the old boundary, and has been the means of saving the colony much loss and devastation, *Bissett* 987-989.

The best way to maintain friendly relations with the people beyond our borders is by an annual mission to them, and by small pensions to the chiefs, and inducing them to visit Cape Town and to receive the missionaries and schoolmasters,

## Report, 1851—continued.

**POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT—continued.****2. Suggestions as to the most expedient, &c.—continued.**

schoolmasters, and also to engage in trade as much as possible, and to give them a taste for European habits, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2805—Such a plan is quite possible, but it has never been fairly tried, *ib.* 2806—The course of policy witness would recommend would be, first, the vindication of the British name by an exemplary display of force, *Renton* 3087—Secondly, the withdrawing of the exercise of British power within the narrowest possible limits, *ib.*—And, thirdly, the extension of moral power to those half civilized tribes through the instrumentality of the missionaries, *ib.*

**3. Opinions that a System of conciliatory Policy might be pursued with Success:**

Opinion that the same conciliatory policy as that pursued at Khandeish might be pursued with equal success with the Kafirs and wild tribes of South Africa, *Ovans* 1150 *et seq.*—Remarks relative to the conciliatory policy followed by Mr. Shepstone respecting the settlement of Natal, and success thereof; the same system would succeed with the Kafirs, *ib.* 1152. 1244—Measures of conciliation might have a good effect at the present moment provided we get the upper hand of them completely, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1256, 1257. 1302. 1308—At the same time strict justice and humanity are the only means by which this or any other nation can be ruled, *ib.* 1256, 1257—Witness does not consider it would be true to say that the conduct of the British Government towards the Kafirs has been marked by a want of that proper degree of forbearance which is due from a civilized country to tribes less civilized, *Sir P. Maitland* 2889.

See also *Bheels. Border Tribes. Ceded Territory. Chiefs, 3. Commission of Inquiry. Constitutional Government. Division of the Colony. D'Urban, Sir Benjamin. Glenelg, Lord. Kafir Wars, 4. Magistrates. Patrol System. Special Commissioner. Treaties. Zoolus.*

**Politics.** There has not been the remotest political excitement produced at Cape Town which has had any effect upon the Kafirs during the last two years, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1917—There is no doubt that the Kafirs and the Hottentots may be in some degree influenced in their proceedings by the state of politics in the colony, *Sir P. Maitland* 2979-2981—The missionaries avoid on principle giving advice to the chiefs on political matters; but in relation to such temporal matters as are connected with husbandry and ordinary affairs, they give their advice readily, *Renton* 3114.

See also *Missionaries, 5.*

**Population.** The number of native inhabitants within the Kat River settlements is rather more than 5,000, *Freeman* 16—Evidence relative to the various tribes inhabiting the country on the other side of the Kafir frontier; the Kafir population may be estimated at about 80,000 or 90,000, but it is impossible to form an idea as to the numbers of the other tribes, *Fairbairn* 512-521—Extent of the population of the Cape Colony; districts into which the colony is divided, *Adamson* 1053-1060—Information as to the number of tribes and the population of each tribe in British Kafraria in 1830; witness estimated them at about 311,000, *A. Smith* 2030-2043—In this calculation with



## Report, 1851—continued.

*Population*—continued.

does not estimate the Zoolu tribes; the Zoolu country lies about 80 or 90 miles beyond Natal; the number of the Zoolus is very great; they have about 25 regular regiments; their system is very much like our system in regard to militias of counties, *A. Smith* 2044-2052—Out of the population estimated by witness at about 311,000, witness would say there would be about 50,000 fighting men, *ib.* 2068-2071.

*Prestige.* For a long time Kafirland was ruled by a species of prestige; the black had a fearful idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white; he has now lost this, the prestige is gone, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1298—Various circumstances have led to the alteration of this opinion, *ib.* 1299—If we had strictly used our moral superiority over them we might have avoided bringing into play that physical force and teaching them their strength, *ib.* 1300.

*Printed Papers.* Observations and explanations with respect to a letter which has been addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by Sir Andries Stockenström, dated 7 July 1851, stating that certain words contained in a letter of Sir G. Napier's of 20 November 1838, and which were inserted in the copy of the papers which were delivered to the Committee, were omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, *Hawes* 3286-3288—This sentence was, "the worst importation that ever came to this colony"; reasons for this being omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, *ib.*—Letter from Sir A. Stockenström to the Right Hon. H. Labouchere, dated 7 July 1851, in correction and explanation of certain portions of his evidence before the Committee, *App.* 498-508.

*Prisoners.* See *Barbarity.*

*Punishments.* See *Cattle Stealing.*

## R.

*Rations.* Complaints of the Hottentots in 1846, that while the men were serving on the frontier their families were left almost to starve; this has been remedied, the Government in the present war promising to supply food to the families of all parties serving on the frontier, *Fairbairn* 605-609.

*Recruits.* See *Cape Corps.*

*Regular Troops.* Impossibility of the regular troops carrying on the war with efficiency with their present equipments, *Bissett* 976-978.—See also *Boers.*

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Witness arrived in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope on 3d November 1850; went as commissioner for the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland to visit a few missionary stations that body has on the frontier, among the Kafirs; witness went immediately into the Kafir country, 3008-3010—Witness remained with the Kafirs from the middle of November till the 21st January, when he had to go into the Kut River settlement, 3011—When witness went into the Kafir country he found rumours of war all the way up on his journey; witness found

Report, 1851—continued.

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

found these rumours very prevalent on the frontier, but he discredited them for various reasons, 3012—From what witness could learn from the missionaries he could not find that there were any grounds for anticipating an outbreak, 3013-3016. 3021-3025—In fact, one or two new stations had been proceeded with at a considerable outlay of money, from the belief that there was a fair prospect of security if not of tranquillity, 3013.

Witness also had communication with the Kafirs themselves, and from their representations and assurances was led to believe there would be no outbreak; evidence in detail relative to the nature of these assurances, and showing that the Kafirs at this time even dreaded war, 3017-3019—Witness had frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with the Gaika Commissioner, Mr. Brownlee, an able and upright magistrate, and his statement was, that it had been long known that Sandilli had been plotting, but that he could not find any evidences of any general sympathy with him, or any design to break out in revolt, 3019—Witness attributes this diminution in the power of the chiefs to the confidence that the people had in the administration of Mr. Brownlee, 3020—The end of it was that there was a formidable outbreak, 3021, 3022—Witness at the time understood that there were latent causes of disaffection in the minds of the people, but they were not sufficient to produce an outbreak unless some occasion arose to excite these latent influences; statement generally of these latent causes, 3023-3035. 3038-3040.

The prevalence of rumours along the frontier and within the colony, of war, had a very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the expectation of it, and thereby calling into activity these latent elements, 3035—Witness is not sufficiently acquainted with military affairs to say whether the want of sufficient military force had anything to do with the aggression of the Kafirs, by inducing them to think that the moment was come when they could strike a blow with advantage against British power, 3036—Witness has no doubt that the chiefs among the Kafirs were dissatisfied with the existing state of things in consequence of their diminished influence; but the great bulk of the people were sensible of their improved condition arising from British influence, 3037—Witness considers the outbreak to have been principally the work of the chiefs acting upon the people, 3041-3043—Respects in which witness considers that the course followed by the Governor, unintentionally, but unfortunately, precipitated it; evidence in detail as to the course pursued by the Governor with regard to Sandilli, and also with respect to his conduct towards Macomo, which further tended to irritate the people, 3044-3073.

Opinion that the Gaika tribe are a people over whom a moral influence might be exercised, if we preserved in their minds the belief that we were acting towards them with justice and good faith, 3073, 3074—The grand point in the present state of affairs will be to prove the indomitable superiority of the British power; but the question as to what is to be done after this is a very grave and difficult question; much must depend upon the way in which the war is put down, 3075-3079—Witness laments that our territory was ever extended so far as it has been; we have nothing to gain from this large extent of territory, and can only retain it at an enormous expense, 3079—Witness's own opinion is that the best thing would be, if it were

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

possible, after the unmistakable vindication of the indomitable power of Britain, to act a magnanimous part, and say, We care nothing about your land; what we want is your benefit, and if you will be faithful allies, and preserve the territory from invasion, we give back a large part of it, 3079—This would be a saving of much money, and would be the means of restoring goodwill and confidence in the minds of the Kafirs towards us, 3079.

The Fish River does not afford a good line of defence, otherwise witness would have thought it desirable to have gone back to what was our territory in 1819; 3080—Supposing we had retired considerably, either to the Fish River or to some good military frontier, the personal situation of the missionaries, established in what would be indisputably Kafir territory, would be just what it was before, 3081—The colonial connexion has been hurtful and not beneficial to the progress of Christian missions, 3081-3085—The conduct of the Kafir chiefs towards the missionaries has been faithful and friendly, 3086.

The course of policy witness would recommend would be, first, the vindication of the British name by an exemplary display of force, 3087—Secondly, the withdrawing of the exercise of British power within the narrowest possible limits, 3087—And thirdly, the extension of moral power to these half-civilised tribes, through the instrumentality of the missionaries, 3087—The difficulty in the way of restoring to these tribes a portion of the territory we now occupy, which has been some years past taken by the British, lies in the vindication of our power sufficiently to preclude the idea that this cession of territory is made from weakness, 3088-3102—Towards such a step a variety of conditions would be indispensable with the chiefs and with the people, conditions that should be very distinct, and about which no party in Kafirland should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misapprehension, 3102.

Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that the location of military villages was a very unfortunate step, 3103-3105—Acts of very great cruelty were exercised on the male population at the outbreak of the war; but the missionaries were unmolested except in one instance, that of Mr. Niven, 3106-3112—Witness was disappointed in finding the amount of influence of the missionaries of various denominations in the Kafir tribes to be considerably short of his anticipations; still, great good has been done by them, 3113—The missionaries avoid, on principle, giving advice to the chiefs on political matters; but in relation to such temporal matters as are connected with husbandry and ordinary affairs, they give their advice readily, 3114.

[Second Examination.]—Witness went to the Kat River Settlement on the 20th January 1851; reasons for his going there, 3115—Disaffection prevailed there extensively at this period, 3116, 3117—The followers of Hermanus had rallied after his defeat and had received accessions from numerous discontented Hottentots, and were exercising a most pernicious influence, 3116—There seemed to be no civil or military authority in the colony competent to the exigency; there seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without or to control the turbulence within, 3116—Information as to the treatment of the population in and after the war of 1835-36 and 1846-47, when the sacrifices

Report, 1851—continued.

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

sacrifices and services were the greatest, and no compensation was made, 3118 *et seq.*—On making inquiries of the missionaries as to the causes of the extraordinary disaffection, witness learned that there was a long series of matters which had soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke primarily of the wars of 1835-36 and 1846-47; 3118.

Memorandum on the Kat River Settlement, drawn up by Dr. Innes, the superintendent general of education in the colony, founded upon official returns and documents, delivered in and read, 3118-3125—Detail of the grievances of the people as related to witness on his visit to the colony in 1851; 3126 *et seq.*—Complaints were made by them that both in 1835-36 and 1846-47 they were treated as a degraded race, and that they had received no compensation for the losses they had sustained by the wars; they also complained that solemn promises made to them by successive governors were broken, 3129 *et seq.*

Reference to the complaints made by them of the conduct of the first magistrate who was appointed over the settlement, namely, Mr. Biddulph, 3129-3134—In regard to this magistrate they complained that a tax was imposed upon wood cutting; this tax was levied since the war of 1846-47; they were not allowed to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or forest, without paying a tax of seven and a half per cent., 3134-3143—The people had not been previously taxed in this way; they considered the wood as their own; as a part of the property that was given to them on their location in that district, 3137-3142—They complained of it as coming upon them after their second impoverishment by war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their prosperity, 3143.

Observations upon Mr. Biddulph's report upon the Kat River Settlement, 3144-3155—This report, in which he represented the inhabitants of the settlement as a worthless and immoral class of people, excited universal indignation throughout the settlement, and was succeeded by remonstrances which led to his removal from the settlement, 3144-3147—Means witness has of controverting these statements of Mr. Biddulph's, 3148-3155—Evidence showing that the progress of education in the settlement was successful up to the time when it was wholly interrupted by the carrying off of all the people into military posts, 3155, 3156.

Further evidence in detail as to the losses sustained by the settlers of the Kat River Settlement, consequent on the wars of 1835-36 and 1846-47; 3157-3167—Witness is aware that many cases occurred of great individual losses to other settlers in other parts of the Cape from the Kafir war, but it was optional with them to come out or to retire, 3167—The Kat River men on the contrary were the first called out and the last relieved, 3167—Witness supposes the design of the settlement was to make them a sort of bulwark to the colony, which they have proved, for they have borne the brunt of every war, 3168—Witness has understood that on every occasion the Hottentots were ready to obey orders and were zealous in their loyalty, 3169—The present disaffection is mainly attributable to the neglect of their complaints, and the absence of redress for their losses, 3170—But there are also other causes; there was the conduct of this magistrate, Biddulph, and

Report, 1851—*continued.*

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

also of the magistrate who succeeded him, Bowker; respects in which this magistrate gave them offence, 3170-3176.

Evidence upon which witness bases the opinion that Mr. Bowker was actuated by prejudices against the Hottentot population, and the coloured population generally, 3176-3196—There were also other magistrates in the district against whom the settlers complained; circumstances under which these complaints arose, 3197, 3198—Observations relative to the location of Hermanus on the settlement, showing that his presence was dangerous to the allegiance of the people of the Kat River, 3199-3202. 3206—The missionaries have great influence with the Kafir chiefs, and with the tribes generally; in the district of the Kat River the influence of the missionaries, as well as of the minister of the Dutch church, was exerted incessantly to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of the rebels, 3203-3205.

Copy of memorandum of a conference with the insurgents at Blinkwater on 9th January, this document being sent to Major-general Somerset by Colonel Forie, then field cornet, and subsequently field commandant of the district; this conference was held with the rebels when making known to them the offer of pardon from his Excellency, 3206-3218—Account in this memorandum of what passed between Mr. Read, jun. and the rebels, as well as what passed on the part of the other individuals who accompanied the field cornet, and the sentiments by which at that time the rebels were actuated, 3207-3218—The insurrection broke out first at the Keiskamma among the Kafirs on the 24th December, 3219—And one of the principal insurrectionary movements was at the Kat River Settlement, immediately following the outbreak of the Kafirs, 3220—It is also the fact that great numbers of persons belonging to that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined the rebels, 3221—Reasons why witness would still say, were all these circumstances considered, that the Hottentots are a very loyal people, 3222-3226.

The desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in a settlement by themselves is a very difficult and a very momentous question, especially in the existing state of sentiment throughout the colony; but witness hesitates very greatly about the expediency of this course, 3227, 3228—It seems to witness to be desirable, if society is to be amalgamated, that there should be a general diffusion of all the classes who are to unite in such amalgamation, and that there should be as general a similarity of treatment as possible, all understanding and enjoying the rights that are common to all, 3229—There is no doubt that in parts of the colony great prejudices exist against the coloured races on the part of the whites in the colony, 3230-3233—There is a feeling of jealousy of the white men among the Kafirs, and also a feeling of injury from the aggression of the white men; this is concentrated more towards the Englishman than towards others, 3234-3236.

Opinion that the magistrates, or rather the civil commissioners who have been appointed over the Kafirs, have most admirably discharged their duties in at once maintaining what is due to British authority and doing justice to the natives, 3237-3244—Witness would decidedly prefer magistrates being sent from this country, who even did not know the Kafir language, rather than select

Report, 1851—continued.

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

select them from those persons whom he considers prejudiced against the coloured races now in the colony, 3239-3246.

Opinion as to the preliminary course necessary for the foundation of tranquillity in the colony and of peace among the Kafir tribes, 3247 *et seq.*—It appears to witness that an Imperial or Parliamentary Commission from this country, composed of men of capacity and high character, entirely removed from all colonial local influence, and with ample power to call parties and documents before them, who should thoroughly and impartially, on the spot, investigate facts, is most desirable if not most necessary to the ends of truth and justice, 3247-3258—Witness considers such a commission would give satisfaction to the Kafirs and would command their respect, 3249, 3250. 3253-3258.

Further grounds for witness's arriving at the conclusion that the course of the general policy adopted towards the Kafirs has been considerably complicated and interfered with by acts of indiscretion on the part of individual magistrates, 3259-3262—In the whole district over which the insurrection has spread, there is not a single missionary or mission family remaining except at the Chumie Station, 3263, 3264—Whether it is desirable that the missionaries should withdraw from the seat of war, or that they should remain, is a question about which good men and wise men differ, 3265—There is much to be said on both sides; but it is obvious to witness that if they can remain with personal safety, there are various important ends to be gained by their continuance in exerting their influence to prevent the well-affected from being involved in the rebellion; the Kafirs were willing that they should remain in their country, 3265-3273—As far as witness's judgment and information go, the missionaries in Sandill's district took no part whatever, either directly or indirectly, in promoting the rising of the Kafirs, 3274-3276—Witness has heard that some of the plunder that was taken from Fort Armstrong was found afterwards in Shiloh, this being a missionary station; but witness is not positive of the fact, 3277-3285.

[Third Examination.]—Witness has not the slightest reason for thinking that the rumour that some of the plunder taken from Fort Armstrong was found at Shiloh is well founded, 3303—Detail of the circumstances attending the destruction of Shiloh and of the previous occurrences; parties from whom witness has gathered these details, 3304-3311.

[Fourth Examination.]—Further reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the Kat River Settlement has not been a failure, 3312—On looking to the services and sacrifices and subsequent treatment undergone by the population, witness does not regard the experiment as having had a fair trial, 3312—Instances in support of the statement made by witness in his former evidence, that the missionaries had exerted themselves incessantly to repress the spirit of rebellion and to resist violence, 3313-3331. 3432—Witness is not aware whether many of the communications between the missionaries and the chiefs have been more political than religious; some of the missionaries have been employed as negotiators on the part of the Government, 3322-3338. 3342.

