A

# DEFENCE OF ZULULAND AND ITS KING.

## Echoes from the Blue-Books.

WITH AN APPENDIX

CONTAINING

*CORRESPONDENCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE RELEASE OF CETSHWAYO, ETC.*

BY

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# DEFENCE FOR ZULULAND AND ITS KING.

*ECHOES FROM THE BLUE-BOOKS.*

## CHAPTER I.

### BOER ENCROACHMENT.

My object in retracing past events, and in bringing to light matter connected with the management of Zululand, is to prove that in the invasion of that country we committed not only a terrible mistake, but at the same time a gross injustice. We have continued that mistake and injustice in the detention and captivity of the Zulu King, against whom the most vilifying accusations have been made from beginning to end without the smallest proof or foundation for such slanderous charges. In a lonely and dreary captivity we are keeping this King, who never harmed us, who never menaced us, who honestly and anxiously desired to live in peace with the people to whom his feelings and interests told him to be friendly.

It is my intention to pass in review every important matter connected with the past history of Cetshwayo's

reign, and in the very despatches brought forward or ignored by his enemies according as it suited their object to vilify and accuse the King, I intend to prove that those accusations are nothing but a tissue of the grossest inventions and exaggerations.

In the year 1848 two chiefs of the name of Putiné, of the Ama Ngwe, and Langalibalele, of the Ama Hlubi, quarrelled with Panda, the father of the present King. The two first chiefs dwelt on both sides of the Pongolo, while Langalibalele lived on the south of the same river. In consequence of this quarrel they fled to Natal, and settled in the Drakensberg, leaving their late locations vacant.

In 1856 we first hear of encroachments made by Boer immigrants into the Zulu country in the matter of claims advanced by them for land east of the Buffalo, and they even carried their encroachments so far as to lay claim to Natal territory west of that river as far as the Biggarsberg range.

Many of the farmers declared that for 100 head of cattle they had purchased a great tract of country beyond the Buffalo, from the Blood River towards the north-west; whereas in reality the land had been granted to them by the Zulu King, not as property, but for the purpose of grazing their cattle, and if they chose to settle thereon they could do so on the understanding that they would in this case become Zulu subjects. In a despatch dated September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196),*

* [C.—1748.] The numbers given throughout are those of the Papers presented to Parliament by command of her Majesty.

Mr. Osborn, then magistrate of Newcastle, testifies to the manner in which the Boers encroached on Zulu territory; and his statements are borne out and echoed in a despatch of Sir H. Barkly, Governor of the Cape, October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140), and by Captain Clarke, of the Royal Artillery, January 22nd, 1878 (2079, p. 104). The Boers continuing to claim land from the Zulus over which they had not the smallest right, naturally annoyed the latter exceedingly, who loudly protested against these encroachments, and desired them to withdraw. This the Boers refused to do, alleging that in 1856 the Prince Cetshwayo had ceded to them the territory claimed in return for the delivery up to him of some fugitive relatives. This is persistently denied by the King, who averred that, his father being alive at the time, he had neither the right nor the power to do so. Anxious to avoid hostilities, but unable to get rid of these persistent encroachers on his territory, the King Panda, in conjunction with his son Cetshwayo, despatched on September 5th, 1861 (in the very year in which the Boers declare the cession had been made to them), a deputation to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal to lay the case before him (1961, p. 7):

'Panda and Cetshwayo wish to inform the Lieutenant-Governor that they are threatened with hostilities by the Boers; that when Cetshwayo demanded from them his two brothers who fled to them, they asked for certain lands to be made over to them. Cetshwayo said that country was not his to give, but belonged to his father. Cetshwayo, however, received the boys back, and consented to send one of us (Gebula) to ascertain what

country they wanted. He went, and found that they desired country which the Zulu people would not consent to give, because it would separate them from, and interfere with their intercourse with, Natal.

'When they got to the spot, and indicated what they wanted, Gebula said he had no power to consent; but they asked him to mark a paper. Sihayo was also present, one of Cetshwayo's Indunas, and residing on that land. Gebula refused to sign, because he had not authority do so, if it would profess to give them the land. They said it would only show their President (Mr. W. Pretorious) that he had been with them to inspect it at Cetshwayo's desire. Upon this understanding Gebula consented to affix his mark, and so did Sihayo.

'Some time after this the Boers came to Panda, and brought seventy head of cattle, "to thank," for the land which had been given by Cetshwayo. Panda said he knew of no such land, and referred them to Cetshwayo.

'Cetshwayo denied that he had ever given them the land, and said that he had no authority to give it. They insisted, and spoke of the paper; but when the circumstances were stated, they were obliged to admit that it was of no value. They, however, persisted in their claim for the land—they said they wanted to close the fords for us between us and the Natal Government, and that they wanted all the waters running into the Tugela on our side down to the sea, and along the coast, to St. Lucia Bay, for their ships to come out. Cetshwayo said he would not consent to this, and they went away in great anger, saying that they would take that country by force. They took their cattle back with them.'

On March 10th, 1863 (1961, p. 8), a second message was despatched, containing these words:

'Cetshwayo complains that they are eating into his country to an alarming degree, as they now extend from the Blood River to the Ntabankulu (mountain), and thence to the Umkuze, and that a great portion of his people is thus taken from him. He says that he feels certain that before long he will be compelled to quarrel with them, or else he will have no territory left. He also says that the Boers refuse to give up his cattle, which were carried away when Ndingesi and Umtonga escaped, and seeks his Excellency's intervention on his behalf.'

On April 25th, 1865 (1961, p. 9), a third message is forwarded to the Lieutenant-Governor on the same subject, in which Cetshwayo declares that the Boers had threatened to take possession of his land and eject the Zulu occupants. Should they do so, he would acquaint the Governor, but at the same time he would be forced to defend his country.

On June 5, 1869 (1961, p. 9), a fourth message was received, in which the difficulties of the Zulus were fully laid before the Lieutenant-Governor, and the earnest prayer was tendered that he would intervene and arbitrate between them and the Boer Government. A further message quickly followed upon this, on December 6th of the same year (1961, p. 11). As it will be seen, it was not until repeated supplications had been earnestly advanced by the Zulus that anything was attempted in their favour. In 1869 some correspondence on the subject was maintained between the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal and the President of the Transvaal Republic, which ended in an agreement being made to settle the

matter by arbitration. The Zulu claims were promptly lodged in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor, who was, however, unable to obtain from the Transvaal authorities any statement of their claims, although in four separate despatches from the British Governor they are earnestly and anxiously requested to be sent (*i.e.*, February 2nd, 1869; February 28th, 1870; July 31st, 1871; and October 9th, 1871). Each time they were promised, but these promises remained unfulfilled, and the papers never appeared. The arbitration never took place. All this time the Zulus continued to entreat the friendly intervention of England on their behalf to avert war, and on May 6th, 1870, the sixth message was sent (1961, p. 12). On December 27th of the same year (1964, p. 13) the seventh was received. In October, 1872, King Panda died at Nodwengu, and on November 9th of the same year the eighth message was despatched by the new King, Cetshwayo (1961, p. 14). This was quickly followed by a ninth despatch, dated November 25th, 1872 (1961, p. 15).

The tenth message came on March 1st, 1873, and on September 1st, 1873, Cetshwayo was crowned King. His conversation with Sir Theophilus Shepstone on this occasion may be classed as an eleventh message (1961, pp. 28-30).

After this came seven other messages, all bearing on the same subject, entreating British intervention in order to avert war, viz.: November 27th, 1873 (1961, p. 16); November 11th, 1875 (1748, p. 14); February 9th, 1876 (1961, p. 10); February 29th, 1876 (1961, p. 19);

March 13th, 1876 (sent in writing by Mr. J. Dunn); March 25th, 1876 (1961, p. 19); April 20th, 1876 (1748, p. 49). Thus it will be seen that, in deference to the wishes of the British Government, Cetshwayo through a lapse of fifteen years, under extreme provocation, evaded war, and referred his troubles to be settled by the Lieutenant-Governor's arbitration. On May 25th, 1875, acting-President Joubert, by proclamation, annexed the whole of the disputed territory to the Transvaal—an act which certainly warranted active reprisals on the part of Cetshwayo, who nevertheless forbore to fight, and continued to ask for justice at our hands. Provocation after provocation, encroachment after encroachment continued to be carried on by the Dutch, and yet Cetshwayo, with admirable patience and forbearance, awaited the decision which he hoped to obtain from the country to whom he appealed. In some of his despatches on the subject Sir H. Bulwer writes as follows:

'The Zulus have never consented to give up their claim to this territory. They have always represented the encroachments of the Boers upon it as a serious grievance, and have always considered the question as one of right, a violation of which it would be impossible for them to submit to, and which it would be incumbent upon them to defend at all costs:

Again he says:

'In support of their assertions, the Boers are now gradually descending into the country, taking forcible possession of it, and driving before them the Zulu occupants.'

On March 27th, 1876 (1748, p. 25), Sir Henry Bulwer says:

'This Government has always impressed upon Cetshwayo the importance of preserving the peace on his part, and of settling all questions of dispute by calm representation; and this advice Cetshwayo has always received in the spirit in which it has been given, and assured us of his desire to act according to it. I have no reason to doubt that he has been and is really desirous of so acting.'

On March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24), Sir T. Shepstone says:

'Messages from the Zulu King are becoming more frequent and more urgent, and the replies he receives seem to him to be both temporising and evasive.'

On January 25th, 1876 (1748, p. 15), a despatch written by Lord Carnarvon contains these words:

'Her Majesty's Government cannot accept, or be a party to, any extension of territory by the South African Republic, more especially any appropriation of lands now ruled over by Cetshwayo, with which the Colony of Natal has so many direct and indirect relations.'

The Transvaal was annexed on April 12th, 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone, and on the 26th of the same month he received an address from the Boers (1814, p. 14), praying him to protect them from the Zulus, who, they affirmed, had driven them from their farms on the disputed territory. Up to this date Sir T. Shepstone had strongly advocated the Zulu cause and right to these lands. We shall see how, with the administratorship of the Trans-

vaal devolving upon his shoulders, he suddenly turned round and embraced the Boer side. On October 18th, 1877, the meeting between himself and the Zulu Indunas on the Blood River took place. The representatives of Cetshwayo there assembled indicated the boundary which they affirmed was theirs by right, to which Sir T. objected, and the matter was referred back to Cetshwayo. After some lengthened delay in correspondence and otherwise, the Boundary Commission was proposed by Sir H. Bulwer in a despatch to the King, dated December 8th, 1877 (2000, p. 67), which was replied to on January 5th, 1878, by Cetshwayo joyfully accepting of the same, and thanking him for the good words sent, whereby the Natal Government showed him that it still wished him to drink water and live. At length Cetshwayo had obtained that which he had so long and earnestly prayed for; how, then, is Sir B. Frere warranted in his assertion that 'the offers to arbitrate were by no means willingly accepted by Cetshwayo'? This assertion is without foundation, and one of the many false charges brought against the King proved to be groundless.

On January 12th, 1878, Sir Henry Bulwer acknowledged the friendly spirit in which his former message had been received, and the account given by the bearers of this message as to the manner in which it was received by the King goes still further to refute the unfounded charge of Sir B. Frere. They say: 'While we spoke to Cetshwayo we saw that what we were saying lifted a great weight from his heart; that they were words

which he was glad to hear; and what he said to us, as we finished, showed we were right in this belief;' for he said:

'The words you have brought me from the Governor of Natal are good words; they are not like those I receive from Sontsen (Sir T. Shepstone). Go to the Indunas—they are in the kraal—and repeat to them the words you have told me.'

They then go on to relate how they did so, and conclude with these words: 'After the message was delivered, they (the Indunas) all of them appeared like men who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had ouly then been told they could put it down and rest.'

On January 26th, 1878 (2100, p. 62), Cetshwayo despatched another reply by Government messengers. He says:

'Cetshwayo thanks the Lieutenant-Governor for the message brought by Borolo and Shibela, and says that he is willing to abide by what the Lieutenant-Governor says, and will wait what message his Excellency may send to him on the boundary question. And at the same time he states that he is not claiming any new territory, but land that has always belonged to the Zulu nation, and which he would have taken possession of some time ago, if it had not been for not wishing to offend the English Government. Cetshwayo also begs that the Lieutenant-Governor will hasten this much-vexed question, so that it might come to an end, and that he feels quite assured that the Lieutenant-Governor will see justice done to him, and so live in peace with the English.'

The worthy efforts of Sir H. Bulwer to maintain peace were approved of by the Secretary of State, who in many despatches, both to the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir T. Shepstone, impressed upon them the great danger of raising any unnecessary question which might kindle the flames of war.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE MILITARY-KRAAL SCARES.

MEANWHILE, in 1877, the Zulu King sent a large body of men to erect a kraal near Luneberg. In a despatch dated November 16th, 1877 (1961, p. 224), Sir T. Shepstone reports this matter in the following words :— 'Information has been brought to me by Mr. Charles Potter, who resides nearest to the Zulu border, to the effect that this morning a force of Zulus amounting to about 2,000 men, all fully armed, passed up to the Pongolo River with the intention of carrying out the order of Cetshwayo to build a military kraal on the right bank of that river, immediately opposite to, and within three miles of, the flourishing German settlement of Luneberg. Mr. Potter says that the orders of this force are to molest no one, but to build a kraal, and if fired upon, to fire in return. . . . . This military kraal cannot be required or used for the internal management of Zululand ; nor is there any consideration connected with the defence of that country against any enemy from without, that can be urged in defence of the building of it in that position. . . . . I feel therefore that the building of this kraal must be prevented at all hazards,' etc.,

etc. Now the matter of the Zulus being fully armed meant nothing, it being the Zulu custom to carry their arms with them in time of peace as well as war ; witness Colonel Durnford's remarks, an officer well experienced in such matters (2144, p. 237) :—'The fact that the men at work are armed is of no significance, because every Zulu is an armed man and never moves without his weapon.' Nor is Sir T. Shepstone correct in his information that the kraal was to be built on the right bank of the Pongolo, as the orders from the King were that it should be built on the disputed land north of that river and on the left bank. The assertion that it was a military kraal is entirely without any proof or fact, as, to use his own words a few days later, it will be shown that he himself must have become so aware. 'They made a small cattle kraal, and chopped and collected some poles which they left on the ground to be used for building of huts hereafter. On November 20th he was informed by some Zulu messengers that the building of this kraal was an old intention, and Panda in his life-time once sent Ntshingwayo to carry it out ; but the Boers had driven him 'away and destroyed what he had built' (2000, p. 31). About this time Sir T. Shepstone further says that there had been a general evacuation of country and abandonment of numerous substantial houses and comfortable homesteads. And again, 'The move-ment of this force through the country has been the cause of considerable loss or damage to the farmers and their crops, seeing that quite twenty farms were aban-doned to the cupidity of the Zulu soldiers on their way

home, and to that of the other native populations'—November 23rd, 1877 (2000, p. 31).

The evacuation of farms here mentioned by Sir T. Shepstone was not caused by the Zulus, but was the result of his own orders; in proof whereof I append the words of the farmers themselves, who in a memorial addressed to the Administrator in April, 1878 (2144, p. 191), say: 'The majority of the people have by order of your Excellency trekked into Laager on December 14th last, and after five months we are to go in and live on our farms again.'

It must be remembered that on November 23rd, 1877, the date on which Sir T. Shepstone wrote the above despatch, the offer to arbitrate had not as yet been made. At the Blood River meeting he had parted with the Indunas in hot displeasure, because, in obedience to his request, they had named to him the boundary they considered to be their just right. He had promised to send a messenger to the King, which promise he had not fulfilled. For sixteen years the King had been played with and baffled by the English Government. Eighteen messages had been despatched to seek the British intervention, and it was not until December 8th, 1877, that Sir Henry Bulwer's message proposing arbitration was sent to the Zulu King. Would it have been surprising if, in consequence of this neglect, the King had built military kraals and endeavoured to assert his just rights? I do not think it would—and yet Cetshwayo did none of this, and when the offer of arbitration arrived most eagerly and gratefully accepted it.

On January 31st, 1878, Sir. T. Shepstone reports (2079, p. 135) that he had received information from Mr. C. F. Van Staden, Commandant of the Laager at Luneberg, that the head-man, Umletshe, had been ordered to repair and occupy the military (?) kraal, 'the erection of which, north of the Pongolo, by a Zulu force is already known to your Excellency.'

With regard to this information, as *no* military kraal had been erected, but only a small cattle kraal, the matter of repair could only have amounted to constructing one or more huts, not for an armed force, but for this 'head-man and his family to live in,' evidently for the purpose of keeping order among Cetshwayo's subjects living north of the Pongolo; while on February 23rd Colonel Pearson reports to Sir Henry Bulwer that there is no longer any portion of the kraal left standing. This, then, is the truth about the first military-kraal scare!

Though the Boundary Commission had been eagerly and thankfully accepted by Cetshwayo, the Boers living on the disputed territory did not acquiesce so willingly, and raised many objections which Sir Theophilus Shepstone considered to be both 'weighty and serious,' and on January 15th, 1878 (2079, p. 27), in a long despatch, these weighty and serious objections are enumerated. Several months passed away in various negotiations and correspondence, and on April 25th, 1878, certain Boers addressed a memorial to Sir Theophilus Shepstone expressing distrust in the matter of arbitration, and begging for means to be

furnished them to punish their enemies. Previous to this, on February 2nd of the same year (2079, p. 140), the Boers had presented an address, protesting against arbitration as 'an absurdity and an impossibility.' To this address Sir H. Bulwer, on February 23rd, 1878 (2100, p. 67), replied :

'Of course, if the object of the memorialists is war ; if what they desire is a war with the Zulu nation, it is not to be wondered at that they should find fault with any steps that have been taken to prevent the necessity of war. Nor if they desire war is it to be expected that they should be favourable to arbitration,' etc., etc.

There is no doubt that Sir Bartle Frere had fully made up his mind that the Commission would decide against the Zulu claims, and that the time so spent would be gained for preparing a military force to silence the Zulus should they object, as he doubtless expected that they would, to such an award. On January 26th, 1878 (2079, p. 134), he approves of the Commission being held in terms which imply what I have just stated, adding an expression that he entertained very little hope of any permanent peace being attained by means of intervention, and concludes with words which pointed to the belief that hostilities were almost a foregone conclusion. In this he simply foresaw what he had determined should take place. On February 12th, 1878 (2079, p. 14), Sir H. Bulwer sent to inform Cetshwayo of the place appointed for the Commission to be held, and instructed him to send his representatives to Rorke's Drift on March 7th to meet the Natal Commissioners.

This injunction was promptly attended to by the King, who despatched three of his Indunas, Muwundula, Gebula, and Sihayo, and a boy named Sintwanga, a personal attendant of his own, to represent his interests before the Commission. The inquiry lasted five weeks, and terminated in a judgment favourable to the Zulus, the report made by the Commissioners ending in these words, 'That the land lying to the east of this line, and between this line and the Pongolo River, has never ceased to be Zulu territory, and is Zulu territory by right, and should be considered as such.' Thus the King's assertion of many years was proved to be true, just, and right. The second Military-Kraal Scare commenced in May, 1878, soon after the Commission had done sitting. On May 25th, 1878 (2144, p. 185), Mr. Rudolph reports :—'About 150 Zulus from kraals in the neighbourhood of Luneburg have been at work during the last eight or ten days, cutting wood in the Pongolo Forest, and conveying the same to a spot near to the homesteads of Messrs. Köhrs and Böhmer, of the Luneburg settlement north of the Pongolo River, for the purpose of erecting a military kraal (?), on or near to the site of the military kraal(?), which was there commenced, and again deserted some months ago ; and it is stated that, as soon as a sufficient quantity of wood to finish the kraal shall have been deposited there, an armed Zulu force will come up to build and complete the kraal. . . .' This account sounds bad, but on June 1st the same gentleman sends a further report (2144, p. 116) :—'I went to Luneburg, accompanied by Major Tucker, on

the 30th ult., in order to become personally acquainted with the state of things there, and that I may be enabled to report on the subject of the erection of the military kraal by the Zulus at that place.

