

THE 'MFECANE' AFTERMATH

towards a new paradigm

6-9 September 1991

UNMASKING THE FINGO:
The War of 1835 revisited

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University of the Witwatersrand

UNMASKING THE FINGO:[1] THE WAR OF 1835 REVISITED

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Introduction[2]

'Mfecane' historiography has separated the advent of the Fingo from the War of 1835. Its Afrocentric explanation of the arrival of the Fingo revolves around the claim that all Fingo were Natal refugees from the devastaion of Shaka's mfecane, who fled south. They were rescued in May 1835 from the oppression of their Gcaleka hosts by the co-incidental arrival of British troops in Butterworth. How the Europeans happened to be three hundred kilometers from the colonial border is explained - quite divorcedly - in white history. They were taking part in the Sixth Frontier War, bravely defending the Cape Colony from the barbarous attacks of the 'Kaffirs'. Both compartmentalised histories - 'mfecane' and 'settler' - are based on myth. The identity of the Fingo in 1835 and the events of the war are intertwined: each is dependent upon a re-examination of the other.

The events of 1835 must be explained within the context of the expansion of the Cape Colony into Rharhabe territory in the early nineteenth century. The burgeoning European population demanded increased labour. And the Rharhabe were further pressurised into reacting to their gradual dispossession. After decades of transfrontier raids by the colonists, the men of Maqoma, Tyali, Nqeno and Bhotumane in late December 1834 attacked farmers in the Koonap River area, and the southern Albany region. The Albany settlers panicked, describing these retributive raids in dramatic hyperbole, and called for help from Cape Town. Governor Benjamin D'Urban and Colonel Harry Smith then took the opportunity to subdue the 'Kaffir' chiefs, seize most Rharhabe land, capture umpteen cattle and control the recalcitrant

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[1] I have used the term 'Fingo' rather than the modern version 'Mfengu', as the latter seems merely to be a recently 'Africanised' word for a people created by British tribalisation. Fingo was the word in contemporary usage, and must be retained. If anyone can provide me with evidence that 'Mfengu' was in common usage before the 1960s, I will change my terminology.

[2] This paper is derived largely from my MA thesis: A.C.Webster, 'Land Expropriation and Labour Extraction under Cape Colonial Rule: the War of 1835 and the 'Emancipation' of the Fingo', Rhodes University, 1991. A thesis can obviously not be summarised in 25 pages, and I have thus concentrated on the revolutionary evidence on the identity of the Fingo in 1835. This paper must be seen in the context of two intended articles - one on the writings of Ayliff and Whiteside, and one on the events of the war. I would like to thank Julian Cobbing and Jurg Richner for their unceasing support and ideas over the last four years, without which this work would probably not have been done.

Gcaleka paramount Hintsa. This was achieved by the introduction of a large force of British soldiers and colonists to the frontier, who marched with relative impunity through Xhosa territory, plundering and burning as they went.



Map 1. Position of African peoples, 1834.

But the most important, and secret, job of this force was the capture of Xhosa women and children, to be taken back into the Colony to alleviate the chronic labour shortage suffered by the eastern districts.[3] Given the illegality of this 'slavery', a cover story had to be created and applied to these people. Thus the story of an oppressed people rescued by British humanitarianism - the Fingo. Most of the 'labour Fingo' (the Xhosa captures) disappeared immediately onto the farms of the eastern Cape. There were only seven hundred Fingo at Peddie in 1835, most of whom were Mpondo, Thembu and Gcaleka who had gravitated to the trans-Keian Wesleyan missions. There were two thousand African collaborators (called Fingo) in a settlement in the Tyhume River valley. And there were a thousand mercenaries in the British army, called Fingo. Yet all Fingo were elided into the same history - all supposed

[3] The first suggestions that labour seizures were being performed in 1835 came from Julian Cobbing, in lectures at Rhodes University in 1987, and in J.R.D.Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi : Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', Journal of African History, Vol.29, October 1988, p.514.

refugees from Shaka who were settled at Peddie.

This revision has important ramifications for 'mfecane' theorists. If the Fingo were not refugees from Shakan destruction, why were they described as such? And if the majority of Fingo were in fact local labour captures and mission collaborators, an entire strut of the 'mfecane' falls away. The intention of this paper is to show the poverty of settler and 'mfecane' empiricism with regard to their descriptions of the Fingo, and to provide a new hypothesis to explain the events of 1835.

The settler orthodoxy on the war of 1835

The settler version of the events and causes of the war of 1835 is encapsulated in the work of Robert Godlonton, the chief creator and voice of settler opinion.[4] He claimed that war on the Colony was fomented and planned from early 1834 by the Rharhabe chiefs, under the leadership of Hintsa, paramount of the 'Kafirs'. The Colony was then allegedly attacked simultaneously over the entire eastern frontier by over ten thousand Africans in December 1834. They overwhelmed the inadequate colonial defences and gained control of most of the area between the Sundays and Keiskamma Rivers. 'Kaffir' dominance was maintained for nearly a month, during which time the districts of Albany and Somerset were looted and denuded of colonial stock, innumerable European houses were destroyed, and innocent settlers were killed. Governor D'Urban informed the London Colonial Secretary of State, Spring-Rice, in January 1835:

> I cannot adequately point out to you the devastation and horror which these merciless barbarians have committed, this fertile and beautiful Province is almost a desert, and the murders, which have gone hand in hand with this work of pillage and rapine, have deeply aggravated its atrocity.[5]

The hostilities, according to Godlonton, were carried into Rharhabe territory in January 1835. In April the Gcaleka were attacked. Godlonton said that this was in punishment for their alleged involvement in the 'irruption', and he accused Hintsa of hiding all the colonial stock that had been taken in December 1834. Hintsa was shot whilst escaping from his captors, which the settlers explained as justice for his complicity in the 'irruption', and subsequent duplicity in claiming not to be

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[4] R.Godlonton, A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes (1836). For an analysis of Godlonton, see B.A.Le Cordeur, 'Robert Godlonton as Architect of Frontier Opinion', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1956.

[5] British Parliamentary Paper (henceforth BPP) 252 (1835), p.132, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 21 January 1835. In 1812 Cradock had used almost the same description for the Rharhabe attacks on Albany, which had supposedly 'rendered desert the most fertile part of His Majesty's Settlement'; see Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 June 1812.

involved. Godlonton claimed that the settlers lost enormous numbers of stock, for which they were compensated with cattle taken from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, and grants of Rharhabe land. He alleged that the war of 1835 was 'a war of necessity, and not of choice',[6] and was deserved punishment for the 'unprovoked aggression' of December.

Settler orthodoxy on the history of the Fingo

Parallel to the imbedding of the settler interpretation of the war of 1835 came the development of the history of the Fingo. The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony was the most important event of the year 1835, and the one most shrouded in mystery. The central work on the history of the Fingo remains The History of the AbaMbo, written in 1912 under commission of the Methodist Synod by a contemporary of Theal and Cory, Reverend Joseph Whiteside.[7] As Moyer said: 'Although some have interpreted the material differently or have embellished upon it, few have added more to our knowledge of the Mfengu'.[8] Yet it is a book full of contradictions, exaggeration and myth, based marginally upon some of the writings of Reverend John Ayliff (claimed posthumously as co-author), with an infusion of Victorian conviction and imagination.[9] In his first two chapters, supposedly describing all the Fingo in Natal, Whiteside draws extensively from Casalis, who was describing the movements of the Ngwane, not the Fingo.[10] Many of his descriptions of the 'Mbo', and their numbers and movement, are adapted from Scully's writing on the Hlubi and Ngwane.[11] Whiteside claimed that all Fingo were refugee members of the Hlubi, Zizi, Bhele, Relidwane and Kunene from the Mzinyathi River region in what is now north-western Natal, where they had all been part of what he called the Mbo tribe. Whiteside's history of the Fingo is rooted in the orthodox explanation of the 'mfecane' as the central factor in all African movement in the sub-continent in the 1820s and 1830s.[12] This holds that the rise of Shaka and the overwhelming military power which the Zulu state had in the late 1810s, resulted in the rapid geographical expansion of the Zulu, accomplished by sundry death and destruction. The orthodoxy asserts that Shaka killed between one and two million people; Whiteside claimed that he had

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[6] Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafirs, p.229.
[7] [J.Ayliff] & J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, generally known as Fingo (1912). I have referred to this book throughout under Whiteside's name, as Ayliff wrote none of it, and was merely inaccurately paraphrased for a small section of it.
[8] R.A.Moyer, 'A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815-1865', Ph.D Thesis, London University, 1976, p.9.
[9] A.C.Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, and the Fingo "Emancipation" of 1835: a reappraisal', BA Hons dissertation, Rhodes University, 1988, pp.2-20.
[10] Whiteside, History of Abambo, chs. 1 and 2; cf. E.Casalis, The Basutos (English translation, 1861).
[11] W.C.Scully, 'Fragments of Native History', The State (1909), p.285.
[12] As outlined in J.D.Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: a Nineteenth-century Revolution in Bantu Africa (1966).

killed enormous numbers of Mbo. A small percentage of the survivors managed to flee south along the coast to Hintsa, as refugees.

Hintsa initially welcomed them, Whiteside continues, but soon forced them into oppressive slavery. Ayliff was the missionary with Hintsa at Butterworth, and was described as the 'Father of the Fingo',[13] as the Fingo supposedly flocked to him for protection and to be converted. Whiteside claimed that it was Ayliff who organised the 'rescue' of these oppressed people from their Gcaleka overlords, and that when the colonial troops entered Gcaleka territory in April 1835, the same 16,800 surviving Fingo were rescued by the British and were given land and all settled around Peddie in the Ceded Territory. The Fingo were so grateful that they became allies of the Colony and supporters of the Church and education; promises outlined by the Fingo chiefs in Peddie on 14 May 1835.

Whiteside claimed Ayliff as posthumous co-author of his history of the Fingo. Yet all he did was to inaccurately paraphrase him for Chapters 4 to 7 of his book. and borrowed from contemporary mythology for the rest of his history. Yet Ayliff himself is not a reliable source on Fingo history, even if quoted accurately. The evolution of his descriptions of their history shows his inadequacy as a historical source. The first 'history' of the Fingo was sent to D'Urban by Ayliff in May 1835, wherein he mentioned nine chiefs and the histories of the people.[14] From 1830 to 1837 Ayliff wrote a daily diary of his life in Butterworth.[15] In this diary, he made scarcely any mention of Fingo, which implies that he had little contact before 1835 with those people termed Fingo. In August and September 1835, Ayliff wrote three articles for the Graham's Town Journal, providing a rough summary of 'Fingo history',[16] that was to go into Whiteside. In 1851 and 1853 he wrote progressively more sophisticated 'histories' of the Fingo, with a strong anti-Gcaleka tone.[17] In these later essays, Ayliff at no stage wrote independently on Fingo history, despite his supposed familiarity with his 'charges'. Despite ninety pages of rambling about the destruction caused by Shaka, Ayliff concluded by saying that 'I am inclined to fear that the hellish practice of the slave trade thus begun on this [Natal] coast, was the origin of those wars which have nearly produced the entire extinction of the

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[13] See for example Gedye's comment in Graham's Town Journal 1875, on 'the late revered, now sainted John Ayliff', who 'is still remembered by many of the now aged Fingos as their father'.

[14] (Cape Archives) - hereafter (CA) - A519/2, D'Urban Papers, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.

[15] (CA) A80, Papers of John Ayliff. The only part of this collection that has been used is his diary between 1830 and 1838. All subsequent references to A80 allude only to the diary.

