


J. GEU

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THE 'MFECANE' AFTERMATH

towards a new paradigm

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EASTERN FRONTIER SLAVING AND ITS EXTENSION
INTO THE TRANSORANGIA AND NATAL, 1770-1843

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"... In Africa the temptation to become a slave trader in disguise is great"

"To justify the wrongs he has done [European slave trade in Africa], he writes history and geography for the instruction of his children".

"Let us see that our children learn the truth in our history and geography books, and do not have their intellects obstructed and their minds debased by falsehood under the name of knowledge."

It is the aim of this paper to give an overview of one aspect of the history of European expansion from the Cape Colony, 1770-1843. I want to demonstrate how the enslaving of indigenous people was one of several important ways to acquire and control labour for both Dutch and English Colonists in the Eastern Cape and how this one form of labour procurement, when exported to Natal and the Transorangia, developed. The wrongly perceived Dutch -English ethnic division for the 1820's & 30's is a hindrance to be able to arrive at a historical understanding of the period in general and the issue of local enslavement of indigenous peoples. The contemporary writings make it clear that the prevailing nature of the relationship between Dutch and English Colonists was that of interaction and co-operation rather than conflict.

I will not approach the issue in the usual "Romantic" approach which prevails much of the history writing on 19th Century, which is essentially geared to identify heroes and villains, usually expressed in ethnic terms (Boers, English, Africans). I am trying to come an understanding of period by examining the experience of both slavers and enslaved in the local (ie: frontier) slave-raiding and slave-trade with empathy. The period chosen includes the official beginning of the "bushman war" on the North Eastern frontier of the Colony in 1770 and ends with the British annexation and takeover of Natal.

Both these aspects are generally hardly known or acknowledged as being important. In fact they are not "seen" because of a still largely prevailing "settler mindset" among historians. It is a problem of meaning which has such deep roots, that we can speak of a problem of paradigm. A paradigm is a necessary pre-theoretical base for scientific research. It is essentially a Weltanschauung-like collection of semi-unconscious basic assumptions, upon which research is based. This is exactly what happened to the history of the late 18th and early 19th Century. I am referring particularly to the mfecane paradigm which is still predominant in historical thinking. In the Mfecane paradigm thinking is essentially ethnic, not only for African people, but also for Europeans. To view Dutch and English speakers in the Eastern Cape in the 1820's & 30's as ethnically opposed to each other is backdating much later realities of relationship to that period. When it came to land, labour and particularly their relationship with the Xhosa neighbours both Dutch and English speaking Colonists had essentially identical interests.

This is not to say, that these Colonist formed a unified community of interest without differences. Of these different and also clashing interests there were a number. But in respect to those interests which counted most in their Eastern Cape existence: acquisition of land,

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acquisition and control of cheap labour as well as control over the neighbouring African Chiefdoms; their interests were largely the same. The big divisions of interests in the Eastern Cape were thus not those of Dutch and British, but those of pro and anti Colonist. This united the Colonist on the one side with any Imperial and/or Cape official who used his office to further the welfare of the Colonists against missionaries, London and imperial officials/officers who pushed policies which were regarded as being to the detriment of the Colonists.

Both English and Dutch colonists were dependent on cheap labour. To get it in sufficient numbers was though difficult, due to lack of ability to pay high wages and the official prohibition of the employment of Xhosa. The almost only labour reserve available in the Eastern Cape were the land and cattle dispossessed Khoi, which were turned into forced labourers by the means of a combination of having the Khoi's children "ingeboek" and debt peonage. But Khoi were never enough to satisfy labour needs. Various means were employed in getting more cheap and controllable labour. The one of these means, the one this paper examines, was to enslave members of the local aboriginal Eastern Cape population. This began very much in the open with the bushman war, from at least 1770 onwards. It was extended to contain both Xhosa and South-Tswana speakers in the Eastern Cape, as well as Sotho-Tswana and Zulu speakers with the great Trek. While in 1770 the slaving, though often given a euphemism such as "inboek" or looking after orphans, was in documents quiet open until the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. "Inboek" or "apprentice" was a normal enough device used in 18th Century Europe to ensure both the welfare of poor children as well as to harness their labour power. In the trekboer society though "ingeboek" was a legal form of forced labour, ie: a euphemism for slavery.

Comparing the slave holding of the Eastern Cape with that of Western Cape the differences are significant enough to speak of a distinct Eastern Cape form of slavery. The existence of imported slaves generated the idea that some people could be held to work for and instead of one-self. Since "trekboere" were largely unable to afford imported slaves the Khoi population came largely to be forced labour on the farms. Even though the number of imported slaves in the East increased drastically from 1795 - 1834, they were a mere 20 % of the total servant community and generally performed labour connected with planting or as more specialised labour in urban areas. But most of the Khoi servant population were tied to the pastoral farms who's labour force could only be increased in enslaving more neighbouring indigenous people. The main duties of Eastern Cape type slaves were the herding of livestock, the general upkeep of the farm buildings and implements, the production and preparations of products for the market and for female slaves domestic duties.

The patriarchal household was the essential social and economic unit in the Eastern Cape, both for Dutch and English Colonists. This patriarchal household consisted of a pyramidal hierarchy of power with the patriarch and his wife at the top. On the next level were single sons and daughters, but often also married children. Then other family and white hangers on (later called "bywoner"). At the bottom of the pyramid, included into the patriarchal household, but never able to move up to a higher level of power, were the various types of servants: imported slaves; Khoi; San, Xhosa or Sotho-Tswana slaves. What kept them together was the patriarch, who ruled his extended family as the sovereign who was the sole author of authority and punishment. Enslaved people could, theoretically, run back to their own people very easily because they lived quiet close. But this was as a rule not a very widespread occurrence. S. Newton-King correctly identifies the fact that the Colonists had were able (horses) to recapture a height percentage of runaways. This alone was a deterrent, which was

greatly increased by the violent punishment meted out to runaways. Altogether, the patriarchal household was able to keep a tight control over all its servants and particularly over its slaves, imported or caught.

The quantity of enslaved indigenous people actually increased after 1807 with the increasing labour shortage of the Eastern Cape, which was extremely exacerbated by the collapse of the 1820 Settler scheme from 1821 onwards. But Colonists engaged in slave-raiding or buying were now no longer open about their activities, because the British abolition of the slave trade legislation held as deterrent stiff sentences. The 1807 slave trade act decreed that all slaves and ships found slaving are forfeited to the crown and a fine for £ 100 per slave. These punishments were not stiff enough and in the 1811 slave trade act imposed, in addition to those penalties above up to 14 years banishment or 3 - 5 years hard labour, that is if one was not caught on water, then the punishment for piracy was imposed on slavery and that carried the death penalty. At least until 1837, when piracy was punished with life long banishment. These were strong deterrence not to let anyone, particularly in print, that one was engaged in anything remotely to do with slave trading. The fact that the above acts were lightly enforced and hardly anyone convicted thereunder did little to decrease their threat.

The methodologies employed in will depend on the nature of the evidence available. For the "bushman war", the slaving of various raiding groups and boer farmers in the Transorangia there is a large body of direct evidence available, both in documents and the literature. A web of circumstantial evidence is presented for the reconstruction of the slaving activities of the Grahamstown military and the Port Natal English, due to the above mentioned considerable deterrence of the British slave trade acts.

"They [San] believe as certain [that the boers are out] either to destroy them at the instant, or convert them into slaves"

Boer: "All "bushmen" or wild Hottentots, caught by us must remain slaves for life"

"The schepselen the Boers at the risk of their lives had ventured to capture among rugged rocks and civilise ..."

The 18th Century saw a massive and fast expansion of "trekboere" from the Hottentots-Holland mountains to the Fish river. This expansion was based on land taken from the indigenous Khoi societies and these Khoi either ended up on farms labourers or went to the mountains to become "bushmen" who raided farms from there. The numbers of farms and thus the need for labourers increased faster than available Khoi population and lead to a serious labour crisis by the early 1880's. Tighter Control over labour with passes, "inboek" of children, debt peonage and other means began. Khoi were increasingly treated like slaves, while still independent Khoi and Bastards in the Colony were increasingly forced to become labourers. The take over of the Cape by the British in 1806 brought no change to the situation of the Khoi. except that the 1812 "Hottentot Proclamation" tightened the existing measures of labour control and led to their much more efficient enforcement in practice. By the time Ordinance 50 came into effect in 1828, which gave Khoi legal equality, these labour practices were so ingrained that the law had little practical effect. But all these measures were unable to procure more labour.

Many Khoi, according to an existing social pattern, made it for the mountain where they re-organised themselves into gatherer-hunting-raiding bands. Since most livestock was owned by the boers these "bushmen's" raiding brought them into direct conflict with these. These boers sent commando's against them to retrieve livestock, exterminate the San and return with women and children for labour. With farms replacing Khoi societies more and more the number of "bushmen" as well as their raiding increased and from the mid 18th Century turned into a full-blown war. My analysis of the San slave issue agrees with that in the recent writings of Newton-King, S., Crais, and the authors of The shaping of South African society, 1652-1840, who's main emphasis though is not the indigenous slave raiding issue. There are a number of general references to the slaving in the "bushman war" both in the 19th and 20th Century literature.