'I found the kraal about halfway finished, and that it was erected on the farm of two German farmers named Köhrs and Böhmer. The size of the kraal is only that of an ordinary private Zulu kraal. The cattle-kraal is about thirty yards in diameter.

'As requested by me, two Indunas, Faku and Jane, came to me with a few followers, and were very respectful and civil. I asked them by whose order the kraal was built, for what purpose it was built, and who the Indunas were that had charge of the building of it. Faku spoke. He said that the kraal was built by the order of his King, Cetshwayo, but not with any hostile intention towards the people or Government of the Transvaal; that it was built simply to have a kraal in that locality, where many of Cetshwayo's people are residing without a head or kraal representing the King, and that Cetshwayo had appointed him to see to the erection and occupation of the kraal; that the King had given instructions that neither the white nor the native subjects of the Transvaal were in any way to be molested or disturbed by the Zulus; that he (Faku) had come with a small force to build the kraal, because he was afraid that, bringing a large force, the people would be alarmed, and Cetshwayo had given him special instructions not to cause excitement amongst the people.

'Faku went on to say that none of the people of the

Government, white or black, had in any way been interfered with by his Zulus, and that he would take care that they should not be molested or disturbed in the occupation of their homes and farms, and that should any of his people be molested by subjects of this Government he would not take the law into his own hands, but would come or send to Utrecht to report the case to me, because he was there as the eyes, mouth, and ears of Cetshwayo on the part of the Zulus, and as the eyes, ears, and mouth of the Landrost of Utrecht on the part of the Government. . . . I am glad to say that the excitement and fear of our people, which existed when the Zulus commenced building the kraal, have greatly subsided, and I believe the people will not now leave their farms.'

On June 7th, 1878 (2144, p. 235), Colonel Pearson reports regarding the King, that 'in reality he appears to have done nothing in any way at variance with his promise to let the border question rest until the result of the Commission had been made known.' And on June 8th (2144, p. 237) Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford makes the following statement:—'I know the district referred to, in which are many Zulu kraals, and believe that if such a military kraal is in course of erection on the farms of one Köhrs, believed to be a field-cornet in the Wakkerstroom district, residing about fifteen miles from the mission-station of the Rev. Mr. Meyer, it is being constructed that order may be kept amongst the Zulus here residing, who owe allegiance to the Zulu King alone, and in the interests of peace.' Finally, on

June 7th, 1878 (2144, p. 189), Sir Henry Bulwer writes that he understands 'that the reports have been exaggerated, and that although a kraal is being constructed, it is *not* a military kraal, but is intended as the residence of a Zulu headman, who has received orders from the King not to allow any molestation of the subjects of the Transvaal in the district by Zulu subjects.' Thus we see the real truth of the second Military-Kraal Scare, and behold how little foundation Sir B. Frere has for his assertion that Cetshwayo 'occupied with an armed force a portion of the country which he claimed, ejected the Boers, and established his posts far within the territory which had long been in Transvaal possession' (November 13, 1878; 2222, p. 93); that he 'had taken the law into his own hands, pushing forward his military kraals (?!) on to the ground occupied for many years by Transvaal grantees.'

When the decision of the Boundary Commission given in favour of the Zulus became known, Sir Bartle Frere gave it as his conclusion 'that the decision of the Commissioners is only a partial and incomplete settlement of the subject-matter under dispute, that it cannot be looked upon as a judicial decision'—(because it gave the Zulus their just right?)—'and that in point of fact the elements for such a decision do not, and cannot, from the circumstances, exist' (!) (August 9th, 1878; 2222, p. 58); and Sir T. Shepstone condemned it very severely, charging the Commissioners with having 'lightly treated the interests of the Transvaal' (October 17th, 1878; 2222, p. 58). Naturally this just finding

of the Boundary Commissioners did not suit the views of either Sir Bartle Frere or Sir T. Shepstone. By many previous despatches the former had shown the bent for war towards which his inclinations leaned, and this justice rendered to the Zulu nation shows itself distastefully apparent to him in all his despatches on the subject. Baffled in this direction, he nevertheless lost no opportunity of seizing upon other matters to bring about his desired aim, endeavouring at the same time to place every possible obstacle in the way of a fair and just execution of the Boundary Award in favour of the Zulus. In this chapter I have endeavoured to give a clear idea of the Boundary Question and Military-Kraal Scares, the events connected with both having been adduced at a later date as so much evidence against the King. It will be seen from the events of this chapter that the doings of Cetshwayo were conducted in a straightforward and honourable manner, and that under every provocation he evaded war, and did all in his power to satisfy and please the British Government. In future chapters it will be my object to throw further light on other matters, bringing to light the truth connected with the slanderous charges levied against him, and tending to show that these distorted accusations which so misled public feeling and sympathy were nothing but a tissue of inventions and exaggerations.

## CHAPTER III.

### ZULU EXECUTIONS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF EUROPE.

TOWARDS the end of the year 1876 it was reported to the Governor of Natal that numbers of girls had been put to death by order of Cetshwayo for disobeying the King and breaking the Zulu marriage laws. In a despatch dated October 13th, 1876 (1748, p. 198), Sir Henry Bulwer reported the matter, in which the following passages occur :—'It appears that, according to an old custom, the King at certain periods authorises certain regiments to marry girls of a particular age ; . . . . and in conformity with this custom the King, some months ago, at the Festival of First Fruits, authorised the Indhlondhlo and Dhloko Regiments to marry.' Being disobeyed, 'The King, on the deceptions being discovered, ordered large numbers of girls and others connected with them to be killed. . . . . .'

It must be an understood fact that Cetshwayo, in giving the order to girls to marry, was simply adhering to an old custom of the nation, and not to a new law instituted by himself; and there is furthermore no existing proof extant that the assertion is correct that 'large numbers of girls and others connected with them'

were killed by the King's orders. It is so easy to make a statement, but there is generally the difficulty of 'no proof' forthcoming, which makes the lie detect itself and convicts the informer. Mr. Rudolph speaks of 'several girls' and 'a few of the parents' being killed, and Mr. Osborn likewise mentioned the fact that 'several girls were killed.' The difference between the words 'several' and 'large numbers' is somewhat apparent.

On October 3rd, 1876 (1748, p. 198), Sir H. Bulwer despatched a message to Cetshwayo, bringing the matter to his notice, and remonstrating against the act of the King. The messengers despatched were Mantshonga and Bayeni, the former being a refugee Zulu of the Umbulazi and Umkungo party, between whom and the King, for various reasons, there existed deadly hostility. Now, to quote Sir Henry Bulwer's own words (1748, p. 10), the King was 'said to have declined communications through refugee subjects of his own who had fled to the Transvaal;' and yet we find one of these very men the bearer of a message to the King from whose authority he had alienated himself. This slight was enough in itself to anger Cetshwayo, who was already embittered by the careless manner in which all his urgent appeals to the Government had been received. A few months had only elapsed since his eighteenth and final message to the Lieutenant-Governor had been despatched, and the inattention and shuffling behaviour of the British Government had both annoyed and wounded him. While still smarting under the neglect he had experienced, the message of Sir H. Bulwer arrived,

one of the bearers, Mantshonga, being an enemy to himself and his country. In a moment of petulance the reply sent back by the King is hardly to be wondered at, and at the time being called up little comment. It was only some years later that his words were dug up from the past and brought as a shaft to wing against him, although he never in any way then, or at a later date, acted up to the tone of his petulant reply, which repeated friendly messages despatched thereafter sought to condone. It was unfortunate that this reply should have been received and transmitted by any other messenger than his own, it being probably distorted and exaggerated by Mantshonga, whose interest it was to blacken the King's character. Then again the Zulu expression *Silingene* was translated as 'The Governor of Natal and I are equal,' whereas the proper rendering would be, 'We are in like positions.' The former would portray insolence; the latter simply a review of the positions in which the King and the Lieutenant-Governor stood. A proof of how much this expression was misunderstood lies in the fact that, in the debate on the Zulu War, March 25th, 1879, Lord Cranbrook in the House of Lords actually used against Cetshwayo the argument derived from the mistaken rendering of the word *Silingene*, affirming that he had replied 'that he was as good as the Governor of Natal,' whereas he had simply stated that, as regards the government of their different countries, they stood in like position. I have dwelt on this matter a good deal in consequence of the assertion by Sir Bartle Frere in his final memorandum

that the reply was couched 'in terms of unprecedented insolence and defiance,' no allowance being made for the fact that, though Cętshwayo with pardonable petulance did return a rebellious reply, as it would appear by the rendering of messengers (not his own), he never acted up to the tone of the reply in question, and sought by friendly messages to atone for this one angry ebullition of temper.

In ordering the executions which took place about this time, the King merely acted up to the laws and customs of the nation. Though I do not wish to advocate the killing of human beings, it was evident that, unless the King ruled by the laws and customs of his country, neither order nor quiet could have long prevailed. On January 1st, 1878, Cetshwayo himself gave an illustration of his difficulty in this matter, when reporting to the Lieutenant-Governor a fight that had taken place between two of his regiments, in which many people were killed. He had warned them that he would severely punish disturbances of this sort; but it would be impossible to preserve order unless he sometimes killed, as he endeavoured to impress upon the Lieutenant-Governor. How are we to change the laws and customs of a nation in a day? and did we not ourselves, not many years ago, after centuries of civilisation, put to death for the minor offences of sheep-stealing, etc.?

A great deal has been brought to bear against the King on the subject of the treatment of missionaries in Zululand. This is both unfair and unjust, as I shall

endeavour to show. At his coronation the King regretted in words to Sir T. Shepstone that they had ever been admitted into his country: he could see no good in them, and they simply did harm. He expressed his regret that they did not confine themselves to the education of his people, admitting that it was education which made the English so great. Some years later, in conversing on the same matter, the Chiefs Mnyamana and Vumaudaba bitterly expressed their opinion that *the nation* would not permit the meddling interference of the missionaries, averring that directly a Zulu did wrong he at once sought refuge at the mission station on the plea of desiring to become a Christian. They said:

'If he wants to run away with a girl, he becomes a Christian. If he wishes to be exempt from serving the King, he puts on clothes and is a Christian. If a man is an evil-doer, he becomes a Christian. All these people are the subjects of the King, and who will keep a cow for another to milk it? This Christianising of the Zulus destroys the land, and we will not have it. The missionaries desire to set up another power in the land, and, as Zululand has only one King, that cannot be allowed.'

In reporting the matter Mr. Fynney says: 'Before I entered Zululand most of the missionaries had decided upon leaving. Some had already left, not from any fear of personal danger, but because in some cases they had been deserted by the natives on their stations; in others the native converts were uneasy and wished to leave; and from the attitude, both of the King and Chiefs, they

could plainly see that all chances of making fresh converts, or even of retaining those around them, were for the present at an end.

'I find there were all sorts of wild rumours going about from station to station ; one, that the British Government intended to annex Zululand at once. I am afraid that this and the like rumours have done harm. Several of the missionaries have been to the King of late, and, as he told me, have worried him to such an extent that he does not want to see them any more. I do not think they have much improved their cause by this step, and it is evident to me that so obnoxious have they become in the eyes of the King that he wishes to get rid of them all.'

On August 31st, 1877 (1961, p. 60), Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir H. Bulwer, informing him that he had received several communications from private persons in Zululand upon the state of affairs in that country, which had been forwarded to him through Sir Bartle Frere. There is little doubt that these communications came from missionaries, who, if they spoke the truth, should *not* have allowed their names to be suppressed, but should have openly stated what they did, allowing thereby some opportunity for contradiction. Commenting on the contents of these communications, which were evidently condemnatory of the King, Lord Carnarvon goes on to say that he gathered from the papers in question that the missionaries entertained hopes that her Majesty's Government would actively interfere in support of their efforts, and undertake the task of their protection

and 'maintenance.' In consequence he requested Sir H. Bulwer to impress most distinctly on these gentlemen that her Majesty's Government could not undertake to compel the King to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in Zululand, and that it would be best for them in this case to retire for the time being from the country. There is little doubt that the presence of the missionaries aggravated and annoyed the King, for the reason that they endeavoured to bring into the country another power, and were always spreading false and disturbing reports. Sir H. Bulwer, in a despatch dated November 27th, 1877, says that the Norwegian missionaries, in discussing the question of leaving the country, held out to the King the prospect of their departure almost as a threat. This mode of proceeding was not only foolish, but had a tendency to produce unpleasant results ; and it is much a matter for wonder how the Zulu King so long governed his temper and actions in submitting for a time to so much effrontery, until, on January 26th, 1878 (2100, p. 61), he despatched a messenger to the Lieutenant-Governor, begging him to advise the missionaries to depart, as they were doing no good.

The statement made by two native converts from the Rev. Mr. Oftebro's station, to the effect that several men had been killed by the King's order, viz., Joseph, Maquamsela, and Jacob, for their religious opinions, at this time provoked a good deal of comment.

In Zululand an Umtagati, or evil-doer, is always killed as doing harm to others. The first man killed

was Joseph, and he was put to death in consequence of having introduced a lung-sick ox of Mabilwana's among Sambelwa's cattle, eight of whom died in consequence, as also several people to whom he gave the meat of the diseased animal. He was killed as an evil-doer, according to the customs of his country, but not, as the missionaries declared, because he was a Christian convert. The putting to death for this sort of thing is no doubt repulsive to the feeling of the present century; but can the blackest deeds of even Chaka and Dingaan be drawn as a parallel with the terrible annihilation of human life not so very long ago in Christian Europe—of 7000 victims burnt alive for witchcraft at Trèves, 600 by a Bishop of Bamberg, 800 in one year in the Bishopric of Wurtzburg, 1000 in the province of Como, 400 at once at Toulouse, 500 in three months at Geneva, 48 at Constance, 80 at the little town of Valry in Savoy, 70 in Sweden? One Christian judge boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death in sixteen years 800 witches (see Lecky's 'Rationalism in Europe,' vol. i. chap. 1.). Did not Luther say, 'I would have no compassion on these witches; I would burn them all'? If the influence of civilisation and Christianity worked such deeds, how do we dare to raise such a hue-and-cry over the deaths of a few evil-doers who suffered punishment according to the laws and customs of Zululand?

With regard to the death of Maquamsela, Mr. Oftebro, Mr. Schmidt, and Mr. Volker, all three missionaries, stated that he had been put to death because he wished

to become a Christian. This is not the case, as Maquamsela was killed by the Chief Gaozi unknown to Cetshwayo, because he was afraid that the King would be angry with him for keeping the conversion of Maquamsela a secret. It will thus be seen that the charge was entirely untrue; and the following statement of Sir H. Bulwer goes a long way to prove what I have said. He says:

'I have heard nothing tending to confirm the opinion so hastily arrived at, and so hastily expressed, that the attacks actually made were part of a hostile design against the missionaries and mission stations in the Zulu country, or to induce me to alter the opinion, originally formed upon the information before me, that the attacks were directed against individual natives for personal reasons.'

The man Jacob was killed as an Umtagati (evil-doer), and because he disobeyed the laws of his country. He was not put to death on account of his connection with the mission stations; and although Mr. Oftebro speaks of him as a Christian, and Mr. Robertson, Mr. Stavem, and Mr. Küch all describe him as a Christian, and leave the reader under the impression that he was killed for being such, the real truth of the matter was that he was a lapsed baptized Zulu, and was not a good Christian, but had returned to heathendom. He was not considered by Cetshwayo as a Christian, and therefore naturally was not killed as such.

In reply to the question put to various missionaries lately at that time from Zululand by Sir Bartle Frere,

as to how many persons had been actually put to death for listening to the teaching of missionaries, or being in any way connected with missions, had been put to death ostensibly for other reasons, they could bring forward no other cases than the three I have just alluded to, and that these three were killed for their religious opinions has, as I have pointed out, not the slightest foundation on fact to countenance their assertions.

If the King desired to kill all Christian converts, how was it that he did not put to death the many converts that occupied the Norwegian and German mission stations? On the former there were over a hundred (see 2220, p. 341), and on the latter there were doubtless corresponding numbers, none of whom, save Joseph and Maquamsela, were killed; to whom may be added Jacob, who had renounced Christianity.

Towards the end of November a man of the name of Samuel, desiring to escape military duty, became a Christian. The King, for this evasion of military service, sent some men to kill him, according to Zulu law. At the intercession of the missionary on the Imfule station, Samuel was forgiven; but Cetshwayo at the same time emphatically stated that though he forgave him (for not having joined his regiment), he would not any longer permit his people to become Christians (thereby staying with the missionaries and neglecting their military duties). The account given of this affair by the Rev. Mr. Oftebro describes it as an impi sent by the King to kill Samuel because he had turned Christian, whereas in reality it was because he had evaded his military duties.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE MISSIONARIES.

THE statement of the missionaries that they quitted Zululand in consequence of the haughty and defiant tone and feeling towards whites is also accompanied by an assertion of Mr. Oftebro, the representative of all the missionaries in the country, that it was by the advice of Sir T. Shepstone, given in April, 1878. That they were driven away by persecution and ill-treatment is totally untrue; but it is not likely that the King could look with favour upon a community whom he knew to be hostilely inclined towards him, who alienated his people from their duties, and who advocated the overthrow of his kingdom, its laws, customs, and past traditions (see October 9th, 1878, and December 17th, 1878, 2220, pp. 344 and 17). Many useful reforms might have been introduced into Zululand had we set about it in a fair and justifiable manner. Cetshwayo himself expressed a wish that his people might be educated; he would have been glad to encourage the missionaries to remain had they confined themselves to this occupation; but he objected to the severe treatment brought to bear upon himself and his country by a nation who for so many years had neglected and abandoned him. He

refused to admit violence, and deplored a treatment which, if only the real facts were known, would have cried shame upon us from the voice of civilised nations. His deeds have never merited the many and highly-coloured epithets addressed against him by Sir Bartle Frere — such as 'grinding despotism' of the 'cruel despot' (2222, p. 5), 'the ignorant and bloodthirsty despot,' the 'sanguinary tyrant,' who is only 'anxious to emulate the sanguinary fame of his uncle Chaka;' whose 'history is written in characters of blood,' whose 'murders and massacres are simply part of a settled purpose to emulate Chaka;' 'in cruelty and treachery he is no degenerate representative of Chaka and Dingane;' 'with Chaka as his avowed model;' 'the monster Chaka is his model, to emulate Chaka in shedding blood is, as far as I have heard, his highest aspiration;' 'we have not a shadow of excuse for doubting that he is in his later utterances expressing his real intention to resume the most sanguinary of his predecessor's practices; 'he was, I believe, inclined to break loose from all restraint and to re-establish the *régime* of Chaka's unmitigated barbarism,' etc., etc., etc. Even so early as August 9th, 1878, before reaching Natal, he speaks of the 'faithless and cruel character' of the King. Abuse of this violent character is doubtless oratorical and awe-inspiring, and the effect it may produce on credulous and ignorant minds—nay, even on the ideas of well-educated personages—is doubtless great; but unless proof is forthcoming to warrant and substantiate such abuse, it should never have been uttered or given vent

to. With regard to the treatment of the missionaries, it is perfectly wonderful that the King should have borne with their meddling interference so long. It shows a spirit of conciliation and forbearance which redounds much to his credit. Neither were they, as Sir Bartle Frere declared, terrorised and driven away out of the country, but they left of their own accord and in consequence of the advice given them by Sir T. Shepstone in April, 1878, while the Border Commission was sitting, and in expectation of a political crisis.