[16] Graham's Town Journal (hereafter GTJ), 20 August, 3 September, 17 September 1835.

[17] (Cory Library - henceforth CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, c.1851; (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History for Cathcart, Ayliff, c.1853. These, significantly, were written during the War of Mlanjeni.

African Tribes of this Continent'.[18] In this manuscript Ayliff borrowed extensively from missionary journals, government and military literature, letters, and contemporary explorers, sometimes employing verbatim quotes in order to write the history of the Fingo.[19]

Ayliff is an unreliable source. He (and Whiteside) described the 'country of the Fingoes' as 'a country rich in pasturage and in wood, healthy, well watered and abounding in game of all sorts....The climate appears to be, generally speaking, temperate'. But this is an unacknowledged quotation directly from Arbousset, who had in fact been describing the country of the 'Zula'.[20] The missionary, John Edwards, wrote in 1836 about the 'Mantatees', and how 'the accounts of their wars and bloodshed would affect the most hard-hearted...[and how] Thousands of human skulls strew the land.'[21] Ayliff borrowed these descriptions, but used them to describe the sufferings of the Fingo. Ayliff was also influenced by the lamenations of T.L.Hodgson on the savagery of Africa, and the latter's hope that the English would bring civilisation and peace. Ayliff used the same phrases in his descriptions of the natural state of Africans and the tribulations of the Fingo.[22]

Ayliff's computation of Fingo deaths in itself precludes him from consideration as an accurate source. He assumed without any basis that there were twelve Fingo tribes: a biblical derivative. He then estimated, arbitrarily, that there must have been sixty thousand in each tribe, thus totalling 720,000 people. Basing his calculations on the number of Fingo in the Colony in 1835, he then seriously concluded that Shaka killed 690,000 Fingo.[23] He described the Fingo as both poor oppressed servants, and as cunning, avaricious cattle owners in his later essays, which has remained a key contradiction within the orthodox history of the Fingo.[24] This contradiction is derived chiefly from the juxtaposition of poor labourer and wealthy collaborator constituents within the 'Fingo tribe', as well as the anachronistic imposition of the fears of European farmers about Fingo economic competition in the 1850s. Ayliff even misquoted himself. In the 1853 manuscript, for

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[18] (CL) PR 3826, p.1. cf. R.Drury, The Adventures of Robert Drury during fifteen years captivity on the Island of Madagascar (1807), p.442.

[19] In (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, Ayliff did not describe the movements of the Fingo in May in his own words. He merely transcribed Dutton's Notice, Ndabakazi, 3 May 1835.

[20] T.Arbousset & F.Daumas Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (1846), p.133; (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, pp.4-5; Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.2.

[21] The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, Vol.15, 1836, p.789, letter from Rev. J.Edwards, 17 March 1836.

[22] (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5, makes specific reference to the 4 August 1823 entry in Hodgson's diary; cf. R.L.Cope(ed) The Journals of the Rev. T.L.Hodgson (1977).

[23] (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5.

[24] The dichotomy between the 'poor' Fingo and the same 'Jews of Cafferland' is clear in (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History.

instance, he described the ill-treatment of a girl whom he called 'Fingo',[25] whom he had described as 'Kaffir' in his diary.[26] The propagandistic suggestion that the Fingo were Gcaleka slaves was first suggested by D'Urban,[27] which Ayliff awkwardly wove into his 1853 manuscript. From his diary, where the Fingo do not appear, Ayliff moved to a brief sketch of Fingo 'history' in 1835, to these full-blown essays in 1851 and 1853. The history of the Fingo thus does not come from the eye-witness Ayliff, but evolved in enigma, myth and military propaganda, from which Ayliff himself copied. Yet Ayliff and Whiteside are still uncritically accepted as authorities on the history of the Fingo.

Background to the war - dispossession and labour seizure

The settler interpretations of the events of 1835 are not only untenable, but they need to be inverted. It was the Colony that was the aggressor in the war, and that solved its labour problem by seizing 'Fingo' labourers under the guise of emancipating Gcaleka slaves. The key to understanding the war lies in the power of the Cape Colony to expand and the ability of the Cape authorities to answer the needs of the colonists, which were largely for land, labour, and security. During the 1820s and 1830s there was a severe labour shortage in the eastern districts. Slave labour had formed the backbone of the Cape economy from the mid seventeenth century. But with the abolition of the maritime slave trade in 1807, the banning of African labour in 1809 and the denial of slave labour to the English settlers in Albany, an alternative constant labour supply had to be found.[28]

Legislation in the form of Hottentot Codes was passed to tie the Khoi to the colonial farms, in the hope that the labour shortage would be solved. These Codes - promulgated by Governors Caledon and Cradock in 1809 and 1812 - stipulated that Khoi either own land, which was forbidden to them in the Colony, or find employment with Europeans. The apprenticeship regulations of 1812, which allowed for the apprenticeship - in other words, for the forced retention - of orphaned or destitute children until the age of eighteen, were exploited, as the landdrosts who were empowered to prosecute exploitation of the legislation were the same who benefitted from it.[29] The term 'apprenticeship' had none of its traditional connotations of learning a trade, with the employer's educational and social obligations; was

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[25] (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, p.46.
[26] (CA) A80, Diary of Ayliff, 6 August 1834.
[27] First pronounced by D'Urban, Government Notice, 3 May 1835. See J.B.Peires, The House of Phalo (1981), p.225; J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu (1930).
[28] See R.Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape Slavery: other forms of labour', Seminar paper, Rhodes University, 1989. See also R.Elphick & V.C.Malherbe, 'The Khoisan to 1828', ch.1 in R.Elphick & H.Giliomee, The Shaping of South African Society (1989); C.C.Crais, 'Some Thoughts on Slavery and Emancipation in the Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1770-1838', Seminar Paper, UCT Slavery Conference, 1989.
[29] J.B.Peires, 'The British and the Cape', ch.10 in Elphick & Giliomee Shaping of SA Society, p.493.

applied merely as a legal cover for child labourers. A child could easily be captured and described as an orphan; there could be no record of his real history. As Agar-Hamilton put it, most of the colonists saw it 'as merely a veil required by an unintelligible convention to cover the exploitation of child labour'.[30]

Vagrancy clauses were included in the Codes, and were then extended in specific vagrancy ordinances that allowed colonists to force any Khoi they deemed 'idle' to labour for them. The vagueness of the wording meant that any Khoi in the Colony could be forcibly indentured by a colonist merely on the grounds of the European's claim that he was a 'vagrant'.[31] Vagrancy legislation resulted from the claim by colonists that vagrant Khoi, San or Africans were threatening colonial security. They demanded that these people be employed by colonists or else removed from the colonial boundaries. The notion of vagrancy hardly involved security at all, but was an attempt (usually successful) to force the aboriginal population into labour.[32] A 'vagrant' was defined as a non-European who did not possess land or a job. As the indigenous population was denied property ownership, the majority were automatically 'vagrants'. 'Vagrancy' remained a useful method of enforcing labour: Cole in 1831, and Wade in 1833, when showing concern about the colonial labour shortage, proposed vagrancy laws as the best method of solving the problem.[33]

But for all the attempts to enforce a Khoi labour force, they still resisted service and could not meet the colonial labour needs. In consequence the emphasis began to shift towards the natural area for labour procurement - the large African population across the frontier. With a blueprint for subjugation and labour extraction proven on the Khoi, the Colony was set to create a similar process with the Africans.[34] Supplementary labour was provided by the increasing incidence of the seizure of Africans, mainly women and children, from beyond the Colony. This was highly illegal, both because the slave trade had been abolished in 1807 and it was thus illegal to capture labourers, but in addition because in terms of the 1809 proclamation, Africans were not allowed within the Colony. Explanations for the

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[30] J.Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers (1928), p.171. He exposes many of the euphemisms employed in labour seizure in the Boer Republics, and the way in which the practices of the 1850s had very distinct roots in the 1820s and 1830s.

[31] S.Newton-King, 'The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828', ch.7, in S.Marks & A.Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa (1980), provides seminal work on labour and the attempts to control the Khoi during this period.

[32] (CA) LCA 6, Comments of Philip, June 1834, and Campbell, 4 July 1834. The latter said that a vagrancy ordinance would force the Khoi to work, to the benefit of the wealthier settlers. Fairbairn's disapproving views on vagrancy laws can be found in H.C.Botha, John Fairbairn in South Africa (1984), pp.97-104. Analyses of the intentions of vagrancy ordinances are provided in W.M.Macmillan, The Cape Colour Question (1927), ch.16; Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.501.

[33] Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.234.

[34] Elphick & Malherbe, "Khoisan to 1828", p.43.

arrival of these Africans were manufactured to appease the Cape and London authorities: farmers claimed that they were either 'apprentices',; alternatively they were described as 'Mantatees', with the mythical explanation that they were a tribe of refugees from the devastation of the 'mfecane'. Many of these workers were in fact seized by commandos beyond the frontier.

The commando system was a powerful method of enforcing white authority, augmenting stock numbers, and seizing labour. Mayhem accompanied these raids: Maynier, for instance, quoted a Boer who had seen over three thousand San killed on the commandos he had attended between 1803 and 1809.[35] By the time the British took over, the system allowed for the summonsing of a commando by the local Field Cornet upon the reporting of stock theft, and the following of the trail to the nearest kraal across the border, whereupon up to ten times the number of cattle reported stolen were seized.[36] The avenues for abuse of the system were numerous. There was no method of checking the honesty of the plaintiff; there was little control on the destruction caused; and the number of cattle seized could not be verified. Stockenstrom thought little of a Boer oath, and estimated that 'nine out of ten would make a false oath to get cattle'.[37] Examples abound of these legal commandos becoming mere opportunities for the plunder of the Rharhabe, sometimes all the way up to the Kei River.[38]

But commandos were not used only to seize cattle and subdue the Africans; they were exploited to seize labour for the colonists. In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the practice of seizing labour became more and more common, and by 1835 there was a long-standing precedent of illegal transfrontier raids, and the capture of men, women and children to work on colonial farms.[39] Commandos were particularly effective in this regard. In the eastern districts between 1786 and

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[35] BPP 50 (1835), pp.29-30, Maynier to Commission of Enquiry, 1825.

[36] A summary of the system can be found in (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834; BPP 279 (1836), p.62, Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 Dec 1835. For descriptions of its injustices see (CA) GH 1/97 p.68, Stanley to Cole, 27 November 1833; BPP 50 (1835), pp.175-7, Moodie, December 1823; J.C.S.Lancaster, 'A Reappraisal of the Governorship of Sir B.D'Urban at the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1980, ch.5.

[37] BPP 503 (1837), p.167, Read to Philip, 17 June 1834.

[38] BPP 50 (1835), pp.183-4, Pringle to Commission of Enquiry, January 1826; T.Pringle, Narrative of a Residence in South Africa (1835), pp.325-6; (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833; BPP 503 (1837), p.151, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 Sept 1834; (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834; Ibid., Read to Fairbairn, 27 June 1834.

[39] The practice of labour seizure on commando continued for decades. In 1840 a commando of Natal Boers attacked the Bhaca and captured cattle and many women and children, explaining unconvincingly that these captives were taken by their Mpondomise allies, and that the Boers were outraged at the idea. They then 'apprenticed' most of them; see G.M.Theal, The Republic of Natal and the Origin of the present Pondo tribe (1961), pp.19-20.

