


36686K



THE 'MFECA'NE' AFTERMATH

towards a new paradigm

6-9 September 1991

CONFLICT ON THE EASTERN HIGHVELD
SOUTHERN KALAHARI, C. 1750-1820

Andrew Manson • University of Bophuthatswana

University of the Witwatersrand

Afrika-Studiecentrum



0732 0000344023

CONFLICT ON THE WESTERN HIGHVELD\ SOUTHERN KALAHARI,

C.1750-1820


A.Manson.

The intention of this paper is firstly to provide evidence for period of conflict characterised by warfare and raiding in the western highveld\southern Kalahari region; secondly to examine the causes for this;thirdly to offer opinions regarding state-formation among the communities resident in this area and finally to relate this discussion to the so-called difaqane as a whole,particularly in the light of recent critiques presented by Cobbing and others of this concept which have challenged its orthodoxy.The intention is not to contest these various critiques with their wide-ranging ramifications but rather to consider alternative explanations for the violence which engulfed the region.It should be noted initially that the people whose history is recorded here are the Tswana chiefdoms living in the present-day Rustenburg district(the Kgatla,Fokeng and Kwenä),and, directly to their west, the Hurutshe in the Marico and the Ngwaketse in the Kanye region of southernmost Botswana.Reference will be made to the Rolong and Tlhaping who impinged upon the affairs of the Hurutshe and Ngwaketse.¹ It should be noted also that the outbreak of "Tswana wars" in the late eighteenth century is not new -it was seized on by Parsons and mentioned in his New History of Southern Africa(1982).This paper constitutes a fresh look at the evidence on which much of Parsons' conclusions were based-the ethnological surveys of P-L Breutz.It also draws on my own research into the Hurutshe, and from Ngcongco's thesis on the Ngwaketse-all of which owe much to the pioneering

BIBL. AFRIKA-STUDIECENTRUM
PL. 36686 K
PPN 297131850
LEIDEN 12-3-2007

work of Schapera.² An attempt is made to reconcile and chronologise the contradictory and sometimes confused, but nevertheless important, oral traditions collected by Breutz, and to flesh out some economic implications from the works of Schapera and Ngcongco, who offer only the briefest clues to socio-economic developments among the societies they examine. Reference is also made to Legassick's innovative work on the emergence of the Sotho-Tswana.

What follows is an account of the violence in the area under study. The roots of this are not examined in conjunction with each episode, but are suggested in the next section where an attempt is made to connect effect to cause in a more specific way. In 1750 the Hurutshe appeared to have exercised dominance over the Tswana communities in the Pilanesberg area. They also appeared to have contained the Ngwaketse to the west.³ From about 1750 however attempts were made to break the stranglehold of Hurutshe dominance. Traditional ceremonial rights usually granted to the Hurutshe were ignored by the Fokeng leading to a battle in which Thebe, the son of the Fokeng chief Diale, was killed.⁴ Around the same period the Ngwaketse began to challenge the Hurutshe from the east. They interceded directly in Hurutshe affairs by placing a client chief, Tirwe, in control of their neighbours, and sought ways of expanding their frontier to the west.⁵ The waning of Hurutshe hegemony over their eastern neighbours receives no mention in Hurutshe traditions, (save for later reference to disputes with the Malete) probably due to the more prolonged threat faced from the Ngwaketse and the Rolong from the south-west. However it seems to have unleashed a period of almost continuous jostling for



ascendancy among the Tswana in the Rustenburg district. This will be outlined before turning our attention to the strife between the Hurutshe and the Ngwaketse.