With respect to the question whether it is prejudicial to the cause of religion

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Renton, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

to mix up in the cases of persons the two purposes of religion and politics, 3343—Witness would say that it is desirable to keep the two quite distinct, but he apprehends that in many cases there are no other suitable parties through whom communications can be made, 3343, 3344. 3433, 3434—Witness is aware that a meeting was held in Graham's Town in March, in which strong disapprobation was expressed at the conduct of the missionaries, 3345-3347. 3431. 3477-3481—The influence of the missionaries over the Kafirs who are under their spiritual influence is very great, and from this circumstance there is a reflex influence over the Kafir tribes in general, 3348-3355.

Further evidence as to the evils which resulted from the establishment of military villages, 3356-3369—Almost all the employment of the Kafirs in their heathen state is stealing cattle; it is considered an honourable employment, 3370—Evidence as to their barbarous treatment of their prisoners; they have of late years been increasingly barbarous to their male prisoners; but they show lenity to women and children, 3371, 3372. 3469-3476—The attack on Woburn and on Auckland villages was a treacherous one; many of the Kafirs and Hottentots who made the attack were at the time partaking of the festivities of the villages, 3373-3380—Up to this period the Hottentots had been faithful to their engagements, and the majority of the proprietors, the people properly possessed of the allotments, are so still, 3381-3383.

When witness stated that the Hottentots had had discontent, from being employed in the last war for a considerable time, it was not the mere employment he specified as the cause, but the conditions of it, and the treatment afterwards, and the losses they suffered, 3383-3392—Witness considers the rest of the Hottentots settled along the frontier were as loyal as those at the Kat River, 3393—Witness does not consider that the small portion of this race that has shown disaffection and has been engaged in the late outrages is any proof of their readiness to become enemies of the Government, 3394-3410—There have been several Kafir wars, and there have been several insurrections of Dutch Boers, and during all these, the Hottentots have never shown the slightest sympathy with either party of insurgents, 3408—Further evidence as to the indiscretion of some of the former magistrates having been one cause their of disaffection, 3411-3425.

Witness has no idea that there was any combination between all the Hottentot settlements on the frontier, including the soldiers of the Cape corps, on the subject of the outbreak, 3426-3430—But witness apprehends there must have been communications from the Kafirs with a part of the Hottentots, endeavouring to obtain their neutrality, and probably their co-operation, 3426-3430—It is very desirable that the missionaries should as much as possible combine with spiritual instruction the teaching of the arts of industry and agriculture, 3435-3451—Extent to which this has been carried out; the Moravian Mission ranks first as regards the teaching of the useful arts; the London Society has also given considerable attention to it, 3436-3451.

Witness has never heard of any instance where the missionaries, either directly or indirectly, had given sanction to the rising of the Kafirs, 3452-3457

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*Renton*, Rev. Henry, A. M. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

—At the time of the outbreak, if a very small number of regular troops, with a military officer, could have been sent into the Kat River Settlement, there is no doubt it would have been sufficient to have rallied the loyal and to have put down the insurrection, 3462-3468—When application was made for arms and ammunition there were none to supply, 3463-3468—The outbreak was conducted with great secrecy, and was most unexpected; there were no means of providing against it beforehand, 3465-3467.

#### REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT:

1. *Opinions in favour of a Representative Government for the Colony.*
2. *Objections thereto.*

##### 1. *Opinions in favour of a Representative Government for the Colony:*

If a representative system were brought into operation in the colony, the Legislature would be disposed adequately to provide for the defence of the frontier, *Fairbairn* 455-457. 461—Grounds on which witness founds the opinion that the establishment of a representative government at Cape Town would tend to re-establish a hold upon the affections of those boers who have penetrated beyond the frontier into Kaffraria, and there established independent authority, *ib.* 552-556—As an owner of property in the colony, witness would say it is absolutely necessary, and would be quite safe to grant a representative government in the present state of things, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1303.

##### 2. *Objections thereto:*

Witness has heard that if representative institutions were given to the colony, the colony itself would be able to take care of its frontier; witness very much doubts the power of the colony to defend the frontier; they would be very sorry to try it, *Sir P. Maitland* 2994—Witness does not see how the establishment of a constitutional government at the Cape would have any beneficial effect upon our relations with the Kafir tribes, *ib.* 2999, 3000.

See also *Division of the Colony. Legislative Assembly.*

*Retro-Cession of Territory.* It is an indispensable condition of any future policy that there shall be no further encroachment upon the Kafirs upon our side; it is a great question whether we ought not to give up certain lands which we have taken from them, *Fairbairn* 571-575—It is very undesirable that after we have occupied any territory that we should re-cede it to the Kafirs; they would not appreciate any retro-cession on our part; they would take it as weakness, *Sir P. Maitland* 3001-3007—Witness's own opinion is, that the best thing would be, if it were possible, after the unmistakable vindication of the indomitable power of Britain, to act a magnanimous part and say, We care nothing about your land; what we want is your benefit, and if you will be faithful allies, and preserve the territory from invasion, we will give back a large part of it, *Renton* 3079—This would be a saving of much



## Report, 1851—continued.

*Retro-Cession of Territory*—continued.

money, and would be the means of restoring good will and confidence in the minds of the Kafirs towards us, *Renton* 3079.

See also *D'Urban, Sir Benjamin. Territory.*

*Revenue and Expenditure.* Amount of the revenue of the colony, and amount of the present expenditure of the Government, *Fairbairn* 507, 508.

See also *Expenditure.*

*Rifle Brigade.* Surprise expressed by the Kafirs at the shooting of the rifle brigade, *Bissett* 973, 974.

*Rifle Corps.* See *Cape Corps. Cape Mounted Rifles.*

*Rights of Property.* It is advisable as soon as possible to ascertain and put on record the rights of the chiefs and people, in order to bring them as much as possible under the jurisdiction of our courts, so that there should be real property rights, *Adamson* 690-693—There is no actual recognition of property rights among the Kafir chiefs; they move from one place to another as suits their convenience, *Bissett* 929-933—The Kafirs do not place any value upon the rights of property in the land; they rove from place to place in search of pasturage, *Adamson* 1106-1112.

*Roads.* Importance of the formation of roads in the Amatola mountains, and the establishment of a military post, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2714-2716.

*Robberies.* See *Cattle Stealing. Depredations. Plunder.*

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*Sandilli, Chief.* Witness had frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with the Gaika commissioner, Mr. Brownlee, an able and upright magistrate, and his statement was, that it had been long known that Sandilli had been plotting, but that he could not find any evidences of any general sympathy with him, or any desire to break out in revolt, *Renton* 3019—Witness attributes the diminution in the power of the chiefs to the confidence that the people had in the administration of Mr. Brownlee, *ib.* 3020—The end of it was that there was a formidable outbreak, *ib.* 3021, 3022—Respects in which witness considers that the course followed by the Governor, unintentionally, but unfortunately, precipitated it; evidence in detail as to the course pursued by the Governor with regard to Sandilli, and also with respect to his conduct towards Maquomo, which further tended to irritate the people, *ib.* 3044-3073.—See also *Surveys.*

*Schools (Kat River Settlement).* The children attend the schools of the London Missionary Society in large numbers, and the people generally are able to read and write; they are familiar, to some extent, with the English as well as the Dutch languages, *Freeman* 20, 21.

See also *Civilization, 1. Education.*

## Report, 1851—continued.

**Seat of Government.** Objection to transferring the seat of government from Cape Town to Graham's Town, *Fairbairn* 449. 453-457—Much practical inconvenience arises from the distance at which Cape Town is from the eastern frontier; it would be very advisable to transfer the seat of government, *Bissett* 861-868—In reference to the defence of the colony, it is not necessary either that the seat of government should be transferred from Cape Town to some point further in the east, or that the colony should be divided, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1279—An executive officer with full powers would be all that would be necessary on the frontier; there could be no objection to a lieutenant-governor, *ib.* 1279-1281—Witness thinks it better that the seat of government should be at Cape Town, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1537—Great inconvenience from the seat of government, Cape Town, being so great a distance from the frontier; there ought to be an officer with paramount authority on the frontier, *Sir P. Maitland* 2883-2888.

**Sectarian Feeling.** Religious or sectarian feeling and rivalry does not run high in the Kat River Settlement, but there is a little of it, *Freeman* 114, 115.

**Servants.** Opinion that the Kafir servants coming into the colony are the means of stealing cattle from the farmers, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1625-1627.

**Settlements.** It would be very desirable after the expulsion of the hostile tribes from Kafirland, to bring about a more dense settlement of the people there; people for agricultural purposes might be located there to any extent, *Bissett* 775-778.—See also *Kat River Settlement*.

**Settlers.** See *Depredations. Encroachments. English Settlers. Kat River Settlements. Military Force, 2.*

**Shiloh.** Witness has heard that some of the plunder that was taken from Fort Armstrong was found afterwards in Shiloh, a missionary station, *Renton* 3277-3285—Witness has not the slightest reason for thinking that this rumour is well grounded, *ib.* 3303—Detail of the circumstances attending the destruction of Shiloh, and of the previous occurrences; parties from whom witness has gathered these details, *ib.* 3304-3311—Statement relative to the recent occurrences in Kafaria, in as far as they have reference to the Moravian settlement of Shiloh, *La Trobe* 3483-3486—There is considerable doubt whether the first aggression was on the part of the Whittlesea people or the Shiloh people, *ib.* 3486—The Moravian missionaries have no station at Whittlesea, *ib.* 3487.