1795, over 2,504 Khoi were killed by commandos, and at least six hundred and sixty-nine (mostly children) were forced into servitude.[40] Newton-King has shown how commandos were being employed to seize San on the northern borders of the Graaff-Reinet district in the late eighteenth century, most of whom were women and children.[41] The 'war captive' labourer population in 1798 was twice the size of that of the slaves.[42] Stockenstrom in 1817 showed concern at the increasing number of San children being captured and placed in service in the Colony, with the explanation of 'civilising them'.[43] In Graaff- Reinet in 1824, there were eight hundred and twenty-five San apprentices, a number of the children officially recognised as having been forcibly indentured.[44]

The capture of labourers was not limited to the northern frontier, and Peires and Donaldson give evidence of the regular practice of capturing Xhosa.[45] In 1818, Rharhabe offered captives to white farmers, in exchange for European commodities.[46] Philip described an instance in 1820 when Ngqika women and children, who had settled on the Fish after moving from the Kat, were fraudulently contracted to Boers in Uitenhage (on the understanding that they were being taken home), whilst their men were sent to Robben Island.[47] On his arrival in Port Elizabeth in 1820 Pringle saw a number of Rharhabe women and children who were to be placed in servitude in punishment for allegedly having crossed the colonial boundary.[48] Thomas Stubbs recalled how a large number of Rharhabe women, who had come to collect clay at Clay Pits near Graham's Town in 1822, were seized by the neighbouring settlers, taken to Graham's Town and hired out to farmers.[49] Around the turn of the century, and especially after 1807, there was a massive increase in the slave population, which can be explained only in terms of a large-scale secret slave trade and the supplementation of the slave population with Africans from commandos.[50] There was an internal slave market at the Cape. Crais estimates that approximately five

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[40] Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.11.
[41] S.Newton-King, 'The Enemy Within', Seminar paper, Slavery Conference, University of Cape Town, 1989.
[42] For further examples of labour capturing, see G.Thompson, Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa (1967), Vol.2, p.7; G.M.Theal, Records of the Cape Colony (1904), Vol.25, pp.386-7.
[43] BPP 50 (1835), p.56, Report of Stockenstrom, 1817; see also Ibid., pp.29-30, Maynier's replies to the Commission of Enquiry in 1825.
[44] BPP 50 (1835), p.144; Elphick & Malherbe, 'Khoisan to 1828'.
[45] J.B.Peires, 'A History of the Xhosa, c.1700-1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University,1976, pp.101, 170; M.E.Donaldson, 'The Council of Advice at the Cape of Good Hope', Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, p.341.
[46] C.C.Crais, 'Ambiguous Frontiers', Draft Manuscript, 1989, p.2.
[47] J.Philip, Researches in South Africa (1828), Vol.1, pp.191-2; Pringle, Narrative of a Residence, p.15, describes a similar incident.
[48] T.Pringle, African Sketches (1834), p.133.
[49] J.Cock, Maids and Madams: a study in the politics of exploitation (1980), p.199.
[50] Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery'; Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'.

hundred to seven hundred and fifty people were enslaved from beyond the colonial borders between 1807 and 1834,[51] although this figure seems far too low. Shell shows that there were five thousand prize Negroes - slaves confiscated by the British from Portuguese and French ships - who had been diverted, and were working in the Cape in 1800-1840.[52]

The battle of Dithakong resulted in workers for the Colony. At least one hundred and seventy-nine women and children were seized as labourers and sent as far south as Graaff-Reinet.[53] The same occurred at Mbolompo in 1828, under the guise of aiding the Gcaleka and Thembu - the British officially seized twenty-five women and sixty-four children, some of whom were given to officers, and the rest distributed as workers in Fort Beaufort.[54] The actual total was higher, as a large number of women and children ended up in Graham's Town, where they were redefined as Fingo.[55] In 1831 Bigge, commissioner of inquiry at the Cape, showed concern at the continuing illegal slave trade with the 'Kaffirs'.[56] Boers were still getting slaves clandestinely from the interior in 1833.[57] Pringle complained in 1834 that British troops and settlers attack the Africans 'and carry the children into captivity'.[58]

But by 1834 there was still an acute labour shortage in the eastern districts. It was exacerbated by the failure of Ordinance 49 (1828) to attract African labourers into the Colony. It was never expected that authoritarian colonial employment would be attractive to Africans, but the ordinance gave permission for Africans to be in the Cape. The crisis was worsened by the overturning of a vagrancy ordinance (which had been designed to force the Khoi into service) by London in 1834, and the imminent emancipation of the Colony's slaves in December 1834.

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[51] Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.15.
[52] Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'.
[53] J.Richner, 'The Withering away of the "lifaqane": or a change of paradigm', BA Hons dissertation, Rhodes University, 1988, p.8; see Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', for a reinterpretation of the events at both Dithakong and Mbolompo.
[54] (CA) 1/AY/8/18, Bell to Campbell, 24 June 1829.
[55] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa.
[56] L.C.Duly, British Land Policy at the Cape (1972), p.146.
[57] (CA) CO 2744, Campbell to ?, June 1833.
[58] Graham's Town Journal, 4 September 1834, Letter from Pringle.



Map 2. Expulsions of Rharhabe, 1829-1834.

In tandem with the need for labour came a colonial desire for land. And dispossession in turn produced displaced Rharhabe for labour. In 1811-12 British troops cleared the 'Zuurveld' area between the Sundays and Fish Rivers of its Ndlambe inhabitants.[59] Troops moved in again in 1819, this time seizing a swathe of territory between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers (the Neutral/ Ceded Territory) from the British ally, Ngqika. The Zuurveld - now called Albany - was then filled with British settlers, who soon began to demand further land annexation. In 1829 much of Maqoma's land was taken away on a pretext manufactured by Duncan Campbell,

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[59] See B.Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror (1986) for a vivid description of this process.

Civil Commissioner for Albany and Somerset.[60] It was given to Khoi to form the buffer Kat River Settlement,[61] and to white soldiers between the Kat and Koonap Rivers. Between September and November 1833 Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno and Qasana's people were driven eastwards.[62] Again in March 1834, Maqoma and Tyali were evicted from their new land and driven east by British troops armed with guns and canon, who burnt crops and huts, and seized cattle. Their bleak position, with the onset of winter without crops, was further aggravated by the fact that the area to which they were expelled - around the Keiskamma - was subject to frequent droughts, one of which occurred in 1833-4.[63] In March and April 1834 thirty-eight farms were surveyed along the Koonap River and allotted to colonists by Campbell; one of them comprised eighty hectares of Maqoma's old *komkhulu*.[64] And again in November and December 1834 the colonial troops attacked Tyali and Nqeno, burning crops and huts, wounding a chief, and forcing their people off their land for the third time in fourteen months.[65] Philip described in November how the British troops had laid

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[60] Campbell, in Graham's Town, was the real instigator of expansionism. He disliked the 'Kafirs' intensely, and it was he who insisted on many of the Rharhabe expulsions in the 1830s - see BPP 503 (1837), p.104, Campbell to Bell, 27 Feb 1834; (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to ?, 20 April 1834,; (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.41, Campbell to ?, 7 June 1834; B.A. Le Cordeur, The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch (1988), p.164 n.41; (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 Dec 1833.

[61] Analyses of the Kat River Settlement are limited. Crais, 'Beasts of Prey' summarises the progressive dispossession and destruction of the Settlement in the 1830s and 1840s, and T.Kirk, 'Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854', Journal of African History, Vol.14 (1973), deals mainly with the lead up to the rebellion of 1851. But work still needs to be done on the early settlement. For a description of the rapid development of the Settlement, see BPP 252 (1835), pp.55-6, Report of Judge Menzies, September 1830.

[62] For a clear description of the evictions see (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn; Chalmers to Stretch, 21 November 1833, in U.Long, An Index to Authors of Unofficial, privately-owned manuscripts relating to the History of South Africa 1812-1920 (1947), pp.81-4; (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833.

[63] Read, (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833; Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833; BPP 503 (1837), p.113, Somerset to Campbell, 5 March 1834; Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.201. See M.D.D.Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique 1823-1831', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1988, for a comparative study of the social tensions produced by drought.

[64] (CA) LG 7, Bell to Commissioner-General, 1834; (CA) LG 587, pp.179-180. See (CA) Maps M1/2451-3 for distribution of farms and the number of Boer farmers on the Kat and Koonap Rivers.

[65] Two patrols in early December in particular contributed to the heightening of frontier tension - those led by Sparkes and Sutton. For the settler attempts to exonerate them of blame, see J.Heavyside, Abstract of the Proceedings of the Board of Relief for the Destitute (1836), pp.88-9n and G.Cory, The Rise of South Africa, III, pp.55-60. For a more accurate assessment, see BPP 503 (1837), pp.158-160, Somerset to D'Urban, 12 Dec 1834; (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.172; C.Brownlee, 'The Old Peach Stump', in Reminiscences of Kaffir life and history (1896).

waste to twenty miles of Ngqika crops and huts along the Tyhume River valley.[66]

The settler interpretation of the war has been rooted in the claim that it took place between 21 December 1834 and 17 September 1835, which places the blame for hostilities firmly on the Rharhabe. The response of the Rharhabe was not in fact the start of a war, but part of one which had been begun by the Europeans long before 1835. The aggressive actions of the British from 1811 were nothing less - to the Rharhabe - than notification of their intention to control and expand colonial hegemony. The five years previous to 1835 had provided a continuity of violence that must inevitably goad the Rharhabe into response.

By the end of 1834 the Rharhabe had little option but to respond. Not surprisingly, it was the people of Maqoma, Tyali and Nqeno who made the counter-attacks in December 1834. For two decades they had been repeatedly forced off their land, their cattle had been raided, women and children captured, their possessions and dwellings burnt by commandos, and their autonomy threatened. As Reverend James Read of the LMS had noted in 1833 :

> There have been a number of the most aggravating circumstances possible, and every method contrived to agitate the Caffres with a view we think to have a pretext to take more land from them.[67]

Griqua and Sotho raiders to the north, powerful Mpondo and Thembu neighbours to the east, and the advancing Colony in the west put increasing pressure on the Rharhabe to defend themselves and assert their independence.

The war of 1835

The counter-attacks of late December 1834 and early January 1835 were undertaken by a minority of disgruntled Rharhabe, who attacked specific areas and farms in Albany in groups, rather than a huge attack on the entire frontier.[68] In the last ten days of December the Rharhabe managed to infiltrate into much of Albany east of Graham's Town. There was no mass onslaught of the type like Somerset's panicky estimates of ten to twenty thousand Rharhabe simultaneously attacking along the length of the

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[66] (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. Philip gives a very clear picture of Rharhabe confusion and anger at the arbitrary and destructive actions of the Colony. D'Urban's explanations of the causes of the war in BPP 503 (1837), pp.56-7, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1836, bear little resemblance to reality.

[67] (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. See also M.Wilson & L.Thompson, A History of South Africa to 1870 (1986), p.252.

[68] See also A.C.M.Webb, 'The Immediate consequences of the Sixth Frontier War on the farming community of Albany', South African Historical Journal, November 1978, p.38.

Fish River.[69] A Boer, Delport, described in February how he had been attacked at his farm near the Fish River on 23 December by one thousand 'Kafirs', and how he and his thirteen year old son, whose gun did not work, had held them at bay.[70] Stories like this abounded, and it is upon these fictional accounts that the settler version of 1835 is based. The parties of the first two weeks seem to have consisted regularly of a hundred or more men, but by mid-January they had shrunk to an average of about ten.[71] Such groups posed little real threat to the armed colonists but were elusive and frustrating for the patrols.