What foundation also had Sir Bartle Frere for the statement that Cetshwayo had killed Zulu converts, 'at first rarely, and as with reluctance and a desire to conceal what he had ordered; and to shift the responsibility to other shoulders, latterly more frequently, openly, and as an avowed (?) part of a general policy for re-establishing the system of Chaka and Dingane in Kafirland'? In asserting this he bases his knowledge on the statements of missionaries who, he declares, left little doubt in his mind as to the truth of the matter, and satisfied him as to the facts (!). (2220, p. 279.)

Let notice be given of Sir H. Bulwer's just and honourable review of the matter—a man who, as Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, had every reason to be able to form a better and more accurate judgment, and whose every word both contradicts and refutes the charges of Sir Bartle Frere. He writes, November 18th, 1878 (2222, p. 171):

'There has not been, I believe, any actual expulsion of missionaries from Zululand by the Zulu King. . . . .

He made no promise regarding the native converts, and none was asked of him. Some sort of promise he gave regarding the existing missionaries, and he has not gone back from what he said.

'With regard to the statement' (by Sir B. Frere) 'that Cetshwayo began to rule in a frame of mind rather favourable than otherwise to missionary teaching, we have only, I think, to look at the Report of Sir T. Shepstone, regarding the frame of the King's mind on this subject at the time of the installation, to find that it was really altogether opposite to what it is thus described by these missionaries. The King began his rule unfavourably disposed to missionary teaching, and before he began his rule he openly declared himself against their teaching, as mischievous, in his opinion, to the Zulus. . . . . .

'I am also much surprised at what they said' (see Sir B. Frere's assertion as above) 'regarding the killing of Zulu converts, viz., that this was at first done rarely, but that latterly it has been done more frequently and openly. As far as I have learned, the first occasion of the killing of Zulu converts, or natives living on mission stations, since Cetshwayo became King was in the early part of last year, 1877. And when representations reached me regarding this, on account of the uncertainty as to the number of mission natives who had been killed, I took some pains to find out how the case really stood, and ascertained that the number of natives, either converts or living on mission stations, who had been killed, was *three*.'

To this, in his reply, Sir B. Frere says :

'I have since made further inquiry, and have no doubt that, though his Excellency may possibly be right as to the number regarding which there is judicial

evidence, the missionaries had every reason (?!) to believe that the number slain on account of their inclination to Christianity was considerably greater than three. One gentleman, who had better means of obtaining the truth than anyone else, told me he had no doubt (!) the number of converts killed was considerable, though many of them were killed ostensibly for other causes than their inclination to Christianity (!!!) He gave me this and much more information *under a stipulation that his name should not be mentioned.*' (!)

In spite of the generous and truthful review of the matter by Sir H. Bulwer, it will be seen by this that Sir Bartle Frere obstinately refused to be convinced of the falsity of his statements. He continued to assert things as facts without the slightest foundation, and based his authority on the statements of one whose stipulation that his name should not be mentioned appears sufficient proof in itself that the informer was ashamed of the lies he had stated, and was not prepared to face or challenge contradiction. On authority such as this, base and calumnious charges were trumped up and fabricated, and sent home to England to poison the minds of those far away against the unhappy Zulus and their King, whose power both Sir Bartle Frere and the missionaries thirsted to destroy. Let him or them bring evidence or proof of any kind to substantiate their charges. I defy them to do so, because, if they adhere to the truth, they cannot.

Sir Bartle Frere's further statement that Cetshwayo had broken his coronation promises is quite without the

support of fact. Even if Cetshwayo *had* put to death Zulu converts, which he did not, he never made any agreement on this subject. It is denied by him and by John Dunn, and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach states that, though the position of the missionaries was discussed, no agreement was entered into on their behalf; while Sir T. Shepstone says, 'I did not consider it wise to attempt to make any arrangement in favour of the native converts.' How, then, did Cetshwayo commit a breach of his coronation promises?

I think I have written enough on this subject to show that the many charges brought against the King in condemnation of his rule as regards the missionaries and native converts are false and without foundation. In all his dealings Cetshwayo acted with candour and openness. What he did not like he stated, and he ever acted in accordance with his professions. In another chapter I shall endeavour to deal with the principal *casus belli* of Sir Bartle Frere—*i.e.*, the raid by Sihayo's sons—and with the determined and aggressive policy which thrust a war into the unwilling hands of the King, who merely directed his arms against us in defence of his country.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE SIHAYO RAID.

I NOW come to a very important period in the history of Cetshwayo's rule—*i.e.*, that time relating to the raid made by Sihayo's sons into the Colony of Natal. As this episode furnished an opportunity to Sir Bartle Frere on which to found his principal *casus belli*, the matter should be thoroughly examined and understood. But in order to do so it is necessary to glance back upon an incident which occurred a short time previous to the raid. The occurrence in question and the manner in which it was conducted tended much thereafter to mystify and confuse the King in later transactions. In the beginning of 1877 a Zulu youth of the name of Jolwana killed in Zululand a white man, his master. Cetshwayo, on learning what had taken place, at once caused the young man to be handed over to the Natal Government for trial. He was, however, returned to the King by Sir Henry Bulwer with the following message, March 10th, 1877 (1114, p. 3):

'The Lieutenant-Governor desires to express his acknowledgment to Cetshwayo for sending the native

Jolwana to this Government. Jolwana cannot be tried in Natal, as he is a Zulu subject; and therefore he is returned with a request that Cetshwayo will give him a full and fair trial.'

On April 17th the Lieutenant-Governor reports the matter in the following words (1814, p. 3): 'In a despatch I had occasion to allude to the recent case of a Zulu lad, whom, having been accused of killing in Zululand a white man, his master, and having been handed over to this Government by Cetshwayo, I had been obliged, in consequence of the Courts of Law in this Colony having no jurisdiction to try him, to send back to the Zulu country that he might be tried by Cetshwayo,' etc.

On July 28th, 1878, the report from Maziana, a native border-guard, was forwarded to the authorities (2220, p. 125), on the matter of a raid which had occurred in Natal. Some six days previous to this report Mamqwebelende, the wife of the Zulu chief Sihayo, escaped from his kraal and took refuge in Natal. She was pursued by two sons of Sihayo, respectively named Mehlokazulu and Bekuzulu, captured by them, and taken back into Zululand.

On August 1st Sir H. Bulwer, in a despatch addressed to Cetshwayo, called the attention of the King to the matter, and requested him to send the two sons of Sihayo to the Natal Government, to be tried by the laws of the Colony for the offence.

On July 29th, 1878, another raid was made by three sons of Sihayo and their uncle Zuluhlenga into Natal.

They seized on another refugee wife of Sihayo, saying, 'Give us our mother; we do not want the dog' (*i.e.*, the man with whom she made off), 'but we will have the woman.' The man, it would appear, was safe from their vengeance, in spite of his heinous crime, as being on English soil; the woman being regarded simply as cattle, which, by our own shameful practice in past years of surrendering female refugees as property, we had taught or encouraged the Zulus to consider them.

This further offence Sir H. Bulwer reports to Cetshwayo on August 16th, 1878, with the *request* 'that in addition to Mehlokazulu and Bekazulu, Zuluhlenga, a brother of Sihayo, and Umkumbikazulu and Tshekwana, sons of Sihayo, be also handed over to the Natal Government, to be tried by the laws of the Colony for the offence they had committed in it' (2220, p. 197).

How is it that Sir Henry Bulwer in these despatches requests the delivery up of these men to be tried by the laws of the Colony, when a short time before he returned Jolwana to Cetshwayo, with the information that the lad, being a Zulu subject, could not be tried in Natal? In his report of the matter he had emphatically stated that he had been obliged to return Jolwana to Cetshwayo in consequence of the Courts of Law in the Colony having no jurisdiction to try him, and yet not many months afterwards we find him requesting the King to deliver up Zulu subjects to be tried by the laws of the Colony. In what way was Cetshwayo to understand this? The matter must have been extremely perplexing

to the King, as indeed it would appear to anyone else.*

On August 24th, 1878, Mr. John Dunn wrote for Cetshwayo a reply to Sir H. Bulwer's first message, that of August 1st (2260, p. 31):

'Cetshwayo is sorry to have to acknowledge that the message brought by Umlunge is true. But he begs his Excellency will not take it in the light he sees the Natal Government seem to do; as what Sihayo's sons did he can only attribute to a rash act of boys, who in their zeal for their father's house' (? honour) 'did not think what they were doing. Cetshwayo acknowledges that they deserve punishing, and he sends some of his Indunas, who will follow Umlunge with his words. Cetshwayo states that no acts of his subjects will make him quarrel with his fathers of the house of Chaka.'

Again on August 30th, 1878, through the medium of the same pen, the King replied to Sir H. Bulwer's second message as follows (2260, p. 32):

'Cetshwayo is again sorry to say that the message brought by Dagudu and Balani is true, and that Sihayo's people have done wrong. And he again begs to say that he hopes the Natal Government will not take what

* Under the law of nations a subject is liable to be punished by his own Sovereign for crimes committed anywhere. He is responsible to a foreign Sovereign only for crimes committed in that foreign Sovereign's dominions. Sir H. Bulwer had no authority over the Zulu who killed a British subject in Zululand, but he had the right to punish a Zulu for a crime committed in Natal. But without a categorical explanation, which does not appear to have been offered, Cetshwayo could hardly be expected to understand the distinction between the two cases.

was done as a slight to the Natal Government, as it was only the act of a lot of rash boys, who, in zeal for their father's welfare, did not think of what they were doing or the consequence. Cetshwayo states that one of Sihayo's sons was wrongly accused, as he was not one of the party. Bekuzulu was at Ulandandhlova with the King at the time. Cetshwayo begs that his Excellency will not persist in Sihayo's sons being sent to Natal for trial, but will accept as a fine £50, which he sends by Meewundula and others, whom he sends to speak good words for him to his Excellency.'

Now, it was by the advice of John Dunn, whom the King consulted on the matter, that he should make an immediate tender of £100 as atonement-money, by which it will be seen that John Dunn did not look upon the offence in so serious a light. Cetshwayo stated to the bearers of the second message his great regret for the occurrence, and said that he had spoken to the young men about it, who had acted foolishly. It was a rash act done by boys, and he could say no more to the second message than he had done to the first. They were to return and say that the request of the Government would be laid before the great men of the Zulu people for them to say what was to be done. He added: 'The English are my fathers; I do not wish to quarrel with them, but to live, as I always have done, at peace with them.'

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE HIGH COMMISSIONER DISOBEYS THE COLONIAL SECRETARY.

So far is a truthful account of how matters stood, but on September 30th Sir Bartle Frere, who had only a few days previously reached Natal, wrote to the Secretary of State a highly-coloured and exaggerated statement of affairs. His letter runs thus, September 30th, 1878 (2220, p. 280):

'The reports first received of raids into Natal territory by large bodies of armed men, who dragged two refugee women out of the huts of British subjects, with expressions of contemptuous disregard (?) for what the English Government might think, or say, or do (?), and the murder of the women directly they were on the other side of the boundary line, appear to be confirmed in every particular (?). There seems to be no doubt that the parties were headed by two sons of Sihayo. This chief lives near the Natal border, and was well known as extremely anti-English in his feelings,' etc.

The tone of Cetshwayo's reply to the Lieutenant-Governor's demand (? Sir Bartle Frere should have said 'request') for the surrender of the leaders of the

band who murdered the two refugee women is not more reassuring than the purport of his messages.

'He regrets the invasion of British territory because it displeases the British.' (? This sentence does not appear in Cetshwayo's replies.) 'But the act was,' he says, 'that of boys jealous of the honour of their father's house, and he offers a *solatium* of £50 for the affront to the British.' (The tender of money was made by the advice of John Dunn.) 'I think her Majesty's Government will agree with me, when the whole correspondence is before them, that his Excellency has gone quite as far as was compatible with a due regard to the honour of her Majesty's flag, in his desire to avoid all possible cause of irritation, by the mode in which he required the only satisfaction that could be possibly accepted for so flagrant and wilful an outrage.'

Sir Bartle Frere goes on to add:

'That unless apologised and atoned for by compliance with the Lieutenant-Governor's demands (?) that the leaders of the murderous gangs shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the Zulu King an ultimatum which must put an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.'

In this statement Sir Bartle Frere completely misrepresents the meaning of the King's words. He also speaks of Cetshwayo's refusal to give redress. This is not the case, as the King had tendered an atonement offer in money, believing that in thus acting by the advice of a white man (John Dunn) he was doing the most correct thing. Neither had he refused to give the boys up; he simply said, 'He did not wish to do so, but

would lay the matter before his great men.' But in the final passages of Sir Bartle Frere's letter it is not difficult to read a determination to commence hostilities which he had long anticipated and prepared for before the raid of Sihayo's sons. Sir Henry Bulwer had never made a demand for the boys, as asserted by Sir Bartle Frere. He had simply requested the surrender of the offenders, which request was rendered doubly unmeaning to the King, since the affair of Jolwana, who had been returned on his hands as a Zulu subject, over whom the laws of the Colony had no jurisdiction.

That Sir Bartle Frere's sentiments were not shared by the Secretary of State will be seen by the following reply to the above statement. November 21st, 1878 (2230, p. 230), he writes:

'The several circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open rupture, do not appear in themselves to present any difficulties which are not capable of a peaceful solution.

'The abduction and murder of the Zulu women, who had taken refuge in Natal, is undoubtedly a serious matter, and no sufficient reparation for it has yet been made. But I observe that Cetshwayo has expressed his regret for this occurrence; and although the compensation offered by him was inadequate, there would seem to have been nothing in his conduct with regard to it which would preclude the hope of a satisfactory arrangement.'

But this fair and lenient view taken by the Secretary of State was not at all suited to Sir Bartle Frere's bellicose intentions, and in accordance with *his* views of

the matter Sir Henry Bulwer despatched another message to Cetshwayo. In this despatch the Lieutenant-Governor finds himself bound to acknowledge that it was but the act of individuals and done without the King's knowledge. In all its dealings with the Zulus the Natal Government had always treated the females as 'property,' and Cetshwayo therefore very naturally regarded these two women as such, and in his reply argued of them as he would of strayed or stolen cattle. I am not upholding these principles, I am simply pointing out the manner in which our Government had taught the Zulus to regard their women. How then could Sir Bartle Frere make so much of an offence which was but part of Zulu custom, and which had not been perpetrated to slight or insult the Natal Government?

It was in vain that both Cetshwayo and his chiefs sent messages of regret and explanation. It was in vain that Sir Henry Bulwer strongly advised a compromise in the acceptance of a fine, heavy enough to be a punishment on the nation. Sir Bartle Frere remained obdurate, and all pacific intentions were cast to the winds, and fresh grievances dug up from the past to countenance his proceedings. The ultimatum which he knew would provoke war was composed, and the meeting which had been called for the delivery of the Commissioners' Award on the disputed territory question was chosen as the time most fitting to deliver it!

On December 11th, 1878, this ultimatum, coupled by the orders of Sir Bartle Frere, with the Boundary Award, was delivered at the Lower Tugela Drift to the

Zulu representatives. They had assembled, as they thought, to receive the first finding of their cause by the Commissioners, but were not prepared for the cruel and premeditated insult which in the shape of the ultimatum was hurled at their heads and at that of their King. When the document was offered to them for transmission to Cetshwayo, they indignantly refused to accept it or to be the bearers of an assegai with which to stab their own King. It was then thrust upon one of the attendants (not an Induna), and on reaching John Dunn, a few miles off in the Zulu country, he there left it, and the King *never* saw it or fully knew its contents. The only manner in which they were communicated to him was through messengers sent by John Dunn, to whom the contents of the ultimatum were once read through. How was it possible for these men to retain in their memory all the many demands enumerated therein, or to impress upon Cetshwayo the meaning and gravity of many of them? John Dunn in messages and statements made at the time asserted it as his belief that the King did not know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the subsequent memorandum. How, then, knowing this, was Sir Bartle Frere justified in declaring war?

In the ultimatum the instant surrender of the Sihayo offenders was demanded, and a further fine of 500 head of cattle for the delay in delivering them up. A further fine of 100 cattle was ordered for an offence committed by the Zulu Border Guard against the persons of Messrs. Smith and Dighton. Twenty days were

allowed for compliance with the above demands, *i.e.*, until December 31st.

Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the remaining demands, and Cetshwayo was given to understand that non-compliance would result in instant war. No unbiassed person can regard these thirteen demands as otherwise than a declaration of war, as no savage King could have complied with the conditions and retained his self-respect. Though he finally agreed to surrender the men and send in the cattle, he begged that if they could not be delivered in the specified time immediate action should not be taken, as the cattle were scattered, the land was great, and he had to seek them. But to this Sir B. Frere replied that further extension of time would not be granted, and, in spite of frequent solicitations from the King on this subject, he returned ever the same reply. How then is he justified in his assertion that 'had Cetshwayo temporised, or made excuses or promises, or availed himself of the many openings left for discussion (!?) he would of course have postponed any active operations till he had full sanction to commence'? (February 3rd.) These words are indeed truly amazing.

It was in vain that Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on the 17th October, 1878, had refused reinforcements, stating that all information that had hitherto reached her Majesty's Government with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appeared to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it would

be possible to avert war; Sir B. Frere continued to urge the despatch of reinforcements. His request was at length granted, but in another despatch, dated November 21st, 1878, they were supplied, it stated, not to furnish means for a campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford protection. Sir B. Frere was urgently reminded to use every effort to overcome the existing difficulties by judgment and forbearance. We have seen how he followed this advice in the unjust and unreasonable demands of the ultimatum. He furthermore intimated to Cetshwayo that no advance should be made into Zululand until the expiration of thirty days; and yet we learn, on reference to official sources (2242, p. 19), that Colonel Wood 'crossed the Blood River' on January 6th, and thus began the invasion of Zululand some days before the expiration of the time given by Sir B. Frere for compliance with the demands of the ultimatum. Cetshwayo made every effort to comply with the first two or three demands within the specified time, but finding his efforts unavailing, and learning from Sir B. Frere's repeated assurances that no extension of time would be allowed, he became too disheartened to exert himself further, and when the troops advanced against him he bravely prepared to resist the unjust and cruel invasion. He furthermore beheld, in Colonel Wood's passage of the Blood River on January 6th, a distinct violation of our word and promises that the troops should not advance until the expiration of thirty days; and in thus beholding this breach of promise he could no longer attach any faith or confi-

dence in our honour. On January 11th No. 3 column, under Colonel Glyn, crossed the Buffalo River into Zululand. Several hundred head of cattle were taken by No. 3 and No. 4 columns on this date, which did not bear out Lord Chelmsford's promise to the Zulus made towards the end of December, 1878, that the advance of the troops 'would not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the King' (2308, p. 39). So, with this breach of honour and of promises on our part, opened the first few days of our invasion of Zululand.