**Smith, Andrew, M.D.** (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was stationed at the Cape of Good Hope for 16 years on the medical staff of the army, and during part of the time was employed confidentially by different governors in reference to the frontier tribes, the Kafirs and bushmen, 262—Witness was employed with the object of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the local government, and to ascertain whether, at least as far as regards the bushmen, they were contented or discontented with that policy; this was in the north part of the colony, towards the Orange river, 263-270—The old commando system had been abandoned, and the belief was, both on the part of the authorities of Cape Town, and also throughout the colony, that by abandoning this system the robberies had greatly increased, 276-279—Witness was for  
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## Report, 1851—continued.

*Smith, Andrew, M.D. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

investing the frontier emigrants with a kind of summary power of redress in the event of depredations on their cattle; there was no locally organized force, nor was there any disposition to form one, 280-288. 289, 290—They depended on the field cornets collecting their people; sometimes they answered to the summons of the field cornets with alacrity, and sometimes they did not, 282, 283. 288-290.

Opinion that the frontier cannot be maintained in peace by any force so long as we have people in an uncivilized state, who believe it is their right to steal wherever they can steal, 291, 292—Witness has had personal intercourse with every chief in his time in Kafirland, 293—They made many special complaints to witness; nature of these complaints, 294 *et seq.*—They were always complaining of the Government holding them responsible for the thieving which went on among their tribes, notwithstanding that they had not the power of restraining it, 295, 296—This was the great complaint of Gaika when he was appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium of communication between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound to restore all stolen cattle, and so on, 295-300—The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect for the chief, but nothing beyond that; if he exacts anything from his subjects which is not agreeable to the whole body, he has no certain means of enforcing it, 295.

Witness does not know that it would be useless to attempt to enter into treaties with the chiefs, 301—But if we form a treaty it must be one that will require such an organization among the native chiefs as would establish a government for them, 301-303—Suggestions as to the most expedient and practicable policy for the British Government to pursue in reference to these frontier tribes, 304 *et seq.*—There might be one of two courses adopted, either to let them entirely alone, and allow them to manage their own affairs, as was the case when witness first went to the colony, or take them under the British jurisdiction altogether, 304, 305. 322-332—If the latter plan were to be adopted every great chief must be immediately removed from the country, 305—We shall never manage the Kafirs, keeping their own chiefs, 305.

If the policy were adopted of not interfering with their internal concerns it would require a line of military posts along the immediate frontier to protect it from the incursions and robberies committed by these people, 306, 307—Witness's opinion always has been, and is still, that it would be necessary to have a special commissioner in Kafirland, who would be, to a certain extent, the adviser of every tribe of Kafirs, and who would appear to the Kafirs to have an interest in them and them only; they do not consider the Governor to have an interest in them, 306-318. 333-337. 386-395—The commissioner ought not to be connected with the colony, nor to receive orders from the Government; the Governor should have no power to control him; he ought to be separate and independent, and communicate with the Colonial Office at home, 306-318. 333-337. 386-395.

The only power he would have would be, in the case of an outbreak, to call upon the Governor for assistance; but in no way should he interfere otherwise, 306. 346-350. 386-395—The object should be to make the Kafir feel that the white man residing with him was his friend, which he does not feel now

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*Smith, Andrew, M.D. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

with respect to any white man, 306—Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that such a commissioner would obtain great moral power and influence over the Kafirs; moral power, if employed with tact, is better than physical power against the Kafirs, 306-318—It would not do to extend the jurisdiction of this commissioner over the whole of Kafirland, but over the immediate frontier it might be extended; over the Kafirs who are more directly in communication with the colony, the Gaika Kafirs, 319.

It would no doubt be necessary to support such a commissioner by a military force; his importance must be maintained; the Kafirs must be made to respect him, 335-337. 340-345. 386-395—Witness does not propose that this commissioner should be in the situation of head of the executive of Kafirland, he only proposes that he should have a moral influence, 338, 339. 355-358—The love of marauding and cattle stealing is a strong passion among the Kafirs, 359—But if they could once be got to think that it was as honourable to find subsistence by other means than their forefathers adopted, there would be a great change wrought, 359, 360—The passion for plunder is stronger with them than the passion for war, but war generally arises from this, 361—They attack other native tribes in the same way as they attack the colonists, 362—Their feeling against the white man is more that of jealousy and fear than that of hostility; they fear eventually that they will be sacrificed by the white men, 363-365—On several occasions the Kafirs and the Hottentots have combined to attack the white man, 366, 367.

Witness would say that the extent of frontier which we have to defend now is about 120 miles, 368-372—Witness would say that the loss of life and property was greater before the commando system was totally abolished than it has been since, 373-385—Evidence showing that the defence of the frontier by the boers is a much more effective system than the operation of regular troops; but witness would be sorry to see the system re-established, 376-385.

From what witness has seen of the Kafirs he believes they would be disposed to receive a commissioner, such as he has described; they are generally a manageable and tractable people, 396, 397. 420, 421—Way in which, in the course of time, under such a commissioner a civil force might be organized in the country, which does not exist now, 398-400. 409-411—A certain amount of expense ought to be incurred by this country for a certain time, in order to introduce this system, 399, 400—Tract of country witness proposes to organize in this manner, 401-408—The Kafirs are now well armed; they are a much more formidable enemy than they were in 1821; 412-414—This new system recommended by witness could only be introduced into Kafirland upon some convention to be entered into between the British Government and the Kafirs; it would only be effectual in that way, 415-419.

[Second Examination.]—Information as to the number of tribes and the population of each tribe in British Kafiraria in 1830; witness estimated them at about 311,000; 2030-2043—In this calculation witness does not estimate the Zoolu tribes; the Zoolu country lies about 80 or 90 miles beyond Natal; the number of the Zoolus is very great; they have about 25 regular regiments; their system is very much like our system in regard to militias of

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Smith, Andrew. M.D. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

counties, 2044-2052—Witness would say that the Hottentots were the aborigines of the country from the Keiskamma to about 40 miles to the eastward; but they have since amalgamated with the Kafirs, 2053-2057—Difficulty of defining the boundary of each tribe; statement of the nearest approximation witness can give, 2058-2067.

The number of Hottentots has been very much diminishing ever since the commencement of the colony, 2061—Out of the population estimated by witness at about 311,000, witness would say there would be about 50,000 fighting men, 2068-2071—In witness's time they were not well supplied with fire-arms and ammunition; they could hardly be induced to touch a gun, 2072—From witness's knowledge of these tribes he is of opinion that they would unite generally against the British, 2073, 2074—The country generally is very favourable to their mode of fighting; there is a great deal of bush fighting, 2075-2077—Evidence showing that Natal is not a safe colony as a British possession if the Zoolus became our enemies; there is only one regiment there, consisting of about 650 men, 2078-2096.

The customs of the various tribes are very nearly similar to one another; there are some slight modifications, 2103, 2104—Way in which they arrange disputes that arise between themselves, 2105—No contracts or other treaties are entered into between the tribes beyond an understanding that no tribe must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing grounds of another tribe; they are generally faithful to these engagements; this is not the case in their treaties with the British Government, 2106-2115—Witness approved of Lord Glenelg's system to a certain extent, but thought something more was wanted; namely, that there should be a commissioner appointed to reside among the Kafirs to organize a government for their chiefs; explanation as to what witness means by Lord Glenelg's system, 2116-2124. 2127-2150.

Upon receiving the colony from the Dutch, the burghers were allowed to defend themselves without any military interference, 2151—The commando system was stopped in General Burke's time, in 1827; opinion that the commando system is not of much use as a means of protection for the frontier, 2152. 2163—Remarks relative to the system adopted by Lord Glenelg for the protection of the colony, 2153-2158—Explanation as to the difference between the patrol system and the commando system; neither system is effective for the protection of the frontier boundary, 2159-2163—Witness would look for the defence of the frontier totally to the moral elevation of the Kafirs, and not to force; it will no doubt take some time to raise their moral character to the required standard, 2163-2167.

Evidence relative to the encroachments made by settlers on the territories of the Kafirs; witness attributes a great deal of the dissatisfaction of the Kafirs to the encroachments of the colonists, 2168-2194—All the policy of Lord Charles Somerset was directed to establish more clearly the old boundary, and to keep a certain tract of country beyond free from all settlers, with a view to secure peace and quietness on the frontier, 2186—Observations relative to the treaties entered into with the Kafirs by Sir Andries Stockenström; this very much satisfied the Kafirs, who considered that an act of

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## Report, 1851—continued.

*Smith, Andrew, M.D.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

justice had been done them, 2195-2205—Witness has heard that there was a modification of those treaties very soon after, and to that modification was ascribed the outbreak of the Kafirs, 2199.

Witness does not place much reliance upon treaties with the Kafir chiefs, unless there be a commissioner or resident to aid and assist them to carry them out; but even then it would not be safe to rely upon such arrangements without sufficient force to maintain them, 2206-2208—The Kafirs have not much respect for the British Government; they believe that the agreements they have made have not been kept; this belief must have arisen out of a misapprehension, because no government could have dealt more nobly and generously than the colonial government usually dealt with the Kafirs, 2209-2219—Generally speaking the chiefs do not like the missionary stations, because from the preaching of the missionaries the Kafirs get a certain degree of light which makes them not so completely subservient to their chiefs; the people like the missionaries, 2220, 2221.

