

320.56 NGUB

85/1808



This book was presented by

ESTATE THE LATE

PROFESSOR A.K. FREYER, 1981

to the Library of the University of
Cape Town



1945

1945

1945



196301573702

DATE DUE

JAGGER LIBRARY
650 3190

23 JUL 2001

23 SEP 1999

24 DEC 1999

11 NOV 2004

10 FEB 2000

27 FEB 2001


25 MAY 2001

34 65

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS
APARTHEID

JORDAN K. NGUBANE

PALL MALL PRESS
LONDON AND DUNMOW



PREFACE

THE internal and external tensions generated by South Africa's racial policy have one immediate danger for mankind: They transform the second republic into a sensitive spot in a turbulent continent that is becoming increasingly involved in the Cold War. This gives rise to the very real fear that the tensions might one day get out of control and start a racial war, which could, in a flash, ignite a world conflagration. The moment it is seen from this angle, apartheid ceases to be a domestic matter for South Africa. It becomes an issue of vital importance for humanity as a whole. The problems it has created are now of such a delicate and complex nature that they call for an immediate solution, as much by the black and white South Africans as by the rest of mankind.

Between the dominant black and white groups, there now exists a legal, emotional, and psychological no man's land, to venture into which means immediate and very serious trouble. If the African tries to move into it, as the Pan-Africanist Congress attempted to do on March 21, 1960, the white authority shoots to kill. The shootings at Sharpeville, Cape Town, Durban, and Clermont Township are proof of this. If, on the other hand, the white authority provokes the Africans beyond a certain point, they, too, shoot to kill. The murder of a mixed group of policemen at Cato Manor some time back and the recent disturbances

in Pondoland reflect the new mood of substantial sections of African opinion.

The race crisis has thus reached the point where, as will be shown in the chapter on underground forces, a relatively unimportant incident could start an ugly blood bath. This is not a prospect that any sane man can view with equanimity. It calls for immediate and decisive action on two distinct planes. Effective pressures must be exerted on the South African Government to force it to abandon policies that the peoples of Africa as well as the nonwhites of the world regard as a standing insult. Secondly, a positive alternative to apartheid must be worked out that will bridge the racial gulf, give to citizenship the same meaning on both sides of the color line, remove the fatal tensions, and enable the republic to become a stabilizing influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

Pressures can be effective, and a feasible alternative formulated, only if the actual forces in the race crisis are more clearly understood; if their origins, history, records of performance, orientations, and points of strength and weakness are more widely known. In the pages that follow, an attempt will be made to give an interpretative picture of these forces and to outline a program of action that indicates in fairly concrete terms—within the scope allowed by the laws of the land—what sort of alternative is feasible in a society where the basic intention is to provide safeguards against any man, woman, or child being punished for having been created a member of a particular race.

No pretensions to objectivity are made in presenting this picture. It is difficult to see how one can be objective when his very being is attacked as a matter of policy, where human resources are callously wasted in order to uphold an ideological preference. I am a partisan on the side committed to justice for the individual regardless of race or color, an opponent of racialism who abhors totalitarianism, whether it comes from the right or the left. Nor do I claim exclusive authority to speak for the African. Mine is but one of different voices raised in the clamor for freedom.

When our perspectives are defined, we can then turn to aspects of the picture that have a special value. Among other things, the picture has been designed to explain quite a number of political riddles and mysteries and to correct dangerous misconceptions on the race crisis. For example, the government encourages the belief by the outside world that the real issue at stake in the race problem is the clash of color. This gives the impression that on one side of the dividing line stand all the white people and on the other, the nonwhites. The truth of the matter is that the opponents of apartheid are drawn from every racial group.

✓ For very obvious reasons the nonwhites in general, and the Africans in particular, lead the revolt against apartheid. But fighting side by side with them is a small and determined group of white men and women. These have not suddenly come to the fore because "the wind of change" is blowing. They belong to, and continue, a tradition that goes back in South African history for nearly one hundred and fifty years. They made serious mistakes in the past; twenty-five years ago, their activities were often looked upon with suspicion, but they have since learned their lessons. The present generation of these white people shows itself to be as ready to go to jail in the fight to destroy white supremacy as any African. Adelaine Hain of Pretoria, Peter Brown, the national chairman of the Liberal Party, and Patrick Duncan, the son of a former governor-general of South Africa, already know the inside of a jail for daring to oppose apartheid with determination. Others, too numerous to mention by name, have had their lives almost ruined by persecution, bans, and intimidation.

The participation of these people in the fight to destroy white supremacy is emphasized to underline the need to achieve a balanced view of the race crisis, to put the race problem in the correct perspective. Humanity in general—and in particular the free peoples of Africa who rightly want to remove the insult of apartheid from their continent with the minimum of delay—need to know these aspects of the race crisis and to gain a realistic ap-

preciation of their implications in order to exert effective pressures against race oppression. The government of South Africa plays up the racial aspect to maintain its hold on white opinion within its borders and to divide opposition in Europe and America. The technique incites most of the free peoples of Africa to react by emphasizing race in their support of the oppressed in the republic. When this happens, difficulties that favor the government arise inside the republic.

On quite another plane, the emphasis on white initiative has given rise to the mistaken view that the Africans are the helpless victims of race oppression who need as much pity as assistance. In the pages that follow, the story unfolds of a virile people fighting against great odds—sometimes succeeding and often failing—to move events away from the goals prescribed by apartheid. They have, over the last fifty years in particular, made recognizably realistic efforts to lay foundations for a society in which the individual, regardless of race or color, will be able to make better use of his life. When they ask for humanity's assistance, they do so because they realize that humanity has the duty to support those who fight to uphold the dignity of the individual.

Something else happens as the story unfolds. Those aspects of the race crisis that baffle foreigners and most white South Africans become more intelligible—for example, the monumental, almost saintly spirit of tolerance and sense of justice of men like Luthuli and large numbers of his people; or the fact that there is still racial good will side by side with race hatred and relatively less bloodshed in situations where the persistent and continuous provocation of the African is the general rule.

My qualifications for presenting this interpretative study, which is also a plea for a more constructive approach to South Africa's race problem, can be stated briefly. I have been involved in the fight against race oppression now for nearly twenty-four years—in my roles as an editor, a political commentator, and an active participant in the formulation of policies. I had the singular advantage of entering journalism and politics when most of the African men and women who laid the foundations for the turn

the race crisis is taking were still active in public life. I lived and worked in close collaboration with some of the most distinguished of them. Later, I found myself actively involved in nonracial politics. These factors gave me an experience in African politics and a view of the race crisis that are unique. I have drawn freely on these to introduce the reader to a world that he does not often come across in the books on South Africa. This has been done in the hope that it will enable him to have a fuller and possibly clearer view of what is actually going on in the republic—as seen through the eyes of a victim of apartheid.

Now, for a word of apology. I am painfully aware of the shortcomings of the present effort. The signs of writing in a hurry—in the heat of battle, so to speak—are all too conspicuous. To avoid them, I would have needed time and an atmosphere that is no longer to be found in South Africa. This is not an attempt to cash in on the genuine and appreciated sympathy of the world toward those who oppose apartheid. The plain fact is that the opponent of race discrimination, whether he has been banned or is still “free,” lives in constant uncertainty about his fate from day to day. Each knock on the door while this book was being written sent me dashing to the place in the house where I hid the manuscript. At first, this amused our last-born child. But he realized its grim seriousness when the police banged on the door after midnight to arrest me. Since then, I, like many others, have been appearing in court on a charge that arises strictly from our political activities. If the courts find against us, each one of us might go to jail for a maximum period of ten years.

This prospect has forced me to rush the writing of this book. I snatched whatever moments I could between my not infrequent appearances in court in faraway Johannesburg and the task of straightening out my affairs in case the worst happened. For me personally, these were not the best conditions for writing. All I could do, then, was to put my message down as briefly and clearly as the circumstances permitted and pray for the reader's indulgence.

Finally, I should like to place on record my very sincere

thanks to the friend who suggested the idea of this book and to others whose encouragement and assistance made its writing possible. I wish I could mention them by name. But in my country today, one cannot take too many precautions to be on the right side of the law. Needless to say, the views expressed here and the conclusions arrived at are mine alone, and I take full responsibility for them.

JORDAN K. NGUBANE

“Emandleni,”
P.O. Inanda, Natal,
South Africa
August 18, 1961

CONTENTS

Preface	v
PART I: THE ROOTS OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM	
1. The Origins of Apartheid	3
2. The British Inherit a Situation	16
3. Dr. Philip and the Conflict of Values	24
4. From Repudiation to Fulfillment	32
5. The Fate of the Republics	38
6. A White United Front	48
7. The Pattern of Afrikaner Justice	55
PART II: TWO MOODS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM	
8. A Black United Front	69
9. The Battle for Initiatives	85
10. The Revolt of the PAC	93
11. New Road to Violence	103
12. Reserves of Power	111
13. The Uncommitted African	135
PART III: COMMUNISM—A COMPLICATING FACTOR	
14. Ally of Afrikaner Nationalism	151
15. African Nationalism Sabotaged	162
16. Underground Forces In Action	174
17. Communists Versus Liberals	191
PART IV: FACING THE FUTURE	
18. A Positive Alternative to Apartheid	203
19. Danger of Swamping	233



PART

I

THE ROOTS OF AFRIKANER
NATIONALISM





1 • THE ORIGINS OF APARTHEID

APARTHEID is the doctrine by which the South African Government regulates the relations between its black and white citizens. It is a doctrine that constitutes the most urgent and potentially explosive problem that faces the free world—a problem that will have to be solved quickly and effectively on the African continent in order to persuade large numbers of Africans to keep to the democratic side of the ideological fence. For the emergence of independent African states has stimulated a consciousness of solidarity and brought about a unity of purpose among the Africans that could very well push black and white South Africans to war. As will be shown later, factors are already at work pushing events in this direction.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the Afrikaner nationalist, who is the most determined advocate of race oppression, regards apartheid as something higher than a mere political formula. He sees it as a way of life, a world outlook by which to create for himself the social order after his design. He accepts apartheid as a vindication of himself, a guarantee of physical, cultural, and economic security and survival. It is the creation of his history, the concrete achievement that marks his moment of fulfillment.

His community came into being just about three hundred years ago. This, coupled with the pressures that affected his life after his ancestors had settled in the Cape, has made him regard

history as an experience in vindication. The past is real because it is reflected in the present. The defeat suffered by his forefathers a hundred years ago is not a moment in the life of a growing nation; it is the personal crisis which gives form to his attitude toward the first African he meets. This makes apartheid a unique phenomenon in Africa. It develops contradictions in the Afrikaner's make-up which complicate his relations with all the nonwhite peoples of Africa. In vindicating himself, he is haunted by a consciousness of crisis that he cannot escape. As a result, history to him is a continually unfolding experience whose real validity lies not so much in its being a guide to the future as in being a justification. Apartheid is thus also a reaction to the pressures which gave meaning, form, and direction to his life in the past. When pressed to modify it, he is bewildered. In his view, all this is tantamount to saying he should renounce the world he has created for himself. He feels he is being pressed to give up the sources of inspiration for his culture. In the final analysis, he concludes that he is being asked to sign his own death warrant, and his natural reaction is to fight to defend what he regards as his own. He does not really mind standing alone while doing this. If he goes under fighting, that would be right and proper for him.

On quite another plane, his determination rests also on a limited understanding of the motivating urges which lie deepest in contemporary humanity's bosom. His ancestors arrived in South Africa at a time when evaluations of the human personality were not what they are today—when political absolutism, for example, was accepted as the attribute of governmental power by most people in Europe. His subsequent isolation and his present encounter with the modern world produce emotional crises, among others, which make it difficult for him to accept wholly the fact that the African and he have precisely the same humanity.

To understand the factors which have produced this state of mind, we have to go back to 1652. For then Jan van Riebeeck, a Hollander, landed at the Cape of Good Hope with a group of men and women who had been sent out by the Dutch East India

Company to establish a victualing station for its ships sailing between Europe and the Orient. Van Riebeeck found the Cape inhabited by a number of African tribes whom he collectively called the Hottentots, from the way they spoke. These were a seminomadic, cattle-rearing people, and his contact with them started South Africa's race problem. Almost from the moment he landed at the Cape, three influences came into operation. The arrival of white settlers and their establishment of a separate colony on land that the Africans regarded as their own was an important assertion of white initiative as the main factor which was to regulate future relations between black and white. Since the company had sent out van Riebeeck without prior consultation or negotiation with any of the Hottentot chiefs, it apparently looked to the use of the gun to justify its claims to the Cape settlement.

On the other hand, the Africans regarded the arrival of the white man, with varying degrees of determination, as an encroachment on their land, on the pastures where they grazed their stock. The climax to the friction that developed was reached about a year after van Riebeeck's arrival, for in 1653, the Hottentots made a bold bid to stop white encroachments on their land. They raided the company's cattle post, killed the herdboys, David Jansen, and made away with over forty¹ of the company's cattle. This collision represented an attempt to assert African initiatives as the main factor by which to regulate future relations between black and white. To assert the authority of the white man, van Riebeeck sent out a small expedition against the Hottentots to recover the cattle. The resultant clash in 1653 was the first war in which black and white initiatives collided openly.

Friction continued between the Africans and the whites. By 1660, van Riebeeck had been compelled to pursue a vigorous policy of residential segregation in endeavors to protect his group against the Hottentots. After the war fought with the Kaapmen (another Hottentot group) during that same year, he took over the Liesbeeck lands and enclosed them within a fence to mark

¹ E. A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), p. 38.

them out as white territory. The whites were to keep to one side of the fence, the Africans to the other, and trading was to be done at the fort.

Economic and physical imperatives constituted the third influence at work on the Cape, but these recognized no boundaries. The demand for beef forced van Riebeeck to jump over his fences to send messengers to the Hottentots with these words: "You must try every imaginable means to persuade them to come to the fort or at least to send some of their people with you."² The scarcity of marriageable women gave him another kind of headache. In keeping "with East Indian precedents [he] had recommended mixed marriages, and Jan Wouter had duly wedded Catherine, a freed woman, daughter of Antonie of Bengal. . . . Van Meerhof, the doughty explorer, married Eva, a Hottentot. He was the first European to marry a Cape Native and received promotion to the rank of surgeon as a wedding present from the Company."³

But while the clash between black and white initiatives produced war and segregation, economic and physical realities moved events in the direction of integration. This contradiction has always been basic in the relations between black and white, and one of the most significant reasons behind it was that the company saw no valid reason for laying down a clearly defined racial policy as long as its ships were properly victualed at the Cape. It issued various decrees, or *placaten*, from time to time, the central theme of which was to instruct van Riebeeck and his successors to react in ways that would best safeguard its interests. Thus, from the very beginning, neither black nor white had any clearly stated set of principles on which to base their attitudes toward each other. To the African, the white man was the invader who would, whenever the opportunity permitted, be butchered or pushed into the sea. To the white settler, the African was the primitive barbarian who opposed the march of progress and civilization. If he could not be bribed, then he had to be shot into submission.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

The Cape settlement had not been in existence for long when a trend started that was to contribute immensely toward giving permanence to the confused pattern of race relations then being evolved. The men whom van Riebeeck had brought to the Cape with him had come out as the servants of the company; as long as they were bound to it, their dealings with the Africans were limited by its interests. But when some of them retired from active service, they decided to settle down at the Cape instead of returning to Holland, and they supported themselves by cultivating wheat and vegetables. They became, in short, the members of a new social class—the free burghers, who were not under the authority of the company in the way its employees were. Their emergence affected the settlement in two important ways: Their desire for more land for themselves sharpened the conflict with the Hottentots, and the company came to assume the function of a colonizing power. Its interests in the Cape were no longer just economic; the political factor entered as well.

This subtle transformation in the character of the company was not accompanied by corresponding changes in the attitude toward the Cape. The directors continued to regard the Cape as a commercial venture. The settlement was run as a victualing station without adequate provision being made for the political tensions that were to develop from the existence of a growing class of free burghers. But as long as the merchants constituted the most important class of free burghers, the problems were not apparent, for it was in the interests of the merchants to be amenable to the discipline of the company. In 1688, French Huguenot refugees, who arrived with new ideas on the manufacture of wine, swelled the numbers of the free burghers and diversified their economic interests. The pressure on the Hottentots to give up more land for white occupation was therefore intensified. And as the white population grew and prospered, the social stratifications at the Cape assumed a more complex form—slave labor, for example, was imported from Madagascar and the Dutch East Indies—so that by the end of the seventeenth century these stratifications had been cast into molds from which the present race crisis in South Africa derives its form.

Let us first follow the exploits of the burghers more closely. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the population of the Cape consisted of the whites, their slaves, and the free blacks. The whites belonged to two main classes—the employees of the company and the free burghers. The latter were further divided into three distinct sections—the merchants, the wheat and wine farmers, and the stockowners. The first two were more closely attached to the company, and up to a point they depended on it for the disposal of their produce. In addition, they were often in communication with Holland and Europe through the ships that called at the Cape. Hence they were never cut off from the main stream of European civilization for long periods. In their public and private lives, as well as in their homes, they attempted to follow as closely as possible the patterns of life they had known in Europe: They maintained fairly high standards of refinement in their manners and erected beautiful homes in and around Cape Town. Partly as a result, the Cape Afrikaner nationalist is a more refined and more sensitive person than his brother in the northern provinces.

Commerce, trade, and wheat farming soon became inadequate means of supporting the growing numbers of free burghers. The most enterprising of them turned, in ever increasing numbers, to stock farming. The life they led—moving with their stock from point to point—was in many ways different from that of the whites in Cape Town. They became seminomads, who roamed the plains in search of better grazing lands. This circumstance progressively cut them off from the refinements of life in the metropolis and increasingly made them strangers to the main stream of European civilization. For life in the hinterland was harsh, primitive, and full of all sorts of dangers, including man-eating animals. The farmers were often isolated by long distances from their neighbors. The people with whom they lived most of the time were their slaves; occasionally, however, they were with Hottentot tribesmen. Both black and white existed at about the same economic level, ate more or less the same type of food, and the stock farmers built mud huts whose floors were smeared over with cow dung or fat like those of their African neighbors.

They faced other troubles too. They were always a minority, both in the white group, and among the Africans; and they were not exactly comfortable, living as they did almost at the level of the Africans, some of whom they owned as slaves.

Their biggest headache was the fear of extinction. Small numbers in a hostile environment made this a real fear. In periods of conflict, the Africans fought to exterminate the white men. Since they were out to rid their country of the white pestilence, they took no prisoners of war. Anything that reduced white numbers lowered the Europeans' fighting potential and, therefore, their capacity to survive.

The threat of extinction came also from another side. Living so close to the racially and culturally different African, some of the white farmers resisted with difficulty, while others did not overcome, the temptation to cross the color line in search of mates. Miscegenation could have had the disastrous effect of depleting the numbers of a small and foreign minority. The man who crossed over, as Coenraad du Buys and others were to do, was as good as dead in the eyes of the other farmers. In these circumstances, protection for the group lay in developing a form of social coherence and a group exclusiveness that virtually refused to recognize the African as a human being.

The more the stock farmers moved into the interior, the less dependent on the company they became for protection against the Africans. This weakened their bonds with the authority in the metropolis at a time when another factor was creeping in to complicate the relationship. The company had never succeeded in evolving a clearly understood political philosophy to give direction to life at the Cape; instead, a policy of virtual drift had been dictated by its commercial interests. This convinced the farmers that the company was interested only in their money and not in their welfare. The absence of a powerful political philosophy linking the company and the burghers won increasing numbers of them to the view that they had to carve out their own political destiny by themselves if they were to survive as a distinct white group.

Other complications came in. Since the Cape Town authority

had been as dictatorial as its servants were rapacious, the company was finding itself in increasingly difficult financial situations. Its fortunes had begun to show signs of decline by the end of the seventeenth century. This affected the standards of living at the Cape. The farmers had difficulties in disposing of their produce, taxes tended to rise, and yet nothing concrete could be shown in return.

These difficulties encouraged the farmers continually to cross the boundaries of the company's area of jurisdiction. They could then be free to make better use of their lives, away from what they regarded as the tyranny of Cape Town. The company replied by running after them and by extending its borders. And this process had the effect of pushing the whites farther into the interior and bringing them closer to the more powerful Xosa Africans. Although the whites in Cape Town had originally introduced the idea of segregating themselves behind van Riebeeck's fences, economic and other pressures had forced them to disregard their own boundaries. This process was to be repeated during the next hundred years, bringing more and more of the land the Africans owned under white occupation. It was accelerated after the Great Trek and led, finally, to the complete takeover by the whites and the consolidation of the process when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.

The estrangement between the stock farmers and the Cape Town authority was affected by the quality of the ideals associated with the French Revolution in a very interesting manner. When trouble developed between the Africans and the farmers in the eastern Cape, Governor van der Graaff had sent out H. C. Maynier, a man of liberal views, to collaborate with J. J. Wagenaar, the secretary of the Graaff-Reinet magistrate, in restoring the relations between black and white to normality. Maynier's view was that if the farmers were in trouble they were not wholly free from blame. So, when he became secretary upon Wagenaar's retirement, the farmers felt outraged by the appointment. It projected government policy as being modeled on the principle that the black man had the right to be treated like a white person. The support given Maynier by the government

was regarded by the farmers as an endorsement of racial policies that threatened their physical survival. In the end, the farmers got together and expelled Maynier from Graaff-Reinet.

The remarkable thing about this dramatic rejection of the main ideals of the French Revolution as expounded from the government side is that within a very short time the farmers did a complete about-face to embrace those very ideals in order to support their revolt against the Cape Town authority. Some communities, notably at Graaff-Reinet itself and Swellendam, threw out government officers and proclaimed themselves sovereign independent states. To be in line with the French revolutionaries, they also called themselves the "nationals," hoisted their version of the tricolor, and elected their own "government." Another contradiction in the evolution of the Afrikaner's attitude toward race was also making itself clear. Truth was being judged from the perspective of race. This would give it one form of validity on the white side of the color line and another among the Africans. The ideals of the French Revolution were good when they inspired the farmers' revolt against Cape Town; they were bad when Cape Town acted on them, rather timidly, to regulate the relations between black and white.

The real significance of the risings, however, is that they resulted largely from the company's failure to evolve a unifying political philosophy for the administration of the Cape settlement. This failure had led to a political vacuum which had never been filled. When the French Revolution came, the farmers borrowed its ideals to fill the vacuum and give content to their revolt. Viewed in this light, the risings could also be said to have been the political expression of the feeling of community which was slowly welding the farmers into a distinctive cultural group. It was motivated by the desire to insure that white initiatives remained the dominant influence in the life of the Cape, as well as to fix the pattern of relations between black and white. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the stock farmers had met the Xosa-speaking Africans, who belong to the same family as the Sutu and the fighting Zulus. Unlike the Hottentots, the Xosas made it unmistakably clear at the very outset that they

were determined to resist forcefully any encroachments on their lands. This started a war of conquest between the Africans and the whites which was to be waged with brief intervals of peace for well over a hundred years. The Xosas were unlike the Hottentots in one other respect—they were not nomads; rather, they were stock farmers and tillers of the soil. They had their own forms of government and ran states that showed a remarkable capacity to withstand the shock of the white man's gun. Their generals were brave and skillful fighters, and they succeeded at least in bringing the white march to a temporary stop. The bitterness which these wars generated left an indelible mark on the white farmers.

The religious and cultural differences between the farmers and the Africans were another factor that affected the relations between them. The majority in the Dutch-Huguenot community were Calvinist fundamentalists. They accepted the pattern of society in which the whites were masters as the visible expression of the divine will; they took every word in the Bible as revealed truth and believed that the African Negro was the delinquent descendant of the Semitic Noah. Hence, the blacks had been created to serve the whites. For the African to claim equality with, or challenge the authority of, the white man was an outrage indistinguishable from treason and sacrilege. Then, too, the ancestors of the Cape Dutch had left Europe when absolutism was accepted as the main attribute of governmental authority. Fulfillment for the individual lay in obedience. These people had not been exposed to the liberalizing doctrines of the French Revolution, which emphasized the right of the individual to liberty and equality.

These two factors combined to give rise to an inflexible attitude that saw men from the perspective of the group. Man's destiny was regarded as having been predetermined by a Higher Being, whose sole representatives were the white race. The will of the representatives was the law for those created for a lower destiny. To challenge this was to question God's infallibility.

This outlook, which we shall refer to as the fundamentalist dynamic, has played and continues to play a very important role

in the life and thinking of the Afrikaners. It has been upheld by the Dutch Reformed Church, by Afrikaner universities, and by predominantly Afrikaner political parties. (It might be pointed out in passing that the relationship between the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and the government was unique from the very beginning. The ministers at the Cape were the servants of the company, since they were maintained or transferred by it. The link with authority was thus strong from the beginning.)

All the factors discussed so far combined to transform the stock farmers into a hardy, crude, fearless, ruthless, self-conscious, and ruggedly individualistic community with a personality that was to become more distinctive as new pressures from outside made their impact on it. The influences that gave meaning to their life were the Bible, the gun, their hatred of the African and of constituted authority, their deep-seated sense of inadequacy, their self-reliance, their belief in repudiation, and their pride in their uniqueness. They regarded themselves as having nothing in common—other than race, language, and religion—with the sophisticated citizens of the metropolis. To emphasize this fact, they called themselves the *Trekboers*—the emigrant farmers. The *Trekboers* were that section of the Dutch-Huguenot community which spearheaded the movement of revolt against Cape Town's authority and expressed in the sharpest forms possible the desire for national fulfillment that is today the main driving force behind Afrikaner nationalism. They, more than the Dutch-Huguenots who remained in Cape Town, gave to Afrikanerdom most of the qualities that are its distinguishing features today.

The slaves played a role in the evolution of the Afrikaner people which is too important to be ignored even in a brief probe into the origins of apartheid. They were divided into three main groups: The Malay craftsmen, the most expensive; the Negroes, the laborers; and the "half-castes"—slaves of mixed parentage—who did most of the domestic work and called themselves the *Afrikanders*, the people of Africa. The *Afrikanders* were closest to their masters physically and culturally. Unlike the Negroes and the Malays, they were a new people in history, with

no past, language, or culture of their own; they were the result of the mixture and segregation of the races at Cape Town. They worked in Dutch-Huguenot homes and had little in common with the Negro or Malay side of their parentage. Since they were largely illiterate and found Dutch somewhat complicated for their needs, they collaborated with their masters in evolving a kitchen lingua that became the sole medium of communication with their owners or among themselves.

One of the things which British emancipation of the slaves was to do, years later, was to destroy the Afrikaner community. When slavery ended, these people disappeared into the social stratifications of the nonwhite community to constitute that section of the nation known as the Cape Coloreds. But before this happened, Britain had, after she had occupied the Cape, adopted the policy of Anglicizing the Cape Dutch. That had started what is today known as the first language struggle. In this fight, the Dutch-Huguenot community campaigned to retain Dutch on a footing of equality with English.

Dutch was, however, the language of the educated and the cultured, mainly around Cape Town. The Trekboers gradually showed a liking for the lingua of the Afrikaners, for it was more in keeping with their situation. Furthermore, it was not, strictly speaking, a European language; it was a lingual amalgam born of the Trekboer's experience of life in Africa. To adopt it as his own would emphasize his distinctiveness as an African national group. In the interior, he was always something of an oddity. Africa was the land of the black man. The Trekboer wanted passionately to be accepted as belonging to Africa, but he nevertheless refused to identify himself with the real Africans. He feared to lose his racial identity. To establish his claim to being an African, he abandoned the idea of calling himself the Trekboer or Boer. Since the Afrikaners, who had been known to belong to Africa, were a dying community, he would take on their name and call himself the Afrikaner. He would finally repudiate Dutch, the language of that Europe on which he had turned his back and take over, in the second language struggle, that lingua

which the slaves had helped to preserve with so much diligence in his kitchens. It was to be his—the Afrikaans, which is today one of the two official languages of the republic of South Africa.

By helping to develop Afrikaans, the Afrikaners made the Dutch-Huguenot community indebted to them in a unique way. The man of color in South Africa is often accused of ingratitude for some of the worthwhile things which the white man has done for him. Reluctance to be thankful or to acknowledge indebtedness is not a particularly nonwhite weakness. The denial to the people who made positive contributions to the culture of the Afrikaner of the right to sit in Parliament is an act of ingratitude on the part of the Afrikaner which should remind all that in the final reckoning no race of men has a monopoly of virtue.

It can be said, by way of conclusion, that the Trekboers had been born into a historical cleft stick. One side of it was the overwhelming legal and economic power of the company, and subsequently of the British. The other was the overwhelming numerical power of the Africans. The one was continually pushing them into the interior, while the other pressed them backwards toward Cape Town. To yield to either meant physical extinction. This developed in the Afrikaner the habit of judging men and events by the extent to which they threatened or secured his survival. In this mood, he grew to rely on the unity and strength of his own group as his guarantees of security. It is difficult to see how a small minority, always unwanted, often treated with contempt and living under the constant threat of extinction, could have behaved differently in a situation in which they had known only the tradition of absolutism and had been nurtured on spiritual values that set the greatest store by the group.

It is in the Afrikaner's preoccupation with considerations of survival that the crux of South Africa's race problem lies. The solution is also there.

2 • THE BRITISH INHERIT A SITUATION

LIKE the rest of the world, most South Africans believe that Great Britain introduced liberal attitudes to the man of color in the Cape. Some of Afrikaner nationalism's apologists still swear that this was done to bribe the Africans for the purpose of getting them to gang up with her against the Boers. Because a lot of bitterness, hatred, and confusion has developed, a brief recapitulation of the salient facts about this formative period in South African history will help place events in their proper perspective.

As far back as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Maynier had been driven out of office at Graaff-Reinet because he had acted on the principle that the African had a dignity of his own as a human being, which had to be respected. Although his predecessor had not been wholly unsympathetic to the idea of treating the African in a humane way, Maynier's expulsion was a calculated demonstration against a very definite stand on a vital issue taken by a Dutch civil servant.

After this event, the Napoleonic Wars brought the British to the Cape to forestall the French. The Treaty of Amiens (1802) restored the Cape to the Dutch, who ruled it under a department of the Batavian Republic. Shortly after the restoration, the republic sent out Commissioner de Mist to modernize the administration of the Cape and fill the political vacuum that had wrought so much harm in the relations between the com-

pany and the Boers. De Mist was appalled by the callous brutality of the Boers toward the man of color: They did not behave like a civilized community. He attributed their attitude largely to the fact that they had been cut off from the main stream of European civilization for a long time. In order for them to develop a humane attitude, he felt, they had to be educated and civilized. Accordingly, he introduced reforms in the Government and the schools designed to bring the Boers more in line with the main stream of European thought. Storms of protest rose the moment he promulgated these, and even the Dutch Reformed Church joined in the popular clamor against de Mist.

Such opposition, coupled with Maynier's expulsion and the Trekboer's expressed desire for national fulfillment, was a clear repudiation of that Holland which had begun to go "liberal" in its evaluations of the human personality. If the Dutch had not been finally driven out of the Cape in 1806, there is no valid reason to suggest that their brand of liberalism would not have been repudiated as completely as was that of the British. What the Boers objected to, basically, was a way of life. Who upheld it was not decisively important; what mattered was that it threatened those values which they cherished most and were not willing to abandon. Repudiation was, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, the most effective form of protest for a minority. People moved away from the center of oppression, since the land beyond was largely in the hands of Africans who did not have guns. Beyond the boundaries prescribed by Cape Town, the Trekboers could be free to do what they liked, once they had broken African resistance.

It was into this situation that the British moved when they took over the Cape. Their coming merely accelerated a process of thinking and action among the Boers that was already moving in a clearly defined direction. What dramatized their impact on the Boers was the fact that they were foreigners who spoke a different language and upheld unpopular cultural values. By succeeding the authorities who had ruled from Cape Town and Holland, they were presumed to be heirs to the sins of their

predecessors in office. As a result, their arrival did little to persuade the Boers to change their minds about repudiation.

At the same time, a very important development was gradually coming to the fore to shatter whatever accord still remained between the Boers and the British. Slavery was on its way out in the British Empire, and its effects were becoming increasingly visible in the policies of the Cape government. British governors began modifying the conditions under which the slaves worked; Sir John Cradock, for example, decreed that the number of lashes inflicted on a slave as punishment should be decreased. The Boers disliked reforms like these, for they saw in them an attempt to weaken the authority and prestige of the white man, a sinister threat to their supremacy and survival. They could remain the black man's superiors only when the law allowed them to do what they liked with their slaves. From the nature of both the short-term and long-term reforms, it was becoming clear that British policy aimed finally at creating a nation in which economic, political, and cultural homogeneity would be entrenched powerfully enough by usage to neutralize racial antagonisms and lead to the creation of a social order in which black and white initiatives could be harnessed for the more successful exploitation of the country's wealth. It so happened that moral considerations and the pressure of public opinion in Britain tended to favor movement in this direction.

But moral considerations had never figured prominently as an influence in determining the relations between the Boers and the Africans. In the eyes of most Boers, a white Christian was under the obligation to use Christian standards almost exclusively in his dealings with white Christians. As guardians of the Christian tradition, the whites had the right to lay down the law for the pagan descendants of Noah. Because of a curse, the people of Africa had been born into sin; slavery was the punishment, the mark of permanent inferiority to the white race. For the white people to identify themselves with the blacks was to degrade themselves and flout the divine intention; it was the right and duty

of every right-thinking white person to uphold the dignity of his race.

The pagan was the enemy of Christ. His attacks on the whites and his defense of his freedom and his lands constituted a threat to the Christian way of life. When the Boers shot their way into his territory, they were carrying out a divine mission—exactly in the way the Israelites had done when they smote their enemies, whom they regarded as the enemies of God. Here Christianity was being used effectively to pave the way for racial and economic policy. The Israelites had maintained the purity of their doctrines by remaining inflexibly exclusivist, by regarding their group or race consciousness as the first condition of survival. The Boers regarded their situation and their mission as similar to that of the Israelites.

On the other hand, the British drew the distinction between moral and economic necessity. But the Boers found it difficult to do this where the man of color was concerned. The result was that while the Britons maintained a fairly flexible attitude, which continually adapted itself to the demands of a changing situation, the fundamentalist approach forced the Boers to have one inflexible code of morals between white and white and another between black and white.

As the years went by, the conflicts in these attitudes became increasingly irreconcilable. In 1772, the British courts had ruled that slaves would be freed upon landing on British soil. About 14,000 men and women were freed as a result. A little more than ten years later, the Anti-Slavery Committee launched its campaign designed to limit the importation of slaves into the British colonies, and by 1807 the slave trade had been abolished in the British Empire.

These external developments affected the position at the Cape drastically. In 1805, the Cape population was estimated at 25,000 whites and 29,000 slaves. First, the Earl of Caledon decreed that the circuit judges should pay more attention to the grievances of the slaves; then, the improvement in their working conditions

and the fact that they could purchase their freedom on relatively more generous terms confronted the Cape with a new and difficult problem—the shortage of labor. Slavery had corrupted the white man and, as Baron van Imhoff had pointed out in 1743, largely incapacitated him for hard work. Since every young white man regarded himself as a gentleman, emancipation was to find him either unwilling or unable to exert himself in ways which could prevent the collapse of the settlement's economy.

To gear the Cape's economy to the coming changeover, the government produced the Hottentot Proclamation of 1809. Most South Africans regard this British law as having introduced the pass system and migratory labor. It broke up the tribal system and forced the Hottentots out of their reserves to offer themselves as laborers on white farms and elsewhere. It became a crime for a Hottentot to be in the white area unless he was employed there; it became compulsory for him to carry a pass showing that he was either in employment or on legitimate business. Written contracts were introduced that bound the Africans to serve for periods agreed upon.

This proclamation, seen from another angle, illustrates how contradictory white intentions were toward the Africans. In 1778, van Plettenberg, a Cape governor, had attempted to persuade the Africans to agree that race segregation, when it came to residence, was best for all. In a tour he made that year, he had assured the Africans that if they kept to their side of the boundary he and they were said to have agreed upon, the whites would stick to theirs. Economic pressures, however, made mincemeat of this policy and helped to create the impression in the African mind that the white man pledged his word to break it the moment he could afford to do so without harming himself. The story of van Riebeeck's fences was being repeated all over again, and it is being done today in the Bantustan policy.

Three years after the Caledon Proclamation had become law, Governor Cradock decreed that Hottentot children born on a white farm should be apprenticed to the farmer for ten years

before they were free to seek employment elsewhere. The attempts to cushion the Cape's economy against emancipation, therefore, created a situation in which the government made laws to insure that economic slavery came in to replace praedial slavery. The new policy cast the relations between the whites and the Africans into an altogether new mold. Up to that time, the wars between black and white had been fought mainly over the land question; now, the growing shortage of labor and the expanding economy made it imperative that more Africans be brought under white control. Only in this way would they work for the white man on terms that suited him. In the wars that followed, the fight was no longer for driving the Africans off the land or pushing them into the interior; the intention was to bring them under white rule. But the white man soon found himself caught in a vicious circle; for, in order to prosper, he had to wage almost perpetual war against all the black peoples in southern Africa. Since the needs of his economy demanded that no sovereign independent African state survive anywhere near his borders, the wars with the Xosas, Sutu, and Zulus, which continued with brief intervals of peace almost up to the end of the nineteenth century, were to a large extent the inevitable result of supplanting a praedial slavery with an economic one.

The year 1814 opened one of the most explosive periods in South African history. Lord Charles Somerset arrived at the Cape to head its government. Two years later, he issued a proclamation requiring all slaves to be registered. In 1823, he decreed that proper marriages had to be arranged for the slaves. Work on Sunday was forbidden. The slaves worked for a fixed number of hours per day. A maximum form of punishment was prescribed. The slaves were no longer to be separated from their families when sold. Their right to personal property was recognized. This proclamation, more widely known as the Slaves' Magna Carta, provoked a storm of protest from the white side. The British Government, acting partly upon missionary pressure in South Africa and a large number of sympathetic groups in England, ignored the protests.

Three years later, Governor Bourke, who acted for Somerset while the latter was in England, issued another proclamation, which established the office of slave protector, made it compulsory for the farmers to pay their slaves for Sunday work, and made it easier for the slaves to purchase their freedom. The white community protested very strongly against this law. Their main argument was that the people overseas did not understand South Africa's problems; they knew the African and were therefore best qualified to deal with him. Surprisingly enough, the argument is still used today in answer to world criticism of apartheid. By that time, however, British opinion was determined to smash the institution of slavery. In desperation, the whites in the Cape demanded representative government as a guarantee that Britain would not interfere in their domestic affairs.

Two other important events had taken place after Somerset's arrival, both of which affected profoundly the attitudes of the Boers. The first had been the coming of Dr. John Philip, in 1819, to supervise the work of the London Missionary Society—the significance of which will be discussed in the following chapter. Here, discussion must be confined to the British settlers, who arrived in 1820.

They were not the only minority group to arrive from Europe. There had first been the French Huguenots and then the Germans. They are important because their presence affected British policy in the Cape; unlike the French Huguenots, who were virtual refugees and were, for this reason, willing to lose their identity in the Boer community, the British settlers had not repudiated Great Britain or Europe. They regarded themselves as an integral part of the large Anglo-Saxon community in the world. Its culture and economic, military, and political power were, in the ultimate reckoning, their final guarantees of security. For these reasons, they were less ready to lose their identity in the Cape than were the Huguenots.

Their arrival created quite a different set of problems for the Boers. Until then, Dutch had remained the main official lan-

guage. Although Somerset had made attempts to reform the government by introducing British ideas and practices, the small numbers of English-speaking people had militated against too bold a program of Anglicization. The arrival of the settlers encouraged him to decree, in 1822, that English would be the Cape's official language after 1827. This led to a head-on collision with the Dutch-Huguenot community and produced the first language struggle. But Somerset was so determined to Anglicize the Boers that he even discouraged the practice of importing ministers from Holland to fill vacant pulpits. He preferred men from Scotland whose doctrines were identical with those of the Dutch Reformed Church. The Dutch monetary system was scrapped, and English coins came into circulation. By 1827, the British judicial system had been adopted.

The wounds cut into the soul of the Boers by all these developments are apparent to this day. British attitudes toward the Boers, Somerset's policy of Anglicization, and Britain's determination to destroy slavery and elevate the man of color to the position at least of equality before the law—all stimulated the conflict of initiatives within the white community itself. The Boers believed that Britain wanted to reduce them to the position of political, economic, and cultural vassalage. This they would not allow, no matter what happened. Their answer was to struggle to assert Boer initiatives as the dominant influences in the white community. Thus were the foundations laid for the long and bitter conflict between the Boers and the British, which led both sides to war and culminated in the Union Prime Minister's decision not to apply for membership in the Commonwealth.

3 • DR. PHILIP AND THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

DR. JOHN PHILIP landed at the Cape when the pattern of the relations among the various racial groups was more or less fixed. The possession of guns had enabled the whites to assert their initiatives so successfully that the Hottentots had been cowed into submission. But although they had only the spear, the Xosa Africans were in no mood to lie down on their stomachs while their lands were pillaged and their women raped by the white marauders. The clashes had been very fierce, but it was becoming clear that the side with the best arms would ultimately carry the day. And inside the white community, a fierce struggle was on to assert group initiatives as the dominant influence in government.

Dr. Philip viewed all these developments with a great deal of concern. The assertion of racial initiatives, he realized, would always drive black and white into two armed camps, and the result would be either the decimation of the African or the expulsion of the whites from the soil of Africa. There could be no hope for Christianity in this situation. In his view, the Cape's greatest need was not conquest or reconquest, but the establishment of a bridge of accord across the color line to enable men and women who worshiped at the same altar to stand together in the defense of those things they cherished most.

He found in Christian values the sort of bridge that would achieve the end he had in mind.

The wars had oversimplified the real issues in the conflict between black and white. The whites had marched as a group into African territory; the blacks had defended themselves as a group. This made white unity an indispensable condition of success. That, in turn, had the effect of justifying and reinforcing Boer attitudes. To Philip, this tendency to view men from the perspective of the group would in time have the effect of making it extremely difficult for black and white to agree on the meaning of citizenship. And where this agreement could not be reached, the outlook for Christian missions would be bleak. To pave the way for a common Christian citizenship, Philip insisted on regarding moral values as having a validity that transcended race. It was not enough, however, merely to pay lip service to these values. To make an impression, they had to give form to the relations between black and white; they had to find expression in the legislative program of the government.

Philip had reached the Cape when the collapse of slavery could not be delayed much longer. While applying himself to the task of accelerating the movement toward its final abolition, he prepared himself for a protracted fight against the pass and migratory labor systems. First, he attacked the British Government's policy of perpetuating slavery in a new guise. He denounced the uprooting of the Africans from their reserves and their being forced to work for the whites against their wishes. This, he said, was not the sort of conduct to expect from a community that called itself Christian. He was outraged by Boer callousness and brutality in dealing with the Africans. No Christian should tolerate this sort of thing. He agreed that it was desirable to civilize the African. But, he insisted, this could be done successfully by giving the African enough land to live on, by recognizing his right to sell his labor where he liked, and by respecting his right to determine his life. He encouraged those Africans who had embraced the Christian faith to settle

in mission reserves; he taught them that, like every human being created in the image of God, they had an inherent dignity.

As was to be expected, his activities made him extremely unpopular with the farmers. They accused him of seeking to rob them of their labor. Any emphasis on human rights, they said, spoiled the Africans and made them think they were the equals of the white man. They took on airs and became rebellious and threatened to upset the social structure which the white man had established at the Cape. The farmers then organized campaigns to get the mission reserves broken up and the Africans dispersed. They exerted pressure on the government to curb Philip's activities. But he replied by carrying the fight right into the House of Commons, where he had powerful friends, and he wrote extensively on conditions in the Cape. His "Researches in South Africa," in which he described conditions as he had seen them, made a deep impression on British opinion. The most outstanding result of his agitations was that the British Government instructed Governor Bourke to pass the now famous Ordinance No. 50 of 1828. This law abolished the previous proclamations limiting the freedom of movement of the Hottentots. Their right to buy land was recognized, and they were no longer forced to work. They became the equals of the white man in the eyes of the law. Dr. Philip pressed the British Government to include a clause in the proclamation saying that it could not be amended or repealed without the consent of the British Government.

But Dr. Philip's most important contribution to the solution of the race problem was not his success in persuading the British Government to get Ordinance No. 50 promulgated at the Cape—important as that was in a situation where the possession of the gun gave the initiative to the white man. It was, first, in the way he introduced a new dynamic into the conflict between black and white. By attacking the white rulers from the perspective of moral values, he built a nonracial bridge for the like-minded on both sides of the color line to coordinate their reserves of power and march together against race oppression.

This moral dynamic differed from the liberalism of Maynier and de Mist in that it relied, for its support, not on the ruling minority but on the good will of decent men and women on both sides of the color line. In Maynier's day, it had been possible for the white supremacists to throttle liberalism in the white community and to ostracize the nonconformists. The humanistic dynamic facilitated the coordination of black and white initiatives on the basis of values accepted by both sides. Because of this, the time would come when it would be the guiding influence in the lives of millions of oppressed people. Then, no power on the side of the white minority could withhold from the Africans the liberty that was their birthright.

Second, it had long been evident that where racial initiatives were pushed to the fore as the decisive factors giving momentum and direction to life in South Africa, victory for one side could, in the end, mean the destruction of the other. Because the African did not have the guns, he was at a disadvantage. Dr. Philip saw no valid reason why the oppressed should not have an effective alternative. By vigorously using the moral dynamic to weaken white supremacy, he fought on ground where the enemy was most vulnerable and in that way gave the Africans a choice of weapons in the fight against race oppression. The African could thus reject reliance on war and bloodshed as a means of winning his freedom; he could try moral pressures instead. Since these had worked where his own armies had failed, they were not the sort of thing to brush aside lightly; certainly not in a situation where the only alternative was the gun.

Third, by showing the Africans that the alternative weapon worked efficaciously, Dr. Philip created a climate of opinion that made it possible for large numbers of people to recover from the shocks of defeat, shake off their despair, and regroup once more for an attack on the citadels of oppression. It is no accident that the founders of the African National Congress, nearly a hundred years after Philip had first set his foot in South Africa, rejected race as a unifying factor and committed them-

selves to a unity based on values of life that would have the same meaning among all the African communities.