The Fokeng living a little north-west of modern Rustenburg were involved in a twenty year long hostility with both the Kwena baMmatau and the Tlokwa from 1790. The Fokeng "warrior chief", Sekete, was killed in a skirmish with the Tlokwa in about 1800.⁴ In the reign of his successor Thethe (c. 1805-1815) war broke out with the Kgatla. Simultaneously Thethe faced a challenge from his two brothers (Nameng and Noge) and sought the assistance of the Pedi. Fokeng traditions mention that Sekwati was the Pedi ruler but it was almost certain to have been Thulare, who was widening the authority of the Pedi at this period.⁷ According to Fokeng tradition, Thethe sent karosses and tobacco to the Pedi who in return dispatched a force under Thulare's son Maleku which devastated the followers of Nameng and Noge.⁸ Captives and cattle were taken back to Pedi country. Thethe's overture helped to induce the Pedi into attempting to "win control over the hinterland on which their trade was based".⁹ The Fokeng appear to have been in a weakened and divided state when the Ndebele arrived in the area in 1830.

The Kwena ba Magopa, settled north-east of present-day Brits, similarly were locked in a state of militancy with the Bapo and Kgatla. The foremost "warrior chief" in their traditions was the regent More who ruled from c. 1750-1770. Kgatla cattle holdings were considerably augmented during this time.¹⁰ More refused to hand control of the Kwena back to the rightful

9

heir Tsoku and the community divided. More settled west of the Pienaars river and several other sections went their own way after about 1770. Tsoku's Kwena were no match for the Kgatla and after a major defeat Tsoku sought the assistance of his rival More. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Kwena regrouped and consolidated under More.¹¹ Around 1820 the Kwena ba Magopa were assailed by a large combined army of the Kgatla, Hwaduba and Tlako from the east. Heavy though indecisive fighting occurred. This was followed by Pedi cattle raids. By 1822 the Pedi seem to have taken control of Kwena affairs for they allocated land for settlement for the various Kwena fragments.¹² According to Andrew Smith the Kwena ruler in 1834 informed him that they had lost their cattle to the Pedi before the Ndebele arrived on the highveld.¹³

Some mention has been made of the Kgatla ba ga Kgafela, resident in the mid-eighteenth century near modern Northam north-east of the Pilanesberg. The prolonged war with the Fokeng is also well established in their traditions.¹⁴ The Kgatla became rich in cattle from these wars but in the last quarter of the century dissention arose in the community over the distribution of captured cattle. Mmagotso, uncle and previously regent of the Kgatla, moved away from the new chief Pheto, and gave allegiance to the Kwena. Mmagotso attacked Pheto with support from the Kwena under Legwale but was defeated and captured. Pheto then centralised the Kgatla in the last decade of the eighteenth century, dying in 1805. More booty fell into the hands of the Kgatla Kgafela shortly after when they assisted the Kwena in the Molepolole hills to beat off an attack from the Ngwaketse.¹⁵ Kgatla power was however sapped by internal rivalries from about 1810 to 1824 leaving them in a vulnerable state when Sebetwane's

Kololo swept onto the western highveld.

In the Marico were the Hurutshe, who, as far as one can judge from the evidence, were preeminent among the western Tswana in the first half of the eighteenth century. This accounts for the widely accepted view that they were the "senior tribe of the Bechuana".¹⁴ This seniority was given ritual respect in ceremonies where Hurutshe chiefs were recognised as the highest in rank.¹⁵ While there were periods of Hurutshe political dominance over their neighbours, they were subject to the same processes of fission and sudden economic disaster that would have moderated the extent of this dominance.¹⁶ From the mid-eighteenth century, as I have indicated, they faced intense and sustained pressure from all directions. In addition to losing sway over the Tswana to the east which gradually allowed the Pedi to dominate affairs in the region, they had to deal with a resurgent Ngwaketse and the Tshidi-Rolong to the west and, from the late eighteenth century, with the Tlhaping who entrenched their hold over mercantile trade emanating from the Cape Colony.¹⁷ Rolong-Hurutshe dissension is indicated by the mention in their traditions of the loss of two of their chiefs at the hands of the Hurutshe between about 1790 and 1818. According to Rolong traditions large numbers of cattle were captured from the Hurutshe in raids conducted in the late eighteenth century.¹⁸ Ngwaketse attempts to intercede in Hurutshe politics in about 1750 have been alluded to. This tendency continued for some time and in 1808, the Ngwaketse under Makaba II managed to draw the Kgatla ba Mmanaana, tributaries of the Hurutshe residing a little to their north, into a conflict. Makaba inflicted a defeat on the Kgatla and siezed most of their cattle. The Kgatla then offered allegiance to the Ngwaketse. Somewhat