Remarks relative to the violation of the treaty made by Lord Charles Somerset in 1819, establishing a neutral territory between the Great Fish River and the Keiskamma, by the erection of a fort called Fort Wilshire; the government never sanctioned the colonists living on that neutral territory, 2222-2225—Opinion that the establishment of a *bonâ fide* neutral territory, which neither colonists nor Kafirs should be permitted to enter, would not effect much good; the Kafirs would cross that territory and steal, 2226, 2227.

*Smith, Sir Harry.* General statement made by witness that in his evidence he has no intention or design to impugn the character of Sir Harry Smith or his government, *Freeman* 10.

See also *Defence of the Frontier. Griquas, 2. Juries. Policy of the Government, 2.*

*Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel T. C.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explanation relative to witness's experience at the Cape; services performed by him at Natal; was appointed frontier commissioner at the last Kafir war, 2228-2234—The immediate origin of the Kafir war in 1846 was the seizure of a prisoner by the Kafirs when under escort; the breaking out of that war was caused by the conduct of the Kafirs, 2235-2237—Evidence generally with respect to the number and nature of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of the colony of Natal; more particularly as to the Zoolus tribe, 2238-2258—There is no doubt the savage tribes will soon obtain a supply of arms and become acquainted with their use through the various traders that will sell them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary, 2241—Great influence possessed by the Zoolu king over the native tribes in South Africa; his power is sufficient to restrain his people from committing depredations to a certain extent, 2251, 2252—Statement as to the extent of the colony of Natal Proper, 2259, 2260.

Favourable nature of the country and climate of Natal; it is preferable to British Kafiraria; it is possible to anticipate a large population there of European origin engaged in the pursuits of agriculture, 2261-2272—  
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*Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

ner in which the boundaries of Natal were fixed; nature of the arrangement made between the Government and the native tribes, 2273-2276—Expediency of establishing some check on the supply of fire-arms and powder to the natives around Natal; impossibility of altogether preventing the smuggling of arms, though it might be prevented to a certain extent, 2279-2304—Estimated number of native tribes in the colony of Natal; great influx of natives since the last war; amount of military force employed to control the native population, 2305-2320—Nature of the duties of the magistrates in the colony of Natal; satisfaction of the natives with the magisterial control, 2309-2313.

Preference to be given to the character of the Zoolu natives over the Kafirs; they are not quite so dishonest, 2321, 2322—Witness would consider it a very dangerous experiment to make troops of the Zoolus under British instruction, 2323-2326—Great dislike of the natives round Natal to the Dutch boers; they prefer the British authority and settlers infinitely before the Dutch farmers, 2327-2329—There is no unwillingness of the natives in the colony of Natal to bring their disputes before the civil magistrates; it has always been the policy of the Government to maintain the authority of the chiefs, 2330-2332—Opinion that the diminution of the authority of the chiefs had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Kafir war in 1846; 2333, 2334.

Opinion that the policy to be pursued with the Kafirs should be one of great decision and firmness in putting down and restraining their thefts from the colonists; the chiefs should be held responsible for the cattle stolen, 2336-2352—The great cause of cattle stealing has arisen from the want of sufficient firmness of the Government in not insisting on immediate reparation being made by the chiefs, 2352—Opinion in favour of the Keiskamma as the frontier of the Cape colony; great difficulty of protecting the Fish River boundary; the great Kei would be far too extended a boundary, 2353-2358—Objections to treaties being entered into with the Kafir chiefs; it has been a great mistake to deal with the savages as if they perfectly understood the usages of civilized society, 2359, 2360.

Impossibility of protecting the frontier without a large military force; the appointment of civil commissioners would be useless, 2361, 2362—Observations relative to the military forts on the Keiskamma frontier; there would be no difficulty in occupying these forts with a British force, 2363-2369—Witness does not consider it practicable to clear the Amatola mountains, and preserve the range of mountains as the frontier, 2370-2378—Explanation relative to the meaning of the term patrol system; nature of the patrol system as applied to the frontier arrangements, 2379, 2380.

*Soil.* The land on the other side of the Kei is of a very fine and fertile quality; there would be no hardship to the Kafirs in driving them across that river, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2830-2839.—See also *Climate*.

*Somerset, Lord Charles.* The Keiskamma should be maintained as it was under Lord Charles Somerset; opinion that he understood the Kafirs and the management of that frontier better than any governor who was ever there, before or since, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1518.

See also *Neutral Territory. Treaties, 2.*

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*Special Commissioner.* Witness's opinion always has been and is still, that it would be necessary to have a special commissioner in Kafirland, who would be to a certain extent the adviser of every tribe of Kafirs, and who would appear to the Kafirs to have an interest in them and them only; they do not consider the Governor to have an interest in them; powers with which he should be vested, *A. Smith* 306-318. 333-337. 386-395—The object should be to make the Kafir feel that the white man residing with him was his friend, which he does not feel now with respect to any white man, *ib.* 306—Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that such a commissioner would obtain great moral power and influence over the Kafirs; moral power, if employed with tact, is better than physical power against the Kafirs, *ib.* 306-318. 396, 397. 420, 421.

It would not do to extend the jurisdiction of this commissioner over the whole of Kafirland, but over the immediate frontier it might be extended; over the Kafirs who are more directly in communication with the colony, the Gaika Kafirs, *A. Smith* 319—It would no doubt be necessary to support such a commissioner by a military force; his importance must be maintained; the Kafirs must be made to respect him, *ib.* 335-337. 340-345. 386-395—Witness does not propose that this commissioner should be in the situation of head of the executive of Kafirland; he only proposes that he should have a moral influence, *ib.* 338, 339. 355-358—Way in which, in the course of time, under such a commissioner a civil force might be organized in the country which does not exist now, *ib.* 398-400. 409-411.

A certain amount of expense ought to be incurred by this country for a certain time, in order to introduce this system, *A. Smith*, 399, 400—Tract of country witness proposes to organize in this manner, *ib.* 401-408—This new system recommended by witness could only be introduced into Kafirland upon some convention being entered into between the British Government and the Kafirs; it would only be effectual in that way, *ib.* 415-419—Witness approved of Lord Glenelg's system to a certain extent, but thought something more was wanted; namely, that there should be a commissioner appointed to reside among the Kafirs to organize a Government for their chiefs; explanation as to what witness means by Lord Glenelg's system, *ib.* 2116-2124. 2127-2150.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Nature of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope; has lived there all his life, except that this is his third trip to Europe, 1247, 1248—In witness's earlier life he resided in Cape Town, but has been principally in public employment in the eastern parts, 1249—Resides now at Maestrom, in the district of Somerset, within 25 miles of Kafirland; has considerable landed property, and is a farmer there, 1250-1252—Periods for which, and capacities in which witness has been connected with the government of the country, 1253, 1254—Has had abundant opportunities of forming an opinion on the subject of the policy pursued by this country, with respect to the border tribes upon the frontier of the colony, 1255.

Witness gave his views with reference to the affairs of the Cape frontier most fully before the Aborigines Committee of The House of Commons in 1835 and 1836, and still adheres to the opinion therein expressed, 1255—

Grounds



## Report, 1851—continued.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Grounds on which witness maintains firmly, that without a commission deputed to the Cape totally unconnected with the colony, or any party therein, to examine the numbers of witnesses of opposite opinions and interests, whom it is almost impossible to bring over to this country, the British Government and Legislature will never be able to ascertain the true causes of the disaffection, disturbances, and wars at present raging at the Cape, 1255—And that they will never be able to do justice, unless a free constitutional government be granted to that colony, whose local knowledge and public scrutiny would render all mystifications at least very difficult, 1255.

Witness considers the cause of the late outbreak to have been our vacillation in systems, in making treaties and breaking them, and the nature of the people we have to deal with, 1256—There is no doubt they are just barbarians who will plunder, and require to be kept tight, 1256—At the same time strict justice and humanity are the only means by which this or any other nation can be ruled, 1256, 1257—There is not a man in this country, nor at the Cape, who can tell what must be done at the close of the war; everything depends on its termination, 1257. 1264-1266—What we are now to do is, not to rest till we have put those people down; unless they are put down they will drive us out of the colony, 1257—Difficulty of suggesting any practical measures which the Government of this country ought to adopt in reference to these tribes in the event of the British authority being completely re-established over them, 1258—Witness did suggest measures 20 years ago, but it is a very difficult question now, 1258.

It is one of the greatest misfortunes that could have happened, to have called in the blacks to our assistance, 1258, 1259—A few years ago, there might have been an advantage in pushing the frontier as far as the great Kei River; but witness does not see how it is to be done now, 1260-1263—It has become very difficult to rule these natives, under the present system, that is, the patrol system, 1261-1263—Objection to the system by which if a man has committed a crime which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the colonial court, and it is supposed there is not sufficient proof before these courts, he is tied up and flogged, 1263—There is not a more able officer anywhere, than the officer who has been for two or three years carrying on this system, Colonel Mackinnon, 1261-1263—He is a man of the strictest integrity, and wishing to do justice, but under the present system he cannot do it, 1262, 1263.