Fourth, Dr. Philip's victorious stand on moral values projected ideals with the same meaning on both sides of the color line as the only initiatives that could span the racial, cultural, and ideological chasms. This, in turn, threw into bold relief one fundamental fact in the South African crisis—that beneath the republic's troubles lie irreconcilable values of life, not the conflict of color.

Finally, his successes emphasized the differences in the approach of the Boers and the British to the race question. These derived ultimately from the conflict between two historic dynamics—the fundamentalism whose roots lay in the absolutism that had characterized political and religious thought in Europe before, during, and shortly after the Inquisition, and the empiricism of a seafaring and commercial island-nation whose unity and internal power had been built on the tradition of compromise.

The flexibility of the empiricist dynamic allowed for change, growth, and adjustment. It did not hold out bloodshed as the only means by which to effect reforms. The Boer's inflexibility, on the other hand, left the African with war as the only means of recovering what he had lost. Since he was not armed, it seemed to him that fundamentalism would condemn him to perpetual ruin. Thus, when he showed a bias in favor of the side with flexibility, he was not expressing a racial preference. He was choosing between a way of life that held out hope of security in the future and one that did not; between an attitude that promised him the possibility of making better use of his life if he adapted himself to the demands of a changing situation and one that frustrated life's purpose for him. The fact that both attitudes were upheld by white groups was immaterial, for both white groups had come to South Africa as conquerors. The fact to which the African attached importance was simply this: After the conquest, what will happen to me and my children? If the empiricist outlook of the British prevailed, the

African's future was not dark; if the Boer's fundamentalism became the dominant influence, there would be no future worth talking about. This, in the final analysis, was the fact that decided African attitudes toward the white groups, as was soon to be shown.

An altogether new chapter opened in Dr. Philip's life after the emancipation of the slaves in the Cape. While he rejoiced that the area of human liberty was being extended, he insisted that the mere act of freeing the slaves was not enough. It would serve only a limited purpose if it did not lead to the recasting of policy toward the nonwhites. The pressures he exerted along these lines led to the appointment of the Aborigines Committee by the British Parliament. The committee sat from 1835 to the following year, and its job was to recommend policies to be adopted in dealings with the aborigines. Dr. Philip took with him to London three men to give evidence before the committee. One was a white, a former civil servant; the other two were a Xosa and a Hottentot. The evidence these men gave in London was most damaging to the farmers, who resented it bitterly. One result of Dr. Philip's representations was that the right of the Xosas to land which the farmers had taken by force was recognized. To insure that some of the colonial boundaries were properly moved back, Stockenström, the other white man in the group that went to London, was appointed lieutenant-governor of the area in which the restoration of the land was to take place.

All these developments made a very deep impression on the African community. By his courage and integrity, Dr. Philip had been able to restore to them what their own arms had been unable to recover. But he did not live to see the visible results of his activities among the Africans. It would, however, not be in accord with the facts to conclude that Dr. Philip introduced the principle of nonracial citizenship. Not even the British did that. Maynier in the eighteenth century and de Mist in the nineteenth had laid the foundations for the tradition to which the principle was to give content. The culprits on the white side

were neither the Dutch nor the British; they were the French revolutionaries who forced European civilization to take a new turn into the future.

Nor would it be correct to argue that the principle around which Dr. Philip crystallized what came to be known as the liberal tradition was the invention of the white man alone. Acting quite independently at the Cape, Dr. Philip had come to the conclusion that common citizenship, to use modern parlance, was the guarantee of stability without which Christianity would be jeopardized in a mixed nation. But acting equally independently, Shaka, the Zulu king, had arrived at the conclusion that common citizenship was the main guarantee of security for the Zulu state.

This is how he had come to this decision: Some of the 1820 British settlers had passed on to Natal, where they learned that the land belonged to the warlike, Zulu-speaking Africans. Their leader was King Shaka, who lived at Dukuza, where the town of Stanger is now situated. When the leaders of the settlers got to Shaka, they requested him to allow them to settle on Zulu territory. Shaka was impressed with their technological know-how and he thought they were fine fellows to have as neighbors. He granted them usufructory rights to land around the Durban bay, for the concept of private land ownership was unknown in Zulu law. When the Zulus talked of giving land, they had in mind usufructory rights and nothing beyond that. The land belonged to their ancestors; the living could thus not own it or give it away.

Shaka wielded absolute power. This circumstance had accustomed him to the need to face and deal in realities. When the settlers killed an ox merely by pointing their "fire-spitting stick" at it, Shaka was quick to grasp the significance of this for the Zulu state, whose soldiers used the spear only. He decided that it would be wise to come to terms with the whites and initiated moves to establish diplomatic relations with the Court of St. James's. In February, 1828, he sent Sotobe "and some others

... to visit, on his behalf, the King of Great Britain."¹ Thus, the granting of usufructory rights and the sending of the diplomatic mission (which never reached London) offered the British settlers citizenship in the Zulu state in return for access to their skills.

The fact that the tradition based on the principle of common, nonracial citizenship has fought, won, or lost political and other battles does not in any way invalidate the fact of its being an integral part of the South African way of life. It lays claim to as brilliant a galaxy of talent, drawn from all the major groups in the nation, as any political tradition in the history of the republic. Thus, when Mr. Eric Louw, South Africa's Minister for External Affairs, rises in the United Nations to repeat the time-worn argument that apartheid is South Africa's traditional way of life, he tells the truth with a sense of economy that gives a distorted picture of the actual position in this country.

The debate on the nature of the foundations on which to base the relations between black and white has been going on, on both sides of the color line, practically from the day Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape. It has always centered around the question whether black or white or coordinated initiatives would shape the course of events. During the eighteenth century, this controversy was often conducted on the battlefields. This was the case during a large part of the nineteenth century too. The creation of the Union altered the platforms from which it was to be pursued. It came to be carried on in the South African Parliament, in the many resistance groups formed to resist white domination, and, ultimately, in the United Nations.

¹ Gibson, *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 35.

4 • FROM REPUDIATION TO FULFILLMENT

THE passing of Ordinance No. 50 of 1828 had given the farmers a shock from which they did not readily recover. They replied by working harder to consolidate their reserves of power for the purpose of making their initiatives an influence the government could not ignore.

The first great challenge came two years after the passing of the 1828 proclamation, when the British Government ordered that record books be kept in which particulars about punishments meted out to slaves by their masters were to be noted. These registers were to be inspected by government officials every two years. The Boers felt that this was almost the limit of provocation. They had in the past protested peacefully against persistent efforts to undermine their position, but now the time had come for direct action. Meetings were called, and in the end the farmers resolved to boycott the record book. The government withdrew it and issued a proclamation making it compulsory that the slaves work a maximum of nine hours per day. Another wave of protests followed, but the government stuck to its guns. The farmers then said that they would agree to emancipation if they were granted representative government. Fearing that this was a ruse by which to give a new lease of life to slavery, the British Government turned the request down.

By this time feeling against almost everything British was running high. That this was the case is illustrated by the incident involving the Bezuidenhout brothers in 1815. Frederick Bezuidenhout had been summoned to answer charges of ill treatment by his Hottentot servant. Since it was beneath the dignity of a Boer to go to court and allow himself to be questioned by a nonwhite person, Frederick ignored the summons. When the magistrate sent a company of Hottentot constables under a white officer to arrest him, he retreated into a cave from which he opened fire. But a shot from one of the Hottentots killed him on the spot. At the funeral, his brother publicly swore vengeance against the British and their Hottentot lackeys; shortly after the burial, he organized a band of desperadoes to drive out the British and punish the Hottentots. Some of the Boers, aware of their numerical weakness, approached the Xosas for help, but the latter openly showed their lack of enthusiasm for the idea. In the end, the British rounded up the rebels and tried them for treason. Five of them were hanged publicly at Slachter's Nek, in 1816, and Frederick's brother was shot and killed while trying to escape. The Boer community was outraged by this incident.

The blood of the rebels had barely dried when the House of Commons passed the act that abolished slavery in the British Empire, as of December 1, 1834. Provision was made for compensation to be paid, for the apprenticeship of the emancipated slaves, and for a transition period during which both sides would adapt themselves to the changed situation.

Emancipation shook the Boers' world to its foundations. They found themselves face to face with the prospect of a large mass of black people who were, in the eyes of the law, to be their equals. They made it clear that they had had enough of British rule and liberalism. Just as the "nationals" had repudiated Holland in the hour of crisis, so the Boers took refuge in repudiating the British when the humanistic tradition threatened to give to citizenship a similar meaning on both sides of the color line. This was not a decision taken on the spur of the moment; it was a dramatic climacteric in a process that had had its roots in the

hatred for the company's rule. In their journeyings into the interior, the emigrant farmers progressively realized that salvation for them lay in solidarity, group exclusiveness, and a fierce possessiveness in clinging to what was their own.

Britain had always stood for ideals that the Boers regarded as a threat to their security and survival. Under the circumstances, repudiation served the purpose of guaranteeing security for a people whose isolation from the cultured world had given them a deep sense of inadequacy. They would leave the Cape colony and trek to the north, where they would be free to make laws that would best express their genius. The Boers, of course, were not the first people in history to confuse moral and physical necessity. Their exemplars, the Biblical Jews, regarded their private enemies as God's own personal foes. The formulation of the law by Moses was not the natural achievement of the human mind in a given situation; it was proof of God's partiality for the Jews, justification for their group supremacy.

In 1834, the Boers secretly sent three parties into the interior to spy on the strength of the African states and decide what areas were most suitable for settlement. These were the Commissie Treks. One of them visited Damaraland, another went to Zoutpansberg in the north, and the third rode into Natal. Shortly after the return of the Commissie Treks, the great emigration started.

The Great Trek is the most important single event in Afrikaner history next to Jan van Riebeeck's arrival in South Africa. Opinions still differ very sharply on the real motivating urges that brought about its organization. Two authoritative witnesses may be called in to testify on the issues that stirred deepest in the Boer bosom. The first is Piet Retief, one of the most idolized and distinguished leaders of the emigration, who gave his and his people's reasons for leaving the Cape in a manifesto published in the *Grahamstown Journal* of February 2, 1837. He declared:

1. We despair of saving the Colony from these evils which threaten it on account of the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed to infest the country in every part; nor

do we see any prospect of peace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted by internal commotion.

2. We complain of the severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them.

3. We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have endured from the Kafirs and other coloured classes, and particularly by the last invasion of the Colony.

4. We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons, under the cloak of religion, whose testimony is believed in England to the exclusion of all evidence in our favor; and we can foresee, as the result of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country.

5. We are resolved to uphold the just principles of liberty, and, while not tolerating slavery, will preserve proper relations between master and servant.

6. We quit this Colony under the full assurance that the British Government has nothing to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in future.

Although Piet Retief had stated the motivating urges behind the Great Trek in tactful language, his niece, Anna Elizabeth Steenkamp, saw no valid reason why she should hesitate to tell the world in candid and precise terms what really burned most fiercely in the Boer bosom. This remarkable lady wrote in the *Cape Monthly Magazine* of September, 1876:

The reasons for which we abandoned our lands and homesteads, our country and kindred, were the following:

1. The continual depredations and robberies of the Kafirs, and their arrogance and overbearing conduct; and the fact that in spite of the promises made to us by our government we nevertheless received no compensation for the property for which we had been despoiled.

2. The shameful and unjust proceedings with reference to the freedom of our slaves; and yet it is not so much their freedom that drove us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with the Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and religion, so that it was intolerable

for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order thus to preserve our doctrines in purity.

One fact might be noted in passing. Both Retief and Steenkamp laid the greatest stress on the losses they had had to endure as a result of emancipation. The point looks somewhat over-emphasized; for although some slave owners suffered heavy losses, it must not be forgotten that as early as 1809 the British had started introducing legislation designed to cushion the farmers against the shocks of emancipation.

Retief probably meant every word of what he wrote against tolerating slavery. At the same time, it must be said that if some Trekker communities gave up slaveholding, others did not readily do so. Mrs. Angelina Dube, the wife of the late Dr. John L. Dube, who founded Ohlange College near Durban, informed the present author some time before the writing of this book that some of her grandparents had been slaves who fled from their Boer masters during the Great Trek. It is possible also that in time the Boers gave up slavery as they penetrated into the interior. But we have it on Piet Retief's own authority that the Trekkers were going to preserve "proper relations between master and servant." These relations had arisen in circumstances where slavery was a fixed and accepted institution. Master meant a white person and servant the man of color. The habits of thought, behavior patterns, outlooks, and practices that gave reality and form to these relations were to remain. In other words, although the Trekkers gave up the institution of slavery, they were, according to Piet Retief, who is a convincing witness, not going to give up the temper of the slave owner.

To insure that these relations were preserved, the Trekkers, after establishing their republics in the north, insisted on treating the man of color as an inferior. The South African Republic (Transvaal), which was the most famous and powerful of the Boer states, declared specifically in its constitution that there would be no equality between black and white either in the church or the state. Largely as a result of this attitude, the greatest African progress was registered in the British colonies, where,

as in the Cape, the African had the vote and in Natal, where he could buy land freely.

In every sphere of life, the temper of the slave owner has constituted a grave and limiting factor in the Afrikaner's approach to the man of color. Everywhere, barring a few and notable exceptions, he insisted upon seeing in the African a permanent inferior. This temper has poisoned every phase of Afrikaner life. The Dutch Reformed Church upheld it; so did the Afrikaner universities. For a long time, Afrikaner literature, again with a few exceptions, has been one unbroken song of hate and contempt for the African. The point of highest fulfillment for the Afrikaner genius in this setting has not been the vision of emancipated man making the best possible use of his life and enjoying that liberty which was the birthright of all human beings created in the image of God. It has been the frustration of the other man's march to freedom and a fuller life, the narrowing down of the area within which the other man could strive to be like God. When the Union Government forbids the admission of Africans into white universities, it is moving to ensure that the "proper relations" are preserved.

The Nationalist Party, which Dr. Verwoerd leads, was returned to power in 1948 on the slogan that *die wit man moet baas bly* (the white man must remain master). This is the ideal apartheid has set itself, the point of final fulfillment for the descendants of the Trekkers. When Dr. Verwoerd elected to leave the Commonwealth rather than modify the temper of the slave owner, he was merely taking the position assumed by Piet Retief more than a hundred years ago, in an almost similar situation. The chain of continuity has never been broken. Apartheid is the twentieth-century version of the temper the Trekkers swore to preserve.

When a special type of education is given the African, it is to make sure that the master-servant relationship is given a permanent form. When the Commonwealth raised its voice in protest against the inhumanity of apartheid, Dr. Verwoerd's prompt and definite reply was to repudiate this community of free nations, and, by implication, to repudiate humanity itself.

5 • THE FATE OF THE REPUBLICS

THE northern lands into which the Trekkers moved were caught in a wave of bloody turbulence. Shaka had laid waste large tracts of land along the east coast of Natal and driven whole tribes across the Drakensberg Mountains or beyond the Limpopo River. These groups, in turn, had used fire and spear to fight their way to areas where they could be safe from him. The Hlubis had climbed over the Drakensberg and were giving Moshoeshoe's Sutus no end of trouble, Mzilikazi's Ndebeles had pushed on into what was to be the Transvaal and had left chaos in their wake. The Griqua chieftains on the Orange River had their own ideas on how to treat the white man. As a result, large numbers of refugees and displaced or stateless persons roamed the countryside. Some of them attached themselves to powerful kings; others traveled up and down the country, a menace to black and white.

The Trekkers moved into this situation in three directions—toward Natal in the east, the Orange River in the northwest, and across the Vaal River in the north. Piet Retief led the Trekkers who wanted to live in Natal. The land was held by Zulu-speaking Africans who were then ruled by King Dingane. The coming of the whites was viewed with very grave suspicion, for they had crossed the Drakensberg and settled on lands that belonged to the Zulus without first obtaining permission from the king. The Zulu intelligence services reported this to Um-

gungundlovu, the seat of government, where it caused no small stir. Retief's followers were caught in an extremely unfortunate situation. Just as the British had inherited the sins of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape, so the Boers had landed themselves in the position where they had to suffer partly for the sins of the British.

About ten years before their arrival, as we noted earlier, Shaka had made serious efforts to become friends with the British. He had sent Sotobe, Mbozamboza, and others to the King of England in an endeavor to establish diplomatic relations. The story that reached Zululand was that King Shaka's envoys had never reached their destination; they had been arrested and jailed by the British authorities at the Cape on the suspicion that they were spies. One of them fell ill as a result of the bad conditions in the cells and died. Zulu opinion had been shocked and angered by this white reciprocation of Shaka's courtesy. Some time later, the Commissie Trek was said to have arrived in Natal to spy on the land and its people. The queer movements of these Boers had aroused much comment among the Zulus, who had begun to view the white people with suspicion.

So when Piet Retief at last approached Dingane with the request for land, the latter laid down the condition that he would consider the application only if the Boers recovered the cattle King Segonyela of the Pedis had stolen from Zululand. Retief and his men accepted the condition and, as legend has it, traveled northward to Segonyela's headquarters. They lured the king into a trap by telling him that they had brought special silver bangles for him. But when he tried them on, they put handcuffs on him, locked him up, and declared him their prisoner until a ransom in cattle was paid. This they took to Dingane.

The Zulu intelligence officer who had accompanied the Boers without their knowledge is said by the Zulus to have rushed home and reported what he had seen to his king. When Retief returned with the cattle, Zulu opinion was in a state of dangerous ferment; there was the fear that the Boers would attempt

the same trick upon their king, protestations of good intentions notwithstanding. What made matters worse for Retief was the fact that the sentinels guarding Umgungundlovu kraal reported strange movements by the Boers at night. They reported that they had seen them attempt to surround the capital. This confirmed the suspicion that they were the spies of a foreign white power. Finally, the Boers complicated matters by being rude and overbearing in their manners. When the Reverend Mr. Owen, who lived in the royal kraal, warned them against manners which could be misconstrued as provocation, Retief is reported to have replied that he knew how to deal with the Kafirs.

Dingane had all along been most reluctant to take drastic action against the Boers. Like his brother Shaka, he had an eye on making friends with them for the purpose of procuring guns. When, however, he was confronted with evidence that they were conspiring to overthrow the Zulu state, he did what any man in his position would have done to a spy and traitor—he ordered their destruction. But he used their own tactics against them. They were invited to a display of dancing by the soldiers; as they watched, they were fallen upon by armed Zulus and stabbed or clubbed to death. Segonyela's humiliation had been avenged. An army was sent forthwith to the settlement Retief had established. It arrived unexpectedly and razed to the ground much of the community's property, killing in all some 280 Boers and about 250 of their black servants.¹

The news of this disaster spread like wildfire in the Trekker communities on the other side of the Drakensberg. A force was hastily got together to avenge the dead. It met the Zulus at the battle of Itala, but the Africans scored a resounding victory. Piet Uys, the leader of the Boer forces, lost his life in this battle.

At first Dingane thought of making a clean sweep of the White men in his country, but after some hesitation he let the English and American missionaries get away. On the other hand he at

¹ Gibson, *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 60.

once sent his impiis (forces) to fall upon the Boer laagers . . . joint action was arranged with the English. Disaster ensued. Neither of the Boer leaders would serve under the other . . . the first English expedition effected little, the second was destroyed and the Zulus, storming down to Port Natal, drove the survivors and the missionaries on shipboard.²

The Boers now prepared for a decisive attack on Dingane. Their army met the Zulus on the Ncome River, where they fought the historic battle of Blood River, in 1838. The Zulus were defeated. The Boers proceeded to set Umgungundlovu on fire, and Dingane himself retreated to the north. Since the power of the Zulu states was weakened, the Boers settled down at Pietermaritzburg, where they established the Natal republic. But dissension, personal jealousies, and rivalries had characterized Boer life for a long time, and the Boers were therefore afraid to give too much power to one man. They set up a people's council elected by white male adults; there was no governor, and power lay in public opinion. Pretorius, one of the leading personalities in the Boer community, took advantage of the brief interval of peace to try to negotiate with Dingane for the return to the Boers of some of the cattle that had been seized by the Zulus.

While all this went on, Boer diplomacy was, in the main, applying itself to the task of widening the fissions in the Zulu royal family. Mpande was being encouraged secretly to stake a claim for the leadership of the Zulus in opposition to his brother, Dingane. This led to the war between Dingane and Mpande, which the former lost at the battle of Maqongqo, in 1840. The Boers gave Mpande all possible help in return for the promise of land to the northwest of Zululand.

The growing influence of the Boers and their quarrels with the Zulus brought in the British. Commissioner Cloete was sent from the Cape to Natal with instructions to tolerate no race discrimination, no slavery, and no encroachment on the rights of the African people. Once more the Boers started trekking

² Walker, *A History of South Africa*, p. 216.

out of Natal into the Transvaal and the territory along the Orange River. After that, the Natal republic died a natural death.

The most important personality near the Orange River was the Sutu king Moshoeshoe, who had started life very humbly. He had collected about a hundred followers and settled down at Butabute in Basutoland; when the powerful Mantantisi raiders drove him farther south to Thaba Bosigo, he halted and, in turn, attacked them from his mountain fastnesses. Moshoeshoe was the most astute diplomat produced by the Africans during this unsettled period. He welcomed to his side the refugees, the displaced persons, and the stateless. These he gradually welded into the Sutu nation, and with their help he fought and beat off Zulu and other invaders. He welcomed Boer hunters into his domains—just as he received Paris evangelicals and British representatives with open arms. When things started to turn against him, he played rival Boer leaders one against another, Boers against British, and vice versa.

He did not rely much on war as an instrument by which to further his aims. When forced to fight, however, he proved himself a brave and clever general. The Boers gave him a lot of trouble. They wanted to control Basutoland because the cold climate was suitable for horse-breeding. By 1865, his relations with them were so tangled that war became inevitable. At first, he did very well against them, but then they called for reinforcements from Natal and the Transvaal. That turned the tide against him. As soon as he realized that Boer pressure was becoming irresistible, he appealed to the British for protection. That took victory almost out of the hands of the emigrant farmers and raised a fearful storm of protest among them. They sent a deputation to England to get Britain to allow them to punish Moshoeshoe, but Britain stood firm by her promise to protect the Sutus. By the skillful use of diplomacy and war, Moshoeshoe had welded the Sutus into a small, powerful, and extremely intelligent nation, which survived the turbulence amid which it had come into being.

While these events were taking place, the British had moved into the area around the Orange River where the Boers were involved in serious clashes with the Griqua chieftains. These had driven the British to the point of calling a conference of chiefs, which met at Touwfontein in 1845. At this gathering, Maitland, the British representative, proposed a formula by which to bring about peace. There was to be fair allocation of the land to the Africans, the whites, and the coloreds. Each chief was to divide his land into two parts—the inalienable portion, which could be leased to the whites, and the other, which would belong to the Africans. The chiefs were to wield sovereign authority in their areas, and the British Resident would control the whites. The Resident would judge mixed cases jointly with the chiefs, and he could call on the chiefs to furnish him with men to maintain peace. But the differences among the chiefs undermined the Maitland plan the moment it was outlined. Many of them gave lip-service support to it, then waited for the first opportunity to wreck it.

The turbulence on the other side of the Vaal was as bad as any in Natal, the Orange River territory, or the Cape. There the most important African personality was the Pedi king, Sekhukhuni, who was to have an interesting history. In 1852, in the Sand River Convention, the British had recognized the Boers in the Transvaal as an independent people, and in the same year a British Order-in-Council had given authority for the establishment of the Cape parliament and provided for a nonracial franchise. The Transvaal republic, like the one in Natal, did not recognize the African as a citizen. He could not buy land; he was not allowed to reside in white areas unless he had a pass; and on the farms he was allowed to squat on conditions that assured the farmer of a permanent source of cheap labor.

Sekhukhuni had become a vassal of the Transvaal republic. Its troubles with the British on the Orange River, the Zulus in northern Natal, and the Swazis and Shangane to the east encouraged him to follow an increasingly independent line. When the Boers tried to bring him to heel, he withdrew to his moun-

tain fastnesses in the Lulu Range. From there he hurled defiance at the South African Republic. It sent a force against him, which he readily crushed.

Down in Natal, meanwhile, a new political star was rising among the Zulus. Cetshwayo had succeeded his father as king of the Zulus, and he was keenly interested in Sekhukhuni's quarrels with the Boers. Legend has it that he continually sent emissaries to Sekhukhuni in the guise of tobacco-sellers (an enterprise in which the Zulus had specialized for centuries) to give him advice and moral encouragement. When the Boers gave both of them trouble, Cetshwayo proposed a military alliance with Sekhukhuni to drive the whites out of their African lands; his plan was to push out the weaker Boers first and then clear Natal of the British. News of Cetshwayo's intentions alarmed the British authorities. Shepstone rushed to Pretoria, where he hectored the members of the South African Republic's parliament into surrendering their sovereignty without a shot being fired.

The thought of the Zulus massing on the Republic's southern borders, of the rebellious Sekhukhuni and the Swazis posed for war, and of the indescribably chaotic state of the Republic's finances forced the president to protest feebly against the annexation and in the end to accept it. By April of 1877, the first South African Republic had come under the British Crown. In this, it had followed the fate of the Natal republic. The impression must not be gained, however, that British policy was influenced purely by the desire to protect the African peoples. Certainly, the Order-in-Council of 1852 had gone to the extreme of giving citizenship the same meaning on both sides of the color line. On the other hand, diamonds had been discovered in Kimberley and gold in Johannesburg, and these discoveries acted as strong incentives to the British to move northward.

Since the Transvaal was safely under the British Crown, Shepstone returned to Natal, where he began preparations for war with Cetshwayo. The latter's plan for uniting the Africans against the whites had to be forestalled to avoid disaster for the Westerners. By this time, Cetshwayo had established a reputa-

tion—founded or unfounded—as an archconspirator. It was said that the troubles the British were having in the Cape with Sandile and Kreli were instigated by him, and he was even said to be doing the same in the Transvaal. Reverend A. Nachtigall wrote from Lydenburg, in the Transvaal, on January 14, 1878, to say: "Sikukuni has again received a message from Cetshwayo wherein he tells him that his people, by strategy, have taken one of the laagers of the White people; that the remainder of the White people have escaped, and their cattle are at the Vaal River and Komati; Sikukuni, therefore, also had better begin at once, then he would easily get the upper hand."³

In time, the British concluded that the Zulu king was the most dangerous African that the Europeans had met in this part of the continent. Backed by a powerful, highly disciplined, and famous army, the best of all armies maintained by the African states, his word naturally carried a lot of weight and inspired confidence. Sekhukhuni's refusal to pay his taxes, his open defiance of the Boers, and the humiliating defeat he inflicted on them when they marched on his mountain fastness were all cited as proof of Cetshwayo's machinations against the whites. And in a dispatch by Sir Bartle Free, dated November 5, 1878, the following was said of Cetshwayo:

It is not this (the Cape) Colony alone, but wherever the Kafir races are to be found, from the Fish River to the Limpopo, and from the Lower Orange River to Delagoa Bay, that the influence of the Zulu King has been found at work festering and directing this warlike spirit. It is not of late years only that the danger was seen by most competent judges; and every month since has accumulated evidence of the reality of the danger.⁴

To make South Africa safe for the white man, the power of the Zulu state had to be destroyed. This would undermine the incipient unity Cetshwayo had set his mind on building. Accordingly, the British found excuses for declaring war on him, and hostilities finally broke out in 1879. The Zulu army surrounded

³ Gibson, *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 143.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

the British at Isandlwana and annihilated 800 regulars and about as many African levies. After fighting bravely against great odds—killing a French Prince Imperial in the process—the Zulus lost the war. Their kingdom was broken up into a number of principalities; Cetshwayo was captured and sent to England, from where he returned stripped of much of his power.

The British had no sooner crushed Cetshwayo than they turned their minds to the Transvaal, where annexation was being bitterly resented. President Burgers, who had signed the instrument surrendering the republic's sovereignty, was attacked for not having gone to war. He was later thrown out of office and hounded out of the country. But his had been an impossible task from the very beginning: The coffers of the republic had been empty; the Postmaster-General had paid himself in stamps, the Surveyor-General seized the lands of the republic in lieu of his salary, and lesser officials did without pay.⁵

The war of independence broke out in 1881, but neither side did well. The Boer state was not in a fit condition to bear the burdens of a full-scale war, and British arms had suffered a demoralizing defeat at Isandlwana. Although the British ultimately won the war, they emerged from it with the prestige of their army damaged. Feeling was strong in the country that the war among the whites was the work of Cetshwayo's conspiring brain. Whenever the opportunity presented itself, he did not hesitate to set one white group against the other. Besides, the British Government was having trouble in Ireland. It was not terribly keen on the South African war. Then there were reports that behind the fresh wave of turbulence in the Cape, the Orange River area, and Zululand itself was an attempt at regrouping by the Africans to take advantage of the quarrel among the whites. The Pretoria Convention, however, brought the war to a speedy end, and the Boers got self-government, subject to the suzerainty of the British Crown.

Paul Kruger emerged from the war as the most important personality in the Boer community. He set himself the goal of

⁵ Walker, *A History of South Africa*, p. 369.

weakening British influences in the republic. Foreigners were flocking in, attracted by the gold, and were creating a serious political problem. Since they paid taxes, they wanted the right to vote. But Kruger raised the franchise qualifications. These were white people he was dealing with; the men of color could never be citizens of the republic. In the end, the war of 1899-1902 broke out between the British and the first republic, and it ended disastrously for the latter.

In their long and painful march from the Cape to the Transvaal, the Boers had hoped for a fuller life. This had strengthened their faith, which had been reinforced by the conviction that one day they would establish their own republic. When they first settled down in the Transvaal, they had felt that their moment of fulfillment had been reached. But now they were crushed by the thought that the supreme moment for which they had sacrificed so much had been of brief duration. Whenever they turned toward the vast plains around Pretoria, they saw smoke, charred walls, and the uniform of British soldiers. That was what was left of their great dream. During the trek, they had often parted by the wayside, whenever a group broke away from the others and moved on to establish its own republic. With the exception of those in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, not one of their attempts at statecraft had survived. Each had collapsed under pressure from the turbulence of the times, internal dissension, inexperience in government, financial chaos, personal jealousies, or British intrigue and arms. Very rarely had any collapsed under African pressure.

Thus, the Boers' moment of fulfillment had ended in failure. Since disaster was staring them in the eyes on all fronts, the Boers settled down and started the painful process of reassessment.

6 • A WHITE UNITED FRONT

THE two most significant developments to emerge from the period of reassessment were the partial abandonment of the heroic approach and a greater willingness to face realities. Repudiation and white supremacy had been two of the main pillars on which Boer life and policy had been based for a long time: The one had regulated the relations with those whites with whom the Boers could not identify themselves; the other gave form to their dealings with the man of color. Both had so widened the chasms between the Boers and the British, on the one hand, and the Boers and the Africans, on the other, that when it came to questions of survival the Boers believed the Africans to be as dangerous as the British.

After their defeat, the Boers realized that they could no longer trek out of the Transvaal. Beyond the Limpopo the British had already blocked the way. To the east were the Portuguese, and the Kalahari desert lay to the west. In order to survive in this situation, the Boers re-examined their position. The great challenge, they agreed, could no longer be avoided, for they were face to face with the reality of disaster. So they decided to abandon the pillar of repudiation and come to terms with the white-skinned British.

For their part, the British had restored the Transvaal to the Boers a few years after the war. They were keen to unify the Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal into one

state to facilitate development, cut down the costs of administration, and evolve a uniform policy toward the African people. Boer agreement to this led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The Boers agreed largely because identification with the British offered the farmers a number of advantages. It would bring about peace and the protection of a great power. Economic prosperity would follow, and in the end fulfillment would come to the Boers because of their numbers. Besides, friendship with the British held out the possibility that one side of the historical cleft stick into which the Boers were born would be removed. There was also the possibility that if the British, who were also a minority, belonged to a state in which they accepted the Boers as equals, they could be persuaded to sever their links with Britain and do as the Huguenots had done. That would provide a remarkable accretion of strength to the insecure Boers; it would swell their numbers while it would tend to destroy liberal influences in the white community. Then the issues facing South Africa would be defined in simple terms of black and white with no complications centering around values of life.

The unity thus achieved might lead to greater things. The white group could then set out to destroy whatever traces remained of Shaka's idea of common citizenship among the Africans. Cetshwayo's disciples would be wiped off the face of the Union. In the end, South Africa would be a country where the white man in general, the Afrikaner or Boer in particular, could feel safe. (By the time of Union, the Boers had gone a long way toward discarding the name of farmers. They were calling themselves the Afrikaners—the people of Africa. After Union, this became increasingly the fashion.)

The British, for their part, were thinking along entirely different lines. As pointed out earlier, they had not severed the cultural and other links with Great Britain when they came to the Cape. There was nothing the Afrikaner could offer them, by way of protection, for example, that would be more reliable than the security deriving from membership in the Anglo-

Saxon community of the world. One of the links in that community was the adherence to a common set of values, which were basically liberal. It was true that in South Africa these had been respected more in the breach than in the observance, at least in relations between black and white. At the same time, the British were emotionally involved in what was known as British fair play. This made them somewhat susceptible to pressures that produced definitely negative reactions from the Afrikaners.

The British had another quality. In addition to the military power of the empire, they possessed technological knowledge. Without it, the country's industrial potential could not be developed beyond a certain point, and the Afrikaners had learned through bitter experience that to run a viable country required more skill than that which a farmer needs to count sheep. But both sides acted as though the differences which had kept them apart would resolve themselves in time and enable them to emerge as a truly united group.

The union of the groups had peculiar features, for which racial interests were largely responsible. The whites were always in a hopeless minority wherever they went in Africa. They had pooled their resources largely to meet the African challenge from positions of greater strength. The Afrikaners had not renounced the fundamentalist dynamic, nor the British the empiricist. Each hoped that when it came to fundamentals the other would yield ground.

But with a shrewder sense of realities, the British insisted on incorporating into the Union's constitution legislation guaranteeing the franchise rights of the Cape Africans. This would prevent the Africans from ganging up against the whites as a racial group. Dr. Philip's exploits had given rise to a tradition in the African community that always set the greatest store by human values. Any doctrine that threatened to undermine these could divide the African community very sharply, and the British were not blind to the prospects held out by this possibility. If the Cape Africans could be kept on the voters' roll, the day

would come when the British would reach agreement with them and still find them, because of these values, in the mood to be friends. Since they had already come to terms with the Boers, the British looked forward to the day when they would make their political peace with the Africans. After that, all three would collaborate to exploit the wealth of South Africa.

To the Afrikaners who were concerned with considerations of survival, the inscription into the constitution of liberal recognition of the political rights of the man of color was unacceptable. It was not until the Cape, which was predominantly British, made it clear that it would not give in that the Boers agreed to the retention of the Cape vote. But the white united front based on blood and race had obvious weaknesses. The Boers and the British had reserves of power that would tend to encourage them not to alter basically their fundamentalist and empiricist outlooks. Since the Afrikaner was in the majority in the white community, that made him the most important political influence as long as white domination was the order of the day. He was determined to hold to this advantage no matter what happened. The economic and cultural superiority of the British placed him in the position where he functioned merely as the business manager of a concern (the state) whose shareholders were the British.

In this setup, clashes on economic or political policy would tend to involve race interests and in the end jeopardize the unity of the whites. The Africans had already shown, particularly in Natal, the Orange River area, and the Transvaal, that whenever the opportunity presented itself they would not hesitate to widen fissions in the white community in order to advance their own interests. For the whites to gang up on the basis of race in these circumstances, when they were in the minority, was to play straight into the hands of Cetshwayo's disciples and successors. What was worse, however, was that the unity based on race gave both sides no alternative except to attach to citizenship a meaning that would be valid from either's basic perspective. This involved a lot of complicated juggling with the

conscience: The profoundly Christian Afrikaners insisted on one standard of political conduct among the whites and another between black and white; the British accepted the process as inevitable and hoped to muddle through. The result was that citizenship came to have one meaning in the Afrikaans community, another in the British, and quite a different one among the Africans, who found themselves lumped together as an unprivileged racial group.

The danger that developed from this was that it made ordinary differences on social, economic, or political questions, which are normal in a free society, fundamental on almost every plane. There was no real South African viewpoint; there was certainly the Afrikaans point of view, the African, or the British. In a situation like this, the legitimacy of government could be maintained only by force, because there was no room for compromise and consent. Rebellion, civil war, and treason remained the only means of obtaining redress. These were the basic weaknesses with which the white united front started, and it fell on the Afrikaners to be the first to rock the boat of white unity. Speaking at De Wildt in 1912, General Hertzog enunciated the policy of parallel development for the British and the Afrikaners. This was more than a hint that Afrikaner initiatives were to be developed until they became the most dominant influence in the white community itself.

The difficulty for both, however, lay in the fact that the Afrikaner, finding himself at last in the position to become master of all South Africa because of his numbers, was no longer able to make concessions and compromises that would make the British believe that he was not conspiring to destroy them as a cultural entity. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Afrikaners could give up Dutch and, with the ingenious help of the Afrikaner slaves, build up Afrikaans. Although they were still very weak, they could still abandon their sense of identity with the people of Holland when Africa produced greater attractions. But at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Afrikaners were relatively too strong to be willing to

yield vital ground. Preoccupation with considerations of survival precluded the possibility of making major concessions, for history had hardened Afrikaner attitudes, fixed their preferences, and destined them to move toward their goal on their own steam if necessary. They could not abandon the ideological outlook that had ensured their survival and taken them to their moment of fulfillment. They could not relent even where the reward was to convince the British that the rejection of the connections with Britain was in their best interests. How could they yield ground when African nationalism was rearing its head in readiness for a showdown with their nationalism?

On the other hand, the British saw no valid reason why the Afrikaner should preach to them the virtue of giving up what was theirs when he clung so tenaciously to what was his. Besides, everywhere he was admonishing the Africans and the coloreds to stick to what was their own. Yet throughout his history, the Afrikaner had accustomed himself to the habit of seeing the truth only from one angle. Men and events either secured or threatened his survival. He banged his bosom passionately for all to see what a perfect example he was of what the others should be. If they did not see much virtue in it, he was offended; if they picked out blind spots, he saw treason in their behavior. He just could not understand how he could be wrong and the others right. After all, God and good luck had been on his side for such a long time.

When the British expressed doubts about the policy the Afrikaner was forcing the new Union to follow, trouble ensued. The attacks on the British press became more acrimonious, and even the Anglican bishops were publicly vilified. The Afrikaner was not going to forget Dr. Philip in a hurry. These moves were designed to cut off the lines of cultural communication between Britain and the British in South Africa, to force them into isolation and then submission. If they would not voluntarily toe the line, they would be forced to do it. In the years that were to follow, British traditions were to be systematically purged from South African public life. The Cape African vote

was abolished. When Verwoerd's Nationalist Party got to power in 1948, an exclusively Afrikaans cabinet was appointed. "God Save the Queen" was rejected as one of the country's national anthems. The Union Jack was hauled down and trampled in mud. The Union of South Africa became a republic. The crowning moment in this process of weakening the British for the purpose of forcing them to identify themselves with the Afrikaner was the severance of the Commonwealth connection.

The British had accepted this systematic clipping of their wings with virtually little more than feeble protests. There were two main reasons for this. Although a minority in the white community, they practically held the wealth of the country in their hands; but the Afrikaners' numbers and the political power derived from this made it risky for them to insist on their wishes being respected beyond a certain point. Secondly, the British, as a group, had developed as vicious a form of hatred for the man of color as some of the most negrophobic Afrikaner nationalists. Although a small band among them upheld the liberal ideal, the majority secretly cheered Verwoerd for his handling of the men of color. So strongly did many of them feel on this issue that they would sooner see South Africa out of the Commonwealth than accept a policy of real race equality.

In 1910, when the white united front had been established, the British were in a strong bargaining position. During the next fifty years, Afrikaner diplomacy isolated them so completely that they had had to accept the fundamentalist dynamic practically on the Afrikaner's unchanged terms. The front had undergone an internal change. It would exert itself in the direction of defining the issues at stake in the race crisis in simple terms of black and white. When that happened, the Afrikaner would be ready to accept the challenge posed by African nationalism.

7 • THE PATTERN OF AFRIKANER JUSTICE

IN THE manifesto he issued when he and his followers left the Cape, Piet Retief had proclaimed that the Trekkers would establish communities where they would be free to establish "just" laws. The first cardinal principle in the Boer notion of justice was that there would be no equality between black and white, either in the church or the state. There had to be one code of law for white people and another for the men of color. They saw nothing wrong with that, since God Himself, they believed, had created men with different skins and temperaments. If the laws expressed this diversity, they were perfectly in accord with the divine intention.

When the first South African Republic was established in the Transvaal, its laws discriminated very rigidly against the African. Except in very rare circumstances, the African could not buy land, he could not vote, he was not allowed to live in the white man's towns. He always got the worst possible of the amenities provided either by the state or by municipalities: He was not free to move about the white man's towns; he was presumed to be a criminal until he produced a pass to prove the contrary; and he was not allowed to be out on the streets after a certain hour of the night without a piece of paper signed by a white man showing that he was not a vagrant.

Where there was no equality in the state and where the laws favored one group, it became natural for the Boers to take the law into their hands in dealing with the African. As a result of this, a tradition grew up that entitled the white man to beat up an African if he became "cheeky." It was not uncommon on Boer farms for people to be tied to wheels and flayed with thongs until blood flowed down their backs. My own father had so much of this treatment on a Boer farm near Ladysmith that he fled from home, never to return to his people again. The conclusion must not be drawn from this, however, that every Boer was a monster in human form in his dealings with the Africans. There were some very decent men and women who never made their impact felt on the life of the community. They were always few, always afraid of being labeled *kaffer-boeties* (niggers' brothers), and consequently, ostracized.

The wars that culminated in the collapse of the first republic, instead of shocking the Afrikaners into a new understanding of justice, merely deepened their sense of grievance and their desire for vengeance. That is why the period of reassessment produced only the willingness to collaborate with the British in establishing a viable state. As soon as this had been done, the Afrikaners were to start all over again on the road to that type of justice that was most in harmony with their genius.

Over the centuries, the temper of the slave owner had undergone three stages of evolution. There had been the era of the wars, when the main purpose was to grab land from the Africans. This process had, as its climax, the establishment of the Union of South Africa. The second phase had been designed to despoil the defeated African of his property and wealth in order to force him out of his reserves to work on the white man's farms, in his industries, and in his homes on conditions that suited the white man best. Hertzog had concentrated his attack on the African's property rights. The third phase came after World War II, when Afrikaner nationalism launched direct attacks on the person of the African to remold his individuality and make him amenable to Afrikaner discipline. The central

idea was always to keep the African in the position of maximum weakness so that the Afrikaner could always remain the master.

The second republic came into being when the temper of the slave owner was in the middle of its third evolutionary phase. In this situation, the Afrikaner nationalists realized that insisting on their type of justice was very much like supping with the devil, but they accepted the full implications of it and used the longest possible spoon. In the last analysis, however, the attack on the person ultimately involves the destruction of a people. There is no halfway house between fulfillment and extinction, between growth and death. Living is a continuous process of unfolding, whether the subject is the individual or the group. To stop this action is to destroy life; to slow it down is to frustrate creation's purpose for man. Gas chambers, pogroms, and possibly concentration camps are the handiest instruments by which a majority seeks to liquidate a minority. The few, however, cannot use these instruments against the many unless they want to release forces among the many that might in the end destroy the few. Survival is too precious to the Afrikaner nationalist to be risked in adventures that might endanger his own existence. As a result, he uses quite a number of techniques to frustrate life's purpose for the African. The end is always the same—to keep the African in the position of permanent weakness in order to preserve the Boer's pattern of justice, to transform him into a pliable tool in the hands of the Afrikaner nationalists. In this chapter, we shall pick only a few techniques at random to show different aspects of the pattern of "just" laws.

Let's take Bantu Education. Its content is designed to wean the African from British influences; although it makes him sufficiently informed to be an efficient servant, it does not train him sufficiently well to compete with the white man as an intellectual equal. Permanent inferiority is the end in view. If this could be achieved, the African would be quite satisfied, the Afrikaner nationalists believe, with being segregated in the reserves as a vassal of the white man. Not poisoned by the fer-

ment that makes the mind seek for a better life, the African would retire to his tribal ways and walk out of the reserves only to serve the white man. Once he had collected a few pounds, he would return to the ways of his ancestors and forget all the silly notions about liberty, human dignity, equality, and the rule of law. The Afrikaner nationalists admit that the African must be civilized, but it must be done the right way, their way. Talk of liberty and similar things is all right for civilized people—in South Africa, the people with a white skin. They claim that the white man came to South Africa on a civilizing mission. Civilizing the African did not, however, mean that the latter should one day want to be the equal of the white man, to marry white women. It meant that he would be helped to develop along his own lines, despite the fact that these had been systematically destroyed by Christianity and the country's industrialization, by the attacks on his property, and by the violence to his being. If his lines were no longer available, it was the duty of the white man to produce new ones for the African. Bantu Education had been evolved to do precisely that.

Ethnic Grouping is another technique. Here the Africans are compelled to regard themselves as members of tribal groups. The Zulus are segregated from the Sutu or the Xosa. Each group must live in its own section of the urban location and have separate schools. The obvious advantage of this arrangement is that it makes it so easy in times of crises to set one group against another and thus keep the Africans from presenting a united front against Afrikaner nationalism.

In and out of the schools, the state goes to great expense in trying to force the African to see in the culture of what was once his tribe the main sources of his inspiration. Personal fulfillment, it is said, is foreign to the African as a source of inspiration, for the tribe does not know what that is. By laying stress on it, the African intellectual betrays his people; he seeks to imitate the whites, and so cuts himself off from his people and makes himself their enemy. According to this view, Pixley Seme, John Dube, Walter Rubusana, or Solomon Plaatje, who taught

their people to look to human values as their source of inspiration, who rejected the tribe as an entity within which individual fulfillment was possible, were the enemies of their people. They imitated the white missionaries who had trained them. The closure of mission schools and the control of all education by the state is meant to realign the process of training the African child and focus his thinking on the things that really endure—the totems that give meaning to tribal life.