reluctantly (given the growing military prowess of the Ngwaketse) the Hurutshe attempted to re-assert authority over their former tributaries. In an ensuing encounter with the Kgatla\Ngwaketse the Hurutshe were defeated and their chief,Sebogodi,was killed.The Kgatla then moved eastwards and were incorporated into the Ngwaketse.²¹

This was followed by further raids by the Ngwaketse prompting the Hurutshe finally to enter into an alliance with the Tlhaping,Kwena,Kgatla ba Kgafela and some Kora groups.The so-called "war of Moabi"(after Makaba's uncle who defected to the alliance) followed.²² A few years later the Hurutshe received help from an unexpected quarter.Shortly after 1815 Coenraad Buys, one of the growing trickle of settlers from across the Orange river,arrived among the Hurutshe earning the name "Moro",presumably an adulteration of his first salutation, ("More"). In 1818 Buys assisted the Hurutshe in an attack on the Malete,at Tholwane river in the Rustenburg district,who had allegedly been a "thorn in the eye"of the Hurutshe.The Malete were defeated,their capital destroyed and they were placed under the control of Senose,a powerful Hurutshe ward head.²³ Buys then moved over to the Ngwaketse.Buys' intervention may have been of some consequence,but it is significant that he did not initiate this friction-it had existed prior to his arrival and continued after his departure. When Campbell arrived among the Hurutshe in 1820 they maintained patrols along the Ngotoane river on their north west to guard against Ngwaketse raids and had curtailed trade to the west and south. When Campbell departed the Hurutshe were expecting an attack from the Kwena living in the Molepolole hills to the north-west.²⁴

The Ngwaketse were key players in the transformations taking place in the region under study. More isolated from the trade arteries to the east and south, they had to assert themselves politically to gain a larger share in mercantile affairs. This aggrandisement occurred in the rule of Moleta initially when he defeated and turned the Kgatheng-Kgalagadi into tributaries. The significance of this was that it broke the stranglehold the Tlhaping and some Kora groups had over trade in the southern Kalahari. It was however the chieftainship of Makaba II (c.1790-1824) which "clearly marked the rise of the Bangwaketse to a position of great prominence in the Tswana world.... Makaba was a warrior chief and during his reign fought nearly all of the chiefdoms surrounding him." ²⁵

Makaba moved to Kanye hill, a position he could fortify against attack. From here he raided the Kwena in order to seize cattle and to "regulate... the frontiers of his geographical and political control." ²⁶ In 1798-99 the Ngwaketse were able to beat off an attack from the Kora and Griqua under Jan Bloem. In the first decade of the next century the aggression of the Ngwaketse gave rise to the counter action by the surrounding communities that was mentioned earlier. This forced Makaba temporarily to relocate his people closer to the Rolong, his only allies in the region. (The Rolong only fully threw their support behind Makaba from 1817 after a Rolong raiding party en route to Kwena territory had been intercepted and routed). The Ngwaketse increased in numbers during this time, attracting various "splinter groups" including some Rolong clans. ²⁷ In 1818 a combined Ngwaketse/Rolong army attacked the Hurutshe who escaped losses by hiding their cattle before the raiders appeared. ²⁸