Witness would have these people independent, and rule them through their chiefs; he would gain an influence over the chiefs, 1264-1266. 1331 *et seq.*—The outbreak which has recently taken place is decidedly attributable to the absence of a military force of sufficient number on the frontier, 1267-1272—Under any policy which can now be suggested or pursued, it will be impossible for some years to come to live on the frontier without the defence of a considerable military force, 1273-1277—With respect to the question, whether the colony would be disposed, in the event of their having representative institutions, to bear the expense of a military force, witness can only say this must depend on the manner in which the war is settled, and the frontier delivered over to them; the colony is entitled to a representative Government

**Report, 1851—continued.**

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

Government, and accepts it of course with all its legitimate responsibilities, 1278.

In reference to the defence of the colony it is not necessary either that the seat of government should be transferred from Cape Town to some point further in the east, or that the colony should be divided, 1279—An executive officer with full powers would be all that would be necessary on the frontier; there could be no objection to a lieutenant-governor, 1279-1281—Strong objections witness entertains towards the present patrol system; difference between this system and the commando system; way in which the commando system has been mistaken; opinion that the patrol system, which has, with the exception of the interval from 1836 to 1844, been going on since 1817, has brought all the misfortunes on the colony, 1282-1295. 1309-1315—Objections witness has to what he calls the flogging system, 1283. 1323. 1325-1341. 1357-1359. 1363-1385.

For a long time Kafirland was ruled by a species of prestige; the black had a fearful idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white; he has now lost this, the prestige is gone, 1298—Various circumstances have led to the alteration of this opinion, 1299—If we had strictly used our moral superiority over them we might have avoided bringing into play that physical force and teaching them their strength, 1300—They must be conquered now and put down by force, and the only way of controlling them hereafter will be through their chiefs, unless they crush them altogether; and a sort of moral control must be kept over their chiefs, 1301-1307—With respect to making the Kei River the boundary of the colony, it must depend in a great measure on the terms which may be come to with the Kafirs and their chiefs, 1304-1307.

Measures of conciliation might have a good effect at the present moment, provided we get the upper hand of them completely, 1302. 1308—As an owner of property in the colony, witness would say it is absolutely necessary, and would be quite safe to grant a representative government in the present state of things, 1303—Witness would not interfere with the domestic affairs of the Kafirs, except through their chiefs, 1331-1341—Formerly the authority of the chiefs in Kafirland was so complete over the Kafirs generally, that they might be held justly responsible to the English Government for the conduct, both public and private, of the Kafirs connected with them; witness does not know how this may be now; the power which the chief has, in concurrence with his council, is very great, 1342-1356. 1360-1362.

Evidence showing the difference between the patrol system and the commando system, 1387—In witness's opinion the commando system was decidedly less unjust and less injurious than the patrol system; the commando system is necessary on a barbarous frontier, 1387-1394—Witness does not see why, if the war terminates successfully, the frontier should be much denuded of inhabitants, unless the measures of the Government be such as to drive the people to emigrate, 1395, 1396—The Amatola mountains would not form a boundary; they run at right angles through the old and through the new boundary, 1397-1399—If the Amatola mountains were cleared of the Kafir inhabitants, they would fall back upon us again, as there is no place to drive them to where they could exist, 1400-1407.

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Further

Report, 1851—continued.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Further expression of the opinion that the natives must be put down before the war terminates; that is, they must be conquered; up to the present moment we have never yet valued the Kafirs, 1408-1423—The only plan will be to make them sue for peace, and then dictate terms to them; treaties must then be made with the chiefs, with the concurrence of their councils, and these treaties must be honestly kept, 1408-1423—Witness has not found European and civilized nations more true to their treaties than the Kafirs, 1410-1423.

Grounds on which witness bases the assertion that we have pursued a system of injustice and oppression, and violation of treaties, and that we have half ruined ourselves, and completely ruined the nation, 1424-1433—The Kafirs are better armed than they were; difficulties in the way of preventing fire-arms and gunpowder being smuggled into the colony, 1434-1447—Generally speaking, the influence of the missionaries over the native tribes is very beneficial; 1451-1453—The land which has been taken from the natives for the European settlers in British Kafria has caused great irritation among them; it would decidedly be advisable to put a stop to further extension of European settlements in that direction, 1454-1458—Extent of the district which witness considers has been improperly added to the ceded territory, 1459-1472.

There has been no great accession of European colonists on the eastern frontier of the colony during the last four or five years, 1473—Droughts are very common on the eastern frontier of Kafria; they occur every four or five years; this has the effect of inducing the colonists to spread their cattle over the country in search of pasture, and at times the people came into collision, 1474-1477—One of the chief causes of offensive operations on the part of the Kafirs arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory, 1478-1482—The emigrant boers are at present very quiet, but they are in a very discontented and excited state; they feel themselves very much aggrieved, and they are very anxious to have the causes of their late collisions with the Government most minutely investigated, 1483 *et seq.*—As things have turned out, witness considers the wisest plan would be not to meddle with them at all, but that as long as they commit no injury or outrage upon the colony, we should not take any notice of what they do in other respects, 1485-1510.

[Second Examination.] Reference to the evidence given by witness before the Committee of 1835, in which he stated that the Government could at that time "have laid down a system of preventive measures which would have effectually protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard their cattle and could make stricter rules for said territory than perhaps it would have been able to do on the western side of the old frontier;" nature of the preventive measures witness contemplated in this answer, 1709 *et seq.*—These measures were subsequently carried out by order of Lord Glenelg in the treaty witness made and signed at King William's Town on the 5th December 1836; 1709-1713—Evidence showing that the view of Sir Harry Smith was confirmatory of these measures, 1709, 1710—Up to the beginning of 1839, when witness left the frontier, he considered this plan to have worked well, and Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approbation of it, 1714—How

Report, 1851—continued.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

—How far Sir George Napier has since felt it necessary to amend this treaty, 1715-1720.

Further expression of the opinion that there has been a constant tendency to encroachment upon the land justly belonging to the Kafirs; and that this has led to bad feeling on the part of the Kafirs towards the colonists, as between the Kafirs and the settlers, 1721, 1722—This has brought our relations to their present unsatisfactory condition, 1723—Explanation relative to the arrangement entered into by witness with the chief Kreli in 1846, the 4th Article of which treaty was that Kreli is "to acknowledge the right of the British Government to all land west of the Great or White Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he, Kreli, or any other Kafir chief or subject, may have possessed to any part of the said territory," 1724-1736.

Although witness generally objects to encroachments upon the lands held by native tribes, he hoped that by treaty with Kreli as the paramount chief, and obtaining from him the land west of the Kei, we might thus obtain a title to the principal strongholds, and restore the remainder, holding him responsible as any other independent chief, 1724—But we broke the convention which was made with Kreli, by raising an army against him, which only exposed our weakness, shook more than ever the faith of the barbarian in our justice, and the result is that he has joined the war against us; witness can therefore no longer recommend this plan, 1724-1736—The patrol system was put down by witnesses; but the depredations by the Kafirs were never completely stopped; this was never expected, 1737-1744.

The colony of the Cape of Good Hope accepts the constitution which has been granted, and accepts it with all its legitimate responsibility; but it will not be in the power of the colony for a considerable time to pay the expenses of the war, 1745—The constitution is a distinct point from the Kafir war; the colonists had nothing to do with it; it is entirely the result of Government measures, 1745-1748—Witness never approved of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system; he disapproved of it from first to last; difference between his system and the arrangement entered into by witness with Kreli in 1846; evidence showing that Sir B. D'Urban himself upset his own system, 1749-1769—Extracts from various letters and despatches, showing the data upon which witness arrives at the conclusion that subsequently to his treaties of 1836 depredations were much less frequent, and the general peace and tranquillity of the country much greater than it had previously been, 1769-1787—The treaties were not witness's, they were Lord Glenelg's; witness was only an instrument in carrying them out, and signed them, 1787, 1788.

Witness is perfectly certain that if the treaties had been strictly and honestly adhered to, we should have had no more war, 1787-1789—The violations of the treaties have been on the part of the Government, 1790-1792—Particulars in detail relative to the strong difference of opinion between witness and Sir Benjamin D'Urban as to the treatment of the Fingoes; opinion expressed by Sir Benjamin that witness had abandoned and sacrificed the Fingo race to the tender mercies of their inveterate enemies, the Kafirs, 1798-1822. 1964-1968—It was an accusation on the part of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, that the policy pursued by witness, in fact, that this treaty of 5 December

## Report, 1851—continued.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.*

ember 1836, was one of the causes of the emigration of the boers from the frontier; statement made by witness that he can prove the contrary, 1823-1830. 1845. 2023-2929—In witness's opinion the causes of the discontent which induced the emigration were various, 1831-1846—One was the manner in which the emancipation of the slaves affected many; and the manner in which compensation was given also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction, 1836-1839—The circumstance of the insecurity of cattle and property on the frontier was also a cause of emigration, 1840-1846.