This process of spiritual demolition does not recognize the pattern of culture that the African has been evolving since Union, when his various groups were lumped together as one black mass, subjected to the same laws, and forced to live under conditions dictated by the white man. Torn away from their tribes and cultures, despised and hated by the white man, the Africans put their heads together and decided to create for themselves a world after their own design. It was a very unique world, compounding bits and pieces of wisdom, vice, and virtue from the civilizations of the West and the East and combining these with whatever was left of the African's way of life to produce a cultural amalgam unlike anything in the modern world. From these humble beginnings, there evolved a philosophy, a moral dimension, which postulated that real fulfillment for the individual, and therefore the group, lay only in doing those things that raised man's potential. Such a positive philosophy necessarily worked for the continuous enlargement of the human personality, for it was inevitable that in time it would cushion the Africans against the shocks of the temper of the slave owner. It produced leaders who rose above the bitterness, hatred, and indignity into which they had been born, who were ready to make every possible sacrifice to enable their people to lead their country along safer routes to a better future. Of this type are such men as Albert Luthuli, Z. K. Matthews, Z. R. Mahabane, and many others in our own times, including John Dube and his contemporaries, whom I have already mentioned.

The pattern of life that produced these men and others is not understood by the Afrikaner nationalist. And what he

does not understand must be destroyed; even the cultural unity built up at great sacrifice during the last fifty years must be destroyed. Each African must give his first loyalty not to the African group but to his tribe. This is the situation into which the Trekkers walked and which made the defeat of the African peoples possible. If the African does not want to return to that position of weakness, the state arrogates to itself the right to force him back to it under the guise of awakening him to the beauties of his own culture.

On the administrative plane, there are the Bantu Authorities, which have been established in some rural areas. The intention is to have them in the urban locations as well, to preserve the links between the townsmen and their tribes. These authorities are, of course, foreign to the tribal way of life, and those who serve them are carefully screened by government agents. If the state does not like the nominee of the people, he stands no chance of ever sitting on the Bantu Authority. These boards are an innovation that the white man, in his goodness of heart, has invented to give validity to tribal institutions in the modern environment. They are so much in accord with tribal preferences that in Pondoland, where strenuous government efforts were made to introduce them, the Africans, losing their heads and resorting to murder, arson, and the utter defiance of authority, waged a private war against the police to show what a fine thing the Bantu Authority was.

Job Reservation is another useful technique. It sets aside certain jobs to be done by members of one race only. The primary purpose is to prevent the African from infiltrating the higher-paid grades of employment; for if he amasses enough wealth he will augment the numbers of the middle class, which already owns property and seeks fulfillment for its children in professional work and business, and, on the whole, increases the threat to the white man's authority. The other intentions are, first, to limit the country's productive potential in such ways that white security will be able to withstand the shocks it is likely to receive from the boycott campaigns organized against apartheid;

and, second, to limit the number of Africans industry and commerce can absorb so that the farmers may have enough labor. This mass impoverishment of a people already living well below the subsistence level is the sort of thing that does not enable the Dutch Reformed Church, as a Christian community, to see much that is wrong with apartheid.

So much publicity has been given to the pass laws and so much blood shed in the fight against them within the last fifty years that here we need go no further than to record the objections to their being extended to African women. The African objects to the pass laws because they presume that he, his wife, his daughter, his sister, or his mother are criminals until they produce passes to prove that they are not. No other section of the nation is subjected to these indignities. Any African can be stopped at any time at any place by either a policeman, or, for that matter, by any white person, and be asked to produce a pass. The pass might be in a pocket in a coat at home, but the fact that the African forgot to bring it with him proves him a criminal. Second, a woman's pass records details of her life that are intimately personal. These become public property to be examined by any authorized person at any time of the day or night, and it makes her live under the sense of being owned. Third, the fact that any African, white, Indian, or colored male, posing as a policeman, can demand the pass at any place and at any time exposes the African woman to a life in which her virtue and honor become the plaything of any scoundrel.

All these techniques are applied systematically to lower the African's self-respect, to crush his spirit, to make him amenable to the type of discipline Afrikaner nationalism seeks to impose on him, and to keep South Africa safe for the Afrikaner. The system has been perfected for generations, and it now works so thoroughly that there is no escape from it. The African is born into it. The very house in which he lives is built to make him fit into the pattern dictated by the temper of the slave-owner; so are the conditions under which he rents it. His wage

has been carefully adjusted to make him conform. He can't escape it. Wherever he goes, his skin and race tell tales against him—they damn him.

Dr. Leslie Rubin had for many years been a distinguished member of the legal fraternity in Cape Town. He was also one of the most courageous champions of liberty and justice for all South Africans, regardless of race or color. In recognition of this, the Cape Africans elected him to represent them in the all-white Senate. (This was before this form of representation was abolished by the Verwoerd regime.) After many years of unsuccessfully fighting apartheid in the Senate, and after considerable experience in dealing with Africans harassed by pass law persecutions, he wrote a pamphlet in which he gave a condensed but very precise picture of apartheid in legal forms.¹ These are some of his summaries of the position:

An African who was born in a town and lived there continuously for fifty years, but then left to reside elsewhere for any period, even for two weeks, is not entitled, as of right, to return to the town where he was born and to remain there for more than seventy-two hours. If he does, he is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by a fine not exceeding ten pounds or, in default, imprisonment for a period not exceeding two months, unless he has obtained a permit to do so.

An African who has, since birth, resided continuously in a town is not entitled, as of right, to have living with him in that town for more than seventy-two hours, a married daughter, a son who has reached the age of eighteen, a niece, a nephew or a grandchild.

Whenever the Governor-General (who acts on the advice of the Cabinet, which is in turn advised by the Minister of Native Affairs) in his unfettered discretion deems it fit to issue the necessary proclamation, an African who has been required by an Order of Court to leave a certain area must do so, and no Court of law may grant an interdict preventing such removal, nor may appeal to review proceedings, stay, or suspend such removal,

¹ Rubin, *This Is Apartheid* (Gollancz, 1960).

even when it has been established beyond all doubt that the Court Order was intended for some other person and was served upon him in error.

It is unlawful for a White person and a non-White person to sit down to a cup of tea together in a tea room in a town anywhere in South Africa, unless they have obtained a permit to do so.

Unless he has obtained a special permit, an African professor delivering a lecture at a White club, which has invited him to do so, commits a criminal offence.

No African, lawfully residing in a town by virtue of a permit issued to him is entitled, as of right, to have his wife and children residing with him.

One of the most important assessments of apartheid was made in 1960 by the International Commission of Jurists, which sent out an eminent legal observer to report on the extent to which the rule of law is adhered to in South Africa. The Commission concluded thus on apartheid:²

As pointed out in the report, rigid racial classification provides the basis upon which all movement and residence of the non-White is controlled and determined according to the labour needs of industry and agriculture. Real freedom of selection and change of employment or improvement of status is virtually non-existent, and collective representation of this massive labour force is strictly limited. Denied the right to vote in general elections or plebiscite, such as the recent determination of the Republic, more than 10,000,000 people are to all intents and purposes precluded from having any effective political voice or organisation. Moreover, the very expression of opposition to or protest against the present policy of apartheid constitutes a criminal offence. The non-White is therefore by law relegated to a permanently unequal status. Perhaps most objected to are the comprehensive requirements that a document of identification, which indicates membership in a less privileged group, must be carried and presented on demand. The Pass Law system has been seen to result in flagrant abuses of the law involving arbitrary arrest and detention and to

² International Commission of Jurists, *South Africa and the Rule of Law*, Geneva, 1960.

create a situation in which certain aspects can be described only as legalised slavery. No less disturbing are the negation of social rights, of free choice of marriage or religious worship, restriction of assembly and, to many, the irritant of the liquor prohibition. Finally, completing and assuring the continuation of the policy of inequality is a carefully supervised educational system whereby non-Whites are to receive instruction solely in preparation for their acceptance of an inferior social, economic and political status. Such a discriminatory policy is not only contrary to generally accepted concepts of justice and principles of human rights, but also creates a potentially explosive situation which might soon lead to even more widespread internal violence than has already been experienced.

This, then, is the pattern of the "just" laws Piet Retief and his Trekker contemporaries left the Cape to enact.

The origins, history, and content of apartheid, or the temper of the slave owner, are such that with the best will in the world, it is incapable of being just. The fundamentalist approach, the tradition of absolutism, the effects of slavery on the thinking of the Afrikaner nationalist, and historical experiences—all combine to give it the character of a ruthless, immoral, and dehumanizing ideology, which can never be modified by appeals to reason.

The dualistic morality it has evolved over the centuries is, in Bantu Education and university segregation, reaching points where it denies the African the right to have access to the truth. It has to distort the growth and development of the African's personality or be destroyed. It has to make the honor of the African woman the plaything of scoundrels, in order to justify itself. It has to destroy the tradition of scholarship built up at Fort Hare University College and persecute men like Professor Matthews in order to delay its being debunked. It has to stop nursing services in many African schools, where disease and malnutrition are rife because of the parents' poverty. It has to prescribe that the African child who fails his second standard twice must be thrown out of school to swell the ranks of the

half-educated, who are fit only to be farm laborers. Apartheid has got to do all these things—to maintain “proper relations between master and servant”—so that the supremacy of the Afrikaner will not be endangered.

At the same time, there is an element of tragedy in all this. The history of the Afrikaner people proves clearly that they love South Africa with a passion unsurpassed in any community. Their literature and their behavior all point in this direction. Yet they have committed themselves to an outlook on life that will exorcise precisely those forces which could one day drive them out of South Africa and undo much of the good work they have done. For, by arrogating to itself the right to impose its will on all ethnic and cultural groups; by pursuing immoral policies that conflict with the basic tenets of the civilization it claims to uphold; by acting as though survival for the Afrikaner people were conditional upon the ruin of the other groups; and by using race and blood as the main criteria by which to fix the position of the individual in the life of the nation—by these means, apartheid sets a ceiling beyond which the individual is not free to develop his personality if he is not white.

This frustrates life's purpose for the individual human being and condemns millions of men, women, and children to inescapable poverty, hunger, disease, and humiliation when all they want is a chance to make better use of their lives.

Apartheid's errors transform divergences of opinion, which should be normal in a free society, into fundamental differences on almost every plane. They create contradictions in the country's economy and retard real progress. The checks and balances that give viability to democratic societies are destroyed, while treason, rebellion, and civil war are upheld as the only means by which to effect reforms. Social coherence and economic stability are undermined. Force increasingly becomes the only instrument by which to preserve order. Tyranny develops, and the democratic tradition is smothered out of existence.


Finally, the doctrine that each race has an innate or historical will of its own, which drives it inexorably to its destiny, stim-

ulates the growth of a multiplicity of wills. Fulfillment for all the peoples of South Africa is said to lie in the jungle of wills thus produced. This ignores what is obvious from the evidence of history—that the final outcome of all this in a mixed society can only be the disruption of the republic. It is toward this very disaster that apartheid is driving South Africa.

PART

II

TWO MOODS OF
AFRICAN NATIONALISM



8 • A BLACK UNITED FRONT

BY 1908, African attitudes toward the formation of the Union of South Africa had crystallized into three distinct forms. In the Cape, John Tengo Jabavu, who owned and edited *Imvo Zabantsundu* and who had long been the main African supporter of Cape liberalism, was critical of any whittling down of African rights. If the Union could be an organic whole within which citizenship would be the same for all men, it would be a welcome development. If, on the other hand, it would lead to the demotion of the African to the position he held before the introduction of the franchise into the Cape, it would be a backward step.

As we recede farther from his times, it becomes possible for us to view Jabavu's position with a greater degree of objectivity. When Dr. Philip segregated the converted Africans and made them live in mission stations, he was merely acknowledging the fact that a new cultural class had emerged in the African community, one which was emotionally and intellectually no longer responsive to the call of the tribe. These people were committed to values of life they regarded as having a greater validity than the ideals that held the tribe together. They believed these to constitute bonds of unity that would transcend race and could guide movement toward the extension of the area of liberty. In a sense, Jabavu was the advanced spokesman of this group.

It was not surprising that a rebel against the call of the group, which was soon to be made, came from the Cape. The Africans in this province had had a longer experience of contact with the white man; they had been exposed to his system of education for a longer period, and their habits and outlooks had been more profoundly affected than any other African group. Nor is it surprising today that Jabavu felt reluctant to do anything that might have frightened his liberal friends and compelled them to withdraw into the white united front. The challenges of the times called for rebels from both sides of the color line, but the white liberals were responding halfheartedly, as though they did not know precisely the extent to which they could go with the Africans. Jabavu felt morally bound to reciprocate this rejection of group solidarity by standing aside from his own group; if he had not, he would have been taking the position that the values he upheld had one meaning among whites and another among Africans. This was precisely what would have delighted Afrikaner nationalism.

The second group represented quite a variety of interests. The most dominant influence among them was Cetshwayo's doctrine that salvation for the Africans lay in creating a black united front. Dr. P. ka I. Seme, the chief apostle of the Cetshwayo line, saw in the establishment of the Union of South Africa the defeat of Cape liberalism and the triumph of the temper of the slave owner. He regarded the Union as a white united front that would work for the continuous ruin of the African people. The only guarantee of security and, therefore, survival was to create an African united front that would work always for the extension of the area of liberty. To accomplish this, however, the African had first to effect a revolution in his thinking. He had to give up the narrower loyalties to the tribe. He had to forget the hatreds and suspicions inherited through history and join hands with his brothers in every province in a gigantic front against race humiliation. He had to agree to lose his tribal identity and emerge as the member of a new, larger, and more effective whole—the African people.

Seme was a remarkable man in his own way. He came from a very humble Tonga family, which had for a long time identified itself with the Zulus. By sheer hard work, he raised himself from an ordinary herdboyc in the Inanda mission station to the position of a barrister. He studied in London and the United States. In London, he wore a top hat and striped trousers, and on his return to his country, he became the most ardent supporter of royalty in the African community. He married a semiliterate lady, partly because she was a senior member of the Zulu royal house. For a long time he was a close friend of the Swazi royal family; chiefs played a very prominent role in his plans for a united front. He insisted that in the organization he was later to form to consolidate African unity, the bicameral system should be adhered to. In this setup, the chiefs belonged to the upper house.

He was supported very effectively by his home-boy, Reverend John Langalakhe Dube. Unlike Seme, Dube was the son of the heir to a tribal chieftainship who had elected to become a missionary. He had received his education in America, where he qualified as a clergyman. On his return to South Africa, he had established Ohlange College, which was to achieve fame as a school for boys. He also published *Ilanga lase Natal*, in which he gave effective and powerful backing to the idea of an African united front.

Where Seme wanted a new united people whose solidarity would bring about the extension of the area of liberty, Dube explicitly wanted to restore to the African what was his own. His immortal phrase was *lapho ake ema khona amanzi ayophinde eme futhi* (where there was once a pool, water will collect again); in this phrase, he expressed his political philosophy. He believed that justice would be done only when the African ruled this country. Seme, on the other hand, had more modest ambitions; he was inclined to say that the African claimed no superiority over any other race, but he was also nobody's inferior. Chiefs Stephen Mini and K. K. Pilane acted as moderating influences on the "extremist" Dube. Holding their office by

Case of Zippo / All my (etc.)

the grace of the government, they frowned on courses likely to complicate things for them. In between the two wings of his following, Seme had a band of very able men, of whom the shrewdest was probably Solomon Plaatje—about whom more later.

The third school of thought, the remnants of Bambada's supporters, saw in the Union an unmitigated evil—the entrenchment of white domination. They believed that since the African had lost his freedom and his land on the battlefield, that was where he must recover them. Their original leader, Bambada, had been a very remarkable man, a Zulu chief who had risen against the British Government in Natal during the first decade of the twentieth century in protest of the poll tax. He had collected a band of armed men around him and had led them in an armed march to clear the whites out of Natal, for he refused to pay taxes to a government not his own. Superior arms broke his resistance; he was caught and hanged by the British. Thereafter, his followers were not in position to influence events in the African community when the Union was formed.

Most Africans in the four provinces supported Seme's line of thinking. As a result, he called a conference of African chiefs, clergymen, leaders, and representative personalities from every walk of life and every lingual group to agree on how best to create the world after their design as a condition of survival where the temper of the slave owner was the dominant influence. The conference met in Bloemfontein in January, 1912, and the event is as important to the African community as the Great Trek is to the Afrikaners. The task of the delegates was a complex and delicate one, since tribal loyalties and suspicions were still strong. Nearly all the major groups were fresh from the period of turbulence when they had fought each other fiercely. To keep the delegates on the subject they had gathered to discuss required supreme gifts of statesmanship.

Seme and his colleagues, however, rose to the occasion. They argued that the whites had established their own united front to keep the African a beggar in his own land. But the African

was not as weak as many thought he was. He had on his side the advantage of numbers, and just as this advantage had enabled the Boers to become an important factor in the first Union government, so the numbers of the Africans would one day create a situation where the Africans would become the rulers of their land. White unity could be effective only to the extent that the Africans allowed it to be. If the Africans stood firmly by each other, white unity would crack; if they wavered, it would be reinforced. There was no such thing as white goodwill; what the white man respected was power. If the African wanted to be free, he had to set his mind on building up the power of the group. True, he needed time to do that; but if he set about it with a will, victory was bound to be his. One day his unity would be irresistible; then, it would sweep away white domination.

After lengthy and careful deliberation, the delegates agreed to unite their peoples for the purpose of projecting them into the future as a new politico-cultural community. They were no longer to be narrowly Zulu or Xosa or Sutu; they were going to be the African people. Their unity was designed to extend the area of liberty; to give to citizenship the same meaning on both sides of the color line, and not to drive the Indian, colored, or white man into the sea. Thirdly, the delegates regarded the violation of human rights by the Union Government's race policy as a matter that concerned humanity as a whole. They rejected the contention that it was a domestic South African matter.

The most remarkable thing about the black and white united fronts was the difference in the bases on which they were established. The white front had been built on the principle that white supremacy was the main condition of survival for the peoples from Europe and of security for the others. The Constitution of the Union of South Africa had made this clear beyond all doubt. In other words, the white front saw men and events from the group perspective. The African front, on the other hand, was based on the principle that values of life with

a similar meaning on both sides of the racial line were more reliable bonds of national unity and provided better guarantees of security for the individual and survival for the group than race or blood. The emphasis was on the value of the individual.

The polarization of outlooks expressed here marked an important turning point in South Africa's development. In so far as the Africans were concerned, race was no longer to be a factor of significance in assessing the worth of a person. Values of life were going to be the issue at stake in the race crisis. The white person who upheld the ideals for which the Africans fought was a friend, one of them. The African who supported race segregation (and, later, apartheid) was an enemy. His race was no longer to be of any consequence.

The other significant point about the Bloemfontein agreement was the series of compromises that made unity possible. Each tribal group surrendered its right to sovereignty on the return of freedom. They accepted the principle of equality. No group was to be more important than the others. Policies that could upset the balances holding the front together were avoided. This was conducive to moderation.

So keen were the delegates to preserve and protect this unity that even in their attitude toward the whites they pursued the course of moderation. They set themselves the goal of extending the area of liberty—a deliberate vagueness designed to minimize the strains on the newly achieved unity. Some delegates wanted the new community to call itself African. The others feared that this might be regarded by the Afrikaners as provocation; they might use it as an excuse for destroying African unity. Finally, the delegates agreed to use the word *Native* in order not to make too many enemies for themselves at the time.

Dube's dictum about *amanzi*, which the delegates accepted as the cornerstone of their policy when they elected him the first president of the organization they founded to perpetuate their ideals, was clearly designed to define the ultimate goal and to buy time to build up reserves of power for the final showdown. After the delegates had deliberated on the principle,

form, and application of unity in practice, they resolved to establish the South African Native National Congress, later the African National Congress (ANC), to perpetuate the ideals they had agreed upon.

Before we study the methods the Congress was to use in the fight against race oppression, it might shed more light on present African attitudes to consider the background of the men who molded opinion at this critical moment in their people's history. I had the good fortune to work in closest collaboration with Dr. John L. Dube for a long time, and at the same time I had the honor of seeing develop between Dr. Seme and me a friendship that lasted until his death. As a journalist, I met and often worked with most of the men who had laid the foundations for African unity; I was in a unique position to appreciate the spirit of the times and the motivating urges that determined their actions from situation to situation.

Nearly all the men who met at Bloemfontein in 1912 had lived through one phase or another of the turbulence that rocked South Africa during the greater part of the nineteenth century. They had either known or seen defeat, and their own lives had been affected by this fact. Most of them had probably been born into sovereign, independent African states, in which the dominant tradition was the continuous two-way flow of power from the *ibandla* (assembly of arms-bearing citizens) to the citizen, and from him upwards. This had preserved the balance between the interests of the citizen and those of the state. The consequent equilibrium had given to citizenship a meaning that was the exact opposite of that advocated by the Afrikaners for the African.

Life in these states had been dominated by a religious system that regarded each individual personality as sacred. Way back in infinity, long before there was the sun or the moon or the stars or the earth, there was *Mvelinqangi* (the First-to-appear), who was neither matter nor visible. He could not be seen by the naked eye because the subtle substance that constituted his body stretched from infinity to infinity. He was eternal and

creative; he was the ultimate reality from which all things were to derive their being. He willed that there should be the sun and the other planets; that there should be man, animals, birds, stones, and trees. All were manifestations of his infinite form. Inside his being was an infinity of specialized forms making up a part of the whole. These were the spirits of living things, some of which had human forms. When they were clothed in flesh, they became the human beings who inhabited the earth.

Each human being was made up of three elements—the *Mvelinqangi* essence, the spirit form, and the physical body. The human always had a dual existence. When he lived, it was in the spiritual and physical worlds. At death, he did not “die”; he merely discarded the physical body and returned to his ancestors, the spirit forms. His age, sex, or position did not affect his nature or his cycle of life. As a future spirit form or *idlozi*, the individual personality had a sacredness that was absolute and immutable. He was the individualized essence of *Mvelinqangi*. The concept of equality in the African community was based on this evaluation of the human personality.

From such an evaluation sprang an important ethical code, which prescribed that the good life was the one in which individuality was treated with reverence and consideration. The most heinous crime in the Zulu state, for example, was witchcraft, not murder. Zulu law took the attitude that in murder the criminal merely separated body and soul; in witchcraft, the miscreant interfered with the most sacred ingredient in the human make-up. Supreme virtue lay in being humane, in accepting the human being as a part of yourself, with a right to be denied nothing that you possessed. It was inhuman to drive the hungry stranger from your door, for your neighbor's sorrow was yours. This code constituted a philosophy of life, and the great Sutu-nguni family (Bantu has political connotations that the Africans resent) called it, significantly, *ubuntu* or *botho*—pronounced *butu*—the practice of being humane. The harshest judgment that the humblest African in the Sutu-nguni community can make of his neighbor is to say that he is not humane. The nearest equivalent

to this value judgment in the West is to say a person is not civilized or morally developed.

This philosophy gave content to life in the *Sutu-nguni* states before the advent of the white man. Defeat shattered the political and social institutions that gave visible expression to this attitude. Disaster could not, however, penetrate so deeply into the African's being as to destroy those things he prized most—the perspectives from which he viewed life and which gave it meaning. These remained deep in his self, giving him spiritual sustenance in moments of trial. He has always clung to them with a determination that nothing seems capable of cracking.

Christianity took deep root in the *Sutu-nguni* community not because it came with the conquering white man, not even because it produced genuinely good men like Philip, but because its evaluation of the human personality was to a very large extent in accord with that of the *botho* way of life. Christianity was readily acceptable because it gave valid interpretation and meaning to the *botho* evaluation of the human personality in the complex fabric of society created by the white man; it showed how the individual could try to be better—how he could be humane amidst the conflicts and complex situations which were part and parcel of the life imposed on the African by the white conqueror. This acceptance meant the blending of humanistic responses evolved in different situations. The result was the enlargement of the African's personality, leading to the development of one of the most remarkable characteristics of his nationalism—its strongly humanistic bias.

Anthropologists whose thinking was orientated in the direction of the white settler communities have described the mode of living based on the *botho* principle as being built on the ideal of sharing. To the *Sutu-nguni* who upholds the *botho* doctrine, the most important thing in life is to recognize the fact that he has no right to anything that might be denied to his neighbor. Although every human being has an equal right to the fruits of the earth, the recognition of this right is quite a different thing from sharing.

The refusal to abandon the great humanistic principle was not a new development. In the great migrations from the north to the south, the Sutu-nguni had lost every material possession in the tropical jungle, but he had not parted with the *botho* doctrine, no matter what happened. Life itself had been threatened so seriously at every stage that the miracle is how such large masses of men and women ever got through the thick forests to establish settled communities and reconstruct their civilizations in the south. In these great movements, the individual had always been exposed to the deadly conspiracy of disease, wild animals, and a hostile climate. The battle for survival had made him realize that in the final analysis the individual's best friend was the other individual. Suffering and danger had been common to all, and this had enhanced the individual's appreciation of the other's potential for giving help in the battle for survival.

Slavery had produced its own complications. By making direct and savage attacks on his being, it stimulated a deeper appreciation of individuality. The centuries of humiliation and oppression awakened in the African a moral dimension that was repulsed by those things which debased man's personality. It drove him to seek his highest fulfillment in whatever raised man's potential to be better. Since he had reached the very nadir of suffering and yet survived, he had had the physical experience of the reality beyond, the indefinable experience that made him lose all fear of pain, made humiliation virtually meaningless, and enabled him to be at peace in the whole of creation. This inner peace, which was basically of the spirit, he translated into his capacity to laugh even when in travail; into his music and art, which are vibrant with life, even though he is in chains. He expressed it in what a famous Japanese called "enduring the unendurable." Yet there is nothing unique or mystical about this dimension, for it lies dormant in every human being. Human groups need to be exposed to certain experiences before it is awakened; but its main distinguishing feature at all times is that it works continuously for the enlargement of the human personality, almost instinctively compelling man to strive toward those things which raise his potential to be better.

Another important factor in the background of the men under discussion was that the African's nation-states in southern Africa had sprung out of diverse peoples. Moshoeshoe, who was almost the last of the great nation-builders, provides a good example. He collected fleeing Zulus, Ndebeles, Batlaping, and others and gave them all a political loyalty that was valid in their lives because it guaranteed survival. Whoever embraced the loyalty was welcome because his coming to the group meant an accretion of strength. In this situation, there could be no room for xenophobia or discrimination based on language or race. To be a Zulu, Xosa, or Sutu was not a question of race or color; it was one of cultural preference and political allegiance or choice. Coenraad du Buys, Christoffel Botha, and Coenraad Bezuidenhout among the Xosas, John Dunn, Ogle, and others among the Zulus were white men who had, after indicating their political and cultural preferences, been accorded citizenship rights in the African states.

Christianity played no insignificant part in molding the attitudes of men like Seme and Dube. With the exception of Bambada, who was a pagan, the leaders of the new awakening were, for the most part, the products of mission schools. They were influenced heavily by the thinking and actions of men like Dr. Philip and his successors in the fight against race oppression. To Tengo Jabavu, for example, moral values were not things to talk about only on Sundays. Since Dr. Philip had shown that they could bring about reforms where nothing else could, liberalism had grown out of this proof of effectiveness. Jabavu looked forward to an extension of the area of coordinated black and white initiatives. So deeply did he feel about this that when his fellow Africans, under Seme's leadership, waxed enthusiastic about the Bloemfontein Conference, he entertained grave misgivings, fearing that the proposed front would be an African lapse into racial fundamentalism—the sort of thing that would destroy the coordination of the power reserves by which he set so much store. He was still impressed with the way in which the Cape liberals had fought for the retention of the Cape African vote after Union.

To these men, the Christian evaluation of the human personality was acceptable because it stated that man had been created in the image of God. Because of this, life's highest purpose was to strive to be perfect like God, to make the best possible use of his life; but to do this to the best of his ability, man needed to be free in body, mind, and spirit. Whatever limited this freedom frustrated life's purpose, it became a criticism of the divine intention. Hence, the Boers' race attitude repulsed them because it represented this criticism. Finally, the most outstanding of these men, like Drs. Seme, Dube, and Rubusana, had received part of their education overseas. These three had all attended American schools. Their own tradition of liberty combined with their understanding of the Christian evaluation of the human personality and the idealism of the American Revolution to produce an ideological ferment, which set itself goals that were the exact opposite of those of the Boers. Where Seme, Dube, and Rubusana had diverted the dominant currents in the main stream of European culture into the life of their peoples to give it richer meaning, the Boers had stuck to their position of isolation.

The main classes from which African leadership had come during that period were professional men, churchmen, businessmen, chiefs, and retired civil servants. This circumstance, coupled with their backgrounds, was to determine the methods they were to use to insure respect for their wishes. They employed the so-called constitutional methods—calling public meetings, making protests, organizing demonstrations, passing resolutions, and sending deputations to white men in positions of authority. Since Dr. Philip had used most of these methods and produced excellent results, his black pupils saw no reason why they should not try them. But there was another side to this story. The leaders of African nationalism at this stage did not believe that the issue of self-determination could become a matter of practical politics in their own lives. They wanted to buy time to nurse the unity they had created until it became an effective striking force. While moving toward this goal, they were willing to do all they could to agitate for reforms without provoking a head-on collision with white authority.

Although the Cape African still had the vote, these men rarely, if ever, thought in terms of initiating action to force parliament to adopt a particular course. The strategy was to wait for the white authority to take the initiative in introducing a law. If it was deemed oppressive, the African National Congress would protest against it in tones to awaken the dead. Demands for its repeal would be made throughout the country. Occasionally—as in the incident involving the introduction of passes for women in the Ficksburg-Winburg area of the Free State in 1913—the ANC would organize resistance. In that particular case, the demonstration proved successful.

From this tradition of struggle, there evolved the politics of resistance that produced two very significant results. The negative attitude of the leadership confirmed the impression in the Afrikaner nationalist mind that African agitations for reform were inspired by the desire to frustrate movement toward national fulfillment for the Afrikaner. On the African side, it surrendered the initiative to influence events to the white minority and failed to project before the masses of the African people a clearly defined goal toward which to march. This indecision made the African National Congress the ready host of all political adventurers who wanted to use the African people to advance their own ideological ends.

The most remarkable achievement of the tradition of struggle based on the politics of resistance was the defiance campaign of 1951-52—a massive demonstration which did not, however, change the attitude of the government. But the failure of the politics of resistance can be traced to a number of factors on both sides of the color line. Although the Africans had the superiority in numbers, they were unorganized; and the white authority had a well trained and highly disciplined army and police force ready to strike anywhere at any time against any challenge. Even on the economic plane, society was organized in ways that made it easier for the whites to club together and exert pressures which could crush African resistance to governmental authority. Finally, the white-led churches were themselves heavily committed to race discrimination. The key posts in very

many of them were held exclusively by white men, many of whom used them to shield the authority of the government and to discourage the growth of any attitudes of militancy.

On the African side, the generation that went to Bloemfontein in 1912 had occupied itself too much with considerations of unity and did not believe that planning for victory could ever be a matter of practical politics. As a result, the leaders did not prescribe a clearly defined goal as an alternative to segregation or apartheid. Because of this, the struggle tended to lack direction, and more often than not it came to be weakened by personality clashes. The use of constitutional methods was based on the quite mistaken assumption that constitutional, political action could be effective in a situation where the African did not have political power. The leaders also had an inadequate appreciation of the power of the call of blood in the white community. By accepting the Union on conditions, most of which were laid down by the Boers, the white community had acted on the principle that blood was thicker than water. Hence, to the whites, the Union symbolized blood unity.

The generation under discussion attached an unrealistic importance to the value of coordinated black-white reserves of power in a situation where the area for this was limited by two factors—the disequilibrium in the reserves of power and the fact that the African professional and business classes were in the embryonic stage. That reduced contact between black and white to minimal proportions.

The Afrikaner nationalist's hunger for security and the serious complications to which it gave rise were never accepted as a problem to which African statesmanship had to give a clear and positive answer. This was partly the result of the habit of hesitating to take the initiative in moving events toward goals desired by the Africans and partly due to the fact that the leaders were too heavily committed to building unity and buying time to accumulate power reserves.

Finally, the church tended to use its position of tremendous influence in the African community to slow down progress to-

ward freedom. It frowned very heavily on "extremism" from the African side. The general strategy was not to take a clear stand in favor of race oppression. As a matter of fact, substantial numbers of white church leaders tended to condemn race discrimination in public while encouraging it within their churches. Some of these men stood on public platforms to attack it, but they insisted that their African colleagues enter their houses through the back door.

The popular strategy was to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the church and what was called politics. African clergymen were discouraged systematically from participating in the political life of their people. They were warned to confine their activities to spiritual matters. The man who concerned himself too much with the lives of his congregants outside the church was often in danger of losing his job.

As a result of these pressures, most African clergymen came to regard politics and sin as virtually synonymous. They encouraged their people to develop a passive attitude toward injustice. It was not the duty of the Christian to raise his hand against injustice. Even when he was denied the right to strive to be like God, all he could do was to fall on his knees and pray.

The general belief among most people is that only the Dutch Reformed Church is guilty of the sin of race arrogance. But all the Christian communities played large parts in slowing down the march to freedom one way or the other, either directly or indirectly. This is in no way a defense of the Dutch Reformed Church; it is merely an attempt to balance the picture.

The practice of race discrimination continues to this day. As a rule, African clergymen are treated as the inferiors of the whites. They are often paid lower stipends. The general argument is that their congregations are not rich. The acid test of consistency, however, is not the wealth of the congregations; it is whether or not the very devout white Anglicans of Johannesburg or the pious white Catholics of Pretoria would accept cultured and outstanding Christians like Bishops Zulu or Mabathoana as their spiritual leaders. It would surprise most South

Africans on both sides of the color line if there was one white congregation willing to accept spiritual leadership from an African priest.

One result of missionary pressure was that the mission stations refused to give effective support to the fight to extend the area of liberty. A complicated contradiction emerged. The mission stations were, in terms of education, the most advanced section of the African people at the time. The missionaries had done magnificent work as school teachers, and the mission stations had produced some of the most militant and effective rebels against white domination. In terms of the thinking of their generation, Dube was an extremist and Seme a dangerous man. Dube suffered, however, for his political beliefs. He was once brought before a court of law, where he maintained that Christ's teaching should have valid meaning in every phase of a Christian's life. Thereupon, the white missionary at Inanda refused him the right to preach in the local church; he actually locked the doors and refused to open them when Dube, a qualified clergyman, was due to preach a sermon. Dube's people, the community that had produced him, sided with the missionary to reject him and his extremism. Dube, Seme, and many of the builders of the African people had started life proud to regard themselves as Christians; they died bitterly disappointed with the way in which the Christian church aided the cause of white domination.

The real weakness of the African National Congress was that its leaders were tied too closely to the church; so closely, in fact, that the church could affect their political effectiveness. It was hardly surprising that when a new leadership emerged to challenge the conciliatory policies the ANC pursued, it did not confine itself to political militancy, but went out of its way to make savage attacks on the Christian church as the agent of the race oppressor. And this leadership was in no way Communistic.

9 • THE BATTLE FOR INITIATIVES

THE Union Government wasted no time in confronting the African front with the first of a series of grave challenges. In 1913, Parliament passed the Land Act, making residential segregation in the rural areas compulsory.

This created a first-class crisis in the African community. Large numbers of Africans had for a long time settled on white farms, often on the basis of sharing crops. This system had enabled a fair proportion of white farmers to move into the towns and live on the proceeds from the farms worked by the Africans. As a result, it was not unusual for the industrious Africans to end up owning the farms. But to the Afrikaner nationalist, this was a sword of Damocles over his head. If the African was allowed to push the Afrikaner off the farms and into the towns, he would take the land back from the white man. Moreover, if the African could support himself by working the land on his own, he would never again allow himself to be a servant. This would make worthless all the sacrifices made to bring him under white control, and it would make South Africa unsafe for the Afrikaner. Therefore, the Land Act was introduced to push the African out of the rural areas so that he should be more amenable to the type of economic discipline the whites were planning for him.

The African National Congress accepted the challenge. It mobilized African opinion and made strong representations to the government against the law. These made absolutely no impres-

sion on the rulers, and it soon became clear that the intention of the government was to reduce the Africans to the position of helots.

The only answer to this situation was resistance. The ANC, however, was not ready for this sort of thing: It feared that a frontal challenge at such an early stage might be catastrophic for the African side. Sol. T. Plaatje, secretary-general of the ANC and one of the brightest men in it, had a bright idea, so the story goes: Since the new law violated human rights, as he said, a delegation should be sent to Great Britain to expose white South Africa's real intentions for the black man. This would have a twofold advantage—it would start the process whereby white South Africa would be isolated from the civilized community of nations and, on the home front, preserve the solidarity of the Africans by showing that something definite was being done to oppose the Land Act.

The delegation reached England shortly before the outbreak of World War I. But the British were preoccupied and in no mood to offend the South African Government, whose help they might need in the coming war. Dr. Dube, who led the delegation, returned empty-handed. After the war, another delegation was sent, in 1919, this time to Versailles, to plead against race oppression in South Africa. This, too, produced no results. By then, however, the failure of the ANC policy of conciliation had created new tensions in the African community. Dube and his colleagues were criticized for being ineffective in the face of aggression from the white side; for wasting too much energy trying to buy time when the increasing burdens on the Africans called for a definite stand against white domination. The end of World War I intensified these pressures, for the economic dislocations that followed hit the African hardest and confronted the ANC with challenges it could not meet. Everywhere people clamored for a new type of leadership to confront the race oppressor with the reality of disaster as a condition of success.

Clements Kadalie stepped forth to accept the challenge of the times. He had originally come from Nyasaland and worked in Cape Town. He thought in terms of seizing the initiative to in-

fluence events from the white side, and he was determined to use industrial action to do it. This was a clean break with the politics of resistance, as well as with the practice of using political action, as the ANC had done. The Philip tradition, which had been dominant among Christian Africans for nearly a century, was beginning to prove ineffective.

In January, 1919, Kadalie and his friends, after being encouraged and advised by a white friend—Kadalie never at any time concealed his indebtedness to this man—launched the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). This organization was started as some sort of omnibus trade union, which was to concern itself with the interests of African workers in the urban and rural areas. It set itself no ideological goals, evolved no theory of struggle, and accepted no philosophical basis for the society it sought to build. It merely wanted fair play, but even this was not defined in the clearest terms possible. It differed from the ANC in one other important respect: Its leaders were not drawn from the “respectable” classes. They had come straight from the ranks of the workers themselves, and they had a ruggedness and militancy that men accustomed to making obeisances before authority found outrageous. They stated that moderate speeches and pious resolutions would never make any impression on a government determined to ensure that the white man remain master, regardless of merit. The only condition of success, they argued, was to confront the temper of the slave owner with the reality of disaster.

To do this, they started by attempting to cast the thinking of their people in a new mold. They set themselves the goal of destroying the sense of inferiority which the government was systematically infusing into the minds of the masses. For example, one of the myths the Africans were being made to believe was that the white man was invincible; but by dragging before the courts of law any white person who cheated his African servant of his rights, the ICU blew this to pieces. More often than not, the ICU won. The effect of showing that white supremacy could be challenged and knocked out in its own courts of law impressed African opinion. From the days of Frederick

Bezuidenhout, of Slachter's Nek, it had been a risky thing in many parts of the country to lodge a complaint against a white person; when the ICU showed it could be done without any trouble, the masses rallied.

The ICU broke new ground in still another field: It did not hesitate to use the strike as an instrument of pressure against employers. Along the Cape coast, where it organized some of the most successful strikes, the effects were electrical. Those whom white domination had crushed and left in despair saw their hopes revived when they beheld the effectiveness of the ICU line. As the mood of the people changed, they demanded a frontal attack on the structure of race oppression itself. It was not enough to deal successfully with trade union matters, they said; efforts had to be made to rid the country of the temper of the slave owner.

This pushed the ICU onto the political plane, where it found itself forced to play a role for which it had never prepared itself. One of the most significant indications was the way in which the ICU proved Seme's dictum that African unity would destroy white solidarity. Increasing numbers of white people from all walks of life began to interest themselves in the ICU and its activities. Hertzog and Malan are said to have sent donations; the Bishop of Bloemfontein pleaded for a more realistic attitude toward the ICU. Then, soon after the ICU had clearly demonstrated the power of the African proletariat, all the disparate groups with socialistic inclinations, which had begun to emerge on the white side about 1915 and then split apart, united to form themselves into the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921. This represented the first ideological crack in the façade of white unity.

This was to be followed by a more dramatic event—the toppling of a government. The ICU made representations to Mr. Walter Madeley on behalf of some of its members and asked for an interview. Prime Minister Hertzog insisted that it would be most improper for a cabinet minister to agree to meet an African deputation. Madeley, who was a Labor man in the coalition government, ignored the Prime Minister's injunction and met

the ICU leaders. When Hertzog tendered his resignation, the Governor-General asked him to form another government, which he did—without including Madeley in the cabinet. It was, therefore, becoming clear to the government that if not checked the ICU would grow in strength until it cracked white unity and overthrew the white government. Hertzog began to prepare a showdown.

The time to attack came when the ICU organized a boycott of the municipal beer halls. The outcome was a series of bloody clashes with the police in 1929, which led to the banishment of the ICU leaders and the virtual destruction of the organization itself. The reasons for the collapse of the ICU were varied. Although it had started as a trade union with no social goal or philosophy of struggle, it had soon realized that, insofar as the African was concerned, there really was no line of demarcation between what was strictly political and what was industrial. Events forced it to function as a movement of political protest, a role for which it was not at all prepared. Moreover, the inexperience of the leaders, their personal jealousies, and whatever remained of tribal suspicions further complicated the task of the ICU. Another important factor that worked for division was the Communist Party, for its intrigues played no small part in intensifying the confusion that finally destroyed the ICU. Above all, however, there was the power of the state against the ICU: When the government finally clamped down on the movement and banished its leaders, its members scattered because there was no unifying doctrine around which people could regroup.

The collapse of the ICU enabled Afrikaner nationalism to devote its attention to one problem that had always remained a sore spot from the day the Union was formed. In the Cape's African vote, the white nationalists saw another sword of Damocles. Hertzog and his followers feared that the African voters would one day use the ballot box to widen fissions in the white community and transform Parliament from a bastion of white supremacy into the instrument with which to destroy the white man's position of privilege. So he launched his campaign to remove the Cape Africans from the common roll of voters. He

wanted to substitute for the Cape African vote a form of representation that would give the Cape Africans (who numbered a little less than 3 million) three representatives in the all-white House of Assembly and provide for the representation of the entire African community by four whites in the Senate. A mixed council with representatives from all the provinces would be set up to advise the government on the grievances of the African people. The greatest volume of opposition to Hertzog's bills came, naturally, from the Cape. The other provinces rallied, though, as was to be seen later, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The areas where the African did not have the vote resisted with very great difficulty the temptation to jump for the idea of having a token foothold in Parliament in exchange for the Cape vote.

Professor D. D. T. Jabavu—the son of John Tengo—traveled extensively up and down the country, campaigning against the Hertzog bills. His idea was to mobilize all sections of the African people into one camp for the purpose of massing and concentrating opposition against the bills. The ANC had been too weak to rally African opinion, and some of its leaders were even reported to be secretly looking forward to the day when they would sit on the representative council. The ICU had been thrown out of commission. So Jabavu found himself placed in a position where he had to create an entirely new organization to lead the opposition against Hertzog. This organization was the All-African Convention, founded in 1935.

Like the leaders of the ANC, Jabavu was a moderate. He had no plans for confronting apartheid with the reality of disaster. His idea was to bring into being an omnibus resistance group, which was to encompass many viewpoints, united only by their desire to oppose race oppression. But almost from the start, the Convention found itself in serious difficulties. It had allowed individuals and organizations to affiliate themselves with it regardless of their political convictions. The Trotskyites and the Communists had moved in; so had some ANC members. The first two were so allergic to the ideological preferences of the

latter that before long a split was inevitable. The Trotskyites led the wing that wanted a complete boycott of the type of institutions Hertzog offered the African people. The Communists, together with most ANC members, found it practically impossible to resist the temptation to use the Hertzog institutions as platforms for their own propaganda. These differences became so acute that soon the ANC members and the Communists were forced to quit the Convention.

Thus purified, the Convention began to straighten out its own thinking. It noted that the ICU's collapse had contained a number of lessons for the Africans. It had not been enough merely to seize the initiative to influence events or to seek to confront segregation with disaster; it had not been enough even to rely on political or industrial action to effect reforms. The most effective way of destroying white domination was for the African to refuse to collaborate in working the segregated institutions and to be ready to pay the price. Noncollaboration, in itself, was only a weapon; for the struggle to have direction, it had to be principled, to move step by step toward clearly defined goals. The Convention later produced a program by which it sought to transform South African society. It contained such matters as noncollaboration, universal suffrage, the right to collective bargaining, and non-European unity.

The Convention was one of the most intelligently-led African political organizations. Its doctrine of noncollaboration and its insistence on a principled struggle were to make a deep impression on African opinion. Unfortunately, however, it involved itself so much in the polemics of nihilistic perfection that it gradually lost touch with the realities of the race crisis and degenerated into a highly articulate debating society. Its influence was not destroyed by the intervention of the state; it merely "withered" away from the front line.

It did not fade out of the limelight, however, before it had done one other thing—popularize the idea of non-European unity. Both the ANC and the ICU had been purely African organizations. Although they were not antiwhite or anti-Indian, they

concentrated on building up African power reserves. The Convention found this a source of weakness in two ways: It divided the oppressed and kept them weak, and it laid the foundations for the African's version of the temper of the slave owner. The oppressed, it said, had to stand together against race oppression. The ten-point program was held out as the rallying point for all nonwhite democrats.

The most significant feature of African political organizations up to this point was obviously the refusal to evolve a mystique by way of an answer to Afrikaner nationalism's oppressive temper. The ANC fought shy of this, the militant ICU kept clear of it, and so did the Convention. There were two reasons for this. First, in order to evolve a mystique that would appeal effectively to large masses of the African people, it would have to be as deeply rooted in race as was the Afrikaner nationalist's. The African community had first rejected the call of the blood when it asked Dr. Philip to press the government for the demarcation of mission reserves, where the converted would be free to lead a Christian life away from their pagan kinsmen. In the years that followed, generations of Africans grew up that were no longer responsive to the call of the blood, of race, or of the tribe. The ablest leaders of the community had come from their ranks. They had set their minds against racialism and were in no mood to emulate the Afrikaner. They could not be moved—emotionally or intellectually—into seeing virtue in a mystique based on race.

Second, the series of compromises on which African unity had been based militated against anything that proclaimed race as a possible unifying influence. Most Africans believed that race consciousness could develop that group thinking which would, in turn, lead to tribal conflicts that were likely to wreck the achievements of half a century and condemn the African to that position of perpetual weakness that Afrikaner nationalism sought to maintain. A unity based on acceptable ideals had the advantage that it could appeal to progressively larger numbers of people on both sides of the color line.