However Makaba's enterprises were not confined to militancy. He was anxious to appease his neighbours, sending cattle to Mothibi, the Tlhaping chief, and envoys to the Hurutshe in 1820 to try and establish friendly relations.²⁹ These overtures were generally treated with suspicion, and both the Hurutshe and the Ngwaketse leaders propounded vehemently Makaba's untrustworthiness to any European visitors to their capitals. According to Ngcongco "it was probably partly exasperation that his efforts (of reconciliation) were being thwarted by Mothibi and the Bahurutshe that led Makaba to recommence his attacks on these people."³⁰

From the preceding discussion it is absolutely clear that the Tswana in the west were embroiled in conflict that mirrored events among the Ndwandwe, Qwabe, Mthethwa and Ngwane at a similar period. But what caused this competition? Firstly a desire to increase cattle-holdings through raiding frequently gave rise to conflict. This is made clear in many cases to explain the wars of this period, particularly those in the Rustenburg area. Traditions point to an increasing level of cattle raiding taking place. The question that follows is why should it have occurred at this juncture? The likely answer is that by about the turn of the century the Tswana population was growing at a time when they were encountering fewer and fewer areas suitable for occupation. They were cordoned off from westerly expansion by the southern Kalahari, and to the north-east lay the Limpopo and the tsetse fly belt so unsuited for cattle and man. Being thus hemmed in, localised fluctuations caused by the need to gain access to land for habitation and grazing would have severely disrupted these societies.

The seizure of women and captives form a second motive for raiding. These captives(bafaladi)and foreigners were assimilated with relative ease through the ward system which minimised problems of administration and discontent by allowing a considerable degree of social and political independence to incorporated people.Cattle and women provided the basis for exchange in Tswana society,as they did in many African societies at a similar period. Exchange of wives for cattle,of cattle for labour and loyalty,provided the basis of political life.Chiefs and powerful men accumulated cattle to distribute and so to raise their social standing and maintain their power.So to the natural conclusion-the accumulation of more cattle and women through raiding suggested that certain chiefs could attract more followers and bind them into stronger relations of dependence.

The frequent incidence of fission taking place within chiefdoms has long been recognised by commentators on the Tswana as a major source of friction.The main reason for fission is usually ascribed to the Tswana kinship system.Though they had in theory well-defined rules of succession to the chieftainship,in practise it was bedevilled by several factors.The "great"wife did not neccessarily accord with the "first" wife,leading to competition for legitimacy between the eldest son of these two wives.In addition the practice of levirate("raising up seed"),whereby a brother or uncle of a chief who died without issue could father a child with the "great"wife, also led to rivalry between half-brothers.³¹ Consequently the patrilineal principle of succession,coupled with the practice of polygyny,led to squabbles and frequently fission.It should be noted

however that this explanation for conflict is probably a convenient way of accounting for more complex or unknown processes that escape or evade(perhaps sometimes deliberately)the oral record.

The fourth cause for tensions among the Tswana relates to the drought of the last decade of the eighteenth century.Coupled with land shortage and an increase in cattle this drought would have had a severe effect on the Tswana chiefdoms then spread in autonomous units across the western highveld region.

A final reason lies in competition over trade.The extent and range of Tswana pre-colonial trade is now so well documented in the archaeological and historical record that it needs no further elaboration here.³² The main directions of trade contact were east to Maputo bay,north-west into the Okavango and central Namibia,and south with the Kora on the Orange river.³³ The main difficulty facing the Ngwaketse was that they were blocked off from the important trade routes,a problem they tried to remedy by adopting a policy of"southward orientation"during the rule of Makaba.³⁴ The main trade goods were furs,feathers,metals(copper,iron and tin)fashioned into ornaments and tools,and tobacco.There is a probability that certain groups such as the Tlhaping and Hurutshe competed strongly over trade in metals,especially copper.The cultivation and exchange of tobacco however was monopolised by the Hurutshe.³⁵ Most crucial was the ivory trade which occupied the attention of all the communities under discussion. The goods were relayed through "trade mates"(marts) from one district to the next.The increased volume of ivory and copper through Quelimane from 1760 suggests the growing importance of the East Coast