The VOC in Cape Town came to regard the situation as serious and in 1770 ordered an official commando consisting of three columns in the Northern frontier areas of the districts Tulbagh and Graaf-Reinet, with the instruction to exterminate the San by killing the men and enslaving the women and children to boers. This shows how much labour raiding was part of private and official commandos. Other official commandos followed in 1775, 1776, 1777, 1787, 1792 and so on¹. In 1791 the Krygsraad of Graaf-Reinet was so desperate as to offer rewards of 20-30 Rixdalers to commandos for every "bushman" captured, measure the Governor in Cape Town agreed to in 1792. Apart from these official commandos were a indeterminable number of private ones. Originally it was boers themselves who went on the commandos, with their Khoi "agtterryers". With time more and more boers sent some of

¹ In the 19th C. official commandos against the San continued: District Tulbagh: 1800 = 2 Commandos, 1805 = 8, 1807 = 3, 1822 = 5. District Graaf Reinet: 1813 = 1, 1816 = 2, 1817 = 1, 1820 = 3, 1821 = 1, 1822 = 6, 1823 = 4, 1824 = 4 - 825.8/1834 commando, 40 San slaves.

their Khoi on these commando. The "bushmen's" resistance was largely broken by 1800 and even though the "bushman war" came to an end the conflict continued on a lower level of intensity. After the end of the slave trade in 1807 the number of commando's increased because it was difficult to motivate boers to join commandos when they were no longer able to take slaves legally. This does not mean that no more San slaves were taken as the necessity for a Proclamation, which threatened to apply the slave trade penalties on the raiding and buying of San children, in 1817 makes clear.

The bushman war, as every other war, was a bloody affair. Sparrmann's description of a battle, from a participant of a commando he just met on their way back, makes this clear. At night the commando surrounded the San camp and then started to shoot at the San indiscriminately. Only cleverest males and thus most dangerous to the commando, who managed not to be shot, made it thought the encirclement. The women and children were caught and taken to the colony. The wounded, Sparrmann was not saying, were of course killed too.

Apart from actual raiding, San were selling their own children. The constant war on the San diminished their ability to feed them and boers could buy children. After 1807 boers changed the facts of either raiding or trading in order to construct a "smoke screen" against possible slave trade act penalties, by claiming that they are looking after children of San parents who were unable to do so or take care of "orphans", often such children who's parents were shot on commando.

San slaves were not only raided for the own use on the farm, but also for resale into the centre of the colony either from farm to farm or by

"itinerant merchants". Both, Graaf-Reinet Landdrost Stockenstrom in the 1810's and Royal Commissioner Bigge in 1825 were convinced of an underground San slave network in the Colony. Once these slaves, mainly children but also women and a few men, arrived on the farm they were to work many were officially "ingeboek". An attempt to calculate the number of San killed and enslaved is very difficult, as S. Newton-King correctly states because of the unreliability of even the records of official commandos. To calculated figures for the San slaves sold to boers seems impossible. Figures from private ones went mostly unrecorded. S. Newton-King gestimated the figure of San slaves at +/- 1000 or 11% of the total Khoi population of the Graaf-Reinet district for 1774-1795. Due to the fact that the figures are difficult to come by I would put them higher and agree with Stockenstrom, who wrote in 1807 that most Khoi in the Graaf-Reinet district were of San slave origin ¹.

"The Caffres scarcely deserve the character given them by certain of the colonists, who have always an eye towards the slavish subjection of these peoples"

The least official can call out a commando for any reason, real or imaginary, to "surprise and plunder villages, burn hovels, massacre the men and carry off the women and children into captivity"

"... it appears that a slave trade is going on among the tribes beyond the border", 1833,

Permanent contact between colonists and Southern Nguni speakers (generally referred to as Xhosa) also date to about 1770, when Boers began to settle in Zuurveld already partly settled by Gona and Xhosa. Both co-operation and conflict took place between the two societies. The main conflict was over cattle which were raided from both sides, but the exclusive occupation of the Zuurveld became increasingly more important source of conflict. Boer commandos against Xhosa not only went after stolen cattle, they were often just raiding under the pretence of Xhosa cattle theft. Maynier, Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet until 1795, was convinced that "the complaints of the boers about depredations from the Caffres were altogether unfounded, and always exaggerated, originating from a design to enrich themselves with Cattle they were in the habit of taking from the Caffres on the Commandos ..."

These commandos apart from cattle, returned also with Xhosa women and children, to be employed on the farms. The general evidence for this occurrence is good, both in the 19th and 20th Century literature. More specific information on slaving is relatively difficult to find: Jacob was taken as a slave as a child and brought up on a boer farm. He will become a controversial figure in the Natal of the 1820's and 30's. Evidence for slave trade, by which Xhosa were selling slaves also exists, but it is mostly of very general nature, with little details; in 1847 a women

1. Compiling the figures available for 1755 - 1792 shows 2403 San dead and 561 enslaved. More general figures for 1824 show 405 San slaves below 16 and 437 above for the district of Cradock alone amount to 842 together. This does not agree with the official figures of 117 San slaves for 1786-1824. But Stockenstrom reports 280 slaves from the Commando of Kommandant Nel in 1824 alone. 950 San slaves for 1772. 2 boers claimed to have participated in commandos that killed: 1. = 3200 San in 6 years : 2. 2700 + life time.

reported that her husband was sold as a slave into the Colony. These Xhosa slaves were Africans like most imported slaves. 500 -750 Xhosa slaves were fused into this legal category of slaves after the abolition of the slave trade from 1807-1834. There is only little direct evidence for this occurrence, essentially because of its illegality. I thus am glad for C. Crais's pioneering research.

The VOC's policy towards these Xhosa was indifferent at best. But at times they even encouraging. Equally indifferent the Batavians viewed the taking of Xhosa slaves as a way to reduce bloodshed on commandos. Local officials sometimes made a difference, such as Maynier who led go free a group of slaves taken by a commando from Swellendam

The policy of the British administration after 1806 was contradictory. Cape Town was proclaiming the slave trade legislation and all the rethoric and threats of penalty that goes with it. But, high Imperial officials not only failed largely to implement these laws, but at crucial times, as we shall see, were actively engages in slaving, even though they covered up their activities due to their knowledge of the penalty. It then should not surprise that lower local official at the frontier, both imperial (military and civil) and as well as part-time serving as Veldkornet or Heemraden (also colonists), were one way or another engaged in the enslaving of Xhosa. This happened by raiding them East of the Fish river or enslaving them when they got to the Colony. Inevitably ended up as slaves on farms¹.

The above slaving must be understood in the context of the general politics of the Eastern Cape. The African inhabitants of the area East of the Sundays river were not one political unit, but a number of large and small chiefdoms with complex relationships with each other. The Colonial Governments at the Cape approached the Xhosa chiefdoms as one nation, based on their pre-conceived ideas, which had to be divided from one's own country by a precise border. The Zuurveld, as an interactive zone of both colonists and Xhosa, was thus an anomaly that had to be eliminated. In 1778 a treaty between Governor Van Plettenberg and two minor Rharhabe chiefs established the Fishriver as border between the Colony and all Xhosa, believed at least by Governor and the colonists. The treaty, of course had no validity for the Xhosa chiefdoms in the Zuurveld. In this context the mutual raiding for cattle (and slaves) that took place all the time led periodically to progressively to more savage wars over the issue of Xhosa presence in the Zuurveld. Until British imperial troops were employed in 1812, the colonists were not able to expel the Xhosa.

The Zuurveld, as the "march" of the Southern Nguni, was populated, apart from the large Ndlambe chiefdom, by a number of small and very small Chiefdoms Ntine, Jingi, Dange, Mbolu, Gwali, Gqunukwenbe and others. These chiefdoms, bent on keeping their independence, came increasingly under pressure from both the large Ndlambe and Ngqika chiefdoms who wanted to incorporate them and the colonists who wanted them as labourers. In this situation these small chiefdoms were turning more and more to raiding boer farms, often in retaliation for taking of slaves. They were responsible for most of the raiding on boers farms since the chiefs of the large chiefdoms discouraged it for political reasons. It is thus reasonable to assume that most Xhosa slaves were also from these small chiefdoms. Some chiefdoms were nonetheless unable to survive in the Zuurveld and broke up either to move to the large chiefdoms or the boer farms while others moved to the Orange river and then the Transorangia, where we will encounter them

¹ It is thus not surprising that Maynier, with Dr. J. Philip, came to be regarded as a "philanthropist" villain in the Settler historiography.

again later in this paper.

Apart from Xhosa slaves there were also voluntary workers on Boer farms in the Zuurveld and elsewhere in the Eastern Cape. Most of these were from the above mentioned smaller tribes. They usually worked only for short periods on the farms. There were thus both Xhosa slaves and workers, often, on the same farm. Legislation against the use of African labour was, based on the above mentioned European idea of precise borders between "nations", were issued both under the first British occupation (1797), as well as during the Batavian period, (1803), but these laws were hardly enforcement. A few years after the second occupation of the Cape by Britain Governor Caledon, prompted by Col. Collins' report of 1810, decided begin the "clearing" of the Zuurveld by moving all Xhosa, both slaves and workers, from the boer farms to their own "tribes", with the use of 560 soldiers. This was very much against the interests of the frontier boers, who's concept of borders was not that of their Europeans colonial masters. They wanted the removal the chiefdoms from the Zuurveld, but not the removal of their labour nor the legislated non-interaction which cut them off a very good source of cheap labour.

A lot of farm workers and slaves who were with the boers from childhood were now unable and/or unwilling to become integrated into neither the large nor the small chiefdoms. Many formed into raiding bands which exacerbated the incident of raiding enormously. Very urgent pleas from Landdrosts Cuyler and Stockenstrom in late 1811 convinced the new Governor, Cradock to order the expelling of the Xhosa from the Zuurveld and any other ones who happened to be inside the Colony. 440 British troops, 431 Cape Regiment (Khoi) and 500 boers commandos attacked the Xhosa in the Zuurveld on Christmas day 1812, killing any Xhosa man in sight. By end of January 1812 they pushed 20'000 Xhosa, mainly Ndlambe, to the East of the Fish River, and capturing 2-3000 cattle.

Official policy during the period 1811 - 1828 was the almost absolute territorial segregation of Colonists and Xhosa. But, in practice the employment as well as the enslaving Xhosa continued because of the continuing labour shortage in the Eastern Cape. With the arrival of the 1820 Settlers Lt.-Governor Donkin legislated again against the employment of Xhosa, But, the 1820 Settler agriculture, which was intended to be selfsufficient with English indentured workers, collapsed. Those who remained on the land adopted the pastoral farming method of the boers and thus came to compete for the same small colonial labour pool and with it exacerbated the already existing severe labour crisis. Xhosa, both slaves and workers were thus very much needed. Finally, Governor Bourke bowed to the inevitable, when he allowed Xhosa labour in Albany district only in 1826 and in 1828 he gave in to the interests of the colonists, by opening the whole Colony to Xhosa workers (passes) with passing Ordinance 49 of 1828.