10 • THE REVOLT OF THE PAC

BY THE time the Convention came into being, the government of the Union had made it unmistakably clear that its one and only answer to the assertion of African initiatives or agitations for reform was to shoot.

Mgijimi's religious followers had been mown down by gunfire for demonstrating on the common outside Queenstown in 1920. About two years later, the Bondelswarts of Southwest-Africa suffered a similar fate for daring to oppose the will of the white man. There had been deaths from police gunfire when the Africans in Durban demonstrated against the pass laws in 1929. The ICU demonstrations against the beer halls that same year produced bloodshed freely.

The use of force was designed to underline the fact that the white man was determined to keep his initiatives the dominant influence in South African life. Any agitation for reform was viewed and treated as either a rebellion in the making or as a rising against the white community. This had the advantage of emphasizing the race factor, of keeping the white front solid, of shocking the nonwhites into accepting permanent inferiority, of impressing them with the invincibility of the white man, and, finally, of forcing them always to fight on ground chosen by the whites.

The Convention realized that in the face of a government that was unresponsive to constitutional agitations for reform,

wanted to substitute for the Cape African vote a form of representation that would give the Cape Africans (who numbered a little less than 3 million) three representatives in the all-white House of Assembly and provide for the representation of the entire African community by four whites in the Senate. A mixed council with representatives from all the provinces would be set up to advise the government on the grievances of the African people. The greatest volume of opposition to Hertzog's bills came, naturally, from the Cape. The other provinces rallied, though, as was to be seen later, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The areas where the African did not have the vote resisted with very great difficulty the temptation to jump for the idea of having a token foothold in Parliament in exchange for the Cape vote.

Professor D. D. T. Jabavu—the son of John Tengo—traveled extensively up and down the country, campaigning against the Hertzog bills. His idea was to mobilize all sections of the African people into one camp for the purpose of massing and concentrating opposition against the bills. The ANC had been too weak to rally African opinion, and some of its leaders were even reported to be secretly looking forward to the day when they would sit on the representative council. The ICU had been thrown out of commission. So Jabavu found himself placed in a position where he had to create an entirely new organization to lead the opposition against Hertzog. This organization was the All-African Convention, founded in 1935.

Like the leaders of the ANC, Jabavu was a moderate. He had no plans for confronting apartheid with the reality of disaster. His idea was to bring into being an omnibus resistance group, which was to encompass many viewpoints, united only by their desire to oppose race oppression. But almost from the start, the Convention found itself in serious difficulties. It had allowed individuals and organizations to affiliate themselves with it regardless of their political convictions. The Trotskyites and the Communists had moved in; so had some ANC members. The first two were so allergic to the ideological preferences of the

latter that before long a split was inevitable. The Trotskyites led the wing that wanted a complete boycott of the type of institutions Hertzog offered the African people. The Communists, together with most ANC members, found it practically impossible to resist the temptation to use the Hertzog institutions as platforms for their own propaganda. These differences became so acute that soon the ANC members and the Communists were forced to quit the Convention.

Thus purified, the Convention began to straighten out its own thinking. It noted that the ICU's collapse had contained a number of lessons for the Africans. It had not been enough merely to seize the initiative to influence events or to seek to confront segregation with disaster; it had not been enough even to rely on political or industrial action to effect reforms. The most effective way of destroying white domination was for the African to refuse to collaborate in working the segregated institutions and to be ready to pay the price. Noncollaboration, in itself, was only a weapon; for the struggle to have direction, it had to be principled, to move step by step toward clearly defined goals. The Convention later produced a program by which it sought to transform South African society. It contained such matters as noncollaboration, universal suffrage, the right to collective bargaining, and non-European unity.

The Convention was one of the most intelligently-led African political organizations. Its doctrine of noncollaboration and its insistence on a principled struggle were to make a deep impression on African opinion. Unfortunately, however, it involved itself so much in the polemics of nihilistic perfection that it gradually lost touch with the realities of the race crisis and degenerated into a highly articulate debating society. Its influence was not destroyed by the intervention of the state; it merely "withered" away from the front line.

It did not fade out of the limelight, however, before it had done one other thing—popularize the idea of non-European unity. Both the ANC and the ICU had been purely African organizations. Although they were not antiwhite or anti-Indian, they

concentrated on building up African power reserves. The Convention found this a source of weakness in two ways: It divided the oppressed and kept them weak, and it laid the foundations for the African's version of the temper of the slave owner. The oppressed, it said, had to stand together against race oppression. The ten-point program was held out as the rallying point for all nonwhite democrats.

The most significant feature of African political organizations up to this point was obviously the refusal to evolve a mystique by way of an answer to Afrikaner nationalism's oppressive temper. The ANC fought shy of this, the militant ICU kept clear of it, and so did the Convention. There were two reasons for this. First, in order to evolve a mystique that would appeal effectively to large masses of the African people, it would have to be as deeply rooted in race as was the Afrikaner nationalist's. The African community had first rejected the call of the blood when it asked Dr. Philip to press the government for the demarcation of mission reserves, where the converted would be free to lead a Christian life away from their pagan kinsmen. In the years that followed, generations of Africans grew up that were no longer responsive to the call of the blood, of race, or of the tribe. The ablest leaders of the community had come from their ranks. They had set their minds against racialism and were in no mood to emulate the Afrikaner. They could not be moved—emotionally or intellectually—into seeing virtue in a mystique based on race.

Second, the series of compromises on which African unity had been based militated against anything that proclaimed race as a possible unifying influence. Most Africans believed that race consciousness could develop that group thinking which would, in turn, lead to tribal conflicts that were likely to wreck the achievements of half a century and condemn the African to that position of perpetual weakness that Afrikaner nationalism sought to maintain. A unity based on acceptable ideals had the advantage that it could appeal to progressively larger numbers of people on both sides of the color line.

10 • THE REVOLT OF THE PAC

BY THE time the Convention came into being, the government of the Union had made it unmistakably clear that its one and only answer to the assertion of African initiatives or agitations for reform was to shoot.

Mgijimi's religious followers had been mown down by gunfire for demonstrating on the common outside Queenstown in 1920. About two years later, the Bondelswarts of Southwest-Africa suffered a similar fate for daring to oppose the will of the white man. There had been deaths from police gunfire when the Africans in Durban demonstrated against the pass laws in 1929. The ICU demonstrations against the beer halls that same year produced bloodshed freely.

The use of force was designed to underline the fact that the white man was determined to keep his initiatives the dominant influence in South African life. Any agitation for reform was viewed and treated as either a rebellion in the making or as a rising against the white community. This had the advantage of emphasizing the race factor, of keeping the white front solid, of shocking the nonwhites into accepting permanent inferiority, of impressing them with the invincibility of the white man, and, finally, of forcing them always to fight on ground chosen by the whites.

The Convention realized that in the face of a government that was unresponsive to constitutional agitations for reform,

the systematic build-up of African power reserves could one day become a lapse into racial fundamentalism, leading to increasingly bloody encounters between the state and the Africans. This would sharpen racial antagonisms and force the non-whites to fight on ground where they would always be sure to lose. The only effective answer to this was to wage a principled struggle, to work out a program by which to guide action from time to time. This, in turn, would have another advantage, for insistence on a program would deracialize the struggle and broaden it to bring in the Indians and the coloreds. A principled struggle was a different thing from a national struggle: The former could attract all people who subscribed to the program regardless of race, whereas the latter embraced the "nationals" who constituted a particular racial group.

This was an important step forward in the evolution of thought on the race question. Both the ANC and the ICU had fought for the extension of the area of liberty. They had systematically striven to crack the color bar, and they had relied heavily on African unity to do this. The Convention argued that it was not enough to imply, as the Congress had done, that freedom would be the birthright of all South Africans after victory. All the oppressed races that had made South Africa their home had to fight together and win together so that they could build together a social order within which they could all feel secure. The Convention, however, in fairness to itself, was not the originator of this idea. Dr. John Philip had tried it in his mission stations, and the older Jabavu had been moved by it when he elected to stand aside from the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912.

What the Convention did, then, was to respond, in an organized manner, to growing clamors for nonwhite unity. The Convention's heroic fight to save the Cape vote had made a deep impression on colored and Indian opinion. These communities felt that the loss of the Cape African vote threatened directly the voting rights of the Cape coloreds and the economic interests of the Indian community in all the provinces. They realized

that by themselves they would not be strong enough to push back the tide of white reaction. Just as the ICU's show of strength effected the first ideological split in the white community, so did the Convention introduce fissions in the colored and Indian communities. When it called for non-European unity, it was providing a political home for the discontented among these groups.

As early as 1927, Dr. Abdurahman, the colored leader from Cape Town, had advised the Kimberley Conference of the African People's Organization (APO)—a colored political group—that thought should be given to the idea of uniting the non-Europeans in the fight against race oppression. This line had not made any visible impression on the then powerful ICU, nor had it been taken very seriously by the ANC, then battling against the ICU for survival. But the emergence of an African group in favor of nonwhite unity stimulated activity among the Indians and the coloreds in new directions. The main centers of this activity were Durban and Cape Town; the Indians were concentrated in the former and the coloreds in the latter. The most enthusiastic supporters in Durban were mainly the Communists, and the Trotskyites were in the forefront in Cape Town. But the intrusion of the African into Indian politics caused a first-class crisis. The moderates took the line that it was in the interests of the Indian community to avoid antagonizing the whites by associating with the powerless Africans. The protracted clashes—on a variety of issues that boiled down to non-European collaboration—between the “progressives” and the moderates split the Natal Indian Congress in two and, in the end, put the “progressives” in the ascendancy.

The Convention was never very influential outside the Cape province. Doctrinal squabbles went on inside it until in the end it became largely a name, and the main preserver of the doctrine became the Non-European Unity Movement, whose increasingly Trotskyite leanings reduced its potential for becoming a mass movement. In fact, the five years before World War II were characterized by debates on the form non-European unity

would take. The Communists favored multiracial groupings as the most desirable and workable basis; the Trotskyites saw in this a variant of apartheid. If unity was to be effective, the latter argued, it had to be between individuals and not groups. As a result, the Unity Movement increasingly became a nonracial organization.

The multiracialist and nonracialist viewpoints were being canvassed heatedly among the nonwhites when World War II broke out. The Natives Representative Council (NRC), which had been established by the Hertzog bills, promptly made it known that it would not embarrass the Smuts government by pressing the claims of the African people too far for the duration. In India, however, Gandhi was being jailed for insisting on a clear definition of British war aims for his country. Here were representatives of an oppressed people deciding to give a new lease on life to race injustice in a war fought precisely against race humiliation.

The shocked African community reacted to this in two ways. Paul Mosaka, a Johannesburg trader, joined hands with Hyman Basner, a Jewish lawyer, to form the African Democratic Party (ADP) in opposition to the ANC, which was at the time dominated by some of the men who had supported the NRC resolution. The ADP had no color bar; it opened its doors to all South Africans and stood for a mildly socialist program. Inside the ANC, the old guard faced mutiny. Also, a group of young men, led by Anton Lembede and Ashby Mda, formed the Congress Youth League to get the ANC to commit itself to anti-Communism and to militant action against race oppression.

The League set itself a twofold goal. In its program, it wanted to start by what Mda called "politicizing the African masses." This meant instilling in the Africans confidence in their ability to break white domination, the so-called reconstruction part of the program. After that, the League wanted to use positive action against race oppression. But on the vital question of racial attitudes, the League rejected both the Communist multiracialist and Trotskyite nonracialist lines as unrealistic. The African was the

poorest, largest, most backward, and most oppressed member of the community. These factors made it necessary for him to put his own house in order before attempting to collaborate with the better-placed members. If he rushed to work with them before he had prepared himself for this task, he would never deal with them on the basis of real equality. The League concentrated, therefore, on working only among the Africans. In addition, it worked on building up its power; on destroying the influence of the conservatives, who were led by Dr. A. B. Xuma and Mr. A. W. G. Champion, formerly of the ICU; and on giving to ANC policies a distinctly nationalist and militant slant. The idea was to seize from the whites the initiative to influence events, to give the Congress militant leadership, and, finally, to confront race oppression with the reality of disaster as the only condition of success.

The League regarded African unity as the key to liberty, and it considered every other problem from this perspective. It was not antiwhite, anti-Indian, or anticolored. It was intensely pro-African. In its approach to men and events, it combined the heroic and realistic viewpoints—the heroic to give emotional appeal, the realistic to guide policy. The hero was Anton Lembede, and Ashby Mda provided the brains behind the entire movement.

Like the Convention, the League believed in a principled struggle. To this, it added the necessity for phasing the struggle; since it believed in pushing African initiatives to the fore, it argued that these could never be effective where they were employed to serve conflicting group interests. The Indian had the right to own land and trade in the towns, but the African carried the pass and was subject to the curfew laws. He was not accepted as a real equal by either the whites, or the Indians, or the coloreds.

The African, the argument continued, could not set the pace of progress toward his goals if he collaborated with racial groups whose interests were not similar to his at the time. Experience had shown that this type of cooperation always placed him in the position of pulling the nuts out of the fire for the more

advanced or better-placed groups. If the other groups genuinely wanted to see the African free, they should support him on terms that did not hurt his self-respect and did not give them unfair advantage over him. After victory, the Africans would be free to identify themselves with anybody whose interests were similar to theirs. Race would cease to be a factor of political, economic, or social significance. There could even be African Communists and capitalists, who would collaborate with the like-minded in the other groups, regardless of race. This plan of action, Anton Lembede, the ablest exponent, called Africanism.

Quite early in its history, the League had committed itself to the policy of going on the offensive in its bid to alter the pace of movement toward freedom. In pursuing this line, it had administered a fatal blow to the NRC when it forced Professor Matthews and Dr. Moroka to resign from the Council. It broke Champion's grip on the ANC in Natal and threw Dr. Xuma out of office by paving the way for Albert Luthuli, whom the Natal Leaguers were steadily pushing to the fore as expressing the new mood of the ANC. And when the League felt it had cleaned the Congress house sufficiently, it turned to direct action against race oppression. The result was the launching of the resistance movement in 1951.

This campaign was designed to achieve several ends. It was intended to widen ideological fissions on the white side by creating a situation in which the white democrat could cross the color line to join hands with the nonwhite opponent of apartheid in the fight to extend the area of liberty. It was a dramatized warning to the world that a point of crisis had been reached in the relations between black and white, and that this would one day endanger the peace on the continent. Third, it was an assurance to Asia that the African, on his own initiative, was taking positive steps to avoid clashes between himself and the Indians, as had happened in 1949.

The campaign did not succeed in its declared aim of getting the government to repeal the six laws mentioned by its leaders. Elsewhere, however, it produced satisfactory results. It effected

the second ideological split in the white community: Anti-apartheid groups got together and formed the Liberal Party of South Africa, which took a progressively uncompromising non-racial stand. From the beginning, Alan Paton, the author and great humanist, gave it his enthusiastic support. Apartheid became a talking-point all over the world. The like-minded of all races thought more and more of coordinated action against apartheid as having the highest potential to destroy race oppression.

After the resistance movement, the government of India started its more effective campaign of dragging South Africa before the United Nations to answer for its treatment of peoples of Indian descent. The Africans welcomed this line; although at the time it did not have much prospect of producing spectacular and immediate results, it intensified the process of isolating the white authority, and thus accelerated and reinforced the trend the Congress had started in 1913. The morale of the African community improved, and more Indians and coloreds were attracted to the idea of closer collaboration with the Africans.

These successes, however, introduced many unforeseen problems. The Communists made more determined bids to capture the leadership of the Congress. When it became clear that the League had the African community behind it in the resistance movement, the Communists made the following decisions: The Congress should be purged of its nationalist influences; it should be made a people's organization; emphasis should be on the interests of workers; and it should become an integral part of a bigger alliance, the Congress Movement, where it could be more effectively controlled by the Communists. The Freedom Charter was to be the new policy line.

Organized bids were made to sow suspicion and confusion among Leaguers in particular and ANC members in general. Walter Sisulu, then Secretary-General of the ANC, was sent on a secret mission to Bucharest, Moscow, and Peking without Luthuli's knowledge. Duma Nokwe went with a youth group to attend the World Festival of Youth in Bucharest. These tactics

shook the Congress from top to bottom. There were resignations from senior posts, and some of Luthuli's followers turned against him for what they described as his yielding of vital ground to the Communists. The League's program of action was shelved in favor of the Freedom Charter; critics of the Communists were elbowed out of the Congress, and the new line increasingly tended to see virtue in the people's republics and vice in the Western democracies. But some of the more militant members of the Youth League pointed out that collaboration with the other racial groups was leading the Congress to disaster; that it had handed over the movement to Communist control. Where there had been unity, there was now only distrust and quarreling, and a weakened organization was being reduced to the status of a mere branch of the Congress Movement.

The point of bitterest attack was the doctrine of multiracialism. The new alliance, called the Congress Movement, was made up of five organizations: the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats (COD, white), the Colored People's Organization (SACPO, colored), and the Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The coordinating body of the Congress Movement was the National Consultative Committee, which made policy. On this body, the ANC, as the largest organization in the movement and the one representing the biggest section of the nation, had as many votes as the COD, which was supported by no more than 500 people in the white community. In the colored elections for the Assembly, SACPO had been unable to muster enough support in the Cape to save its candidate. This organization had as many votes as Luthuli's ANC, which had a paid membership of thousands and which, having called for 10,000 volunteers to go to jail in the resistance movement, had got not less than 8,000.

Although the African National Congress spoke for the majority in the nation, it had been demoted to the status of a minority organization inside the Congress Movement. The Youth League critics who had feared that collaboration with the other groups would lead to the humiliation of the African, pointed out that their fears had been vindicated. Multiracialism in practice

meant that the minority groups could gang up in the policy-making body against the majority and place themselves in a position to dictate policy.

Groups started to form in some of the major urban areas to find ways and means of breaking the multiracialist grip on the African Congress. The two most famous and most determined of these were in Johannesburg. One met in the house of Josias Madzunya, a former Youth Leaguer and a powerful political figure in Alexandra Township, who concerned himself with fighting the Communists on the field of action. The other met in the house of Potlako Leballo, at Orlando, another ex-Youth Leaguer. The Leballo Group concerned itself directly with evolving a theory of nationalism that it could use to neutralize the Communist influence in the ANC. It soon grew in influence and attracted a number of very devoted young men: Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, a lecturer in African Studies at the Witwatersrand University, and Jacob Nyaose, a leading anti-Communist trade unionist, are but two examples. As soon as it was strong enough, it established liaison with Madzunya and made an open bid to oust the Communists from the leadership of ANC. But it was beaten decisively. Leballo and his followers left the ANC and proclaimed the establishment of a new organization to uphold the ideals of the original Bloemfontein Conference.

Some time later, in 1959, the rebels in various parts of the Union met for a conference in Orlando, where they founded the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) with Mangaliso Sobukwe as president and Potlako Leballo secretary. From the beginning, Potlako Leballo was the most interesting character in the PAC. His determined opposition to the Communists and his shepherd-ing of his group to the point where it became the PAC marked him out as Communism's principal bogeyman. Communist journalists projected an image of him in which he was represented as a hard, insensitive, dull-witted race-hater, an uncompromising dictator, and a mob-rousing mountebank. The rest of the white press took up the cue: Leballo became South Africa's bogeyman Number One.

The individual behind the bogeyman, however, was a fierce

hater of race oppression. He had felt its reality in his own life. When World War II broke out, he had suffered so much from it that he left school, volunteered for service, and fought courageously by the side of white men to destroy Nazi racialism. The man who had inspired Potlako to risk his life in this fight was a white man, none other than Jan Hofmeyr, a Cabinet Minister in the Smuts government. Hofmeyr had gone on a recruiting tour to Lovedale College to explain to the African students the issues at stake in the war. After Leballo had signed up he devoted his life to oppose race oppression.

The All-African Peoples Conference that had met in Accra in 1958, had inspired the oppressed in many parts of the continent with new visions of freedom. The PAC made it clear that it wanted to align itself with the liberating forces that were changing the course of events in Africa. But the really new factor in the thinking of the PAC was the determination to make the issue of direct participation in government a matter of practical politics. Up to that time, African political organizations had not taken a clear stand on immediate participation. They had contented themselves merely with demanding equal rights for all. The PAC did not stop at demanding participation, but enunciated an ideal of the society it wanted to build. In this, the PAC went further than any other political group, for it was out to build an Africanist, socialist, and nonracial nation.

Their critics admitted that Africanism was a criticism of Europeanism as it was known in South Africa. They pointed out, however, that a racial reaction had certain dangers. Since there was intrinsic virtue only in being a member of the human race, Africanism might find that in order to destroy Europeanism it would have to use the latter's techniques. In doing that, it would limit freedom and damage the human personality precisely in the way totalitarian regimes had done during the last twenty-five years. Therefore, any emphasis on being African emphasized the racial factor, and a people who had won its victory by using race as a weapon would find it hard to persuade themselves, once they were free, that racialism was immoral.

11 • NEW ROAD TO VIOLENCE

THE ANC had spent considerable energy buying time to build up power reserves. Since it had used only constitutional methods to convince its followers that it was coming to grips with the race question, this had given rise to a tradition that was to culminate in a complete rejection of violence as a weapon in the racial fight. The ICU, during its short life, had not been very particular about the methods it used; necessity had been the determining factor. The PAC, on the other hand, took no position that committed it one way or the other; its attitude was that, for its part, it would prefer to use nonviolent methods. It hastened to point out, however, that things being what they are in this country, it was not in the power of the African to say whether or not his struggle would remain non-violent. History had shown that peaceful demonstrations by Africans had provoked violence from the government.

Having thus defined its ground, the PAC prepared to seize the initiative from the white man to set the pace of movement toward its goal. The plan was, first, to launch what was called the status campaign. This would not be directed at any particular political target, although there might be boycotts of stores with the color bar. The end in view was to accustom the Africans to the idea of acting collectively to force the pace of progress toward freedom. Meanwhile, every effort would be made to build up a trade-union movement free from Communist influ-

ences. Jacob Nyaose had brought into being the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA) as a rival to SACTU, which was suspected of strong World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) sympathies. He applied for membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The third phase of this program would come when the PAC was strong enough to make demands it could back up with "decisive action." After that, the African society would be established.

This plan of action made a deep impression among friends and neutrals on both sides of the color line. As part of the campaign of preparing the ground for action, the PAC sent letters to friendly countries in Africa explaining the nature of the fight planned and its targets. One of their fears was that the Western press might too easily take its cue from the white press in South Africa and give a wholly distorted picture of the situation. This could be disastrous if the intended demonstration came up for discussion in the United Nations. So there had to be a bloc of well-informed, friendly nations in a position to place the real facts before the world. In addition, friends of the PAC throughout the rest of Africa were asked to give moral support to the campaign and provide relief for the dependents of those who might be given long terms in jail. And, finally, Ghana had just called the Accra Conference. She was interested in the idea that the South Africans were at last making a determined stand to remove from their national life apartheid's standing insult to all men of African descent.

Everything seemed to proceed according to plan. But suddenly there was a switch in PAC policy: The status boycott was shelved. The PAC was no longer to establish itself as a recognized political organization in the African mind, but instead it would launch a campaign against the passes. It would make simple demands. It would ask for a living wage, for the repeal of the pass laws, and for nonvictimization for participation in the campaign. That would gain it the recognition it needed. But since it was expected that the government would reject these demands,

an answer in the negative would be followed by a major campaign to force the government to start negotiating.

Nearly all the members of the PAC executive committee fell for this line—barring the president himself. They believed that there would be a massive response to the call to surrender the passes at charge offices; but if the government acted against them, there would be such chaos in the locations that the government would be forced to release them. After that, the campaign would gallop to a victorious climax. The naïveté expressed in all this was new to PAC thinking, and people who had been sympathetic to the PAC found it most distressing. The enthusiasm of the executives for its new plan knew no bounds. To the end, however, Sobukwe doubted the wisdom of the new line—but then his own loyalty to his executive committee forced him to accept the majority decision.

On March 21, 1960, after two postponements, the campaign was launched. Except at Sharpeville and Cape Town, the response of the community was far from spectacular, but of course the government saw in the demonstrations a definite threat to the supremacy of the white man. The police opened fire at Sharpeville and Cape Town, and subsequently there were shootings in Durban and Clermont Township. Although the leaders of the PAC had not all obeyed Sobukwe's order to lead demonstrators to police stations, the police rounded up those they could catch as the rest went underground.

Subsequently, very heavy sentences were passed on those leaders who had surrendered themselves for arrest. There was considerable damage done to property in the southern locations of Johannesburg, but in time the police regained control of the situation and forced the PAC underground. The ban made it extremely difficult to operate efficiently.

According to reports attributed to him, which circulated freely in the country after Ghana had sent to Basutoland a certain Mr. Barden—said to have succeeded the late George Padmore in the Office for African Affairs—Accra had sent a considerable sum of money to Basutoland for relief work among the

dependents of the jailed or of those who had been killed in the PAC demonstrations. Nobody knew precisely how the South Africans had used the money passed on to them from Basutoland; some of it had reached a few dependents, but nobody knew precisely the purpose to which it had all been put. A lot of friction developed among some of the underground PAC leaders on the use to which this money should be put. In the mudslinging that followed, the reason slowly emerged for the unexpected switch in PAC attitudes toward the status campaign.

Ghana had always been most encouraging in her understanding of the PAC position. She had been ready to provide money for relief work, it was said, but when she learned of the status campaign she criticized it as an absolute waste of time. She was for a frontal attack on apartheid and expected the local whites to panic, as the Belgians had done, and yield ground. Ghana was in a very advantageous position at this time, for her prestige among all political organizations of the African people was very high. She had just called the successful, morale-boosting Accra Conference, and most oppressed Africans were sincerely grateful for this declaration of solidarity. Besides, Ghana was willing to give moral support to the PAC and provide money for relief work among their dependents.

It would be unfair to Ghana to say she used her tremendous influence to force unwilling PAC leaders to change their minds on the status boycott. Most members of the PAC executive committee suddenly cultivated an inexplicably naïve belief that a determined show of African strength would shake the government so badly that in six months Verwoerd would be forced to negotiate. So confident were they of success that they committed themselves to the No Bail, No Fine, No Defense slogan; but after the heavy sentences, it was most mortifying to their friends and sympathizers when PAC leaders sent urgent appeals from jail, asking that they be defended and that their cases be sent on appeal. But at least one man in Vereeniging (where the Sharpeville shootings had taken place) refused resolutely to be bailed or defended. That man was Thomas More.

One of the most important lessons of the PAC campaign was

that any determined demand for reform would continue to be regarded by the government as an act of treason, to be answered with shootings. Whether a peaceful demonstration of unarmed men, women, and children or an attack on property, the government would give only one answer—the bullet. This confronted African political organizations with a problem. In the face of determination to use force to curb any demands for the sharing of political power, how did the unarmed man go about ensuring justice for himself?

Two traditions had emerged during the first fifty years of the Union. One school of thought had continued to regard the assertion of African initiatives as the factor that would extend the area of freedom. Mgijimi, the ICU, and the PAC had belonged to this category, and they had suffered the greatest violence from the state without showing any gains. The other regarded values that transcended race as the essential unifying factors; their approach was basically realistic and evolutionary. To a large extent, the ANC had belonged to this category, as well as Tengo Jabavu and, later, the Convention. This school had suffered less violence from the state, but it had not won any concessions either.

On balance, most African political organizations had not set out to use violence. Since they did not have access to arms, it would have been suicidal to choose to fight on ground where the government was strongest. And after Union, the emphasis had progressively been on nonviolence. The laws that made their way into the statute books made it clear, however, that a government that was not responsive to moral and other peaceful pressures would regard any insistence on nonviolence as a sign of weakness, as an encouragement to pursue more oppressive policies. To insist on nonviolence was to be ineffective, in short. At the same time, evidence was piling up everywhere in Africa that only after violence of some type had occurred did the British, whose system of government and whose maintenance of the color bar had something in common with South Africa's, begin to yield ground.

The issue of yielding to apartheid was out of the question. The

Africans had fought for their land for centuries. When they were defeated on the battlefield, they had simply decided to carry on the fight in other ways. Even after Union, they had stopped at no sacrifice to obtain justice; for asserting their determination to be treated like human beings, they had been shot freely in almost every part of the country. They had been jailed and exiled; men and women had been torn from their loved ones and sent to remote corners of the country to break their spirits. How could people who had fought with such determination yield?

Three ways out of this dilemma offered themselves. The Africans could resort to overwhelming demonstrations of non-violent power; they could consider rebelling; or they could undertake violence to property as a compromise between the other two.

For nonviolence to be effective in South Africa, however, there has got to be a measure of freedom to assemble or to travel, a large army of disciplined volunteers, and a measure of responsiveness to peaceful or moral pressures on the part of the government. None of these conditions exists any longer. This applies with particular force to the African, for the pass laws have been tightened in such a way that the police can trace the movements of a person virtually from day to day. So fine is the net that in a city like Durban plainclothes police search people in broad daylight on the streets, and there is hardly a corner in central Johannesburg where Africans are not stopped to have their passes checked. The government keeps an hour-to-hour watch for any challenge to its authority. The growing volume of refugees leaving the country and the large number of banned or exiled people, as well as the number of political prisoners and of political cases before the courts of law, all indicate that the state is so much on the lookout for trouble that the organization of massive, nonviolent demonstrations would be an invitation to defeat. Smaller shows of strength could be easily suppressed by shootings.

Sharpeville showed so clearly that mass nonviolence leads to

shootings that there is no longer any enthusiasm among the Africans for fighting on ground where they always lose. There would not be the morale to keep people together in demonstrations that produce disaster every time they are staged. Even a stay-at-home has its disadvantages; in Cape Town, for example, after the PAC antipass campaign, the police went from house to house beating up men and women in efforts to break the strike. The feeling grows in the African community that nonviolence might already have had its day. Luthuli still thinks that it can be used effectively, but he no longer has the majority on his side on this specific issue.

As things now stand, rebellion would have a very powerful emotional appeal. The humiliations over the years, the race hatred and oppression, the deep sense of grievance, and the drama of a determined bid for freedom all create emotional responses that favor a rebellion. But for it to be anything but an invitation to butchery, the Africans would have to possess arms, and they would have to be trained in their use. Pondoland recently showed that it takes time to train men in the use of arms, and both the guns and training in their use are out of the question in South Africa today. But rebellion would have to be ruled out for another, very important reason: It would deteriorate rapidly into a racial blood bath, in which the African would surely suffer the heaviest losses and costliest defeats.

In between these two extremes, there is violence to property. A growing number of Africans view property control as an expression of the power of the race oppressor, since it is used to perpetuate injustice. Its destruction would reduce the state's potential for using force as an answer to agitations for reform. It is the Achilles' heel of the ruling group; by striking at it, the country's economy would be shaken. This, in turn, would ensure, as nothing else could, the equitable distribution of suffering, for it would force attention on the urgent need to give positive answers to demands for reform. Apart from minimizing violence to the person, it would be the only effective way of fighting a de-racialized war with any hope of success.

Africans had fought for their land for centuries. When they were defeated on the battlefield, they had simply decided to carry on the fight in other ways. Even after Union, they had stopped at no sacrifice to obtain justice; for asserting their determination to be treated like human beings, they had been shot freely in almost every part of the country. They had been jailed and exiled; men and women had been torn from their loved ones and sent to remote corners of the country to break their spirits. How could people who had fought with such determination yield?

Three ways out of this dilemma offered themselves. The Africans could resort to overwhelming demonstrations of non-violent power; they could consider rebelling; or they could undertake violence to property as a compromise between the other two.

For nonviolence to be effective in South Africa, however, there has got to be a measure of freedom to assemble or to travel, a large army of disciplined volunteers, and a measure of responsiveness to peaceful or moral pressures on the part of the government. None of these conditions exists any longer. This applies with particular force to the African, for the pass laws have been tightened in such a way that the police can trace the movements of a person virtually from day to day. So fine is the net that in a city like Durban plainclothes police search people in broad daylight on the streets, and there is hardly a corner in central Johannesburg where Africans are not stopped to have their passes checked. The government keeps an hour-to-hour watch for any challenge to its authority. The growing volume of refugees leaving the country and the large number of banned or exiled people, as well as the number of political prisoners and of political cases before the courts of law, all indicate that the state is so much on the lookout for trouble that the organization of massive, nonviolent demonstrations would be an invitation to defeat. Smaller shows of strength could be easily suppressed by shootings.

Sharpeville showed so clearly that mass nonviolence leads to

shootings that there is no longer any enthusiasm among the Africans for fighting on ground where they always lose. There would not be the morale to keep people together in demonstrations that produce disaster every time they are staged. Even a stay-at-home has its disadvantages; in Cape Town, for example, after the PAC antipass campaign, the police went from house to house beating up men and women in efforts to break the strike. The feeling grows in the African community that nonviolence might already have had its day. Luthuli still thinks that it can be used effectively, but he no longer has the majority on his side on this specific issue.

As things now stand, rebellion would have a very powerful emotional appeal. The humiliations over the years, the race hatred and oppression, the deep sense of grievance, and the drama of a determined bid for freedom all create emotional responses that favor a rebellion. But for it to be anything but an invitation to butchery, the Africans would have to possess arms, and they would have to be trained in their use. Pondoland recently showed that it takes time to train men in the use of arms, and both the guns and training in their use are out of the question in South Africa today. But rebellion would have to be ruled out for another, very important reason: It would deteriorate rapidly into a racial blood bath, in which the African would surely suffer the heaviest losses and costliest defeats.

In between these two extremes, there is violence to property. A growing number of Africans view property control as an expression of the power of the race oppressor, since it is used to perpetuate injustice. Its destruction would reduce the state's potential for using force as an answer to agitations for reform. It is the Achilles' heel of the ruling group; by striking at it, the country's economy would be shaken. This, in turn, would ensure, as nothing else could, the equitable distribution of suffering, for it would force attention on the urgent need to give positive answers to demands for reform. Apart from minimizing violence to the person, it would be the only effective way of fighting a de-racialized war with any hope of success.

One of the most important arguments used in favor of violence to property is that fewer numbers of people would be engaged in it. They could be trained singly or in small groups without attracting too much attention, and the training would be reasonably simple and take a relatively short time. If the need arose, every African could become a saboteur using the lit match against anything inflammable that belonged to the white side. Finally, it is said, there is infinite scope for reprisals and an almost unlimited choice of targets.

Since rebellion can be ruled out as impracticable, the real choice remains between massive nonviolence and violence to property. As will be shown in the chapter on the uncommitted African, large sections of the African community have already made their choices underground. That is where some of the most decisive battles against race oppression are now being decided.

12 • RESERVES OF POWER

THE pattern of race oppression in South Africa is such that hardly a decade has gone by during the last hundred years without a bloody clash between one section or another of the white authority and one African group or another. The legislative programs of successive governments since Union have been increasingly oppressive. All this has led to a degree of anti-whiteism among the Africans that should by now have made South Africa a veritable inferno. That this is not the case is, to most people on the white side, one of the most baffling features of the race crisis. The African who crosses the color line to make friends with the whites is not murdered—nor is his house burned down. These friendships, as well as nonracial organizations, flourish now more vigorously than at any other time in South African history.

It is true, of course, there there is a lot of hatred for the government. The armed risings that have occurred in the reserves since 1948, when the present regime obtained power, and the frequent murders of police—in some of the larger locations policemen patrol the streets only in heavily protected cars—show how strong the feeling is against the group that upholds the temper of the slave owner. In some locations, it is unsafe for white people to be on the streets after sunset. On the other hand, Alexandra Township, the most politically advanced and the most militant African township in the country, allows white people to move in

and out practically at every hour of the night. I once drove into the township in the company of a friend, Dr. Alan Friedmann of Johannesburg, who is now in Britain; at almost every corner, a voice would shout, "Hullo, doctor!"

When everything has been taken into account, it can be said that the area of mutual understanding and good will between black and white is almost as wide as that of hatred. The explanation for this lies in the peculiar reserves of power possessed by each one of South Africa's racial groups and the rather unique way in which these have interacted in the relations between black and white within the last three hundred years. For the purposes of this chapter, these reserves might be divided into three categories—those which influence thought and action on both sides of the color line, African reserves, and white reserves.

Cultural homogeneity is the most important single influence upon conduct on both sides of the color line. By going to John Philip's reserves, the African converts announced that they had rejected the ways of the tribe and had elected the culture of the white man and its norms. Race discrimination limited their chances for a full life in the white man's world; because it attacked the individuality of the black man, however, it awakened in him a keen appreciation of individuality and developed a strongly humanistic bias. As a result of these early Christian efforts and subsequent economic developments, a large and strong class of Africans has grown that has more in common cultural ties with the whites than with the tribesmen. Therefore, the African community is divided into two major groups—the Westernized and the tribal.

This cultural polarization within the community generates fierce tensions. The tribal mind sees the white man from the perspective of race—as a foreigner, an oppressor, who is inscrutable, lives in a world that cannot be understood, and can only be feared and hated. The Westernized African is not a stranger to the white man's world; he has a working understanding of the motivating urges that stir deepest in the white bosom, an intelligent appreciation of the values that give meaning to life in

the white man's world. To him, the white man is an ordinary person, like every other individual in the African community; he can be loved or hated as an individual.

These conflicting attitudes tend to have a moderating effect on each other. While the tribesman would want to drive all whites into the sea, he is never certain what the Westernized sections would do. Deep in his heart, he does not really trust them. Since he is aware of his weaknesses, he feels himself at their mercy, for they understand the ways of the white man, they can deal with him best. The Westernized African, on the other hand, does not trust the tribesmen: They are always the first to betray him to the white man; their values are not his. Because both face a common enemy, the angularities in their outlooks have an inhibiting effect on their behavior.

On the white side, the divisions are on the racial issue itself. The racialist reserves his worst venom for the nonracialist, the *kafferboetie*, who crosses the sacrosanct color line to rub noses with the "niggers." If he had his way, he would erect special jails where all white liberals would be subjected to medieval torture until they realized that earth does not have anything dirtier than association with Africans.

The nonracialist does not take this lying down. While driving in Johannesburg with a white friend, I saw a white girl sitting in an ancient Ford Anglia driven by a young African sporting a beard. She held a bottle of gin in front of her, almost at the level of her eyes for all passers-by to see. She was defying convention very aggressively and putting the law in an impotently bad temper. First of all, it is not correct for a decent white girl to go out with an African boy; second, it was then a crime for an African be found in possession of liquor. She was deliberately holding the bottle very high in an African's car for those who might care to speculate precisely on what her mission was.

This was, of course, an extreme case. But the nonracialists defy both convention and the law as a matter of policy in ways that throw the racialists into perpetual convulsions in every stratum of white society. For the racialist distrusts and fears the non-

racialist. He believes the nonracialist is the traitor who will sell out to the "niggers." The consequent tensions make it impossible for the whites to stand together as a group, united and determined to protect their superior position.

Thus, on both sides of the color line there are the aggressive racialists and the determined nonracialists. Many of them worship the same cultural gods, their race notwithstanding, and the only real difference is that the African nonracialists are in a very powerful position in their group, whereas their white counterparts are very much weaker. The result is that no racial side has absolute solidarity. To escape from the tensions that continually rock the group, the individual often leaves it to seek communion with the like-minded on the other side of the color line. This often involves a defiance of racialism on both sides. The girl who buys the gin for the boy is matched by the boy who drives her into the location in broad daylight, defying every municipal regulation and offending his group's racialists by bringing an "enemy" into their camp.

These excursions have hazards that many people find at least emotionally satisfying. The violation of the legal code to respect a moral law has its own compensations in a society whose racial laws are devoid of moral content. A form of solidarity develops, which derives its appeal from the novelty of the experience, its force from the upholding of moral law, and its permanence from an enhanced feeling of security. The people who have gone through this experience work zealously and continuously for the breakdown of the color bar and for the neutralization of race prejudice. Having escaped from the tensions which constrict the growth of the personality and tasted the new life in which it is enlarged, they find themselves at an advantage over their opponents. The fact that moral law is on their side enables them to keep their enemies on the defensive. But one very obstinate fact of African life which springs from the factors just outlined is that any attempt at developing a collective racial attitude will split the community in two. It is a fact every intelligent political or religious leader or social welfare worker knows only too

well, and African opinion draws the distinction between white enemies and friends.

Another influence at work on both sides is the common humanity black and white have. More often than not, the relationship between the domestic servant and her employer's family is deeper than that which the contract prescribes or the law permits. It has been developed to the point where both sides see each other from the perspective of human beings, bound together by a common interest, and sometimes it reaches the plane of mutual attachment. A classic illustration of this reserve of power is provided by the African employee of an Indian family who threw himself into the flames to save his employer's two children in a burning house during the 1949 Afro-Indian riots. He saved the little girls but died in the process. At the time, the relations between the Africans and the Indians were strained beyond the breaking point, and African group solidarity in Durban was at its height. The house had been set on fire by Africans.

On quite another plane, this reserve produces rather unexpected results. The Afrikaner policeman who enforces the Immorality Act, the DRC clergyman who preaches against the sin of miscegenation, and the highly placed officer of the Nationalist Party responsible for the Act often find themselves almost crushed by the tensions which are continually worked up to preserve Afrikaner solidarity. To escape them, at least for a time, some risk their good names by crossing the color line to feel that common humanity that only the clandestine embrace of an African woman in the backyard of a white home can give them. The experience opens up an entirely new world for the prisoner of racial tensions. Having tasted the consequent enlargement of his personality, he wants to have it again and again. The court records of South Africa show how widespread the demand for this experience is among the highest members of the Afrikaans community itself.

The third influence working on black and white alike, one that is never given the importance it deserves, is the support of the politically valuable colored and Indian minorities. Since the

1930's, when the Convention first spoke of non-European unity, African nationalism and its Afrikaner counterpart have been involved in a fierce struggle to win over the coloreds for different but equally powerful reasons. The Indians were courted at a much later period, and the courting then was less dramatic.

Since the whites comprise a numerical minority, they have long wanted to win over the coloreds to their side, for together they would be too substantial a minority to be pushed into the sea. But it was not until the 1949 riots that the role the Indian could play as a buffer between the white man and the African became clear. When the African racialists got out of control, they directed the impact of their fury against the Indian, when, basically, it was the white man they were angry with.

Finally, however, Afrikaner nationalism has come to realize that African nationalism is going to lead the country through a long period of economic crises and industrial disturbances. If colored and Indian good will can be gained, these communities will at least keep the essential services going to enable the army to deal effectively with the African revolt.

The African does not need the coloreds or the Indians for he has his numerical strength. But he needs their loyalty; for if the race-conscious whites could be isolated from every section of the nation, they would be appreciably weakened. The coloreds, who have blood links also with the African, could even be a source of additional strength, and the Indians would remain a valuable lever with which to stir up outside opinion against Afrikaner nationalism. An Indian community forever shouting loud protests against Afrikaner nationalism could be a very good advertisement for African nationalism among the millions of Asia, especially since both the colored and the Indians are incredibly allergic to any form of racialism.

We now turn to the African's power reserves. In terms of numbers, the Africans constitute the largest population group. Roughly, there are about four to every European, eleven to every colored, and twenty-two to every Indian. They are concentrated mainly in the urban areas and in the rural reserves,

the rest being scattered among the farms. The point of heaviest concentration is the Witwatersrand industrial area.

Numerical preponderance gives the African, first of all, the advantage of remaining the country's economic backbone. All sectors of the economy need his labor in ever increasing numbers. Apart from a greater purchasing potential, this key advantage places him in the position to use strikes and boycotts very effectively in the fight to extend the area of liberty. Second, the security of numbers has protected the African from the fear of extinction. Although survival is not his problem, it has tended to retard the growth of a virile group consciousness. Yet, the black man is in a more advantageous position to view the problems of the country without being affected by racial fears.

The disparity in black and white numbers ensures that the majority could inflict the maximum amount of damage on the economy with the minimum of sacrifice. Any African carrying a box of matches could be a menace to the supremacy of the white man, for the police would not be able to round up every African responsible for sabotage. By the simple technique of forcing the white man to deploy, over the widest area possible, his military and economic power, the African could seriously weaken his reserves. A major strike conducted simultaneously in every town of the Union would pin down the army and police and leave the rural reserves practically free to do what they liked. Finally, in the event of war, the government's participation would be rendered fairly useless. If four-fifths of the population were actively disloyal, the government would be powerless to make decisive contributions.

The second power reserve is that moral law is on the side of the African. By opposing race oppression and upholding the dignity of the person, the rule of law, the right to free expression and assembly, and the equality of men, the African has given moral content to his struggle. Therefore, the white community can no longer hold the Bible in one hand and the gun in the other and continue to march into the future as a united group. The more so since the African has already shown—in the

ideological splits effected within the white community, the third of which affected the United Party after the internal and external economic boycotts and the fourth, the Nationalist Party after the revolt of the Bassonites—that he will not allow this to happen.

In response to moral pressure, a group of Dutch Reformed Church theologians wrote a book entitled *Delayed Action*, in which they tore apartheid to bits on Christian and scriptural grounds. This was not just a retreat to a safer position of political power; it was a serious attempt to face the moral challenge posed, among other things, by the African's insistence on giving to Christian values the same meaning on both sides of the color line. How serious the step of the theologians was emerges clearly against the background provided by the history of Afrikaner nationalism and its insistence on dual meanings in the church and the state.

This reserve of power enables the African to take up a more convincing and therefore more powerful position on the issue of the Cold War. His antipathy to totalitarianism springs from his long experience with it in his own country and from his protracted fight for freedom. The moral values he has consistently upheld in this situation are the exact opposite of those accepted by the Communists. Dr. Verwoerd's regime, on the other hand, is as totalitarian as the Communists' in its handling of the non-whites. For it to claim to be a natural ally of the West is almost meaningless, if not embarrassing, to the free world. It makes the side which apartheid supports suspect.

One of the results of World War II was that humanity emerged from it with a sharpened sensitivity to injustice. For a long time, the world had believed Hitler when he said the Jewish problem was a domestic German matter. By so believing, the world connived at the basest abuses of the human personality that the mind of man has ever conceived, and the result was a war which brought untold suffering and grief to millions of innocent people. The lesson learned was that injustice to the individual anywhere was a threat to peace everywhere, and the United Nations was established as the specific expression of this

awakened moral sense. The concern with South Africa's race problem is in no way whatsoever a reflection of world hatred for the white citizens of the republic. On the contrary, the world is merely being sensitive to a situation which has in it the seeds of an ugly racial war and is therefore directly concerned about the maintenance of peace. Indeed, the African's consistently humanistic line has made things very much easier for the world. The black man's refusal to be provoked into a racial reaction has been proof of his political maturity, which has created a deep impression among all decent men and women.