In 1836 the Kat River settlement was self-supporting; it never had one farthing of support, and had done more for Government than any other part of the country; it was ruined by the war, 1847-1855—Lord Glenelg's system was introduced in December 1836; witness can only speak as to its being faithfully carried out the first two years, 1856, 1857. 1859, 1860—It was in some measure put a stop to by amendments made by Sir George Napier when witness returned to the colony in 1840; he considered that these amendments were fatal to the system, 1858. 1861-1863—Witness was in the colony in the year 1845, at the time petitions were presented to the Governor of Cape Town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on the frontier, and of depredations committed by them, 1864, 1865—Reference to the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of these petitions by Mr. Montagne, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cloete, stating that the rumours of these depredations were unfounded, and that the colony was never in greater security and tranquillity, and more free from depredations, 1867-1874. 1876-1881. 1898-1095.

Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that at that time, in 1845, the Kafirs were preparing to attack the colony in consequence of Lord Glenelg's treaties having been put a stop to, 1874, 1875. 1882-1897. 1901-1905—Witness attributes the cause of the present disturbances to the breaking of these treaties in 1844; witness attributes the blame exclusively to the Government, and no portion of it to the chiefs, 1906-1908—Peace is comparative with barbarous tribes; there are always disagreements between them without war, 1909, 1910—So long as the frontier is in its present state it is impossible altogether to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, 1911, 1912—There has not been the remotest political excitement produced at Cape Town, which has had any effect upon the Kafirs during the last two years, 1917—A constitutional government in the Cape colony would decidedly produce a more kind and just policy towards the natives than that which has been in force during the last four years, 1918.

The statement of Sir George Napier, that the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was more popular among the colonists than the policy of Lord Glenelg, is correct, 1919—There was great clamour against Sir Benjamin's policy before Lord Glenelg's policy was introduced, 1920—The colonists were delighted with the alteration made by Sir Peregrine Maitland in the treaties; the feeling of many of the colonists was in favour of a very summary and stringent policy to be exercised towards the frontier tribes, and therefore the change from a humane to a military policy delighted them, 1921-1932. 1938-1942. 1969-1971—Witness believes that the Kafirs, when honestly  
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Report, 1851—continued.

*Stockenstrom, Sir Andries.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

and justly dealt with; are inclined to be friendly, 1946-1953—Further grounds on which witness considers that the amended treaty led to the war, 1954-1963.

Witness wrote a letter during the summer of 1850, relating to the complaints made by the settlers on the Kat River; their principal complaint was about burning them out of their houses; there was much irritation on the minds of the settlers; this was before the war, 1972-1976—Up to 1847 there was never a more loyal set of people in the world, 1976, 1977—Since then the change which has taken place among them yearly surprises every one, 1976-1978—Witness does not believe that this Committee will ever get to the bottom of this rebellion without a most minute investigation on the spot of all the parties, and particularly the missionaries who risked their lives, and stayed among them, and made every sacrifice to keep them within bounds, 1979, 1980.

Witness has met with a report, made by Mr. Biddulph, of the state and condition of the Kat River settlement, in May 1847; witness strongly differs from him; he considers the description of the settlement to be libellous; reference to certain statements made in this report which witness knows to be incorrect, 1989-2000—Such a plan as is proposed for compensation by the Government for losses incurred by the colonists upon the frontier is not advisable, 2001—Sir G. Napier considered that one of the principal causes of the predatory habits of the Kafirs was, that they attach no sort of idea of disgrace to the theft, 2002—He therefore proposed to punish them for such offences, with a view to degrade them in the eyes of their tribe, 2002—In witness's opinion any punishment would do provided it went through the regular channel, 2002.

Objections to Sir Harry Smith's view of obtaining redress through the agency of the Kafirs themselves, that is, by a chief assenting to a jury of 12 of his people to try the offenders in presence of the superintendent of police, 2002-2005. 2007, 2008—The criminal trials among Kafirs for offences committed among themselves are very solemn and very particular, 2006—Great strictness is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties; it will require a strong military force for a long time upon the frontier for this purpose, 2009-2014—From what witness has heard, he would say that the Kafir chiefs, when they entered into the treaties they did with Sir Peregrine Maitland, did it unwillingly, and in some degree compulsorily, 2015-2022.

[Third Examination.]—Information as to the number of the various Kafir tribes to the east and north-east of the Keiskamma, 3290-3296—Reasons for Sir Lowry Cole punishing the Kafirs that were living by sufferance in the ceded territory, and driving them out, and establishing a Hottentot settlement on the same ground, 3296—Witness fully approved of the policy pursued at that time, and was the principal instrument in the expulsion of Maquomo, 3297-3299—Speaking of the wars of 1846-47, and of everything that has occurred since, witness draws a broad distinction between the colonists and the Government; witness considers them the acts of the Government, and not of the colonists, 3300—The war of 1846 was brought about by the violation of our treaties with the Kafirs in 1844, and everything that has followed since was just the consequence of that, 3301.

## Report, 1851—continued.

**Stockenstrom, Sir A.** Great influence possessed by Sir Andrew Stockenstrom over the Kafirs, which he exercised to maintain peace and loyalty, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1546, 1547.

See also *Frontier Boundary. Printed Papers. Treaties, 1.*

**Store Depôts.** Suggestion that Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort, and along there, might be kept as a depôt for stores, and for some troops, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1518.

**Superstition.** The influence of superstition is very great among the Kafirs; this is very much made use of by the chiefs for political and any bad purposes, *Bissett* 772-774. 893-898.

**Surveys.** The Kafirs found a pretext for commencing the war in 1849, on our sending a small party to survey a piece of ground within their territory beyond Chumie River; nature and object of their survey, *Owen* 2398-2415—Remarks relative to the survey made on part of the territory of Sandilli, the Blockdrift, at the desire of Sir Peregrine Maitland, which the Kafirs made a pretext of war in 1846; such an encroachment might have been a just pretext for complaint, but not for war, *ib.* 2523-2537. 2590, 2591. 2617, 2618—Witness knows of no other cause of irritation, arising from any acts of the white people, which could have led to the war in 1846, than that of the survey of the Blockdrift on the Chumie River, *ib.* 2658, 2659—Witness does not think that sending the surveying party by Colonel Hare had anything to do with the breaking out of the war in 1846; witness had no idea of placing a post at Blockdrift until it was proposed by Sandilli himself, *Sir P. Maitland* 2914, 2915. 2919-2922—The Kafirs had been for years, previous to 1846, preparing for war, by the collection of arms and ammunition, and the occasion of the survey of the Blockdrift was seized on by them as a pretext for commencing the war, *ib.* 2974-2976.

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**Tambookie Frontier.** Remarks relative to the Tambookie frontier; this has hitherto been a very peaceful frontier, but now the Tambookies are at open war with the colonial government; a greater force will be required hereafter on that frontier, *Fairbairn* 528-531.

**Taxation.** See *Timber Tax.*

**Tenure of Land.** An important end would be gained by giving the Kat River settlers a personal interest in the land, and encouraging them to become *bonâ fide* landholders; at present they have simply permission to occupy, *Freeman* 25-38—With respect to the question, whether giving title to these Hottentots to hold their lands for ever would tend to retard the civilization of the colony, and prevent Europeans from efficiently cultivating the land, witness can only say there were two views on the part of the Government in granting the Kat River settlement to the Hottentots, *ib.* 39—One was to reward them for faithful services for many years past, especially in the war, *ib.*—And the other to have a body of men who might serve as a defence to the colony in the event of a Kafir attack, *ib.*—Witness's notion of a settlement is, that the persons

Report, 1851—continued.

*Tenure of Land*—continued.

persons so located should have lands granted to them with a good title, that they should cultivate them, and maintain themselves, and be ready, if necessary, to take their share in the defence of the frontier, *Freeman* 73—This description corresponds with the Kat River settlement, only that the parties have no right in the soil, *ib.* 73-79.—See also *Rights of Property*.

*Territory.* Witness laments that our territory was ever extended so far as it has been; we have nothing to gain from this large extent of territory, and can only retain it at an enormous expense, *Renton* 3079—The difficulty in the way of restoring to these tribes a portion of the territory we now occupy, which has been some years past taken by the British, lies in the vindication of our power sufficiently to preclude the idea that this cession of territory is made from weakness, *ib.* 3088-3102—Towards such a step a variety of conditions would be indispensable with the chiefs, and with the people; conditions that should be very distinct, and about which no party in Kafirland should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misapprehension, *ib.* 3102.

See also *Boundaries.* Ceded Territory. Chiefs, 1. Fish River.  
Frontier Boundary. Neutral Territory. Retrocession of Territory.

*Theft.* See *Cattle Stealing.* Depredations. Plunder.

*Timber Tax.* Allusion to the case of the forests, which the people of the Kat River settlement had simply, from usage, supposed to belong to the respective allotments or settlements, *Freeman* 14—The cutting of timber and selling it has been a great source of profit to them, *ib.*—Since the war of 1847, the Government has seen it right to enforce a tax of 6 s. per load on the timber cut; way in which this has tended to discourage the people, *ib.*

In regard to Mr. Biddulph, they complained that a tax was imposed upon wood cutting; this tax was levied since the war of 1846-47; they were not allowed to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or forest without paying a tax of seven and a half per cent. *Renton* 3134-3143—The people had not been previously taxed in this way; they considered the wood as their own, as a part of the property that had been given them on their location in that district, *ib.* 3137-3142—They complained of it as coming upon them after their second impoverishment by war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their prosperity, *ib.* 3143.