Hardly was this Ordinance passed, when the first colonists arrived at the Wesleyville, Methodist mission station to engage Xhosa workers, who had their passes signed by W. Shaw, the resident missionary. It was clear to the colonists that this legislation not the trickle of voluntary workers of the past into the flood needed to quench the Eastern Cape's long standing crisis-like labour shortage. Thus the only way to get Xhosa labour was outlined by Campbell, Civil Commissioner for Albany, who wrote "they [Xhosa] would come [into the Colony] only if they had no option, whether forced by war and destitution or coerced by the Colony. Since Atmore, A. and Marks, S. see it as any 19th Century Southern African colonial state's function "to produce, highly controllable labour, which at times was very difficult to distinguish from 'forced labour'" (read slaves), it should be

not surprise to find the Eastern Cape authorities being involved in some very "drastic" action to relieve the labour crisis shortly after Ordinance 49 coming into effect on 14. July 1828.

The fact, that Brownlee, at Buffalo river LMS Mission station (Kingwilliamstown) reported that he met a commando of +/- 50 men under Major Dundas, with women and child slaves, only a few weeks after the passing of Ordinance 49, confirms the above expectation of Eastern Cape ruling elite sponsored slavery in the Trans-Fish. The contemporary explanation for Dundas' commando was a "Zulu" attack on the Trans-Fish chiefdoms from June 1828. Dundas was sent from Grahamstown as the head of a civil/military commission to persuade Shaka to stop the attack on the Trans-Fish peoples. Reaching the Pondo of Faku Dundas received information that the "Zulu" were in their back; ie: towards the Colony: and he thus turned in fear of being cut off. On the way back they met Thembu who complained that the Zulu stole their cattle and asked to the commando to accompany them to help them attack the "Zulu" regain the cattle - Dundas & Co. agreed. Several days and 60 + dead "Zulu" later the Thembu got their 20 000 cattle back. While Dundas was away the largest colonial army (+/- 2000 men) ever to be used against Africans was assembled by Col. H. Somerset, ready to march into the Trans-Fish to intervene should the Zulu prove troublesome. Strange, there was no word to be found in Dundas' dispatches to Somerset or any later writings of his. Dundas & Co. were hardly back in the colony, when Hintza (Gcaleka) and Vosani (Thembu) cried Wolf (read: Shaka) again and Somerset begun to move his army to the Mtata river where the "Zulu" kraal was surrendered. At dawn a negotiating team was sent to the "Zulu", who immediately attacked the team so that it had to be withdrawn. The British army, strengthened by 16 000 - 20 000 Gcaleka and Thembu, attacked, chiefly with artillery on first on the town first and when the "Zulu" moved their cattle, women and children to a nearby forest into the forest until it came ablaze. Cattle, women and children fled the fire and run into the Gcaleka and Thembu who took the cattle, but began to slaughter the women and children until gallant British soldiers started to shoot their allies until they stopped that savage murdering. The "Zulu" cattle were now divided between the African allies and the British, who also took some women and children with them to the colony, since they were now without protection. In the Colony these "civilians" were "ingeboek" on farms. Only when Somerset & Co. interrogated their "prisoners" did they realise with recourse that they attacked the Ngwane and not the "Zulu". The Ngwane fled, some stayed in the Trans-Fish, but some joined Matiwane, their chief, who went back to Natal where he subjected himself to the treacherous Dingaan who had him killed.

There are so many problems with this explanation that it is wholly unacceptable to explain the events of June - August 1828. It is quiet clear that the Grahamstown military elite under Col. H. Somerset (Commander of British forces in the Eastern Cape), who were blatantly pro-colonist, were the active force in this British invasion of the Trans-Fish of mid 1828. Everything centred on Grahamstown. Cape Town, the general colonial public and particularly philanthropists, local as well as European were only selectively informed. Even Gov. Bourke only got those bit of information Grahamstown thought he needed to make the "right" decision; ie: to authorise army intervention in the Trans-Fish. Due to the distance between the two cities it does not surprise that disinformation was very successfully. Some concerned contemporary writers, in the S.A. Commercial Advertiser as well as in their books, criticised the violence used against the Ngwane, but non was able to see what actually happened. Now given the above lack of unedited contemporary information it is clear that only the critical use of circumstantial evidence will bring us closer to understand this extraordinary event. After all where and when in history has a

colonial army ever fought an enemy (Ngwane) of neighbouring African for charity?

To unravel the issue it is best to start with the Ngwane state who was shot to bits in 1828. As far as can be asserted the Ngwane lived in the area of today's Vryheid in Natal. The fact that they fled due West, just below the Watershed to the Transorangia, to the Bergville area suggests that they were not pushed by the Zulu who lived towards the sea from Vryheid, but by people connected with the D. Bay slave trade who attacked them from the East, and this not later than 1817-1819. There, if not before, the Ngwane turned multiethnic state by incorporating other people affected by the slave raiding. But they were not save below the Giant Castle of the Drakensberg as further attacks from the East made them flee further West into the upper Caledon Valley, by 1821-1822 the latest. Here they were not the zuluised horde of the 'mfecane' paradigm, but one of at least 4 African states that settled on flat-topped mountain fortresses within +/- 50 km of each other. All four states, Moshesh's, that of the Hlubi, Ngwane and Tlokwa were under constant attack of the Khoibas slave raiders, as the rest of the Transorangia throughout the 1820's and 1830's. The Hlubi state collapsed and Hlubi, as well as other Sotho-Tswana speaking refugees were incorporated into the other three states. When the Khoibas attacks became too threatening the Ngwane state decided avoid the fate of the Hlubi by moving to the Trans-Fish. There existed a wide band of land, close to the Drakensberg, between the Colony and Natal, which was occupied by San but not by Southern Nguni speakers. On their way there the Ngwane met resistance from the Thembu. But after the Ngwane won the battle of Hanglip (Queenstown) in 1825, they moved into that above mentioned wide band of land. It is not clear quiet where, but because of events to come it is my hypothesis, that they moved further East the Mtata.

To be able to understand the events of mid 1828 better it is necessary to bring the three groups of English merchants settled in Port Natal in 1824-1825 ("P.Natal UK" from now on). I will be dealing more detailed with the P.Natal UK later in this paper. My hypothesis is that they were not a few frightened and isolated adventurers who hung on to the harbour of Port Natal to do a little bit of not very profitable legitimate trade, but they got themselves engaged in the building up of "prazos". They each had "tribes" who worked the land; African armies with guns, called izinkumbi (locusts), hunting Elephant & Hypos and raided slaves; as well as trading of both Ivory and slaves. Their slaves were exported both overseas and clandestinely into the Cape Colony, either by ship or through the Trans-Fish. The raiding of P.Natal UK spread further and further and increasingly in co-operation with parts of the Zulu state, particularly Dingaan. It. King informed the readers of the S.A. Commercial Advertiser that the people of Matiwane were attacked for slaves by the Zulu (and izinkumbi) in that above mentioned band of land. The Ngwane state was thus forced to move further West to the upper Mtata river (today's Umtata area).

From 1827 P.Natal UK were communicating to the Grahamstown colonist and military elite, Cape Town and the general public (news papers) that Shaka planned to conquer and either exterminate or incorporate all the Trans-Fish tribe, so that he could become the Colony's neighbour. This was obviously nonsense written for a certain purpose, because Shaka's state between the Tongat and the Mfolosi river was as large as he could manage, if not larger already. The purpose was to prepare the Cape not for the Zulu massive attack on the Trans-Fish, but for the rumours of such a slave raid of a Zulu, P.Natal & izinkumbi army on chiefdoms in the Mzimvubu/Mzinkulu area and Southern Natal in June 1828. The victims were not the Pondo of Faku, an old ally of Fynn and most probable a slaving state, as usually said to be, but we know of Mpondomise villages which were depopulated in these raids.

Col. H. Somerset was not only informed on impending slave raid by Lt. King who arrived by ship from P.Natal in May 1828, but I am sure he helped to prepare if not the actual attack then surely its timing by communicating with the P.Natal UK via Wesleyan missionary stations on the land route to P. Natal. After news of the passing of Ordinance 49, Somerset began to "inform" Gov. Bourke on the news on the "Zulu" attack. He then sent Major Dundas and 50 men, officially, as a civil/military commission to Shaka in mid July, to try to persuade Shaka from his chosen path of the conquest of the Trans-Fish by informing him of the British unwillingness to accept such an action. But Dundas was up to something else. He went to Faku's place where he picked up women and child slaves caught by the Zulu, P.Natal UK & izinkumbi slave raid and transfer them to the Colony to sell them to colonist. Fortunately, LMS missionary Brownlee saw these slaves and wrote about it. That Dundas & Co. were not attacking the Ngwane should be quiet obvious from the following facts: It could not take army scouts of Somerset's colonial army 6 days to find the Ngwane state if Dundas & Co. were there barely a month earlier. Were the Ngwane attacked in July would they not have moved again to find security somewhere else? But Somerset's army found them in well established villages. The Ngwane were absolutely unaware until attacked that there was an army upon them. This is surely not the behaviour of a people recently attacked. They would have scouting parties out and sentries in the vicinity of their villages - but the Ngwane expected no evil because they were not attacked before.