The last category of reserves available to the African is the strategic, for South Africa is the economic gateway into sub-Saharan Africa. Whoever ultimately controls it, as the tide of liberation rolling from the north has made only too clear, has the ideological initiative to influence the course of events in this vast and potentially wealthy part of the continent. The Africans who have won their liberty state that their freedom is neither full nor secure while apartheid remains the dominant influence in the republic. Real fulfillment for them rests in working for the liberation of the Africans of the Union. Again, this is not because the Africans hate the whites of the Union; it is because apartheid constitutes a standing insult to every man of African descent and a direct threat to his security. White supremacy is incompatible with African sovereignty.

The emergence of African states has been a tremendous morale-booster in the African community for two reasons. The black states are expected to be emotionally involved in the fight against apartheid in a way few, if any, white countries can be expected to be. From them, it is said, ultimately will come the decisive assistance no white country could really give. Since the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and the rest of Europe are all white, they cannot be expected to fight against their kinsmen in Africa with the same determination that the Africans would display. This help could take one of many forms or combine them all—diplomatic pressure, economic boycott, moral and material support, or, above all, the provision of arms and training.

The large number of young men who leave the country illegally are not all of them adventurers eager to make better use of their lives in free countries; some are patriotic Africans who hope to get military training for the day when they might settle accounts with the Verwoerd regime.

Second, the African states are expected to use their independence to exert direct pressures to break apartheid's back. In a world where Africa remains the only place with the largest bloc of uncommitted humanity, it is natural that the Iron Curtain countries and the Western democracies go to great extremes to win African support. This gives to African good will the character of a precious commodity whose price is still rising in the world. Dr. Verwoerd is in no position to give this commodity to anybody, and surely not to his followers. Only the Africans can give it to whomsoever they choose, and their price is the immediate destruction of apartheid. And this, in turn, raises the African's potential to influence events—while that of the white community diminishes.

The extent to which these power reserves have been built up is shown very graphically in two recent developments. Externally, African diplomacy has, since 1913, set itself the goal of isolating white South Africa. The Union Africans now feel powerful enough to have showdowns with the Union Government on given planes. There has, for example, been the long and fierce battle in the United Nations in which the white authority has had one humiliating defeat after another. Then there was the major showdown during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. The Union's Prime Minister obviously went to London under the impression that his white skin and his boast that he is a genuine enemy of Communism would shield him from African attacks. He found that inside the Conference apartheid was viewed with repugnance by people on both sides of the color line, and this repugnance was so strong that Dr. Verwoerd was compelled to withdraw his application for membership in the Commonwealth. It was a major defeat on a major battlefield. It demonstrated, as clearly as could be done in the circum-

stances, that the African now controls strategic reserves of power, which, when deployed in given situations, can confront apartheid with the reality of disaster. This is real power in the hands of the African.

On the other hand, the process of isolating the supporters of white supremacy has led to the organization of international boycotts that have lost South Africa valuable markets and good will. These took a lot of time, energy, and money to procure and build, but capital is now being frightened off from South Africa.

The policy of buying time to build up power reserves has often and rightly been criticized as costly and slow to produce results. But today there is no doubt that it has begun to pay dividends, for it has placed the African in the very unique position in which he can start giving serious consideration to the possibility of choosing the ground on which to force a showdown with apartheid. The initiative to choose is at last in his hands. The fact that African initiatives could push South Africa out of the Commonwealth without bringing the Verwoerd Government crashing to the ground shows the very peculiar way in which the power reserves balance the relations between black and white. On the day mankind understands the laws according to which they work, the solution to the problem of race adjustment everywhere will be in sight.

This brings us to the white man's set of reserves. These can be categorized as economic, cultural, and military. Caledon's Hottentot Proclamation of 1809 forced the integration of the African into the white man's way of life by destroying the pastoral-agricultural economy of the tribe. Since then, industrial growth has transformed the African into a proletarian living largely on the cash wage earned in the urban areas. He is no longer a unit in a balanced society, since he has to leave the tribal area and venture into the towns where life is affected by influences that have very little in common with those in the tribal community. He has to acquire the habits of regular application, of working for a fixed period, and of obeying orders for the purpose of achieving a certain end; he has to realize that maximum productivity means

a better wage and a greater capacity to earn his living. These new experiences remold his attitudes, and they give a new meaning to life. Even the laws of hygiene he has to observe make him see men and events from a totally different perspective. Therefore, when he returns to the tribe, he is already a stranger to it. His heightened sense of individuality makes him a misfit, like hundreds of thousands of men and women on the tribal reserves today. The result is that tensions have developed in the mind of the tribesmen, which find ready expression in armed resistance to governmental authority in the reserves. It is not an accident that the use of arms in opposition to government policy—that is, on anything like an organized scale—has come almost exclusively from the reserves. But the point at issue is that the white man's economic requirements have so shattered the tribal system from within that the African's *own lines* are no longer there. Fulfillment for the black man can no longer be in the form of life led by his ancestors, and yet the advocates of apartheid insist that tribal life has scope for a better existence for the African. It just makes no sense whatsoever.

About one third of the African people lives in the rural reserves, one third on white farms, and the remainder in the urban areas. Yet the continuous and increasing demand for labor on the farms and in industry has denuded the reserves of large numbers of able-bodied men and left them in the hands of women, aged men, and children, whose ability to work the soil productively is limited. As a result, the reserves are so poor that they cannot support their own third of the African population. Even if millions of rand could be sunk into rehabilitating them, there would still remain the poverty of the remaining two-thirds of the African population to deal with. The strained relations between the government and the tribesmen, which are virtually endemic in the reserves, are but protests against the grinding poverty in these areas.

This poverty is a lever used to force the tribesman into the white man's towns and farms. When he is there, his poverty compels him to accept whatever wage he is offered. He is not

in a position to do much about his fate in this setup, since influx-control regulations are such that if he makes a nuisance of himself he can be thrown out of the towns and forbidden to enter any urban area at all. The pass laws regulate his movements twenty-four hours of every day of his life in the white man's towns, and the police have the right to enter his room at any time of the day or night to check on his behavior.

This system of checking is airtight. In the reserves, the Bantu Authorities are being introduced. These keep a sharp watch on the people. The men who serve on them are carefully screened and approved by the government, and the chiefs have been given wide powers over the men and women they must keep tractable. The result of all these elaborate precautions is that the white man remains assured of his cheap labor while his superiority is not immediately threatened; the "proper relations between master and servant" are maintained.

The people on the farms are the poorest and the most backward in the African community. They give the impression that some spark has gone out of their lives, that their spirit of resistance has been broken. The great risings against the authority of the white man and the massive demonstrations designed to weaken apartheid both in the rural and the urban areas have come almost exclusively from the tribal reserves and the urban areas. The reason for this is that these people have been torn away even from the crumbling tribal life, are rejected by the white man's world, and yet are forced to use their blood and sweat to bolster his economy. They are so much at the mercy of the farmers and the police that whatever security they have is that granted them strictly by the farmers.

The urban proletariat is the most progressive section of the African people. It has made the most consistent attacks on white domination and organized the most protracted campaigns. It has evolved its own, clearly recognizable philosophy of struggle and political traditions. Unlike the people in the reserves and on the farms, this section is almost exclusively dependent on the good will of the white location superintendent not only for its

being in the urban area but also for its having a place to sleep by night. The control is so perfect in South Africa that the white ruler has arrogated to himself the right to say where the African must sleep.

A new factor becomes observable in the locations—the systematic crushing of individuality. The locations are not designed as residential areas for human beings with different temperaments and preferences; they are meant to be reservoirs of labor in which the enlargement of the personality will be kept to a minimum. The houses are built according to one monotonous pattern, with straight streets to facilitate troop movements; and the hut in which the university lecturer lives is like that of his neighbor, the gravedigger; there is usually a high steel fence surrounding the location. Entry is by means of a pass, for movement into and out of the location is controlled. Outside the location, the police check to ascertain whether or not any African has the authority to be in the white man's town; if he cannot produce a pass to show that he should be there, he is presumed to be a criminal and arrested.

In the Transvaal, the government has started destroying the propertied communities in the urban townships—as distinct from the locations. In places like Sophiatown, Alexandra, and Lady Selborne, the Africans are being forced by law to sell their properties, leave the towns, and establish themselves in the locations where they are issued not the title deeds they had in the townships but certificates of occupation to make them more amenable to the discipline of the location superintendents. They are allowed to build houses according to their own plans.

The urban wage itself is designed to “preserve the proper relations.” With very few exceptions—and these are being wiped out steadily by job reservation—it is not enough to enable a man to bring up a family, buy the necessaries of life, and provide good educations for his children and security for himself in old age. It is intended to provide him with the minimum requirements for physical existence. He earns a special wage because he is an African, not because of his skill. The Indians and the coloreds

earn on a slightly higher scale because they are neither African nor white. The highest pay is always reserved for people with a white skin. Finally, the African is debarred by law from developing his skill beyond a certain point. No matter how able, he cannot be an engine driver on the railways, and in the gold mines he is barred from certain jobs because of his race.

All these factors combine to give large sections of the African population feelings of insecurity and dependence; to give reality to the fear of being starved or thrown out of the location to the streets and from there sent on to the dreaded potato farms.

On the cultural plane, policy aims at allowing the African access to some of the material forms of the white man's civilization. In short, he must observe its conventions: He must go to school, where he learns to read and write; he must go to church; and he must learn the habit of consistent application by working to earn his living. He must wear Western-style clothes, use a water latrine, and travel by train. These are necessary to keep him a good servant. However, those things that give real meaning and content to the white man's way of life—respect for individuality, the right to liberty and self-expression, the right to develop his personality to the best of his ability—must not be given him.

The distinction here is a very important one. The republic's government always complains bitterly that its critics ignore the tremendous contributions it has made toward African progress: Magnificent hospitals, schools, and university colleges. These contributions are not to be denied, but they are significant precisely because they are designed to make the African a good servant and not a well-developed human being who is the intellectual equal of his white countryman. They are the visible expressions of an immoral attitude toward life; but when the attitude itself is criticized on moral grounds, it is a waste of time to take them into consideration. The Ngoye university college for Zulus in Natal may have first-class buildings; it may have the most highly qualified and experienced academic men on its staff. But this is not the point at issue; what matters is the policy these

men have to carry out, the type of citizen, the personality, they must produce. As long as policy aims at preserving "the proper relations," Ngoye is a cynical waste of public funds. As long as the African wage is an instrument of racial policy, the huge hospitals (which are complemented inevitably by the large cemeteries in the locations) are the visible symptoms of the inner spiritual rottenness that is the essence of the temper of the slave owner. Poor people need money to buy themselves better food. It is poor consolation to them to show them magnificent hospitals.

Just as the economic system of the tribe has been destroyed, so the cultural pattern has changed. There has emerged in the place of the old an amalgam compounded of traditions from the African, Oriental, and Western ways of life. My family, for example, speaks Zulu; we eat curry and rice; and one of our most enjoyable experiences is listening to the music of Beethoven and Mozart. The culture of a people is a living reality, through which is expressed the desire to make life worth while and better. It lives because it breathes the spirit, the life-force, of a living people. Unlike economic systems, it cannot be destroyed unless it be with the consent of the people who uphold it.

For generations, the African has been subjected to systematic pressure to adapt himself to the demands of surviving in an environment in which the temper of the slave owner was the dominant influence in national life. In order to do this, he evolved a cultural pattern whose inspirational sources were rooted deeply in the African and European experiences of life. This is not a compromise between the West and Africa. It is a new way of life, with its own pulse and dynamism. It will make its own impact on human history and civilization. Like that other reality in South Africa, the colored, the African's cultural pattern is a direct product of contact between Africa and the West. The colored is physically like neither of his parents. In the same manner, our pattern is neither Western nor tribal. It is a new entity, giving new content, form, and direction to life. Just as the colored cannot change the fact of having descended from black and white, so our culture cannot divorce itself from the sources of its inspiration without the destruction of the African people.

What some Africans regard as a cruel dilemma emerges from this. In his bid to eliminate white supremacy, the African has to be careful to ensure that he does not destroy the white person and, ultimately, those sources of his inspiration that are distinctly white. For spiritual sustenance he has always had to look as much to his sources as to those from the white side. If he destroys the white community, he might crush its sources of inspiration and therefore thwart or warp the development of his own personality. He might surrender the influence to mold his life to those who impose ethnic grouping on him to destroy his history and his finest achievements. He might repudiate the symbols that stand out as monuments to his industry and wisdom. In the final reckoning, he might destroy the African people and ultimately prove that apartheid is right. In short, he has to justify himself on terrain that is not of his choosing, and his is a cruel dilemma in a situation that treats no community with pity.

The Afrikaner has his own dilemma. He has evolved apartheid to guarantee himself a place in the African sun; but in so doing he has exercised forces that make an Afrikaans diaspora inevitable unless there is a sudden change of attitude. It might be heroic for the granite mind of the Afrikaner nationalist to contemplate a scattered existence among the nations of the world in order to justify apartheid. For the average Afrikaner man or woman, however, it might mean an exile and a degree of suffering to which humanity could not afford to be indifferent.

The Jews could scatter to the four corners of the earth because there was moral content in their cause. In the final analysis, their Jehovah was the God of Mercy. Man had been created in His image so that he should strive to be like Him. The struggles of the Jews constituted one unfolding process of evolving toward God-like perfection, wherever they were. This motivating urge was a liberating influence. It worked for the continuous enlargement of the Jewish personality and it enabled the Jews to make their fair contribution to every field of human endeavor and in that way insured their survival. The Jews survived because they gave.

The doctrine that *die wit man moet baas bly* is restrictive. It narrows perception of the truth. In this doctrine, reality is not an

infinite complex, which man is forever understanding in increasingly clearer light; it is a static whole, which must be seen and understood only from the perspective of the fundamentalist dynamic. In this setup, the truth ceases to have an objective or intrinsic or absolute validity; it has that meaning imparted to it by the requirements of survival. Supreme virtue reposes in its heroic acceptance, not in reality.

This has obvious dangers. It restricts and then distorts the growth of the personality. It creates an attitude of mind which confuses right and wrong and finds it hard to draw the essential distinction between political necessity and moral right. The result is a constriction of the personality that can only spell disaster for the Afrikaner people. A diaspora in these circumstances would lead to the destruction of the community itself and its culture. What point would there be in allowing Dutch Reformed Church mission stations in Nyasaland, Nigeria, or elsewhere in Africa if the Afrikaner missionaries were committed to the ideal that *die wit man moet baas bly?* Nigeria and Nyasaland might, in the not distant future, ask DRC missionaries to close down their schools and return to South Africa in protest against the immorality of apartheid. This would be a moral defeat for the Afrikaner Christian. If the Afrikaner had to face this moral challenge wherever he went and if he had nothing else to offer but the heroic approach, his future would be in jeopardy. History allows a people to survive only to the extent that it is prepared to grow in mind and in spirit.

Viewed objectively, the destruction of the Afrikaners would be a major tragedy not only for them but for humanity as well. Each time a human group fails to measure up to the requirements of living peacefully and fruitfully with its neighbors, humanity is the poorer for the defeat.

The emphasis is being put on the Afrikaner here because it is from his side that the most determined advocacy of the temper of the slave owner comes. The British support his racial policies up to a certain point. If the moment came for the whites to be driven out of South Africa, the British would go to other parts of the Commonwealth. The Afrikaner would literally have no-

where to go. This serves to underline the tragic nature of his position.

To return to the African's dilemma: His cultural borrowings have taken such deep root in his life and they go back for such a long time in history that for him the struggle to reach the moment of fulfillment is no longer basically racial. For him, it centers largely around irreconcilable values of life. The clash is no longer between black and white; it is between a philosophy of life that sets the greatest store by the group and another that attaches maximum importance to the individual. He has built up a whole tradition, a whole life, and, indeed, a political philosophy on this belief.

Most people on the continent find it hard to understand all this. When I was in Accra for the All-African People's Conference in 1958, West Africans often told me that I and other South Africans they knew were not Africans. They said we did not *think African*. When I visited Swaziland recently, I was informed by highly educated Swazis that the black South Africans in the protectorate conducted themselves as though they were black Europeans. There was no malice in all this. People who had been brought up in accordance with the ideals and beliefs of an environment they regarded as African could not understand how men of their own race could think differently or belong to a different cultural world.

They understand only too well why the Negro is a black Westerner. He was captured as a slave and forced to live in conditions in which he lost almost everything cultural he ever took with him from Africa. He had no choice. He had to become a black whiteman. They do not see how an African majority, which has fought for almost every inch of its land as we have done within the last three hundred years, can have attitudes that are different from those of the majority on the continent.

The answer, of course, is simple. The white man settled in our country in such large numbers and was so armed that after defeat we faced the prospect of being wiped off the face of our land if we did not adapt our life and thinking realistically to the demands of the changed situation. We could do this in one of

two ways. We could abandon everything in our own culture and set ourselves the ideal of becoming black Europeans. British policy at the Cape had begun to move in this direction by 1852, when a nonracial franchise was granted. Or we could, after fighting heroically to maintain our independence in the face of overwhelming odds, decide to create for ourselves a new pattern of life based on our experience in history. It would be inspired by borrowings from our culture and that of the conquering white man, to insure our survival. We decided on the latter course. The result was that we evolved a cultural pattern that was no longer tribal and that, at the same time, could not be European. It was unlike anything history had seen before. Go to any African capital and you will promptly notice that our music has a distinctiveness all its own. We do not say it is superior to anybody's; we merely say that it is uniquely our own, born of our peculiar experience of life—the unique creation of the human mind forced to survive in unique conditions.

We had to develop a somewhat eclectic outlook on life to enlarge our personality. We had to do this or face disaster. In the process, we learned the hard way that the things which really endure in human experience are the values of life that give content to existence for man. We realized that race and color had no inherent value in themselves. We may have been politically right in adopting this attitude; we may have been wrong. Our justification is that this attitude ensured our survival and has now placed us in such a position that we have, with these bare hands of ours, finally isolated apartheid from the family of civilized nations.

The sense of realism that was to develop from our new view of life naturally encouraged the emergence of new attitudes toward our relations among ourselves, toward our relations with the non-African minorities, and, for that matter, with the other peoples of our continent. As a result, substantial numbers of Africans in the republic draw a sharp distinction between the meaning freedom should have in South Africa and that which it has in West Africa, for example. In the latter area, it is said, the climate was of such a nature that the whites could not settle in

large numbers. They came for specific purposes and periods, and upon retirement they tended to return to cooler zones. The climatic factor discouraged the growth of substantial white minorities with deeply vested interests in these countries, and that militated against too wide an area of acculturation. Thus, when the spirit of revolt against white domination rose, the whites did not have as many reserves of power as they had in South Africa. Because of this, African nationalism could interpret freedom to mean the transfer of sovereignty from the white authority to the indigenous community. This we might call the Saharan Approach.

Quite a different set of circumstances existed in southern Africa. The temperate climate allowed permanent white settlement. Economic and other factors attracted large numbers of whites from Europe, most of whom cut off their links with their countries of origin. The Afrikaners even gave up the Dutch language; the Huguenots did not want to have much to do with France and French culture; and the British, when Dr. Verwoerd finally forced them to choose between their own people in the Commonwealth and South Africa, elected to become political beggars in Verwoerd's race-conscious republic.

These communities developed a sense of nationhood that differed in important essentials from the European conception. The differences were the result of their experiences in the African environment. They belonged to Africa and developed attitudes that, popular or not, were valid only in the African environment. They had deeply vested interests of all kinds; Afrikaans poetry, for example, has derived endless inspiration from the beauties of the veld. All these roots tied them almost permanently to the African soil. Very many of them would have nowhere to go if they were thrown out of Africa, for there are no communities with the same lingual or cultural ties. Hence, they occupy a position that, in important respects, is similar to that of the Negroes in the United States and South America. In addition to all this, they have developed reserves of power that necessitate a realistic approach. Apart from the moral and humanistic aspects, they can justify their sense of belonging to Africa. They

present a problem that does not allow of solution by the methods adopted in Ghana or Nigeria.

In West Africa, freedom could have only one meaning—the transfer of power from the foreign authority to the inhabitants. In South Africa, the problem is quite different. To develop the democratic tradition, many Africans maintain that freedom must mean the sharing of power, wealth, security, and opportunity on a basis that will give free scope to the will of the majority without threatening the survival of the minorities. In practice, this will mean the free sharing of power on a nonracial basis in a society where race and color are no longer factors of political, economic, or social significance. This approach we shall call Capricornian Realism.

Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika has faced the problems presented by a mixed community and arrived at the conclusion that where race antagonisms exist, the coordination of group initiatives in a nonracial society is in the best interests of all concerned. This is the line Seme and Dube laid down for the Union Africans in 1912.

To many Africans of the republic, the danger of seeing in the Saharan Approach the only solution for all African countries lies in the fact that it might produce a polarization of attitudes in the continent, which might divide the peoples of Africa into two camps—the advocates of the Saharan Approach with its southern connotations of expelling the white “foreign minorities” and the supporters of Capricornian Realism, who believe in the coordination of race initiatives. Such a division at this stage would play into the hands of the Verwoerds and the Welenskys and in that way retard progress toward real freedom. What the times call for in this field, it is said, is a flexible attitude that recognizes both the Saharan Approach and Capricornian Realism as legitimate expressions of Africa’s desire for freedom and encourages both as African responses to the same challenge in different situations.

This flexibility is of vital importance to South Africa and, probably, to the rest of the continent. It opens the doors wide to all the peoples of Africa to work together for the liberation of

the continent and, after victory, for the pooling of their resources to raise their standards of living with the minimum of delay. In this gigantic task of reconstruction, there will be need for all the reserves of power owned by all the peoples who have made Africa their home. And how deep this feeling runs can quickly be made clear: If one stands up in an exclusively African meeting to say these things, one gets cheers, so strong are the reserves of power.

The last group of reserves is the military. The machine that the white man has established to secure his dominance can be divided into two sections—the police and the army. Both are unique in one respect, for they are organized, trained, and oriented to regard themselves as the first line of defense of one section against the other. This means, of course, that South Africa is a nation at war with itself: On the one side is the small white minority and, on the other, the overwhelming majority of the Africans. The coloreds are giving serious consideration to the idea of taking sides with the Africans, and some Indians are attracted to the prospect of making friends with the rulers of tomorrow. Between the two main opposing sides are the police and the army, to keep the peace.

In both forces, elaborate precautions are taken to ensure that in moments of crisis the initiative to influence events under no circumstances slips into African hands. In the police force, the African cannot rise to any position higher than that of a first-class sergeant. As in the army, where he is always a noncombatant, so in the police force he is forbidden to carry firearms—except in situations where such carrying, as in some of Johannesburg's locations, becomes the only means of ensuring the supremacy of the white man.

In the locations, the police behave like an army of occupation, since they are free to enter any house and search it without a warrant. They are the most heavily armed police force this side of the Iron Curtain and outside of the dictatorships. Their main task is not to protect the citizen and uphold the law, but to ensure that "proper relations" are maintained between black and white. The accumulated experience of operating tyrannical in-

stitutions down through the ages is at the disposal of the South African police, and they use it to perpetuate one of the most vicious tyrannies man has ever invented to limit his neighbor's freedom.

Although they readily involve themselves in private wars with the Africans—as in Witzieshoek, Zeerust, and Pondoland—knowing beforehand that Parliament will indemnify them, they are merely an instrument of policy. Ultimate power reposes not in them, not in the cabinet or Parliament, not even in the electorate or the Afrikaner people, but in a secret society, the Broederbond, which wields a sinister, cabalistic influence on the course of events in the republic.

The Broederbond is the true custodian of the Piet Retief tradition. It controls the government and, to some extent, the Dutch Reformed Church. Through these, it influences parliament, the universities, the army, the police, and every phase of South African life. If, tomorrow, the Broederbond decided that apartheid should be scrapped, it would not be long before it was erased from the Statute Book of the country. That, however, is unlikely, for the strength of the Broederbond lies not so much in the number of its members as in its inflexible determination to keep the Afrikaner master on his terms at any cost. But a warning should be sounded here: The Broederbond is not holding a peaceful and innocent Afrikaans people in thrall; it merely expresses, with the greatest degree of clarity and the fiercest determination possible, the motivating urges that stir deepest in the Afrikaner nationalist bosom.

It will be seen from all the foregoing that the reserves of power interact in the South African situation in a most peculiar way. No group can impose its will on the others indefinitely without being hurt. In spite of his dominance, the Afrikaner has not been able to solve the race problem on terms that suit him. In spite of his numbers, the African has not been able to destroy white supremacy.

13 • THE UNCOMMITTED AFRICAN

ONE visible effect of the reserves of power on the various nationalistic groups that came into being during the first fifty years of the Union was the acceleration of the process by which they were divided into two groups. One side favored a realistic approach to the race problem, while the other preferred the heroic. This arose largely from acceptance and nonacceptance of the values that gave content to life in the white man's world.

Although the African National Congress developed African initiatives to alter the balance of racial power reserves, its policy in practice was guided by a deep-seated respect for realities. The policy of buying time to build up reserves of power was an acknowledgment of both the weaknesses and the potentialities of the African. The ICU, like Bambada before it, was ready to take the offensive on any plane where there was the possibility of embarrassing the white authority. It believed, or acted as though it believed, that the masses would become militant in proportion to the number of challenges hurled at the race oppressor. As long as the two moods were differently motivated there was the certainty that nonviolence would remain a significant factor in the race crisis. The conflict between the realistic and heroic approaches would project peaceful solutions to the fore as the feasible bases of unity, and this would certainly remain the case also as long as the power reserves were balanced in the white man's favor.

During the course of the fifty years after Union, a number of factors combined to alter the balance of power in the African's favor. Apartheid's refusal to listen to peaceful appeals for change, and its inability to respond positively to constitutional demands or nonviolent agitations for reform, narrowed the gulf between the two moods of African nationalism. The Cold War raised the value of African good will, and the emergence of African states and the Accra Conference all combined to bring the reserves to parity.

One very important result of this was that when the white authority, as was its habit, shot the Africans at Sharpeville in 1960 to assert white initiatives, the gulf between the two moods was bridged. A new harmony in the voices raised from both sides of the gulf became noticeable. Criticism of peaceful methods was bolder, for increasing numbers of people argued that mass nonviolence was an incitement to state violence. There tended to be general agreement that the only answer was protracted majority violence. In short, a change was taking place in the thinking of the African: At last, the heroic and realistic sides had begun to see the race problem from reconcilable perspectives. When Luthuli called for a day of mourning for the death of Sobukwe's followers, the realists and the heroicals—to coin a word—could then think alike on strategy. For them, the moment had come to start speaking and acting firmly.

Their main problem was how to do this. The Consultative Conference of African leaders, which met at Orlando toward the end of 1960, was to some extent an attempt to find a solution acceptable to all sides. Most of the delegates who accepted invitations to it hoped that it would furnish them with the answer they were looking for. For the heroic side the answer was simple—assert group initiatives decisively in a major challenge to apartheid. The former members of the PAC stated that they were particularly interested in positive action against race oppression. The realistic side did not find it as easy to provide the answer. For a long time, they had been nurtured on traditions that rejected racial initiatives. From insistence on a principled struggle

and a program of action, they had gone on to preach that values of life with a similar validity on both sides of the color line were the only desirable and effective bonds of unity in a mixed nation. Unlike the heroic side, they doubted the wisdom of the African "going it alone." That, they feared, could very well degenerate into racial fundamentalism on the African side. Coordinated intergroup initiatives were what they would have liked to have been able to prove to be the answer.

But they faced serious internal difficulties. The multiracialists in the Congress movement and the nonracialist liberals, for example, were handicapped by the fact that the like-minded of all races did not all have similar economic interests. This fact aroused different responses to particular lines of action. The only logical weapon the realists could use effectively—because of their outlook and their composition—was mass nonviolence. To do this, though, they required time, money, and emotional effectiveness, especially if the heroic side was one of their rivals. Not having these in sufficient quantities made them largely impotent in the face of urgent challenges; for wherever it became possible to procure arms, the advocates of the heroic line would certainly capture the initiative to influence events.

Another cruel dilemma was emerging. It was becoming clear that the day was not far off when the choice before South Africa would be between the guerrilla with a grenade or gun in his hand and the saboteur with a box of matches in his pocket. The "extremist" would be the guerrilla; the "moderate," the saboteur, so violent and extreme were the contradictions in the race crisis.

The startlingly significant fact in all this was that apartheid's intransigency had pushed both the heroic school and the realists, the "extremists" and the "moderates," to the point where they both virtually accepted violence as the only potential means of making an impression on the white ruling minority and the government. The only real problem that remained was whether it was going to be violence to the person or to property.

After the collapse of the stay-at-home strike, which the Consultative Conference had been originally called to organize for

May 29-31, Nelson Mandela, who had suddenly emerged from obscurity to be "recognized" as national leader, announced that the days of nonviolence were over. He added ominously that the oppressed would consider other ways of struggle, and nobody in the ANC movement leadership repudiated him. He was merely making public a change in attitudes that had already taken place in the underground, and the acceptance by substantial sections of the African community of violence as the instrument without which change could not be brought about marks one of the critical turning-points in the history of South Africa. This could very well be true of Africa, since nobody knows for certain how Africa's millions would react to another bloody explosion in the republic. Finally, an important point to note about the change in attitudes is that it is precisely what the Communists had waited and hoped for during a period of nearly forty years.

It is at this point that the so-called uncommitted African enters the picture. In South Africa, the African was born into a situation of inescapable involvement. Some, Dube, and their contemporaries were mainly the products of mission schools. The world they wanted for themselves was to be based on democratic values as understood in the West, for the spiritual and intellectual umbilical cord of their generation was in the West. Emotionally and physically, they lived in a world where the temper of the slave owner was the dominant influence. The consequent dichotomy in the life of the African was to constitute, to a large extent, the state of being uncommitted.

In large parts of Africa, neutrality entails no congenital involvement. Intellectually and physically, the people belong to Africa. But in South Africa, cultural integration has gone too far, for too long, for the black man to experience no conflict between his present environment and his intellectual or spiritual preferences. This makes involvement a far more serious matter in the republic than in any other part of Africa. When a large group that has spiritually chosen a life based on values that have meaning in the Western world is forcefully turned away from its path, in order to perpetuate a tradition that is foreign

to the free world, then there is bound to be conflict. When the African democrats say that apartheid is the best recruiting agent Communism has in the republic, this is what they mean.

In this situation, commitment has a variety of meanings. Apart from embracing the Communist doctrine, it entails agreeing to respond to particular situations in prescribed ways. It involves moving intellectually or emotionally from a previously occupied ideological position to its opposite. It is a form of political proselytization and not a conversion. In the category of responses, the preference for violence and involvement might be included, by implication at least. The latter is a form of adjustment dictated by the laws of the country, which make the profession of Communism a crime; consequently, commitment is not a dramatic happening like baptism or death—certainly not for groups. It tends to be a gradual, almost imperceptible process of change in habits of thought, in behavior, in attitudes, and, of course, in reacting to given situations.

If we use this definition for purposes of ascertaining the changes taking place in the mind of the African, it will become clear that the acceptance of violence implies the rejection of a cardinal principle of Western policy in Africa. Both Western Europe and America have gone to great pains to keep violence out of the South African crisis, certainly out of the African's mind. The fact that their efforts have failed does not necessarily mean that Communist values have been accepted; it does indicate that a valuable tactical position has been lost, that a security vacuum has been created, which waits to be filled. And it shows that a climate of opinion has been created which surrenders to the Communists the tactical initiative to influence events on a vital plane. They, in turn, will find it easier, from now on, to work in a community whose thinking is becoming oriented toward violence. Apartheid is responsible for this. Accordingly, the Communists are gearing themselves for effective action in the more propitious circumstances created for them by Dr. Verwoerd and his followers. How they are doing this will be demonstrated in the section on Communism.

The security vacuum is the most disturbing danger sign this side of the point of no return. A key people in sub-Saharan Africa have been exposed to conditions that might make their association with the free world increasingly difficult. The Communists themselves are not responsible for this; rather, the republic's government, which claims on all occasions to be a friend and ally of the West, is doing it. To the uncommitted African, the real danger in this setup is not the loss of tactical initiative: It is that a vacuum has been created, which threatens his freedom (if he has it) or destroys his chances of getting it (if he has not won it). It may limit his area of fulfillment and impose on him one more European-made destiny that will cramp the free development of his genius. It may rob freedom of content. Nkrumah and Nyerere are of one mind in their hostility to this threat.

This throws into bolder relief another view of the security vacuum. It need not be seen exclusively from the angle of disaster, for its existence is also a challenge that must be accepted. What may be lacking is an economic, cultural, spiritual, ideological, or political security. Where the gulf between poverty and wealth has followed racial lines for a long time and where political security has been denied on racial grounds, the safest precaution, for some time to come, is to start by filling the economic and political sides of the vacuum. A super-Marshall plan for Africa, administered preferably by the United Nations, is one idea that deserves consideration, since it could be useful in slowing down the processes accelerated by apartheid. On the political plane, democracy has to show that it produces quicker and better results than Communism in the fight to extend the area of liberty. If it merely saturates the air with admonitory unctuosities when apartheid frustrates life's purpose for millions of people right under its nose, then it is repeating Nero's blunder—with a vengeance.

The problem of commitment might be seen also from the angle of the continent and the perspectives from which the African views his destiny.

The two moods of African nationalism have their roots ultimately in man's experience on this planet. The most dominant factor in this experience is the individual's desire to make the best possible use of his life—the urge to live. When the anthropoids abandoned their homes in the trees of the primeval forest, they did so because an arboreal existence offered them only limited opportunities for making the best possible use of their lives. The dangers that man faced in his new abode, from animals, floods, disease, and his neighbors were such that in order to survive he gave up the individualism of arboreal life for life in the caves. Among the trees, life had centered around his own individuality; his personal quickness of mind, agility, and resourcefulness were his primary guarantees of safety. But survival in the caves called for the development of different qualities. Since the troglodytes might suddenly find a dozen bears snarling at the entrance, they had to recognize the need for collective action, for collective defense. The tribe and its disciplines emerged. For maximum efficiency, of course, the new unit had to be compact, disciplined; it had to accept leadership. The individual had to surrender much of his personal freedom in order to build up the solidarity and power of the group. These were more reliable guarantees of security and survival.

But when life in the caves became inadequate and unsatisfying—when, in other words, it no longer enabled man to improve himself—he went to the valleys where he could till the soil when game was scarce. He met others placed like him. His leaders increased their power over him, and in time they appointed themselves permanent heads of their tribes. Their positions and those of their allies, the priests, became hereditary. The chiefs had come into being. During the winters, when game was scarce, man could sit down, sharpen his tools, sew his clothes, exchange experiences with his neighbors, and, also, think. Thought has been the most potent weapon against dictators right through history.

In the meantime, the demands of survival were making the tribal states an institution that made growing inroads on the

liberty of the individual. The chief, his relatives, and his supporters were becoming a group within the tribe, the distinguishing feature of which was its possession of power. The ruling group used this power to strengthen its position at the expense of the individual. But as man began to think about his problems, he challenged the priests, the chiefs, and the kings (who had emerged from the more progressive states). He wanted to reduce their power, since it narrowed his area of fulfillment. So the great conflict between the individual and the group developed in full force, and it was to affect the entire course of human history. At every stage, the group insisted on narrowing down the individual's area of freedom in return for the protection it gave him, but the enlargement of the individual personality that resulted from this clash necessitated a change of strategy on the part of the group. As soon as it felt called upon to vary its techniques for controlling the individual, it developed classes within the group, all of which specialized in the suppression of the individual's liberty. They were in time to fight among themselves for dominance, but that is beside the point.

From the long conflict between the individual and the group, there arose two traditions—the one that set the greatest store by the individual and the other that attached maximum importance to the group; the one which saw fulfillment for man from the perspective of the individual and the other which viewed it from the angle of the group. History is but one long and unbroken record of the conflicts between the two traditions. The side upholding the rights of the individual was to produce the tradition we describe as democratic, and the totalitarian outlook was to develop from the other.

When the white man came to South Africa, the individual African was quick to see in those values of life that had the same meaning on both sides of the color line a better guarantee of security and a safer road to fulfillment. For him, the acceptance of these values was the wise thing to do. So he became a Christian, broke away from the tribe, and went to live in the community of believers on the mission station; and because he no longer had the

might of the group behind him, he developed the instinct for respecting realities.

The tribe, on the other hand, was a defensive organism and a machine for attack. Its job was to protect itself, to ensure its survival. When the white man came with the Bible and the gun, threatening to sow evangelical dissension in its ranks for the purpose of shooting it into submission when it became weak, it rejected him and the divisive values of life he brought along. It despised and hated the traitor who crossed over to the side of the white man; when possible, it killed him. Seme's family belonged to the refugee group that had fled from the Zulu kingdom because the king no longer thought it good to have converts among his subjects. These people fled until they settled down in the Inanda mission station. And because the tribe or the group had power on its side, it saw men and events from the heroic perspective.

When the white man finally conquered, he treated all black men alike, whether or not they had accepted his values of life. The nonacceptors blamed the acceptors for the defeat and vice versa. The one side thought its approach better and more effective than the other's and refused to abandon its own. The differences became so acute that in later wars between the African and the white man the acceptors took up arms on the side of the latter against their own kith and kin. In short, spiritual links were proving stronger than blood connections. When Cetshwayo fought the British, for example, African Christian communities furnished the British with men. This was as long ago as 1879! And these were volunteers! From all this, there developed the two moods of African nationalism in South Africa.

This element of dualism is one of the most remarkable characteristics of African nationalism in Negro Africa. Nowhere does it manifest itself as clearly as in the two interpretations of freedom referred to in this study as the Saharan Approach and Capricornian Realism. Geography does not have much to do with the differences between the two; it is largely a question of self-interest and temperament. In West Africa, just

next door to Ghana, Houphouët-Boigny has projected himself to the fore as an ardent Capricornian Realist, one who attaches importance to the individual and the values that give content and meaning to life. In South Africa, the PAC saw in the Saharan Approach the first and last revelation of the truth, for it lays the greatest stress on the group and its power.

Nkrumah has made most Africans believe that his ideal of a free Africa is the creation of a vast, monolithic state within which the African personality would be the dominant influence. This is not the idle dream of an idealist; it is an end that can be attained—given the leadership, the courage, and the determination. There is no valid reason why an inspired African cannot do for the continent what Karl Marx did for Communism. But to keep this vast empire together would present its own problems. Some Negro Africans might not find much scope for fulfillment in a world dominated by the African personality—just as some whites find a world dominated by the white personality crushing. History teaches that the racial personality can sometimes be viciously tyrannous, that it can damage the individual personality and stunt its growth. In a world torn in two on the issue of evaluating the human personality, stress on race or the power of the group could quite conceivably accustom millions to thinking of themselves only in terms of the group. If this happened, freedom and fulfillment would be seen from the collective perspective.

Here, again, the adoption of the group approach would imply the rejection of a cardinal democratic principle—that the individual has a sacredness that makes it imperative that he should be governed by consent. In itself, this would not imply an acceptance of the Communist ideology. But an Africa that saw things from the perspective of the group would be more amenable to another type of group approach—that of the Communists. It would all be a question of habits of thinking. The Pan-Africanist, for example, might regard himself as an ardent democrat. If, however, he encourages his followers to see themselves as a racial group, if he teaches them to see their future from the angle of

group fulfillment, there is always the danger that when the Communists start working up group pressures against him he will be poorly placed, tactically and morally, to steer events toward his goal of freedom. The African personality and the Communist personality are irreconcilable. His difficulties are not made easier by the fact that in the conflict between African nationalism and colonialism, the West hesitates to give immediate, effective, and decisive help to those who fight for the extension of the area of liberty.

The moral, therefore, is that if there had been no free Ghana or Nigeria, for example, the chances are that South Africa would have remained a distinguished member of the Commonwealth. She would probably still be given all the honor and acclaim accorded a perfectly respectable Western democratic nation.

But then, the failures of the West are no yardstick by which to measure our own moral stature. They are no beacons by which to direct our march into the future. They are no argument for paving the way for the Communists—unless, of course, the African personality is but an imitation of the European personality, with no vitality of its own. The uncommitted African has his own criteria—his capacity to achieve, his moral dimension, and the world he is creating for himself. He is a new type of individual, bringing with him a fresh outlook on life. He wants to play a new role in a new type of civilization. He wants the opportunity to prove his worth, to justify himself, to serve in nobody's ideological kitchens. For him the Communist and capitalist stereotypes are too rigid and inflexible to allow for that enlargement of the human personality that would take him to his moment of fulfillment. He is suspicious of any policy that might tie him hand and foot to one side of the ideological fence or the other.

On the other hand, Capricornian Realism—like the Saharan Approach—takes note of the common historical experience of the African Negro. It holds, however, that fulfillment for the black man, whose humanity was outraged and whose personality was damaged as a matter of policy for centuries, cannot be

achieved in an African version of the white personality. It can only be achieved in the ideal of emancipated man enjoying the liberty that is his birthright, and being free to make the best possible use of his life as an individual. He might be black, brown, or white—the color is not important. He must be free to draw for his development from the vast experience man has accumulated during his sojourn on this planet. What matters vitally, above everything else, is the human personality, because in the final analysis, the only personality that is real is the human.

The Capricornian mind would rather have federations of countries with contiguous borders and common problems. If need arose for greater aggregations a Commonwealth of African States would be preferable.

The two moods of African nationalism are realities in the twentieth century. They are the ingredients that keep African nationalism a motive power, and they synthesize into the march to freedom. In this process, Houphouët-Boigny is as real as Nkrumah, occupying as honorable and patriotic a position. If, for him, freedom can be understood from a different angle—say, in closer collaboration with France—the African statesman will not shout against this in tones to awaken the dead. He will see in it the expression of the varied genius of a great people preparing itself for the task of leading civilization in its next jump into the future. This is a cardinal principle of uncommitment.

Many fears have been expressed about Sekou Touré's alleged flirting with the Communists. There is no convincing evidence that he wants to narrow down the area of freedom by tying his people to the coattails of the Soviet Union. Like every African statesman, he is impatient to see the scourge of poverty removed from the life of his people. If Marxist formulas hold the key to success for him, we should ask ourselves if Western democracy demonstrated to him its proof of effectiveness, if, indeed, it still can. One of the most loved and respected sons of Africa, Leopold Senghor, has often warned that the distinction should be drawn between Marxism as understood by the socialist, on the one hand, and the Communist, on the other. The latter, he has often said, is not acceptable because it works for the restriction of freedom.

Capricornian Realism, like the African personality, is as African as anything can ever be. To denigrate it in efforts to throttle it, or to cast African thinking into a racial mold, would mark the moment of failure for African statesmanship. A new era of wars would have been opened. Freedom would have been won to be betrayed. For, African nationalism will always have its two moods. It is right and desirable that this should be the case. The alternative would be a collective racial mind. When this nationalism has served its purpose—we shall not have use for it forever—and when freedom and security are no longer in danger, the two moods will continue as the conservative and radical wings of African opinion.

What the times and the situation call for is an African Accord, a community of feeling, an organic relationship, which will remove race hatred and suspicion and rely for its success, not on dehumanizing compulsions or the odium of excommunications, but on its ability to give proof of its effectiveness. This, in the view of the uncommitted African, would extend rather than limit the area of African unity. This Accord would be neither a neutral force nor a compromise between Communism and capitalism. It would be a new phenomenon on the world stage, but it would have its roots in the African's common historical experience. Content would have been given to it by a variety of inspirations—some African, others Occidental and Oriental. Its motivating urge would be to see the individual reach the moment of highest fulfillment. It would be based on a political, economic, and cultural eclecticism that combined the best traditions in the human experience and from these produced a new amalgam. The composite whole would be the best expression of the African genius, on the one hand, and, on the other, would give content to that type of democracy that would best satisfy Africa's hunger for freedom and security.

This is the goal the uncommitted African has set himself. His friends will be those who help him move toward it with the minimum of delay, and not those who push him to one side of the ideological fence or the other. He has his own purpose in life.



PART

III

COMMUNISM—A COMPLICATING FACTOR



14 • ALLY OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

WITH the exception of South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet had a serious Communist problem. The main reason for this is that contact between black and white has not been of long or permanent duration. Consequently, most countries in this region were not developed industrially with the degree of enthusiasm the whites have shown in the south. If this has been advantageous—by not developing a complicated race problem—for these in some ways, it has also retarded the growth of an urbanized proletariat. The high degree of industrialization in South Africa has, over the generations, produced a large working class—probably the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. This, in turn, has attracted Communism in ways the rest of the African people find difficult to understand.

In the pages that follow, an attempt will be made to show how Communism has affected the struggle of the African people against race oppression. In a sense, this is a unique story because it dispels many popular illusions, both inside the country and beyond its borders. This is the primary reason why a section on Communism has been included in this study.

The second reason is that the government of South Africa regards all its opponents as Communists. To throw the net as widely as possible, Parliament has already, in the Suppression of Communism Act, stated that it recognizes Marxist Communism and Statutory Communism. According to this definition, any-

body, even a Roman Catholic archbishop, who says apartheid is wicked is a Communist. If, however, the archbishop attacks apartheid strictly on moral grounds, then he is merely an agent of the Communists.

This technique of smearing people is useful in two ways. First, it enables the government to persecute all its opponents without raising too many storms in the outside world. America, for example, does not utter a word when a Communist is locked in jail. He might be a right-wing reactionary of the worst type possible; but if he is branded a Communist, America is through with him. This helps to keep the free world in that position of relative neutrality that makes shootings like the ones at Sharpeville and in Pondoland possible. Second, the government needs a whipping boy for the purpose of continually stirring up the tensions without which Afrikaner solidarity would crack. It has to show from day to day that the Afrikaner people are threatened by a sinister, revolutionary movement directed from Moscow.

In passing, it is not without significance that a few devoted Communists have made it impossible for the government to neutralize them or to silence them. In the Soviet Union, recalcitrant groups are easily disposed of; but in South Africa, the elimination of the Communist threat through the law courts would deprive Afrikaner nationalism of its most valuable political whipping boy. So, the Communists must be allowed to lurk somewhere on the outer periphery while the government deals effectively with the real enemy: African nationalism.