trade.³⁴ The Hurutshe knew the names of all their trading partners to the Tsonga on the east coast,³⁷ a distance of over a thousand kilometres. In exchange for these goods the Tswana received beads cloth, buttons and livestock. The principal beneficiaries were the existing powerholders who were in the best position to secure a monopoly over this trade. By accumulating wealth so chiefs could attract new followers and clients. The logical outcome of this argument is that attempts to control trade led to competition and conflict. Thus the Tswana on the western highveld were aware of the new demand for, and availability of trade goods and, building on established trade routes and practises, bound themselves into the international trade network on the best terms they could.

Two points could be emphasised here. Firstly that this trade was in goods and not in people. According to Campbell in 1820, the Hurutshe "knew of no nations who sold men"-a suggestion that they no knowledge of slaving taking place in the region.³⁸ Secondly this escalation in trade would not have severely disrupted a community geared to an exchange economy, though combined with factors mentioned above its impact presumably was significant.

To conclude this section we need to order these causae belli into some meaningful pattern. Land shortage for grazing and agriculture coupled with the sudden demand for ivory raised competition and conflict to a new pitch. The effect this had on these communities was to bring to an end the period of fissioning that characterised the period up to about 1770-1780. Military and political alliances began to proliferate around the end of the century (viz. the Kgatla\baHwaduba\Tlokwa in the

Rustenberg-Pilanesberg, the Tlhaping\Kwena\Hurutshe and Ngwaketse\Rolong further west). From the early nineteenth century fusion, as many historians of the Tswana now agree, became the "dominant process" among Tswana chiefdoms.³⁹ A glance at the number of new wards joining certain Tswana groups from the last decades of the eighteenth century confirms this pattern.⁴⁰ The "detonator" of kinship and chiefly succession still remained a constant counter to this process, but by the mid-eighteenth century a dearth of good lands put a break on expansion, except at the expense of one's neighbours. Consequently, as Sanson has noted, a "tendency to predation prevailed once chiefdoms became embattled within boundaries".⁴¹ However the process of amalgamation was uneven and incomplete by the time that the first of the desperate victims from the south arrived in the area. The Ngwaketse had welded themselves into a strong enough polity to withstand these new pressures but the Kwena, Fokeng and Kgatla of the Rustenburg district, weakened and still in the process of being drawn into the orbit of Pedi dominance, succumbed with little resistance.⁴² The once powerful Hurutshe were clinging precariously onto their severely diminished base at Kaditshwene. Their fortunes took a turn for the worse when in mid-1820 a large section under Senose seceded to form the Hurutshe boo Mokgathla.⁴³

Using these Tswana chiefdoms as a means of investigating developments on the western highveld\southern kalahari region prior to the 1820 we can draw the following conclusions. Firstly that there was a process of state-formation similar to, but never as fully developed, as it was to the south-east. While militarily less organised than the Nguni speakers, the acquisition and retention of power by certain Tswana chiefs led to the

further development of certain agencies and institutions that served to order and rank Tswana society. This was reflected in the political and social hierarchy that prevailed in Tswana chiefdoms and which so impressed the early European writers on the Tswana. Recent research has exposed too the level of economic stratification caused by differential access to resources.⁴⁴ The replication of a ready made, bureaucratic structure at all levels of Tswana society was developed to cope with the "amalgamation process" of "separate communities into larger confederations."⁴⁵ These crucial features of state formation need to be emphasised.⁴⁶ There is a need to stress the point made by Shaw in his study of state formation amongst the Tswana that "Tswana polities had a...well developed, centralised political organisation with...power concentrated in the hands of the chief."⁴⁷ Secondly it should be noted that the causes of this state formation were similar to those suggested by scholars of the Nguni-speakers for the emergence of centralised states in that region.⁴⁸