It should now be equally clear that the Dundas slave transport was only one part of the whole operation. Dundas' reports to GRH from the Trans-Fish full of "Zulu-scare" were sent dutifully sent to Cape Town, together with an request to be authorised to enter the Trans-Fish in order to stem the Zulu invasion should Dundas' mission be unsuccessfully. In the mean time, Somerset gathered a large army consisting of Imperial and Khoi troop as well as commandos of Dutch and English colonist. The exact number of combatants is difficult to ascertain because varying number given by many sources, but +/- 2000 should be correct. As already mentioned this was the largest European army so far used in Africa, with sufficient artillery power. Gov. Bourke granted the permission, as expected, and as soon as Dundas was in the Colony Hintsa and Vosani sent their "Shaka-Shaka" cries to Grahamstown, at least as far as written reports were concerned. Somerset moved his army with the 16 000 Gcaleka and Thembu auxiliaries to the Mbashe river on the 20th August and sent out scouts to look for a suitable victim to enslave. The question at this stage is, would any chiefdom have sufficed, or where they actually looking for the Ngwane, not because Dundas was there before, but possibly because the Thembu were quite happy to get rid of an enemy? However, the Ngwane were found on the 26th of August. The army was moved towards them on the 27th and in the night that followed it surrounded the Ngwane. It is not clear how the Ngwane settlement was set up, except that it was in a valley, such as Grahamstown, surrounded by hills. There was no attempt to negotiate, the cannons erupted just after dawn on the 28th and what followed can only be termed a massacre. Artillery and guns were fired on the villages, and while the men attacked suicidally, the women, children and cattle moved into the nearby dense bush. The cannons were then turned on the bush which began to burn and that forced the cattle as well as the women and children to emerge from it to be caught by both the colonial army and its African auxiliaries. There might well have been some mistreatment or murder of Ngwane women and children which occurs in the contemporary accounts. But both the army as well as the Africans were out to get slaves from them selves. Gcaleka and Thembu were met by writer who had Ngwane captives.

Somerset then moved his army back to the colony, herding both the large

herd of cattle and numerous slaves, not just the few he mentioned in his dispatches to Cape Town. The details about how these slaves were brought into the colony and how they were distributed without arousing the suspicion of the philanthropist and anti-slavery law-enforcers are not clear at this stage of the research. One detail though is known: In April 1829 French sailors from a French ship that was wrecked on the Trans-Fish coast on their way to Grahamstown saw +/- 100 Ngwane women and children in a concentration camp just outside Fort Willshire. The fact that they were kept by the army leads to two conclusions: It clinches the argument of Somerset involvement in the slave raid on the Ngwane. It also shows that Ngwane were imprisoned in the "Ceded Territory" until they were able to be moved. It thus stands to reason that Ngwane slaves were kept in other such camps at other locations in the "Ceded Territory", forts or otherwise. As welcome as this additional labour though was in the Colony, it was not enough. This raid on the Ngwane made it clear to the colonists that not only had the support of the army but also the technology to defeat any African state in the Trans-Fish.

The issue of the labour crisis remained a reality and was continued to be debated both among colonists and imperial officials until the mid 1830's. commando seizures of children continued of course, but it was no permanent solution. In January 1834 a new Governor, D'Urban, assumed power who was not only for the expansion of the British empire in general and the Cape in particular. He was what the colonist were hoping for a long time, he was pro-colonist and this interested in finding a permanent solution the labour crisis. The British empire, in the meantime, prepared to abolish the system of slave ownership at the end of 1834 and D'Urban knew that this could only worsen the labour problem, not only of the Eastern Cape but of the whole Colony. In this section on the war of 1834-1835 and the fingo slaves I am drawing extensively on the recent research of Allan Webster. For more details an all these issues see his conference paper.

While D'Urban dealt with all these things in Cape Town local officials and officers in Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort were using 1833-34 to make the life of some Rharhabe chiefdoms under Tyali, Maqoma, Qeno and Bhotumane really difficult. They forced these chiefdoms with violent army patrols to move from one spot to the next (abandoning crops) during these years, until finally out of good agricultural land onto dry and thus poor land. Two very violent patrol at the end of November 1834 led to these chiefdoms attack the Colony in mid December. But this was not the "irruption of the Kafir horde", as it has been portrayed by the settler historiography from Godlonton to Thompson, L.. It was the uprising of 4 small chiefdom in desperation against a violent Colony and British army, which led to 43 white deaths throughout the whole war which lasted far into 1835. African deaths, were not counted, but were several times that number.

Somerset organised the immediate defence and when Sir Harry Smith got to Grahamstown he realised that this was an opportunity not to be missed. Troops and commandos were organised and these moved against these 4 Rharhabe chiefdoms in January 1835. These chiefdoms were easily pushed out of the colony, defeated or pinned into the forested Amatola mountains. D'Urban & Co. were not happy with this result, they had much higher issues at stake. In late April 1835 750 British soldiers, 1639 colonists on commando and 800 Khoi auxiliaries, an army dwarfing that of 1828 invaded Rharhabe and then Gcaleka territory. An all conquering and destroying machine was let loose on these people, that killed men, enslaved women and children, captured cattle and small stock, burned crops and wrecked imizi. While a case against the Rharhabe as chiefdoms who attacked the colony could be made out, that given as the reason why the Gcaleka had to be attacked was utterly farcical. The Gcaleka chief Hintsa was regarded as the

supreme chief, so D'Urban argued, and thus no one attacks the Colony without the supreme chief at least knowing about it. Also, so D'Urban, did Hintsa look after the cattle the 4 Rharhabe chiefdoms stole from the Colony. Hintsa agreed to pay any number of cattle to get the invading colonial horde off his people. On the way to these cattle Hintsa was shot and his ears cut off. The details of this political murder are surrounded with suspicions ever since. This British "scourge" was not content in enslaving Rharhabe and Gcaleka but raided the whole Trans-Fish full. We know Harry Smith raided slaves deep into Mpondomise territory.

17 000 slaves, mainly women and children, were moved towards the Colony: a lot were settled into holding camps in the upper Chumie valley and between Pedie and the Colony in the newly conquered between the Keiskamma and the Kei from where they were successively moved into the Colony to farms in the Colony. Note the parallel with the aftermath of the 1828 slave raid on the Ngwane. Others remained there while the breadwinner became a migrant labourer to the neighbouring colony, visiting "home", the army controlled holding camps, periodically. Since it would have been outright dangerous, anti-slave trade legislation, to bring people into the Colony who were recognisably slaves a cover was needed and found in the story and the term Fingo. Accordingly, the people who came to the Colony came voluntary because they were racially different from the Gcaleka. They, so the story goes, were the remnants of the tribes of Natal which Shaka exterminated. When they came to the Trans-Fish they were enslaved by the Gcaleka until the valiant British army came to rescue them. Note how the blame of slavery is blamed on the victim of a massive slave raid! D'Urban & Co. provided these slaves with an artificial ethnic identity = "fingo", which stuck until today. The mechanics of how this artificial identity was accepted and internalised by the people involved is still an issue to be decided. The "fingo" labour solved not only the Eastern Cape's labour problem, but by implication that of the whole Colony for a number of years to come. There was now a source of labour who were tied to the patriarchal organised farms, cheap and plentifully. "Fingo" being a legal category made it easy for colonists who had illegal black slaves to fuse them into the new "fingo" ethnic group. Any slaves raided after 1935 thus became automatically defined as "fingo".

The "bushman war" as such, of the Northern frontier, ended just before 1800 with the virtual disappearance of San inside the borders of the Colony due to a combination of genocide, slavery and forced emigration. In those same years, with the labour shortage worsening, official and private encroachment increased on all remaining independent pockets of Khoi, those on mission stations, small chiefdoms of Xhosa in the Zuurveld and increasingly also on Bastards to force them onto the farms. This led to further emigration into the Transorangia (TRO), including several groups of Xhosa. The most significant body of emigrants were Bastards, soon to be known under the term Griqua, from Namaqualand under the leadership of the Kok and Barends families. There these emigrant groups were joined by runaway slaves and whites from the Colony as well as Kora (Khoi) of the TRO. These groups were all organised as commandos, a form of organisation they learned by participating in colonial commandos against both the Xhosa and particularly in the "bushman war". It is necessary to have a generic term for these various ethnic commando based groups and I suggest the following term: Khoibas. As commandos the Khoibas were able to use Colonial technology, particularly horses, guns, wagons to survive in the TRO. Apart from grazing cattle and trading colonial goods to Sotho-Tswana speaking people Khoibas groups came to apply their experience of the "bushman war" to raiding San on their own account and then selling these slaves to the

Colony which was a unsatiated labour hunger.

As San became scarcer, the labour crisis in the Colony increased, particularly with the brake down of the 1820 Settler scheme and the Khoibas became more experienced as well as better equipped they extended their slave raids to Sotho-Tswana people. The first of these attacked were the Hoya in the OFS, then Kwena-Fokeng of the Caledon valley, by 1823 they reached the upper Caledon attacking not only the various Kgatla but also refugee chiefdoms from Natal and finally they clashed with a Zulu ibutho in central Natal. Other Khoibas raided into Botswana, the Magalisberg area, Pretoria and by 1824-25 into Eastern Transvaal as far as the Ermelo area where the Ndebele state under Mzilikazi was already straining under the attacks of slave raiders from the Delagoa Bay area.

A veritable slave system came into existence. Incident of Sotho-Tswana people selling slaves, particularly children (officially called orphans) are known and Khoibas were surely not slow in tapping that slave source as well. Khoibas first took their slave to the boers closest to the Colony and traded them there from where they then were sold further into the Colony along the same network which was established for the slave trade of San inside the Colony in the late 18th Century. With an increasing supply, particularly of Sotho-Tswana slaves, colonists from all over the Eastern Cape went to the Northern border to buy slaves from the raiders. In due course itinerant traders/merchants, particularly after trading trips into the TRO became legal in 1825, became heavily involved in the buying of slaves in the TRO, moving them into the Colony and selling them there again.