They took cattle (although nothing like the number claimed), burnt selected farmsteads, and killed twenty-five men, leaving women and children alone. It was not a mass 'Xhosa' response, planned well in advance by conniving chiefs, and masterminded by the paramount Hintsa. It was a series of attacks by some of the frontier Rharhabe (on a smaller scale than 1819) who, after the settlers put up such a weak initial defense, were joined by many of the eastern Ndlambe. The main participating Rharhabe chiefs, Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno and Qasana, did not wish a major confrontation with the militarily superior Europeans, but wished to bring to the attention of the whites their anger at their loss of land and increasing military impotence.

The two main areas attacked were that centring on the Koonap River - a tributary of the Fish, north-east of Graham's Town - and that south of Graham's Town, breaching the lower Fish south of Trompetter's Drift. These two regions contained relatively dense colonial populations, the former chiefly Boer and the latter English. There were complaints by the Rharhabe about their ill-treatment at the hands of these frontier inhabitants. In 1830-1 farms had been issued to one hundred discharged white military personnel between the Koonap and the Fish (the area vacated by the Ngqika in 1819) to act as an additional buffer. It was the colonists in this area who were attacked, for reasons not difficult to comprehend.

Boer and settler patrols retained control in most areas throughout the period of the 'irruption'. By mid January the Europeans had control of most of the territory west of the Keiskamma River, and the Rharhabe warriors were retreating from the Ceded Territory. D'Urban and British troop reinforcements arrived between 13 and 23 January, not to protect Albany, but to carry the war into Rharhabe territory and claim their spoils. D'Urban, who had only been in the Colony for six months, was a

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[69] The Fish River was also in flood on 21-22 December - see (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of H.J.Halse. Halse is not generally a reliable source, but is corroborated on this point by J.B.Scott, 'The British soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1800-1850', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Port Elizabeth, 1973, pp.187-190.

[70] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Evidence of Delport, 23 February 1835.

[71] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Report of P.Retief, 16 January 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Report of Ziervogel, 8 April 1835.

conservative, officious, military man, who was firm in his belief in asserting military control. He found the Graham's Town faction very radical, but their views coincided sufficiently with his own for him to provide the land, labour and military dominance which they demanded.

The armed response of the Rharhabe provided the opportunity for the amelioration of the settler demands for land and labour, and the chance to ensure the recognition of British hegemony by all 'Kaffir' chiefs. The Mpondo and Thembu were prepared to acknowledge and aid the British, but the Gcaleka were recalcitrant. The settler view of the war, which was endorsed, supported and in many respects created by D'Urban, gives the impression that the army operations of April and May were relatively haphazard, and that the invasion of Gcaleka territory in particular was a decision of the moment, as was the 'emancipation' of the Fingo and the annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province. These three events, though, were the specific objectives of the colonial forces, and were in fact performed as part of a well-planned and carefully conducted campaign.[72]



Map 3. The War of 1835.

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[72] ^For the clear outlines of this plan, see G.M.Theal, Documents relating to the Kaffir War of 1835 (1912), pp.10-14, Smith to D'Urban, 14 Jan 1835; BPP 279 (1836), pp.26-7, D'Urban's Orders, 22 Feb 1835; (CA) A519/18, p.51, D'Urban to Bell, 27 Feb 1835.

After a period of planning in Graham's Town a massive force of British soldiers, colonists and Khoi made its way through Rharhabe territory, burning huts and crops, taking cattle, killing men and capturing women and children. Hintsa was commanded to side with the British. But he vacillated, and the army continued straight into his territory in April. The failure of Hintsa to meet D'Urban's ultimatum for the Gcaleka actively to aid the Colony led to a full-scale war on the Gcaleka. They, too, had their homes destroyed, their cattle taken, and their women and children captured. After surrendering to the overwhelming power of the British, Hintsa was imprisoned and murdered two weeks later. The power and effect of the British troops is clearly outlined in D'Urban's summary of the war. The Rharhabe loss, he said

> amounted to 4000 of their warriors or fighting men, and among them many captains. Our's fortunately has not in the whole amounted to 100, and of these only 2 officers. There have been taken from them also, besides the conquest and alienation of their country, about 60,000 head of cattle, almost all their goats, their habitations every where destroyed, and their gardens and cornfields laid waste. They have, therefore, been chastised not extremely, but sufficiently.[73]

The Fingo

Their role as forced labourers

D'Urban made it clear that a chief reason for bringing Fingo into the Colony was of 'furnishing a supply of hired servants to the colonists'.[74] A substantial percentage of Fingo ended up as labourers.[75] That there was a labour shortage in the 1820s and 1830s (especially in the Eastern Cape) is indisputable. Bathurst in 1833 had a mere one hundred and forty Khoi and Mantatees to provide labour for the nine hundred Europeans,[76] although this was an improvement from the complete lack of servants in 1824. The population figures for the late 1820s show the eastern Cape with 86 non-whites (42 in Albany) to every hundred whites, compared with the Western Cape median of 134 to a hundred. The labour shortage was regularly a subject of concern to the eastern colonists: 'W.G' wrote to the Graham's Town Journal in 1833 to describe the scarcity of labour as 'the cause of all our troubles'.[77] The 1836 Cape Blue Book is vague as to the number of 'aliens' (Fingo, Mantatee and Bechuana) in Albany and Somerset, but makes it clear that: 'Great numbers of these are in the

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[73] (CA) GH 1/108, pp.122-3, D'Urban to Glenelg.
[74] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Campbell, 14 October 1835.
[75] (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835.
[76] (CA) LG 7, Population returns for Bathurst, 1833.
[77] Graham's Town Journal, 14 February 1833, Letter from 'W.G.'.

service of the farmers.'[78] It lists 1,575 aliens working for farmers in Graaff-Reinet. By 1838, there were officially over six thousand Fingo in the Colony (3,517 in Albany), which inverted the figures to 134:100 in the East, and 119:100 in the West. In summary, in Albany in 1828 there was a ratio of forty-three non-whites (potential labourers) to every hundred whites. In 1838 there were one hundred and forty-one to every hundred whites. The war of 1835 completely inverted the labour situation in Albany.

The 'arrival of the Fingoes,' wrote Ayliff, 'conferred an invaluable boon on the Colonists, who at that time were greatly suffering from the want of labour'.[79] The missionary at Bethelsdorp commented in 1837 that 'there has not been the same demand for labourers as formerly, a great number of Fingoes having come into the Colony, who are employed at lower wages than those usually given to Hottentots.'[80] In the same year a group of eighty Fingo (with families) were prepared to sell their cattle in order to ensure employment at Slaai Kraal.[81] Moyer noted the large number of Fingo workers in Port Elizabeth in the 1840s who were ousting the Khoi as cheap labour.[82] By 1842 there were several thousand Fingo and Tswana working in Cradock alone.[83] It is significant that the myth of the Fingo was generated in the region which stood to gain most from their arrival - Albany - and received generous support from the whole eastern Cape, to which they were such a boon.

The first extensive group of Fingo brought in to work was that accompanying Somerset (who had organised the Mbolompo affair) in May 1835, who were, according to the Ayliff/Whiteside myth, settled at Peddie. Some were retained at Fort Wellington[84] and Fort Warden[85] to work on the buildings, and at least two hundred accompanied Somerset to Graham's Town, where they were immediately indentured.[86] In his attempt to explain why there were Fingo employed in the Colony, Ayliff wrote that most of

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[78] Cape Blue Book, 1836, p.201.
[79] (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.2. Ayliff pinpoints Ordinance 50 and the Emancipation of the slaves as most harmful to the labour situation, but says that the abundant Fingo labour solved it.
[80] Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.253.
[81] (CA) 1/AY/8/50, Hudson to Campbell, 22 July 1837.
[82] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', ch.4. See J.C.Chase, Cape of Good Hope, p.238, for Fingo surf labourers at Algoa Bay.
[83] Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.261.
[84] (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 22 May 1835. There were twenty men, forty women and fifty children.
[85] J.E.Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage of Observation among the colonies...and of a campaign in Kaffer-land, 1835 (1837), Vol.2, p.215; (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 10 May 1835. There was still a large number there in 1836, see (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835.
[86] A.C.M.Webb, 'The Agricultural Development of the 1820 Settlement down to 1846', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, p.209; see also (CA) CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835.

the Fingo at Peddie wanted to work in the Colony.[87] It seems that many of the Fingo moved immediately to Graham's Town, where a location was set up on the outskirts of town. Fingo awaiting employment were to reside there, from where the Graham's Town residents eagerly took labourers.[88] There were so many Fingo entering into contracts in Graham's Town with colonists, that an extra clerk was appointed in July to countersign the service contracts.[89] In the same month Godlonton complained that the area around Graham's Town was 'teeming' with unemployed Fingo.[90]

When the Fingo were brought under military escort to Graham's Town in May, Colonel England took a list of their names and those of the Boers to whom they were being indentured, and distributed it to all Civil Commissioners.[91] This list has not been found, which is particularly suspicious. At least ten copies must have been made, but none of them have survived. One list of Fingo labourers would have completely undermined D'Urban's explanation of their origins if it had somehow come to the attention of the Colonial Office. Did D'Urban order them to be destroyed? The majority of the Fingo were employed on farms as far afield as Graaff-Reinet, but the magistrate's records do show Fingo women working as domestics in Graham's Town.[92]

During the attacks on the Amatole Mountains in early April a number of Rharhabe women were captured and brought into camp,[93] but very little was said of them, as was the case with women and children captured in the Fish River bush.[94] T.H.Bowker reported that fifty women joined the British during the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda on 7 April, and that the following day many women - apparently Nqeno's people - came to the camp.[95] No further mention is made of them, and they were presumably either employed for the pleasure of the troops or taken into labour. The Rharhabe women around Burnshill were advised by the 3rd Division to move out of the bush, but they refused, as those who had fled to D'Urban's camp had been raped.[96] On 7 April Smith led a patrol into the bush around the Pirie mission where he 'captured 2500 cattle[,] 15 women and a hottentot of the name of Lewis Arnoldus'.[97] T.H.Bowker's

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[87] Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article.
[88] (CA) CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835.
[89] (CA) 1/AY/9/62, W.Smith to Campbell, 4 July 1835. Aldwin was appointed.
[90] Graham's Town Journal, 28 July 1835, Godlonton editorial.
[91] England wrote to D'Urban from Graham's Town on 20 May 1835 - (CA) A519/2, p.24 - saying that he had made lists and made them available. Despite an extensive search, I have not been able to locate one copy in the Cape Archives.
[92] For example, (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, Graham's Town, 11 January 1836.
[93] U.Long (ed), The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain (1946), pp.94-5; Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, p.80.
[94] A.L.Harington, Sir Harry Smith - bungling hero (1980), p.30.
[95] (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 7 and 8 April 1835.
[96] Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.61.
[97] (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 7 April 1835. See also Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, p.80. A similar description is given by Goldswain, Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.94-5, who mentions that one of the women had given

diary provides oblique references to the capture of Gcaleka women and children in late April while his patrol was hunting for Hintsa.[98]

The evidence for the seizure of Rharhabe women and children west of the Kei in 1835 is clear, but that for the taking of captives east of the Kei more circumstantial. The fact that there was definitely capturing of Rharhabe by the troops, and yet the evidence for it has always remained intentionally hidden, merely emphasises the extent to which this illegal behaviour was taking place and being covered up. There was no question that the Colonial Office would have launched a high level enquiry, with very serious consequences for the Cape authorities, had it been known that Africans were being captured and forced to labour and that the British administrators were actively involved in planning this. D'Urban had planned for the invasion of the innocent Gcaleka before April, and by May he brought seventeen thousand 'Fingo' into the Colony, most of whom were labourers. Had he planned a general labour seizure to deal with the colonial demand? It was not co-incidental that this solved the acute labour shortage in the eastern districts. There had been a long precedent for the capture of African women and children outside the Colony and brought in under euphemistic explanations to work. Labourers were being captured west of the Kei in 1835. The reasonable conclusion is thus that most of the 'Fingo' were Gcaleka (and Rharhabe) women and children captured illegally, and that the methods and accounts of capture were censored in official documents and excluded from private papers.