Thirdly the "Tswana wars" severely reduced the cohesion and economic independence of certain groups (for example the Kwena ba Magopa and Fokeng) who were in the process of being incorporated into larger political units. Thus the economic and political insecurity of such communities was due entirely to intra-Tswana rivalries and political developments that pre-date and owe little to white influence in the region. The ease with which the Ndebele settled the highveld was due as much to the fact that the Tswana were caught up in a process of profound political change which was leading to the emergence of new alignments and "states", as it was due to Ndebele power. The defeat of the Pedi by the

Ndebele (or the Ndwandwe) allowed them to take over, with relative ease, those communities formerly coming under Pedi authority.

Given these three points it seems that we cannot talk of the violence of the 1820's as having one source or even several epicentres. Possibly there was an internal revolution among the Nguni-speakers as well as the simultaneous "antipodal pressures" which Cobbing sees as being exerted from the Cape Colony and Delagoa Bay. However there is a need to look too at the view offered on the horizon of the western highveld where, as this paper has demonstrated, dramatic developments took place in the last decades of the eighteenth century a long way from these epicenters. These were the result of on-going processes that were not initiated, though they may have been hastened, by the impact of European traders and raiders. To remove these changes and transformations from the picture is to strip away any possibility that African society was capable of functional or enterprising action. A look at the situation prevailing among the Tswana communities examined above suggests that we should not approach this period from the point of view of counter arguments about "Zulucentrism" and "Eurocentrism" but from a wider perspective that includes societies beyond these confines. The heightened violence and upheavals of the 1820's when they came should be seen as an event, albeit profound, in a continuum of change that engulfed chiefdoms on the western highveld. It did not represent a major break from the past heralding the dawn of capitalism into southern Africa. The speed and success with which many Tswana communities transformed themselves into autonomous and independent "states" from the 1840's suggests that the process of state formation was under way by the late eighteenth century. The stimuli of external pressures

and threats, of mercantile capital and of new technology hastened and shaped, but did not introduce, this transformation. It is fallacious to suggest, as Copping does, that African society was simply "broken down and exploded by the (capitalist) system", or that this same system "jolted them into life".⁴⁹ They were very much alive and very much kicking.

⁴Margie Kinsman is, in any event, dealing with the Rolong-

²See P-L Breutz, The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts, Dept. of Native Affairs Ethnological Publication, (Pretoria 1953); Tribes of the Marico District, (Pretoria 1953-54.); A.H. Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1848-1914", unpublished Ph.D thesis, U.C.T., 1990; L. Ngcongco, "Aspects of the History of the Bangwaketse up to 1910", unpublished Ph.D thesis, Dalhousie University, 1976. For Schapera's work most reference is made to his Short History of the BaKgatla baGaKgafela of Bechuanaland Protectorate, (Cape Town 1942.)

³For this see Manson, "The Hurutshe", p. 41; M. Legassick, "The Sotho-Tswana before 1800", in L. Thompson (ed.), African Societies in Southern Africa, (London 1969), p. 100.

⁴See Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 61.

⁵Manson, "The Hurutshe", p. 51; I. Schapera, "A short history of the Bangwaketse", African Studies, vol. xv, (1941), p. 3.

⁶Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 63.

⁷See P. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, (Johannesburg 1983) p. 15.

⁸Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 63.

⁹Legassick, "The Sotho-Tswana", p. 109.

¹⁰Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, pp. 85-86.

¹¹Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 87.

¹²See Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 89.

¹³See The Diary of Dr. A. Smith, 1834-1836, edited by P.R. Kirby, (Cape Town 1940), pp. 110-111.

¹⁴See Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 254; Schapera, ?

¹⁵Breutz, Tribes of Rustenburg, p. 254.

¹⁶G.P. Lestrade, "Some notes on the Political Organisation of the Bechuana", South African Journal of Science, vol. xxxv, (1928).