Much more remains to be said on the subject, but for the continuation of this defence we must refer to another and continuing chapter.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ALLEGED ZULU RAIDS INTO NATAL.

THE charge has so often been brought against Cetshwayo of his intending to ravage the Colony both before and after the battle of Isandhlwana, that this matter I think deserves some attention and sifting to prove how foundationless and shallow are all such asseverations on the part of Sir Bartle Frere and others. Speaking of the probable invasion of Natal by the Zulus, the former says: 'All the Dutch farmers we saw told us of neighbours and friends who, since the war alarms, had trekked for safety to the Orange Free States, so that by far the larger portion of the Dutch and many of the English farms were wholly or partially deserted.' There is no doubt that many of Sir Theophilus Shepstone's proceedings, and later on some of Sir Bartle Frere's, all tending towards the same aim of bringing to an issue their attempts to provoke war with the Zulu nation, had caused much excitement and alarm amongst the border farmers, many of whom in consequence deserted their farms; but it must not be forgotten that such desertion was frequently caused because water failed in the districts in which they lived, and not solely on account of the

dread of Zulu invasion. On October 27th, 1878, Mr. Rudolph wrote (2222, p. 105), 'Januys and almost all the farmers have left the border, *partly* because water has failed and partly because they are afraid of the Zulus;' and Sir Bartle Frere, writing from Sanderton, in the Transvaal, on April 4th, 1879 (2318, p. 39), says: 'On my way thus far I have seen most of the farmers who live near the road I have taken, including large numbers of Dutch from the Newcastle, Utrecht, and Wakkerstroom districts, who had come, some for security, some for pasture, to this side of the Drakensberg.'

About six months after the raid by Sihayo's sons, and at the very time when, by reference to the Blue-Books, it will be seen that Sir Bartle Frere was writing voluminous despatches regretting that war with the Zulus was unavoidable, a truthful account of matters, prepared expressly for the High Commissioner (Sir Bartle Frere) by a gentleman, and dated October 4th, 1878, appeared. It was sent to England by Sir Bartle Frere on January 31st, 1879, and appeared in the Blue-Book in March (2260, p. 48). It runs thus:

'The prevailing drought is decidedly the most serious evil now threatening us. I know that in my time in Natal (some fourteen years) such scarcity of water has never prevailed as at the present time. Wherever I went the want of water was the chief topic of conversation. The Zulus were very little talked about, and at this I was somewhat surprised, as down here we learn that excitement is great concerning them. . . . From Dundee I passed by the links of the Buffalo, and *here*, for the

first time, *I* seemed to find real traces of disturbance. The keeper of the drift-store assured me that all business is now at a standstill, many Boers having trekked, looking for grass, or dreading the Zulus. Of course, I cannot tell how many have gone from fear or how many from necessity; but I certainly fail to see how anyone could possibly live on many of the farms during the present scarcity of water. Here and there a house which has a good supply of water is tenanted; only in one instance did I notice signs of hasty departure, and that was about ten miles this side of the Buffalo. The house was empty, but fowls, ducks, and geese were left. Everywhere else the places were empty and silent, and bore no signs of having been hastily evacuated. My firm impression is that in a good season nearly all the Boers would have stayed on; and this opinion is strengthened by the fact that *only those farms* which are badly watered are left to themselves.

'Arrived at Utrecht, I found that *fear* of the Zulus was the *last* thing that entered the heads of the townspeople. They seem to feel quite secure, and, although ignorant of the intentions of the Government, they will not believe themselves in danger of attack. . . . I am convinced that the nearer one gets to Maritzburg, the more alarming will be found the reports. Near the border even reasonable security is felt. But I may mention that some Boers, even up there, are very fond of spreading reports of aggression, which I believe exist only in their own fears or passions. If the border resident had any real fear, the immense number of lies put in circulation must have long since hurried on a collision.'

In spite of these reassuring expressions conveyed to Sir Bartle Frere by one who was well qualified from

personal observation and experience to give a trustworthy opinion on such matters, the High Commissioner then and afterwards continued to write 'voluminous despatches' anticipating Zulu raids and regretting that war with that nation was unavoidable; but never once alluding in the faintest manner to the despatch in question which accounted for so many groundless alarms and gave such a reassuring and favourable aspect to what had been made to appear so dark and threatening. Though dated October 4th, Sir Bartle Frere does not seem to have desired that it should reach the English Government in any haste, and four months were nearly allowed to elapse before, on January 31st, 1879, it was forwarded to England and appeared in the Blue-Books of March of that year. Its contents were in themselves too just a refutation of the many unfounded assertions made by the High Commissioner, and it was doubtless on this account that it was withheld from the Home Government.

When the news of the battle of Isandhlwana reached the Colony many of the inhabitants, animated by the numerous and exaggerated reports of what the Zulus intended to do, became filled with an insane terror. The poison of slander had too deeply filled their minds, and they never paused to think that Cetshwayo had never yet under many provocations invaded the Colony. Completely at his mercy at one time lay Natal, and yet his impis forbore to disregard the orders of their King, and confined their power to repelling foreign invasion. All along the King had abstained from washing

his spears in accordance with the national custom, and this forbearance on his part merited not the declaration of the High Commissioner that the open declarations (?) of the King proclaimed foreign conquest and bloodshed as a necessity of the Zulu existence. (See 2318, p. 50.)

Could not Cetshwayo, had he so desired it, have ravaged the unprotected Colony, as I have just remarked? For weeks it lay trembling and completely at his mercy, but never by any kind of action did he or his armies give any trouble or foundation for the charge of invasion. The attack on Rorke's Drift on the evening of the 22nd January was merely a continuation and part of the dreadful struggle of Isandhlwana, and was declared, moreover, by the King himself to have been made against his own express orders. This declaration is confirmed by native statements, and by the actual fact that no such raid had been made by his orders. On the authority of a trustworthy native, Bishop Schreuder reported that 'the attack on Rorke's storehouse was directed and led by Dabulamanzi, a prince, against the will and order of the King, who would have killed the leader if he had not been a prince;' and it is further stated by four waggoners, who escaped from Isandhlwana and crossed the Buffalo into Natal, that they sank helpless and exhausted, and completely at the mercy of any Zulus that might follow. While lying there they saw an impi come down and begin to cross, when it was called back by an Induna on horseback, who shouted: 'Did the King order you to cross? Come back!' and it returned at once. Looking into the case fully, it

becomes clear that Cetshwayo never ordered a raid into Natal. On June 25th it is true two thousand five hundred Zulus crossed the Tugela, burnt twenty-four kraals, killed three men and six women, and carried off some cattle ; but this raid was committed solely as a kind of reprisal which had been provoked by repeated raids of a similar character committed by Lord Chelmsford in pursuance of an unwise and unjust policy which was strongly condemned by Sir Henry Bulwer and the Executive Council, and was probably made without the orders or knowledge of the King. Sir Henry Bulwer, on April 9th, 1879 (2318, p. 55), deprecates the employment of native levies along the border for the purpose of making raids into the Zulu country, as being calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to the natives so engaged ; and a further resolution passed by the Executive Council of March 1st, 1879, 'That in the opinion of this Council, the proposition that raiding expeditions should be made into the Zulu country is unadvisable of adoption, as being an impolitic and undesirable system of war, as being calculated to provoke retaliation, and as tending to demoralise the people engaged in it,' goes further to condemn the unwise and unjust policy which advocated this measure. These protests, however, appear to have been disregarded by those in command, as it would seem by reference to these various despatches. 'This morning a despatch was brought in by the police from Lower Tugela, conveying the General's instructions to make raids into Zululand' (Mr. Fannin, April 7th, 1879, ib. p. 69), and Lord Chelmsford says on April 11th (ib. p. 56),

'When I had determined to move up to the relief of Etshowe, I sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible, to raid into Zululand.' Referring to official sources we find accounts of many raids committed by one side, but it is not till June the 25th that, filled with anger at so many provocations, the retaliative raid on the Zulu side to which I have above alluded took place. The intention on the part of Cetshwayo to invade and ravage Natal can never be substantiated by any trustworthy proofs, and the panic which succeeded the Isandhlwana disaster, and which was fostered and encouraged by those whose duty it was to soothe and allay unfounded fears, should ever remain as a reproach and humiliation on the weakness of a community. No doubt the existence of such a scare was most useful to the authorities who had helped to create it, as tending to support their policy in the eyes of those at home, and an actual inroad of Zulus at that time would have effectually justified the unfounded charges against the King made by the High Commissioner. Unfortunately for the veracity of those charges such an occurrence never took place, and yet, in spite of this, Sir B. Frere continued to reiterate them even after the battle of Isandhlwana, and by malignant phrases and epithets directed against the Zulu King sought to substantiate the fabrications and highly-drawn charges of a fertile imagination and exuberant literary skill. But so it was—we in England heard of these scares and believed in them ; we read and accepted as

truth the cruel, unfair, and false statements sent home in regard to the actions of the Zulu King and his people, and accepting these same as the truth, we forgot that there are always two sides to a question. One side has been given by Sir Bartle Frere, and the results are but too shamefully apparent. The other side I am endeavouring to lay before the public, regretting all the while that a pen more able and masterful than that which I am able to wield should not be brought forward in defence of justice, of truth, and fair dealing. That the threatened invasion of the Colony was but a trumped-up fabrication, unsupported by any solid proof, must be painfully apparent to those who, in the cause of justice, should care to wade through the intricate and colossal proportions of the Blue-Books, and it is horrible to think that a King and a nation should be suffering for the faults and ambition of others, and in consequence of so many misleading statements unsupported in any quarter by proof of any kind. In the past chapters I have endeavoured to deal with that portion of the history of Cetshwayo's reign, and the charges brought against him relating to the cause and commencement of the Zulu War. To those who have followed me throughout a new light has probably dawned upon them, that the justice so vaunted of England is not all pure and undefiled. If they will accompany me yet further they shall learn what were the actions of the many in command during that period, and, it may be not without shame, become acquainted with transactions alike disgraceful as they were ungenerous and uncalled for.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE ALLEGED CORONATION PROMISES.

One of the demands made in the ultimatum relating to the causes from which arose Sir B. Frere's declaration of war was that the supposed promises made by the King at his coronation should be faithfully observed. That Cetshwayo made promises of any kind or bound himself in any way to observe the laws proclaimed by Sir T. Shepstone on that occasion is extremely doubtful, and it seems to me a most hazardous declaration of Sir B. Frere's that the King 'at his coronation bound himself by solemn promises to the British Government, and to the Zulu people . . . .' whereas the proof that he did so is by official sources or otherwise nowhere apparent. That Sir T. Shepstone was vested with power to lay down laws at the installation of the King is entirely disproved by the words of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in 1879 spoke, in the House of Lords, words to the effect that had he been aware that these new laws were to be treated as binding obligations, or as anything more than friendly assurances, he would have at once repudiated them. Sir T. Shepstone himself says (1137, p. 18), 'That when he left Natal he

knew that he was expected to deliver a charge to Cetshwayo on his installation, which it was supposed would influence the character of his reign. This charge he looked upon as likely to influence only in so far as the consciences of those addressed might respond, and their conduct conform to the principles laid down.' From this as well as from Lord Kimberley's speech in the House of Lords it will be seen that Sir T. Shepstone was invested with no powers either to lay down or to enforce any laws, and his position was more that of a—to use the words of Sir M. Hicks-Beach—'friendly counsellor giving advice to the King as to the good government of the country' (May 14th, 1878; 2144, p. 1).

On Saturday, the 30th August, 1873, Sir T. Shepstone had a private conference with the King and his chief Indunas, which lasted five hours. It was, he says, conducted with great 'ability and frankness by Cetshwayo. Theoretically, my business was with the councillors who represented the nation, but had it not been for the straightforward manner in which Cetshwayo insisted on their going direct to the point it would have been impossible to have got through the serious subjects we are bound to decide in the time we did.' Sir T. Shepstone says, 'Theoretically, my business was with the councillors who represented the nation,' words which at once imply that anything agreed upon was agreed upon by the councillors, and not by the King—whom Sir B. Frere accuses of having broken his solemn promises. If business was carried on with the council-

lors, how could the King break promises with which he had nothing to do, and never made ?

On Monday, September 1st, 1873, the installation of the King took place, and the new laws which Sir T. Shepstone had not been authorised to proclaim as binding *were* proclaimed. But even he could scarcely believe in the immediate and full performance of these laws, as his own words will show :

'It cannot be *expected* that the amelioration described will immediately take effect. . . . . It was but sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and mature' (1137, p. 3).

Sir T. Shepstone proclaimed these laws, but he was *not* sent to Zululand authorised to do so. Neither have we any proof that the Zulu King agreed to be bound by them. The special correspondent of the *Cape Argus* affirmed that Dunn declared that—

'No undertaking was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation Sir T. Shepstone gave to the King a piece of paternal counsel, and the conditions to which Cetshwayo is said to have assented were in reality nothing more than recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner, with the laudable purpose of securing the more regular government of the Zulu people.'

In the ultimatum Sir B. Frere endeavours to attach especial significance to these laws by stating that they were 'the *conditions* required by the British Government, in return for the countenance and support given

by it to the new Zulu King by the presence of its representative and by his taking part in the King's coronation' (!) (2222, p. 206).

Is it likely that Cetshwayo would allow a whole string of new laws to be introduced into his country for the mere pleasure of being installed by Sir T. Shepstone? I do not think so, neither is there any proof forthcoming to countenance and support this assertion of the High Commissioner. Not a word was said either to the King or people at the coronation about these laws being the 'conditions' on which it took place, and the words of Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself prove that he had no idea of or authority for laying down such laws when he left the Colony of Natal for Zululand. In March, 1879, Lord Kimberley, speaking in the House of Lords, says: 'With respect to the *so-called* coronation promises, nothing had more astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation. He happened to have some concern in that matter; and, if he had supposed that Sir T. Shepstone in asking for these promises from Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that they were enforced, he would not have lost a single mail in disavowing such a responsibility.' He was supported in the view he took by the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and constituted no engagement. But Sir B. Frere put these 'coronation promises in the foreground.'

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, too, says, May 14th, 1878 (2144, p. 1):

'It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this matter was that of a friendly councillor, giving advice to the King as to the good government of the country.'

But Sir B. Frere is determined not to view the matter in its real light, and reiterates the same charge continually against Cetshwayo in various despatches. I append a few as sample. He says: 'These undertakings by Cetshwayo were the price required by the British Government in return for its countenance and support,' November 13th, 1878 (2222, p. 92). 'The history of the promises then made by Cetshwayo, and their exact terms and import, should be carefully stated. . . .'

'At his coronation *he* bound himself by solemn promises to the British Government and to the Zulu people' (ib. p. 94), etc., etc.

Of course all these despatches impressed the public mind with a sense of the duplicity of Cetshwayo's proceedings, and served to blacken his character in the eyes of everyone. But that these statements can be supported by any fact beyond that of heated imagination, oratorical display, and inventive skill I entirely deny, and a study of official despatches about this period clearly banishes every shadow and particle of truth that might have appeared to clothe such inaccurate assertions. *The King at his coronation bound himself by no promises*, and therefore could not rightly be accused of breaking faith. Sir

T. Shepstone was invested with neither right nor power to impose new laws on the Zulu nation, and the conditions of these laws were not the price required by the British Government in return for its countenance and support of the Zulu King. Despatch after despatch follows in quick succession, all serving to swell the cry against Cetshwayo. They are written by different personages, and many display the grossest inaccuracies, misstatements, and ignorance, which would take up too much space to review and refute. Some of Mr. Brownlee's charges against the King are simply ludicrous in their painful ignorance. Personal knowledge of the King this gentleman never had, and the fact becomes wofully apparent in all his statements—many of which receive direct contradiction in the very despatches of those who, like him, directed their venomous charges against the King. In one of his many charges Mr. Brownlee says: 'No sooner had he (the King) obtained our formal recognition of his position, amid the thunder of artillery and the sound of trumpets, and *no sooner* had Mr. Shepstone turned his back on Zululand, than the Zulu King cast his engagements to the wind' (2222, p. 136).

Turning to p. 132 of the same number, we read a distinct contradiction of this statement in a despatch by Sir T. Shepstone, who says: 'For a short time after his installation Cetshwayo seems to have felt that his engagements on that occasion had some binding effect and involved some responsibility.'

I have quoted these two paragraphs to show the con-

tradiction which invariably arises in the confusion of misstated matters ; but I have neither time nor space to enter into a lengthy discussion or exposition of so much inaccuracy. Suffice it that the ultimatum demanded the fulfilment of promises by which the King had never bound himself, and of laws which Sir T. Shepstone had neither the authority nor the power to impose. In demanding the said fulfilment we did the King an injustice, while in invading his country to enforce such conditions we permitted an outrage which calls for the severest condemnation. In spite of the strongest advice from Sir M. Hicks-Beach to use every effort to overcome the existing difficulties by judgment and forbearance, Sir B. Frere hastened on and pushed forward matters to a crisis, and the ultimatum and subsequent invasion of Zululand crowned the whole fabric of injustice with shame and disgrace. With a haste positively indecent the columns under Lord Chelmsford were pushed forward into Zululand. The despatch of Sir M. Hicks-Beach of December 18th was not received until January 21st. In this despatch Sir B. Frere is reminded that in sending reinforcements to assist the local Government to *protect* the settlers in emergency, her Majesty's Government did not desire 'to furnish means for any aggressive operations not directly connected with the *defence* of her Majesty's possessions and subjects'—a reminder which the High Commissioner pointed out in his reply was ineffectual, coming as it did when all the columns under Lord Chelmsford's command had already made their way well into the Zulu country.

On January 23rd a decided censure on Sir Bartle Frere's proceedings was given by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, as would appear by the following words in his despatch of that date: 'The representations made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn, as to the urgent need of strengthening her Majesty's forces in South Africa, were based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus. . . . In order to afford protection to the lives and properties of the Colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and in informing you of the decision of her Majesty's Government, I took the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the Zulu King are evidently such as he may not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war. And I regret that the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would have been involved in consulting her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetshwayo should be required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the Zulu King' (2222, p. 198). It will be seen by these despatches that the High Commissioner had precipitated the war by ordering the invasion of Zululand without giving an opportunity to those at home to put a check on his proceedings. Knowing well that such a check would most assuredly be brought to bear if time were allowed to elapse, the troops were hurried forward and the unjust invasion began; and, replying to Sir M. Hicks-Beach's

despatch of December 18th, he is able on January 24th to remind him that it has arrived too late. Accompanying this reminder there is a recapitulation of leading 'facts,' meant doubtless as a justification of his policy. It appears to come suddenly to an abrupt conclusion, caused doubtless by the arrival of that same news which, when heard in England, sent a thrill of horror through every British heart. I refer to the first result of the opening act of Sir Bartle Frere's policy—the disaster of Isandhlwana (Isandula).