The seizure of women continued. Bailie returned to King William's Town from the Pirie area on 21 June with a large patrol, having killed eight Rharhabe and 'captured 100 Caffre women with as many children'.[99] Was his death in the same area three days later[100] retaliation for these captures? Godlonton described this patrol as 'most judiciously and spiritedly conducted', but neglected to mention the captives.[101] A second patrol was sent out westwards from King William's Town to the Debe Flats, also on 21 June, under Sutton and Granet. They returned with four women and sixteen children.[102] A party of military Fingo chasing the Ndlambe eight miles

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birth the previous day but had been forced to walk five miles.

[98] (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 26 April 1835: 'catch several horses, and some Kafir women and children, these latter were let go as useless'; they moved on and 'find some more women and children'; 28 April 1835: shot a woman by mistake 'and return without taking her'; 6 May 1835: 'Maqoma and Tyali's cattle and women and children have not been found and taken'.

[99] Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.98, 22 June 1835.

[100] The hagiography of the death of Bailie and his patrol is similar to that accorded the Wilson patrol in Matabeleland in 1893. For the settler version, see Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafir, pp.195-202. For a more accurate account, see (CA) A519/27, D'Urban Papers, pp.65-70, Information of Fingo women, 23 July 1835; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, ch.4.

[101] Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, p.196.

[102] Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, p.197.

outside King William's Town on 2 July seized twenty women, who were brought back with the other plunder.[103] They were presumably sent to Boer farms as forced labourers. Stretch received a complaint from an elderly Ndlambe man in 1836 that his son had been forcibly seized from his garden on the Keiskamma by D'Urban's forces returning to the Colony, and made to work on the farm of a Boer named O.Niekerk.[104]

It is important to remember that women and children formed the majority of the labour seizures in the Caledon valley, and were the preferred captures, as the women were pliable and the children young enough to be subdued and inculcated to fulfil colonial labour demands. Men could defend themselves.[105] Newton-King provides similar explanations for why the majority of labour captives in the Graaff-Reinet district were women and children.[106] Eighty-eight percent of the May Fingo were women and children. Were they not mainly captured labourers? It is probable that the British seizure of cattle in Rharhabe territory - from the Amatole, Keiskamma and Buffalo areas - and Gcaleka territory (especially in the week of 17-24 April in Butterworth) was accompanied by the capture of Africans, who were brought back to work. Why else would the Fingo have needed the entire 2nd Division (including military Fingo) to 'protect' them on their journey into the Colony, when Warden needed only a small patrol to ferry six hundred people through Gcaleka territory? A fake history would then have been necessary to cover the actions.

The 'labour Fingo' were supplemented in mid-May by one thousand 'Fingo' taken by Smith in a raid on the Bomvana. He claimed that they were under Gcaleka oppression, 'who, from their remote situation, had been unable to join their country men now under British protection'.[107] The pursuit of these Fingo seems to have formed an important reason for his attack past the Mbashe River. These Fingo were gathered at Smith's camp on the Guada River on 14 May and little information is offered as to their identity or background. Given the general use of the term 'Fingo', and the fact that on the 13 and 14 May, while Smith was chasing cattle within sight of the Mtata River, most of his force had remained at the mouth of the Mbashe,[108] as well as the precedence of labour seizure, it can be reasonably assumed that these were Bomvana and eastern Gcaleka, taken by a whirlwind commando to work in the Colony.

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[103] (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 2 July 1835.
[104] (CA) LG 420, p.57, Report of Stretch, 1836.
[105] See for example the arguments proposed by the Advisory Council in 1827, BPP 252 (1835), p.12, when discussing the implementation of Ordinance 49. The civil commissioners from around the country had suggested that children be used as the main labour supply because of their obedience and inability to protest or rebel.
[106] Newton-King, 'The enemy within'.
[107] General Order No.18, Smith, Fort Waterloo, 21 May 1835; Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.157.
[108] For Smith's description of the patrol, see BPP 279 (1836), pp.48-51, 18 May 1835.

These people were called 'Fingo' and most were placed temporarily in the King William's Town Fingo location where Smith found them useful.[109] From here a number were distributed in the Colony. Frederick Rex, Assistant Quarter-Master at King William's Town, sent a group of ten Fingo to his sister in Knysna in August, taken to her by some Khoi taking leave, and another twenty to his parents, also in Knysna, in September, after his father had written to him in June to ask for Fingo labourers.[110] Rex had chosen his group because they were the 'best-tempered' of the many available in King William's Town. He felt 'that having them driven to the Island [at Knysna] and back again once a day may have a good effect upon their scabby old legs.'[111] He also contemplated sending some to a friend as a present, with the warning that some Fingo needed to be flogged to ensure productivity.[112] In September, after reports from the town of George about the laziness of Fingo, George Rex asked that his son send him only women and children, with the explanation that civilisation would thereby be spread.[113] These facts all point to the assertion that forced labour was being distributed throughout the Colony from a base in King William's Town.

From July 1835, the eastern civil commissioners complained of 'Fingo vagrancy'[114] - Fingo moving around armed with assegais and refusing service. Over six hundred were reported in the Winterberg area in August,[115] although it is unclear whether they originated outside or inside the Colony. As early as July, Ziervogel had complained to Campbell that there were Fingo, armed with assegais, wandering around Somerset district, to which Campbell replied that they were to be arrested and transported to Graham's Town.[116] A complaint came from the Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner that there were many Fingo, Bechuana and Mantatee wandering around his district, and causing a disturbance by stealing cattle and refusing to enter service under the Boers.[117] The civil commissioners of Uitenhage and George reported similar situations.[118] The possibility exists that these 'wanderers' were Rharhabe who refused to become labourers. Integral to D'Urban's plans for the Colony was that there were to be no unemployed Africans in the Colony, as they would pose a security threat - much the same argument used in favour of vagrancy ordinances. The pass laws

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[109] BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to Smith, 12 November 1835.
[110] Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.195, G.Rex to son, Knysna, 11 June 1835; pp.174-7, F.Rex to sister, King William's Town, 28 July 1835; F.Rex to father, 28 August 1835.
[111] Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.177, F.Rex to father, 28 August 1835.
[112] F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Ibid., p.180.
[113] G.Rex to son, 18 September 1835. in Ibid., pp.195-6.
[114] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, O'Reilly to Campbell, Cradock, 22 September 1835; 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to D'Urban, Graham's Town, 24 July 1835.
[115] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Report from Field Cornet, Winterberg, 7 September 1835.
[116] (CA) A519/6, p.95, Ziervogel to Campbell, July 1835.
[117] (CA) A519/3, p.194, Bell to D'Urban, 4 December 1835.
[118] A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835.

for 'Kaffirs' were to remain the same, and all Fingo must be controlled too. He thus ordered the 'apprehension' of all wandering, unemployed Fingo, Bechuana and Kaffirs, to be sent to Fort Beaufort or Cradock, from where they were to find employment, settle in a location near a town or in the new Ceded Territory locations, or leave the Colony.[119] Although D'Urban's orders were carried out and many Fingo arrested, there were still disturbances throughout 1836 from wandering Fingo and Mantatees, and from armed Africans from the interior.[120] Captain Armstrong was in charge of placing the captured Fingo in the Fort Beaufort location, from whence many were distributed as labourers. He noted that

> I have held out every encouragement to the farmers to take the Fingos into their service and have already disposed of about 20 families in this way. I have also apprenticed several children to the farmers. The Graff Reynet and Beaufort burghers are desirous of taking a number of Fingos to their districts as servants, and I hope to dispose of a good many of them in this way.[121]

With Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort acting as bases, Fingos were distributed wherever they were needed. Three hundred and fifty-two women and five hundred and sixty-seven children were taken from Graham's Town to King William's Town in June, against their will.[122] The Civil Commissioner for Graaff-Reinet complained in October of a labour shortage, whereupon surplus Fingo from Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage were sent there.[123] Part of a group of thirty-three Fingo families being transported to work in Uitenhage in November escaped in the night and returned to Graham's Town.[124] Most of these Fingo movements were accompanied by armed military patrols, which indicates that the Fingo were not moving voluntarily. With this threat of enforced removal to farms, any unemployed Fingo in Graham's Town rapidly found service, if only carrying firewood and water in town.[125] A prospective Cape

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[119] A519/17, pp.121-4, D'Urban to all civil commissioners, 14 October 1835. Somerset was sent out to oversee the implementation: see A519/3, p.65, Somerset to D'Urban, 23 October 1835; A519/3, pp.97-100, Somerset to D'Urban, October 1835.

[120] (CA) A519/6, p.99, Campbell to Hudson, 16 April 1836; LG 420, p.105, Report of Bradshaw, Bathurst Field Cornet, 21 September 1836; 1/AY/8/49, Hudson to D'Urban, 19 November 1836; 1/AY/8/50, Report of Stockenstrom, March 1837; 1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel to D'Urban, 15 November 1836.

[121] (CA) CO 2756, Armstrong to Campbell, 19 October 1835.

[122] (CA) A519/23, p.269, D'Urban to Smith, 30 June 1835. D'Urban commented that 'many of the women are by no means willing to come.' I am grateful to Julian Cobbing for this reference.

[123] (CA) A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835; (CA) CO 2756, Orders from Campbell, 4 December 1835; A519/6, p.98, Campbell to Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner.

[124] (CA) A519/3, pp.189-190, Campbell to D'Urban, 27 November 1835; (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 November 1835.

[125] (CA) 1/AY/9/8, Campbell to D'Urban, 11 March 1836.

Town employer, on the advice of J.C.Chase, asked Campbell to send him sixty to eighty male Fingo, aged twelve to twenty.[126] In 1837 there were a thousand applications for Fingo workers from Cape Town alone.[127]

The evidence of Fingo before 1835

The etymology of the term Fingo is unclear. There were people called Fingo scattered, as individuals, families or groups, in the area between the Sundays and Umzimvubu Rivers before 1835. In 1827 the traveller Cowper Rose described a group of refugees gathered around Butterworth, who were called Fingo.[128] William Shaw described them in June 1827 as 'Africans of several distinct nations, who, in consequence of wars and commotions in the interior, have been scattered and driven from their native countries, and have sought refuge in the country of Hintsa, who has treated them kindly, and allowed them to settle among his people.' He noted that some came 'from the neighbourhood of the Portuguese settlements on the east coast', in other words from the vicinity of Delagoa Bay.[129] A month later William Shrewsbury claimed that there were five to six thousand Fingo at Butterworth, all of whom had been 'subdued by Chaka'.[130] Given subsequent evidence, Shrewsbury's estimate of Fingo numbers is probably too high. Shaw's evidence is crucial in three respects, which contradict Shrewsbury and Ayliff. He says that some Fingo moved originally from near Delagoa Bay. He stresses that Hintsa treated them well, as custom dictated for strangers. And he notes that they came, not from the coast, but from the interior.