The most bizarre incident of which we know in the TRO was the so called battle of Dithakong. Rumours of devastating hordes in the interior reached LMS missionary Moffat in Kuruman from at least 1822 onwards. Looking at all references these hordes, called Mantatees from 1823, some an interesting picture emerges. (1.) Mantatees is most likely a European corruption of Matabele and this term meant both lowlander, ie: Nguni or Tsonga speakers, as well as raiders and not just the people of Mzilikazi, except that these were also raiding lowlanders. (2.) The rumours to Mantatees often include a physical description of people who, at the time, were identified as Portuguese or Portuguese Bastards. (3.) These rumours referred to the Mantatees as raiding in the N.E. of Kuruman, particularly the Magalisberg and further N.. (4.) We know from Ngwato and other chiefdoms to the North of the Magalisberg that Portuguese/Bastards/Tsonga came up the Limpopo to trade and raid for slaves. The only explanation for the above rumours heard by Moffat is: that Matabele slave raiders (raiding lowlanders), including Portuguese/Bastards were slave raiding to the N.E. of Kuruman. These rumours were caused concern among the Tlhaping at Kuruman.

When Moffat was ready to leave on a trip to the Ngwaketse in Amy 1823, Mathebe, chief of the Tlhaping at Kuruman told that he just received news that the Mantatees were out there and approaching the general Kuruman area. What Mathebe was doing her though is not reporting on a real invasion, he was just protecting his economic interests. Mathebe established the Tlhaping as the monopolistic trade outlet to the Cape for all the Tswana chiefdoms to the North. He successfully persuaded whites not only from travelling and trading further inland, which would undercut his trade monopoly, by a the scare story that Makabba, chief of the Ngwaketse, kills all whites immediately. Just travel to Makabba, as Moffat wanted, Mathebe regarded as being dangerous since it would have exposed his Ngwaketse scare story as a fraud and thus endanger his trade monopoly. Mathebe thus used the pre-existing Mantatee rumours to invent a second "commercial scare" to prevent Moffat from going. Moffat, not seeing through Mathebe's intrigue,

was non the less not very concerned and left on his trip. For days he revised constant reports on the approach of the Mantatees by Tlhaping living in outstations (reports inspired by Mathebe's messages to these subjects of his). Further on he meets Rolong who also tell him that the Mantatees are approaching and these reports convinced him that there was a horde approaching. He returns to Kuruman where, concerned about his mission people, he takes Mathebe's continuing reports on the Mantatee threat, given by Mathebe to prevent Moffat from ever thinking of travelling further North again, as confirmation of his perception that a real attack was looming. Moffat decided to act and placed himself in command: he organised a public meeting, went to Griquatown and returned with +/- 100 armed Griqua, went on a scouting trip to Dithakong, tried to negotiate with the "Mantatee", and led the Griqua into battle against what he thought were 50 000 "Mantatee".

Mothibi was forced to play along with Moffat after he realised that his new "commercial jealousy scare" was developing a dynamic of its own, - and since this scare was his only chance to restrict European trading to Kuruman. When Moffat went to fetch Griqua horsemen, Mothibi feared that if there was no "horde" to be attacked, the Griquas would take his cattle. To find a victim people for the raid was easy. When Mathebe moved to Kuruman with LMS missionary Read in 1817 a split occurred in the Tlhaping state, with some, among of which were the Maidu, remaining to form their own state. What is not clear is that they stayed at Dithakong or another town in the area. Mathebe who wanted to re-unit the two states felt that there was no better way to do this by having the his rebellious subjects attacked by the Griqua. The facts, that the inhabitants of Dithakong or what ever the name of the town was, moved to Kuruman to join Mathebe and that the Maidu at the end on 1823 were defined as hostile enemies of the Tlhaping supports the theory that Mathebe used the Griqua in a civil war that ended in re-incorporation of people Mathebe thought belonged under his rule.

Moffat's confused description of the "battle" shows, that the Griqua attacked two groups, one inside and the other outside of the town. The group outside the town consisted of at least some Hurutshe and of many Kwena refugees, as both Moffat and Mellvil, confirmed. It is not clear if they were part of the state attacked or if they were a group of refugees (not horde) who were at the wrong time (26 June 1823) at the wrong place. Moffat's account also shows that there were South-Tswana women and children were collected by both Moffat, Mellvil (Government agent at Griquatown) and the Griqua. For Moffat this was an act of mercy to look after these destitute, after all he brought the calamity over them. For Melvill and the Griqua this, ie: slaves, was part of the reason they left their town and the 4000 cattle they took was the other reason.

This "battle" had very important consequences in the Colony. San slaves on the farm was easily defined as Khoi. But Africans were not since they were legally not allowed in the Colony and thus were a source of legal problems for their owners. Shortly after the news of the Mantatees reached the Cape officials and then the reading public by means of the Government Gazette. Officials allowed the poor women and children of the defeated Mantatee horde to be brought to the Colony were they were "ingeboek" to colonists on farms to ensure their upkeep, for their labour of course. From now onwards any Sotho-Tswana, who either fled to the Colony or was brought in as a slave was now defined as Mantatee by his employer. Mantatee became the perfect legal smokescreen for the colonist (both Dutch and English) owner of any enslaved Sotho-Tswana people.

The Colonists were not the only people who made use of South-Tswana slaves. Both the Griqua and Kora came to have large slave populations who were not only domestics slaves but particularly engaged in agriculture for their

Griqua/Kora owners. These Khoibas raids lasted far into the 1830's, but the participants and the general context was changing. The Griqua surely the most important raiders before 1822. In that year the Colony sent Melvill to Griquatown as government agent. Him and the resident missionary established the pro-missionary Waterboer as chief against the heads of the traditional leaders of the Kok and Barends families. This led to a move of the Kok clan to Campbell, the Barends clan to Danielskuil and more marginal people, the Bergenaars, to move into a mountainous area between the Riet and Modderriver. Melvill regarded all three as being in rebellion against their legitimate chief, Waterboer and wrote to the Cape Govt. about the raiding and slaving of particularly the Bergenaars. This does not mean that the others, including Waterboer and himself, were not slave raiding, but he was able to put the blame for all onto the Bergenaars and thus portray Griquatown as blameless. Waterboer's conflict with the Bergenaars led him to attack their base in 1824 and to take 4000 cattle as well as hundreds of slaves, which he incorporated into his own slave labour at Griquatown. By 1825 both the Barend and the Kok clans felt themselves far too close to Griquatown for their independence and began to look better places to settle. The Barends moved to Boetsap in 1827 from where they continued to raid until a massive raid of theirs on Mzilikazi's Ndebele turned out to be a total defeat for Barend. When Dr. J. Philip, superintendent of the LMS in S.A., visited the TRO he met Adam Kok who asked him to allow the Kok clan to move to an old San mission belonging to the LMS. Philip, knowing, who rightly regarded A. Kok as a chief of the Bergenaars, agreed to this request in the hope that secured land rights will attract Bergenaars to settle down as pastoral grazing farmers and leave their raiding. The Kok clan as well as many Bergenaars moved to that ex-mission which came to be known as Philippolis in 1826.

The Griqua raiding continued unabated into the 1830's, but events originating in the Colony brought some important changes. Hunting expeditions were always part of trekboer existence. It provided biltong, skins, Ivory and other products for the Cape Town and overseas market as well as slaves for the farms. By the late 18th century these expeditions began to reach into the TRO from where the colonists usually also returned with slaves, first Khoi and San, later also South-Tswana people. The number of trips into the TRO increased drastically from 1819. We have references to such trips into the Orange - Caledon rivers triangle, but trips were also going further afield. From the mid-1820's draught prevailed the Northern "Veldkornetskappe" of the Graaf Reinet district from where Dutch colonists moved their herds and wagon into the TRO. First seasonally only, later permanently. Such boers were now much closer to the source of San and Sotho-Tswana slaves, slaving raids on whom were thus also carried out, alone or together with Khoibas or even African allies. The evidence, both general, middle specific and specific for this boer slaving; and buying slaves from both Khoisan as well as San and Sotho-Tswana people; in the TRO both by colonial hunter and grazers is large. Boer slave raids on San and Sotho-Tswana mission peoples were recorded particularly detailed by the missionaries. With the general turmoil due to slave raiding in the interior refugee groups were in need of security and some of these attacked themselves voluntarily to boers.

The Griqua under A. Kok had to deal more and more with the boers settling on their land. This came at a time when the Griqua slave trading faced a massive crisis, because slaves became scarcer, victim people put up much stronger defences, boers were able to both raid and slave themselves instead of buying them from the Griqua as well as the drying up of the Cape labour market, due to the availability of large numbers of "fingo". It became clear to the Griqua leadership in Philippolis that their only salvation lay in preserving their land and possibly increasing their land

holding against encroaching boers. In this process their slaving decreased all the time. The Kora, connected with both the Kok clan and the Bergenaars did not have the European concept of land ownership and did thus not share the concern of the Griquas. They separated from the Griqua and continued to slave raid in the TRO until the boer states, results of the great trek, stopped them.

Natal comes into the picture for a number of reasons, not only because of the P.Natal's UK's participation in the events of mid 1828, but because all of them had direct ties with the Colony and particularly with the Eastern Cape. But the story begins further North in Delagoa Bay in 1823 where there not only three British war ships, the Leven and the Barracouta under Capt. Owen, engaged in the surveying of the coast of S.E. Africa, and the Andromache under Commodore Nourse, in charge of Simonstown naval station and with it both the Southern Atlantic and the South Western Indian Ocean from 1822 until his death in 1824. There were also the ships belonging/chartered to Cape Town merchant houses, the Salisbury under Lt. King with merchant J.R. Thompson and F.G. Farwell, the Jane and the Orange Grove of merchant H. Nourse, brother of Commodore, with two supercargo (the on board merchants) H.F. Fynn and Ch. Maynard, an in law of H. Nourse. The naval ships were busy with surveying the Bay and Cpt. Owen accepted a treaty with the Thembe chiefdom whereby the latter voluntary renounced its sovereignty and transferred it to Britain, at least so he reported to London. What he wanted was to turn Delagoa Bay into a British harbour but Portuguese resistance and London's reluctance to accept such a highly suspect treaty foiled the scheme. Meanwhile the merchants put up trading posts with the Mabudu and other, rival, chiefdoms in the Bay and did good business until their clashes with Portuguese, as well as the lack of official backing, ie: the treaty, made it clear that Delagoa Bay was not as viable as they first thought. At Delagoa Bay these merchants came into contact with Hollontontes or Vathvas, from the South, who's chief was called Shaka and who invited them to come and trade directly with them.