The third reason for including Communism in this study is that it is a force working according to its own pattern to influence events in a particular direction. No study of African politics in South Africa would be balanced that ignored its important role in the race crisis, for Communism functions very curiously in South Africa. In one mood, it is the sworn enemy of African nationalism; in another, it is the self-proclaimed friend of liberation. Since 1921, when it formally entered the political arena, it has followed a policy of sharp and costly zig-

zags, which has made it the firm ally of Afrikaner nationalism at one time and of African nationalism at another, and has finally transformed it into the enemy of both.

The events through which this pattern unfolded were influenced by two important considerations—South Africa's phenomenal industrial growth and the strategic position she holds as the halfway port between Asia and the West on the main sea route linking them. These factors combine to make the republic the main gateway into sub-Saharan Africa. Whoever controls South Africa has tactical mastery of this part of the continent. The second consideration is the race factor. Nowhere on the continent is the policy of race oppression pursued with a greater degree of determination than in South Africa. Although oppression provides Communism with the opportunity to project itself to the fore as a liberating influence, the emphasis on race creates awkward challenges. The white working class is the avowed enemy of the African proletariat, and apartheid derives its most determined support from the white proletariat. Since the Nostradamian prophecies of Karl Marx often tend to fall to pieces in a situation like this, recourse has to be made to expediency and policies of drift. The history of Communism brings out this fact more clearly than any analysis.

By 1915, splits had begun to develop in the socialist movement in this country. The socialists were at the time a white movement; if there were any Africans involved, very few people knew it. The formation of the ICU in 1919 made it clear that there already existed a politically conscious proletariat for whom Communism could be the immediate doctrine of salvation. The socialists resolved their differences and, in 1921, formed themselves into the Communist Party of South Africa, to spearhead the working-class revolt against capitalist domination.

The Party started with a rigid color bar. It admitted to membership only people with a white skin. But this betrayal of Marx was, strictly speaking, a tactical move to avoid hurting the sensibilities of the race-conscious white proletariat. The underlying belief—which de Mist had held as well—was that the processes

which the Party would set in motion would tend to liberalize opinion and destroy race prejudice more effectively if the Party shut its doors to the African. One circumstance which reinforced this approach was the fact that social intercourse between Africans and the Europeans was limited. The African middle class had not been out of its embryonic stage for long, and literacy was still the privilege of the relatively few.

The adoption of the color bar did not mean, however, that the Communists were indifferent to the plight of the workers on the African side. When trouble developed, they came along with help; when strikes or lockouts occurred, they organized soup kitchens, distributed food, and encouraged the Africans. On the other hand, the white worker had been conditioned in such a way that he distrusted any political party that did not say specifically that it was determined to uphold the "proper relations between master and servant," which Piet Retief had sworn to preserve. This circumstance was to force the Communist Party to follow a policy of zigzags with disastrous effects on the unity of the African people.

The first major move was made in 1922. That year, the white workers of Johannesburg were involved in a serious dispute with the mine owners. Strikes and disturbances spread over large parts of the city. Smuts, then Prime Minister, called in the army. Martial law was proclaimed, and it was not until blood had flowed that the white workers' rising was suppressed. In the elections that followed, the Communists joined hands with the Afrikaner nationalists and the mainly English-speaking Labor Party to throw Smuts out of power. In their view, Smuts was the agent of the capitalists. To vote against him was to strike a blow for the Marxist revolution, even if it meant returning to power a coalition the senior partner in which was committed heavily to the Retief tradition and the temper of the slave owner.

The Nationalist-Labor coalition took over the reins of government under Hertzog. Because it had never concealed its dislike for the African, it initiated legislation at once to narrow the area of freedom for the blacks. But with Afrikaner nationalism

in the seats of power and bent on imposing a racial dictatorship, while the ICU's influence continued to spread like wildfire, the Communists found themselves facing another awkward challenge. They had either to remain a small and ineffective white party or perch upon the crest of the wave of African nationalism. The Johannesburg conference of the party, which met in 1924, decided to abandon the color bar.¹

This change of position was significant. The Communists had helped Afrikaner nationalism to power during the elections. Afterward, they turned to the African and started working up pressures from below in the belief that Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism were the ingredients which, if encouraged skillfully and effectively enough, would one day collide with such violence that the consequent chaos would pave the way for the revolution.

But the attempt to collaborate with Afrikaner nationalism had convinced the Communists that the former was being driven by historical, emotional, cultural, and economic forces that threatened everything Marx had proclaimed to be precious. Afrikaner nationalism saw the truth, men, and events from the perspective of the group. Highest fulfillment for the individual lay not in his making the best possible use of his life, but in serving the ends of the group, the *volk*. The supreme arbiter between right and wrong was not the individual conscience but the *volk*, and the final goal was a closed racial state, membership in which would be determined by a prescribed yardstick—race, instead of merit. In essentials, the principle underlying this way of life was that the Communists stood for. They viewed reality from the angle of the group, or class, and the highest fulfillment lay in doing the will of the class. The individual had no real value of his own; he was important only insofar as he was a component unit of a collective whole, the masses. The real judge between right and wrong was “the people”—a mysterious entity

¹ Much of the factual material used in this chapter has been taken from *Time Longer Than Rope*, by Eddie Roux, an authoritative study of the Communist movement in South Africa up to the early 1930's.

symbolized in the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communism set out to establish a closed state, citizenship in which would be determined by one's economic status.

Collaboration with Afrikaner nationalism had been designed to achieve two other ends as well. Not only was it the implacable foe of British imperialism, but it seemed destined to quarrel bitterly with industrial capital because its own roots were in the rural countryside. Communism has always had a strong bias for seeing virtue in its enemies if they can be used to serve its ends. Therefore, Afrikaner nationalism's divisive role in the white community held out good prospects of creating perpetually unsettled relations in the ruling group, and this could be used to advantage at the right time.

The Communists also reckoned that Afrikaner nationalism's hatred for the African was a guarantee that it would awaken the sleeping black proletarian giant. It would then sting him into seeking to be free from the tyranny of race, finally force him to organize himself effectively, and forge his unity into a powerful force that would drive headlong to a collision with Afrikaner nationalism. The new darlings of the Communist Party were largely illiterate, however, so energies were devoted to organizing night schools. Since the law did not require this to be done under license at the time, the African workers were taught not only the three R's, but the ABC's of Communism as propounded by Bukharin.

The most important achievement of the Communist Party during this period, and the one which stands out today as the most positive, was to stress the importance of training skilled trade-union organizers. The ICU had started brilliantly as a trade-union organization, but because it did not have skilled workers, its affairs were not handled properly. When the inevitable crisis came, it was blown to pieces. The pioneering work it did would have almost come to an end, for a period at least, if the Communists had not stepped in to improve the foundations laid by the ICU. Since this involved them directly in African politics,

they were able to establish links with African political organizations during the formative stage. And this, in turn, gave them an experience of African political life which no other mixed group has.

Largely because the ICU was a working-class movement, and possibly because it was powerful, the Communists tried by infiltration to influence its choice of directions. A fair proportion of them succeeded, but when it became clear that they wanted to carry out instructions issued from Moscow, Kadalie gave them the boot. This was in 1926. In the meantime, the Communists were showering vilification on the ANC, accusing it of being led by stooges of the capitalists, bourgeois intellectuals, and a host of other undesirables. To counteract them in Cape Town, Professor Thaele fought a long, bitter rear-guard action. In Natal, however, where they produced their one (and probably only) martyr, Johannes Nkosi, they did not take firm root; although they were not spectacularly strong in Johannesburg, they established a powerful, closely knit organization.

Kadalie's action, however, forced them to concentrate upon the ANC, the only other organization they could turn to. Progress to the top of this movement was more difficult than in the ICU, for the African middle class, which was well educated, was suspicious of Communist intentions. And the men it had promoted to the top as leaders were mostly people of independent means. Therefore, a new technique was used to accelerate infiltration—a special type of political bribe. Selected young men were sent to Russia for advanced training in the leadership of revolutionary movements. Then, J. T. Gumede, of Maritzburg in Natal, was invited in his capacity as President-General of the ANC to attend the Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism in 1927; from there he proceeded to Russia, where he was taken on a tour of Soviet Asia. He not only returned to South Africa bursting with enthusiasm for the Soviet way of life, but he traveled up and down the country reporting on his visits. Wherever he went, he told the Africans that virtue lay only on the Soviet side. One of the most successful propagandists that

Moscow has ever had in South Africa, he paved the way for the Communists to infiltrate the ANC more openly.

The bulk of the African people, however, still remembered the antics of the Communist Party before 1924 and, in particular, its support of Afrikaner nationalism. They revolted openly against the line laid down by Gumede, and in the 1928 elections he was thrown out of office as President-General of the ANC. The Communists were furious. They had spent money on Gumede, taken him overseas to give him status, and now there he was, a lone figure in the political wilderness. After they had decided to teach the ANC a good lesson, they managed to split it in two by bringing into being a liberation league with Gumede as its first and last president. But when, as was their habit, they reported this to Moscow, Eddie Roux says, they were told to disband it at once. They complied in a hurry.

The ICU continued to grow in strength. Men and women from all walks of life flocked to it to buy the famous red ticket, and prominent citizens on the white side, including the Bishop of Bloemfontein, urged a more realistic policy toward it. The movement was receiving attention in Germany, where the Nazis viewed it as a threat to white supremacy. People in Great Britain were interested in it. The Communists did not like it: African nationalism was becoming too powerful, attempting to influence events by itself, without their guiding hand. This they would not allow.

The 1929 general elections in the white community were approaching. By that time, the Comintern had given instructions that the Communist Party of South Africa should remain a small group of the elite providing the leadership to sway the black millions of the Union toward Moscow. The Depression was showing on the horizon, and things were not going well in the white community. The Communists then produced their famous Black Republic Manifesto, in which they announced as their goal the establishment of an all-African republic in South Africa.

On the face of it, this was an attempt to outbid the ICU; at close range, however, it seems to have been the line dictated by

Moscow. In the colonial world, word had gone around that support should be given to the national aspirations of the oppressed. In the United States, the Communists were demanding the establishment of a Negro state in the south. Naturally, Hertzog promptly denounced the manifesto as an African attempt to drive the white people into the sea, as part of a world conspiracy by the Communists to destroy white South Africa. As was to have been expected, white opinion was electrified, and African nationalism got a terrific boost. In the elections, the Nationalist Party galloped to power with an absolute majority. The Communist manifesto had done its job: The ICU and the ANC had been punished.

Up to this time, not one recognized leader of the African community had ever wanted a racial state. Even the ICU, which had angular preferences on the race question, did not want a separate racial state or Bantustan. In any case, the Communists knew beforehand that they would stand no chance whatsoever of getting a hearing if they asked for a black racial state. All they could succeed in doing would be to unify white opinion behind Hertzog and give a new lease of life to Afrikaner nationalism in power. The people who would suffer most in this situation would be the Africans, for that, of course, would sting them into rebelling against the authority of the Afrikaner nationalist. So it was grist for the party mill.

As soon as he had achieved power, Hertzog gave the ICU a crushing blow. Since that produced catastrophic effects on the morale of the African people, the field was then left open for the Communists, who made a desperate bid to capture the support of the Africans by organizing the antipass demonstration in which Johannes Nkosi lost his life. In the meantime, Hertzog was completing his plans for the removal of the Cape Africans from the voters' roll. That forced Professor Jabavu to launch a nationwide campaign to save the vote and brought the All-African Convention into being. The Communists were instrumental in splitting it; at least, they had their fair share in the sad business.

When the elections came to the institutions set up by the Hertzog laws, the Communists put forward their own candidates. The underlying theory was that apartheid should be helped to drift with all possible speed to its absurd doom. At the same time, capitalistic platforms would be exploited for the propagation of Communist propaganda and the projection of Communist leaders as the real representatives of the Africans. A small party of the elite could exist, therefore, only to provide the brains or "bosses" of the African people's revolt against race oppression. Curiously, the Communist bosses were often men and women from the racial groups which did not carry the pass. Many of them were wealthy professional persons; some owned large farms, country estates, or large business establishments; and from their expensively furnished drawing rooms, they worked out strategy for the African to follow.

In the fifteen years following the abandonment of the color bar, the Communists had successfully laid a fatal trap for the ICU, shaken ANC solidarity, and split the All-African Convention in two. By 1939, there was no well-organized movement to mold opinion among Africans in any definite or effective way.

Although the Communists had also suffered in the disturbances of 1929—some of their leaders were banned or driven out of the country—the political paralysis that followed did not affect them as disastrously as it did the African organizations. They had one advantage: They were able to finance a press, which constantly kept Communist leaders and policies before the African people. This has been their strongest point in South Africa since then; week in and week out they have dished out news slanted their way with no effective replies from their opponents. Their papers were brilliantly edited, the news-gathering machinery was good, and the lay-out was often attractive. Not only did they give a fair picture of how apartheid really affected its victims, but they were smart enough to know how to circumvent the law and survive when every other paper in their class would have gone under.

At first sight, it appears ironic that Communism in South

Africa should have functioned in ways that sabotaged the African's march to freedom. Afrikaner nationalism had already evolved a number of techniques to achieve this end, for its legislative program is designed to keep the African in a state of permanent weakness in order to preserve Afrikaner supremacy. Communism complements this process by sowing suspicion and dissension in the ranks of African nationalism, by preventing the emergence of a strong, nationalistic leadership, which would lead the community to freedom on its terms.

It is not until we remember that apartheid and Communism are both totalitarian that the touch of irony is removed. The one wants the Africans to remain a colonial people to serve its ends; the other wants to dominate the thinking of the Africans so that they will commit themselves to its side of the ideological line.

15 • AFRICAN NATIONALISM SABOTAGED

AGAINST the background of war clouds on the horizon, the All-African Convention split in half. Communist propaganda took the line that the war would be a collision between two rival imperialisms, and as Hitler brought more European countries under his heel, the Communist press increasingly warned against participation. One of the reasons for such an interest in participation was that large numbers of nonwhites were joining the war to ensure that Nazism and its race consciousness was defeated. Even when Smuts refused to recognize them as active combatants, they still persisted in regarding enlistment as an effective form of protest against Nazi racialism.

But when Russia entered the war, the Communist line changed sharply: Then the war became the people's struggle against fascism. African opinion was shaken badly by this about-face. People wanted to know where the real loyalties of the Communists were; had they been good South Africans, they would have stuck to the line that was best for their people; yet on the entry of a foreign country into the war, the local Communist line had changed almost overnight.

By this time, the group of young men who were later to form themselves into the Youth League had emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Communist line. One of its cardinal objectives was to build up a stable leadership which would command the respect of the African's enemies and enjoy the com-

munity's confidence by its proof of effectiveness. The names of Luthuli and Matthews frequently came up for discussion in Youth League circles as they searched for the men who would be the symbol of the new spirit of resistance. The moment Luthuli won the backing of the Natal League, it became obvious that his way to the leadership of the ANC was clear.

As soon as the war was over, the League intensified its pressure for a definite stand against race oppression. Although the resistance movement of 1951 was launched in time, the long debates which preceded this demonstration are perhaps more interesting. For the Youth Leaguers regarded the campaign primarily as a tactical move to train the African masses in the use of peaceful collective action. Some of them selected this weapon for reasons of principle, but others said that expediency had decided the issue for them. At first, the Communists dismissed the idea of a nonviolent demonstration; but when it became clear that African opinion supported the resistance campaign, the line changed. They were heart and soul for a Gandhian campaign. In the meantime, they had worked hard behind the scenes to create a coordinating committee representing all the organizations behind the campaign. The acceptance of equal representation on it by the Johannesburg Youth Leaguers, who were coming increasingly under the influence of the Communist leader, Dr. Yussuf Dadoo, imposed severe strains inside the League. After the campaign, however, Communist pressure on Youth League unity was intensified. Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, and other Youth Leaguers visited Iron Curtain countries—with disastrous effects on Youth League unity. The consequent tensions led finally to the capture of the League by the Communists. And that was its end.

After the resistance movement, Communist policy stressed the need for action against race oppression rather than subversion of state authority. The idea was to stage dramatic stunts designed to administer continuous and indecisive shocks to the economy of the land in order to keep it in a state of chronic malaise. Anti-pass campaigns, boycotts, and mass demonstrations ensued. One

of the most famous and best organized of the latter was the secret trip of 20,000 women to Pretoria, without the knowledge of the police, to protest against race oppression. They demanded an interview with the Prime Minister, J. G. Strijdom, who found it convenient to remain securely behind barred and guarded doors. In all such protests, the idea was not to shock the government into making concessions—no Communist would be so naïve—but to impair the health of the country's economy.

These demonstrations were all said to have been organized by the Congress Movement. People who sat in the inner councils of this alliance stated privately that the ANC tended to accept instructions rather than to participate decisively in the formulation of policies. Dr. Wilson Conco, who was for a long time Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown gathering, in 1955, which produced the Freedom Charter; but on his return, he said he had seen the document for the first time at the conference. And Luthuli himself had not known who had drafted the charter. The coordinating committee of the alliance was, as a matter of fact, not the real originator of policy. The bosses of the underground Communist Party did the planning and made policy decisions. They approached men like Luthuli and other non-Communist leaders merely, in actual practice, to acquaint them with what had already been decided. One example will illustrate this point. Just before he went to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, Moses Kotane—the former Secretary-General of the Communist Party—traveled from Johannesburg to Groutville to inform Luthuli that he too was attending the conference. The latter, a key member of the ANC, was in no position to approve or disapprove; Kotane had come merely to inform him.

This remote control of the ANC was facilitated by the bans on Luthuli. The government had forbidden him to move outside the boundaries of his magisterial district. His head office was in distant Johannesburg. The Communists had successfully resisted pressure to transfer the head office to Durban, which was only about forty-eight miles from where Luthuli lived. Johannesburg

did not keep him as well informed on developments as they should have done. One case will illustrate this contention. When the government threatened to eject the Africans from Sophiatown, near Johannesburg, the ANC promised to lead the resistance. Luthuli, assured that the will to oppose government plans was irresistible, committed himself to the public statement, as a result of the advice he had received, that Sophiatown would be a Waterloo either for the ANC or the government. By this, he meant that the ANC would accept the Sophiatown challenge and resist removals because the people were behind it. When the day of removals came, the subtenants and the tenants dumped their goods and jumped into police and army lorries, singing. Manilal Gandhi often used to say that he did not see any sign of ANC resistance when the police showed up; in 1955, he had traveled especially to Johannesburg to see Luthuli's followers disgrace apartheid.

This was not just a piece of bungling. The withholding of vital information from Luthuli was part of the plan to destroy, whenever necessary, any African leader who was not completely under the control of the Communists. And there was an important complement to this plan of subtle destruction. The South African Congress of Trade Unions was one of the members of the Congress Movement. Unlike the other four allies, it was mixed racially, although the Africans were, of course, in the majority. African members of SACTU were encouraged to join the ANC and vice versa; Moses Mabhida was the Communist-sponsored chief of SACTU, and Luthuli led the ANC. Under this arrangement, the African member was deliberately given a dual loyalty and leadership as a precaution against Luthuli's defecting one day. If he were to do that, Mabhida would assert himself as SACTU leader against Luthuli. Since Mabhida was always with the workers, he stood a better chance of pulling a very substantial section of them in any showdown with Luthuli. And in any crisis not involving Luthuli, he could easily be upheld as the leader of the Africans.

It was all part of a complicated plan to reduce Luthuli to the

position of an impotent prisoner of the Communists. Locked up as he virtually was in Groutville, he was not free to make any impact on outside opinion. In the meantime, the Communist press was taking advantage of every conceivable opportunity to boost Mabhida. Hence, the type of leadership the Youth League had tried to establish was being subtly undermined and African nationalism sabotaged.

The treason trial started shortly after Sisulu had returned from Moscow and Peking. The trips to Bucharest, Moscow, and Peking by prominent ANC leaders had been clever moves to commit the organization by implication. Luthuli might argue that he and his movement were not Communist; but if his right-hand man could go to Iron Curtain capitals without his knowledge, the world would ask Luthuli who was the real boss of the ANC. If he said, as he did, that he did not know who had paid for these costly trips—his treasurer was saying publicly that the ANC was in the red financially—then it would be clear he was no longer boss. In the event of a showdown, he would not have enough world support to embarrass the Communists.

The government felt it was time to strike at the leadership of the Congress Movement. With characteristic maladroitness, it locked up the Communist and non-Communist leaders of the Movement, together with a few anti-Communists outside of the congresses. In evidence during the trial, it became increasingly clear that Luthuli did not have a real hand in formulating policy for the Congress Movement; therefore, the charge against him and some of his more immediate supporters was dropped. After nearly five years, the government case collapsed, and the accused were free men again. In short, the trips to Iron Curtain capitals had forced the government to show its hand, for it was going to act ruthlessly against all who challenged or opposed apartheid, regardless of whether or not they were Communists. And the same rule applied to the bannings.

The story that went around Durban after the return of each Congress leader from Peking was that China had been most insistent on building up rural pressures. True or not, there was a significant change noticeable in Congress Movement strategy

after the visits to Iron Curtain countries. Although efforts were made to organize urban workers, the greatest stress was laid on the need to attract the people in the rural reserves. Money flowed into the republic, and paid organizers were employed in some of the most sensitive areas of the country. The idea was to start tension piling up in the reserves to complement the pressure in the towns. There was a twofold advantage in this strategy: If the towns went on strike there would be no scab labor from the reserves; second, if there was trouble in both urban and rural areas, the police and the army would exercise little control over the whole situation because of the distances between them and the disparity in population ratios.

In the meantime, the nationalist revolt against Communism's tightening grip on the ANC was gaining momentum. In the Transvaal ANC members, and in Natal, to a lesser extent, anti-Communists, were being purged systematically. In Cape Town, Tom Ngwenya held out against Communist pressure and led a long and bitter fight almost precisely in the way Professor Thale had, and at the same place, during the 1920's. But when the nationalists realized that it was impossible for them to change the leadership of the ANC, they left it to form the PAC. This was the most spectacular split the Communists had brought about in African opinion, and it left the Congress Movement without real opposition to Communist policy. It became increasingly dangerous for the moderates who stayed behind to want to deviate; numerically, the PAC walkout had weakened them.

The volume of support the PAC got for its campaign, both internally and externally, gave the Communists a nasty jolt. Some members of the Congress Movement had for a long time agitated for another dramatic stand against apartheid, but the leadership, still involved in the treason trial, had not been keen on a mere stunt. The PAC took advantage of this clamor, which was, in fact, popular, to stage its antipass campaign and write Sharpeville into the history of African nationalism. Luthuli at first refused to collaborate with the PAC in the antipass campaign; but after the massacre of scores of men, women, and children in various parts of the country, he called for a day of mourning. This

was supported widely by all sections of the nation and sent the government into a rage. It banned the PAC and the ANC for a year, declared a state of emergency, and forced some of the ablest Communist leaders to flee the country. Two PAC executive members had been instructed to leave before the campaign to present the PAC case overseas.

Politically, the PAC and the ANC were not on speaking terms. But when both sides got to London, it became necessary for them to speak with one voice as South Africans. They formed the United Front. The balance of forces was against the PAC from the very beginning, and opinion in South Africa was divided sharply on the wisdom of forming a United Front in which the pro-Communists and their supporters constituted the biggest element. In any case, the United Front had no mandate to speak on behalf of all the nonwhites, since whatever authority it possessed derived only from the organizations represented in it. It soon became necessary for it to have a mandate and attain status in the republic—particularly since press reports were circulating to the effect that the Front was being pressed to constitute itself a government in exile. Inside the Congress Movement, discussion had started on who would be the first prime minister; the pro-Communist wing wanted Dr. Dadoo, but most of the younger Africans felt insulted by this. The head of the government, they felt, had to come from that section that had borne the brunt of oppression: They wanted Luthuli.

While all these things were happening, it became obvious that the political vacuum caused by the bans on the African resistance organizations had to be filled. Leaders of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation (IDAMF) stated that an attempt to regroup on a different plane should be made and that a new basis for African unity should be found. IDAMF held a position of unique importance in the African community, for it represented the clergy and could therefore speak with authority on African problems. It had the following and was nonsectional. Since it had, in 1956, also called a conference of leaders in Bloemfontein, where apartheid was formally rejected, it came under

increasing pressure to call another to agree on a formula of unity. But in this case it could not move very fast because it was engaged in delicate negotiations with the government on purely church matters.

Then, almost without warning, the Communists began to interest themselves in the idea of a new regrouping and in private conversations exerted pressure for the immediate calling of a national conference. The idea was being canvassed almost everywhere, and Alan Paton, speaking for the liberals, had even suggested a third force between apartheid and African racialists. In response to these pressures, Luthuli and Matthews, among others, sent out invitations to a consultative conference of African leaders, which met in Orlando, Johannesburg, toward the end of 1960. The idea was to consolidate African unity.

It emerged quite early in the deliberations of the conference that a group of the delegates had come with a ready-made plan of action which they wanted the others to endorse. Real unity was not what they sought; they merely wanted the mandate to carry out their own plan. Feeling in the conference was so strongly in favor of real unity, however, that a committee was subsequently appointed to work out plans for the calling of a national conference of all intellectual leaders in the African community. These, in turn, would ask the government to call a national convention to draft a new constitution. Little time was wasted: The continuation committee elected by the conference, in its first session, presented a fairly detailed plan, according to which it was to move events to a particular climax. After the steps described in the conference, attempts would then be made for a showdown with apartheid.

But during the functioning of the machinery which the continuation committee set up to carry out its mandate, it soon became clear that the committee was intended merely to be a rubber stamp to endorse the actions of an invisible hand that moved events toward its own goal. This hand wanted its plan adhered to rigidly, no matter what happened, and expected it to be carried out in a hurry. As long as the requisite speed and con-

formity were maintained, money was available for this purpose in incredibly large quantities. At social parties organized in the locations for members of the continuation committee, expensive dinners were given, at which whisky, brandy, and gin were served in quart bottles. Members of the committee from Durban, for example, flew to Johannesburg, and cost was no deterrent in the printing and dissemination of literature. Never in the history of African nationalism had so much money been available.

There was, however, something very peculiar about this money. First, it did not come through the hands of the treasurer elected by the committee. Second, no proper statements of accounts were given. When the committee pressed for these, shoddy, unprofessional documents that meant absolutely nothing were handed in. Third, no receipts were requested in return for the money paid out to delegates. Finally, the real source of this money was not revealed; it was said that it had been donated by certain individuals, whose names were never given. Naturally, the mystery surrounding the funds started tensions in the continuation committee.

At the same time, the committee was being committed to lines of action that some members felt were not in the mandate given to it by the conference. After the walkout by the former PAC member on the committee, the invisible hand pushed events in the direction of isolating the heroic wing of African nationalism. Since no genuine effort was made to meet the objections of the delegate to some of the committee's emphases, the feeling grew among some of those who remained that the invisible hand was not interested in genuine African unity, that it was using the committee merely to advance its own ideological ends. These became more apparent in the kind of literature sent out on the "all-in" conference of African leaders that was to meet in Maritzburg, Natal, for the emphasis was on the interests of the workers. Stormy debates took place in the committee on the perspectives from which the pamphlets approached the race crisis, and some members felt that they were being committed by implication to Communist approaches, which they could not sup-

port. Telegrams were sent to pro-Soviet leaders outside the republic, and, of course, to others, without the authorization of the committee. When the members met, they often found themselves faced with accomplished facts. When they protested, they received assurances that the "mistakes" would not be repeated, but no sooner had they left than the invisible hand proceeded with its plans as though nothing had happened.

In the meantime, reports from Basutoland reached Johannesburg through people close to the Communist underground that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was one of the influences behind the financing of the continuation committee. Couriers were said to be carrying money between the protectorate and South Africa. When these matters came up before the continuation committee, they were denied—although the couriers were well-known personalities. But the persistent circulation of these reports and the denials merely added to the strains and suspicions that were threatening to break up the continuation committee. The last straw came when one section of the committee pressed for the postponement of the Maritzburg Conference in order to heal the breach caused by the walkout of the former PAC member. The invisible hand would not hear a word of this. Then the section that pressed for negotiations argued that the walkout altered the basis on which the continuation committee had been set up and that the United Front could no longer be expressive of the will of the Orlando meeting if the basis was changed. The invisible hand was no longer interested in African unity. The important thing was the Maritzburg Conference. There was to be no modification of the timetable, even if it meant splitting the continuation committee. Events galloped toward a crisis, and when the dissenting section resigned from the continuation committee, that brought an end to the United Front.

As the day of the Maritzburg Conference neared, its nature emerged in clearer light. It was no longer to be a conference of intellectual leaders from all walks of life, for press statements from the organizers or their supporters indicated that delegates

and nondelegates would be invited. The high light of the conference was Nelson Mandela's dramatic appearance, his ultimatum to the government, and his equally sudden disappearance into the underground. The conference called for a stay-at-home strike for May 29-31, and Mandela's speech detailed the type of action to be taken if the government did not acquiesce to the conference's demands.

The element of secrecy is an important ingredient in political or military warfare. Mandela gave a detailed description of what would be done, where, and how, and he gave the government plenty of time to take precautions. It passed a law through Parliament enabling it to detain a person suspected of prescribed activities for twelve days without being brought up for trial. Partial mobilization was ordered. The army and police reserves were called up. "Dangerous" men were detained. Thousands of African youths in the locations were arrested. The African residential areas in the urban areas were patrolled twenty-four hours every day. Saracen tanks stood at the gates. Loudspeakers on vans blared out police propaganda against the leaders of the stay-at-home, who had suddenly deserted their followers and gone into hiding when the arrests started. The air force was called in. Military planes zoomed menacingly above the locations. By the time the day of the strike came, there was nobody to lead the African masses. Some of the volunteers who had been especially trained to lead strikers were the first to go to work when they saw no sign of their leaders. In the face of these developments, large numbers of Africans went to work.

To stop merely at seeing state power or heroic opposition as the causes of the failure of the stay-at-home is to ignore facts. Throughout all the events described here, Luthuli was deliberately kept in the background. First, in a really serious demonstration the masses of the African people expected him, not Mandela, to give guidance. Second, the crack in the continuation committee destroyed the United Front internally, for it showed that no single section of political opinion can afford to march on its own to freedom in the present circumstances. The rigidity that the

invisible hand had insisted upon in the continuation committee showed that it had overestimated its power. Those Africans who supported the bloc that resigned had serious doubts about the tactics employed at Maritzburg. Third, there had not been efficient, thorough, and painstaking organization, in spite of the large sums of money available. One got the impression that the organizers of the conference did not really take themselves seriously. If they had gotten a mob to shout endorsement of their line, and in that way given them or Nelson Mandela status, they would have been satisfied.

On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to ignore one very important achievement of the stay-at-home: By forcing the government to order mobilization, it had administered a shock to the economy of the country, which opened the way to economic paralysis. Millions of rand were poured down the drain by the government simply because a few thousand Africans had met in Maritzburg and threatened to do certain things.

16 • UNDERGROUND FORCES IN ACTION

THE general attitude of the government is that no genuine opposition to it has any right to exist. Since 1948, therefore, policy has systematically been moving in the direction of silencing and crushing opposition. The Suppression of Communism Act immobilized the Communist Party of South Africa a few years after the Afrikaner nationalists had achieved power. In 1960, both the ANC and the PAC were banned. Shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister warned the white community that the greatest threat to its dominance came from the Liberal Party. And the way some Liberal leaders on both sides of the color line have been jailed, while others, like Alan Paton, have been subjected to some form of persecution—Paton's passport was recently seized—indicates that the Liberals are next on the list of those whom the government wants to silence.

The technique of crushing opposition and banning or exiling critics has driven quite a number of political groups underground. Since that is where South Africa's future is being decided now, I shall, in the present chapter, give a general picture of the actual forces at work among Africans underground—with particular reference to their composition, structure, ideological orientation, tactics, records of performance, strains and stresses, and possible alignments.

The forces might be divided into five major groups—the heroic wing of African nationalism, the realists, the Communists, the

Trotskyites, and the uncommitted Africans. In this list, only the Communists are really one politically homogeneous group; the others tend to function as assortments of attitudes bound together by certain loyalties. The dominant section in each group, which gives substance to the doctrine, is always the best organized. It might be the largest; it might not be.

The heroic wing of African nationalism draws its support from the young, militant, educated, and nationalistic section of the African community. The largest single group is made up of former members of the Pan-Africanist Congress. Sections of the African church might be counted here, as well as some businessmen. The heroic slogan of "Africa for the Africans" appeals to sections in the business community because it promises to be a lever with which to prize African custom from white and Indian competitors. The heroic sections of the church argue that it frustrates the African's communion with God if he kneels side by side with the white advocate of race oppression. But this ceases to be surprising when it is borne in mind that South Africa has a very long tradition of separatism in the African Christian community. Although this wing is intensely pro-African, it often works in very close collaboration with people of European extraction and with Indians, and it admits the coloreds to membership.

Those who give shape to the doctrine are largely people who were once either members of or sympathizers with the now banned PAC. This organization was made up of the leadership, the rank and file membership, and the task force, and each sector held a special position in the movement and performed clearly defined duties. After Sharpeville, large sections of the leadership were jailed. Since then, the periodic mass arrests in the largest urban areas have virtually destroyed the task force, and there now remains only the body, which is oriented in the direction once taken by the PAC. These, in turn, have gravitated underground, where they have become the most powerful section in the ranks of heroic nationalism.

The heroicals represent a very wide variety of viewpoints.

Some stand foursquare for a nonracial social order on the basis of one vote per man. Others are distinctly socialist. And there are clusters of antiwhites, who reject collaboration with non-Africans, although there are some who accept collaboration. All of them believe passionately in what they call positive action, a slogan capable of a variety of interpretations—the murder of political enemies, the organizing of boycotts, or the setting on fire of factories and plantations. But the intention always is to strike blows that hurt visibly and deeply.

This line has a strong emotional and dramatic appeal. By promising to hit the race oppressor where he is most vulnerable, and in that way distribute suffering equitably, it gives the faithful the feeling that the day of reckoning is in sight. Enthusiasm is kept up and self-confidence developed by applying the *Africanistic* formula in as many situations as possible. Social gatherings, for example, are Western-oriented, largely to the extent that brandy, gin, or both are served. Although their form of organization is distinctly Western, the spirit is aggressively African. The songs they sing, for example, are usually not those from the white man's culture; they are often the ancient chants which the Africans sang down through the ages when they were on the warpath, and the traditional war cries. Drunkenness is generally frowned upon; so, also, is sex. There is nothing puritanical; rather, there is a sense of destiny visible, which makes people feel that these excesses might harm them one way or the other.

To attend one such party gives one the feeling of having been inside an emotional steam bath. In this setting, tribalism is crushed ruthlessly out of existence, since each individual is encouraged to regard himself as an African. A Zulu will rise and perform the war dance, the Sutu will fill the air with the songs of the mountains, and the Xosa will tell of the exploits of his ancestors in the hundred years' war with the white man. All will listen as though they were being spoken to in their own language, for the heroicals set the greatest store by African solidarity.

The general strategy, on the political plane, is to avoid a

head-on collision with apartheid, which would produce disaster. As a result, attempts to stage stunts that are not likely to force the government to change its policy are invariably and bitterly attacked by the heroicals. This has mystified most people in South Africa, and the enemies of the heroicals have even accused them of collaborating with the government. The explanation is simple. The various heroic groups take the view that the task of dislodging a modern government is a highly specialized job. But since the training of skilled workers was not provided for initially, this weakness has to be corrected. And while this is being done, the heroicals argue, it is a waste of time to go massively on the offensive against apartheid. When the trainees are ready, the heroicals propose then to resort to positive action, which could quite conceivably force the United Nations or one or the other of the great powers to intervene. If the nations hesitate to act, a series of political veld fires might flare up until they merge into one holocaust engulfing the whole of southern Africa. The heroicals believe that after such suffering and pain a new Africa will arise, in which it will be possible for the black man to call his country his own and look the other groups in the face as an equal. But while waiting for this, they concentrate on building up their forces. They do not, as a rule, bother about surfacing to protest against various forms of injustice from the white side. This they regard as irrelevant, for their sole aim is to build up irresistible pressures to launch a decisive frontal attack on the citadels of white power.

Inside their own ranks, they face some awkward problems. The most complicated of these is the attitude toward the antiwhiteism. A substantial section regard racialism as barbarous, as something unworthy of the new African; another sees no virtue in what it terms the turning of the other cheek for the white man to hit. Nonracialism, these argue, will, like nonviolence, incite the whites to intensify the oppression and humiliation of the African while neutralizing the latter's anger against injustice.

The emergence of African states reinforces the racialists without narrowing the gulf between the two schools. The danger is

real that if Accra and other African capitals friendly to the African of the republic did not stress the importance of a non-racial approach, antiwhiteism might split even the heroicals, who regard Accra as their spiritual and political Mecca. Race complicates the relations not only between black and white but even between African and African on so many levels that expedient courses with no roots in morality often do as much harm as good.

Then, there have been the financial scandals among some of the groups that have received foreign relief aid and the consequent jealousies and conflicts among the rival leaders of the various underground factions. If these are traceable in part to the relative inactivity that has resulted from waiting for trained leaders, they also shake the morale of the heroic side rather badly.

It is on the plane of possible alignments that some unexpected developments seem likely to take place. For thirty-five years now, the heroic wing has maintained its unchanging hostility to Communism, and one reason adduced for this is the "foreign" loyalty on which Communism insists. The heroic nationalist regards Moscow as a white capital; loyalty to it makes him the stooge or protégé or colonial of white men in faraway Russia, and this hurts his self-respect. He takes a similar attitude toward Peking: The Asians in South Africa have often behaved toward the African in ways that hurt his pride, and he is in no mood to forget these injuries in a hurry. So strongly does he feel, and so sensitive is he, that he sees little virtue in turning to Moscow, Peking, or, for that matter, New Delhi when salvation for him waits in Accra, Lagos, Dar-es-salaam, or Addis Ababa.

The second reason given for the heroic nationalist's hostility to Communism is the latter's policy of zigzags. He regards the Communist as a traitor who has consistently sabotaged nationalistic movements toward real liberty, and he is in no mood to forgive this either.

Some of the strangest alignments may one day emerge from this hatred—especially since the Afrikaner nationalist is also bit-

terly hostile to the pro-Soviet side, though for different reasons. Communism pioneered the nonracial coordination of black, brown, and white initiatives after Union. After 1924, it admitted to membership people of all races and in that way projected itself to the fore as the archenemy of some of the things Afrikaner nationalism regarded as precious.

The African's and the Afrikaner's hatred of Communism on this plane is so intense that an alignment between the two is no longer as remote an eventuality as events might suggest. When the Congress Youth League was at the height of its power, the Ossewabrandwag, one of the more militant factions in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalism during the war, approached Anton Lembede, one of the greatest heroic leaders, with an offer of assistance against "foreign elements" like the Jews, the Indians, and the Communists. Lembede declined the offer on the score that the two nationalisms had little in common.

Since then groups in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalism have been quietly trying to find a formula of accord that would be acceptable to the African. The Afrikaans-speaking South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) has done more behind the scenes in this direction than is generally known. The attacks on it from the Prime Minister and the resignations by some of its leading members were designed, among other things, to stop the process of trying to find solutions acceptable to the African. As this chapter is written, one section of Afrikaner nationalists is trying to find ground for collaboration with one of the smaller factions in the ranks of the heroicals. The basis of what could become a form of *rapprochement* is the rejection of race discrimination, the acceptance of race equality in separate states (which would be sovereign and independent), a joint defense policy, and coordinated action against the Communists.

Like the heroic wing, the realistic is supported by groups committed to a number of different outlooks. There are the moderate traditionalists, the socialists, multiracialists, businessmen, church leaders, intellectuals, and workers. It is a more broadly based and better organized underground than its counterpart. Apart from

the general body of loose supporters and sympathizers, it is made up of a number of smaller, clearly recognizable groups sharing a common loyalty, and its following is more widely distributed in all the provinces of the republic.

The largest group on this side is made up of former members of the now banned ANC. The organizational structure is not as compact as that of the heroicals, for there is a greater degree of flexibility, verging almost on laxity. Nor does the spirit of the group make as hard and sharp an impact on one as the heroic side tends to. An atmosphere of urbanity prevails, which springs from an eclectic attitude toward politics and culture.

Let's take again the social gatherings to show the contrasts. As is the case among the heroicals, the best of these are attended very largely by the professionals—doctors, lawyers, journalists, nurses, social welfare workers, and, very occasionally, clergymen—the civil servants, businessmen, and people of some status in other fields of activity. They are organized along Western lines. The atmosphere, however, is completely different. For one thing, there is a greater degree of freedom. Singing, yes; but the songs are of a different order, most of them expressing the eclecticism of the new African. The harmony derives from the blended traditions in the cultural amalgam, neither Western nor traditionally African. A few may be freedom songs, the melodies of which are usually Western, and the dancing may be Western or of the amalgam type—the various Africanized versions of jive. In brief, there is neither the hardness nor the emotional intensity that the heroicals love, nor the strained consciousness of destiny.

The realistic wing tends to frown very heavily on loyalty to foreign lands or instructions from foreign capitals—whether Accra, New York, or Moscow. It insists on a *South Africa First* loyalty. For it, nationhood does not mean an Africanistic society; it signifies a social order some describe as multiracial and others as nonracial. The general tendency is to regard both adjectives as synonymous, both being understood to mean equal citizenship on the basis of one vote per man. The heroicals hate the word multiracialism.

The strategy of the realistic wing of African nationalism is less clearly defined at present. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, most of the leaders seem to have been exhausted by the long treason trial, which hit the realistic wing hardest. They have not been quick to recover from the blow, and they do not appear to have made up their minds where to launch the next offensive against apartheid. At the same time, the United Front, with which they have close links, seeks to exert pressure toward direct frontal attacks on race oppression. Hence, the conflict between the policies advocated by the United Front overseas and the realities of the internal situation tend, at the moment, to paralyze many of the realistic groups.

The second factor is the very sharp conflict that has developed between the pro-Communist and anti-Communist sections in the realistic camp. The latter reject multiracialism, claiming that the Congress Movement was a device concocted by the whites and the Indians for ganging up against the Africans. They insist on a nonracial organization in which no racial side will come in as a group. The pro-Communist wing has replied to this by boosting tribalism. After their experience in Pondoland, the Communists were suddenly rapturous in their praise of the "democracy of the tribe." To give it the correct ideological slant, they now describe it as multinationalism, as distinct from multiracialism. The new line recognizes the existence of distinct national groups within the African community itself—thereby blowing to pieces the foundations of unity laid down by the first Bloemfontein Conference. For the glorification of tribalism repudiates in the clearest manner possible the policy adopted by the Accra meeting of the All-African Peoples Conference, which met in 1958. Internally, its effects are to recreate tribal fissions and divide the Africans precisely in the way that Ethnic Grouping is intended by the government to do.

These clashes are too fundamental to make movement forward possible. The most prominent leaders of the realistic groups are trying to get out of the impasse by looking around for new regroupings, and others are pressing forward with a militant pro-

gram of strikes to extend the area of malaise in the economy of the land. From this, it is possible to predict that the tactics of the realistic school may finally depend on the outcome of the conflicts just referred to. On the plane of performance, however, the realistic wing has been more active than the heroicals. Some of the groups in it have organized protests against injustice and focused more attention on living conditions in a number of situations. And to a certain extent, they have played no small part in working for raising the wages of certain classes of laborers in places like Durban, for example.

The emergence of the Liberal Party on the white side threw into bold relief the real issue in the race crisis—the clash between the approach that saw the human being from the perspective of the individual and the one that viewed him from that of the group. The demand for “deracializing” the realistic proponents is a logical rejection of the group approach by those who have been its victims. The final pattern could very well assume this form: At one extreme, there would be the African racialists; at the other, the white advocates of apartheid; and in between, a large bloc of nonracial opinion.

If events were moving this way, political multiracialism would be progressively rejected. A deracialized mass organization would emerge, which would be a balancing factor between the extremes on either side of it. If time were on the side of the realists, this is the only course that would remain open to them. But since they no longer have it as an ally, it seems more likely that they will come increasingly under pressure to align themselves with the heroicals for the purpose of launching a coordinated campaign against property.

In 1929, Communism ceased to want a mass movement of its own. Instead, the party was to remain the “brains” of the liberation movement as a whole. Today, however, this circumstance places Communism in a position of relative weakness, since its limited numbers make it impossible for it to take a clearly defined party stand or adopt an independent political program. But this it could not do even before the enactment of the Sup-

pression of Communism Act, and to be effective at all it had to use African political organizations as hosts. The first condition for this, however, was that it had to support nationalistic programs and content itself with manipulating events from behind the scenes. Therefore, it was forced to concern itself not with questions of conversion but with tactical considerations. One result of this is that now that it has gone underground it is placed in the position of its numbers being too small to enable it to take over the control of the country even in a highly favorable situation. The other is that the growing power of African nationalism threatens to swamp it. The bans on various people, and on it, have to a very large extent cut it off from direct contact with large masses of the African people.

The second circumstance that leaves the Communists relatively weaker is that the elaborate machinery they set up to maintain contact with the African masses is becoming redundant. This is how it was constructed: The inner, nonracial core of real Communists, with headquarters in Johannesburg, was in direct communication with the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, partly through agents in Lourenço Marques, London, and, more recently, Dar-es-salaam. The members of the core joined a number of "national" organizations of Africans, Indians, coloreds, and whites, which, in turn, belonged to a bigger alliance called the Congress Movement.

But neither the "national" organizations constituting the Congress Movement nor the Congress Movement itself was Communist. They functioned merely as an apparatus manipulated by the inner core. If Moscow wanted a particular course of action taken in South Africa, the ANC was not approached directly. Word went to the central core, and from there it was passed on to the Joint Consultative Committee of the Congress Movement, in which the Communists occupied a strong position. There they met as the "representatives" of the "national" organizations, and through the committee they forwarded the instructions to the "national" organizations as a directive. If there were differences too serious to be ironed out in the inner eche-

lons of the apparatus, an "all-in" conference was called. Here, opposition was swamped by the sheer volume of numbers, and emotional enthusiasm deliberately whipped up to discourage it; as a result, the conference then took the prescribed action and gave mass to it. This is the tortuous course through which the Freedom Charter was taken in order to become the policy of the Congress Movement, and the spectacular demonstrations which the Communists engineer from underground follow the same course. Multiracialism was, of course, the ideological bond by which the Congress Movement was kept together.