There is much material to show that those Fingo who were refugees, came into the Colony via the interior - the modern Orange Free State and western Lesotho region - rather than south through Natal. Ayliff mentioned on a number of occasions that the Fingo were refugees from wars in the interior.[131] Brownlee met a group of people at Hintsa's kraal (Butterworth) in 1822 who had been there for a number of years. He assumed that they were Bechuana or Damara, as they came from north-west of Lattakoo.[132] Somerset said in 1833 that the Fingo came from the north; that they had lived with the 'Goes' north of the Bastards, and had been driven south into the

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[126] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Letter to Campbell, 30 October 1835.
[127] Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.209.
[128] C.Rose, Four Years in Southern Africa (1829), pp.93-5.
[129] The Report of the Wesleyan-Methodist Society, for the year ending December, 1827 (1828), p.42, Letter from W.Shaw, 19 June 1827.
[130] Report of Wesleyan Society, p.45, Letter from W.Shrewsbury, 12 July 1827.
[131] (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history; (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff.
[132] Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.219; cf. Philip, Researches in South Africa, Vol.2, ch 10. Reverend Kay made mention of the Fingo he had found with the Th mbu, who were refugees from the interior; see S.Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, describing the character, customs, and moral condition of the tribes inhabiting that portion of Southern Africa (1833), pp.133-4, 293-4.

Colony.[133] In October 1835, Judge Menzies, while travelling through the districts of Albany, Uitenhage and George, found 'many "Natives of the Interior of Africa", called, or calling themselves, Fingoes'.[134]

This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of Cobbing - that there was a movement, amongst others, from Delagoa Bay (away from slavers), into the Caledon area, and then south after Griqua attacks. These 'wars of the interior' were not fratricidal holocausts generated by Shaka and raiding bands. It was the dislocation which resulted from the penetration of Griqua and Coranna slavers and raiders that produced the upheavals in the Transorangian interior referred to. Movement in the interior had been dictated partly by intra-African hostility, but largely by European penetration in search of forced labour. Portuguese slave traders and their African middlemen had begun to have a major impact on the Delagoa Bay/northern Natal hinterland from the 1810s.[135] This increased disruption forced weaker groups - such as the Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele and Zizi on the Mzinyathi and upper Tugela Rivers - to move, while the stronger groups like the Zulu and Dlamini Swazi were able to grow as defensive states.

Components of the weaker groups moved south-west into, amongst other places, the Caledon River area, attempting to escape the disruption caused by the slave raiding. But here again there was no safety, as by the early 1820s bands of armed Griqua and Coranna raiders were penetrating the area from the west, in search of women and children to be captured and sold to colonial farmers as 'apprentices' or 'Mantatees'. A similar collision again occurred, and from here there was a gradual flow moving south throughout the 1820s. They moved individually in different directions, to settle with varying acceptance among the peoples from the Thembu to well into the western parts of the Colony, and were called 'Fingo'. Those who moved south into African polities were incorporated within them with varying status. Almost all Fingo who moved to the Colony became labourers.[136]

The earliest documentation of a Fingo that I have found was in 1824, and by the mid 1830s they were to be found scattered throughout western Rharhabe territory. There were 'Fengus' at Pirie mission station in 1824,[137] who had come from the north

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[133] (CA) GH 1/97, p.125, Report of Somerset. It is not clear to whom Somerset was referring, but is likely to have been the Ghoya, who were in the northern 'Orange Free State' area.
[134] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Judge Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835. Original stress.
[135] Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.504-7; and J.Cobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle: the Slave Trade and the early Zulu ', Seminar Paper, University of Natal-Pietermaritzburg, 1990, pp.8-19.
[136] Campbell commented on a number of occasions that the 'devastating wars of the interior' were providing 'a valuable supply of servants' to Albany and Somerset. See, for example (CA) LCA 6, evidence of D.Campbell, 4 July 1834, in reply to Philip's complaints about the proposed vagrancy bill.
[137] (CL) MS 2642, Letters of Mrs Ross, April 1824.

where they had been dispossessed by Mantatees. In this case Zizi refugees were surprisingly elided with Mantatees, with specific differentiation between them and 'Fengus'. By 1833 there were one hundred and twenty Fingo at the Kat River Settlement,[138] and Fingo nearby with Bawana of the Winterberg Thembu.[139] Laing spoke of Fingo living near Anta on the upper Keiskamma, and in the Gaga and Buffalo River areas in 1832.[140]

The only group to have maintained cohesion in the move southwards was the Ngwane. In his movements into the Caledon and then south over the Drakensberg, Matiwane had gathered refugees, who became part of his doomed state and assumed the Ngwane identity. A clear case of the elision of the terms Fetcani, Ngwane and Fingo occurred in 1829, when two Fingo came to Butterworth to be married by Kay. The man had been with the Mantatees at Dithakong, whereafter he fled south-east and joined the Ngwane in the Caledon area, whom the woman had already joined.[141] This group of Matiwane's was then forced south by the Griqua dislocation in the area, and was scattered by the British in 1828 at Mbolompo.[142] It must be stressed that the couple in question did not see themselves as Fingo until they came into contact with whites in 1829, and their original identities are unknown. There were many Ngwane who ended as labourers in the Colony after 1828. Most were subsequently termed Fingo.[143] Many of the Ngwane captured in 1828 were taken to Graham's Town involuntarily, from where they 'were distributed amongst the farmers in the Graham's Town District. From there they were distributed amongst the Fingos on the border and in the Eastern Cape.' They were then redefined as Fingo.[144]

The process of Fingo-isation in the 1820s and 1830s needs a close study. What was the precise motor of movement in the central and northern 'Transkei' in the period? What factors other than capture caused groups like the 'Mantatees', Bhele, Zizi and Ngwane to enter the colonial ambit? What was happening to the African polities and

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[138] (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.38, Population of the Kat River Settlement, 7 June 1833. There were also 426 Tswana.

[139] (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of Sihele, p.35.

[140] (CL) MS 16, 579, Diary of Laing, entry for 18 September 1833; (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, pp.261, 280. See also (CL) Diary of Kayser, 19 and 22 Feb, 12 April, 31 May, 25 July, 4 Aug, 11 Sep, and 17 Oct 1834 for references to Fingo near Burns Hill mission station.

[141] Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.299-300.

[142] Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.500-3.

[143] For examples of the Fingo-Ngwane elision, see (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Statement of Umjojo, Graham's Town gaol, 22 February 1835; Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.333.

[144] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa. See also J.Bird, The Annals of Natal, 1495 to 1845, Vol.1, p.123, Evidence of H.F.Fynn to Native Commission, 1852. Cory, Rise of South Africa, III, p.165n. interviewed an old Ngwane man who called himself Fingo, and who gave a brief synopsis of Ngwane history, and described all Ngwane as Fingo.

their internal dynamics that resulted in the alienation of so many people?[145]

Military Fingo used in the army

There were a thousand men who joined the British army in 1835, and accompanied the force across the Fish and Kei. D'Urban said that they were Fingo men who wished to aid the British. A number acted as messengers,[146] and the others were particularly effective in capturing cattle.[147] Of those used in Gcaleka territory, fifty were sent to Clarkebury, forty helped to ferry cattle between the Tsomo River area and Butterworth, and one hundred and thirty aided Smith in the Tsomo mountains in late April.[148] It seems unlikely that these men merely appeared, as the military reports claimed; the British army was not in the habit of summarily adopting untrained, untrusted locals to aid in its operations. Most importantly, these men were given guns by the British.[149] These men must have been trained prior to the war - Halse reported that the Provisional Battalions, the Khoi divisions used in the army, included many Africans.[150] These mercenaries were then described as Fingo, and included in the history ascribed to all Fingo. The Fingo military group was given land at King William's Town after hostilities ceased and was settled under the charge of William Fynn, who received a farm on the Keiskamma River in payment.[151]

The Fingo mission collaborators

The group that chiefly assumed what was to become the identity of the Fingo was a 'collaborator' group. Most of them were from the trans-Fish mission stations, and they formed the basis of the settlements at Tyhume and Peddie. Ayliff claimed that all 16,800 Fingo were settled at Peddie in May 1835, where they remained. The Peddie location, according to D'Urban, was to encompass almost half the Ceded Territory,[152] and act as a buffer between the white colonists and their neighbours. D'Urban made a further suggestion in July that all the land between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, between Fort Willshire and Peddie, be allocated to Fingo in small fortified villages. He indicated that a list had been made of all Fingo settled

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[145] I am indebted to John Wright for his comments and discussions on these questions.

[146] (CA) A519/1, p.201, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 April 1835.

[147] (NA - Natal Archives) A96, Shepstone Diary, entries for 24-8 April 1835. For Smith's view on the cattle-capturing ability of the Fingo, see W.Brinton, History of the British Regiments in South Africa (1977), p.51.

[148] (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, p.31.

[149] (CL) MS 15,543, Ayliff's Sketch of Fingo history, p.80; (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 30 April 1835; (NA) A96, Diary of Theophilus Shepstone, p.28a.

[150] (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse, p.15.

[151] (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, W.Fynn to D'Urban, 1 November 1836.

[152] (CA) GH 19/4, p.953, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835; (CA) A519/17, pp.25-31, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835; BPP 279 (1836), pp.38-40, Somerset to D'Urban.

there, and their locations, although I have not been able to find this list.[153] Somerset reported that he had followed orders and placed the Fingo in the entire area.[154]

But these statements differed from what was happening on the ground. The Peddie location consisted in reality, not of an extensive buffer system, but of a small settlement of less than forty square miles, clustered around the protection of the fort and the Boers stationed there.[155] An 1835 map shows the Fingo in two small settlements on the Clusie (near Peddie) and Tyhume Rivers, not in any extended settlement.[156] By October 1835 there were a mere six hundred and ninety eight Fingo at Peddie.[157]

Not only was there a very small settlement, but hardly any of these 'Fingo' at Peddie came from Natal. In late April, Captain Warden had been despatched to Clarkebury with a patrol (which also included military Fingo) on a two-fold mission. He was to organise a Thembu attack on the Gcaleka, and he was to fetch the trans-Kei missionaries and traders gathered there. The Europeans (including Ayliff) were brought to the British camp on the Ndabakazi on 5 May, along with 524 'station people'. The larger, but quite separate mass of 'Fingo' had already been collected there by the 1st and 2nd Divisions in the previous week. The whole Clarkebury group tagged along with the 'Fingo exodus', which left on 9 May, and arrived at Peddie on the 14th. These 524 'station people' came from the missions at Morley, Buntingville, Clarkebury and Butterworth,[158] where they had been faced in 1835 with the choice of white or traditional allegiance, and chose the more powerful. Given the low success rate of the missions, very few were likely to have been actual converts.[159] It is vital to note that this group from Clarkebury was enumerated on the official

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[153] (CA) A519/17, p.28, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835.
[154] BPP 279 (1836), p.39-40, Somerset to D'Urban.
[155] (CA) Map M3/379; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of Fingo at Peddie; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835; BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to ?, 12 July 1835.
[156] See (CA) Map M1/2728. For the extent of the locations in 1835 and 1855 see (CA) Map M3/379; see also (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of the Fingo at Peddie, for the distribution of the Fingo from the missions at Peddie.
[157] (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 October 1835. The Fingo commissioners complained to D'Urban that the group at Peddie were particularly troublesome - (CA) A519/3, D'Urban Papers, pp.26-8, 5 Oct 1835. This is in marked contrast to Ayliff's descriptions of a happy, co-operative settlement.
[158] BPP 279 (1836), p.38, List of persons removed from Clarkebury, 3 May 1835.
[159] For a report on the state of the missions and conversions, see (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of the AGMs of the Wesleyan Methodist preachers in the Albany District. In 1834 there were 22 converts at Butterworth and 92 attending school. At Clarkebury there were 12 converts and 29 at school; at Morley there were 24 converts and 330 at school; and at Buntingville there were 11 converts and 329 at school. Laing noted (CL) MS 16,579, entry for 28 December 1834, that many Ngqika who used to reject the station were coming to him for protection, or to get the advantages it offered.

list specifically as Gcaleka, Mpondo and Thembu.