## CHAPTER IX.

### SUMMARY.

In preceding chapters I have shown the causes which led up to the Zulu War, and have endeavoured in as cursory a manner as possible to put the hitherto distorted falsehoods and barefaced assertions in their real light before the public. I have pointed out the desire for peace which in all his dealings with the British Government Cetshwayo so anxiously evinced. In the eighteen messages which followed each other through a succession of fifteen years this desire can easily be traced, and the actions of the King, when not distorted by falsehood and exaggeration by his enemies, go still further to prove his sincerity. In the matter of the Boundary Commission it will have been seen that the Zulu claim was proved correct, and the justice for which Cetshwayo had so patiently waited through a long lapse of years at length awarded. But months flew by after the Commissioners had sat before this settlement of the question was made known to the Indunas of the King, who assembled at the Lower Tugela to receive the award of the Boundary Commission. Coupled with this award was the ultimatum, which in its cruel terms and impos-

sible demands was nothing short of a declaration of war; and in causing it to be framed and delivered *with* the award, Sir Bartle Frere knew well that any good impression derived from the reception of the Commissioners' Boundary decision would be speedily counteracted by the evil effects of his peace-destroying ultimatum.

There is furthermore no doubt that Sir Bartle Frere, in sanctioning the inquiry, fully expected that the Commissioners would decide *against* the Zulus, and that he regarded the delay that would be caused by the inquiry —prolonged month after month—as a means of gaining time for collecting the forces necessary with which to assert his claims. Even so far back as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere, as is proved by the statements of Commodore Sullivan, contemplated the invasion of Zululand. (See despatches quoted in former chapters.) On October 18th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone met the Zulu Indunas at the Blood River to discuss with them the matter of the Boundary question. In obedience to his wish they stated the boundary tract which they considered theirs of right, and Sir T. Shepstone, who in previous despatches had always upheld their cause, suddenly veered round (presumably because as Administrator of the Transvaal an attitude suited to the Boer wishes was necessary) and declared against the Zulus. The key-note of aggression was first struck by him in his despatch of January 2nd, 1877; and three days later, in another of January 5th, the death-knell of the Zulu King was sounded. No matter what Cetsh-

wayo did, whether good or evil, his doom as King was sealed.

By quotations from *official* sources I have endeavoured to show how little truth can be discovered in the assertion that the kraals erected north of the Pongolo were military ones built aggressively. This statement made by Sir T. Shepstone in his despatch of November 16th, 1877, is contradicted in a further one a few days later, dated November 23rd, and yet in spite of this retraction on his part, Sir T. Shepstone continues later on to make use of the term 'military' in alluding to the 'small' cattle-kraal which had been built. The same remarks apply equally to the case of the alleged second military kraal, which bears the same facts.

In its turn I have dealt with the matter of killing girls under the Zulu Marriage Law, and have dwelt at some length on the missionary cases and the killing of native converts. To summarise these proceedings would be waste of time, they have been all fully dealt with in past chapters. Reviewed at length has also been the raid of Sihayo's sons, the apprehension of Zulu raids into Natal, and the (so-called) Coronation promises. It remains for me but to refute the several charges hurled at the Zulu King by Sir Bartle Frere, Sir T. Shepstone, and even on several occasions by Sir Henry Bulwer, who, to do him justice, would have temporised and averted a Zulu War had the supreme management and control of affairs been relegated to his charge. On January 24th, 1879, Sir Bartle Frere, writing to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in reference to the war, appends a

statement of the leading facts (?) which had guided him in his past actions. In this statement appear many charges which I propose to refute. He says:

'Since his installation, Cetshwayo has endeavoured to build up a great military power, and to restore the system of Chaka by regulations seriously threatening to his neighbours.'

Was Sir Bartle Frere aware when he made this charge that out of the twenty-one regiments of which Lord Chelmsford said the Zulu army was composed, one had been raised by Dingane, eighteen by Panda (the chosen king of the white man), and only *two* by Cetshwayo? Those who care to read M. Delagorge's account in his 'Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe,' vol. i. p. 396, of Panda reviewing first 6,000 young men, and then 25,000 full-grown warriors, will perceive at once how misleading is the account here given of Cetshwayo's doings. Mr. Leslie, in his 'Among the Zulus,' p. 16, states, on Bishop Schreuder's authority, that in Panda's time there were 'about 40,000 soldiers.' But this is about the number reckoned by Lord Chelmsford as composing the army of Cetshwayo. How then could he have added in any way to his forces?

Sir Bartle Frere adds that the King had 'obtained firearms to an unprecedented extent.' Who was it, may I ask, who explained to Cetshwayo the mysteries of the breechloader, if it was not the white man at his installation; and were not the firearms obtained chiefly by the advice and through the lucrative agency of Mr.

John Dunn, who was Cetshwayo's chief adviser, though receiving £300 per annum as 'Immigration Agent' of the Natal Government?

In this statement the High Commissioner goes on to remark that—

'At the installation of the King he made, as the price of his recognition by the British Government, in the most formal and precise manner, various promises for the better government of his own people.'

This assertion I have, I think, already disproved in the preceding chapter on the Coronation promises, so that it is unnecessary to deal with it further.

'He has taken,' says Sir Bartle Frere, 'the brutalising system of Chaka for his model.' (In what manner can Cetshwayo and Chaka be compared?) 'And he has enforced notices by inroads of armed men, who have murdered peaceful subjects of the Transvaal living within what is now British territory.' These inroads, on the contrary, were made by the Swazi refugee Umbilini and his followers, and were always strongly condemned by Cetshwayo.

The only other inroads were that made by Sihayo's sons, of which Sir Henry Bulwer said, 'There is nothing to show that they had the King's previous concurrence or even cognisance;' and the attack on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, which Sir Michael Hicks-Beach regarded as a 'very small matter.'

Sir Bartle Frere used as one of his accusations against the King that—

'When the Government of Natal offered its good services to adjust the dispute regarding land till then held by grantees from the Transvaal, Cetshwayo's conduct to the envoys sent to him was rude and defiant.'

How misleading is this statement! The envoys sent to the King on this occasion were Messrs. H. Shepstone and Rudolph, who had been sent by Sir T. Shepstone, not to propose arbitration, but to reiterate the demands which the Zulu Indunas of the Blood River had indignantly rejected. The manner in which this assertion is made leads the ignorant to imagine that the Natal Government had already 'offered its good offices to adjust the dispute,' and implies that Cetshwayo was 'rude and defiant.' The fact of the matter is that Sir H. Bulwer's offer was made AFTER the envoys in question had failed in their mission, and that this offer was at once gladly accepted by Cetshwayo. Sir Bartle Frere goes on to add that—

'It cannot possibly be said that Cetshwayo had not ample time for consideration, or ample warning of the consequences of neglecting to comply with the demands. He had been warned, some weeks previous to the final message, that such a message, of the gravest importance was to be delivered to him, and he had been requested to summon his Great Council to consider the message when it should reach him.'

What *does* Sir Bartle Frere mean? What extraordinary and misshapen statement is this? He asserts that the King had been warned, some weeks previous to

the final message, that such a message of the gravest importance was to be delivered to him; whereas this message was simply sent to the King one week before the delivery of the ultimatum, and merely states that on December 11th the award will be delivered and such other communications as have to be made. In what portion of the message is the King requested to summon his Great Council, or told that the message was one of 'the gravest importance'? Alas for truth!

We are told in this statement that the King 'was well aware of the troops assembling on his frontier and closing around him. He had no pretence for saying that he was taken by surprise.'

Cetshwayo had every excuse for so saying, for, when he expressed his anxiety on this account, Sir Bartle Frere wished Sir H. Bulwer to explain to the King that 'the assemblages of her Majesty's troops of which he complains are for protective and not aggressive purposes.'

It would fill pages to recapitulate all the false charges made against the King both in this defence of his policy by Sir Bartle Frere as well as in the final defences after Isandhlwana. That I could refute them all I have not the slightest hesitation in asserting, and I challenge every word he has uttered against the King, and stand prepared to prove their falsity, here or elsewhere. The ghastly epithets which the High Commissioner levelled at the head of Cetshwayo simply show the passion and prejudice of their author, and go far to prove their falsity in the evidence which all around crops up—that these

epithets were framed to poison the minds of the Government and of the public against a man whom Sir Bartle Frere had made up his mind to ruin. His assertion that 'nothing up to the year of the Zulu War had been asked of Cetshwayo but to keep himself to himself, within his own bounds, and to manage his people according to their own ideas of good government,' is truly amazing, when we find him in the ultimatum demanding from the King that within thirty days he should overturn the whole military and social system of Zululand. In every point and on all sides do the policy and statements of Sir Bartle Frere clash and reflect the lie that the public are asked to believe. These assertions are not made without weighty proof to back them up. I am prepared to substantiate every word or charge I utter.

One of the cruellest charges against the Zulu King comes from the pen of Sir H. Bulwer, who finally, but I believe unwillingly, became a convert to or acquiesced in Sir Bartle Frere's principles. The despatch is dated so far back as July 19th, 1877, in which the writer appears to be still recalling the 'formidable' reply of November 2nd, 1876. In it appears the following charge. Sir H. Bulwer says:

'If anything brings the Zulu King into collision with the English, his destruction will follow far sooner than he expects; because hatred and fear of him as a tyrant are daily increasing in the minds of the Zulu people.'

The best reply I can give to this unfounded assertion is

the description of the wanderings of the Zulu King when, as a lonely fugitive, he sought refuge amidst his people from the pursuit of his enemies. In the *Cape Times* of September 11th, 1879, appeared the following account of the pursuit of the King, by Mr. Longcast, a gentleman attached to the Headquarters Staff, and a resident in Zululand of over twenty years. He says :

'We felt certain that the Zulus knew where the King was, and, if they would only give us the information, he would be caught in a few hours. We tried threats and everything else during the hours of our bivouac until daylight next morning, but without result. We (Lord Giffard and party) then returned to the rendezvous and rejoined Major Barrow. In our absence he had brought together about forty Zulus, and we set to work to see if we could get any information from them. They were as uncommunicative under the threat of being shot as they were impenetrable to our seductive promises. . . .

'At daybreak a party of us went to Mbopa's kraal, and took all the people prisoners, and as they would give us no information (say, rather, because they would not betray their King), we burnt the kraal and took the cattle. . . . . By proper persuasive measures' (? flogging) '*one* Zulu was induced to make a confession, and promised to take us to where the King had been the day before, and where he was still. The Kaffir led us into the bush, and then gave us the slip. We sent a few shots after him, but missed him. . . . .

'For the next two days, as the people were deceiving us, Major Barrow cleared the district of cattle, but we could get nothing out of the Zulus. We were treated

the same at every kraal. I had been a long time in Zululand, I knew the people and their habits, and, although I believed they would be true to their King, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, nor the offerings of large bribes, would make them false to their King.'

Thus the story of the pursuit of the King goes on. I have, I think, quoted enough to refute Sir H. Bulwer's assertion that 'hatred and fear of him as a tyrant are daily increasing in the minds of the Zulu people,' and sufficient has been said to disprove the epithets levelled against him by Sir Bartle Frere as an 'ignorant and bloodthirsty despot,' a 'sanguinary tyrant,' a 'ruthless savage' whose 'history is written in characters of blood.' Is this the sanguinary tyrant of whose safety the Zulu nation showed themselves so solicitous? Threats, persuasion, bribes proved equally ineffectual; at every kraal it was the same. Devotion and loyalty to their hunted King marked the natives throughout. Not even the fear of death could make them false to their King.

People of England, to whom this defence is addressed, in this first part of my pleading read well and learn the truth. Follow me through these echoes from the Blue-Books, and demand, of those in power, justice for a King and a nation whom we have so cruelly and unfairly treated. What has been the sin, what is now the fault of Cetshwayo, that he should be retained in so dreary and lonely a captivity? He has appealed to the British

public—let them not turn a deaf ear to his prayer. Let a prayer be sent up by them to restore him to his country, with power to change its present anarchy into peace and tranquillity. Let traitors and adventurers, such as John Dunn and others, be banished from a land which they have usurped, and let England, who advocates justice, wipe out as much as possible the past stain which, in her Zulu policy, has blotted the page of all we hold most noble and most sacred. In the cause of justice, which I desire to see done to this lonely and helpless captive, I have worked hard. But the labour becomes sweet, and the toil will be well repaid, if I find that my efforts have only in the smallest way assisted the King to obtain simple justice Let not that justice come too late.

P.S.—Since writing the final chapter of Part I. of this defence, and since receiving from Cetshwayo the two letters for the Queen and the Prince of Wales, already published, I have received another letter from the King. As its contents are addressed as much to the English public as to myself, I here append it. It runs thus :

'Oude Molen, January 3rd, 1882.

'I am writing to you again, my great friend, to thank you once more for all your battling for me, and for the way in which you are standing between me and a precipice to help me in this my terrible trouble. I write with hope, as you are working very hard for me. I have great trust in you and the English people. Will my enemies in Natal deceive the English by their misrepre-

sentations and unjust judgment of my past and what would be my future actions? It was this continued lying that caused my country to be invaded. The desire to possess themselves of land belonging to the black man is the root of all this lying, and you, my friend, who have been in Zululand, know this, and can tell the Queen and the Great Chief' (Lord Kimberley) 'who rules these things the truth. I trust to you, my great friend, to reply to these slanders; and again I say, who should better do so, since you have been in my country and have heard for yourself the words of my people? Once Sir E. Wood was my friend, or said he was. Now I hear he has taken the part of John Dunn. I fear that the lies of my enemies in Natal and those of the White Usurper' (John Dunn) 'have crept into his ears and heart so that now he has forsaken me. To your strong advocacy I trust, and in the good judgment of your Queen and that of the Great Chief who rules matters out here (Lord Kimberley). I trust to the men of your Great Council and to the justice of the English nation, who are not like my enemies in Natal, who hunger for what is mine. I have heard that John Dunn wished to become the greatest chief in Zululand, such as I was; but I have heard that the Great White Chief' (Lord Kimberley) 'was just, and would not allow this. Now I hear that J. Dunn wishes to divide Zululand with me. Is this true? It could never be. Let not the English nation be blinded by his words; let them not listen to them; and when I come to England let them be kind to me. I am coming to them, running away as it were from a beast that would eat me up' (meaning his slanderers in Natal and his enemies in Zululand). 'I am coming to place myself beneath the feet of England, and ask her for protection. Those who desire my land desire to finish me; but if I have a

friend to interpret my words aright when in England, I have hopes that my past sorrows may vanish, and that I may live to laugh again in the country I love. Once more I thank you very much for your kindness in every way, which I shall never forget.

'CETYWAYO, Ka 'Mpande.'

# APPENDIX.

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# CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF

## THE RELEASE OF CETSHWAYO, ETC.,

WHICH APPEARED IN THE 'MORNING POST' BETWEEN THE DATES OF NOVEMBER 1, 1881, AND FEBRUARY 12, 1882; WITH LEADING ARTICLE SUMMARISING MATTERS;

ALSO

## LETTERS FROM THE KING TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES, ETC.,

AND

## A REVIEW OF THE MOTION

BROUGHT FORWARD IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF NATAL BY MR. J. ROBINSON, PROTESTING AND ADDUCING REASONS AGAINST CETSHWAYO'S RETURN TO ZULULAND.

# APPENDIX.

## From the Special Correspondent of the *Morning Post.*

Government House, Cape Town, *Sept.* 27.

A few days ago, by the kind permission of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, I drove over to Oude Molen to visit Cetshwayo. The King had previously been made aware of my desire to see him, and through his interpreter wrote me a letter signifying the pleasure it would give him to receive once more the visit of 'his friend.' The letter was signed in the King's own hand, a facsimile of which I append. On arriving at Oude Molen, Cetshwayo came to the front door of the house to welcome me, and shook hands long and cordially, after which he conducted me into the bare and desolate room which serves to him the purpose of a sitting-room. There possibly may be rooms more cramped, more desolate, and more bare than that in which Cetshwayo lives, but I hardly think it possible; and it is all the more painfully felt, I should say, by the captive himself, who is well able to both feel and distinguish between comfort and discomfort. Seating himself in a wooden chair placed almost in the centre of the room, the King motioned to me to occupy another which was placed near him, his interpreter standing close by. It pained me to observe the

anxious and troubled look which seemed to have settled down on his features as soon as the smile with which he had greeted me on my arrival had died away, and a visible alteration was distinctly discernible in the man since I had last seen him six months ago. In repose, his features assume a sad, careworn expression, the forehead is more wrinkled, and the face looks older than when I last saw it. I remarked to the interpreter that he was much changed. 'Yes,' he replied, 'he is fretting a good deal, and is often subject to long fits of depression.' The King sat silent in his chair waiting for me to open the conversation. His eyes were fixed on the ground, but he raised them and looked at me as soon as I began to speak. 'I am come, Cetshwayo,' said I, 'to tell you that I have just returned from Zululand. I thought it might please you to receive news of your country, and I am here to-day to answer any questions I can which you may desire to ask me.' Through the interpreter I then proceeded to relate to him all I had seen and heard in the country. When I came to the meeting of the chiefs at the Inslazatye, he became very much interested, frequently interrupting me to ask questions. 'Tell me,' he said, 'the names of the chiefs who were present.' I complied with his request, and he was much struck by the absence of so many from the meeting. I told him of my conversation with some of the Indunas and chief men, and how they had expressed such earnest wishes to have their King back. 'I am sure,' said he, 'that it is the wish of the Zulu nation that I should return; it is only those who are frightened and held in check by John Dunn that oppose my restoration.' 'I conversed,' I said, 'at the Inslazatye with Mogojana, one of the chiefs who were present, and he is greatly anxious for your return, as

are also, he tells me, Liwungasa, Faku, Somkeli, Mlandela, Sekehwayo, Mjitshwa, and Ntshingwayo.' 'Yes, yes,' he replied, 'they wish me back, and so do the Zulu people. All I love is in Zululand; my heart is there, where lays my father's grave. I am heart-sick and weary with waiting. When will England be just and let me return? Do you think that because I am a black man I cannot feel or suffer the less by this long, long, and weary captivity? England has given the Transvaal back to the Boers, Basutoland to the Basutos, Sekukuni is restored to his people, and all are free but I. How is it so? What have I done that I should be so treated? When I fought against you, it was to defend my country. I was taken prisoner, and I felt that one stronger than I had beaten me, and that power I acknowledged. But now you keep me here, where I am weary and sick at heart. I have appealed to England, who they tell me is great and just—to her Queen, who they say is merciful—but my prayer is unheeded, and I am still lonely here.'

I have repeated as faithfully as possible Cetshwayo's words as they were interpreted to me by the interpreter. The King spoke slowly and distinctly, but in a lower tone than he had originally used, and until his voice ceased he kept his eyes fixed upon my face. His whole bearing was dignified and majestic; he was neither flurried nor excited, but there was a pleading sadness in his voice which was very touching. I replied 'that England would undoubtedly, ere long, do justice to him, but that he must be patient, and wait a little while longer.' I told him 'that public feeling was gradually rising in his favour.' I begged him 'not to be down-hearted, to keep up his spirits, that justice would ere long restore him to the country he yearned for, and to

the nation who longed for his return, and I pointed out to him that he had many friends abroad who were working hard in his cause.' I spoke to him of his future visit to England, and told him that on his return from that country it might be as a restored King of Zululand. 'I am waiting,' he said, 'for a reply to my prayer addressed to England to allow me to proceed there immediately. I am growing weary and impatient that I do not receive a reply.' I had that morning been informed by his Excellency that a telegram from Lord Kimberley had arrived signifying the intention of the Government that Cetshwayo would not be allowed to visit England before the coming summer, the Governor telling me that he intended to send for the King the next day in order to acquaint him with this decision. Knowing, therefore, the substance of this disappointing news, I endeavoured to prepare him for its reception, and strongly advised him not to think of visiting England during the winter time, but to endeavour to make up his mind to await the arrival of the summer, when so many people of influence would be gathered together in London, and all the sights most worthy of seeing would be available. 'I am too impatient to return to my country to willingly wait,' he replied. 'You, who are not a prisoner, cannot understand how weary and miserable I am ; how heartsick and lonely. You tell me to be patient; but have I not been so until I can be so no longer? If I am to live they must let me go; a little longer of this and I shall die.' 'Tell Cetshwayo,' I said to the interpreter, 'that he is a brave man, and brave men should never give in. As his friend I ask him to be patient yet awhile; if it is for his future good that he should not visit England before the summer time, will he not try to remember this, and

await that time in patience?' In two words the King answered this question of mine. 'What does he say?' I asked the interpreter. 'He says,' replied the man, 'that he will try, but his heart is sad.'