The contemporary literature fails to make it clear what goods these Cape Town based traders were trading. The most important article of trade from that Bay were always slaves, even though the numbers exported, as far as we know, were moderate during the 18th century. In the early 19th Century this trend changed drastically as Dr. J. Cobbing's 2nd paper to this conference makes clear. Given the slave trade legislation it is thus hardly surprising that virtually no direct evidence for the engagement of these British subjects in the slave trade can be found. But an increasing body of circumstantial evidence has been collected and interpreted, notable by C. Gorham, also presenting a paper in this conference. "Mbuyazi [African name of H.F. Fynn] told me he ... would not have required to be in this part of Africa, had it not been for certain specie that ought to have been shipped at Cape Town but wasn't"¹.

It is clear that he could not refer to Ivory since that was well imported, as about every thing else that was at least partly legal. What ought to

¹ Webb, C. & Wright, J.B. (eds.) The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, 1976, (Pietermaritzburg & Durban), p. 58.

A special thanks goes to Cathy Gorham for this Reference! Particularly slaves were sold off Portuguese ships re-supplying in the bays or river mouths of the Cape Colony nothing would be known due to the absence of critical observers, but precedence of such landing in the 18th confirm viability of such landings.

have been imported into the Colony, given the labour crisis, were slaves. Illegal slave imports into the Colony was no new issue, pertaining particularly to the Western Cape, if only because of existence of Government and the existence of critical observers. In the 1780's the VOC had great difficulties to contain the illegal landing of slaves both for avoiding a slave landing tax and certain undesirable slaves from Java. Governor Young of the first British occupation was recalled to London in 1797 due his involvement in illegal slave dealings. The situation got worse after the abolition of the slave trade. There was a Cape commission of inquiry in 1813 which confirmed the existence of illegal importation of slaves into the Colony, though little specific evidence was found. harbour, with involvement of Cape Town officials. Rumours continued in Cape Town of further illegal imports in the 1810's. To land slaves at Cape Town was very risky, but that is because we know of it. Of slave landed in other

Not that the Navy would have been beyond being engaged. During the Napoleonic war Naval officers and crews were paid a premium for every slave (called "Prize Negroes". Such slaves, if caught in the Southern Atlantic/Indian Ocean were then brought to Cape Town and "ingeboek" on farms for up to 14 years. With the peace of Vienna in 1815 the taking of "Prize Negroes" came to an end, but the precedent of money for slaves existed. It is here that I want to make the link with the Navy's presence in Delagoa Bay in 1823. What was Cpt. Owen's motive in getting a treaty which gave Britain sovereignty over Delagoa Bay? British glory? The presence of Cape traders, linked to the most senior naval officer by family ties, and engaged in the slave trade strongly suggests complicity. This hypothesis is strengthened to the point of certainty if one takes into consideration that in his own writing Cpt. Owen admits that he ostensibly took local (African) crews on board, what happened to these Africans is no where recorded. A shrewd observer wrote in 1797-98 that it was normal custom by walers to take on African crews at Delagoa Bay for waling and then selling them on the way home in the Cape Colony. There is a strong parallel to Cpt. Owen's actions in this regard and I suggest, that Cpt. Owen, co-operating with Commodore Nourse and his brother Henry, was actively engaged in slaving.

Their plans not working out in Delagoa Bay both merchant houses' ships, on the way back found, P.Natal acceptable as an alternative base for their operations. Back in Cape Town, contrary to the accepted understanding there was no the combined effort. But right from the beginning there were two Cape Town consortium who engaged two managers for their Natal slave and other trading operations: J.R. Thompson & Co. supported F.G. Farwell and Nourse & Co. (incl. Navy) supported H.F. Fynn. And these consortia were thus in competition to each other from the word go. Writers at the time, particularly N. Isaacs, glossed over their contest to present an image of co-operation since both these consortia were engaged in the same illegal business and thus could not sink the other without "going down" themselves. Farwell negotiated for trading rights in Natal with Governor Somerset. Fynn made use of the latter's permission by pretending to be part of Farwell's party and left Cape Town a month or the before Farwell. In Natal Fynn went immediately to the South and established his rights there by the time Farwell & Co. arrived at P.Natal in June 1824. Farwell then went immediately to Shaka to establish trading ties there. He claimed to have got a land treaty from Shaka covering 35 miles on the coast, covering both N. and S. of P.Natal and 100 miles inland. In reality all he got was the temporary right to reside and trade in P.Natal. Apart from Fynn and Farwell there was going to be third local merchant for an outside merchant group. Lt. King, who captained the Salisbury for J.R. Thompson's trip to Delagoa Bay in 1823, left the Cape for London shortly after he offloaded

from that trip. There he was able to find merchant backing, which included the firm Redman & Co.. Although this needs still to be confirmed, it seems most likely from N. Isaacs immediately becoming a partner in the firm after his arrival in London in 1832. King then arrived in Natal in 1825 not as a helper in need to the Farwell group, as King claimed his reason to go to Natal was. Farwell was in no trouble at all, he got resupplied just a few days before by Cpt. Owen, an old slaving acquaintance, on his way to the Cape. Lt. King really went to Natal to be an independent local merchant for his London consortium.

These three P.Natal merchant organisations included, apart from their heads of several whites and Khoi subordinates. Farwell had Cane, J. and Ogle, H., Lt. King had the largest staff, not only the 17 year old, only partially educated N. Isaacs, but also a number of Sailors and Fynn had his Khoi. All these, whites and Khoi, turned themselves quickly into "prazeros". This is a concept from the Zambezi valley, Mozambique. It referred to Portuguese males who legally married local African women (lobola) to create political alliances; conquered chiefdoms who's chiefs they became and who had to produce agricultural products; organised African slave armies who kept the peace in the chiefdoms, raided other chiefdoms for slaves and other goods and were generally powerful military forces to be reckoned with. The way the P.Natal UK organised themselves is so similar to the "prazeros", that the parallel suggests itself. The P.Natal UK had legal wives (lobola) and growing "tribes" under them, not only the three major merchants but also the lower ones and the Khoi. They usually had a European type house close to the umuzi of a wife they regarded important. The orthodox explanation was that these people were remnants of the tribe of Natal Shaka exterminated whom the P.Natal UK pitied and thus looked after and protected from the cruel Zulu. Nothing is further from it. These were people who, to the main part, were moved forcefully. Others and there is evidence, were political refugees from the Zulu state and these were incorporated into the prazos.

Each of the three trading operation had its own area in the P.Natal area and also further afield. We know, that Fynn had a whole string of imizi from the Mzimikulu to P.Natal and Ogle too had imizi in the South. The people under the control of the P. Natal UK were estimated to amount to 10 000 people by the mid 1830's. Most important for the maintenance of order and subjection of their chiefdoms, as well as for hunting, trading and slave raiding were the izinkumbi, their armies, partially armed with guns. There was a Senate at Port Natal, consisting of the major tribal chiefs and the major P.Natal UK which acted as Parliament, Executive and also supreme court with the right to impose the death penalty. Not that the P. Natal UK had much scruples in killing anybody they wanted to, H.F. Fynn was not for nothing known as Mbuyazi, the slaughterer.

As to the details of the P.Natal UK's slaving, including how slaves were exported, there is still great scope for research. What seems clear is that they were essentially raiding in Natal, with Fynn concentrating on the South and today's Eastern Transkei. Farwell and King co-operated with both Shaka and Dingaan in attacks on chiefdoms to the North of the Zulu state and returned to P.Natal with slaves. What is the evidence for this slave trade in Natal? I think the following items should make the point! The existence of the Slave trade in Natal was clearly established by bishop Callaway when, after presenting many "Zulu nursery tales" with references to cannibals, concluded that cannibals refers undoubtedly to white slave trader who ate people, it took them away from their community without them having died. After Lt. King's death N. Isaacs took over King's operations until he finally left in 1831 on a trip on a US ship, visiting all the important slaving ports on the African East Coast, including Madagascar and

the Comores. There he met Ramataka ex-governor of Mahajanga for King Radama I of Madagascar who became rich there due to the slave trade. He was an exile on the Comores since fled Radama's death in 1828 and wanted to move somewhere, and Isaacs suggested Natal. Isaacs, back at the Cape in 1832 made the blunder to recommend Ramataka for settlement in Natal because his request of was sent to London with a letter by Governor Cole referring to the recent complaint of the Sultan of the Comores that Ramataka not only conquered his main island Johanna and that he was a slaver too. Isaacs never got any reply for his effort to import a slaver with his army into Natal. Isaacs not only continued Lt. King's connection with the firm Redman & Co., but became a partner in it soon after his arrival in London in 1832. In the early 1840's the old Port Natal slaver went as the resident partner to Sierra Leone where he organised slave exports with his local "coloured" girlfriend who was known to still export slaves in the 1860's. Isaacs was found out but, after his flight to England, the evidence went against him down in a ship and it never came to a trail. If it did we would most probably have learned that he was very much engaged in slaving in Natal in 1820's & 30's. The P.Natal UK also had allies in Natal, who slaved and then sold them their "catch". One of these allies was the Fodo, chief for the Hlangwini, or Botwas (Isaacs). He continued to be engaged in slaving in the Natal under the Volksraad. He was instrumental in bringing about the combined Boer, Ogle's izinkumbi, and Fodo's Hlangwini slave raid on the Bhaca in December 1840.