It was this small group that was settled around Fort Peddie on the Clusie River, under government agents John Mitford Bowker, Captain Halifax, Lieutenant Moultrie and Ayliff.[160] But in the population census of October 1835, these same people were no longer described as Thembu, Mpondo or Gcaleka. They now came under the designation 'Fingo'.[161] To this group there had been added sixty-two Hlubi, thirty Bhele and thirty-two Relidwane. Of all the Fingo at Peddie, there were, therefore, only one hundred and thirty-four men, women and children from Natal. Umhlambiso, chief of this Hlubi group, with a mere sixteen male followers, had been appointed overall chief, on the orders of D'Urban, from a recommendation by J.M.Bowker.[162] Ayliff's attempt to create a Fingo history is clearly exhibited here. In May 1835 he correctly described the people at Peddie as 'Native Inhabitants to the number of 500, who from attachment to the Missionaries, or dread of the Kafirs, had accompanied them [Warden].'[163] Yet in his restructured notes of 1851, he described this same group as Fingo who had lived for many years with the Thembu.[164] Ayliff and D'Urban were wholly misleading in their descriptions of Peddie. The majority of the small settlement was 'Kaffir', who had been 'formed' or 'altered' by the missionaries.[165] A small Natal group was placed with them, and a loyal chief was appointed by the government.

A second settlement, along the lines of that at Peddie, was created in the Tyhume River area in late August 1835, under government commissioners Captain Armstrong, Thomson and Dr Minto. 2,014 men, women and children were settled around Fort Thomson, with adjacent land reserved for European farmers, as well as a possible Khoi settlement and an area for Fingo from the Kat River Settlement.[166] Captain

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[160] (CA) A519/3, pp.26-8, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, Peddie, 5 October 1835.
[161] (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of the Fingo at Peddie by Fingo Commissioners, 5 October 1835. But cf. (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of Fingo at Peddie, where they are still described as Gcaleka, Mpondo and Thembu, and the land apportioned to them is indicated.
[162] (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.
[163] Graham's Town Journal, 22 May 1835. The collaboration between D'Urban and the missionaries is evident in the fact that D'Urban had described the same event in precisely the same words a week previous; see (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 15 May 1835. A similar description had been given by Reverend Davis, Wesleyan missionary at Clarkebury, BPP 503 (1837), p.225, 19 April 1835.
[164] (CL) PR 3826, Rough notes of Ayliff, p.14.
[165] 'Fingo' is a Latin term, which means 'to form/shape, or to alter/change (with the intention of untruth)' - see C.T.Lewis & C.Short, A Latin Dictionary (1966). Another interesting definition of 'Fingo' can be found in J.L.Dohne, A Zulu/Caffer Dictionary (1857); he says that it means 'to force, urge'.

[166] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Thomson, Armstrong & Minto, 24 July 1835; (CA) A519/3, p.73, D'Urban to Fingo commissioners; 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 35.

Bain and Charles Miller were singled out for preference on the recommendation of Armstrong; and the latter had a farm surveyed for him there in November because of his 'usefulness with the Fingo in May'.[167]



Map 4. Location of Fingo in 1835.

It is very difficult to assess how many Fingo there were in 1835. The orthodoxy claims that there were 16,000; a figure derived from the estimate of one of the British troops.[168] D'Urban's estimations of the Fingo vacillated between five and fifteen thousand in May. The elision of different types of Fingo has resulted in confusion as to their total number. But by late 1835, there were definitely seven hundred at Peddie, two thousand at Tyhume and two thousand at King William's Town. A likely estimate of the number labouring in the Colony would be up to ten thousand. Fingo numbers need further investigation.

The Fingo at both locations: some as collaborators and buffer,[169] and others as

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[167] (CA) CO 4381, Armstrong to Smith, 10 November 1835.
[168] BPP 279 (1836), p.37, Estimate of Trotter, 14 May 1835.
[169] As outlined in BPP 279 (1836), p.16, D'Urban to ?; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Thomson, Armstrong, Minto, 24 July 1835.

labourers, were provided with goats, implements, food and seed corn until 1837,[170] and were encouraged to plant gardens and establish themselves. There was a separate Fingo location at Fort Beaufort on the town commonage, although the size is unknown. Some Fingo waited at Fort Beaufort until land could be apportioned to them at Tyhume, while others waited to be sent to farms to work, and this transitional location was growing by late 1835.[171] It is strange that the Fingo locations there and at King William's Town were not included in the detailed maps of the towns, drawn in late 1835.[172] Were the locations excluded from official records because they were labour camps? The Fingo commissioners at Fort Beaufort reported in November that the Tyhume settlement was growing, with huts erected, crops sown and more people, and suggested that more land be allotted to Fingo at Tyhume.[173] A similar progress report was made three months later.[174] By July 1836 Laing was describing sixty-seven 'Fingo hamlets' in the area around Fort Thomson, where Lovedale was to be placed.[175]

The Fingo settlement on the west bank of the Tyhume was, by October 1837, twice as densely populated as when the Ngqika lived there. The precise identity and role of these Fingo is unclear, but it seems that many were collaborators, who were given land. With the disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province in early 1837, the Colony needed to bolster its buffer regions, the most important of which was in the Tyhume area. The population had risen to approximately three thousand, with well over three thousand cattle and a similar number of goats. It is plain that the Fingo were acculturating rapidly to colonial farming techniques and culture, as they worked particularly hard in clearing and cultivating the area, selling a corn surplus after their first year. The shedding of any remaining traditions is obvious in the way in which men and women had begun to share in agricultural operations by 1837.[176] In 1835 Fingo women had done the work alone, as custom dictated.[177]

What was the plan behind these three Fingo locations? As can be seen, the evidence on Fingo in 1835 is scanty and piecemeal. It does show distinctive categories within the term 'Fingo', and it does give glimpses of movement and hints of a general policy. There are certain consistencies between and features common to Tyhume, Peddie and King William's Town. Each settlement had elements of each type of Fingo:

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[170] (CA) CO 4381, Fingo commissioners' letters 21 August to 21 November 1835; (CA) LG 14, pp.173-4, Palmer to Campbell, 2 November 1835; (CA) A519/7, p.21, Bowker to Campbell, 20 October 1835.
[171] (CA) A519/3, pp.154-5, Armstrong to D'Urban, 14 November 1835.
[172] See (CA) Maps M1/2729 and M1/2730 respectively.
[173] (CA) A519/3, P.156, Minto & Thomson to D'Urban, 13 November 1835.
[174] A519/4, pp.38-41, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.
[175] Cory, Rise of South Africa, p.197.
[176] The information on the Fingo in 1837 comes from an informative report from Thomson to D'Urban, A519/7, pp.176-8, 23 October 1837.
[177] The sex delineation was commented on by the Fingo commissioners, (CA) LG 14, pp.15-6, Fingo commissioners to Hudson, 11 November 1835.

labourer, collaborator (peasant farmer) and military. The Tyhume complex included Fort Beaufort, where there was a large Fingo camp on the commonage, from where Fingo were distributed as labourers in southern Somerset and northern Albany. There were land-owning collaborators around the Tyhume, and a military contingent in Fort Thomson, in the centre of the settlement. Peddie regularly sent labourers into the Colony; it had a gradually weakening collaborator settlement; and a military force in Fort Peddie. King William's Town provided many labourers for the Colony, as far west as Knysna (see below), and had its share of collaborators with land. Because it was furthest into African territory it had the largest military force, with a fort, Khoi soldiers and most of the Fingo military. Each of the settlements was attacked on a number of occasions by local Rharhabe.

A further feature common to all three was the placing of settler farms in their immediate vicinity in 1835, after the annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province. A substantial number of farms were granted along the Buffalo River, near King William's Town, and the Fingo commissioners at both Tyhume and Peddie had instructions to intersperse the Fingo land grants with European farms, which were surveyed in late 1835. It is unlikely that African peasant farmers would be set up in direct competition with white farmers, so what was the point of the Fingo locations? Were they specifically engineered as agriculturally self-supporting and militarily self-defending units situated strategically in the newly conquered territory, to extract local labour for the colonial market, and to provide the adjoining new settler farms with a permanent labour supply? In other words, were they the basis of a consolidation of the expanded settler farm land, in terms of both security and labour, and a rural labour pool for colonial farms?

Fingo chiefs and tribalisation

Because there was no such thing as a 'Fingo tribe' before and during 1835, it was impossible for there to be natural chiefs. If the Fingo were being amalgamated and tribalised, there had to be African men in charge of them, apart from the white commissioners. Whiteside claimed that the Fingo chiefs were all from Zizi, Hlubi, Bhele and Relidwane royal lineages, and that they had pretended not to be chiefs when with the Gcaleka, to avoid victimisation. But the evidence suggests that they were collaborators and opportunists, who were prepared to follow British orders on the management of the Fingo. The collaborators from the missions were placed under them, and it was claimed that the labourers who had disappeared as farm labourers also fell under their control. The chiefs changed fairly rapidly.[178] In 1854 the only two left of the original nine were Jokweni and Matomela.[179] Within two

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[178] See the changes from (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, Clarkebury, 1 May 1835; to (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 Oct 1835 and (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson to D'Urban, 29 Aug 1835; to (CA) GH 19/5, Treaty between Maitland and the Fingo chiefs, Jan 1845.
[179] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.595-8.

decades, the entire chief hierarchy had changed, presumably as a result of the dismissal of chiefs not meeting British expectations.

The chiefs at Tyhume[180] were not those whom Ayliff had listed as chiefs in May 1835.[181] They in turn differed from Theophilus Shepstone's list of April,[182] where the Fingo totalled merely 1,120. Shepstone had said on 19 April that there were only three Fingo chiefs, and that it was they who offered nine hundred and seventy military men.[183] Jokweni, who by the 1850s was one of the wealthiest Fingo chiefs, was no hereditary chief, but because of his post-1835 importance, ethnographers like Bryant inserted him into the Zizi royal genealogy.[184] Makalima had lived near Ayliff for a while before 1835, and his loyalty could thus be trusted.[185] It is significant that when Ayliff listed the 'Fingo chiefs' in May 1835, Makalima was not among them.[186] It was decided to appoint him as a chief only once he had arrived in the Colony. Mabanthla was also recognised as a chief for the first time when inside the Colony. Both became Fingo chiefs with British backing. Veldman Bikitsha later commented that Umkwenkwezi, Jokweni and Umhlambiso did not appear in the respective Bhele, Zizi and Hlubi royal genealogies.[187] If this is correct, not one of the men given land in 1835 and appointed as chiefs had any claim to a position, apart from their loyalty to the British. They were all collaborators.
It is hardly surprising that the chiefs had little power and less respect,[188] as there was little bond between the newly created tribe and the appointed collaborator leaders. Less than a month after their settlement, J.M.Bowker sent a batch of letters complaining about the Fingo at Peddie, and the way in which they were divided and fighting - even killing - each other. There were clearly problems in getting the Fingo to unify and accept the chiefs, and some Fingo refused to acknowledge chiefly authority and remained independent. Bowker had to arrest and remove a Khoi, Hermanus, as he was attracting Fingo away from the chiefs.[189] This view is far from the mystical tale of spontaneous Fingo unity and joy given by Veldman Bikitsha and Whiteside later in the century.[190] In order to entrench the appointed chiefs as leaders, they were given suits and knives by the British;[191]

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[180] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, p.129, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.
[181] (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.
[182] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.90c. Moyer, Ibid., p.190, commented on the dissimilarities in the various lists of chiefs made between 22 April and 9 May, which is when D'Urban was choosing whom he was to recognise.
[183] (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 19 April 1835.
[184] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.184n.
[185] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835.
[186] (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835.
[187] (CA) NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to the Lagden Commission, 1905.
[188] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835.
[189] (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 5 and 9 June, 20 October 1835; (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.
[190] (CA) NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to Lagden Commission, 1905.
[191] (CA) A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835.

they also received and distributed land, which their followers were unhappy about.[192]

The Fingo chiefs fulfilled the role of sub-magistrate, under the Fingo commissioners, in order to create a structure of control over the Fingo, as suggested to D'Urban by Bowker.[193] In 1836 Makalima was appointed Veld Commandant at Tyhume, and Mhlambiso at Peddie. Others were appointed to the posts of Veld Cornet[194] on the recommendation of the Fingo commissioners in order that the chiefs 'would possess a more defined authority over their people than they do at present'.[195] This system of co-optation became increasingly wide-spread in the Stockenstrom period after 1836, and had proved an effective method of subjugation by the 1850s.