In trying to convey all the nobility and courage which those few words laid bare of what this unfortunate captive is capable of, I but feebly represent the case. In those few words—'I will try, but my heart is sad'—can be traced a reply at once noble and dignified. It shows a courage that rises to bear misfortune with nothing but sadness to make the pain less hard, and it shows that Cetshwayo, who has been represented as a cruel, bloodthirsty despot and tyrant, possessed that which many white men with civilization and education around them entirely lack, and which they may well enjoy—*i.e.*, a nobility of soul, dignity, and courage in misfortune—which makes him in all he says so 'every inch a king.'

I inquired of him whether, in the event of his being restored to his country, he would consent to allow John Dunn to remain in Zululand. 'Why should I do so?' he replied. 'When I reigned in that country I treated John Dunn as my friend; his return was to act as a spy between me and the English Government. He told them much that was false, he harmed me in all the ways he could; he never could be my friend again. How can I, then, forgive him, and live in peace with a man who treated me so badly after I had treated him so well?' In all Cetshwayo says he reasons with a truth and good sense which it is impossible not to perceive. Naturally he wonders how it is that a man like John Dunn should be placed as chief in power. Here is a man who ignores in many ways the laws of civilization. In the late struggle with Sitimela, when he advanced against him

to restore Mlandela, women and children who belonged to the rebellious side found no quarter at his hands. All who fell in his way were massacred without mercy; it is a fact which cannot be contradicted, for all who know anything about the matter are aware that this is the truth. When Cetshwayo killed women and children he was called a merciless despot, but when John Dunn does likewise the affair is hushed up, the matter is not even reported, and no blame is attached to this white usurper of black rights. We have endeavoured to instil into the native mind that it is wrong to take to their home more than one wife; yet John Dunn, this white chieftain, who is supposed to set them a good example, lives surrounded by a large harem, setting at defiance the white man's law, which we pretend we are desirous the black should follow.

I remained some time with Cetshwayo talking to him about his people and Zululand. He clung to the subject as though it had a peculiar charm for him. His interpreter assured me that he had not seemed so interested in anything for a long time, and it was quite refreshing to see the King so cheerful. On one point he was very anxious, and that was to obtain news of three of his chiefs who he hoped would be allowed to join him in his captivity and proceed with him to England. 'Had I seen them?' he asked. I replied that the men in question had journeyed a long distance on foot, and had endeavoured to catch Sir Evelyn Wood at the Mshlazatye meeting, but were unfortunate enough not to succeed. The last I had heard of them was that they were on their way from that place to Pietermaritzburg, hoping there to obtain an interview with the general, and lay before him their prayer, which begged permission to be granted them to join Cetshwayo at Cape

Town and share with him his captivity. Anxiously the King inquired whether this permission would be granted by the Government, to which I replied that I could not say, but that doubtless it would, as there could be hardly any reason for refusing. After this I told him that it was time I should leave, as my visit had been somewhat prolonged. He asked me how soon I intended leaving for England, and when I told him he exclaimed, 'Oh, why cannot I go too ?' 'Have you any message to send to the English people which I can transmit for you ?' I asked. 'Yes,' replied Cetshwayo, with grave dignity, 'tell them that I am a King and a captive ; that I am alone and helpless ; that I am very sad and almost heartbroken ; that they should not believe all the ill they hear of me ; ask them to be my friend and to help me. I have no more to say.' As I was saying good-bye to the interpreter, Cetshwayo held out his hand again, and I shook hands once more. As I did so he said a few words. 'He is thanking you for being his friend,' said the interpreter ; 'he says he will not forget your kindness, and will always be your friend. Perhaps he may be able some day to prove his gratitude when he becomes King again.'

On leaving Oude Molen I drove to the farmhouse occupied by Langabalele, close by. My interview with this old chief was very short ; he appeared very anxious to know if Cetshwayo was going to England. He frequently walks across to Oude Molen on a visit to the King, but Cetshwayo has only once condescended to return the call ; it appears that it is an act of the greatest condescension for a King to visit his subject, however great the chief may be. In this narrative I have faithfully reported what occurred on the occasion of my visit to the King. In the last simple words with

which he begged me to transmit to the English public his prayer that they should help one 'who was a King, who was lonely and helpless, sad, and almost heart-broken,' he did not speak with a grasping eagerness or excitement, but with a grave, intense sadness, which showed and forced the listener to realise how much he felt all that he was saying. His words, eloquent in themselves, should appeal and strike home to the heart of a nation whose desire is that of justice. Is it not something more than cruel that this unfortunate man should be kept captive when the nation of whom he is the rightful King so universally desire his return? Circumstances and the march of events demand that the policy which at one time was necessary and right should change. Time alters all things, and that time has brought the moment when the peace and tranquillity of Zululand is at stake, for the reason that there is no one to rule it, no one whom its people will respect and obey. Cetshwayo has seen our power, and were he restored he would fight against the English no more. He says himself, and his people say so too, that they do not wish to fight with England, but desire to live in peace with her for ever. We have given the Transvaal to the Boers, Sekukuni is restored to his people, Basuto-land has been given back to the Basutos; in Affghanistan the same policy has been pursued. Cetshwayo alone remains a prisoner. Is this a fair or just policy; is this treatment such as it should be? Let the sense of fair play and generosity answer for itself in the breasts of the English public. The letters addressed by the captive from his dreary solitude at Oude Molen to Lord Kimberley, in his ease and comfort at home, are not those of an ignorant or cruel despot, but in every line they show a nobility of soul, a greatness and sagacity,

a sense of wisdom and reasoning, which the heart of a savage could not conceive. Let England do justice to a man who is kept in a cruel and unfair captivity, who has appealed to a nation, whose might and sense of justice he acknowledges, to help and protect him. His very loneliness and utter helplessness should appeal more forcibly than anything to every heart which is not poisoned by the gross misrepresentations of interested parties as to the state of affairs in Zululand and the wishes of the Zulu people. There is little doubt that our military prestige is much weakened in the eyes of the Zulu people. In their wish to get back their King they may reason to themselves that if the Boers can defeat us they can likewise do so. The result of this reasoning will show itself before long in anarchy and rebellion. The chiefs placed over them they neither respect nor obey, and it is in a moment like this that Cetshwayo as our ally would be most acceptable. In the *Times* of August 23rd a letter appeared from a member of the Legislative Council of Natal, in which the following remark appears: 'No colonist wishes ill to Cetshwayo. None grudge him the surroundings of a comfortable and luxurious exile.' Is this meant to imply that he lives in comfort or ease? If this is the opinion of the British public, I can assure them they are greatly mistaken. I have seldom seen a more dreary place of abode than that awarded to Cetshwayo; the rooms inhabited by himself and his girls of the kraal are totally devoid of furniture of any kind; little or no amusement is provided for him; if he wishes for any extra comfort his wants have to be made known through so many channels, that it is long before he obtains what he requires. Repeatedly he has asked leave to have a little pocket-money allowed him, but this wish has not been granted; and this is

classed as a 'luxurious and comfortable exile.' I saw Cetshwayo yesterday when he came to Government House, to learn from Sir Hercules Robinson the contents of Lord Kimberley's telegram with regard to his visit to England. I was not present when the bad news was communicated to him, but I am assured by one present that the only sign this brave man showed of his great disappointment was in a slight contraction of the face and a nervous movement of the hands; but he made no remark. In the few words with which he had a day before promised me to be patient, this promise was faithfully kept. Only those who knew Cetshwayo's wishes could guess the hopes that telegram dashed to the ground, or the acute pain its words must have caused. Later on, in trying to cheer him up, I conducted the King through the different rooms of Government House. The bedrooms upstairs, the electric bells, and the beds themselves, greatly interested him. Many were the long-drawn exclamations of surprise which he gave vent to as some new object astonished and delighted him. The interpreter told me that Cetshwayo liked to look at the house; he would like to build some similar to it in his own country, if he was ever King again, in order that he might lodge his white friends therein when they came to see him. Some hours after the King's departure I received a letter written by the interpreter and signed by Cetshwayo himself. It contained but a few words, and ran thus:

'Oude Molen, *Sept.* 26, 1881.

'I am writing to you, my great friend, . . . . (here follows my name inserted) to remind you of your kind promise to help me to the best of your power. I am sorry you are going away so soon.

'CETSHWAYO,

'Ka 'Mpandi (meaning Pande's son).'

In writing this letter the object I have had in view is to truthfully and faithfully represent what really is and what really takes place. Let England do an act of justice in liberating this unfortunate captive. Another year's exile from his country may bring both sad and fatal results, which it will then be too late to regret.

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To the Editor of the *Morning Post.*

Sir,

The letter of your special correspondent, dated 27th September last, which appeared in your issue of the 1st instant, and in which the return of Cetshwayo to his own country is warmly advocated, cannot fail to awaken the sympathies of all those who regard the King's captivity from a purely sentimental point of view, and who are but imperfectly acquainted with, or who wilfully ignore, the political side of the question. Feeling, as I do, very strongly that the measure advocated so powerfully would be a political blunder of the gravest description; that it would add enormously to the difficulties which already press hard upon our colony of Natal; and that it would complicate very seriously our present critical relations with the Dutch community in South Africa, I trust that you will be able to find space for the observations which I am anxious to make on the subject.

Whilst fully admitting that the so-called settlement of Zululand has been in many respects a failure, and that the division of the country into thirteen independent territories has not up to the present time worked satisfactorily, still, looking to all the surrounding circumstances of the situation after the close of the Zulu

War, and to the peculiar characteristics of the Zulus themselves, I am bound to confess that in my opinion it was the best arrangement which could have been made, assuming that the annexation of the country had been strictly prohibited in any shape or kind. For it must be remembered that the formidable power of the Zulu army did not consist in the individual courage of its warriors, but in its admirable organization and discipline, which welded together for military purposes the entire nation into one united body, under one absolute and despotic chief. The tribal distinctions which, under the ordinary conditions of life, had a certain faint existence, were absolutely ignored in the Zulu military system. Each regiment, or fighting unit, was made up of men from every part of the country, arranged according to age, and commanded and officered by chiefs appointed by the King himself. The army consequently moved as one vast machine of destruction, under orders received direct from the King himself, and under the influence of national, not tribal, *esprit de corps*.

The result of the Zulu War has been to completely destroy this national army. All the military kraals or regimental places of rendezvous have been burnt, the subdivision of the country into independent territories prevents the possibility of those annual national gatherings which used to take place at Ulundi; and the permission to marry given to the young men, and which has no doubt been widely taken advantage of, will tend to intensify their natural instincts for a quiet, domestic life, and render them, every year which passes, less and less inclined for warlike pursuits. The return of Cetshwayo to Zululand would at once restore the unity of the nation. It is quite possible that, as has lately occurred, intertribal disputes and quarrels will arise from

time to time amongst the several chiefs. According to the 'terms, conditions, and limitations' laid down in the settlement of the country, and subscribed to by the several chiefs, these disputes should be referred to the arbitration of the British Government through the Resident. This is not likely to be complied with, nor does it seem desirable that the Government should interfere, unless it is prepared to enforce its decision. Under one circumstance alone do I consider it would be wise and politic for us to interfere actively in the internal affairs of Zululand, and that is under the possible contingency of one chief endeavouring to obtain supreme power in the country. Should the Zulu nation at any time come again under the rule of one man, it will not be long before its military power is again resuscitated, and it will then once more become a standing menace to the peace and security of the neighbouring States. It is on these grounds that I deprecate the restoration of Cetshwayo.

I am, sir, yours obediently,

CHELMSFORD.

50, Stanhope Gardens, *Nov.* 2.

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TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Morning Post.*

SIR,

I have read with much interest the letters of your correspondent on the above subject and Lord Chelmsford in reply. If I venture to question the conclusions of Lord Chelmsford's answer in your to-day's issue, it is with the utmost deference to his opinion, and on the plea that, having spent several months of last year in Zululand, I have had a later

opportunity of judging of the probable outcome of the rule of thirteen petty Kings in place of one.

In an unpublished manuscript I then wrote, and which I handed over to Mr. Alexander M'Arthur for private circulation in February last, I ventured the prediction that the 'little fingers of a dozen chiefs would be found to be far heavier than the loins of Cetshwayo,' and that if it were decided that the old King should never return, it had been perhaps better to have made Mr. John Dunn Paramount Chief of Zululand, and so have secured one central responsible authority to deal with. As matters now stand each petty chief of the thirteen will parody Mr. Dunn's good attempts to give his people some of the advantages they would have in Natal. The administration of any such government costs something, and a hut tax, similar to, but of less amount, than in Natal, has been imposed in his territory, and registration fees for the joint protection of his people and Natal planters, who hire them, has been instituted, but, at all events, his people receive a *quid pro quo*. On the other hand, many of the other chiefs, if not all, would impose similar taxes on their people without any sort of equivalent, and purely to satisfy a cupidity born of their new knowledge of the value of money, learnt during our invasion of their country. Three days ago I received a letter from the Lower Tugela from a well-known hunter and trader in the Zulu country, to the effect that where formerly tribute was due to Cetshwayo, to whom he was well known, it must now be paid thirteen times over, and that natives cannot afford to buy goods so heavily taxed by these chiefs. Certainly I cannot endorse Lord Chelmsford's view that, bad as it was, this government by thirteen chiefs 'was the best arrangement which could have

been made;' but I do think with him that the 'return of Cetshwayo to Zululand would at once restore the unity of the nation.' I believe also that all false pretensions of the petty chiefs would disappear. I believe that it would be high policy first to bring Cetshwayo on a visit to England, to drive him through our big 'kraal' London, through a sea of people many times more than the entire population of his own country; show him our arsenals and ships, our manufactures and our civilization, our public buildings, etc.; and I then venture to affirm that any stipulations we make with him will be faithfully kept, and the first would be that no reorganization of the former military system should take place in any form, or interference with the freedom of the marriage contract or personal liberties of the people. He expressed to me his wish to see England, though rather apprehensive of the big water voyage. There are, of course, obstacles to his restoration. There is Mr. John Dunn, appointed a chief by ourselves, and given possession of the King's cattle, who, on the strength of our guarantee, has rebuilt one of his houses and constructed another fine country house amongst the Zulu hills. Had Mr. Dunn merely crossed with his people into Natal when the war commenced, and remained neutral, would not his claims afterwards have received but slight recognition at the settlement? Mr. Dunn's position should be considered and made secure, or compensation be granted him, were the King sent back. As regards the Dutch on the high veldt bordering Zululand, they are dependent in winter-time for pasture for their herds and flocks upon the low veldt over the Zulu boundary adjoining them, and it may save much future trouble, and may not be too late yet, if, with the money-indemnity due to us by the Dutch, we

purchase a neutral border. Be it ever remembered in his favour that, hitherto in our dealings with Cetshwayo, his first word has been his last; that when we invaded his country he declared he would only defend his country from our invasion; and he kept his word, although, after Isandula, had he followed advice, he might have swept the colony to Port Elizabeth, gathering strength from the tribes as he went and abundance of cattle in Pondo Land to feed his army. I fancy Dubliamanze, his brother, could tell a tale to this effect, despite the facer he received at Rorke's Drift.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,

ARTHUR EDWARD M'CALLUM.

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TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Morning Post.*

SIR,

I have read with much interest Lord Chelmsford's reply to my letter of September 27, about the release of Cetshwayo. His lordship asserts that the letter in question 'cannot fail to awaken the sympathies of those who regard the King's captivity from a purely sentimental point of view, and who are but imperfectly acquainted with, or who wilfully ignore, the political side of the question.' I am the last person in the world to regard this question as one of sentiment alone. In all my letters on the subject I have pointed to it as one of very grave political interest, so grave, in fact, that upon its solution hangs the future fate of peace or war. The difficulties which press upon the colony of Natal, and to which Lord Chelmsford alludes, will surely become greatly aggravated unless Cetshwayo is restored; and, as far as regards our present critical relations with the Dutch community of South Africa, is it possible that

Lord Chelmsford can advocate the refusal of justice to the Zulu people for the sake of a community whose critical relations with us are caused by our own bungling and our own mistakes, who hate us in their hearts, and who would willingly thrust out of their territory the Englishman who has helped them in their needs and fought for them in their quarrels? Are we to reject the appeal of a King and a nation in order to consider the interests of a mixed race of a few thousand men who form the Dutch community? It is the undoubted wish of the Zulu nation that Cetshwayo should return; the loyalty which fired that enthusiasm and courage in the breasts of the Zulus of 1879 has not been a whit extinguished, but rather increased, by the settlement of that period and the captivity of the King. In Zululand the love of Cetshwayo remains; its organization and discipline has been suppressed, but the memory of their King has not left them; they have never forgotten him, and they never will. Does England think this is not so? Let her ask the Zulu nation and listen to their reply.