When the Communists went underground, this apparatus became too unwieldy. They discovered that nonviolence, which they had advocated, could not be organized successfully in secret. Their interest turned to smaller, more manageable groups—the tribes. They had a good number of desirable qualities: Group thinking and solidarity were strongest among them; they were committed neither to the traditions of struggle nor to the ideals of the townsmen and the people in the mission stations, which necessitated the creation of an elaborate apparatus. They accepted violence more readily as an argument against apartheid. In addition, they represented virtually virgin ground for political organization. When trouble developed in Pondoland, for example, there was an exodus of some of the top Communists from Johannesburg to Durban, and regular contact was maintained with Pondoland. The Communists, of course, were by no means the only group at work in Pondoland.

The weaknesses in Communist strategy are giving rise to two significant developments. In Natal, some of the more important personalities already say that they are studying Portuguese and Shangani because they are the languages of the future. They also say they expect major developments in Mozambique, where those two languages, coincidentally, are spoken. If trouble flares up in Mozambique, the Communists obviously want to be involved in ways that will strengthen their relatively weaker position in South Africa. This may necessitate the training of men in sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and arson in an effort to force the re-

public's state of malaise to deteriorate into a condition of acute economic paralysis. And the emphasis laid on a more aggressive attitude on the trade-union front suggests an attempt to ready the workers to administer the shocks the republic's economy might have to be given in a situation of increasing difficulty for apartheid.

If the Communists choose to fight in these two ways, they may not need the collaboration of the realistic wing; they may find themselves able to win support by their own efforts. The control of the working class would place in their hands a weapon they could one day use effectively to come to grips with African nationalism itself. With this in mind, the underground Communists now make serious endeavors not to hide their identity. In the past, they were most anxious to be regarded as part and parcel of the Congress Movement, but the prevailing policy now is to assert their independence, which allows them greater freedom in the deepening economic and racial crisis.

Flexibility and adaptability have always characterized Communist policy in the republic. A factor that gives significance to the new show of confidence—expressed in increasingly independent action—is the shedding of the moderates. There were no dramatic purges, just the systematic shunting to the sidelines. This has surrendered part of the initiative to the more extreme wing, which, in turn, has adopted a vigorous policy of training African leaders in relatively larger numbers.

But all these things are done in conditions of urgency, which indicates the need for hurried adaptations to pressing changes and quick corrections of weaknesses in order to meet a situation in which Communist forces might have to operate over a large area. The explosion expected in Mozambique would be just the sort of situation that would suit all the underground groups. Chaos on the northeastern border of the republic would facilitate the return of the large number of Communist leaders now abroad. The trainees in North Africa who are mastering the techniques of sabotage would come back to work with brighter prospects of being effective. Against this background, the changes in internal

Communist policy are clearly based on the need to play a more effective role in the turbulent conditions that are developing in Mozambique. The fall of the latter would give the underground access to ports from which arms and trained saboteurs could be transported to the republic. Then, an explosion of the ugliest type would develop.

The Trotskyites are unique in quite a number of ways. Their history has been characterized by schismatic crises. None of the various factions that adhere to one facet of the doctrine or the other has been banned, but all have built for themselves the quite misleading reputation of being great talkers who resort to little action against race oppression. On the whole, however, they are a largely nonracial group, some factions of which are more mixed than others. The groups that are most active in the nonwhite communities idolize the principle of organizational federalism, by which they hope to bring together, on the basis of federation, larger associations of people in a vast phalanctic march against apartheid. The critics of the Trotskyites all agree that the latter, whether they are talkers or activists, invariably function as a negative influence in the fight against race oppression. They have been driven underground—at least, those sections that operate there—not by state action—but by their own policies.

The faction to which attention will be given here is the one that regards itself as the “socialists.” It has two wings—the political and the paramilitary. The former is largely African, although it is nonracial, and it is the weaker of the two. Its policy aims at building up the African following for the purpose of forming a group that would be large enough to provide a government. The paramilitary wing, on the other hand, is almost exclusively white, and it has highly trained men who have served in the armed forces of the republic. Like the Communists, it has at its disposal large funds. (The two wings of African nationalism have no money.)

The “socialists” are anti-Communist; they stand for a program of extreme and rapid socialization. Both their goals and plans are designed to frustrate Communist intentions to capture the

government of the country after apartheid's collapse. Their general strategy is to stay underground and obtain as much African support as possible. To achieve this purpose, they have not ruled out flexibility in the program of socialization. Meanwhile, in the paramilitary wing, there is a feverish build-up going on, and some members boast that they already have arms available within the country. Their intention is to coordinate African political pressure with European military skill in the fight against apartheid.

Trotskyite strategy in the past has created the impression that theorization was its primary contribution to the struggle against race oppression—certainly among sections working in the African community; but this has always been a very effective smoke screen to cover some of the most daring and well-planned acts of sabotage. Actually, the Trotskyite technique has for a long time concentrated its efforts on training a solid core of activists to infiltrate African schools. Here, their one and unchanging line was to launch vicious attacks on the missionaries by branding them as the agents of the oppressors who would have to be liquidated before the onslaught on the main citadels of race oppression. In their attacks upon Christianity and, of course, oppression, student activists were planted in some of the largest and most famous missionary schools in the country. Since the aim was always to damage and destroy missionary influences, the instigation sometimes issued in alarmingly literal forms—fierce fires and riots. This is how Adams College perished, in flames, and Ohlange College was the scene of some of the ugliest riots. Behind many of the arson incidents in the boarding schools, the hand of a Trotskyite activist surely could be traced. Although the group that now controls the paramilitary wing was not in existence when Adams College was burned down, the general Trotskyite movement has nevertheless accumulated more experience in underground work and sabotage than any other political group in the country. In the sensitive conditions that prevail in the republic, it would not be surprising if the Trotskyites ignited the explosion black and white momentarily expect.

They have, however, serious problems of alignment, for their

outlook on life is too rigid and negative to enable them to make a visible impression on African nationalism. Those Africans whom the "socialists" are trying to woo express grave fears: They argue that merely to form the political wing of the "socialist" movement would be to allow themselves to be caught in a dangerous trap. If the predominantly white paramilitary wing kept underground, it would surface after victory, shoot the African government, or dictate terms to it. For coordination to be effective, these Africans argue, they must be given military training underground, within the country, and on the largest scale possible under the conditions now prevailing.

The uncommitted African does not belong to or constitute an organization with a recognizable structure. He expresses a mood, a reaction to a particular historical experience, and a community of feeling with those who have shared his experience of life. Understandably, then, this underground group is unorthodox in its composition and almost unpredictable in its behavior. Perhaps because it is the oldest in South African history, it has always lived somewhere in the political "subconscious" mind. Its members may already belong to known political groups, but they formally join the uncommitted to give mass to it for the purpose of achieving his moment of fulfillment. This desire for fulfillment is one of the distinguishing marks of the uncommitted African, and he, in turn, has become the one influence almost everybody dreads. Living as he does in the political subconscious, nobody can say with certainty which spark will rouse him to action. His group chooses its own moment to move in directions of its own preference, and when it does it shows practically no signs of political motivation.

Nobody really organized the Alexandra bus boycotts. People simply started talking quietly among themselves about the intolerable conditions to which they were exposed in the transportation system. They said among themselves that the moment of reckoning would come one day, but nobody took their murmurings seriously. One morning, however, a few people refused to pay the higher fares sanctioned by the government,

and within a few days the boycott had snowballed into a movement of incredible dimensions. In Natal—to take another example—the Indians emulated the white man by treating the African with contempt: One afternoon in 1949, an Indian hit an African boy, George Madondo, in Durban, and it immediately ignited a bloody explosion that rocked the country from end to end.

When the uncommitted African moved into action in these instances, he was at a disadvantage because the balance in power reserves favored the white community. But since then there has been a very significant change: Parity has been reached. When Sobukwe launched the PAC campaign last year, and when Mandela delivered his ultimatum to the government, they were indicating that there had been an important shift in the balance of power reserves in the African's favor. The result of this change is that the millions of uncommitted Africans who wait on the sidelines of the ideological battleground are no longer an amorphous mass likely to be blown in any direction by any wind. They are poised for action, waiting to give their support to any side that gives proof of its military (or other) effectiveness against apartheid. Next to the government's intransigency, this is the most dangerous single factor in the South African crisis. It incites rivalry and extremism in the underground, which might cause an explosion at any time. The signal for trouble could be an attempt by any one of the underground groups to make a spectacular bid to impress uncommitted African opinion. And an underground eruption would rapidly assume the proportions of a major explosion above ground. And above ground, only a relatively minor incident—say, a collision between the police and a few Africans—could be the signal for the unleashing of the fury locked in the African bosom.

The underground initiative need not be only on the military plane. The heroicals, for example, do not have the guns, but they could train their followers in arson. Every African could then be transformed into a front-line fighter by putting a box of matches in his pocket. Neither a reorganized army nor a heavily armed police force would be the answer here because the

disproportion in racial numbers would deprive the government of the manpower to guard every factory, every plantation, or every vital installation.

One basic weakness in the race crisis is that the balance between the opposing forces is such that once the conflagration started there would be no internal power to extinguish it. External intervention would be effective only if used as a prophylactic measure—before the actual collision. If it came later, it would take a long time to bring the inflammable tensions under control. This is why it is so vitally important and urgent that the nations should make drastic changes in their attitude to apartheid.

Some of the free peoples of Africa who wish to give practical assistance in extending the area of liberty ask why the Africans of the republic do not unite. A realistic glance at the South African race crisis will reveal that unity can no longer be the issue because there are such irreconcilable differences on the nature of the society to be established after the collapse of apartheid. These differences are not racial. The psychological war against apartheid has been won, and the civilized world's hostility to it is proof. What remains to be settled is the pattern of society to replace it. The heroic favors one kind, the Communist another, and the Trotskyite yet another. This circumstance combines with the peculiar nature of the power reserves and the internal political alignments to make African unity irrelevant for the purpose of breaking apartheid's back. The Africans cannot unite on any basis other than antiwhiteism in the present circumstances. Add to this the fact that the Cold War plays no insignificant role in the interaction of anti-apartheid forces above ground and under. All the Africans can do is to coordinate their power reserves and initiatives with those of the non-African opponents of apartheid. In the last analysis, this is the realistic answer to race oppression. But then, unless something is done very swiftly, the house might be on fire, as the Africans would say, by the time the nonracial front is set up.

17 • COMMUNISTS VERSUS LIBERALS

ONE of the major advantages the government had had up to the time of the resistance movement in 1951 was that it was not opposed effectively on the white side. The various groups against it supported the color bar in one form or the other, and any party that had stood for a clear-cut program of race equality would have had no chance of gaining enough support to reach Parliament.

The resistance movement was intended to show the potentialities of coordinating group initiatives, and Africans, Indians, whites, and coloreds joined together to defy certain laws and court imprisonment. The size of the African response to Dr. Moroka's call for 10,000 volunteers exceeded the expectations of the resistance organizers. Over 8,000 men and women went to jail, and quite a number allowed themselves to be arrested more than once to register their protest against race oppression.

One important result of this demonstration was that it convinced a group of people, largely on the white side, to make systematic attempts to establish machinery for the effective coordination of nonracial initiatives in the fight against apartheid. If this could be done, race oppression would be effectively opposed for the first time in the history of the Union by democrats on both sides of the color line.

On the nonwhite side, the readiness of all races to go to jail together created a political vacuum—or, rather, it focused atten-

tion on a political vacuum that had long waited to be filled. There had not been a democratic nonracial organization functioning among the nonwhites since Union. The Communists were the only exception, but then they did not work as a South African political party, since they took their instructions from Moscow and were interested largely in international threats to Moscow's line. And Paul Mosaka's African Democratic Party had come into being prematurely and had not lived long enough to make an impression on opinion.

The Liberal Party, however, came into being to fill the vacuum. The intention of its founders was to coordinate group initiatives and build up a powerful instrument to oppose apartheid and clarify the real issues at stake in the race crisis. They wanted to give constructive purpose to the national debate on the race question and to show that race collaboration was practicable. They took practical steps to defy the social color bar as a matter of policy: Black and white went into each other's homes, and friendships across the color line were established. This was the first systematic attempt to attack apartheid from the political and social angles, but it was immediately opposed by a number of political groups and persons. Among the first to do so was Dr. Yussuf Dadoo, who had been a leading member of the Communist Party before it was disbanded. He pooh-poohed the idea of a mixed party based on liberal principles and doubted its effectiveness in the conditions that prevailed in South Africa.

The underground Communist movement saw dangerous rivals in the Liberals. After 1924, when the Communist Party abandoned the color bar, the Communists had been the only white people who had identified themselves with the Africans in their fight against race oppression. It placed them in positions of advantage from which they could often influence events in particular directions when it suited them. But a new group coming up to compete with them in a field they regarded as theirs was a threat. Second, they realized, rightly, that temperamentally the Liberal Party was not a revolutionary movement. Its leadership was predominantly white and was drawn largely from the professional

and business classes, and this circumstance would make it a moderate group. If it gained support in the African community, it would work for the neutralization of movement toward the revolution the Communists wanted. The Liberal Party had already committed itself to using only constitutional methods in the fight against apartheid, to opposing Communism, to winning a qualified franchise, and to employing nonviolent weapons.

Sharp attacks came also from another totalitarian group—the Afrikaner nationalists. The whites who had joined the Africans to form the Liberal Party had committed the most heinous sin in the nationalist litany—that of working for race integration. No decent white man could do a thing like that: White women would be endangered, white supremacy would be undermined, and the day of Afrikanerdom's end would be in sight. They also had a second reason for alarm. The fact that white people had crossed the color line to join hands with the Africans in opposition to white supremacy indicated that a serious crack had been made in the wall of white solidarity. The Liberals would widen fissions among the whites while providing a new rallying point for the enemies of Afrikanerdom. A mixed anti-apartheid front in which white brains and African numbers were harnessed together could create very dangerous situations for Afrikaner nationalism.

The African nationalists—the realists were still in the ascendancy during the early 1950's—took an equivocal attitude. They welcomed the formation of the Liberal Party as a step in the right direction; at the same time, not one of the front-rank leaders was prepared to commit himself to the right step. Even men of liberal persuasion like Luthuli and Matthews merely gave their blessings and politely wished the party good luck. Luthuli was always glad to speak from Liberal platforms whenever he could, but the support stopped there.

The reasons for this varied. Cape Liberalism had a bad name in the African community. In the years when he had allowed himself to be associated with it, the elder Jabavu had been placed in the position in which, so his people feared, he was being used as a stooge by the Cape Liberals. Although there had

never been a real political machine in which black and white sat as equals to work out policies, the Cape Liberals, the successors to Dr. Philip, had been Jabavu's friends and not his colleagues. But the political zigzags through which this relationship led Jabavu damaged his standing in the African community, and word went around that behind the scenes the Cape Liberals advocated a go-slow policy against race oppression. African memories are very long: When the Liberal Party of South Africa came into being—it was supported largely from the Cape—they remembered how Jabavu had ended up a discredited man at the hands of the Cape Liberals, about half a century earlier.

The second reason was that the gulf between the races had been so wide, for such a long time, that it was difficult to achieve mutual trust between black and white in a political organization. Some African nationalists took the line that the moment to distrust the white man most was when he stretched out his hand in friendship. They agreed that they could collaborate with him on specific issues, but they would not identify themselves with him. They feared that he would either betray them to his government or would be unwilling to bear the suffering that had always been part and parcel of the African's fight against white supremacy. At the critical moment, they said, he would run away from the struggle. He had been brought up differently, and there was no point in expecting him to do what, to him, would be a physical impossibility. And, finally, matters were not improved by the party's insistence on adhering to the qualified franchise. Its African critics pointed out that this merely revealed the cloven hoof.

Consequently, there was no spectacular rush to join the party from both sides of the color line. Members spent the first few years sizing each other up at close range. Black and white had never really sat down together before to find a common solution to their problems, and there were temperamental, cultural, and other angularities on both sides to be reconciled. For example, African and white attitudes toward the law were quite different. The African, regarding it as devoid of moral content, felt no

moral need to obey the law; if he could get the chance to ridicule it or break it, he had few qualms of conscience in so doing. But since the white liberal had been taught to respect the law, all sorts of difficulties arose that plunged the party into one internal crisis after another. But as had happened during the period of the wars, the principles that brought black and white together eventually prevailed, and the party grew in numbers and influence.

It received its first real test of effectiveness when the removals were on in Sophiatown. Large numbers of Africans were being arrested for the contravention of pass laws. The party rushed headlong into this fight to organize legal defense. This made such a deep impression in the African community that before long the Sophiatown branch had a very large African membership, and the evictions in Natal produced a similar result.

The influx of large numbers of Africans into the party, however, started a series of tensions that were to lead it through a number of crises and in the end leave it a changed body. The first serious crisis centered around the party's stipulation that it would use constitutional methods against race oppression. For the European, who could use the ballot box, organize trade unions, strike, stage public demonstrations, and call for boycotts, there were many constitutional methods at his disposal. But what of the African, for whom any attempt to modify apartheid was criminal? After lengthy and painful debates, the party decided that it would nevertheless use constitutional and extraparliamentary pressures to extend the area of liberty.

Trouble flared up next on the franchise question. The conservative wing of the party was still haunted by the fear of being swamped; still others did not want to adopt too radical a policy lest they frighten off potential white supporters; and the African members were humiliated by a franchise policy that, in effect, indicated that they had accepted an inferior status. The party was in a dilemma: It could not win many whites to its side unless it showed that its policies were acceptable to the Africans, and what the African was willing to accept was too extreme even

for some people within the Liberal Party itself. But after some of the bitterest exchanges that the party had up to then had, agreement was reached on the need to adopt, as party policy, universal adult suffrage on a common roll of voters.

The third crisis arose from the boycotts. Once the party had committed itself to extraparliamentary pressures, the way had been cleared for supporting nonwhite campaigns, not all of which were strictly constitutional. The explosions within the party were as violent as any it had known in its short history; a fair number of white members resigned, but larger numbers of Africans were registered.

The last crisis was sparked off by the revolt of the PAC. A section of the party regarded Sobukwe and his colleagues with unconcealed fear. They believed them to be race-haters, that this was the reason they had broken with Luthuli; and some of them, like large sections of the white press, accepted the Communist line that the revolt was a racist betrayal of the struggle. The other section nonetheless insisted that the revolt was a genuine rejection of Communist domination. The race factor had come in, they claimed, because of multiracialism, which facilitated the remote control of the ANC by the racial minorities in the Congress Movement. And it was a particularly unfortunate coincidence that the Communists who exercised control happened also to be largely non-Africans. More positively, they argued that the two moods of African nationalism were visible within the PAC: Sobukwe had clearly committed himself to a nonracial society, whereas Madzunya, his most powerful rival, saw problems from the angle of African dominance. Finally, they said, the attitudes of the PAC were going through the formative stage, and the ultimate crystallizations would depend on the type of pressures exerted on the PAC. This section of Liberal Party opinion believed that liberalism's duty in the circumstances was to keep an open mind toward the PAC and to exert persuasive pressures that would help keep it a democratic, not a racialistic, force. In the end, the party decided to keep an open mind, to give help to the PAC if asked, and to collaborate wherever possible, as was the case with the ANC.

The remarkable thing about all these crises was that opinion divided very sharply on the basis not of race but of principles. Some of the most vehement denunciations of the PAC came from African members—and not from old men, either, who had a hearty dislike for “extremism,” but from young, well-educated men who belonged to the generation that had produced the PAC. In turn, some of the most telling blows against the qualified franchise came from the white side.

The first real test of the party's sincerity of purpose in agreeing to help the PAC came when the latter launched its antipass campaign in 1960. The Cape Town branch of the Liberal Party was most enthusiastic in its support of the PAC, and close collaboration between the PAC and the Liberals followed. One outcome of this was that the most spectacular demonstration of PAC power came from Cape Town: Thousands of people marched from the locations into the city in the most orderly fashion that had ever been seen.

After the Sharpeville shootings, the Liberals moved in with all sorts of help, by the side of other groups. When the great trials started, the people of Sharpeville got some of the best Liberal legal brains to defend them. Then, during the state of emergency which came after the start of the campaign, thousands of people were detained. Among these were a number of senior leaders and members of the Liberal Party from both sides of the color line. The national chairman of the party, Peter Brown, was detained in Pietermaritzburg. Although some of his friends made representations to get him released, he refused stubbornly to take advantage of the government's readiness to free him. He would leave jail only if his colleagues on both sides of the color line were also released. This showed the Africans that the white liberal was determined to destroy white supremacy, and of course he remained in jail until he was freed with the other detainees. Finally, more Liberals were arrested shortly before the stay-at-home planned for May 29-31, 1961.

Some of the transformations that took place in opinion on both sides of the color line in the party are worth noting. The influx of a large number of Africans pushed the party more and

more to the left, and its economic policies increasingly approached those of a welfare state. A large number of whites gained practical experience in African politics by working in close collaboration with the black people. The adoption of "extreme" non-racial policies affected white opinion in two ways: It threw into very bold relief the real issue beneath the race crisis—the conflict between irreconcilable values of life—and this, in turn, created a political vacuum in the white community. The gap between the Liberal Party, on one side, and the United Party and the Nationalist Party, on the other, was too wide to be left unfilled for a long time.

From its end, the Liberal Party exerted a very powerful gravitational pull on moral grounds, where its principles were unassailable. It was showing that nonracial collaboration works, and it had debunked the nationalist doctrine that the black man is not yet ready for participation in the government of his country. The result was that the liberal wing of the United Party was encouraged to branch off to form the Progressive Party. This group constitutes the halfway house between liberalism and white reaction. It wants the qualified voter to meet the aspirations of the nonwhite middle classes and at the same time not swamp the whites; it emerged, in short, to fill the gap between the Liberal Party and the white conservative groups.

In other words, the gravitational pull has brought about a polarization of attitudes on the white side, which gives the voter a real choice of alternatives. In a normal democratic society, the two outlooks in the white community would correspond with the two moods of African nationalism. The realistic wings from either side of the color line would look forward to the day when they would merge, while the heroic sides remained conservative. In shaping and directing thought and events in this way, the Liberals have made one of the most important contributions toward the creation of a real democratic and nonracial society. To this must be added another contribution—the avoidance of a collision between African nationalism and liberalism. If the clash had been allowed, the heroic approach would have been in the

ascendancy on the African side. Race would have been pushed to the fore as the main factor in the present crisis; black and white would have had no choice but to fight on their respective racial sides. In the end, Afrikaner nationalism would have succeeded in manipulating black and white into that position that would have served best its own ends.

As things stand, there already exists a solid core of nonracial opinion on both sides of the color line, which confronts Afrikaner nationalism and its African opposite with moral challenges that clamor for an answer. This core has the potential to become one of the most powerful influences in crushing apartheid without disastrously impairing the economy of the country.

Significantly enough, the most determined opposition comes not simply from the government but also from the Communists. The reasons are obvious. A deracialized movement of protest, with the potential to give the country its next government, would swamp the Communists so completely that they would not be able to exercise even remote control of African politics. Such a body would be able to create a crisis it could control—a crisis which would not get out of hand and transform South Africa into a second Congo. Its insistence on the value of the individual would destroy the group approach and accustom the masses of the African people to seeing themselves as individuals. The understanding with African nationalism would insure that if the latter took control of the country it would have the backing of substantial portions of people from all racial groups. This would give it greater stability and would make the Communist strategy of undermining it more difficult.

All this should not be read to mean that the Liberal Party is without its weaknesses. The most outstanding is that temperamentally it is not a revolutionary organization; in a revolutionary situation, it could very well find itself impotent. Second, its nature makes it belong more appropriately to the postrevolutionary era when people will be groping for a nonracial stabilizer. When Professor Leo Kuper told the annual conference of the party in 1961 that it should work for the extension of the area of

deracialization, he was warning it, in a sense, that unless it changes its outlook it might find difficulty in making its way through the swift political currents that will precede the collapse of apartheid.

The race factor affects political groups in the republic in a most peculiar way. It compels every one of them to fight, equally energetically, on a number of fronts at the same time. To reach the top, the Communist has to fight the Afrikaner nationalist, seek to destroy the capitalist in the United Party, undermine the Liberal, and sabotage the African nationalist. This dissipation of energy simultaneously retards political progress and reflects the nature of the basic conflicts in the whole crisis. It is one of the biggest problems facing the opponents of the government.

PART

IV

FACING THE FUTURE



18 • A POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE TO APARTHEID

THE most important single fact to emerge from the reviews of African nationalism and its Afrikaner counterpart is that in spite of temperamental, historical, and ideological differences the basic urges that have motivated thought and action on both sides are not irreconcilable.

The Afrikaner nationalist yearns for a place in the African sun. Since this is a fundamental human urge, the Afrikaner has as much right to satisfy it in Africa as the Negro does, by means of citizenship, in the United States. And for his part, the African wants that freedom of body, mind, and spirit that will enable him to make the best possible use of his life. Now, these aspirations are not mutually exclusive, for they give content and meaning to the human experience and express man's basic desire to live. What cannot be reconciled are the ideological, cultural, and other preferences by which the two powerful groups hope to move to their moments of fulfillment.

The second fact is that in spite of the paucity of Communist numbers Communism *is* a factor to reckon with in the South African situation. It wants neither the Afrikaner nor the African to move to his moment of fulfillment on terms not dictated by it. Throughout its history, it has shown that it is prepared to play one group against the other for the ultimate purpose of destroy-

ing both in order to remain the only dominant influence in South African life.

To the uncommitted African, Communism is acceptable for a number of reasons, the most striking of which is that it sees creation, life, and the human experience from limited perspectives. But when these prove inadequate, Communism does not examine its premises, but insists on maintaining its closed mind. Therefore, it can never be in the wrong; it is always the other man, the other group, who differs and so holds a monopoly on vice. It justifies itself not by approaching the truth objectively but by destroying the nonconformist. And the African is not a stranger to this destruction of the personality in order to justify an ideological preference.

Second, Communism sets the greatest store by the group, ignoring the fact that the group can be as fallible as the individual. But because it is more powerful, its capacity for doing harm is infinitely greater, for Communism allows no checks on the abuse of power by the group. History shows that where it was allowed complete freedom to do what it liked, the group was brutal, callous, and often corrupt. Communism stipulates that there can be no rottenness in it; otherwise, it would make provision for its authority to be limited. People who are emerging from one form of group domination want to tread warily in order not to land themselves in another form of it.

Third, Communism is a dehumanizing philosophy of vengeance. Its starting point is hatred for the capitalist; it sees in his destruction the only condition for its own success. This hatred, this constant threat to the capitalist, keeps a perpetual cloud of war hovering above humanity's head, and it also serves as the gravest danger to the freedom and security of those peoples who have just won their liberty and who are beginning to give visible meaning to it in the light of their own experience. This is not a form of defense for the capitalist, who is often just as unscrupulous a materialist as any Communist dictator. It is to say merely that the capitalist is an individual with as much right to life—and not the exploitation of his fellow men—as the Communist.

When Communism has liquidated the capitalist, it establishes a dictatorship in which the ordinary worker becomes the slave of the Communist masters. The individual is, of course, promised the paradise of the classless society where no man exploits another, but the price for that is the destruction of the individual. Therefore, any way of life that accepts vengeance as a virtue will destroy liberty—and especially in Africa, where there is every possible reason to hate and seek vengeance.

Finally, the limited horizons from which Communism sees life and the contempt it has for the individual—expressed most clearly in its preference for dictatorship—restrict the enlargement of the human personality. The fixed stereotypes it prescribes—which were evolved, really, for conditions in Europe—will cripple this growth and make the African a second-class European instead of the equal of every other human being.

For freedom for the African can be real only when it works for the continuous enlargement of his personality. The generations in the house of bondage awakened in him a dimension that makes this a condition of survival. As long as the growth of his personality is not crippled, he will enlarge it and equip himself for the task of creating a civilization that will be the finest tribute to the genius of man, something far better and nobler than the Communist paradise. Communism does not, however, recognize the African's right to this growth. Its repeated betrayal of his fight against apartheid, so clearly revealed in its insistence on the African's fighting on its terms, is not just a piece of political bungling. On the contrary, it is a systematic attempt to destroy those notions of liberty that do not suit the Communist pattern, to give to freedom the form of content that will transform the individual into a stereotype with built-in hatreds and deliberately limited perspectives. Africa cannot make her distinctive contribution to human advancement if her mind is so imprisoned.

The third conclusion is that parity in the power reserves means that the phase of African reasonableness in the approach to the race crisis is coming to an end. Events have placed him in the

ing both in order to remain the only dominant influence in South African life.

To the uncommitted African, Communism is acceptable for a number of reasons, the most striking of which is that it sees creation, life, and the human experience from limited perspectives. But when these prove inadequate, Communism does not examine its premises, but insists on maintaining its closed mind. Therefore, it can never be in the wrong; it is always the other man, the other group, who differs and so holds a monopoly on vice. It justifies itself not by approaching the truth objectively but by destroying the nonconformist. And the African is not a stranger to this destruction of the personality in order to justify an ideological preference.

Second, Communism sets the greatest store by the group, ignoring the fact that the group can be as fallible as the individual. But because it is more powerful, its capacity for doing harm is infinitely greater, for Communism allows no checks on the abuse of power by the group. History shows that where it was allowed complete freedom to do what it liked, the group was brutal, callous, and often corrupt. Communism stipulates that there can be no rottenness in it; otherwise, it would make provision for its authority to be limited. People who are emerging from one form of group domination want to tread warily in order not to land themselves in another form of it.

Third, Communism is a dehumanizing philosophy of vengeance. Its starting point is hatred for the capitalist; it sees in his destruction the only condition for its own success. This hatred, this constant threat to the capitalist, keeps a perpetual cloud of war hovering above humanity's head, and it also serves as the gravest danger to the freedom and security of those peoples who have just won their liberty and who are beginning to give visible meaning to it in the light of their own experience. This is not a form of defense for the capitalist, who is often just as unscrupulous a materialist as any Communist dictator. It is to say merely that the capitalist is an individual with as much right to life—and not the exploitation of his fellow men—as the Communist.

When Communism has liquidated the capitalist, it establishes a dictatorship in which the ordinary worker becomes the slave of the Communist masters. The individual is, of course, promised the paradise of the classless society where no man exploits another, but the price for that is the destruction of the individual. Therefore, any way of life that accepts vengeance as a virtue will destroy liberty—and especially in Africa, where there is every possible reason to hate and seek vengeance.

Finally, the limited horizons from which Communism sees life and the contempt it has for the individual—expressed most clearly in its preference for dictatorship—restrict the enlargement of the human personality. The fixed stereotypes it prescribes—which were evolved, really, for conditions in Europe—will cripple this growth and make the African a second-class European instead of the equal of every other human being.

For freedom for the African can be real only when it works for the continuous enlargement of his personality. The generations in the house of bondage awakened in him a dimension that makes this a condition of survival. As long as the growth of his personality is not crippled, he will enlarge it and equip himself for the task of creating a civilization that will be the finest tribute to the genius of man, something far better and nobler than the Communist paradise. Communism does not, however, recognize the African's right to this growth. Its repeated betrayal of his fight against apartheid, so clearly revealed in its insistence on the African's fighting on its terms, is not just a piece of political bungling. On the contrary, it is a systematic attempt to destroy those notions of liberty that do not suit the Communist pattern, to give to freedom the form of content that will transform the individual into a stereotype with built-in hatreds and deliberately limited perspectives. Africa cannot make her distinctive contribution to human advancement if her mind is so imprisoned.

The third conclusion is that parity in the power reserves means that the phase of African reasonableness in the approach to the race crisis is coming to an end. Events have placed him in the

position where his initiatives will henceforth set the pace of movement toward his goals. In this situation, he will want to alter the balance of power reserves in his favor. This, then, is the real significance of training saboteurs, and it is not unreasonable to expect that conditions of instability will be intensified even further, making it possible for anything to happen at any time.

The government's answer to these dangers is to arm the white community to the teeth. Since women are being trained openly in the use of firearms, the crisis mood is deliberately being developed in the white community. The tensions that result from this on both sides of the color line make a collision inevitable; and when it comes, it is difficult to see how the independent African states can fold their arms and do no more than cheer the black peoples from the sidelines. Africa's honor, self-respect, and dignity are at stake in the fight against apartheid. The West African high command is not being established to flatter African vanity, nor did the Winniba secret conference of dependent peoples, which met in Ghana toward the middle of 1961, assemble for purposes of mutual admiration. It agreed on the need for the various political groups opposing race oppressions in each country to present a united front; it stressed the need for the regional coordination of resistance against white domination and emphasized the importance of concerted, simultaneous action. These are danger signs no sane man can mistake. The peoples of Africa are determined to cleanse their continent of the scourge of apartheid. And when the explosion comes in the republic, the independent states will be involved directly or indirectly. This will mean war in Africa. It is difficult to imagine America or Russia remaining neutral in a war to decide the fate of the most important continent in the ideological struggle.

The fourth conclusion is that the relative stability in South Africa is the result not of a fortuitous combination of circumstances but of systematic planning over a period of about fifty years. This has produced a tradition of realistic statesmanship among Africans, which will still respond to positive attempts to

find a feasible solution to the race problem. The area of its effectiveness is getting smaller each day, but there is no doubt that the tradition itself is deeply rooted in the life of the African people. The consequent malleability to which this gives rise remains one very hopeful factor in the race crisis.

Finally, property is likely to be the next point of concerted attack by the black and white opponents of apartheid. This is the plane where race oppression's vulnerability is great. For the first time in the history of South Africa within the last fifty years, the possibility is now real that the opponents of apartheid may reach real agreement on strategy. In the past, unity could not be forged, largely because there was no *modus vivendi* all major anti-apartheid groups on the nonwhite side could accept with confidence. Violence to property is the new unifying factor because, among other things, it insures the fair distribution of suffering and hits the race oppressor where it hurts most. Finally, manpower sacrifices would be on the minimal side, and no very great skill in the use of fire would be required. All these considerations attract the militant African nationalists. The Communists too can support the destruction of capitalist property with a very clean conscience, as well as the Trotskyites, who have long seen in this weapon the only real means of driving a little more common sense into the "granite" heads of the Afrikaner nationalists.

All these factors combine to emphasize one truth: That bullets will not save apartheid from its deserved fate; that, at the same time, they will not establish that peace and stability every section of the nation needs to make better use of its life. Once the problem is viewed from all these angles, it becomes possible to see apartheid in clearer light. It then emerges as a phenomenon that is too complex to be dismissed as a mere political outlook or an ideological aberration. It is seen primarily as a way of life evolved in unusual circumstances for the purpose of guaranteeing survival to the Afrikaner and winning his right to a place in the South African sun. Fundamentalism, absolutism, repudiation, and race hatred are the main pillars of this life—not because the Afrikaner is incorrigibly backward, wicked, dishonest, or callous,

but because they are integral parts of the only political heritage it was his lot to inherit from history. The trek into the interior and the decades in the wild plains of Southern Africa cut him off from the main stream of European civilization. His numerical weakness exposed him to the danger of extinction. And the turbulent events overseas, liberalized European attitudes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, bypassed him. He was involved in a different kind of turbulence: He was fighting for survival against Dingane, Moshoeshoe, and Sekhukhuni.

The image of a changed Europe was to be brought to him by the officials of the Dutch Government, for he had turned his back on Holland and no longer regarded himself as bound to her. Then came the English, who were a different people, upholding an alien culture. They, too, adhered to a liberal outlook on life, and their economic and military superiority made them as great a threat to his survival as the African was. His guarantee of security in this situation was to hold on to whatever was his own with a fierce tenacity: the fundamentalist dynamic, group exclusiveness, self-consciousness, repudiation, the temper of the slave owner, a blind love for his people, language, and history, and fearlessness. These were integral parts of his culture and make-up, and their validity sprang from the fact that they had brought him to his moment of fulfillment.

The damage these attributes have wrought on the relations between black and white in the republic and the embarrassments they have caused in the Commonwealth in particular and the free world generally are thus not just the visible expressions of a delinquent group mind. They are a desperate attempt to give permanent and valid meaning to life in an environment the Afrikaner believes, rightly or wrongly, to be hostile. But this tragic groping away from insecurity is not unique among the Afrikaners, not an exclusively Afrikaans aberration. Wherever men, women, and children battle for survival instead of living; wherever they are hungry, cold, despised, neglected, or threatened—then they either grope away from insecurity or march toward security. The distinction is an important one for two

reasons: The one process is basically negative, often motivated by hatred and vengeance; the other is positive. Second, groping implies a lack of method or order in moving toward declared goals—an absence of sound guiding ideals. Wherever this is the case, collisions become inevitable. Marching, however, connotes orderly, principled movement.

In Africa at the moment, the two processes are taking place simultaneously in opposite directions. This is particularly the case in the republic of South Africa. Apartheid gropes away from insecurity, African nationalism marches to freedom. In this situation the prospects of a collision require no emphasis.

We have seen how men groped away from insecurity in Europe after the Industrial Revolution to evolve Communism. The hunger and insecurity following World War I produced Nazism and fascism. From the cleft historical stick in South Africa, there has emerged a familiar groping. Its name is apartheid, and it moves toward final disaster along a pattern that is too well known to make Dr. Verwoerd convincing when he says apartheid means justice for all. But the immediate danger is no less important, for apartheid has transformed South Africa into one of the most sensitive spots on the globe. Since what happens in South Africa affects the continent intimately, Africa itself is turned into a sensitive continent. Mankind cannot afford too many such areas. Their increase creates instability, real progress is retarded, insecurity follows. Then, more people join the groping stampede, the Communists add to the confusion, and the vicious circle that develops culminates inevitably in war.

If apartheid is viewed in this light, three other conclusions become possible. First, it is seen as an attempt to fill the vacuum that has existed in the relations between black and white from the days of the Dutch East India Company. Second, the tensions it generates in the community of nations place it in the position where it cannot remain a domestic matter for South Africa, if only because humanity has an inescapable obligation to regard it as one of its most urgent problems. Third, mankind cannot solve the problem it creates merely by raising arms in impotent

horror or by ganging up with the African against the whites, since that would be simply to emulate Dr. Verwoerd. Racism is a wicked thing from the white or the African side of the color line, because it debases the personality of man by corrupting the racist and degrading his victim. An immoral act on the white side does not become a virtue on the African; viciousness is no cure for wickedness. No, an evil is conquered by producing a better idea. Thus, the real answer to white racism is an ethic whose strength will spring from its having the same meaning on both sides of the color line.

If apartheid threatens to engulf the continent in an ugly racial war, it also confronts the African statesman with an inescapable challenge—one that faces the free world too. The problem for the African statesman is not how to get the Afrikaner out of Africa, since there is no room for such thinking in a people with an awakened moral dimension. Rather, the problem is how to integrate him in the life of the nation and enable him to become the wanted and welcome neighbor of all his countrymen, instead of being regarded as a menace to their security and happiness.

If apartheid is seen in this light, the obvious answer to the problem it creates is to shift the center of social, political, cultural, and economic gravity from reliance on the unity and power of the like-colored group, as a guarantee of security and survival, to the unity and power of the like-minded individuals, regardless of race or color. This is not an easy thing to do because it entails corroding the crusts of prejudice in such ways as to convince both the African and the whites that democratic values, given the same meaning on both sides of the color line, are better bonds of national unity and more reliable guarantees of security for the individual and the group than race consciousness or blood affinities. The alternative is war. Finally, then, the answer lies in realizing that the real issue at stake in the race crisis is not the mere winning of a political victory; it is to enable men, fellow citizens, to see the truth.

All this means a clean break with much of the past on both

sides of the color line—a revolution in the minds of men, women, and children. It entails the acceptance of a new sense of nationhood—one that will allow no human being to be punished for belonging to a particular racial group. In that setup, not only would the individual be free to make the best possible use of his life, but it would be society's duty to see to it that he was enabled to do so to the best of his ability. Then, too, the positive aspects of the various traditions that give meaning to life among the peoples who have made South Africa their home would be recognized as the different, desirable, and legitimate expressions of the varied genius of a mixed nation whose peoples were bound together by loyalties with the same meaning on both sides of the color line. The sum total would, in the end, be a cultural amalgam, which would have the only claim to being recognized as a truly South African culture.

Blood links need not forever remain the only bonds of unity among men. The most powerful nations in the world today are mixed communities whose peoples are knit together not by race or color but by the values of life they cherish together. South Africa is ripe for a nonracial type of unity. In the social order envisaged above, the African will not see in threats to Afrikaner survival the guarantees of his own security. Where citizenship has a nonracial meaning, the various groups will see in threats to any one of them a danger to themselves. The collective strength of the whole will be at the disposal of all the component groups. The African, the Afrikaner, the Asian, the colored, the British, and the Jew will then march arm in arm to defend together those things they value most and that have the same meaning in their lives—their country, their freedom, and their independence. The reserves of power each group has will be there to facilitate collaboration. Education in the schools will be oriented in a different direction.

The ultimate aim in all this would be to give a new and more positive meaning to life; to free the thinking of all our peoples from the grip of fears that belong to the childhood days of the nation; to release the creative energies of all groups for the pur-

pose of exploiting the wealth of the country for the good of all; and to close a chapter in our history in order to march to a more satisfying future. Above all, the intention would be to build a nation dedicated to the ideal of enlarging the human personality in ways that will make peace, security, prosperity, and contentment the birthright of every South African. This is the ideal this book has been written to present as the alternative to apartheid. It is an attainable end, given the will, the leadership, and the concern for realities. It prescribes that each racial group should discard the irreconcilable angularities in its own attitudes to facilitate agreement on ultimate objectives. These irreconcilables are expendable, particularly where the alternative would be war.

Movement toward the above goal has of necessity to be on two planes that complement each other. There has got to be a good deal of demolition—a clearing of the physical, mental, and spiritual debris accumulated by the temper of the slave owner over the generations. There must also be the will to reconstruct. The destruction of apartheid will not be an end; it will be only a process of clearing the way for something better for all. To get the best results for all, black and white initiatives would have to be coordinated and harnessed in establishing the social order in whose maintenance all groups will feel they have a vested interest.

Coordination has a special importance for South Africa at this moment in her history. It has the potential to become the most powerful influence capable of challenging apartheid successfully without sharpening racial antagonisms to dangerous extremes. This power has got to be built up *now* so that when apartheid collapses there will be a solid bloc of tested and effective non-racial opinion both to prevent the excesses of passion that have ruined the Congo and to entrench the democratic tradition against political disrupters who would use chaos to advance their own ideological ends. But coordination has another use. Race oppression has wrought so much harm in the relations between black and white that we should be ready for riots, strikes, and other disturbances immediately after apartheid's collapse. Coordination, however, will narrow down the area of racial

violence and preserve stability because it will be supported by people from all the racial groups. In short, there must be built a strong sector of opinion that will function as a nonracial buffer, strong enough to check racialism from either side and constructive enough in its purpose to fill the political vacuum that will be created by apartheid's fall.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that in a mixed society a purely African victory will project the racial dynamic as the decisive factor in the freedom struggle. If this were allowed to happen, it would weaken the loyalties based on values, perpetuate the tradition of relying on group power and loyalty, and give a new lease on life to race conflict in conditions where pogroms could ultimately become inevitable. We have seen how the reluctance to build up coordination as an effective force has led to a very important change of African attitudes to violence. If the dilly-dallying continues, we might wake up one day to find that the two moods of African nationalism have vanished and that in their place there is a solid bloc of racial opinion. When it challenges apartheid, it will ask for no quarter, as it will expect to be given none. There is danger here, though, for the African himself. Inasmuch as white domination is failing because it can not break the spirit of the African people, a victorious African nationalism inspired by hatred could never be in the position to drive the white man or the Indian into the sea without reckoning with a world opinion that, as Dr. Verwoerd has learned, can be cripplingly hostile. For democracy's victory to be complete, it has got to be won by all the peoples who make up the South African nation working in concert.

Reconstruction connotes the laying of new foundations in place of the old. The long history of conflict between black and white teaches that neither side can destroy the other without losing a lot, materially and spiritually. Where this has proved to be the case, the sensible thing is to abandon policies based on conflict, sit down in an effort to agree on how best to live together, and seek to build on new foundations. The British tried this in 1852, when they gave the Cape a nonracial right to vote.

In 1912, the Africans pledged themselves to fight for the extension of the area of liberty. But it was to take nearly fifty years after the first Bloemfontein Conference for the Afrikaner authors of *Delayed Action* to realize that in the final reckoning agreement on ultimate objectives is the only reliable guarantee of survival for the white minority in a predominantly black continent. One cannot read *Delayed Action* without being impressed by the sense of responsibility and the moral courage that inspired its writing or by the sincerity with which most contributors uphold the dignity of the person, regardless of race or color. Here is the resurgence of a spirit many feared had long died in the Afrikaans community. The persecution Maynier suffered is being atoned for.

These developments indicate positive movements toward a constructive goal, which gives hope to South Africa. They are milestones to guide all of us toward a just society, and the tradition they give expression to has its roots deep in the history of the African, the Afrikaner, and the British. That it has not been dominant in South African life is due mainly to the fact that its advocates worked virtually in isolation in their respective communities. But the crisis in which the country is caught necessitates an urgent revision of strategy. It is no longer realistic to denounce apartheid from within one's racial group; as a matter of fact, to do so might be to invite defeat. Decisive, coordinated, nonracial action is what the times call for if the country has to be saved. The British nonracialist, the African advocate of race equality, and the Afrikaner democrat must join hands across the racial or linguistic fences in a vast and irresistible movement of moral and political protest against injustice. Those who are committed to the same values of life have the duty to stand together in defending them against attacks from all sides. Such an upsurge of opinion has the highest potential to return South Africa to the path of democratic sanity, to the only destiny we can look to as a mixed nation.

We cannot forever be wrangling about the fact that one human being is black, another brown or white. It does not

really take anybody far. Over the last three hundred years, it has been tried, but it has not made life richer for black or white. On the contrary, at a time when the country should be gearing its economy to satisfying the markets opening up in Africa, the republic is face to face with disaster from inside and outside. It cannot be otherwise when most of the country's best brains waste more time planning how to erect double doors to public places for the separation of one race from the others. The problems that clamor for solution pass by relatively neglected—for example, the fight to raise the standards of living for all our peoples; the need to remove ignorance, poverty, and disease from our national life; and, with our nonracial resources, the opportunity of furnishing the rest of sub-Saharan Africa with trained personnel and leading the continent to the realization of a fuller and richer life. These are the great challenges that clamor for a coordinated answer from black, brown, and white alike. We cannot tackle them successfully as long as we see our problems from the perspective of the ghetto mentality by which Dr. Verwoerd sets so much store.