*Traders.* Nature of the opposition between the missionaries and the traders, the traders supplying the natives with articles such as brandy and gunpowder, which the missionaries wish to prevent their being supplied with, *Adamson* 669-671. 714-728—Witness does not believe that the missionaries at their stations deal in fire-arms and powder; they have stores for supplying the natives with goods, articles of clothing, &c., their object being to exclude the travelling trader, *ib.* 718-723—The itinerant traders introduce arms, ammunition, and brandy into Kafirland; great extent of smuggling carried on by them; they should not be allowed to go into Kafirland, except as they did under the system established by Lord Charles Somerset, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1617-1624.

See also *Cultivation.* Fire-Arms. Itinerant Traders.  
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## Report, 1851—continued.

*Treachery.* The attack on Woburn and on Auckland villages was a treacherous one; many of the Kafirs and Hottentots who made the attack were at the time were partaking or the festivities of the villages, *Renton* 3373—3380—Up to this period the Hottentots had been faithful to their engagements, and the majority of the proprietors, the people properly possessed of the allotments, are so still, *ib.* 3381—3383.

*TREATIES:*

1. *Opinions that the Kafir Wars have been brought about by our breaking our Treaties with the Chiefs.*
2. *Evidence showing that no Reliance can be placed upon Treaties with the Kafir Chiefs.*
3. *Suggestions as to the only Mode in which a satisfactory Treaty can be entered into between the British Government and the Chiefs.*

1. *Opinions that the Kafir Wars have been brought about by our breaking our Treaties with the Chiefs:*

Grounds on which witness bases the assertion that we have pursued a system of injustice, and oppression, and violation of treaties, and that we have half ruined ourselves and completely ruined the nation, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1256. 1424—1433—Witness considers the cause of the late outbreak to have been our vacillation in systems, in making treaties and breaking them; and the nature of the people we have to deal with, *ib.* 1256—Observations as to the alterations made by witness in the treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom with the Kafir chiefs, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1525—1529.

Extracts from various letters and despatches, showing the data upon which witness arrives at the conclusion that subsequently to his treaties of 1836 depredations were much less frequent, and the general peace and tranquillity of the country much greater than it had previously been, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1769—1797—The treaties were not witness's, they were Lord Glenelg's; witness was only an instrument in carrying them out, and signed them, *ib.* 1787, 1788—Witness is perfectly certain that if the treaties had been strictly and honestly adhered to we should have had no more war, *ib.* 1787—1789—The violations of the treaties have been on the part of the Government, *ib.* 1790—1792.

Witness attributes the cause of the present disturbances to the breaking of the treaties in 1844; witness attributes the blame exclusively to the Government, and no portion of it to the chiefs, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 1906—1908. 1954—1963—From what witness has heard, he would say that the Kafir chiefs, when they entered into the treaties they did with Sir Peregrine Maitland, did it unwillingly and in some degree compulsorily, *ib.* 2015—2022—Observations relative to the treaties entered into with the Kafirs by Sir Andries Stockenstrom; this very much satisfied the Kafirs, who considered that an act of justice had been done them, *A. Smith* 2195—2205—Witness has heard that there was a modification of those treaties very soon after, and to that modification was ascribed the outbreak of the Kafirs, *ib.* 2199—The war of 1846 was brought about by the violation of our treaties with the Kafirs in 1844, and everything that has followed since was just the consequence of that, *Sir A. Stockenstrom* 3301.

2. *Evidence*

Report, 1851—continued.

*TREATIES*—continued.

2. *Evidence showing that no Reliance can be placed upon Treaties with the Kafir Chiefs:*

Opinion that the formation of treaties with the Kafir chiefs has been a great error; treaties are not advisable in respect to a people situated as the Kafirs are, from the circumstance that the chief cannot be responsible to any great extent, *Adamson* 686, 687—Witness will venture to say that the treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenström were never once infringed by the colonists, but they were frequently infringed by the Kafirs; the moment it occurs to a savage that it is his interest to do so and so, treaties may go to the wind, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1533. 1581-1592—Witness attaches no value to treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs; such treaties would only be observed as long as it suited their interests, *ib.* 1593, 1594.

Great strictness is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties; it will require a strong military force for a long time upon the frontier for this purpose, *Sir A. Stockenström* 2009-2014—No contracts or other treaties are entered into between the tribes beyond an understanding that no tribe must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing grounds of another tribe; they are generally faithful to these engagements; this is not the case in their treaties with the British Government, *A. Smith* 2106-2115—Witness does not place much reliance upon treaties with the Kafir chiefs unless there be a commissioner or resident to aid and assist them to carry them out, but even then it would not be safe to rely upon such arrangements without sufficient force to maintain them, *ib.* 2206-2208—The Kafirs have not much respect for the British Government, they believe that the agreements they have made have not been kept; this belief must have arisen out of a misapprehension, because no government could have dealt more nobly and generously than the colonial government usually dealt with the Kafirs, *ib.* 2209-2219.

Remarks relative to the violation of the treaty made by Lord Charles Somerset in 1819, establishing a neutral territory between the Great Fish River and the Keiskamma, by the erection of a fort called Fort Wilshire; the Government never sanctioned the colonists living on that neutral territory, *A. Smith* 2222-2225—Objections to treaties being entered into with the Kafir chiefs; it has been a great mistake to deal with the savages as if they perfectly understood the usages of civilized society, *T. C. Smith* 2359, 2360—Witness does not consider that the slightest reliance can be placed upon treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs; it is expedient to trust alone to the military defence of the frontier, *Owen* 2436-2439. 2538-2542. 2603. 2632-2636—Remarks relative to the treaties entered into by witness with the Griquas; denial that Maquomo was forced to sign the treaties, *Sir P. Maitland* 2977, 2978.

3. *Suggestions as to the only mode in which a satisfactory Treaty can be entered into between the British Government and the Chiefs.*

Witness does not know that it would be useless to attempt to enter into treaties with the chiefs, *A. Smith* 301—But if we form a treaty it must be one that will require such an organization among the native chiefs as would establish

## Report, 1851—continued.

**TREATIES**—continued.**3. Suggestions as to the only Mode, &c.**—continued.

establish a government for them, *A. Smith* 301-303—The only plan will be to make them sue for peace, and then dictate terms to them; treaties must then be made with the chiefs, with the concurrence of their council, and these treaties must be honestly kept, *Sir A. Stockenström* 1408-1423—Witness has not found European and civilized nations more true to their treaties than the Kafirs, *ib.* 1410-1423.

See also *Civilization*, 1. *Defence of the Frontier.* *Emigration.*  
*Glenelg*, Lord. *Griquas*, 2. *Krelé*, Chief. *Military Chief.*

*Trial by Jury.* See *Juries.*

## U.

**Useful Arts.** The missionary influence has been generally extensively used in inducing the native population to resort to agricultural or industrial pursuits, *Adamson* 1011-1029—Attempts which have been made by the missionaries to introduce arts and manufactures among the tribes; they have only succeeded as to agriculture, *ib.* 1089, 1090—Extent to which this has been carried out; the Moravian mission ranks first as regards the teaching of the useful arts; the London Society has also given considerable attention to it, *Renton* 3435-3451—It is very desirable that the missionaries should, as much as possible, combine with spiritual instruction the teaching of the arts of industry and agriculture, *ib.*—See also *Chiefs*, 4.

**Violation of Treaties.** See *Treaties.*

**Volunteer Force.** See *Commando System*, 1,

## W.

**Wandering Tribes.** Considerable portion of the population of Kafirland who are not under the authority of any particular chief; they are a wandering tribe, now attached to one tribe, and now to another, *Adamson* 1061-1065—From the nature of the cultivation adopted by the Kafirs, it would be no hardship to push them across the great Kei, they being migratory tribes, seldom inhabiting the same spot for long together, *Owen* 2605-2616.

**Wars.** See *Kafir Wars.*

**Western Frontier.** Witness does not consider that there is any necessity for entering into the consideration of the defence of the western frontier at the present moment, *Sir J. E. Alexander* 2689-2691.

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*White Men.* See *Coloured Races.*    *Europeans.*

*Wienand, Mr.* See *Magistrates, 1.*

*Woburn Village.* See *Treachery.*

*Women and Children.* See *Barbarity.*

*Wood Cutting.* See *Timber Tax.*

## Z.

*Zoolus.* Observations as to the great success which has attended the policy of the Government as pursued with the Zoolus in Natal, *Sir G. T. Napier* 1602. 1615. 1616—Evidence generally with respect to the number and nature of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of the colony of Natal, more particularly as to the Zoolu tribes, *T. C. Smith* 2238-2258—Great influence possessed by the Zoolu king over the native tribes in South Africa; his power is sufficient to restrain his people from committing depredations to a certain extent, *ib.* 2251, 2252—Preference to be given to the character of the Zoolu natives over the Kafirs; they are not quite so dishonest, *ib.* 2321, 2322—Witness would consider it a very dangerous experiment to make troops of the Zoolus under British instruction, *ib.* 2323-2326—Remarks relative to the Zoolus who occupy Natal as our subjects; they were driven in by the tyranny of their chiefs, *Sir P. Maitland* 2916-2918.

See also *Natal.*    *Population.*





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