Lord Chelmsford admits that the so-called settlement of Zululand has been in many respects a failure, and that the division of the country has up to this time not worked satisfactorily. Not only in many respects, but in every respect, is this failure too plainly visible. This settlement ordains that all disputes shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government through the Resident. What do the Zulus care for the Resident? To them he is a mere nonentity, a tiresome fly that requires brushing away. When Mr. Osborne endeavoured to settle matters between Sitimela and Umlandela in the late disturbance, he was pursued and chased over the veldt and had to fly for his life. His

influence in Zululand is purely imaginary, while the chiefs are neither feared nor respected, and are powerless to enforce their commands. Theirs is but a mere titular dignity, and their superiority is treated with contempt by the people. To John Dunn was relegated the task of suppressing the rebellion, and the means this white chief employed were the very ones we condemn in Cetshwayo. To preserve order in Zululand the people must have a head whom they will respect and obey. This at present they do not possess. What wonder, then, if discontent and anarchy, smouldering yet awhile, presently break out into open rebellion? He who could rule them is most unjustly detained a captive, while the dissatisfaction of a nation is at present their only guide. How was it that, at the meeting of chiefs at the Inshlazatye last August so many failed to put in an appearance? How was it that the Zulus were not allowed to speak, and that the desire of a people was not permitted to be made known? I, who did converse with the chiefs present, and not only with them, but with the Indunas and chief men, as also with the common people, know that the reply I received was ever the same—disgust at the present state of affairs, the desire to live in amity with England provided Cetshwayo was restored. Why should the truth of matters all-important be ever kept concealed from the English public, who seldom hear what really takes place at the time, and whose only chance of obtaining tardy information is by having recourse to a Blue-Book? As regards the King's restoration, he has himself learnt by bitter experience that the policy he once pursued is no longer possible. It is his expressed desire to return to Zululand as our ally. His own lips have framed the wish to govern his country through an English Resident, who

shall acquaint him with the desires of the British Government. To use his own expression, 'I no longer wish to be myself deceived, or to feel that the English are so also. I would govern through one whom we could both trust. It was otherwise before. England was told lies of me, and I was told lies about her.' Lord Chelmsford says that the result of the Zulu War has been to completely destroy the national army. This is true ; and so much the better. Cetshwayo has no wish to resume a policy which proved disastrous to his former fortunes. His return will unite Zululand, but this time into a peaceful ally of England, not into an armed foe. 'Experience maketh man wise,' and Cetshwayo is as capable of learning wisdom as any of us. It does not follow that the King, who sees in what lay the mistakes of his former reign, should wish to repeat them ; on the contrary, he frankly acknowledges his error, and is desirous of reform. It may be argued that it would be impolitic to trust the word of a savage, and that in believing the assertions of Cetshwayo one becomes through one's own simplicity one's own dupe. But this is not so. The Zulu King is as far removed from a savage as the sun is from the moon ; this black captive has much too comprehensive power to be classed as a wily savage, and in the few words with which, through the medium of my pen, he appealed to the justice of a nation whom he respects, he showed both feeling, and understanding, and trust in that nation, in whose generosity he believes. 'Tell the English people,' he said, 'that I am a King and a captive ; that I am alone and helpless ; that I am very sad and almost heartbroken ; that they should not believe all the ill they hear of me ; ask them to be my friend and to help me. I have no more to say.'

Cetshwayo has appealed to a powerful nation ; let us hope not all in vain. It is Lord Chelmsford's opinion that, united under the rule of one man, the Zulu nation will resuscitate the old evils of past years, and become a standing menace to the peace and security of the neighbouring States. It is on these grounds he deprecates the restoration of Cetshwayo. But his opinion is not universally shared, and there are many men well qualified to give an opinion on this subject whose ideas incline the opposite way. I think, on the contrary, that a lasting peace for Zululand will alone be obtained by the restoration of its lawful King, whom we unjustly retain in captivity.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

FLORENCE DIXIE.

Bosworth Park, Leicestershire.

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TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Morning Post.*

SIR,

I observe that Lord Chelmsford, in his reply to the admirable letter of your special correspondent at Cape Town, deprecates the restoration, on the ground that 'should the Zulu nation at any time come again under the rule of one man, it will not be long before its military power is again resuscitated, and it will then once more become a standing menace to the peace and security of the neighbouring States.' It is, I know, far too late in the day to embark in a controversy concerning the origin of the Zulu War, but I desire to call attention to the undoubted fact that, under Cetshwayo, the military power of the Zulus was always exercised for purposes of self-defence. Sir Henry Bulwer, late Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, in a despatch addressed to Sir Michael

Hicks-Beach on March 10th, 1880, says: 'I must also say, because the subject is one which I think has not been free from misapprehension, that the action of the Zulu King in the steps that he took to arm his people with firearms, and to cultivate the military organization of the nation, was owing in a great measure to the aggressive and threatening course taken by the Government of the (Transvaal) Republic, and to the determination of the Zulu King and people to resist at all costs an invasion of what they considered to be Zulu rights. . . . The attitude adopted by the Government of the Republic, the action taken by it, and the claims advanced by it, were such as to cause the greatest anxiety in the minds of the Zulus; and their preparations to defend their rights are not, in my opinion, deserving all the blame which they have received.'

Lord Chelmsford altogether ignores these facts, a knowledge of which is, however, absolutely essential to the formation of a correct judgment on the past conduct of Cetshwayo. The Boers had made repeated encroachments upon Zululand; they had taken possession by force and fraud of a most fertile tract of Zulu country; and, as Cetshwayo points out in the letter he wrote to Sir Hercules Robinson on March 29th last, they had also committed many outrages on the Zulus who lived on their borders. Does Lord Chelmsford think that the Zulu King and people had no right to defend themselves against these nefarious acts? I venture to say that, in standing up for their rights, and in being prepared, if necessary, to fight for them, they only did what we, or any other nation, would do in similar circumstance.

The information which I have received from various parts of Zululand during the last few weeks convinces me that some decisive action on the part of the Imperial

Government will soon become imperative. Nothing can be more deplorable, or, I would add, more dangerous, than the condition of anarchy to which the country is now reduced; and it is, I think, impossible to discover any middle course between annexation and the restoration of the ex-King. Cetshwayo, in his letter to Sir Hercules Robinson, said: 'My father lived and died in peace with the Queen. . . . I ask the Queen to be so kind as to look into my case, arrange my country, and put me back, and I will have peace till I die.' I am confident that public opinion in England will support this prayer, not for reasons of a sentimental character, but on grounds both of justice and of expediency.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,

F. W. CHESSON.

ABORIGINES PROTECTION SOCIETY,
17, King William Street,
Charing Cross, *Nov.* 4.

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TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Morning Post.*

SIR,

That the old hereditary chiefs of Zululand are unanimous in wishing for the return of Cetshwayo, and that they express the general wish of their people in the matter, may be granted. I visited the chief Somkele at his principal kraal twice in the autumn of last year. He was then most anxious for my opinion as to the chances of Cetshwayo's return; and when I observed that his place was already occupied and his cattle gone, they would not have it, and an Induna started up with the exclamation, 'That for cattle there was not a kraal in all Zululand that would not send him a beast, or a chief not a drove of oxen,' which sentiment was echoed

and applauded by the crowd present. Nor shall I easily forget the looks exchanged when I gave it as my opinion that 'Cetshwayo' would never be seen in Zululand again. This was fifteen months ago, and now I read in to-day's paper that this same chief Somkele, with others, were turned back without meeting General Wood, whilst the answer they receive is in effect that they are a set of discontented nigger dogs seeking after a lost 'bone' they will not again get back, that their old King is 'chinga,' which means something worse than a dog. I would ask who is responsible for this? Also, if this country desires another Zulu War, headed by Cetshwayo's old chiefs? The smothered discontent is patent in the resistance being offered to our appointed chief, John Dunn, and our resident, Mr. Osborne, who both, I consider, carry their lives in their hands. With the return of Cetshwayo the position of Mr. Dunn would be untenable, if, indeed, he can much longer hold his own. Is our policy to be to let matters drift, hoping that we may secure the consummation suggested in Lord Chelmsford's recent letter. Let Mr. Dunn but experience disaster, and we shall wake up out of a fool's paradise. We must either support the white chief we have ourselves appointed, or institute a new *régime* under Cetshwayo. I can quite endorse the opinion of your correspondent who calls the late King a primitive gentleman, and all else he says of him.

I am, sir, yours faithfully,

ARTHUR EDWARD M'CALLUM.

Brighton, *Nov.* 10.

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To the Editor of the *Morning Post.*

Sir,

The correspondence on this subject which is appearing in your valuable journal cannot fail to have a beneficial effect, in so far as it brings more accurately before the public the phases of a subject upon which a great amount of apathy, or even ignorance, prevails. It would be invidious for one to take upon one's self the task of generally explaining matters, and I make the foregoing remarks more as a tribute to the graciousness which accords space for the statement of facts and opinions from which your readers must at least gather some information. The point to which I would wish to draw attention, as one having, I think, a greater and more important bearing upon the subject than is generally suspected, is the action and present position of John Dunn. Briefly stated it is this: John Dunn, a white man, trading into Zululand, becomes the King's great friend. He is given land, cattle, and rank, and is permitted to enjoy all the blessings afforded by a plurality of wives. Colonists, who ought to know, credit him with no small share in fomenting a rupture between the Zulus and the Imperial Government. Be that as it may, war is carried into Zululand, and John Dunn avails himself of an early opportunity to retire over the Natal border with his wives, retinue, and cattle, and, not content with neutrality, gives to the Imperial troops the benefit of his acquaintance with the Zulus and their country, and takes an active part in hunting down Cetshwayo. The war concluded and Cetshwayo captured, this admirable man is arrayed by the representatives of the Imperial Government in all the pomp of chiefdomship, the very cattle belonging to his former friend bestowed upon himself. Verily it is a

noble specimen of centuries of civilization to set up in the country of a people whom we regard as savages. It would be difficult to imagine a less pleasing act than that of rewarding, as we have done, a man by whose treachery to his benefactor we owed not a little of our success in the Zulu campaign. John Dunn's aim is, of course, the paramount chieftainship of Zululand. One of your correspondents, I think, rather favours this idea, and goes so far as to think that his 'position should be considered' in the event of the King's return. In reading the account of the interview of your Cape Town correspondent and Cetshwayo, it is easy to discover that the instincts of the man had led him to the conviction that he owed his downfall to the machination of this exemplary white polygamist, and evidence is certainly in favour of such a conclusion. The reinstalment of Cetshwayo means, of course, the retirement of John Dunn from the country, and thus, with not the least of the many causes which led to the late Zulu War removed, we have an additional inducement to the belief that in again uniting, by the restoration of their King, the Zulu nation, we should be securing an ally whose power we have gauged, and whose loyalty we could depend upon. To hazard a guess as to 'what might have been' is unavailing, but to trace the source of an event is not always useless. Our ostensible and avowed object for annexing the Transvaal was to afford protection to the Boers against the Zulus. Had we allowed events to take their course instead of gratifying that insatiable earth-hunger of ours, it is not difficult to see what would not have been. We should have had no Zulu War, and certainly no Transvaal War. How the Boers would have fared at the hands of the Zulus it is not easy to determine. Viewed by the light of our late ex-

periences, however, it cannot be doubted that they would have been able to take care of themselves. The deduction is that having handed over the Transvaal to the Boers and liberated Secocoeni, the restoration of Cetshwayo should follow as a sequence, for in that country of diversified interests the main source of our own safety often lies in the differences arising between our neighbours. Apologising for so long a letter,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

L. C.

Empire Club, *Nov.* 5.

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To the Editor of the *Morning Post.*

Sir,

I beg space in your columns for a few words in support of the views advocated by your correspondents, Lady Florence Dixie, Mr. M'Callum, and Mr. Chesson, in your issue of the 4th and 5th inst. Having come much into contact with the natives both of the colony and Zululand in the course of recent practice in the Natal Law Courts, and having several times conversed with Cetshwayo himself, I venture to think that I am not without grounds for the opinions which I hold on the subject in question.

I would in the first place add my testimony to that of Lady Florence Dixie respecting the personal qualities of the Zulu King. During a week spent by me at Ulundi, in January, 1878, I was much impressed with what I saw of Cetshwayo. To say that he was a gentleman in the primitive sense of the word would be to say no more than could be alleged of most well-to-do Zulus. It was obvious, in fact, that he was a man of whose excellent disposition and tractable nature we ought long

ago to have taken advantage. A frequent duty upon which the King was engaged was that of hearing law-suits between his subjects, and I found that the natural equity which characterised his proceedings was remarked upon even by the rude trader. 'He will never listen to one side unless the other is present,' I was told. I myself heard a complaint made by a missionary of the misconduct towards him of a young Zulu, and an order given by Cetshwayo that the culprit should be examined by Commissioners in the presence of the complainant. The upshot of the case was that the young man was fined a bullock for an offence which seemed to me on the showing of the missionary himself to have been a trivial one. The matter is referred to in the Blue-Book 2252, p. 14.

Lord Chelmsford's difficulty would, it seems to me, vanish if he could correct his estimate of the character and antecedents of the Zulu King. Believing Cetshwayo to be the 'ruthless savage' that he has been painted by Sir Bartle Frere, his lordship feels it impossible to imagine his making good use of his influence were he to be reinstated. But the truth of the matter is rapidly becoming manifest, and all fears can be obviated by making Cetshwayo's restoration conditional upon certain reforms being introduced into the country by him. We cannot ignore the wishes of the Zulu people, and all attempts to suppress their utterance must fail. That efforts have been made by interested persons in and near Zululand to misrepresent them is obvious. In proof of this I would refer you to the telegram which appeared in the issue of the *Daily News* of the 14th September, giving an account of the meeting of Sir E. Wood with the chiefs. The correspondent states: 'The chiefs wish to have European Residents. There was no sign of

anxiety for Cetshwayo's return. The conviction evidently was that bloodshed would soon result, for which the British Government would be responsible.' And yet on the 20th October we have a detailed account from the correspondent of the same paper at Durban, in which we are told that when the old hereditary chief Dilikana asked why they might not speak, seeing that some had come expressly to pray for Cetshwayo's return, the reply was given evidently without Sir E. Wood's knowledge: 'You are always troubling us with asking for that rascal, whom we have done away with. We have not come here to talk about that, but we warn you let us have no more messengers to Maritzburg on that subject; you have troubled us too much.'

In conclusion, let me add that in my opinion a good and lasting moral effect will be produced upon the natives of Natal and Zululand if we restore Cetshwayo. With every fresh raid of Chiefs Hamo and Dunn we incur fresh blood-guiltiness, and we shall merit a national visitation if, to avoid a charge of sentimentality, we neglect a plain duty.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

A BARRISTER.

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FROM THE *Morning Post*, NOVEMBER 7, 1881.

The South African letters of our Special Correspondent have called attention to questions of very great interest, and the review of the South African situation which has been the result is likely to produce distinct and important consequences. No reader of Lady Florence Dixie's letters can ignore the justness of observation and vivid accuracy of description which have marked the whole of the correspondence which has

proceeded from so accomplished and facile a pen. The fatigues which have been endured and overcome by Lady Florence Dixie in the course of her researches, the distances which have been traversed, the difficult situations which have been met with equal courage and composure, would do credit to any of the war correspondents of the English Press. It is, however, the subject which she has especially brought under general attention, and which has been further illustrated by the numerous letters from persons and associations possessing a claim to be heard in connection with it, that forms the substantial ground for the interest of the public and the consideration of statesmen and politicians. There can be no doubt that the state of Zululand is the reverse of satisfactory, and under existing arrangements there does not seem to be much likelihood of improvement. Every other telegram from Natal and every mail bring the news either of another war between the chiefs or a continuation of the war spoken of in the preceding intelligence. Knowing the fierce and headlong valour of the Zulu warriors, the English public naturally hears of these perpetual fights with much dislike and a little, perhaps a good deal of, qualms of conscience. It is pretty well understood that when the Zulu tribes meet in hostile encounter it is no child's play, but a very bloody and dreadful business indeed. One thing at least is clear, and this is that the thirteen chiefs among whom we distributed the power and authority of the captive Cetshwayo have not succeeded in establishing harmony in the country; and it is asked on very strong, or on very plausible, grounds whether we are quite justified in exposing a race of men of exceptional capacities, considering their uncivilized condition, to the horrors of a perpetual system of mutual slaughter of

this kind. The strong and stately Cetshwayo at all events appeared to have secured something like order in his kingdom before his savage monarchy was shattered at the contact of the British Empire, or, if he did not establish exactly what we call order, he certainly allowed no man to misuse his subjects but himself. 'Why not put Cetshwayo back upon his throne?' ask a good many people, and Lady Florence Dixie asks the same question with a force of argument and a clear statement of observed facts which decidedly call for serious reflection. We are all agreed that Cetshwayo is every inch a king by nature and bearing. He fell along with his country after a defence which will always make service in Zululand a thing to talk of in the British army as the proof of terrible dangers encountered and obstinate resistance finally overcome. His people, it is alleged, on what appears to be unimpeachable evidence, desire to have him back, and the rooted loyalty to the true King Cetshwayo is said to accompany that undisguised contempt for the pretensions of the thirteen petty usurpers which is at the bottom of all the unrest in Zululand. After their fashion the Zulu braves are dusky Jacobites, and it is the King who was carried away in a big ship 'over the water' who still occupies the hearts of wild Highlanders and Lowlanders beside the White and the Black Umvolosi.

At first there was some pretence of denying the rooted loyalty of the Zulus to their captive King, but the authors of the denials were to be found, on being traced, to be exclusively the petty chiefs among whom we have shared Cetshwayo's royal power without being able to share among them the allegiance of Cetshwayo's former subjects. The real objection now comes from the colonial or British witnesses, who volunteer testimony

to the effect that, though Cetshwayo's return might be a boon for his own people, it would raise up anew a great danger for the British dominion in South Africa. Lord Chelmsford, who has had much experience in Zululand, may be taken to represent this form of the objection to Cetshwayo's restoration, and his letter to us last week very fully summarised the main argument in support of this view. Lord Chelmsford, it is to be observed, 'fully admits that the settlement of Zululand has been a failure,' and this admission is a significant contribution to the facts at our disposal. But Lord Chelmsford thinks that Zulu unity is so dangerous that it is better to resign ourselves to hear of these brave tribes being perpetually doomed to mutual slaughter at the hands of some or other of the petty chiefs who distract the country. Lord Chelmsford reminds us that quarrels between the chiefs ought to be referred to the British Resident, but that this condition 'is not likely to be complied with, nor does it seem desirable that the Government should interfere unless it is prepared to enforce its decision,' which, of course, Lord Chelmsford, in a truly Gladstonian spirit, approvingly implies it is not. We confess that we do not follow this reasoning. In fixing the thirteen chiefs on the Zulus we undertook to supply, instead of the sovereign authority of Cetshwayo, whom we drove away, the arbitration of the British Government. 'But that would require that the Government should enforce its decision!' says Lord Chelmsford, and so we are neither to keep order in Zululand ourselves nor to restore the Ruler who can do so. Lord Chelmsford will allow the Zulus to do anything except become united and satisfied. The thirteen chiefs may murder one another, and one another's followers to their heart's content, provided only that there

be at least two or three of them always left to keep up the internecine business. The instant that one chief has proved himself able to hold Zululand for himself the British Government must step in to set up a couple of rivals simply to start the mutual murder over again. It is a political version of the 'Nine Little Niggers.' There are thirteen little Zulu chiefs, it seems, and as the result of their fighting and massacre one little Zulu chief gets killed, and then there are only twelve. The twelve get similarly reduced to eleven, or ten, or nine, or eight, or any number except one, without danger to the British Empire. The instant that there is only one little Zulu chief who has become the great Zulu chief Lord Chelmsford and the British Empire are in alarm, and the 'Nine Little Niggers' game must be set going over again.

Seriously, we do not think that exclusive importance should be attached to this alleged necessity of keeping Zululand cut up among thirteen black brigand chiefs, over whom it is acknowledged our Resident has no influence whatever, as that gentleman is aware by personal experience. The great question, it seems to us, is whether Cetshwayo could be trusted to use his authority peacefully and loyally to England if it were to be restored. It is quite plain that if Cetshwayo were loyally to be guided by the British Resident, then the British Resident would have an authority in Zululand which he cannot hope to have so long as it is a scene of rapine, murder, and savage civil war. Lady Florence Dixie is quite convinced that Cetshwayo fully recognises the necessity and propriety of being loyal to England, and certainly Lady Florence Dixie appears to have had the best possible opportunities of becoming acquainted with the captive King's sentiments. Mr. M'Callum,

who is well qualified to give an opinion, publishes an emphatic corroboration. The Aborigines Protection Society has arrived at no other conclusion. Cetshwayo is an able man, quite capable of observing the meaning of events. A visit to our centres of population and power in England would probably complete his appreciation of British strength and civilization. It must be remembered that since Zululand was conquered and Cetshwayo was exiled the Transvaal has passed out of the control of England; and there are sound thinkers who hold that if Zululand were still powerful, the belligerent Boers would have been glad to rest under the ægis of England as 'quiet as Sunday.' It must also be remembered that Cetshwayo never attempted an invasion of British territory, but stood calmly on the defensive even after we had attacked his country. If, after the terrible disaster to our forces, the Zulu King had pursued a different strategy, and had burst upon the defenceless colonies with the devastating thousands of his victorious 'impis,' what untold horrors might have blotted the face of South Africa. Statesmen must consider the matter in all its bearings; but, at any rate, Cetshwayo is entitled to have it borne in mind that in the hour of his greatest power and most intoxicating success he calmly refused to strike a blow except in the actual defence of his country from invasion.