Now that the goal has been defined, the question that rises is this: How can black and white move toward it with any hope of success? It can be done in two clear ways. The first is to confront apartheid immediately with economic disaster. Sweet words, appeals to reason, moral pleas, angry denunciations, or threats not backed by decisive action will not make Dr. Verwoerd and his followers abandon apartheid. It is too vital an ingredient in the make-up of Afrikaner nationalism. Since the separation of one from the other cannot be effected without catastrophe of some kind, the choice is limited only to economic disaster and war. It would require an advanced form of insanity for anybody inside the republic to advocate the use of war as a solution to South Africa's race problem because an explosion in this part of the continent could quite conceivably ignite a world conflagration and saddle black and white in the republic with problems of incalculable complexity.

Although well-aimed economic pressures from inside and out-

side would crack the superstructure of apartheid without producing unnecessary bloodshed or widening the area of violence, the government has shown quite clearly that its answer to agitations for reform is the bullet. Therefore, internal demands for change can be pressed only to a very limited point unless we want bloodshed, for where the state is well armed and the Africans are unarmed, it makes little sense to choose to fight on ground where defeat is a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the first people to feel the shock of economic disaster would be the Africans themselves. Millions of them live well below the subsistence level, and any collapse in the economy would send them onto the streets. This, some people feel, militates against the use of economic disaster against apartheid. The African, however, sees the problem from a wholly different angle. To him, apartheid is but the continuation of the temper of the slave owner he has been fighting on and off the battlefield for nearly three hundred years. He is on a crusade; he has paid dearly in the fight to protect his being and uphold his dignity, and it has been a fierce war, fought by every man, woman, and child, every day of their lives, on every imaginable plane. So an economic blow will not bring in new or unknown types of suffering because when you go to war, you don't expect to be treated with much consideration by your enemy.

Against this background, the African attitude emerges in clearer outlines. The people argue that they are very much in the position of the Jews in Hitler's concentration camps, from which there was no escape. If the prisoners could have spoken their minds, not an inconsiderable number of them would probably have said that each time they heard the noise of Allied bombers over the camps, their hopes were raised. If given the choice between the bombardment of their camps and the return to their bases of the Allied planes, those prisoners would have elected to perish in the knowledge that this would shorten the wicked rule of the Nazis. This is precisely the attitude of the Africans. To us too, it would be better to perish from hunger rather than perpetuate our humiliation and poverty by accepting the bread

crumbs from the Afrikaner nationalist's bloodstained hand. It would be better to suffer acutely for a short while to bring our misery to an end than to feel less pain indefinitely out of false consideration for our welfare.

The Afrikaner nationalist will change his mind about apartheid only when he clearly sees that it hurts him, that it threatens his survival. Apartheid has got to be pushed to such an extremity that the Afrikaner will see in it a threat to his security, for then, and then only, will he change his mind.

The second thing to do to move black and white toward the goal outlined in this chapter is to have a program of reconstruction that complements the first. It would be based on coordinated black and white initiatives. Its aims would be to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of apartheid, to give the Afrikaner nationalist an alternative loyalty, to extend to him that respect and security that are his because he is a member of the human family, and to free him from the grip of race hatred and the temper of the slave owner. His history shows that it was not until he came face to face with the reality of disaster that he reassessed his position and adapted himself to the demands of changed situations. If the intention is not to destroy him, effective pressures can be exerted with a clear conscience—particularly if he is given alternatives that are morally sound and acclaimed by humanity, do not injure his self-respect, and extricate him from the claws of a Frankenstein he has created for himself. For it was not until he had come face to face with disaster in the first South African republic that he decided to come to terms with the British. History might be repeating itself now, since he is face to face with disaster again. The chances are that he might make his peace with the Africans, but we have got to push him to this point with the irresistible determination of just men.

The suggestions that follow are designed to facilitate demolition. A separate program of reconstruction will be given later.

1. Apartheid should be outlawed. This should be done to serve the limited purpose of confronting it with that type of economic disaster which will bring about its collapse without impairing

the physical unity of the nation. Provision should be made for speedy reconstruction.

2. The free world should know that external pressures remain the only weapon which can destroy apartheid without producing bloodshed on a vast scale internally. The apartheid government cannot reply to a Swedish boycott by shooting Africans. On the other hand, the actual loss of external markets forces it, as the sensational relaxation of liquor laws shows, to adopt more reasonable policies at home.

3. The United Nations should take over the mandated territory of South-West Africa and prepare it for independence within a prescribed period. The excision of such a large part of the apartheid empire, now that the chance to incorporate the protectorates has been lost, will confront the Afrikaner nationalist with that type of disaster which should make him pause to ask himself if apartheid still pays. Again, he cannot murder children at Sharpeville when the United Nations acts in the mandated territory.

4. The dock workers of the world should blacklist apartheid ships and refuse to handle goods of apartheid manufacture. The Christian church in the free world should raise its voice powerfully in support of this type of action. It would make nonviolence effective. The church has up to now not distinguished itself in the fight to defend its principles against apartheid's attacks on it. It is time the church moved in.

5. America should be pressed to stop subsidizing apartheid by buying gold procured under apartheid conditions.

6. African states like Nyasaland should refrain from exporting labor to the gold mines of the republic.

7. Free-world universities should translate their opposition to apartheid's degradation of the human personality by resorting to more effective action. For example, they could insist that for every white student accepted from South Africa, a nonwhite should also be given a passport. International student associations should sever relations with South African student unions supporting apartheid.

8. The United Nations should adopt a more constructive attitude toward the race crisis. It should send to the republic a powerful

good-offices commission to make an authoritative study of the local situation, on the spot, for the purpose of working out a formula or a program of reform likely to be supported from both sides of the color line. A program of reconciliation worked on the spot could be a formidable weapon when used as an alternative to apartheid. United Nations denunciations of race oppression would cease to be negative; they would have focus.

9. If South Africa continues to be deaf to reason—she is deaf simply because the free world allows her to be—the free world should make it impossible for her to continue to be a member of the United Nations.

10. Internally, encouragement should be given to the habit of thinking in nonracial terms on both sides of the color line. Properly trained African clergymen should be appointed to white congregations willing to have them. Nonracialism should be encouraged on every possible plane. A white community which showed it was changing its attitude would encourage sections of African opinion to want to negotiate a settlement. A start could be made in this direction by representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church meeting those of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation for the purpose of examining together the moral foundations of the relations between black and white.

11. The African, for his part, should resist the temptation to gang up on a racial basis against the whites. Whenever the opportunity presents itself for an honorable settlement of the race problem, he should show a readiness to consider it on its own merits. He must be willing not only to shoulder responsibility but to give leadership to both black and white.

12. The real friends of South Africa should insure that the legal and political structure of the nonracial society to replace apartheid is a federal constitution, which makes provision for four types of federating provinces—those in which Afrikaner initiatives are the dominant influence, those in which the African has the biggest say, those in which the British are the key factor, and the nonracial provinces.

The chief value of this program lies in the fact that the pressures and crises it advocates can always be stopped the moment

apartheid changes its attitudes. Second, those who exert these pressures will keep the initiative to influence events in their hands. The Africans and the whites who oppose apartheid are then placed in the position to effect a peaceful revolution, which is what South Africa really needs. Finally, the successful exertion of these pressures would be proof of democracy's effectiveness in one of Africa's most challenging situations.

The last suggestion in the program outlined above belongs more appropriately to the phase of reconstruction. But because demolition and reconstruction are complementary, it has been included here to give focus to internal and external pressures against apartheid. The Afrikaner's fear of being swamped by the Africans in a nonracial society constitutes a challenge that any statesmanlike approach to South Africa's race crisis must take into account.

The federal constitution—not an original idea, since quite a number of organizations and leading personalities have advocated it from both sides of the color line—would ensure that the Afrikaans minority had areas in the country it could regard as its "homelands." Within these, it would be free to develop its culture and language and, at the same time, make its distinctive contribution to the progress and prosperity of the whole.

In each ethnic province, the language and culture of the dominant group would become the main influences, and nonracial areas would, of course, be free to adopt cultural patterns of their choice. This arrangement gives each culture not only the soil, as it were, in which to nurture itself, but the room for adapting itself to changing circumstances, and it places a premium on collaboration, more or less in the way the different Swiss cultural groups have one loyalty but different homelands. Thus, the Afrikaans areas would not discriminate against the African, nor would he expect the Afrikaner to be treated differently in the black provinces. The principle would apply to every other ethnic group as well, and this process of give and take would develop the habit of interdependence. It would cement real national unity.

We are dealing here with a very complicated human situation, in which there is no short cut to success, no magic formula, which can transform South Africa overnight into a paradise for everybody. We have to take into account the difficulties inherent in the whole race crisis and the factors favoring change. Out of these, we have to evolve a course of action that will enable people on both sides to realize where their interests are identical; a course that will make them move as far forward, without war, as they can, in unity. If some people prefer to move as individuals, as the liberals are doing; if others feel securer when they march as groups, as some nationalists on both sides prefer to do—statesmanship should encourage both for moving forward rather than block them by an inflexible and doctrinaire adherence to the narrower aspects of ideological propriety.

The Afrikaner nationalist who rejects Verwoerdism and who accepts race equality in a federal structure is already moving forward. There has already been awakened in him the sense of real South African nationhood. He is already struggling to come to terms with reality. And if he is prepared to accept democracy within a given constitutional framework, we should rejoice at that and meet him halfway. He has covered a long distance by repudiating the narrower loyalties that his group prescribes for a good South African. Therefore, efforts should at all times be concentrated on enabling him to see the democratic truth in increasingly clearer light, since this is the essence of democracy and good neighborliness, and a similar attitude should be adopted toward the African nationalist. It is difficult to see how national unity can be created unless this approach is adopted.

The real aim behind the federal ideal is to balance conflicting ethnic or cultural interests, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure their harmonious coordination as a guarantee of viability for the state. A community that had its cultural and linguistic roots firmly established in its homelands would be in no danger of cultural swamping. The right to secede would moderate the rapacity of a racial majority that had oppressive inclinations. Besides, the power reserves are likely to be with us for a long

time, working to modify racial angularities; although their forms will definitely change in a free society, their effectiveness will not be entirely destroyed. For a long time after emancipation, the white community will still have the skills without which a modern state cannot be run. The "acceptors" in the African community will not suddenly elect to abandon the cultural amalgam built on borrowings from all sides of the color line. As more Africans enter the skilled trades, more wealth will be created, and it will be in the interests of the Afrikaner farmer to have a contented black community able and willing to buy his produce. If a collective racial mind has not developed among the Africans when political conditions favored it, it is doubtful that it will suddenly emerge when every African has the opportunity to make better use of his life in a society that has rejected race prejudice.

We are merely at the beginning of a great experiment in human relationships. It has taken us three centuries to get to this point. Three hundred years from today people will most probably no longer be thinking in terms of race. They will just be South Africans. The narrow loyalties that belong to the childhood days of any nation will possibly have been outgrown, and men will have learned that the individual has an intrinsic value transcending race. They will concentrate on developing it for the purpose of enlarging the human personality and enriching life. But until the advent of that happy day, every nerve should be strained to do what is just and possible—to lay the solid foundations from which a great African nation will rise.

Some Afrikaner nationalists might argue in all sincerity that the homelands in a federal republic would be no guarantee of survival for Afrikanerdom. The homelands idea, of course, is borrowed from their side; but if they think it is good for the African, surely it must be good for them too. If, however, what they mean is that their domination of the African is the only guarantee of survival they will accept, then we might as well face the fact frankly that salvation for the African would lie in preparing for war as the only solution to the race problem.

If they want to have the lion's share of the land of Africa and shunt the African majority to the eroded and crowded reserves, the black man will not have much of a choice other than to teach himself and his children to know no rest until they drive the last Afrikaner out of South Africa, back to Europe. These realities must be faced because people are thinking and talking about them. If the Afrikaner nationalist is determined to keep by force of arms what he holds, he should realize that the African will one day seize by force that which was taken away from him. The emergence of African states will have been in vain if it does not enable them to supply arms to the Africans in the republic to redress a historical injustice. Force provokes force. It might not be today; it must come sooner or later.

Afrikaner nationalists might say that, human nature being what it is, the African would have every reason to want to avenge himself on the whites the moment he had the power to do it, and this would rob the federal ideal of whatever value it might have. It must be conceded at the very outset that in the last analysis man has not as yet evolved a foolproof and permanent guarantee of survival for himself. Since apartheid itself has not done this for the Afrikaner in Africa, what chance of survival do one and a half million people have against two hundred million black people? No, treaties, conventions, armies, and laws are no permanent guarantees; the only reliable ones in human relations are the willing mind and the consenting heart, and it is these that the Afrikaner is offered in this study.

The point about human nature might be pursued a little further. It is true that it is the same among all races of man; it is characterized by greed, selfishness, and hatred—just as it is by love, magnanimity, and justice. What matters, however, is not that there is this mixture of vice and virtue in the human bosom. Man was created like that, and nobody can do anything about it. What is important is that exposure to given conditions makes man either virtuous or wicked. The factors that determine his conduct are many and complicated—among others, his environment, his culture, and his temperament. Thus, if the Afrikaner national-

time, working to modify racial angularities; although their forms will definitely change in a free society, their effectiveness will not be entirely destroyed. For a long time after emancipation, the white community will still have the skills without which a modern state cannot be run. The "acceptors" in the African community will not suddenly elect to abandon the cultural amalgam built on borrowings from all sides of the color line. As more Africans enter the skilled trades, more wealth will be created, and it will be in the interests of the Afrikaner farmer to have a contented black community able and willing to buy his produce. If a collective racial mind has not developed among the Africans when political conditions favored it, it is doubtful that it will suddenly emerge when every African has the opportunity to make better use of his life in a society that has rejected race prejudice.

We are merely at the beginning of a great experiment in human relationships. It has taken us three centuries to get to this point. Three hundred years from today people will most probably no longer be thinking in terms of race. They will just be South Africans. The narrow loyalties that belong to the childhood days of any nation will possibly have been outgrown, and men will have learned that the individual has an intrinsic value transcending race. They will concentrate on developing it for the purpose of enlarging the human personality and enriching life. But until the advent of that happy day, every nerve should be strained to do what is just and possible—to lay the solid foundations from which a great African nation will rise.

Some Afrikaner nationalists might argue in all sincerity that the homelands in a federal republic would be no guarantee of survival for Afrikanerdom. The homelands idea, of course, is borrowed from their side; but if they think it is good for the African, surely it must be good for them too. If, however, what they mean is that their domination of the African is the only guarantee of survival they will accept, then we might as well face the fact frankly that salvation for the African would lie in preparing for war as the only solution to the race problem.

If they want to have the lion's share of the land of Africa and shunt the African majority to the eroded and crowded reserves, the black man will not have much of a choice other than to teach himself and his children to know no rest until they drive the last Afrikaner out of South Africa, back to Europe. These realities must be faced because people are thinking and talking about them. If the Afrikaner nationalist is determined to keep by force of arms what he holds, he should realize that the African will one day seize by force that which was taken away from him. The emergence of African states will have been in vain if it does not enable them to supply arms to the Africans in the republic to redress a historical injustice. Force provokes force. It might not be today; it must come sooner or later.

Afrikaner nationalists might say that, human nature being what it is, the African would have every reason to want to avenge himself on the whites the moment he had the power to do it, and this would rob the federal ideal of whatever value it might have. It must be conceded at the very outset that in the last analysis man has not as yet evolved a foolproof and permanent guarantee of survival for himself. Since apartheid itself has not done this for the Afrikaner in Africa, what chance of survival do one and a half million people have against two hundred million black people? No, treaties, conventions, armies, and laws are no permanent guarantees; the only reliable ones in human relations are the willing mind and the consenting heart, and it is these that the Afrikaner is offered in this study.


The point about human nature might be pursued a little further. It is true that it is the same among all races of man; it is characterized by greed, selfishness, and hatred—just as it is by love, magnanimity, and justice. What matters, however, is not that there is this mixture of vice and virtue in the human bosom. Man was created like that, and nobody can do anything about it. What is important is that exposure to given conditions makes man either virtuous or wicked. The factors that determine his conduct are many and complicated—among others, his environment, his culture, and his temperament. Thus, if the Afrikaner national-

ist sees the race problem from the angle of survival, it does not follow that the African, who has been affected by different influences, will view it only from the same angle. If fulfillment for the Afrikaner nationalist lies in limiting the growth of his personality and that of his neighbors, there is no valid reason why the African nationalist, who has been brought up in a different tradition, should not see fulfillment for himself in its enlargement.

No attempt is made here to deny that some Africans are thinking seriously of, and planning for, vengeance. Others are thinking in the opposite direction. That is how human communities behave. Forces are at work in the African community that move thought in different directions. This is as things should be in a racial group that has been affected in the way we have been by so many conflicting influences. The wise thing to do, then, is to note that there is as yet no collective, racial mind on the African side and to be grateful that this is the case. It is to use this advantage to reinforce those who reject racialism among the black peoples and to cooperate sincerely and effectively with them to narrow down the area of race hatred and lead South Africa along safer routes to a better future.

The concrete first steps to take to achieve this end on the plane of reconstruction include the following:

1. The immediate establishment of a nonracial, democratic, coalition government.
2. The division of the country into a number of culturally autonomous provinces. (See map)
3. The union of these provinces into a federal republic.
4. Voluntary union with the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and the mandated territory of South-West Africa.
5. Universal adult suffrage for all on a common voters' roll.
6. Entrenched guarantees of personal liberty and individual rights.
7. The restoration of the Commonwealth connection.
8. Friendly alliances with the states of Africa.



Map of South Africa, showing the boundaries of the suggested autonomous provinces, including Swaziland and Basutoland

9. Provision for territories and peoples who would later like to join the federal republic.
10. The immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the bans, and the return of all political exiles to their homes.
11. The procurement of active United Nations assistance in establishing the federal republic as an additional protection to the minorities and a precaution against the dislocation of the country's economy.
12. A minimum wage for all unskilled labor.
13. The recognition of the right of all workers to organize and bargain collectively for higher wages and better working conditions.
14. The redistribution of the land along the following lines:
 - a. Heavy taxation on all land not used economically.
 - b. The repeal of all laws restricting the ownership of land.
 - c. The recognition of the right to ownership of the land by any man working it.
 - d. The cutting up of large and unused farm lands into small holdings for the purpose of settling those who want to work the land.
 - e. The extension of Land Bank facilities to all farmers, regardless of race.
15. The encouragement of cooperative enterprise in the urban and rural areas.
16. The break-up of the reserves into farming communities in order to settle in these places only people attracted to the life of peasants.
17. The scientific training and distribution of labor to raise the country's productive potential.
18. The co-ownership of the sources of wealth and of the media for producing and distributing it to ensure that it is shared equitably.
19. An economy geared to the need to raise the standard of living for all citizens without delay.
20. A social security system which included:
 - a. A home ownership plan for all married couples.
 - b. A cheap system of food distribution to place larger and

better quantities of it at the disposal of the largest number possible.

- c. A national health, unemployment, old age insurance scheme.
- 21. Cheaper transportation for the working classes.
- 22. A uniform system of free, compulsory education for all.
- 23. Abolition of the color bar in every walk of life.
- 24. A positive approach to Afrikaner nationalism.
- 25. A joint white-nonwhite campaign to restore to South Africa her good name and standing among the nations.
- 26. The establishment of machinery to make certain that the individual is enabled to make the best possible use of his life, regardless of race.
- 27. The modernization of the penal system.
- 28. The recognition of the right to secede.

This program has not been advanced by any political party. It is presented here solely as a basis for discussion, and it is intended to show which way constructive thinking on the race problem could be directed. Its chief merit is that it stands good chances of being supported by people from all sides of the color line.

A few specific points might require explanation, of which the federal constitution is one. It would cut up the republic of South Africa into no less than thirteen provinces of about the same size each. Both the African and predominantly white groups of provinces would, to start with, have more or less similar problems; but to avoid polarization along racial lines and to facilitate agreement, there would be a catalytic, nonracial cluster of states between the first two. The mere geographic division of the country, however, would be useless by itself. To be effective, it would have to reflect a balance in the economic forces as well. The Afrikaner, who is predominantly a farmer, would control the main granaries of the country. The British would exercise power over two of the most important industrial areas and seaports. And the African provinces would have authority over the vast coal fields of Natal. Between the economic power reserves controlled by

the Africans and the whites, there would be the vast industrial areas of the Witwatersrand and the western Cape, which would be in the nonracial zone.

It is probably on the political plane that the balance would face its severest tests. The mere giving of the vote to every adult citizen could very well become incitement to the African underprivileged to gang up against the privileged minorities. Some minority groups are convinced that this would happen. To meet this objection, the provinces would have the right to veto certain types of legislation which, in their view, threatened their cultural autonomy. The federal principle would be useless in an atmosphere charged with race hatred unless it was reinforced by the veto in clearly defined fields of legislation. After twenty-five years, the veto could be dropped.

No effort is being made here to avoid realities. The white community has, as a whole, been uncompromisingly hostile to any suggestion that the franchise be extended to nonwhites. The argument used to justify this is that it would bring about the swamping of the whites in a tide of color, and this argument has got to be answered. In the first place, it is dangerously unrealistic. The real issue before South Africa is no longer whether or not the African will have the franchise, since the extension of the area of liberty on the continent makes it only a matter of time before the African gets it. If he gets it with the assistance of the whites, the chances are that he might reject the temptation to develop a collective racial mind. If he gets it in spite of white opposition, that could very well be a victory for black racialism.

Ten years ago, there would have been a good case for the qualified vote. Then the power dispositions in Africa were differently oriented. All that has changed now. The African in the republic now has a choice of worlds. If his country continues to treat him with contempt, he can switch his loyalties to Pan-Africanism and regard Accra, Lagos, or even Conakry as his spiritual home. The Pan-African cosmos is essentially the world of the black man, and it holds out to him the promise of fulfillment on terms that do not injure his self-respect. It welcomes

him and assures him of the support of millions who have had the same experience he has had. If he finally turned to them, the fate of the white man in South Africa would be sealed. And if Pan-Africanism is not attractive enough, there is Moscow or Peking. If he turned toward them, the white minority would still stand to lose catastrophically.

White South Africa has to realize that it cannot keep the loyalty of the African as long as its racial policies are a standing insult to him. It must also realize that it now has serious rivals for his loyalty. Although it is a tribute to his maturity and common sense that he has up to now maintained a realistic attitude and not fallen for the offers from outside, this position, it must be noted, will not last for a long time. The African's realism gives the white man his last chance to bridge the gulf between himself and his black countrymen, and he can do this only by offering something more real, permanent, and attractive than anything Pan-Africanism or Communism can promise. The only thing he has left now is the unqualified franchise.

The problem may also be seen from a slightly different angle. Ten years ago, there would have been better chances of getting the African to accept the qualified franchise. The estrangement between black and white had not reached its present extremes, and the social structure of the country then had built-in shock absorbers and safety valves. If the African could not vote in parliamentary elections, he could invest his money in land and trade in the towns like everybody else. If he was not on the common roll of voters in the Cape, he at least had token representation in Parliament and the Cape provincial council; if he was not a skilled worker himself, he could send his children to the best British universities in the land.

These safety valves combined with the racial power reserves to discourage the rapid development of the revolutionary temper. Up to the 1930's, the word "extremist" had connotations in the African community that were almost as odious as those it had among the whites. With the possible exception of A. W. G. Champion of the ICU, few African leaders felt complimented when described as agitators. But when the Afrikaner nationalists

took power, they smashed the shock absorbers and plugged the safety valves; in their place, they set up a solid mental wall of unreason. No matter how reasonable African demands are, they stand no chance of being reasonably considered by the present government; what it prescribes, and only that, is to be accepted. And this, in turn, has created a climate in which most Africans regard policies of moderation as a waste of time, as an encouragement to apartheid. In this situation, the African regards the qualified franchise as a subtle process of getting the whites to gang up against him, with the aid of the more privileged nonwhite groups.

Statesmanship would give the vote to every citizen beyond a certain age and at the same time entrench in law a Bill of Rights to curb racialism from either side. Such a bill would protect the individual against power abuses, on the one hand, and, on the other, insure that the courts of law were also the courts of justice. The granting of the franchise on these terms would have the effect of encouraging African nationalism to abandon the agitatorial approach and to concentrate on using political power to improve the living conditions of the black people.

An aspect of the franchise debate that will become increasingly important in the years ahead might as well be given attention now. Although the ruling community always warns the African that he must earn his right to equal citizenship, there is no constitutional machinery by which to tell when an African is fit to vote. There are no legal conditions he has to satisfy in order to earn the franchise. In the absence of these, it becomes extremely difficult to understand precisely what the white man means when he talks of the African's earning citizenship rights. The real danger in this argument, however, is not in its vagueness, not in its dishonesty, but in its ignoring of the fact that as the African's capacity to influence events increases, while that of the whites diminishes, the white man, too, will have to earn the good will and trust of the African. It is about time serious attention was given to this fact, for both sides will have to give and take on a wider scale if black and white are to live together in Africa.

The extension of the area of political freedom would serve a limited purpose if it was unaccompanied by a corresponding extension of the area of economic contentment. Where the gulf between poverty and wealth has followed racial lines for generations, it would not be enough for the state merely to guarantee the individual the right to make better use of his life. The laws must insure that the wealth is distributed and shared equitably, since the extremes of undiluted capitalism and Communism are not suitable for South African conditions. A welfare state would provide a practical system, halfway between the two.

The problem of distributing wealth might be seen from another angle. The whites are the "haves" in South African society; to a very large extent, they own the land and its wealth, and their property also serves as an instrument by which they perpetuate their dominance over the African. In other words, property is a political weapon used for the oppression of the African. Where the two moods of African nationalism agreed on the use of violence as a weapon in the race crisis, property would obviously be the first target to attack, largely for reasons given elsewhere in this study. But once this happened, the Communists would come in to press for the destruction of property on a vast scale to weaken capitalism. As capitalism and race oppression go hand in hand, the African nationalist would most probably find himself compelled to become an economic iconoclast, demolishing property in order to cripple the racialists. In doing this, of course, he would be playing the Communist game of destroying the wealth he would later need to give stability to his rule.

But then, the situation in South Africa is charged with explosive emotions, and people, unfortunately, do not adopt a rational attitude in every crisis. African nationalism would probably resist with difficulty the temptation to use violence to property as a weapon in the race fight. This would give it a vested interest in hating property on the white side. The average African would come to believe that property stands between him and economic security. After gaining political power, he would want to declare war on property, and his numbers would ensure

took power, they smashed the shock absorbers and plugged the safety valves; in their place, they set up a solid mental wall of unreason. No matter how reasonable African demands are, they stand no chance of being reasonably considered by the present government; what it prescribes, and only that, is to be accepted. And this, in turn, has created a climate in which most Africans regard policies of moderation as a waste of time, as an encouragement to apartheid. In this situation, the African regards the qualified franchise as a subtle process of getting the whites to gang up against him, with the aid of the more privileged nonwhite groups.

Statesmanship would give the vote to every citizen beyond a certain age and at the same time entrench in law a Bill of Rights to curb racialism from either side. Such a bill would protect the individual against power abuses, on the one hand, and, on the other, insure that the courts of law were also the courts of justice. The granting of the franchise on these terms would have the effect of encouraging African nationalism to abandon the agitatorial approach and to concentrate on using political power to improve the living conditions of the black people.

An aspect of the franchise debate that will become increasingly important in the years ahead might as well be given attention now. Although the ruling community always warns the African that he must earn his right to equal citizenship, there is no constitutional machinery by which to tell when an African is fit to vote. There are no legal conditions he has to satisfy in order to earn the franchise. In the absence of these, it becomes extremely difficult to understand precisely what the white man means when he talks of the African's earning citizenship rights. The real danger in this argument, however, is not in its vagueness, not in its dishonesty, but in its ignoring of the fact that as the African's capacity to influence events increases, while that of the whites diminishes, the white man, too, will have to earn the good will and trust of the African. It is about time serious attention was given to this fact, for both sides will have to give and take on a wider scale if black and white are to live together in Africa.

The extension of the area of political freedom would serve a limited purpose if it was unaccompanied by a corresponding extension of the area of economic contentment. Where the gulf between poverty and wealth has followed racial lines for generations, it would not be enough for the state merely to guarantee the individual the right to make better use of his life. The laws must insure that the wealth is distributed and shared equitably, since the extremes of undiluted capitalism and Communism are not suitable for South African conditions. A welfare state would provide a practical system, halfway between the two.

The problem of distributing wealth might be seen from another angle. The whites are the "haves" in South African society; to a very large extent, they own the land and its wealth, and their property also serves as an instrument by which they perpetuate their dominance over the African. In other words, property is a political weapon used for the oppression of the African. Where the two moods of African nationalism agreed on the use of violence as a weapon in the race crisis, property would obviously be the first target to attack, largely for reasons given elsewhere in this study. But once this happened, the Communists would come in to press for the destruction of property on a vast scale to weaken capitalism. As capitalism and race oppression go hand in hand, the African nationalist would most probably find himself compelled to become an economic iconoclast, demolishing property in order to cripple the racialists. In doing this, of course, he would be playing the Communist game of destroying the wealth he would later need to give stability to his rule.

But then, the situation in South Africa is charged with explosive emotions, and people, unfortunately, do not adopt a rational attitude in every crisis. African nationalism would probably resist with difficulty the temptation to use violence to property as a weapon in the race fight. This would give it a vested interest in hating property on the white side. The average African would come to believe that property stands between him and economic security. After gaining political power, he would want to declare war on property, and his numbers would ensure

that he had his way. The outcome would be a victory for Communist attitudes toward property—or a forceful seizure of it.

Statesmanship could steal a march on the Communists, however, by offering the African a vested interest in property. It could extend to him the right to buy land anywhere and to build on it and give him the assistance to do it. It could ensure that the African workers in the gold mines, in industry, and in commerce became shareholders. The worker who knew that he was one of the owners of the establishment that employed him would be interested in protecting the concern, not in destroying it, and property would no longer be a political and economic instrument for his oppression, but a form of wealth in his hands. On this plane, a solid and nonracial core of property owners would emerge to enhance African nationalism's sense of responsibility and weaken the Communist appeal. The worker and his boss would stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the concern in which they had similar interests. This is what is meant by co-ownership.

It would not be wholly improper to conclude a chapter in which guiding ideals are discussed with a slightly emotional note. For a long time, Afrikaner nationalism rode the wind, a conquering force. Then the wheel of history turned. African nationalism rose, and it is now riding the wind, a conquering force. But man was not created to be forever crushed between conquest and counterconquest. His rightful destiny is to make the best possible use of his life. The program outlined in this chapter is designed to enable him to start doing just that. It seeks to bring to an end the age of the conquerors from both sides of the color line and to usher in the era of collaboration by enabling man, in his black, brown, and white forms, to make better use of his life, by building a powerful and truly united nation out of all the peoples who have made South Africa their home.

19 • THE DANGER OF SWAMPING

RACIAL fears constitute an important ingredient in the average white South African's approach to the race problem. He supports apartheid in one form or another because it gives him security in employment, in politics, and in every other field of activity, because it guarantees that despite the paucity of his numbers he is in control of the country. If he were to share political power with the African, he would be swamped at the polls, black men would marry white girls, standards of performance at work would be lowered, and he would have to forego the comfort and the high standard of living he has won for himself. If he lost these, the next thing for him to do would be to quit. And that would be the end of him. To prevent this happening, he must concentrate all political power and economic initiatives in his hands. This, he believes, is his only guarantee of security.

He has, therefore, built high protective walls around himself to make certain that the African does not come anywhere near sharing political power with him. Not a single African today has the vote. Certain jobs are earmarked for people with a white skin, no matter what their qualifications or standards of efficiency. And the African is being systematically deprived of ownership rights to land he has owned in some cases for nearly a hundred years. Moreover, movement into and out of the urban areas is rigidly controlled; the security police work twenty-four hours

every day to keep a sharp eye on the activities of so-called agitators; and any determined demonstration against race oppression is suppressed with the bullet. True, a number of Afrikaner nationalists admit that the system they have imposed on the African is not just. But if they did not hold on to it, they argue, the sluice gates of vengeance would be opened, and the country would be drowned in a terrible blood bath. In other words, the race consciousness they have developed with such assiduity has now become a Frankenstein that holds its creators prisoners.

For these reasons, it is important that the factors against swamping from the African side should be outlined. In the last chapter, the federal principle was given as a guarantee of cultural survival, but here we shall consider those influences which militate against the type of disaster the Afrikaner nationalist fears.

Revolutions of the past have generally been guided by ideals or goals. When people rise up against a particular way of life, they are basically rejecting the principle on which it is based, for they cannot rise successfully if they are willing to accept the principle against which they revolt. Professor Keppel-Jones has said somewhere that revolutions are inspired by ideals that are the exact opposite of those against which people rise.

In South Africa, the ruling community is committed to the principle that the white man must remain master. The opposite of this may appear to be the doctrine that the black man must remain master. But it is not. Rather, it is that the individual must be the master. For the white man here is a group, and the real opposite of the group approach is the *individual* perspective.

When the first African converts to Christianity were baptized, more often than not their own people repudiated them. They were outcasts, with no right to call themselves by their family names, and their lives were often in danger. They often had to find refuge in mission stations, where they lived under the guidance of missionaries. In the Cape, where opinion was particularly harsh against the convert, the Christians were forced not only to give up their family names but refused any African names. Yet these men and women were so determined to guide their

lives by the new values that they took on Western names. That is how we come to have the Bams, Wauchopes, the Philips, etc. These are real African families with a long history of association with the Christian tradition.

The adoption of these names was an act of final repudiation of the group approach. Jabavu the elder could not be persuaded that the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912 was not perpetuating the group approach. The leaders of this assembly themselves were the products of the new tradition. Some, as has already been said, came directly from a refugee family which had been threatened with death for its acceptance of the white man's values of life. The revolution whose foundations these men laid saw men and events basically from the perspective of the individual.

In the years to follow, this tradition took deep root in the African community. It is not by accident that there has been so much tolerance from the African side or that so much emphasis has been laid on the realistic approach. These people were brought up on a tradition that respects the person of the individual, and over the years they have been translating this respect into the refusal to develop race hatred by way of an answer to white racialism. They feel that in their moral dimension they have something precious on which to build a better society. This awareness cushions them against every calamity from outside; nothing that apartheid is capable of doing will break their spirit.

In their political institutions, they have given expression to this awareness. In the fifty years since Union, not one important African political organization has pledged itself to throwing the white man into the sea. All of them, barring the ICU, which never sat down to work out a philosophy of struggle, evinced a strong humanistic bias. The result of this is that in spite of incredible provocation, the African in the South African republic is not angry. But he is indignant against race oppression; for him, apartheid is wicked, and he will know no rest until he has wiped it off the face of his country. Although he is determined to do this, he draws the distinction between the person of the

Afrikaner and the attitude of the Afrikaner. The person is sacred—so the religion of his ancestors taught; it cannot be changed. Attitudes, however, are things of the mind, acquired attributes, which can be changed once the right argument has been used.

In the half century following the establishment of the Union, his political behavior and policies were basically empirical because he drew the distinction between the person and the attribute. He respected the former even when he was indignant with the latter, and this led to his avoiding heroic short cuts that promised dramatic successes. It developed a sense of responsibility and a regard for realities that largely explains the fact that South Africa is a relatively peaceful country.

It is therefore difficult to see how a people whose culture is based on ideals opposed to racialism, whose history has been characterized by a strong, humanistic, and realistic bias, and whose outlook on life is inspired by a visible and powerful desire to create a better world can suddenly turn around, repudiate everything in their past, and see in race hatred the light that will lead them to their moment of fulfillment.

The white man in general and the Afrikaner nationalist in particular are in a different position. In their homes, schools, universities, the Afrikaans churches, the press, and Parliament, they are constantly bombarded with propaganda to the effect that the fear of the African is the beginning of political, economic, and social wisdom. Hatred and vengeance for them are their instinctive reactions in almost any situation similar to the African's. The latter, on the other hand, having been brought up in a wholly different atmosphere and tradition, sees men and events from an altogether different angle. The tragedy in the republic is that the white community—its press and politicians, in particular—does not know the African; it does not understand the motivating urges that stir deepest in his bosom. And it cannot when the chasm dividing the races is so deep and when there is no open exchange of ideas. As a result, it relies on ignorant generalizations and half-truths and uses these as the bases on

which to formulate its policies toward the African. It is hardly surprising that in this situation the whites expect the African to react as they do.

People whose humanity was denied, who were degraded for centuries as a matter of policy—which continent did not buy African slaves?—and yet survived did not have much of a choice. To defend their being and ensure their survival, their resistance had of necessity to be basically humanistic. Now, too, in the conflict between the racial and humanistic dynamics, the African does not have much of a choice: He has to take his stand on the side of humanism because it holds out better hopes of enabling him to make the best possible use of his life. The moral dimension is a spiritual instinct aroused by a historical experience, a historical habit of mind. It is the basic dynamic that moves him to his moment of fulfillment.

So when the African chooses race equality, he is choosing a route into the future that will allow of the enlargement of his personality. He is not taking up a tactical position to destroy the white man so that he can impose a black dictatorship. He is making a declaration of faith. As a matter of fact, in his march into the future the African does not think the white man in South Africa is terribly important for his survival—or so important that policies should be aimed at keeping a watch on the whites. Life is too vast and the opportunities too great to allow of time being wasted on hatreds that belong to the childhood days of the human race.

Other factors militate against swamping, the most important of which is the economic. In South Africa today, there is not a single African home that has not been integrated into the white man's economy in one way or the other. In the marshy hinterland around Ingwavuma and in northern Natal, where there are people who have never seen a white man or had a glimpse of a train on rails, paraffin and sugar are used, taxes have to be paid. As might be expected, the vast concentrations of population in the urban areas are completely dependent on the white man's economy, but to a very large extent, the people on

the reserves are also dependent on it—to say nothing of those on the farms. The advent of freedom will not transform these people overnight into a self-sufficient community; it will only bring them wider opportunities to make better use of their lives. While doing this, they will need money, food, and a roof beneath which to sleep. Therefore, in strict self-interest alone, they will be compelled to retain the good will of the white man—who has the technical skills, the know-how, for maintaining the nation in a healthy condition, producing food for the millions, creating wealth, and distributing it. He has been trained to do these things, but the African has not. If, after emancipation, the African tried silly tricks on the white man, the latter could reply by crippling the economy in ways that are too catastrophic to contemplate—for example, pack up and leave the country. Just that and nothing more, and the African would be in for very serious trouble. The good thing about the African nationalist in the republic, whether he belongs to the heroic or realistic school, is that he knows this truth only too well.

It would take time after the emancipation to carry out reconstruction programs. There would be the difficulties of adjusting to changed conditions—riots and strikes, for instance, the inevitable pains of birth into freedom. A stable economy would of course contribute considerably toward their curtailment; but in order to keep the economy stable, the African nationalist would be forced to collaborate with the white community in plans to distribute wealth equitably. If he did not, the Communists would be there to make things awkward for him. Thus, the harsh fact that emerges from this is that no matter how indignant the African is with the white man's present policies, he needs him for economic survival as desperately as the white needs the African and his good will for physical security.

The second factor against swamping is defense. In the event of another world war, say between the West and the Communist countries, both sides would strain every nerve to control the strategically important Cape, situated halfway on the main route

linking the East with the West. If South Africa chose to be neutral, she would need a very strong army to defend her neutral position and guard all her borders. But because that army could never be produced from the 3 million or so white citizens, she would have to draw very heavily for manpower upon the African community. And if she sided with the West, she would be in danger of direct attack from the Communists, and again she would need a powerful army to protect her boundaries. Whether or not war came, however, South Africa already has a Communist problem. After independence, it would be magnified and would present awkward challenges in its bid to force the African government to surrender the country to control by Moscow. The only effective answer to that challenge would be the coordination of black and white initiatives in the defense of liberty.

The third factor to bear in mind is that the African wants to take over the country as a going concern, not as a shambles. It is in his interest to ensure that neither his goals nor his methods upset the delicate balances that preserve peace between the races. Taking over in this context means that the moment the vote is given to every African, the center of political gravity will shift from the white side to the African. The disparity in numbers alone will move events in this direction.

Finally, world opinion has shown very clearly that it dislikes race oppression intensely. In the United Nations today, South Africa stands virtually alone in the defense of white supremacy. Her virtual expulsion from the Commonwealth indicates that even within this family of nations, which still has its Notting Hills and Naga problems, race oppression is strongly disapproved. This attitude is not taken up because the culprits are white, since mankind will pronounce equally severely against African racialists. A complicating factor for the African rulers of South Africa, if they became racialistic, would be that they would need to do trade with the West—certainly to a fair degree. Since they would most probably need skilled manpower, machine tools,

loans, and capital, it is difficult to see the West rushing to supply these commodities to places where the whites were being oppressed.

The unfortunate events in the Congo are hurled at the advocates of a wider area of liberty in South Africa to justify the fears of swamping on the white side. The first answer to this is that the real cause of explosions like the ones in the Congo and Angola is the restriction of the area of liberty and the narrowing down of the opportunities for the individual to make better use of his life. In other words, oppression bears so heavily upon people that in the end they make desperate bids to break the shackles which tie them to slavery.

But the real point to be made here is that the critics of the advocates of freedom for all miss one very vital fact about South Africa. There is a basic difference between the Africans of the republic and those of the Congo: The latter do not have as long a history and experience of contact between black and white as the former. Integration has not taken place on as vast an area in the lives of the Congolese. In three hundred years, black and white have affected each other so deeply that traditions and attitudes uniquely South African have grown and developed.

One visible result of this is that the Africans have developed their nationalism and allowed it deliberately to grow along two parallel lines. The other is that about fifty years ago the various African communities met at Bloemfontein, where they declared war on tribalism. They decided to emerge as a new people in history, with a new purpose in life and a new cultural pattern. The program adopted by the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in 1958 incorporated principles which the Africans of the Union had accepted in 1912. One outcome of this was that a tradition of nonracial collaboration had developed which was practically without a parallel in sub-Saharan Africa. The other was that a tradition of struggle had developed which was based on a deep-seated respect for realities. The relatively little blood

shed in the freedom struggle arises from the sense of realism developed over the centuries.

The point can never be emphasized too often that the series of compromises which made African unity possible in 1912 continue to be a moderating influence and will remain so for some time to come. By the time they lose their potency, the Africans and the whites will have learned what Professor Leonard Thompson, formerly of Rhodes University, used to call "the habit of collaboration."

The oppression of the whites could very well boomerang on African nationalism. The attack by one group on any other could widen the fissions that always exist in all the communities of the republic. Even the Indian community, which is the smallest, has its bitter feuds and delicate problems. On the African side, there are few things which are dreaded in the way the disruption of unity is. The feeling is that race consciousness against the whites might ultimately, when it has broken white resistance, become a Frankenstein that would set the Xosas against the Sutu and the Sutu against the Zulus. The result would be that the work of the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912 would be undone, and the sacrifices of half a century trying to build a new people would have been in vain.

Neither individuals nor nations commit themselves to a way of life for the fun of destroying themselves. They take particular courses into the future in response to particular compulsions. The African has not rejected racialism in favor of equality out of a sentimental and naïve regard for the white skin. Born into humiliation, he finds a realistic attitude a necessity for him. If he thought in terms of swamping, he would keep the whites a solid bloc for the longest time possible, for each time he has cracked their unity, it has occurred when he staged powerful, peaceful demonstrations against race oppression. If he became racialistic, he would unify them and justify the use of military power against his defenseless women and children. The state would then be given the chance to scatter the various groups,

ultimately destroy every trace of the unity agreed upon in 1912, and reduce the African people to a position of absolute impotency. Apartheid would be given a new lease on a virtually trouble-free life.

Finally, in this list of reasons that militate against swamping is the fact that there is no room for race hatred in African culture. As pointed out elsewhere in this study, the religion of the Sutu-nguni group (before the advent of the white man) revered the individual as the incarnation of a future ancestral spirit. The white man's conquest of the African was not so complete that it made the latter abandon everything precious in his culture: He adhered to his regard for the human personality. Even when he was crushed by white racialism, he was, because of his numbers, never driven to that point of desperation where he could see salvation only from the perspective of race. The African can claim, in all fairness, that he does not have a tradition of race hatred. It has never been a potent ingredient in his history or culture. And then, of course, the African has always had alternative weapons to fight race oppression: The buying of time to build up power reserves forced the republic out of the Commonwealth, and the isolation of white South Africa has led to humiliating defeats at the United Nations. Although the internal use of nonviolent resistance has not brought about the repeal of oppressive laws, it has certainly split the white community from time to time. The result has been the emergence of a climate of opinion that has put apartheid on the defensive almost on every plane. The serious and almost dramatic modification of the liquor laws is not an act of Afrikaner magnanimity; it is a realistic bowing to irresistible pressures, the result of fifty years of planning and adapting strategy to the demands of a complex situation.

No effort is made here to deny that powerful islands of anti-white feeling exist in South Africa. It would be most abnormal if they did not. Since the hatred of the Afrikaner nationalist burns with a fierceness that has to be seen to be believed, a reaction was bound to occur. One only has to come in contact with the police—or, better still, to be jailed and thus be left in their power—to

realize how deep-seated, vicious, and depraved this hatred is. It is impossible for a human being to go inside a South African jail for nonwhites and walk out of it the same person: Each experience with the police is an adventure into hatred.

The remarkable thing is, however, that in spite of it all there are still only islands of antiwhiteism. It is true that under the pressure of apartheid they are widening and might develop into a new political tradition in South Africa.

When all these things have been taken into account, the area of tolerance still remains sufficiently wide to justify bold and positive experiments to extend the area of liberty. The possibility is greater that the majority of the African people will want to busy themselves more with improving their lot, or adapting themselves to the demands of the changed situation, than with wasting their time emulating the race-hating advocates of apartheid. This advantage will not be there indefinitely. A new era of turbulence is opening, and nobody can say how it will affect South Africa. One can, however, be certain about one thing—speed and effective action can still stop bloodshed in South Africa.