The record for Ships in and out of Port Natal is very thin, but is clear that US ships appeared there from 1828 at least onwards. There seems to have been three ways of exporting slaves. Adult men and some women either onto ships at Port Natal and in Delagoa Bay (as Cane in 1827) or women and children through the Trans-Fish to the Cape, whereby Lochrenberg, who travelled through the whole Trans-Fish and Southern Natal, was most probably one of those in charge of the slave transport to the Cape. But traders, hunters and commandos also played their part in that transport.

The P.Natal UK's relationship with Britain remained ambiguous. One thing is clear, they wanted no interference in their illegal business. What they then sought was British support for their "prazo" state without interference. During the 1820's they made little "noise" in the Cape. But the P.Natal UK's situation changed irreversibly from 1830 onwards. Their cooperation with Dingaan turned increasingly into violent conflict. There were invasions of the "prazo" state by Zulu amabutho, attacks by P.Natal UK on Zulu amabutho in Natal, and various small slave raids on people inside the Zulu state. The precise reasons and the development of this conflict still needs to be studied in depth. 1830 also saw the influx of other merchants into Port Natal which undermined the monopoly of major P.Natal UK's, who consisted by 1830 of H.F. Fynn in alliance with N. Isaacs (Lt. King died in 1828) and Cane, J & Ogle, H. who divided Farwell's holdings after the latter's death in 1829. By mid 1830's the merchant population increased to +/- 30, many 1820 Settlers from the Eastern Cape. Many of these were interested in "prazo's" of their own, but their mercantile interests were more geared towards legal trade and land speculation with a British annexation of Natal in mind. These operations of these other merchants made the secrete shipping of slaves from Port Natal more and more difficult. As a result of these developments Isaacs left Natal in 1831, with the idea of returning and Fynn finally left in 1834, not to return until the 1850's but Cane and Ogle stayed on.

Calls for the annexation of Natal went out, particularly by the post-1830 arrivals, to both the Cape Governor and London, where they were answered with the usual; no money for colonial expansion. 1834 saw the dispatch to London of a memorial of 190 Cape Town merchants for the annexation of Natal

supported by a London based pro-Cape Town merchant Lobby, the largest attempt to persuade Government yet. It met the same reply as previous and subsequent petitions. Isaacs, after his return to London, tried something new. He advertised a chartered company for the colonialization of Natal, but failed to get enough support. The advantage of such a company would have been direct British political and diplomatic support without any interference from London. By 1837 there existed a well organised "prazero" state at Port Natal with both civil and also military structures. The failure of gaining any support from Britain increased their resolve to make it on their own and at that independent from Britain.

To be able to understand the further developments in Natal we have to turn the great trek. All accounts in Dutch, Afrikaans and English are based on H. Cloete's 5 published lectures of 1856 or are slight reworkings of it. The last academic history written on the great trek was the book of the same name by E. Walker in 1934. It is important to note, that until now in the history on the great trek, as well as that on the 'mfecane', historians have hardly begun to their task of asking themselves what the critical questions of the great trek are. I am going to concentrate on the questions of great trek salving and "its" relations with the English speaking colonists in Natal.

The conventional account is that the boers went on the great trek in 1835-1838 to gain national liberty from the British. This view makes no room even same basic issues for which the direct evidence exists: not all boers left the Colony, not even all in the affected districts. The question who left and who stayed and why is very important, but until now unresearched. Among the emigrants there were not just boers, English colonists, some married to boer women and of course the servant population of Khoi, Eastern Cape type slaves and some imported slaves. Of these people there are no numbers are available. While there were large and well organised emigration treks in 1835-1838, research shows that greater numbers of colonists emigrated into the TRO and Natal after 1840, usually in much smaller groups of travellers. It is clear that there was no national unity that was threatened by the British, since only a minority of Dutch speaking colonists emigrated and it would have been these who broke the unity by leaving the majority behind.

If unity was no the issue at all, then what was? From the study of the sources as well as later works written on the subject it becomes clear that there were both push and pull factors involved. Writers until today have exclusively concentrated on factors that might have pushed the trekkers out of the Colony. Among these two stand out above all. The one was the land and the other the labour issue. In the further Eastern most districts of the Eastern Cape only 17 % of adult male colonists famed land of their own. The others famed either on their parents farms or "bywoner" on someone else's farm. Land shortage was a crisis in trekboer society which was built on easy access on cheap land for every successive generation. But that was no longer the case in the 1830's and emigration was thus the usual way of resolving this problem. The South Western Orange Freestate, including A. Kok's Griqualand was full of emigrant boers, who continued to regarded themselves as Colonial citizens. The labour crisis alone hardly led to emigration and this crisis solution, ie: the availability of "fingo" after the war of 1834-35, should following this argument have ended any thoughts on emigration.

The issue here is not labour availability, but labour relations. Trekboer society functioned in the pre-enlightenment values system of the

sovereignty of the patriarch, who was the sole author of authority, punishment and control over the labour of the members of his patriarchal family. There was a pyramidal hierarchy of power with the patriarch and his wife at the top. On the next level were single sons and daughters, but often also married children. Then other family and white hangers on (later called "bywoner"). At the bottom of the pyramid, included into the patriarchal household, but never able to move up to a higher level of power, were the various types of servants: imported slaves; Khoi; San, Xhosa or Sotho-Tswana slaves. What kept them together was the person and position of the patriarch and all he stood for.

British rule at the Cape changed very little at first, except that it enforced the existing and newly proclaimed labour laws more efficient than any government before. In the mid 1820's a royal commission examined Cape colonial society, economy, politics and law thoroughly and ordered many changes. The main change for the issue of the great trek was that it brought the introduction of the enlightenment values of strict legal equality (though under strict state control) and free labour. These values, beginning with "Hottentot Ordinance", No. 50 of 1828 which brought legal equality between Khoi and colonists, were a major threat theoretical for trekboer society. It meant that sovereignty of the patriarch, the rock bottom, of society was abolished. That labour relations, which consisted essentially on underpaid workers being forced, in one way or another, to work for the farmer were to change to that of free labour where the worker would sign a treaty with the employer who paid the most and offered the best working condition. This of course did undermine further the ability to get and keep further slaves from either of the two frontiers. The state at the same time also undermined the boer's sovereignty by regulating who was allowed to punish misbehaving labour and how. Of course, Ordinance 50 was resisted by colonists and brought no great change in the practice of labour relations. The abolition of slavery in 1834 was the next step in the direction of the implementation of the British value system. The labour reasons given for boers going on the great trek always come down to the central issue of equality of the servant populations and that this was utterly unacceptable. So boers went on trek despite sufficient labour existing for the first time in the Eastern Cape, but labour they feared they would not be able to control, as they were used to. While these changes took place in trekboer society, they hardly affected the 1820 Settler, who were used to enlightenment values and thus very few English speaking colonists joined the trekkers.

Without any pull factors though it is doubtful that there ever would have been a great trek, but only a gradual settling of boer farms over the Transorangia over a long period. The first pull factor came out in the war of 1834-35 when an easy defeat over the Rharhabe and the Gcaleka, the most powerful chiefdom of the Trans-Fish, at least in the perception of the Colony was achieved. This war made it clear to colonists that there was essentially no African state, that would be able to defeat them because of the superiority of their firearms, wagons and horses. African chiefdoms in the interior were thus now no longer hindrances in the trek boers' way, wherever they chose to move. While this pull factor was essentially one of awareness of own strength the second one was much more important for the decision to move. As already mentioned boer hunters from the 1820's travelled over much of the TRO, others joined traders and Dr. A. Smith in the 1830's on trips to Natal and reports from P.Natal UK reached their boer friends. Boers were generally aware of the conditions of both Natal and the interior by the mid 1830's. All this has been mentioned in the literature on the great trek, but I do not think that this was enough. Close relations between certain Eastern Cape boers and P.Natal UK existed. More radical elements among the boers were aware that their problems would not be solved

by more land and labour, but by the perpetuation of the trekboer society as it existed. It was in this context that Natal became interesting, since as territory not belonging to Britain thus outside its values. Also the P.Natal UK's existence there was based on the same value system of sovereignty as that of the trekboers. It was clear to the P.Natal UK by mid 1834, that they were neither going to get British support of any kind with the Cape Town merchant petition also being refused in London, nor a chartered company territory, as Isaacs was unable to find financial backing for it. It was in such a situation that the Uys commission reached Port Natal, looking for a place for boers to live according to the values and practices of trekboer society. Both groups realised that getting together and forming a combined state was in each's best perceived interest.

While a "trekgedagte" thinking about emigration existed before 1834 it only took off after the return of the Uys commission to the Eastern Cape. There are enough suggestions about an organised spread of the "trekgedagte" in the literature to accept such a notion. The spreading of the idea, so the suggestions, was carried out by Retief alone or Retief and Maritz together. Retief's behaviour during the build up of the trek, his own trekking as well as his easy "take over" of the trek leadership and his unwavering move to Natal lends this suggestion much weight. It must though be kept in mind that it could not have been a conspiracy, carried out with military precision, but rather that there was an idea spreading and certain people who had influence, such as the widely known and very popular Retief, were able to push the issue far. Retief's life has come under revision since the 1970's, but the definitive study on him is still missing. Retief on the other hand was a friend of B. Norden and most probable also a fellow freemason, for which there exists an increasing body of evidence. The company Norden & Maynard (relative of Nourse) was trading in P.Natal and thus had direct interests in an independent Natal too. Shortly before Retief himself left the colony in 1838 he tempted H.F. Fynn, government agent with the Thembu, to trek to Natal and become a high official in the Natal government. Due Sir Harry Smith's strong council (and bullying) against, Fynn declined the offer.