The destruction of Rharhabe livelihood was one of the keys to the increase in Fingo numbers from the end of 1835. Apart from the three categories of Fingo in 1835 - collaborator, military and labourer - there were many Africans who came into the Colony to seek work as the only means of survival. They either called themselves Fingo or were subsumed by the colonial authorities within the name. Apart from the Fingo forced to become labourers, there were a number of African peoples who moved into the Colony, either attracted by employment, or forced by poverty in 1835 and the period following it. The immense destruction of Rharhabe food and livelihood by the troops in 1835, coupled with the seizure of the Queen Adelaide Province, produced landlessness and poverty, to be solved by colonial indenture. GMS missionary Kayser noted in 1836 that the formerly well-populated areas around the Keiskamma were poverty-stricken, and that 'the Kaffers are now very much seeking work to get only food for payment.'[196] Even some of Phato's people undertook indenture.[197] While 1835 was not on the scale of the dislocation caused by the Cattle-Killing of 1856-7, it forced a large number of Rharhabe into the Cape. Because of the multi-faceted, vague nature of the 'Fingo' these people were easily subsumed as members of it.[198]

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[192] Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article. They were also given cattle to distribute to their followers, see (CA) GH 34/5, p.21, Campbell to D'Urban, 14 July 1835.

[193] (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835.

[194] Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.197. A similar system was applied to the Ndlambe; Mhala and Mqhayi became Field Commandants, and Siyolo and Qasana Field Cornets.

[195] (CA) A519/4, p.40, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 2 February 1836.

[196] Kayser to Ellis, 4 January 1836, quoted by Crais, 'Ambiguous frontiers', pp.43-4.

[197] F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts.

[198] The mechanics of the process of tribalisation - and specifically that of the Fingo - have not been sufficiently explored here. It is a vital aspect of the growth of the 'Fingo', and needs to be researched.

Conclusions

What does this reconstruction of Fingo history mean for John Ayliff? He has retained an unblemished historical record as the humanitarian and spiritual guide of the Fingo, although Majeke's accusations that he conspired with the colonial authorities are worth noting.[199] The fact that Ayliff was present with the Fingo in 1835, and yet made such simple errors as describing the Fingo as Gcaleka slaves, who were all settled at Peddie, can lead to only one conclusion. He must have been consciously involved in the construction of a cover-story for the Fingo. Ayliff's actions, and especially his diary entries in his period at Butterworth from 1830 to 1835, provide a key to his situation. His intention, integral to mission philosophy, was to divide the Gcaleka by undermining Hintsa's power,[200] and offering an alternative (European) power source. He attracted Gcaleka opportunists and social misfits, and the mission 'proved itself an asylum for not only the destitute and afflicted, but it has proved itself a refuge for those appointed to die'.[201] The few converts[202] whom he attracted were largely Gcaleka (Kaffirs).[203]

Ayliff's diary makes it clear that he had little contact with 'Fingo': there are but twelve mentions of the word in his daily diary entries between 1830 and 1837. Only four of these occur before July 1834. He makes no mention of Fingo in his annual reports on the state of the mission and conversions.[204] Why does the 'father of the Fingo' not talk about his charges? How can it be claimed that Ayliff had a close relationship with the Fingo? Ayliff's diary - his unwitting comments at the time - and his articles of 1835 and essays of 1851 and 1853 do not correspond with regard to the Fingo. The diary reveals little more than a passing awareness of the existence of 'Fingo', and no knowledge of their past. Yet Ayliff subsequently wrote convoluted and lengthy 'histories' of the Fingo, based almost solely on secondary sources. The inference is clear.

But who thought of applying the general Fingo story to the labourers? D'Urban? As

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[199] N.Majeke, The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest (1952), pp.34-5. Dora Taylor is not given sufficient credit for the importance of her ideas. Whilst there are overstatements and weak empiricism, her insight and intuition are revolutionary.

[200] Clearly stated in (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entries for 24 August 1832, 9 September 1833; 11 July 1834.

[201] (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837.

[202] As noted by Ayliff, Ibid., entry for 26 January 1834. By February 1834 he had a total of 22 converts and 92 attending his school.

[203] Examples of Gcaleka conversions: Ibid., entries for 14 April 1831, 25 June 1831, 25 June 1832, 7 August 1833,. See also J.V.B.Shrewsbury, Memorials of Rev. William J.Shrewsbury (1868), p.334, who comments, 25 December 1827, that there had been numerous Kafir converts, but only one Fingo.

[204] (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of AGMs of Wesleyan preachers. He also made no mention of Fingo in 1837, when summarising his achievements at the station, see (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837.

shown, there were occasional references to Fingo refugees in the late 1820s and early 1830s. When Ngwane women and children were captured at Mbolompo in 1828 and taken into the Colony to work, they were called Fingo. A precedent was thereby created where people seized illegally to labour were described as Fingo. By the early 1830s there were a number of 'Fingo' working in Albany and Somerset. The equation of the Fingo with labour came again in 1833, when Godlonton complained of the labour shortage. He suggested that the 'Fingoos' and 'Mantatees', who were living 'under the most despotic control of the Caffers', should be encouraged to enter colonial service, as their 'industry is almost proverbial'.[205] D'Urban was centrally involved with the Fingo in 1835: he was at the head of the invading forces in April and May, he appointed the Fingo chiefs, he organised the creation of the collaborator settlements. And it was he who first described the Fingo as slaves of the Gcaleka in April 1835. By portraying the Fingo as slaves being rescued by the British, it would be possible to escape Colonial Office censure. He and the colonists, in their public statements, constantly equated the 'Fingo rescue' with 'the true spirit of the sweeping emancipation made by the mother country',[206] thereby inverting the identity of the captured labourers.

The only feasible explanation is that Ayliff then intentionally wrote the 'Fingo history', probably with the aid of D'Urban and Godlonton. The initial stories of Natal refugees were taken, and interwoven with the contemporary myths of the destruction of Shaka. To this was added elements of each category of Fingo: that some fought in the army, some settled at Peddie, and some were refugees. All of this was amalgamated into one history, so that every Fingo supposedly had the same origins. Automatically, the thousands of illegal labourers had an identity that was acceptable to London. The story was polished when Ayliff was in Graham's Town - not ministering to the Fingo, as Whiteside claimed - between May and September. He published the new history in August and September, and reworked it again in the 1850s. Ayliff never met D'Urban's expectations, and D'Urban (who in 1835 and 1836 had control of mission appointments) removed him from both of the important Fingo settlements, Peddie and Tyhume. His confused efforts at explaining Fingo history seem to have annoyed D'Urban, who complained to Smith that 'Mr Ayliff was a very improper person to send to Butterworth, imbecile, timorous and weak. Mr Boyce and Mr Palmer [actively pro-settler Wesleyan missionaries] both described him thus to me, and said that he was unfit for any post of trial.'[207] Ironically, Ayliff's 'history' was so effective that it has not been challenged for a century and a half.

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[205] Graham's Town Journal, 16 May 1833, Godlonton editorial.
[206] For examples, see (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban, Official Notice, 3 May 1835; BPP 503 (1837), p.181, D'Urban; BPP 503 (1837), p.181, Address from Port Elizabeth residents.
[207] (CL) MS 2033, D'Urban to Smith, 10 June 1836. See also A.T.C.Slee, 'Some aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1830 and 1844', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1946, p.49.

It must be stressed that the orthodox history of 1835 and the Fingo is based largely on uncritical interpretations of military reports, and of the writings of settler apologists. Yet there are numerous proven cases of these reports and accounts being not only factually inaccurate, but specifically designed to mask the real events. D'Urban, in a colourful overstatement, described Albany as a barren and devastated desert before he had even arrived in the district. He blamed Hintsa for organising the attacks of December before he could have had any evidence of it. The report on the Smith patrol past the Mbashe River in May lied about the intentions of the patrol, about who suggested it, about the circumstances of Hintsa's death and about the identity of the 'Fingo' taken. D'Urban later claimed that he had only decided to annex the Queen Adelaide Province on 8 May, when it had been planned since January. D'Urban regularly alleged that the Fingo were slaves of the Gcaleka, when he knew that they were not. He also said that he had settled 16,800 Fingo around Peddie; a mere seven hundred were placed there, most of whom were 'Kafirs' from the Wesleyan missions. He deliberately misled the Colonial Office about the size of the 'Kaffir' force, about the effectiveness of his own troops, and about the length of the hostilities. The settlers, with the collaboration of D'Urban and the Cape colonial authorities, exaggerated their losses and the destruction of late 1834. These are all crucial aspects of the war and the identity of the Fingo, and are demonstrably incorrect.

The most significant aspect of the invasion of the Rharhabe, Bomvana and Gcaleka - the War of 1835 - was the capture of women and children to solve the colonial labour crisis. These people were called Fingo, and distributed secretly amongst the colonists in the eastern districts. They were elided with two other groups with the same name - military auxiliaries and refugees and mission collaborators. The 'Fingo' were not a homogenous group, settled together at Peddie as D'Urban and Ayliff claimed. There were Fingo locations at Peddie, King William's Town and Tyhume which contained groups of collaborators, militia and labourers. There were also locations at Graham's Town, Cradock, Fort Beaufort and Somerset whose purpose was to provide Fingo labourers for the eastern Cape. These were two very different types of Fingo. In the Fingo locations, certain British loyalists were appointed as chiefs to ensure that the settlement followed instructions. And all 'Fingo' were described in terms of the same history and identity created by D'Urban and Ayliff, which was intended to mask the highly illegal fact that the Colony was capturing African labourers.

Significant areas of research are affected. The origins of the Great Trek need to be reviewed. Nineteenth-century labour history, and the beginnings of African proletarianisation are affected by this interpretation of the identity and function of the Fingo. One of the pillars of 'mfecane' mythology - the notion that the Fingos were refugees from Shaka - must be removed. This has serious ramifications for the structure and credibility of the entire 'mfecane' argument. Cobbing has shown how 'mfecane' history has erased the effect of European penetration in three key areas - Delagoa Bay, the Transorangia region, and the eastern frontier. This paper puts the Europeans back on the map with regard to the power of British expansionism, and

validates Cobbing's early suggestions of the labour-centered machinations of the colonists in this area. Explanations of the causations of movement in 1835 can never be the same again. But Fingo case histories still need to be found in order to trace the exact movements and origins of Fingo labourers. Analyses are due on the power and authority of the Graham's Town faction, on the growth of the eastern Cape economy based on the gains of the war and the Fingo labour, and on why settler historiography has maintained its psychological hegemony.