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To the Editor of the *Morning Post*.

Sir,

The following letter may prove of interest to the many who, like myself, are taking an interest in the

unhappy fate of the captive Zulu King Cetshwayo. Writing to me under date of December 13 he says:

'Oude Molen, *Dec.* 13, 1881.

'I am writing to you, my great friend, to thank you very much for your very great kindness that you are showing me, such as is praised by all people. Although you are a lady, you have beaten men in your talking for me. This kindness I shall never forget. You will not be thanked by me alone, but also by all my family, relations, and the Zulu nation, who desire my return. I pray you to persevere in your great kindness. Stand firm on both your feet, and let the English know the true feeling of the Zulu nation about me. You know that the Zulu nation wish for my release. People try to hide the feeling of the Zulus, but you know it well. Plead my casue for me, so that when I return to my country, if England gives me that justice, my family, my relations, and the Zulu nation may laugh again and feel happy. All my property has been made away with, so I will return to nothing of it when I am restored, if restored I am. I pray you to continue talking for me to your great men and the council of your nation, as I hear from Mr. Grant, of Natal, that your battle is great for me. Speak on, kind friend, so that I may return once more to the country I love, and become conspicuous as the sun and moon' (meaning literally 'that I may become a great and wise King'), 'so that every one may see that we black races obtain our light' (greatness) 'from the English nation. Let England show its greatness to me, though I am a black man whom others have misrepresented. I am soon coming to English people, I wish my heart to tell me that I am coming to my home. Do not cease your

kindness, but stand firm on both your feet. I hear that one I cannot trust is to be my interpreter to England' (Mr. Henriquez Shepstone). 'This cannot be true. I pray it is not so. Why is my present interpreter taken from me? he is kind, and honest, and will tell England what I say. I am helpless in this matter; I cannot speak the English tongue, and I cannot hear if my words are retold aright. My friend here' (Mr. Interpreter Samuelson) 'would tell the English what I really say; but if I have an enemy, or one who does not wish me well, the English nation will never hear my words, but those of other lips. Speak for me in this matter; do not let Cetshwayo's lips speak words he does not utter; it will be so if interpreters he cannot trust are given control of his words. My friend, tell the English nation what I say. Ask them to help me to speak my own words aright. My father, 'Mpande, was a great friend of the English; but he has been taken out of his grave by some rascals that are known in Natal. The English cannot surely know of this disgrace, so dreadful to me, or else they would not allow the matter to rest. I pray you to ask the English to start a strict inquiry, and punish the perpetrators of such a disgrace. I send you with this a letter for the Queen and one for her great son; will they read my words and help me? Alas! have they ever read them, and do they know the sad position in which their great men have placed me? Once more I thank you for your goodness on my behalf. It will not be forgotten, for Cetshwayo has a heart, and can feel as well as any white man.

'CETSHWAYO, Ka 'Mpande.'

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The following are copies of the letters addressed by Cetshwayo to her Majesty and his Royal Highness the

Prince of Wales, the former of which I forwarded to Lord Kimberley for transmission to her Majesty and the latter straight to his Royal Highness:—

'Oude Molen, *Dec.* 13, 1881.

'I am writing to you, Lady, Queen Victoria, Sovereign of the English people, to ask you for your kind heart. I ask you to have a white heart towards me. I am soon coming to you, and I have great hopes in my future accordingly. My sorrows are heavy, but I have great hopes in my visit to you, the Sovereign of the English people. I beg you to help me with all your kindness. You are the great Sovereign of the English nation, and I used to be the King of the Zulus. I am now in your hands, and who will be able to molest me in the future when I am put back into my country by your kindness? If you and the home Government had known about the truth of the grounds of the Zulu War, the war would not have been made against me. I know that the English do not make war without good grounds. I have, however, great hopes of living and dying in peace after I have seen you. I am now about to come to you on behalf of my country, family, relations, and myself, to ask for your kind heart. I am coming to make a league with you, and to ask for compassion. I hope to live and die in peace with the English nation after you help me. By your showing me kindness in my distress you will exhibit the magnanimity of the English nation, and you will be drawing me out of my grave (meaning "you will prevent me from dying").

'CETSHWAYO, Ka 'Mpande.'

'Oude Molen, *Dec.* 13, 1881.

'I am writing to you, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales. I look upon you as my brother, as the Queen

is my mother. I ask you to feel for me. You must not look on me as a black man. I am looking greatly for your help in this my trouble; I ask you to have compassion on myself, my family, and relations in this distress that they are in. My children are your children, and your children are my children. Let us feel for one another. I pray you to talk kindly for me to the men of your country. I am coming to ask for greatness and for wisdom that will give peace to Zululand till I die, and will make the Zulu people glad. I am coming to make a league with you, so that lies may no more make war against Zululand. My father was a great friend of the English nation, and died the same. I was a great friend of the English nation, and thought that I would reign and die at peace with the English. I know not why I was punished. No one can come before my face and prove that I did any wrong to the English. Although all that was mine is now as it were at the bottom of the sea, I trust that you will so help me that my family and myself may laugh again and feel happy. The Zulu nation will thank you for your kindness.

'CETSHWAYO, Ka 'Mpande.'

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These letters were forwarded to me from Oude Molen, and are written by the interpreter at the dictation of Cetshwayo. Will the prayers of this unfortunate captive for justice remain unheeded by the English public, to whom he has once more appealed? The Zulu King asks for nothing more than justice. He wishes for inquiry to be made into his case by unprejudiced and disinterested persons. Let this be done, and the decision of competent and unbiased persons so be made known. Will England continue to listen to the voices of his

enemies and to the slanders and falsifications which have neither foundation nor truth to back them up? Cetshwayo is shortly to visit England, and the appointment of Mr. Henriquez Shepstone as his interpreter has filled him with dismay, as he very naturally asks, 'Why is my present interpreter taken from me?' This question is much to the point. The King is completely dependent on his interpreter, and Mr. Samuelson, who acts at present in that capacity, would honestly and truthfully report the King's words. Why, then, is he to be removed and Mr. H. Shepstone placed in the position which Mr. Samuelson has all along so ably occupied? Is it to be supposed for a moment that Mr. Shepstone would, in speaking of his father's past policy and treatment of the King, condemn that parent's actions? And yet if he interprets Cetshwayo's words aright, he would be forced not only to do this, but to throw the true light and version of Cetshwayo's story of past policy before the public eye. Can it be imagined that Mr. H. Shepstone would denounce the acts of that Administration under which he served, and in which he participated? In giving to him the charge of the Zulu King, we render absolutely unmeaning the visit of Cetshwayo to England, and so seal his lips to silence. Common humanity should surely have prompted the Government to give him a friend as interpreter, and not one prejudiced against his interests. His present interpreter, Mr. Samuelson, who, out of pure pity, has stuck to the King through his miserable and dreary captivity, should surely be permitted to remain with him during his visit to England. Cetshwayo likes him, and Mr. Samuelson, who has lived from his youth upwards among the Zulu people, is just the man to interpret the King's words, for he understands the language thoroughly. If it is justice that is

intended for the Zulu King, let not this cruel wrong be done him. A correspondent from Zululand, writing to the *Times* newspaper, gives us the information that the natives of John Dunn's country desire the King's return, but that the Europeans in those parts are of opinion that such would endanger the peace of the country. Naturally they do not desire this King's return whom they have so cruelly treated. The present state of Zululand is one of secret terrorism; the man who breathes a prayer for his King's return knows that he does so under the severest penalty. This is the real truth of the state of things there, and the land is one of secret persecution. Let proper inquiry be made, and it will be seen that my words are true.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

FLORENCE DIXIE.

Bosworth Park, Leicestershire, *Jan.* 24, 1882.

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Not long since, in the Legislative Council of Natal, Mr. Robinson rose to move—

(*a*) That in the opinion of this House the return of Cetshwayo, late King of the Zulus, to Zululand, or his location in any territory adjacent thereto, would imperil the maintenance of peace and order in South East Africa, and would be inimical to the best interests of the native tribes.

(*b*) That this House advances for this conviction the *following grounds:*

That the Zulu people must ever regard their late King as the representative of the military system which it was the aim of the recent war to overthrow;

That the return or restoration of Cetshwayo would fan anew in the minds of the Zulus those ideas of military aggression and conquest which for years

made them a source of disquietude and dread to the neighbouring territories ;

That the late King's return would have a most deplorable effect upon the minds of the natives of Natal, who could not fail to recognise in the fact a fatal evidence of weakness and vacillation ; that it would re-establish throughout the frontier districts of this Colony the feeling of alarm and unrest that prevailed there prior to the Zulu War ; and that it would tend to impair most seriously the prospects of civilization and advancement amongst the many native tribes who own direct or indirect allegiance to the Government of the Queen.

(*c*) That a respectful address be presented to the Administrator of the Government, transmitting a copy of the foregoing resolutions for his Excellency's information, and praying his Excellency to be pleased to forward the same to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Are these the only reasons which the enemies of Cetshwayo can put forward as good grounds why he should not be returned? Can it be conscientiously asserted that this is all? If so, for such erroneous arguments are we to continue to perpetrate an injustice which is revolting to all generous minds? Mr. Robinson began by asserting that the return of Cetshwayo would imperil the maintenance of peace and order in South East Africa, and would be inimical to the best interests of the native tribes. Here is a bold assertion, unhesitatingly made, but without a shadow of proof or foundation to support it. He furthermore advanced the reason that the Zulu people must ever regard their late King as the representative of the military system which

it was the aim of the recent war to overthrow. If this is Mr. Robinson's opinion, I can only say it is not widely shared. The object of the recent war was not commenced with the intention of overthrowing the military system alone, which, up to the date of the declaration of war, had never acted as a menace to the Colony of Natal. The war was commenced to enforce the cruel and unjust demands of the ultimatum, whereby in thirty days Sir Bartle Frere sought to overturn the whole system of the Zulu laws, customs, and traditions, since the days of Chaka; and although one of the conditions of the ultimatum demanded that the Zulu military system should be discontinued, it was rendered unmeaning by the impossibility of execution in the one short month allowed for the overthrow of a nation's entire system of government.

Then again the visit of Cetshwayo to England will do much to civilize the mind of a really intelligent and sagacious man. No one is more willing or anxious to improve himself, and thereby his people and his country, than the King. Were facilities afforded him to become acquainted with much that is useful, no one would be more keenly interested than Cetshwayo. How is it possible for him to learn or improve in the dismal location in which he is placed, surrounded by people who would be glad to see him dead, who look upon him as a wild blood-thirsty beast without sense or feeling, but those of brutes? The stately dignity of the King, the silent pride and patience with which he bears his wretched life, must surely prove him to be something above the common. The misery of his existence is only too plainly visible, and yet he bears it all with a dignity and patience which must call for the greatest admiration. Is this the man whom we should fail to civilize

and be unable to live with in peace? For the King who is a helpless captive, and therefore unable to defend himself, I deny most emphatically that there is any ground to rest upon in the reasons put forward by Mr. Robinson why the King should not be restored. If we went to war to overthrow the military system of Zululand, in what way have we succeeded? During the past months, murder, massacre, and spoliation have been rife, life far exceeding that in the days of Cetshwayo has been taken, and blood has been spilt such as has never been proved to have been done under the reign of the Zulu King.

In direct breach of the rules to which the chiefs signed their adhesion when they were appointed to their different territories has been the standing army of Zibebu, and the sanguinary proceedings of Oham and John Dunn. If it is not so, then all I can say is, that this Government has lent its sanction to these past proceedings of massacre and bloodshed, as may be seen by quoting two of the conditions of the Zulu settlement: '2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or the existence of any military system or organization whatever, within my territory; 3. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs or people without the sanction of the British Government.'

Was it by the sanction of the British Government that Zibebu, since the Inshlazatye meeting, committed his deeds of murder and spoliation, and that Oham swept off in his terrible massacre the Abaqulusi tribe, because they desired the King's return? If it was not, why then has the Government failed to take any notice of these proceedings, and why has it not punished and deposed these chiefs, who have defied and broken the compact by which they hold their present power?

Has this military system, which Mr. Robinson dreads

in the event of the King's restoration, been done away with under the present system; and how is it that John Dunn and Zibebu were able to use guns in their attacks, since all firearms were to be surrendered at the time of their appointment as chiefs, unless 'the express sanction of the Resident' has been given for their importation? (Rule 3.)

The mover of the motion in the Legislative Council goes on to argue that the restoration of Cetshwayo would fan anew in the minds of the Zulus those ideas of military aggression and conquest which for years made them a source of disquietude and dread to the neighbouring territories. The result of the King's return would mean nothing of the sort. During the years of Cetshwayo's reign his armies were never employed in aggression or conquest. Several times he informed the English Government that unless it would interfere to prevent Boer encroachments of his country, he would be forced to take the matter into his own hands; he never attempted, however, to invade any territory, and his armies fought but in one war, and that was to repel our unjust invasion of their country. What does Mr. Robinson mean when he further asserts that the King's return would have a deplorable effect upon the minds of the natives of Natal, who could not fail to recognise in the fact a fatal evidence of weakness and vacillation; that it would establish throughout the frontier districts of this Colony the feeling of alarm and unrest that prevailed there prior to the Zulu War? (?)

The present anarchy in Zululand will decidedly have a deplorable effect upon the natives of Natal, which the return of Cetshwayo, who would restore peace and order, might counteract; and as to the statement of Mr. Robinson that a feeling of alarm and unrest prevailed

throughout the frontier districts of the country prior to the Zulu War, it is one which would receive contradiction in almost every quarter, if the question was put to the residents themselves. To prove this assertion, I will once more quote from an account written expressly for Sir B. Frere's information by a gentleman, who had recently at that time returned from a visit to Utrecht, on the general state of the border in that direction, and from Utrecht down to Greytown. It is dated Oct. 4, 1878, was sent to England by Sir B. Frere, Jan. 31, 1879, and appears in the Blue Book in March (2260, p. 48). He says:

'. . . . Wherever I went, the want of water was the chief topic of conversation. The Zulus were very little talked about, and at this I was somewhat surprised, as down here we learn that excitement is great concerning them. . . . Here and there a house which has a good supply of water is tenanted. My firm impression is that in a good season nearly all the Boers would have stayed on; and this opinion is strengthened by the fact that only those farms that are badly watered are left to themselves.

'Arrived at Utrecht I found that the fear of the Zulus was about the last thing that had entered the heads of the townspeople. They seem to feel quite secure, and, although ignorant of the intentions of this Government, they will not believe themselves in danger of attack. Nearing Greytown, I began to hear rumours of Kafir annoyances, and, on arriving at Maritzburg, I found that Greytown itself was here reported to be in a great state of scare, and various alarming circumstances were related to me (!); as, however, many of these had given them time and place which proved them to be untrue by my own observations, I simply let them pass,

or, in one or two cases, contradicted them, adducing my recent passage down in proof of my accuracy.

'I am convinced that the nearer one gets to Maritzburg, the more alarming (and less true) will be found the reports. Near the border even reasonable security is felt. But I may mention that some Boers, even up there, are very fond of spreading reports of aggressions, which I believe exist only in their fears or passions. If the border residents had any real fear, the immense number of lies put in circulation must have long since hurried on a collision.'

This statement, quoted from official sources, distinctly contradicts the assertion of Mr. Robinson, that prior to the war a feeling of alarm and unrest was established on the borders of the Colony of Natal. That no such feeling existed is very evident, and the reports which reached England of these scares at the time, were the result of that fostering care to make them known, whereby those who had asserted dangers as being present which never appeared sought to justify their unfounded statements. As some importance has been attached to the protest of the Legislative Council against the King's return, common fairness should assert that as the reasons put forward by it are clearly no reasons at all, every sense of justice and straightforward dealing points to the fact that Cetshwayo should be restored. Had the arguments of the Council any proof or foundation to support them, it would be necessary to grant hearing to their reasons, but I maintain that those very arguments, having no facts to back them up, must be regarded as simply erroneous, and should therefore not be weighed in the balance with the King's restoration. Why should not the matter of the King's return be fairly and impartially laid before the Natal Colonists?

To quote a few words from a leader on the subject which appeared in the *Natal Witness* of December 3, 1881, the writer of which is adverse to the King's return—even he is bound to acknowledge that were this matter laid before the Colonists 'with all the consideration both for and against such a course, it is quite possible that many of them might admit that the balance of argument—and it is by the balance of argument that all such questions must be decided—lay in favour of the course which the philanthropic party' (*i.e.*, the advocates of justice for Cetshwayo) 'so eagerly recommend. It is only because they know that the case never will be laid before them in this way that they feel bound to resist the interference of that party.' Here is a man adverse to the return of Cetshwayo, acknowledging that, were the matter laid fairly before the Natal Colonists, many would be in favour of the course recommended by the friends of the King for his return. It is only because they feel that they should be consulted on a matter in which they think we have interfered that they feel bound to resist our efforts.

Many who do not desire the King's return are actuated by private feelings of interest. The fear that with Cetshwayo's restoration, John Dunn would be forced to retire, gives alarm to those who have cast their fortunes in with his. The knowledge that Zululand would no longer be theirs in which to amass wealth which of right belongs to another, appalls the many who had visions of riches accruing to them from speculations in which they had no right to indulge. That the mass total of Natal Colonists are averse to the King's return is a slander which cannot be too strongly denied. The recent meeting called at Durban to protest against the King's return was of no importance. It was attended

by few of the leading men of Durban, and of these, many voted against the protest. The author of it was a Mr. Pinson, a man of no position in the Colony, whose speech is characterised by the *Natal Witness* as 'foolish and ignorant,' as such it decidedly was, and not only that, it was vulgar, while at the last moment no one could be found to move the resolution, and the gentleman who ultimately was induced to do it, complained that he was informed only two hours before it took place that there was absolutely no one to occupy the position he was then assuming, and he was forced in consequence to do for others that duty which they should have been present to perform! This meeting was telegraphed home to England as an emphatic protest from the Colonists against the King's return, when in reality it was a meeting of small importance and badly got up, as the *facts* I have quoted will show. It is for this reason that I declare that justice should be accorded the King. All official documents go to prove that before the Zulu War he was not a menace to the Colony, neither would he be if he was returned. Let unbiased men examine the case, let proper inquiry be made in Zululand and Natal, and it will then be found that the banishment of the present system and the restoration of the King is the only remedy for the ills of Zululand and its present state, which, to quote the words of the *Natal Witness*, is a disgrace to the name of England.

FLORENCE DIXIE.

Bosworth Park, Leicestershire.

THE END.

BILLING AND SONS, PRINTERS AND ELECTROTYPERS, GUILDFORD, SURREY.