¹⁷See Schapera, Ethnic Composition of the Tswana, p. 8; F.H.W. Jensen, "Note on the Bahurutshe", African Studies, vol. 6 (1949), p. 176.

¹⁸This occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century when a large faction of the Hurutshe under Mangope moved away from the main Hurutshe house at Kaditshwene. See Manson, "The Hurutshe", p. 41.

¹⁹For a thorough account of economic developments among the Tlhapin

see G.V. Okahiro, "Precolonial Economic Change Among the Tlhaping", International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, (1984).

²⁰See S.M. Molema, Montshiwa-Barolong Chief and Patriot, (Cape Town 1966), p. 8.

²¹See Manson, "The Hurutshe", pp. 51-52; Ngcongco, "History of the Ngwaketse", pp. 89-90.

²²Ngcongco, "History of the Ngwaketse", p. 90.

²³See The Marico Chronicle, March 16, 1912, letter from F. Jensen.

²⁴See Diary of Rev. J. Campbell South African Public Library, Cape Town; J. Campbell, Travels in South Africa Second Journey, vol. 1, (London 1822), p. 251.

²⁵Ngcongco, "History of the Bangwaketse", p. 85.

²⁶Ngcongco, "The Ngwaketse", p. 89.

²⁷Ngcongco, "The Ngwaketse", p. 90.

²⁸Breutz, Tribes of Mafeking, pp. 31-32.

²⁹See Campbell, Travels First Journey, pgs. 247, 264; Second Journey, p. 266.

³⁰Ngcongco, "The Ngwaketse", p. 94.

³¹See I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom, (London 1955), pp. 55-56.

³²It was observed by early travellers such as Lichtenstein, Burchell and Campbell. More recently scholars have outlined in greater detail the prevalence of trade among the Tswana. See Okahiro, "Economic Exchange among the Tlhaping"; B.P. Shaw, "State Formation, Nation Building, and the Tswana of Southern Africa", M.A. Duquesne University, 1975; T. Tlou A History of Ngamiland 1750-1906, (Gaborone 1985); M. Wilson, "The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga", in OHSA, (Oxford 1969) vol. 1.

³³For a summary see J. Denbow, D. Kiyaga-Mulindwa and N. Parsons, "Historical and Archaeological Research in Botswana", Symposium on Research for Development, Gaborone, 1985.

³⁴The phrase is Ngcongco's. See "History of the Bangwaketse", p. 105.

³⁵Campbell, Travels... Second Journey, vol. 1, p. 226.

³⁶Campbell, Travels, vol. 2, p. 274.

³⁷Campbell, Travels, vol. 2, pp. 240-241.

³⁸Campbell, Travels, vol. 2, p. 242. I do not wish to comment on an obvious rejoinder to this, viz. that Campbell was lying.

³⁹The idea was articulated with most precision by Legassick in "the Sotho-Tswana", pp. 106-107.

⁴⁰See Schapera, The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes, (London 1952).

⁴¹B. Sanson, "Traditional Economic Systems", in W.D. Hammond-Tooke (ed.) The Bantu-speaking People of Southern

⁴²The process was probably slowed down by the death of Thulare in 1822 and the subsequent civil war between his sons. See Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, p.15.

⁴³Manson, "The Hurutshe", p.58.

⁴⁴For a discussion of this see M.Kinsman, "Notes on the Southern Tswana Social Formation", Collected papers, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1980.

⁴⁵Leggasick, "The Sotho-Tswana", p.106.

⁴⁶They tend often to be overlooked, for example by Schapera. For the standard view of Tswana disunity see P.Maylam, A History of the African People of South Africa, (London 1986) p.48.

⁴⁷Bryant, "State Formation...and the Tswana", p.94.

⁴⁸These have been put forward by Hedges, Bonner, Wright, Smith, and Guy, amongst others.

⁴⁹See Cobbing, "Jettisoning the Mfecane", p.15.