In October 1837 Retief and his men and wagon arrived at Port Natal and was very annoyed that he missing B. Norden who sailed just hours before his arrival on the Elize. This ship belonged to Redman & Co. in London (of which N. Isaacs was now a partner) and was wrecked at Port Natal, Norden bought the ship, had it repaired it. Retief was received as a fellow warmly by the P.Natal UK. From those he found out that they, while tired of waiting for the boers' decided make public their intended state creation in September already, when they dated the harbour clearance papers of the Elize "in the third month of out independence". This was the ship's first voyage to Port Elizabeth after Norden had it repaired. Was it not for the wars that following Dingaan's killing of Retief & Co. an immediate declaration of an independent state in Natal would have followed. A state in which both Dutch and English speaking colonists would have been ruling their own servants in "prazos" and patriarchal family with unchallenged sovereignty and the procuring of more workers would of course have been by means of slave raids. It took a lot of effort a whole year and more to bring a first defeat on Dingaan at blood river. The independent state was then established nonetheless, but with most P.Natal UK killed in the meantime.

There are a lot of issues in the context of the great trek that need to be studied. I will now concentrate on the issue of slave raiding. In the Transorangia the trekkers joined the trekboers already living there in raiding both San and Sotho-Tswana people for women and children, as well as buying slaves both from Khoibas raiders and also from San and Sotho-Tswana

people. Raids on mission people are particularly well known. It is quiet clear that both commando's on the Ndebele were only partly engaged in as revenge but also partly as a slave raid, such as that against the Ngwane in 1828 or in those in the war of 1834-35. Once they reached Natal they first settled in the Bergville where hardly any Africans lived. Boers were able to engage voluntary labour in Natal as they did in the Eastern Cape before the British army took them away in 1809. But they also raided women and children slaves for labour to such a degree that a veritable trading system in slaves occurred in Natal.

On the way to blood river prisoners were also taken. That most famous of battles is surrounded with lots of myths and has to be put into perspectives too. That is why it is necessary to return to the beginning of 1838. When the news of the killing of Retief & Co reached Port Natal, the P.Natal UK immediately got an army together and marched against the Zulu. The motives were surely to attack the enemy of their allies, but their action made it clear that they were also at least as much interested in slaves, because their attack on two amakanda in the Kranskop area met with little resistance since the men were all absent. The P.Natal izinkumbi instead carried off 4000 cattle and several hundred women and children, it is not clear if these slaves were destined for their own "prazos", the boers in Natal or the Cape market. Later in March, after the raiders return to P.Natal, a combined attack on Dingaan's capital Gungundlovu by the boers and the P.Natal izinkumbi was planned for April. But their co-ordination was bad and both were defeated. Two boer commandos of +/- 400 men were lured into a kloof at Italeni and then attacked, while the horse commando of Uys fought, that of Potgieter turned after 16 shots and run. Result +/- 16 boer dead, including Uys. The "grand army of Natal" as the P.Natal UK called it consisted of all able-bodied men, except Ogle, H. (but his men were there) and the missionaries, between 2000 and 3000 of which 400 were armed with guns. This army attacked an ikhanda just North of the Tugela and got surrounded by a Zulu army, led by Mpande, and massacred. Of the +/- 30 whites 5 returned to the Port, the casualties of the Khoi and Africans were just as catastrophic. The Zulu then moved on Port Natal and destroyed the "parazos" in that area, but left the town of D'Urban alone, because it was in the range of the cannons of the Comet in the harbour. The first half of 1838 was a qualified success of Dingaan. He wiped out a small army, the size of that which defeated the Ndebele during both attacks in January and November 1837 as well as two attacks aimed on his capital, of which the second one was total victory. But that was never mentioned in the school textbooks or the popular "hi-stories".

This was not the only fighting in 1838, in August several amabutho attacked one laager in the Bergville area, even using guns ineffectively, but had to withdraw in the end. The experiences of fighting Africans in 1836 to 1838 showed two trends; when you attack with a horse commando, you have lots of advantages (Ngwane 1828, war of 1834+35, and both attacks on the Ndebele, but you can be defeated (Italeni). If you use fortified wagon fortresses you can not be defeated, if you place them correctly and have sufficient firepower, such as Vegkop 1836 and the failed attack in August 1838. Pretorius, as soon as he was chosen Kommandant Generaal, decided the only way to defeat the Zulu was to use the second method. He thus immediately ordered a commando against Dingaan, which next to the fighting men consisted of a mobile fortress, ie: +/- 60 wagons and "veghekke" to close up the gaps underneath and between the wagons. This commando moved towards Zululand until the approach of a Zulu army of +/- 10 000 men was reported on the 15th Dec. 1838. Pretorius found a good position for his fortress on one side the river, a marsh on the second and a deep "donga" or gully on the third which forced the Zulu, when they attacked at dawn on the 16th to advance their main forces on only side of the fortress. This master stroke

of placing the fort meant that most of his men could concentrate their fire on one instead of four sides. All 1200 oxen and 500 horses were inside the fortress too penned it tightly to prevent a them from coming loose during the battle. Several hours of repulsing wave upon wave of Zulu amabutho with gun shots, even though some eyewitnesses mentioned the existence of cannons, their use was not mentioned in any of the sources. By about 11.00 Pretorius gave the order to 1/3 of the boers to fall out on a horse commando and under this mounted counter attack the Zulu army broke and their were pursued and shot until deep into the afternoon.

One popular misconception of this battle is that it contained women and children too but it was actually a war commando with its own fortress. Another myths is that the was a victory for the Afrikaner people. A careful study of the sources shows that there were may other people apart from boers present in that fortress. There were +/- 470 boers, several English colonists, A. Biggar and between armed 60 + 120 izinkumbi from P.Natal and 300-400 Khoi wagon drivers and "agterryers". Since this was a war commando these would also have been armed. It also was not such a miracle that the boers won that battle. The excellent position helped but the +/- 10 000 Zulu fought +/- 900 armed "colonists" (see above figures) instead of +/- 470 as believed hitherto, against +/- 10 000 Zulu, ie: 11 : 1, instead of 21 : 1. In terms of casualties it was the other way round, 3000 Zulu dead against on boer wounded. The "colonists" then moved to Gungundlovu, which was abandoned and partly burned. But enough hidden items were dug up, including silver and guns, to have a auction of enemy loot. The claim is that on the hill of execution the land treaty between Retief and Dingaan was found undamaged in leather purse after 10 1/2 month of exposure. Both the expositions of Cory in the 1920's and of Naidoo, J.'s recent book make it clear that we are dealing here with a forgery. The question why Pretorius should have it forged has to focus on two aspects. Retief reported to the boers in November 1837 that Dingaan promised a treaty, so Pretorius & Co. just wrote down what they know was promised to them (such as the Donation of Constantine). While the war commando moved towards blood river, a British army contingent landed at Port Natal and informed that they were there to prevent fighting between the Zulu and the boers. But Pretorius was not sure how this limited British military presence would develop and thus needed some legal document to justify the boers presence and right to Natal. While in the battle of blood river no boer died, the picture changed when the commando moved into Zululand and some boer, A. Biggar and a number of his izinkumbi were killed in an ambush in January 1839.

The battle of blood river essentially secured Natal for boer settlement and removed further Zulu attacks. Pretorius used the rest of the year to organise government and in the face of British military presence he demonstrated a conciliatory policy towards Dingaan and peace with the Africans in Natal. Satisfied, that there are prospects for peace in Natal as well as obeying orders from London Governor Napier withdrew the British troops from Natal at the end of December of 1839. The soldiers were hardly gone when Mpande fled to Natal with his people and the republic of Natal mobilised to intervene in the Zulu civil war. In January 1840 an invasion of both boer commandos with wagon and Mpande's amabutho occurred. The boers on commando were unhappy since they were only given a quota of four Zulu children each. This a clear indication that apart from punishing Dingaan this commando was intended to be a labour raid, just as the war of 1834-35. After Dingaan's forces were defeated and he fled to the Swazi who apparently killed him Pretorius annexed all land South of the black Mfolozi to the Republic and installed Mpande as a puppet King of the Zulu to the North of the Mfolozi. The loot of this commando was +/- 36 000 to +/- 42 000 cattle and +/- 1000 Zulu children.

At the end of 1840 another Volksraad appointed commando was called out, this time, officially, to go and look who stole cattle from the herds of the Zulu loot cattle which were grazed under the Drakensberg between Mooiriver and Matatiele. In reality the Hlangwini chief Fodo, an old slaver, suggested to the Volksraad a slave raid. Fodo's brother guided the commando, which contained Ogle, H. and most probable his izinkumbi, to the Mzimkulu where Fodo and his people joined the commando in a slave raid on the Bhaca. Officially 17 orphaned children were taken back to Natal, and there "ingeboek" of farms. But this was only a cover up for the much higher number of slaves taken. Governor Napier became aware of what really happened and began to push London for the annexation of Natal. The above mentioned large slaves raids in 1839 and 1840 were of course not the only occurrence of slaving. In Natal as in the Transorangia slaving continued there is a lot of evidence for the 1840's and 50's. Slaves were also traded from one boer state to another, despite Volksraad's legislation. In time agreements of regular slave supplies were reached with some African state, above all the Swazi and the Gaza states. By 1844 the boers from the Transvaal began to export slaves to the Portuguese in Delagoa Bay and Napier suspected that the Governor of Mozambique concluded a contract with the boers for the supply of slaves. In 1843 Napier finally got the permission from London to annex Natal and he also executed that special project of his with great haste. What is still not clear why Napier was so much interested in Natal, despite London's the longstanding opposition.

This forgoing then was an overview of South African history and it particularly focused on the reality of the enslavement of local people. First it showed how this enslavement came about in the "bushman-war", how it was extended to the Xhosa by the colonists and on San as well as on Sotho-Tswana people in the Transorangia by the Khoibas. The overview then showed how that Eastern Cape pattern of local slaving was applied by the P.Natal UK in Natal and how they adapted it to the "parazo" system. The motive of the great trek was to find a place how boers could ensure the survival of the trekboer society, consisting of composite families under patriarchal sovereignty, to which of course the raiding, buying and holding of local slaves belongs. An this place was initially found in the Natal Republic until 1843 when Britain annexed it, and then in the other boer republics.